Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
SSINS No. : 6835
IN 85-56
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
July 15, 1985
Information Notice No. 85-56: INADEQUATE ENVIRONMENT CONTROL FOR
COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS IN EXTENDED
STORAGE OR LAYUP
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to problems
which can occur if equipment is improperly stored or laid up during
construction or extended plant outages. Addressees also are reminded that
programs for proper storage and preservation of materials and components are
required by NRC regulations (10 CFR 50, Appendix B), even though not
specifically addressed as license conditions. It is expected that recipients
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and
consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at
their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice
do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
Licensee event reports, 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports, and NRC inspection reports
contain many instances where materials and components have been seriously
degraded due to improper storage, protection, or lay up, both at facilities
under construction and facilities with operating licenses. A number of
representative examples are described in the following paragraphs.
A recent NRC inspection at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 disclosed that the cooling
water heat exchanger for the high pressure core spray diesel generator had
water standing irk the tube side of the unit. The heat exchanger had been
delivered to the site and had been "stored in place" in 1977, but was not
yet in service. The source of the water is unknown, but it has been
hypothesized that the heat exchanger had been inadequately drained after a
manufacturer's hydro-test in 1976. The site construction organization had no
program for inspection or surveillance of equipment in storage. Significant
corrosion damage was observed on the copper alloy tubes and the carbon steel
tube sheets and water boxes.
8507110108
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IN 85-56
July 15, 1985
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Corrosion damage similar to that described above was found during an NRC
inspection at Hope Creek. In that instance, the two heat exchangers were
supplied for the engine cooling system for the plant emergency diesel
generators. The heat exchangers had been received onsite sometime before,
and stored in place. They had not yet been placed in service.
In November 1984 the licensee for H. B. Robinson Unit 2 notified the NRC
that, while preparing for restart after a 10 month outage, numerous pinhole
leaks had been detected in the stainless steel service water piping. Further
examination of the piping disclosed other corrosion pits that had not
penetrated through the wall. Temporary repairs were accomplished by the use
of about 800 welded sleeves. The licensee has submitted plans for future
complete replacement of the affected pipe. The corrosion has been attributed
to microbiological growth in the stagnant water that was in the system
during the extended outage. Proper layup of the system could have precluded
damage. Information Notice No. 85-30 provides additional information on this
phenomenon.
At Palo Verde, the licensee reported in June 1984 that corrosion attack had
been found on internal surfaces of two Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pumps. The
pumps had not been operated. In December 1984, the licensee reported that
the corrosion had been caused by contaminated water inadvertently left in
the pumps after prestartup flushing of the system.
Discussion:
The cases cited above are a small sample of the wide variety of instances
where improper storage or layup has resulted in significant damage and
extended plant outages. Many of the events are related to balance-of-plant
equipment and are not reportable to the NRC. They do, however, often cause
extended outages. The Robinson service water piping damage extended the
plant outage for 4 months, and additional down time will be required in the
future to install the replacement pipe.
At Palo Verde, it required extensive work and 6 months time to finally
resolve that the pumps were still serviceable.
10 CFR 50.34(a)(7) requires that each applicant for a construction permit
shall provide a description of the quality assurance program to be applied
to the construction of the facility, in accordance with the requirements of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B. 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii) requires a description of how
the requirements of Appendix B will be satisfied during the operation of
each nuclear power facility. Among the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion
XIII addresses storage, cleaning, and preservation of materials and
equipment.
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IN 85-56
July 15, 1985
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No specific action or written response to this information notice is
required. If you need additional information about this matter, please
contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or
this office.
Edward L. Jordan Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: J. B. Henderson, IE
492-9654
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
