Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
January 19, 1989
Information Notice No. 89-05: USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY GUARDS PROTECTING
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL
SABOTAGE
Addressees:
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose:
This information notice is being provided to present NRC responses to
questions raised during safeguards inspections and discussions with licensees
concerning use of deadly force by guards protecting nuclear power reactors
against radio-logical sabotage. The information provided in this notice does
not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
During recent inspections and discussions with the NRC staff, some licensees
expressed reservations about their authority to use deadly force to protect
nuclear power reactors. The NRC considers use of deadly force justifiable
in protecting nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage in circum-
stances under which a guard could reasonably believe that the use of deadly
force is necessary to counter an immediate threat of death or severe bodily
injury to self, to others in the facility, or to members of the public. This
is already embodied in NRC regulation 10 CFR 73.55(h)(5), which requires
licensees to "instruct every guard and all armed response personnel to prevent
or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force suf-
ficient to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force
when the guard or other armed response person has a reasonable belief it is
necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others."
Discussion:
The staff considers use of deadly force justifiable in protecting nuclear
power reactors against sabotage if there is reasonable belief that an act
of radiological sabotage will be perpetrated unless deadly force is used
to prevent it. Radiological sabotage as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(p) means
any "deliberate act" directed against a plant or against a component of
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January 19, 1989
Page 2 of 3
a plant, that "could directly or indirectly endanger the public health
and safety by exposure to radiation." At nuclear power reactors, the
principal focus of safeguards is to protect against deliberate acts that
could result in sub-stantial meltdown of the core. Components of a plant
that must be protected are those considered "vital equipment," defined in
10 CFR 73.2(i) as "any equipment, system, device, or material the failure,
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the
public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Equipment or systems
which would be required to function to protect public health and safety
following such failure, destruction, or release are also considered to
be vital."
Some situations and circumstances that could justify the use of deadly force
in protecting nuclear power reactors are as follows:
(1) Defending Against Violent Armed Assault
Use of deadly force could be justified in defending a power reactor
against a determined violent armed assault.
(2) Defending Against Armed Attack By Stealth
Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting
armed intruders who have penetrated the protected area and are at-
tempting to break into an area containing vital equipment, ignoring
defenders' challenges and warnings to stop.
(3) Defending Against Attackers Employing Explosives
and/or Incendiaries
Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting
intruders placing explosives or incendiary devices near vital
equipment if the intruders ignore defenders' warnings to stop.
(4) Defending Against Perceived Armed Attack
Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting
heavily armed intruders who enter the protected area ignoring
challenges and warnings.
Under these and similar conditions, facility guards do not have to abandon
cover and concealment or their defensive positions, or wait for the ad-
versaries to fire the first shot. Such actions may expose the guards to
casualties and jeopardize their ability to defeat or contain the attacking
forces.
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January 19, 1989
Page 3 of 3
No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the
appropriate regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact: Nancy Ervin, NRR
(301) 492-0946
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notice
. Attachment
IN 89-05
January 19, 1989
Page 1 of 1
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No._____Subject_______________________Issuance_______Issued to________
89-04 Potential Problems from 1/17/89 All holders of OLs
the Use of Space Heaters or CPs for nuclear
power reactors and
test and research
reactors.
89-03 Potential Electrical 1/11/89 All fuel cycle and
Equipment Problems major nuclear
materials
licensees.
89-02 Criminal Prosecution of 1/9/89 All holders of a
Licensee's Former President U.S. NRC specific
for Intentional Safety license.
Violations
88-23, Potential for Gas Binding 1/5/89 All holders of OLs
Supp. 1 of High-Pressure Safety or CPs for PWRs.
Injection Pumps During a
Loss-of-Coolant Accident
89-01 Valve Body Erosion 1/4/89 All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
88-46, Licensee Report of Defective 12/30/88 All holders of OLs
Supp. 2 Refurbished Circuit Breakers or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
88-101 Shipment of Contaminated 12/28/88 All holders of OLs
Equipment between Nuclear or CPs for nuclear
Power Stations power reactors.
88-100 Memorandum of Understanding 12/23/88 All major nuclear
between NRC and OSHA materials licensees
Relating to NRC-licensed and utilities
Facilities (53 FR 43950, holding CPs and
October 31, 1988) OLs.
88-99 Detection and Monitoring 12/20/88 All holders of OLs
of Sudden and/or Rapidly or CPs for PWRs.
Increasing Primary-to-
Secondary Leakage
_____________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
..
