ADJUDICATORY ISSUE

(Information)

<u>June 3, 2002</u> <u>SECY-02-0099</u>

FOR: The Commission

FROM: John F. Cordes, Jr. /R/

Solicitor

SUBJECT: LITIGATION REPORT - 2002 - 01

State of Nevada v. NRC, No. 02-1116 (D.C. Cir., filed April 11, 2002)

The State of Nevada (joined by Clark County, Nevada, and the City of Las Vegas) filed this petition for judicial review. It challenges 10 C.F.R. Part 63, a rule the NRC issued last November that established criteria and requirements for licensing the proposed Yucca Mountain repository for high-level radioactive waste. Petitioners apparently intend to argue that Part 63 violates the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in various respects.

Joined by the Justice Department (representing the United States), we recently filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. Petitioners filed suit more than five months after the NRC's issuance of Part 63. Our position is that petitioners' suit falls under the Hobbs Act, which has a 60-day deadline for petitions for review. Petitioners invoke the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which has a 180-day judicial review period. Our motion argues, however, that the NRC issued Part 63 under the Atomic Energy Act, not the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

The court of appeals likely will act on the motion later this summer.

CONTACT: John F. Cordes

415-1956

Steven F. Crockett

415-1622

Sarrion v. NRC, No. 02 Civ. 2474 (LMM) (S.D.M.Y., filed April 1, 2002)

This lawsuit sought issuance of NRC rule requiring anti-aircraft defenses at the Indian Point power reactors in New York and at other reactor sites nationwide. Plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Defense has available "electronic shield" technology that would "obliterate" aerial threats to nuclear facilities before a "destructive result" took place.

Acting through the United States Attorney's office in New York, we informed plaintiffs' lawyer that federal courts of appeals, not federal district courts, have jurisdiction to review NRC rulemaking action (or inaction). We also informed plaintiffs' lawyer that the NRC has in place a petitioning process that allows citizens to bring their concerns to the NRC's attention without going to court prematurely.

Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their lawsuit voluntarily.

CONTACT: Grace H. Kim 415-3605

Center for Biological Diversity v. Abraham, No. 02-0027 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 2, 2002)

A group of environmental organizations brought this lawsuit against nearly every government agency, including the NRC. Plaintiffs seek to enforce a requirement in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 that a certain percentage of federal agency vehicles be "alternative fuel vehicles." As a small agency, the NRC has minimal, if any, responsibilities under the Act. We are working with the Department of Justice on the case and are providing the necessary background facts and law applicable to our agency.

CONTACT: Marjorie S. Nordlinger 415-1616

AC 440 (Rev. 10/93) Summons in a Civil Action

United States Bistrict Court

SOUTHERN

- DISTRICT OF .

NEW YORK

LISA SARRION and LUIS F. LOZANO,

Plaintiffs.

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL CASE

V.

CASE NUMBER:

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, RICHARD A. MERSERVE, Chairman, GRETA JOY DICUS, NILS J. DIAZ, EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN, JR., AND S. MERRIFIELD, Commissioner

Defendants. TO: (Name and address of defendant)

> U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION No. 1. White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to serve upon PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (name and address)

STUART JAY YOUNG, Esq. 65-08 Austin Street Rego Park, New York 11374 JAMES B. COMEY U.S. ATTORNEY, SDNY

an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within <u>Sixty (60)</u> service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service, If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You must also file your answer with the Clerk of this Court within a reasonable period of time after service.

M. FARKISON

CLERK

(8Y) DEPUTY CLERK


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LISA SARRION and LUIS F. LOZANO.

02 CV

2474

Plaintiffs,



-against-

Dkt. No 02 CV

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, RICHARD A MERSERVE.. Chairman, GRETA JOY DICUS, NILS J. DIAZ. EDWARD McGAFFIGAN, JR., and JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, COMMISSIONERS.

Defendants.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT IN THE NATURE OF A MANDAMUS PURSUANT 28 U.S.C. § 1361

Plaintiffs by their counsel, STUART JAY YOUNG, Esq. do hereby show and allege to this Court as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. Jurisdiction arises and obtains under and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1361, a federal statute vesting in U.S. District Courts original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or an agency thereof to perform a duty mandated by law.

PARTIES

2. At all times herein mentioned LISA SARRION and LUIS F. LOZANO were and are natural persons, are United States citizens respectively currently having an office or place of business in and residing in the County of Westchester, State of New York and residing within a radius of about forty-five miles of the town of Buchanan. New York within the County of Westchester. State of New York.

- 3. At all times herein mentioned defendant UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ("COMMISSION") was and is a duly and lawfully constituted agency of the Executive Branch of the federal government, having its office and headquarters at No. One White Flint North. 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.
- 4. At all times herein mentioned the defendants, RICHARD A. MERSERVE,, as Chairman, GRETA JOY DICUS, NILS J. DIAZ, EDWARD McGAFFIGAN, JR., and JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, were and are duly and lawfully appointed respectively as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMMISSION ("COMMISSIONERS").
- 5. At all times herein mentioned two nuclear power plants were and are in operation at or near the Town of Buchanan, County of Westchester, State of New York, ("Indian Point").
- 6. Upon information and belief, the nuclear power plants at Indian Point are owned and/or operated by ENTERGY, a corporation duly licensed and authorized to operate the Indian Point nuclear power plants in the State of New York.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

- 7. Upon information and belief the defendant COMMISSION is headed by five Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-years terms. One of them is designated by the President to be the Chairman and official spokesperson of the Commission.
- 8. Upon information and belief the COMMISSION'S statutory function is set forth in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and *inter alia*, is charged with regulating the operation of the 104 nuclear power plants currently in operation throughout the United States in a manner consistent with the safety of its citizens including the plaintiffs. The COMMISSION is a collegial body and formulates policies, develops regulations governing nuclear reactor and nuclear material safety, issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates legal matters. The COMMISSIONERS are charged with the implementation and enforcement of such regulations pursuant to that end.

- 9. Since the advent of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attack upon the World Trade Center in New York City, it has become evident from a series of newspaper and television news releases that the federal intelligence community has learned that United States as a nation is under further threat of imminent attack by terrorists and that a series of increasingly deadly and devastating terrorist attacks on specific United States national targets are intended by a worldwide terrorist network. These targets include essential facilities such as bridges, tunnels, dams, water supply systems, high profile buildings and particularly nuclear power plants.
- 10. Upon information and belief a successful terrorist aerial attack upon a nuclear power plant such as those at Indian Point as hereinbefore alleged, has the potential for releasing deadly radiation with the probability of causing tens of thousands of deaths from radiation sickness and rendering extensive territories of this nation uninhabitable for perhaps hundreds of years. The destructive impact of such an attack upon this nation would by comparison dwarf the devastating effect of the World Trade Center attack.
- 11. Upon information and belief that in the event of such a successful aerial attack upon a nuclear power plant, the release of deadly radiation as alleged aforesaid would have the potential for causing the death of the plaintiffs and/or their serious and permanent sickness and disability together with the permanent loss of their habitation and place of business.
- 12. Accordingly, to increase security and protection against such a foregoing disaster and correspondingly to decrease the potential of its occurrence there is an urgent, immediate need for constant, continuous, minute by minute, round the clock, seamless aerial surveillance combined with ability to interdict and prevent aerial attack upon the Indian Point nuclear plants in particular and other nuclear power plants nationwide so as to prevent actual impact by an aerial intruder with the nuclear plant structure.
- 13. Upon information and belief the Department of Defense has had available to it suitable technology to protect and insulate targets from aerial attack by generating an electronic "shield", "sensory field" or "bubble" to create a "no-fly zone" over potential targets so that an aerial intruder intending to penetrate such a "no-fly zone" would trigger an Surface To Air (SAM) missile retaliatory response which would effectively obliterate

an Surface To Air (SAM) missile retaliatory response which would effectively obliterate the threat before such intruder could intercept its target, thus preventing the intended destructive result.

- 14. Upon information and belief, notwithstanding the availability of the foregoing technology and perhaps of even more advanced, sophisticated technology now available and suitable to such purpose, no such technology has as yet been installed to protect nuclear facilities generally and the Indian Point nuclear plants in particular from what should long have been (and is now) evident to be a grave threat to the continued existence of this nation, nor have regulations requiring such installation been promulgated by the COMMISSION.
- 15. Given the national alert now in effect warning of the imminent probability of terrorist attacks and the tragic example of the World Trade Center aerial attack, the foregoing measures when required by COMMISSION regulations and implemented by nuclear plant licensees and/or appropriate federal agencies would constitute reasonable, appropriate and necessary measures incident to the COMMISSION'S legal responsibilities to insure the safe and secure operation of the Indian Point nuclear plants in the context of our government's war on terrorism. Correspondingly, the COMMISSION'S failure or refusal to adopt such regulations and to require their compliance would be entirely unreasonable and in violation of its statutorily mandated responsibilities—and thus the failure to promulgate such regulations would be unlawful.
- 16. Indeed the continued failure or refusal to promulgate such regulations directing nuclear plant licensees and/or other appropriate federal agencies to do so can only be viewed as a dangerous, impermissible and irresponsible abdication of the COMMISSION'S statutory governmental mandate to protect this nation's citizenry from radiation leaks ensuing from aerial attacks upon nuclear power plants.
- 17. Upon information and belief the foreseeable consequence of the COMMISSION'S continued failure forthwith to require the installation of this type of technology or of such other available, similar or superior technology to shield nuclear plants from aerial attack will be to expose plaintiffs and indeed thousands of other persons similarly situated to nothing less than an agonizing death in the event of a successful terrorist attack upon the nuclear power plants at Indian Point (Buchanan, New

York). Furthermore, in such event vast tracts of New York State including New York City will likely be rendered virtually permanently uninhabitable as would vast territories of other States from attacks on nuclear power plants nationwide, causing political, economic and social crises and chaos of such magnitude as to threaten the very existence of this nation and leaving its very survival in doubt.

WHEREFORE it is respectfully requested that this Court forthwith make and enter an Order/Judgment/Decree pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361

- A. Directing the COMMISSION and the COMMISSIONERS forthwith to promulgate and enforce suitable regulations directing the installation with all deliberate speed of appropriate technology herein described as well as other available technology suitable to protect the nuclear power plants at Buchanan, New York in particular and all nuclear power plants nationwide in general from terrorist aerial attack, and
- B. For such other, further and different relief as to this Court may seem just and appropriate in the premises.

DATED: Rego Park, New York March 16th, 2002

TO:

STUART JAY YOUNG (SJY3958

Attorney for Plaintiffs
Office and P.O. Address
65-08 Austin Street
Rego Park, New York 11374
Tel. No. 1(718) 459-6601

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
RICHARD A. MERSERVE,, Chairman,
GRETA JOY DICUS, Commissioner
NILS J. DIAZ, Commissioner
EDWARD McGAFFIGAN, JR., Commissioner
JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, Commissioner
No. One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.

VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK			•
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER)			
Plaintiff in the within action; I have a know the contents thereof and the same the matters therein stated to be alleged matters I believe it to be true. The groupon my own knowledge are: stat documents.	e is true l on info	to my own kno rmation and be	wledge, except as to Elief, and as to those
Subscribed and sworn to before me this	97th.	ar years -	
day of March, 2002	<u> </u>	No.	**
Notate Public, State of New York		©richter Oermu (j	200 3
STATE OF NEW YORK			
COUNTY OF WEST CHESTER)			
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File No. 02 CV

Year 2002

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LISA SARRION and LUIS F. LOZANO,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR AN ORDER/JUDGMENT/DECREE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1361

Law Offices Of STUART JAY YOUNG

Attorney for

Plaintiffs

65-08 Austin Street Rego Park, N.Y. 11374

Tel. (718) 459-6601

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, the undersigned, an attorney admitted to practice in the courts of New York State, certifies that, upon information and belief and reasonable inquiry, the contentions contained in the annexed document are not frivolous.

Dated ... March 22nd, 2002.

Print Signer's Name...STUART JAY YOUNG......

Service of a copy of the within

Daied:

is hereby admitted.

Allorney(s) for

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE

Notice of [] that the within is a (certified) true copy of an

Entry

entered in the office of the clerk of the within named Court on

Altorney for

Notice of [] that an Order of which the within is a true copy will be presented for settlement to the Settlement

Hon

a

one of the judges of the within named Court

on

, al

М.

Dated ... March 22nd, 2002

Law Offices Of STUART JAY YOUNG Plaintiffs

65-08 Austin Street Rego Park, NY 11374

Tel. (718) 459-6601

TO United States Attorneys Office. Southern District of New York Attorney for Defendants. No. 1 St. Andrews Plaza, New York, NY 10007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. One White Filmt North,

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.

Cordes

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

STATE OF NEVADA, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, and CITY OF LAS VEGAS, NEVADA,)))	
Petitioners,)	
v.)	Case No. 02-/// (-
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,))	
Respondent,)	
)	
	_)	

PETITION FOR REVIEW

The State of Nevada, Clark County, Nevada, and the City of Las Vegas, Nevada hereby petition the Court for review of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC") rule entitled Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 10 C.F.R. Part 63 ("Part 63"). Part 63 is a final rule of the NRC, and it was published in the Federal Register, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732-55,816, on November 2, 2001. The rule is unlawful and in violation of, inter alia, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. 42 U.S.C. §10101, et seq.

This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Review pursuant to Section 119 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §10139.

WHEREFORE, the State of Nevada, Clark County, Nevada, and the City of Las Vegas, Nevada respectfully requests that the Court, <u>inter alia</u>:

- (1) Grant this Petition for Review;
- (2) Declare that Part 63 is inconsistent with applicable law; and
- (3) Direct the NRC to reissue Part 63 to make it consistent with the NWPA, other applicable laws, and this Court's findings.

Respectfully submitted,

Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General Marta A. Adams,* Sr. Deputy Attorney General STATE OF NEVADA 100 North Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701 (775) 684-1237 TEL (775) 684-1108 FAX

Elizabeth A. Vibert, Deputy District Attorney CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 500 South Grand Central Parkway Las Vegas, NV 89106 (702) 455-4761 TEL (702) 382-5178 FAX

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William P. Henry, Senior Litigation Counsel
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Special Deputy Attorney General
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(703) 918-4943 FAX

Charles J. Cooper*
Robert J. Cynkar*
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William H. Briggs, Jr.*
ROSS, DIXON & BELL, L.L.P.
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Washington, D.C. 20006-1040
(202) 662-2063 TEL
(202) 662-2190 FAX

Joseph R. Egan*
Counsel of Record
Attorneys for Petitioners the State of Nevada, Clark
County, Nevada, and the City of Las Vegas, Nevada

* Member, D.C. Circuit Bar

DATED: April 11, 2002

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served this 11th day of April, 2002 <u>via Certified U.S. Mail</u> upon the following:

Annette L. Vietti-Cook
Secretary of the Commission
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Room 16 H3, Mail Stop 16 C!
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
301-415-1969

Karen D. Cyr General Counsel United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Room 16 H3, Mail Stop 16C1 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 301-415-1743

The Honorable John Ashcroft Attorney General of the United States U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr. United States Attorney U.S. Attorney's Office District of Columbia Judiciary Center 555 Fourth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530

John C. Brown

1 James J. Tutchton (CA Bar No. 150908) Julie A. Teel (CA Bar No. 202282) 2 | Earthjustice Environmental Law Clinic University of Denver-Forbes House 3 1714 Poplar Street Denver, CO 80220 Telephone: (303) 871-6034 Facsimile: (303) 871-6991 5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 9 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL 10 DIVERSITY, BLUEWATER NETWORK, and 17 SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiffs, 12 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND 1.3 v. DECLARATORY RELIEF 14 | SPENCER ABRAHAM, in his official capacity as Secretary CCP7 15 of the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 16 DONALD L. EVANS, in his official capacity as Secretary 17 of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 18 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DONALD H. RUMSFELD, in his 19 official in his official capacity as Secretary of the 20 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 21 GALE A. NORTON, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of the 23 Interior, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 24

Complaint For Declaratory & Injunctive Relief

- 1 | INTERIOR, JOHN ASHCROFT, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STEPHEN A. PERRY, in his 4 official capacity as Administrator of the U.S. General Services Administration, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS. NORMAN Y. MINETA, in his 10 official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation,
- 12 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
- 13 | RICHARD A. MESERVE, in his official capacity as Chairman
- 14 of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 15 COMMISSION,
- CHRISTINE T. WHITMAN, in her official capacity as the
- Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection
- Agency, 18 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
- AGENCY, 19 ANN M. VENEMAN, in her official
- capacity as Secretary of the 20 U.S. Department of Agriculture,
- U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TOMMY G. THOMPSON, in his
- official capacity as Secretary 22 of the U.S. Department of
- Health & Human Resources, 23 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &

24 Complaint For Declaratory & Injunctive Relief

	HUMAN SERVICES,	
	MEL R. MARTINEZ, in his	
2	official capacity as Secretary	
1	of the U.S. Department of	
3	Housing and Urban Development,	
- 1	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND	
4	URBAN DEVELOPMENT,	
	ELAINE L. CHAO, in her official	
5	capacity as Secretary of the	
	U.S. Department of Labor,	
6	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,	
	COLIN L. POWELL, in his	
7	official capacity as Secretary	
	of the U.S. Department of	
8	State,	
	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,	•
9	PAUL H. O'NEILL, in his	
	official capacity as Secretary	•
10	of the U.S. Department of	•
	Treasury,	> ,
11	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,	
	DANIEL R. MULVILLE, in his	
12	official capacity as Acting	
	Administrator of the National	
13	Aeronautics and Space	**
	Administration,	
14	NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE	
	ADMINISTRATION,	•
15	JOHN E. POTTER, in his official	
	capacity as Postmaster General	
16		
	U.S. POSTAL SERVICE,	
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	Defendants.	
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24	Complaint For Declaratory	
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INTRODUCTION

- 1. In signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992 into law, former president George H.W. Bush stated "[m]y action today will place America upon a clear path toward a more prosperous, energy efficient, environmentally sensitive, and economically secure future." His hope was short-lived. America strayed far from the "clear path" toward an environmentally sensitive and energy efficient future because the federal government failed to implement the Energy Policy Act.
- 2. This action seeks to compel the federal Defendants to comply with Energy Policy Act requirements that Congress designed to achieve cleaner air, strengthen energy security, and establish a nationwide alternative fuels infrastructure.
- 3. First, this action seeks to compel all Defendants, with the exception of the U.S. Department of Energy, to comply with the Energy Policy Act's requirement that if an agency buys vehicles covered by the Act, a certain percentage of those vehicles must be alternative fuel vehicles ("AFVs").
- 4. Second, this action seeks to compel all Defendants to comply with the Energy Policy Act's requirement that they place their annual AFV fleet percentage compliance reports on a publicly available website, the location of which must be provided to the public in the Federal Register.

Complaint For Declaratory & Injunctive Relief

5. Third, this action seeks to compel the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy to comply with the Energy Policy Act's requirement that the Department of Energy determine, according to specified procedures, deadlines, and standards, whether a private and municipal fleet requirement program is necessary to achieve the goals of the Energy Policy Act.

JURISDICTION

- 6. The Court has jurisdiction over this action to compel the performance of non-discretionary duties by the Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (Administrative Procedure Act). The relief requested is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202 (declaratory and injunctive relief).
- 7. Defendants have not remedied their violations of the Energy Policy Act. There exists an actual controversy between the parties within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (declaratory judgments).

VENUE AND INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1391(e) because Plaintiffs maintain offices in the Northern

District of California, many of Plaintiffs' members reside in the

Northern District, and a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claims occur in the Northern District.

- floods and drought. Additionally, Plaintiffs' members are already and will continue to be adversely affected by the impacts of oil exploration and development in sensitive wildlife areas due to the increasing demand for petroleum oil.
- 16. The acts and omissions of Defendants alleged in this complaint related to AFV procurement cause injury to Plaintiffs' members and staff by contributing to global warming, prolonging air quality conditions that adversely affect Plaintiffs' health, welfare, and environment, compounding the need for petroleum oil exploration and development in sensitive wildlife areas in the U.S. and abroad, and nullifying measures mandated by the Energy Policy Act to protect their health, welfare, and environment.
- 17. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' members and staff derive scientific, recreational, health, conservation, spiritual, and aesthetic benefits from the preservation and protection of threatened and endangered species, which are adversely impacted by vehicle emissions. The decline of many species, such as California's mountain yellow-legged frog and other imperiled amphibian species, are associated with air pollution. The health, recreational, aesthetic, and environmental interests of the Plaintiffs' staff and members have been and continue to be adversely affected by the acts and omissions of Defendants alleged

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- 1 | in this complaint. Granting the requested relief would redress the injuries described above.
 - The acts and omissions of all Defendants alleged herein related to their refusal to publish AFV compliance reports on a publicly accessible website and notify the public of their location and availability through the Federal Register as required by the Energy Policy Act deprive Plaintiffs' members and staff of information guaranteed to the public by the Energy Policy Act. Plaintiffs' members and staff are adversely affected by Defendants' failure to publish this guaranteed information.
 - 19. If Plaintiffs' staff and members had this information, they would use it to educate the public about air pollution, alternative fuels, and AFVs, and to advocate for the adoption of measures by the government for attaining and maintaining compliance with the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. Defendants' failure to produce this information as required by the Act deprives the Plaintiffs' staff and members of these benefits and thus causes them injury. Granting the requested relief would redress the injuries described above.
 - The acts and omissions of Defendant Department of Energy alleged in this complaint deprive the Plaintiffs' members and staff of procedural rights and protections to which they would otherwise be entitled, including, but not limited to, the right to comment on

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the overdue proposed rule to determine whether a private and municipal fleet requirement is necessary to achieve the Energy Policy Act's goals. The Department of Energy's failure to timely determine whether a private and municipal fleet requirement is necessary in order to achieve the goals of the Act has the same effect as a decision that such a requirement is not necessary, without providing Plaintiffs' and their members with the right they would otherwise have to comment on the overdue proposed rule and challenge the final rule in court. Plaintiffs' members and staff have been, are being, and unless the relief requested is granted, will continue to be adversely affected and injured by the above violation.

- 21. Defendant SPENCER ABRAHAM is sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy. Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY is an agency of the government of the United States and is legally charged with implementing the Energy Policy Act and complying with its provisions, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Abraham and U.S. Department of Energy are collectively referred to as "DOE."
- 22. Defendant DONALD L. EVANS is sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

 Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged

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- 1 | with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Evans and U.S. Department of Commerce are collectively referred to as "Commerce."
 - Defendant DONALD H. RUMSFELD is sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense. Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Rumsfeld and U.S. Department of Defense are collectively referred to as "DOD."
 - 24. Defendant GALE A. NORTON is sued in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Norton and U.S. Department of the Interior are collectively referred to as "DOI."
 - 25. Defendant JOHN ASHCROFT is sued in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States and head of the U.S. Department of Justice. Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants

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- Ashcroft and U.S. Department of Justice are collectively referred to as "DOJ."
- 26. Defendant STEPHEN A. PERRY is sued in his official capacity as Administrator of the U.S. General Services

 Administration. Defendant U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION is an independent establishment of the U.S. government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Perry and U.S. General Services Administration are collectively referred to as "GSA."
- 27. Defendant ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI is sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.

 Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Principi and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs are collectively referred to as "DVA."
- 28. Defendant NORMAN Y. MINETA is sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation.

 Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions

- sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Mineta and U.S. Department of Transportation are collectively referred to as "DOT."
- 29. Defendant RICHARD A. MESERVE is sued in his official capacity as Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Defendant U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION is an independent establishment of the U.S. government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Meserve and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission are collectively referred to as "NRC."
- Defendant CHRISTINE T. WHITMAN is sued in her official 30. capacity as Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Defendant U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY is an executive agency of the U.S. government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Whitman and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are collectively referred to as "EPA."
- 31. Defendant ANN M. VENEMAN is sued in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Veneman and U.S. Department of Agriculture 22

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are collectively referred to as "USDA."

- 32. Defendant TOMMY G. THOMPSON is sued in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Resources. Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Thompson and U.S. Department of Health & Human Resources are collectively referred to as "HHS."
- capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Martinez and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are collectively referred to as "HUD."
- as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor. Defendant U.S.

 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR is a federal executive department of the United

 States government and is legally charged with complying with the

 Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein.

 Hereinafter, Defendants Chao and U.S. Department of Labor are

 collectively referred to as "DOL."

- 35. Defendant COLIN L. POWELL is sued in his official
 capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of State. Defendant
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE is a federal executive department of the
 United States government and is legally charged with complying with
 the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein.
 Hereinafter, Defendants Powell and U.S. Department of State are
 collectively referred to as "State."
 - as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury.

 Defendant U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY is a federal executive department of the United States government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants O'Neill and U.S. Department of Treasury are collectively referred to as "Treasury."
 - and Space Administration. Defendant NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION is an independent establishment of the U.S. government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Mulville and National Aeronautics and Space Administration are collectively referred to as "NASA."

38. Defendant JOHN E. POTTER is sued in his official capacity as Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S.

Postal Service. Defendant U.S. POSTAL SERVICE is an independent establishment of the U.S. government and is legally charged with complying with the Energy Policy Act, including the actions sought herein. Hereinafter, Defendants Potter and U.S. Postal Service are collectively referred to as "USPS."

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

- 39. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201 et seq., establishes a comprehensive scheme to achieve environmental, economic, and national security benefits by promoting the use of alternative fuels and reducing the transportation sector's consumption of petroleum fuel.
- type of energy consumption and the quality of the environment. The Act also embodies Congress's effort to enact a national energy policy that gradually and steadily increases U.S. energy security in part by reducing our use of oil-based fuels in our motor vehicle sector. A barrel reduction in oil demand through substitution or efficiency is at least as valuable as an additional barrel of oil produced.

- Congress intended the Energy Policy Act to displace conventional petroleum fuel with non-petroleum energy sources, focusing on light-duty motor vehicle fleet operations.
- 42. By initially focusing on federal fleets, Congress intended for the federal government to pave the way for alternative fuel use and fuel flexibility for society at large by demonstrating the in-use practicability of the technology on a substantial scale and to provide the necessary critical mass to catalyze markets into supplying alternative fuels and vehicles with sufficient scale and access.
- 43. In this way, the federal fleet AFV requirements would plant the seeds for growth of AFV use.
- 44. Under the Act, DOE is required to develop and oversee a program designed to replace 10 percent of our petroleum motor fuel consumption by the year 2000 and 30 percent by the year 2010.
- 45. To achieve this purpose, the Act contains several regulatory mandates directed at federal agencies. The three requirements that follow are the focus of this litigation.
- I. Minimum Federal Fleet Percentage Requirements
 - A. The Fleet Requirement Program of the Energy Policy Act
- 46. Energy Policy Act requires that at least 25 percent of the total number of Energy Policy Act-covered vehicles acquired by a federal fleet in fiscal year 1996 must be AFVs; at least 33

- percent of the total number of covered vehicles acquired by a

 federal fleet in fiscal year 1997 must be AFVs; at least 50 percent

 of the total number of covered vehicles acquired by a federal fleet

 in fiscal year 1998 must be AFVs; and at least 75 percent of the

 total number of covered vehicles acquired by a federal fleet in

 fiscal year 1999 and thereafter must be AFVs.
 - 17. The Act defines a federal fleet as a group of 20 or more light-duty motor vehicles located in a metropolitan area with a 1980 population of 250,000 or more persons, and owned, operated, acquired, controlled by, or assigned to any Federal executive department, military department, Government corporation, independent establishment, or executive agency, the U.S. Postal Service, the Congress, the courts of the U.S., or the Executive office of the President.
 - 48. These vehicles must be centrally fueled or capable of being centrally fueled. DOE regulations define capable of being centrally fueled as a vehicle that can be refueled at least 75 percent of its time at the location that is owned, operated, or controlled by the fleet or is under contract for refueling purposes.
 - 49. The Energy Policy Act exempts law enforcement vehicles from the Act's requirements.

- 50. The Energy Policy Act exempts emergency motor vehicles from the Act's requirements.
- 51. The Energy Policy Act exempts from coverage motor vehicles acquired and used for military purposes that the Secretary of Defense has certified to the Secretary of Energy must be exempt for national security reasons.
- 52. The Energy Policy Act exempts from coverage motor vehicles held for lease or rental to the general public.
- 53. The Energy Policy Act exempts from coverage motor vehicles held for sale by motor vehicle dealers.
- 54. The Energy Policy Act exempts from coverage motor vehicles used for motor vehicle manufacturer product evaluations or tests.
- 55. The Energy Policy Act exempts nonroad vehicles, including farm and construction vehicles.
- 56. The Energy Policy Act exempts from coverage motor vehicles that under normal operations are garaged at personal residences at night.
- 57. The Act defines "alternative fuel vehicle" as a dedicated vehicle, meaning one that only operates on alternative fuel, or a dual fueled vehicle, meaning a vehicle that can operate on alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel.

- The Act defines "alternative fuel" as: methanol; denatured ethanol; and other alcohols; mixtures containing 85 percent or more methanol, denatured ethanol, and other alcohols with gasoline or other fuels; natural gas; liquefied petroleum gas; hydrogen; coal-derived liquid fuels; fuels derived from biological materials; electricity; and any other fuel the Secretary determines by rule is substantially not petroleum and would yield substantial energy security benefits and substantial environmental benefits. 8
 - In the alternative to fulfilling the Energy Policy Act's AFV acquisition requirements by purchasing AFVs, the Act provides that an agency may receive one AFV credit for every 450 gallons of biodiesel fuel in fuel containing at least 20 percent biodiesel by volume used in vehicles that weigh more than 8,500 pounds gross vehicle weight rating. Credits allocated under this section can be used to satisfy up to 50 percent of an agency's AFV requirements.
 - The Fleet Requirement Program In Executive Order 13149 в.
 - On April 21, 2000, President Clinton issued an Executive Order to "ensure that the Federal Government exercises leadership in the reduction of petroleum consumption through improvements in fleet fuel efficiency and the use of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) and alternative fuels." Exec. Order No. 13149, Greening the Government Through Federal Fleet and Transportation Efficiency, 65 Fed. Reg. 24607 (Apr. 21, 2000).

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- 61. Executive Order 13149 directs each agency operating 20 or more vehicles in the U.S. to reduce its entire fleet's annual petroleum consumption by at least 20 percent by the end of FY 2005 as compared with FY 1999 levels.
- 62. Executive Order 13149 directs each agency to fulfill the Energy Policy Act's acquisition requirements for AFVs and to use alternative fuels to meet a majority of the fuel requirements for those motor wehicles by the end of FY 2005.
- 63. Executive Order 13149 requires each agency to increase the average Environmental Protection Agency fuel economy rating of passenger cars and light trucks acquired by at least 1 mile per gallon by the end of FY 2002 and at least 3 miles per gallon by the end of FY 2005 as compared to FY 1999 acquisitions.
- 64. Section 401 of Executive Order 13149 makes it easier for agencies to fulfill their Energy Policy Act AFV requirements by providing vehicle reporting credits for the following: each agency acquisition of an alternative fuel light-duty vehicle, regardless of geographic placement; one additional credit for each light-duty AFV that exclusively uses an alternative fuel; one additional credit for each Zero Emission Vehicle of any size; three credits for dedicated medium-duty AFVs; four credits for dedicated heavyduty AFVs; and one credit for every 450 gallons of pure bio-diesel used in diesel vehicles.

II. Reporting Requirements

- agency subject to the Act to prepare and submit annual reports to Congress summarizing the agency's compliance with the Act's alternative fuel purchasing requirements for federal fleets. This summary must include a plan of compliance containing specific dates when the agency will achieve compliance.
- 66. The agency must place the reports on a publicly available website and notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register.

III. Private And Municipal Fleet Requirement Program

- 67. The Energy Policy Act requires DOE to undertake a staged rulemaking process to determine whether or not AFV requirements must also be applied to private and local government fleets.
- 68. DOE is authorized to promulgate a rule under one of two distinct rulemaking schedules to determine whether a private and municipal fleet requirement is necessary.
- 69. Under the "early rulemaking" provisions, DOE must publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to evaluate the federal government's progress toward achieving the replacement fuel goals of the Act and assess the achievability and adequacy of those goals.

- 70. Subsequently, DOE must publish in the Federal Register a proposed rule implementing a private and municipal fleet requirement and provide a public comment period with hearings on the proposal. DOE is then authorized to promulgate a final rule.
- 71. However, any rule DOE promulgates under this early rulemaking section must be completed by December 15, 1996 to be enforceable. If DOE misses this deadline or determines under this section that a fleet requirement program is not necessary at the time, the agency must proceed with later rulemaking.
- 72. The section of the Act concerning later rulemaking provides that by April 1, 1998, the Secretary must publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to evaluate the progress made toward reaching the goals set out in section 13252(b)(2) of the Act of reducing 10 percent of our petroleum motor fuel consumption by the year 2000 and 30 percent by the year 2010. DOE must provide for at least three regional hearings and a public comment period on this advance notice.
- 73. The Act requires DOE to publish a proposed rule for a fleet requirement program by May 1, 1999, with hearings and public comment to follow.
- 74. By January 1, 2000, DOE must determine whether a fleet requirement program applicable to private and municipal fleets is necessary.

- 75. A private and municipal fleet program "shall be considered necessary" if DOE determines the following: (1) the goal of 30 percent replacement fuel by 2010 (or other goal if modified under the proper modification procedures) is not expected to be achieved without a private and municipal fleet requirement program; and (2) the 30 percent goal (or goal as modified) is practicable and achievable with a private and municipal fleet requirement program in combination with voluntary means and other programs.
- 76. The determination that a private and municipal fleet requirement is necessary can serve to modify the goal of 30 percent reduction in motor fuel consumption by 2010, and establish a revised goal, if DOE determines through the proper rulemaking procedures that the goal in place is inadequate, impracticable, or not expected to be achievable.
- 77. DOE also may modify the private and municipal fleet requirement percentages for a given year, but at least 10 percent of the vehicles acquired must be AFVs.
- 78. If DOE determines that a private and municipal fleet requirement program is not necessary, DOE must by January 1, 2000 publish this determination in the Federal Register as a final agency action, including an explanation of DOE's findings and basis for the determination.

- 79. If DOE determines that a private and municipal fleet
 requirement program is necessary, then DOE must by January 1, 2000
 require by rule that certain percentages of the total number of new
 light duty motor vehicles acquired for a fleet, (other than
 Federal, State, or covered alternative fuel provider) must be AFVs
 beginning in model year 2002.
 - 80. Model year 2002 began on September 1, 2001.
 - 81. Under the Act, the following phased-in percentages of AFVs apply to private and municipal fleet vehicle acquisitions: 20 percent of the light duty motor vehicles acquired in model year 2002 must be AFVs; 40 percent in model year 2003 must be AFVs; 60 percent in model year 2004 must be AFVs; and 70 percent in model year 2005 and thereafter must be AFVs.
 - 82. If accomplished by proper rulemaking, the Secretary can establish lower percentages of AFV purchasing requirements (not less than 10 percent) or later years for initiating the program.
 - 83. The statute permits the Secretary to extend the January 1, 2000 deadline for determining whether a private and municipal fleet requirement is necessary for a maximum of 90 days.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- I. Motor Vehicle Emissions Harm Public Health and The Environment
 - A. The U.S. Consumes a Significant Amount of Oil for Transportation, and Significant Air Pollution Results

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- 84. In 2000, the U.S. was responsible for 25 percent of the world total oil consumption. In 2000, the U.S. imported approximately 58 percent of its total oil demand.
- 85. According to DOE, the gap between the transportation sector's demand for petroleum and U.S. petroleum production continues to widen. In the transportation sector alone, U.S. consumption of petroleum surpasses total U.S. domestic petroleum production by 5.9 million barrels. This gap is estimated to increase to 12.8 million barrels per day by the year 2020.
- 86. The transportation sector is projected to use 17.8 million barrels of petroleum per day by 2020. Light-duty motor vehicles will use approximately ten million of these barrels.
- 87. Each year in the U.S., approximately 65 percent of the oil consumed is used for transportation. As a result, vehicle emissions have become the leading source of U.S. air pollution.
- 88. Transportation related activities are responsible for an estimated quarter of the greenhouse gases produced in this country, with the U.S. contributing approximately 20 percent of these gases globally.
 - B. Poor Air Quality From Vehicle Emissions Adversely Affects
 Humans And The Environment
- 89. The U.S. Public Health Service has determined that high levels of air pollution can cause and aggravate lung illnesses,

- including acute respiratory infections, asthma, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and lung cancer.
 - 90. Vehicles running on petroleum emit several "criteria" pollutants regulated by the U.S. EPA under the Clean Air Act, including ozone, carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), and particulate matter (PM).
 - 91. Emitted NOx and volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"), form low-level ozone (O_3) in the presence of sunlight and high temperatures.
 - 92. Low-level ozone is a major component of smog, which is the most serious and persistent outdoor air quality problem in the San Francisco Bay Area and in other parts of the country.
 - 93. In the past five years, the San Francisco Bay Area has violated the National Ambient Air Quality Standard ("NAAQS") for ozone twenty-nine times. As a result, EPA has reclassified the Bay Area as a non-attainment area for the federal one-hour ozone standard.
 - 94. Even at very low levels, ground-level ozone triggers a variety of health problems including aggravated asthma, reduced lung capacity, and increased susceptibility to respiratory illnesses like pneumonia and bronchitis.
 - 95. People with respiratory problems and children are most vulnerable to ozone. However, when present in high levels, ozone

- 1 also can affect healthy adults, especially those active outdoors.
- 2 Repeated exposure to ozone pollution for several months may cause
- 3 permanent lung damage.
- 96. Ground-level ozone interferes with the ability of plants
- 5 to produce and store food, which makes them more susceptible to
- 6 disease, insects, other pollutants, and harsh weather. Ozone
- 7 damages the leaves of trees and other plants, ruining the
- 8 appearance of cities, national parks, and recreation areas. Ozone
- 9 reduces crop and forest yields and increases plant vulnerability to
- 10 disease, pests, and harsh weather.
- 97. Motor vehicle exhaust is responsible for about 56 percent
- 12 of all Carbon Monoxide (CO) emissions nationwide.
- 98. Higher levels of CO generally occur in areas with heavy
- 14 traffic congestion. In cities, 85 to 95 percent of all CO
- 15 emissions may come from motor vehicle exhaust.
- 16 99. At high levels in the air, CO is poisonous even to
- 17 healthy people. CO can affect the heart and central nervous
- 18 system. For a person with heart disease, a single exposure to CO
- 19 at low levels may cause chest pain and reduce that person's ability
- 20 to exercise; repeated exposure may contribute to other
- 21 | cardiovascular effects.
- 22 100. People who breathe high levels of CO can develop vision
- 23 problems, reduced ability to work or learn, reduced manual

- dexterity, and difficulty performing complex tasks. At extremely high levels, CO is poisonous and can cause death.
 - of highly reactive gases, all of which contain nitrogen and oxygen in varying amounts. NOx forms from fuels burned at high temperatures. Motor vehicles are a primary source of NOx.
- formation of ground-level ozone. NOx also reacts to form nitrate particles, acid aerosols, as well as NO₂, which also cause respiratory problems. NOx contributes to the formation of acid rain, nutrient overload that deteriorates water quality, and visibility impairment. Lost visibility is now noted in many National Parks. Furthermore, NOx reacts to form toxic chemicals and contributes to global warming.
 - 103. Sulfur dioxide, or SO_2 , is a member of the family of sulfur oxide (Sox) gases. These gases are formed when gasoline is extracted from oil and when fuel that contains sulfur, including oil, is burned.
 - 104. According to EPA, SO₂ dissolves in water vapor to form acid and interacts with other gases and particles in the air to form sulfates and other products that can harm human health and the environment.

- heart and lung diseases. SO₂ contributes to acid rain, which damages trees, crops, historic buildings, and monuments. SO₂ makes soils, lakes, and streams acidic. SO₂ also contributes to the formation of atmospheric particles that cause visibility impairment.
 - 106. Particulate Matter (PM) is the term used to describe particles found in the air, including dust and smoke. PM can be directly emitted into the air from a variety of sources including cars, trucks, and buses.
 - 107. PM is associated with serious health effects, including aggravated asthma, increases in respiratory symptoms like coughing and difficult or painful breathing, chronic bronchitis, decreased lung function, and premature death.
 - responsible for reducing visibility in many areas of the U.S., including our national parks. PM settles on soil and water and changes their nutrient and chemical balance. PM makes lakes and streams acidic, changes the nutrient balance in coastal waters and large river basins, depletes the nutrients in soil, damages sensitive forests and farm crops, and affects the diversity of ecosystems. PM erodes and stains structures including monuments and statues.

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- 109. Motor vehicles also emit several hazardous pollutants that EPA classifies as known or probable human carcinogens. EPA estimates that mobile sources of air toxics, such as cars, trucks, and buses, account for as much as half of all cancers attributed to outdoor sources of air toxics.
- 110. The gasoline additive benzene, for instance, is a known human carcinogen. Benzene causes leukemia and blood disorders in adults. Short-term exposure to benzene can cause dizziness, headaches, vomiting, unconsciousness, and, at high levels, death.
- 111. Studies also indicate an association between high traffic streets and childhood cancer, including leukemia. An estimated 80% of benzene emissions in the U.S. originate from motor vehicles.
- 112. Children, the elderly, athletes, and people with compromised immune systems suffer the worst health problems associated with poor air quality. Among these individuals, poor air quality causes heightened health impacts, such as difficulty breathing, lowered disease-resistance, and hindered development of lung capacity in children.
- 113. Air pollution is a problem that affects millions of Americans. In California, for example, over ninety percent of the population lives in regions adversely affected by air quality problems, largely as a result of vehicle exhaust.

- 1 114. Long-term exposure to air pollution in the four San
 2 Francisco Bay Area counties may cause an additional 208 cases of
 3 cancer for every million residents, which is 208 times greater than
 4 the acceptable risk of cancer caused by air pollution as
 5 established by the Clean Air Act of 1990. Most of the cancer risk
 6 is attributable to benzene, discussed above, and butadiene, a
 7 byproduct of fuel combustion.
 - II. Alternative Fuel Vehicles Are Better For Energy Security, Public Health, and The Environment
 - 115. Displacing petroleum with alternative transportation fuels reduces our dependence on imported petroleum, reduces U.S. vulnerability to oil price shocks, decreases emissions of greenhouse gases, criteria and toxic pollutants, and promotes domestic economic development.
 - 116. Substitution of petroleum-based transportation fuels (gasoline and diesel) by non-petroleum-based fuels ("replacement fuels," including alternative fuels such as electricity, ethanol, hydrogen, liquefied petroleum gas, methanol, and natural gas) could be a key means of reducing the vulnerability of the U.S. transportation sector to disruptions of the petroleum supply.
 - 117. The vehicles using alternative fuels work well and have operating characteristics that are acceptable to a significant portion of the vehicle-owning population.

- Alternative fuels that have lower carbon fuel-cycles 1 than gasoline or diesel fuel also have the added benefit of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 3 119. Alternative fuels are inherently cleaner than gasoline 4 because they are chemically less complex and burn cleaner. 5 120. When used with advanced engine and emission control 6 technologies, alternative fuels burn more efficiently and thus 7 release fewer emissions from incomplete combustion. In addition, because alternative fuels evaporate less readily than gasoline, 9 there are fewer evaporative emissions from the vehicle's tank, 10 limiting smog-forming emissions. 11 121. Electric vehicles, which have no internal combustion 12 engine, potentially offer the greatest emission reductions. 13 primary source of air pollution comes from the power plants that 14 create electricity to charge batteries. Yet even after these 15 emissions are considered, electric vehicles typically have 90 16 percent fewer emissions than an internal combustion engine. 17 FACTS GIVING RISE TO PLAINTIFFS' CAUSES OF ACTION 18 Defendants Are In Violation Of The Act's AFV Purchasing 19 I. Requirements 20 122. Defendant Commerce is in violation of the Energy Policy 21
- 23 In its response to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 Freedom of

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Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D).

1 | Information Act (FOIA) request, Commerce provided no 1996 compliance data. On information and belief, Commerce is in 2 violation of the requirement that of the covered vehicles Commerce 3 acquired in 1996, 25 percent must be AFVs. In its response to 4 Plaintiffs' FOIA request, Commerce stated that in 1998, only 11 5 percent of the covered vehicles it acquired were AFVs rather than 6 the 50 percent required by law. In 1998, Commerce was 7 approximately 127 AFVs short of the Energy Policy Act requirement. 8 In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, Commerce stated that only 16 percent of the covered vehicles Commerce acquired in 1999 10 were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by law. 11 Commerce was approximately 227 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. 12 In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, Commerce stated that 13 only 17 percent of the covered vehicles it acquired in 2000 were 14 AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by law. In 2000, Commerce 15 was approximately 76 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. 16 response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, Commerce stated it only plans 17 to purchase 19 percent AFVs in 2001 and 35 percent in 2002, rather 18 than the 75 percent required for both years by the Energy Policy 19 20 Act.

123. Defendant DOD is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). DOD has not responded to Plaintiffs' FOIA request of August 10, 2001.

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According to DOE information produced in response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOD stated that only 21 percent 2 of the covered vehicles DOD acquired in 1996 were AFVs rather than 3 the 25 percent required by law. In 1996, DOD was approximately 279 4 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. According to DOE information 5 produced in response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOD stated that only 24 percent of the covered vehicles DOD 7 acquired in 1997 were AFVs rather than the 33 percent required by 8 In 1997, DOD was approximately 722 AFVs short of the Act's 9 requirement. According to DOE information produced in response to 10 Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOD stated that 11 only 33 percent of the covered vehicles DOD acquired in 1998 were AFVs rather than the 50 percent required by law. In 1998, DOD was 1.3 approximately 1,184 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. According 14 to DOE information produced in response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 15 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOD stated that only 36 percent of the 16 covered vehicles DOD acquired in 1999 were AFVs rather than the 75 17 percent required by law. In 1999, DOD was approximately 3,056 AFVs 18 short of the Act's requirement. According to DOE information 19 produced in response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to 20 DOE, DOD stated that only 47 percent of the covered vehicles DOD 21 acquired in 2000 were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by 22

In 2000, DOD was approximately 2,233 AFVs short of the Act's requirement.

124. Defendant DOI is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). its response to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request, DOI 5 provided no 1996 compliance data. On information and belief, DOI is in violation of the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the 7 covered vehicles DOI acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. In its 8 response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOI stated that of the covered vehicles DOI acquired in 1997, only 22 percent were AFVs 10 rather than the 33 percent required by law. In 1997, DOI was 11 approximately 7 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. In its 12 response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOI stated that of the 13 vehicles it acquired in 2000, only 31 percent were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by the Act. In 2000, DOI was approximately 335 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. 16

125. Defendant DOJ is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). its response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request, DOJ claimed a 100 percent exemption from compliance in 1996. Plaintiffs contend that a 100 percent exemption was not warranted

in 1996. On information and belief, DOJ is in violation of the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles DOJ

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1 | acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOJ claimed a 100 percent exemption from compliance in 1997. Plaintiffs contend that a 100 percent exemption was not warranted in 1997. On information and belief, DOJ is in violation of the Act's requirement that 33 percent of the covered vehicles DOJ acquired in 1997 must be AFVs. According to DOE information produced in response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOJ stated that only 42 percent of the covered vehicles DOJ acquired in 1998 were AFVs rather than the 50 percent required by According to DOE information produced in response to 1.0 Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOJ stated that 11 4,791 out of the 4,828 covered vehicles DOJ purchased in 1998 were Plaintiffs contend that a 99.2 exempt for law enforcement. 13 percent exemption was not warranted in 1998. On information and 14 belief, DOJ is in violation of the Act's requirement that of the 15 covered vehicles DOJ acquired in 1998, 50 percent must be AFVs. 16 its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOJ provided insufficient 17 data to determine whether DOJ complied with the Act's requirement 18 that of the covered vehicles DOJ acquired in 1999, at least 75 19 percent must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, 20 DOJ stated that 4,233 out of the 4,237 covered vehicles DOJ 21 purchased in 1999 were exempt for law enforcement. Plaintiffs contend that a 99.9 percent exemption was not warranted in 1998. 23

On information and belief, DOJ is in violation of the Act's
requirement that of the covered vehicles DOJ acquired in 1999, at
least 75 percent must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA
request, DOJ stated that of the covered vehicles it acquired in
2000, only 28 percent were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required
by law. In 2000, DOJ was approximately 54 AFVs short of the Act's
requirements.

126. Defendant GSA is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). its response to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request, GSA stated that of the covered vehicles GSA acquired in 1996, only 23 percent were AFVs rather than the 25 percent required by law. 1996, GSA was approximately 4 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, GSA did not provide any 1997 or 1998 compliance data. On information and belief, GSA did not comply with the Act's requirement that 33 percent of the covered vehicles GSA acquired in 1997 must be AFVs. On information and belief, GSA did not comply with the Act's requirement that 50 percent of the covered vehicles GSA acquired in 1998 must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, GSA stated that only 71 percent of the vehicles GSA acquired in 2000 were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by law. In 2000, GSA was approximately 7 AFVs short of the Act's requirements.

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127. Defendant DVA is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's 1 AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). 2 its response to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request, DVA did 3 not provide any 1996 compliance data. On information and belief, DVA is in violation of the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the 5 covered vehicles DVA acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DVA did not provide any 1997 7 compliance data. On information and belief, DVA is in violation of the Act's requirement that 33 percent of the covered vehicles DVA acquired in 1997 must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA 10 request, DVA did not provide any 1998 compliance data. 11 information and belief, DVA is in violation of the Act's 12 requirement that 50 percent of the covered vehicles DVA acquired in 13 1998 must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, 14 DVA did not provide any 1999 compliance data. On information and 15 belief, DVA is in violation of the Act's requirement that 75 16 percent of the covered vehicles DVA acquired in 1999 must be AFVs. 17 In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DVA stated that only 18 22 percent of the covered vehicles DVA acquired in 2000 were AFVs 19 rather than the 75 percent required by law. In 2000, DVA was 20 approximately 662 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. 21 response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DVA stated that it only 22 planned to purchase 11 percent AFVs in 2001 rather than the 75 23

percent required by law. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DVA stated that it only planned to purchase 16 percent AFVs in 2002 rather than the 75 percent required by law.

128. Defendant DOT is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). In its response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request, DOT stated that only 23.2 percent of the covered vehicles DOT acquired in 1996 were AFVs rather than the 25 percent required by law. In 1996, DOT was approximately 11 AFVs short of the Act's requirements. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOT stated that only 24.1 percent of the covered vehicles DOT acquired in 1997 were AFVs rather than the 33 percent required by law. In 1997, DOT was approximately 56 AFVs short of the Act's requirements. response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOT stated that only 40 percent of the covered vehicles DOT acquired in 1998 were AFVs rather than the 50 percent required by law. In 1998, DOT was approximately 65 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOT stated that only 53 percent of the covered vehicles DOT acquired in 1999 were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by law. In 1999, DOT was approximately 133 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOT stated that only 54 percent of the covered vehicles DOT acquired in 2000 were AFVs

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rather than the 75 percent required by law. In 2000, DOT was approximately 386 AFVs short of the Act's requirements.

129. Defendant NRC is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). Ιn its response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request, NRC stated that only 15 percent of the covered vehicles NRC acquired in 1996 were AFVs rather than the 25 percent required by law. In 1996, NRC was approximately 2 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, NRC admits that zero percent of the vehicles NRC acquired in 1999 were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by law. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, NRC admits that of the covered vehicles NRC acquired in 2000, zero percent were AFVs rather than the 75 percent required by law.

130. Defendant EPA is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). has not responded to Plaintiffs' FOIA request of August 10, 2001. On information and belief, EPA did not comply with the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles EPA acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. According to DOE information produced in response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, EPA stated that only 14 percent of the covered vehicles EPA acquired in 22 1997 were AFVs rather than the 33 percent required by law.

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1997, EPA was approximately 35 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. According to DOE information produced in response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, EPA stated that only 35 percent 3 of the covered vehicles EPA acquired in 1998 were AFVs rather than the 50 percent required by law. In 1998, EPA was approximately 22 5 AFVs short of the Act's requirement. EPA has not responded to 6 Plaintiffs' FOIA request of August 10, 2001. In response to 7 Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOE had no 1999 8 compliance data for EPA. On information and belief, EPA did not 9 comply with the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered 10 vehicles EPA acquired in 1999 must be AFVs. 11 131. Defendant USDA is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's 12 AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). USDA 13 has not responded Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request. 14 information and belief, USDA did not comply with the Act's 15 requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles USDA acquired 16 in 1996 must be AFVs. On information and belief, USDA did not 17 comply with the Act's requirement that 33 percent of the covered 18 vehicles USDA acquired in 1997 must be AFVs. On information and 19 belief, USDA did not comply with the Act's requirement that 50 20 percent of the covered vehicles USDA acquired in 1998 must be AFVs. 21

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On information and belief, USDA did not comply with the Act's

requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles USDA acquired in 1999 must be AFVs.

132. Defendant HHS is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). its response to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request, HHS did not provide any 1996 compliance data. On information and belief, HHS did not comply with the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles HHS acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, HHS did not provide any 1997 compliance data. On information and belief, HHS did not comply with the Act's requirement that 33 percent of the covered vehicles HHS acquired in 1997 must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, HHS did not provide any 1998 compliance data. information and belief, HHS did not comply with the Act's requirement that 50 percent of the covered vehicles HHS acquired in In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, 1998 must be AFVs. HHS did not provide any 1999 compliance data. On information and belief, HHS did not comply with the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles HHS acquired in 1999 must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, HHS did not provide any 2000 compliance data. On information and belief, HHS did not comply with the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles HHS acquired in 2000 must be AFVs.

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133. Defendant HUD is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's 1 AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). HUD has not responded to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request. 3 information and belief, HUD did not comply with the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles HUD acquired in 5 1996 must be AFVs. According to DOE information produced in 6 response to Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, HUD 7 stated that zero percent of the covered vehicles HUD acquired in 1997 were AFVs rather than the 33 percent required by law. According to DOE information produced in response to Plaintiffs' 10 August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, HUD stated that zero percent 11 of the covered vehicles HUD acquired in 1998 were AFVs rather than 12 the 50 percent required by law. In 1998, HUD was approximately 1 13 AFV short of the Act's requirements. HUD has not responded to 14 Plaintiffs' FOIA request of August 10, 2001. In response to 15 Plaintiffs' August 7, 2001 FOIA request to DOE, DOE had no 1999 or 16 2000 compliance data for HUD. On information and belief, HUD did 17 not comply with the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles HUD acquired in 1999 and 2000 must be AFVs. 19 134. Defendant DOL is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's 20 AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). 21 its response to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request, DOL did 22 not provide any 1996 compliance data. On information and belief,

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DOL is in violation of the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles DOL acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. In its 2 response to Plaintiffs' FOIA request, DOL provided insufficient 3 information to determine whether DOL complied with the Act's 4 requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles DOL acquired in 5 1999 must be AFVs. On information and belief, DOL failed to comply with the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles 7 DOL acquired in 1999 must be AFVs. In its response to Plaintiffs' 8 FOIA request, DOL provided insufficient information to determine 9 whether DOL complied with the Act's requirement that 75 percent of 10 the covered vehicles DOL acquired in 2000 must be AFVs. 11 information and belief, DOL failed to comply with the Act's 12 requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles DOL acquired in 13 2000 must be AFVs. 14 135. Defendant State is in violation of the Energy Policy 15 Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). State has not responded to Plaintiffs' August 14, 2001 FOIA 17 On information and belief, State is in violation of the request. 18 Act's requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles State 19 acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. On information and belief, State is 20 in violation of the Act's requirement that 33 percent of the 21 covered vehicles State acquired in 1997 must be AFVs. On 22 information and belief, State is in violation of the Act's 23

requirement that 50 percent of the covered vehicles State acquired
in 1998 must be AFVs. On information and belief, State is in
violation of the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered
vehicles State acquired in 1999 must be AFVs.

136. Defendant Treasury is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). Treasury has not responded to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request. On information and belief, Treasury is in violation of the Act's requirement that 25 percent of the covered vehicles Treasury acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. On information and belief, Treasury is in violation of the Act's requirement that 33 percent of the covered vehicles Treasury acquired in 1997 must be AFVs. information and belief, Treasury is in violation of the Act's requirement that 50 percent of the covered vehicles Treasury acquired in 1998 must be AFVs. On information and belief, Treasury is in violation of the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles Treasury acquired in 1999 must be AFVs. information and belief, Treasury is in violation of the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles Treasury acquired in 2000 must be AFVs.

137. Defendant NASA is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). In its response to Plaintiffs' August 10, 2001 FOIA request, NASA did

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| not provide any 1996 compliance data. On information and belief, NASA is in violation of the Act's requirement that 25 percent of 2 the covered vehicles NASA acquired in 1996 must be AFVs. In its 3 response to Plaintiffs' FOIA response, NASA did not provide any 1999 compliance data. On information and belief, NASA is in 5 violation of the Act's requirement that 75 percent of the covered 6 vehicles NASA acquired in 1999 must be AFVs. In its response to 7 Plaintiffs' FOIA response, NASA did not provide any 2000 compliance data. On information and belief, NASA is in violation of the Act's 9 requirement that 75 percent of the covered vehicles NASA acquired 10 in 2000 must be AFVs. 11 12

138. Defendant USPS is in violation of the Energy Policy Act's AFV purchasing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)(A-D). In its response to Plaintiffs' October 24, 2001 FOIA request, USPS stated that 28 percent of the covered vehicles USPS acquired in 1997 were AFVs rather than the 33 percent required by law. In 1997, USPS was approximately 137 AFVs short of the Act's requirement.

II. All Defendants Are In Violation of The Act's Public Reporting Requirements

139. Defendant DOE has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location

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- through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 140. Defendant Commerce has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 141. Defendant DOD has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 142. Defendant DOI has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 143. Defendant DOJ has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and

failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. §

144. Defendant GSA has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).

145. Defendant DVA has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).

146. Defendant DOT has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. §

- 1 147. Defendant NRC has failed to place its annual federal
 2 fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and
 3 failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location
 4 through publication of this information in the Federal Register as
 5 required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. §
 6 13218(b).
 - 148. Defendant EPA has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
 - 149. Defendant USDA has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
 - 150. Defendant HHR has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as

- required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 151. Defendant HUD has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 152. Defendant DOL has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 153. Defendant State has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location through publication of this information in the Federal Register as required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. See 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b).
- 154. Defendant Treasury has failed to place its annual federal fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location

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1	through publication of this information in the Federal Register as
2	required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. <u>See</u> 42 U.S.C. §
3	13218(b).
4	155. Defendant NASA has failed to place its annual federal
5	fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and
6	failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location
7	through publication of this information in the Federal Register as
8	required by Energy Policy Act section 13218. <u>See</u> 42 U.S.C. §
9	13218(b).
10	156. Defendant USPS has failed to place its annual federal
11	fleet AFV compliance report on a publicly available website and
12	failed to notify the public of the reports' existence and location
13	through publication of this information in the Federal Register as
14	required by Energy Policy Act section 13218, <u>See</u> 42 U.S.C. §
15	13218(b).
16	III. Defendant DOE Has Violated The Act's Private And Municipal Fleet Provisions
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157. Defendant DOE has missed its January 1, 2000 deadline for determining through rulemaking whether a private and municipal fleet requirement program is necessary to comply with the Act's clean air and energy security goals.

158. DOE complied with the first step of the mandatory fleet requirement program rulemaking by publishing an advance notice of

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proposed rulemaking to evaluate the progress made toward achieving
   the 10 and 30 percent oil consumption reduction goals of the Act as
   required under Energy Policy Act section 13257(a)(3). Alternative
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   Fueled Vehicle Acquisition Requirements for Private and Local
   Government Fleets, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice
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   of Public Hearings, 61 Fed. Reg. 41032 (Aug. 7, 1996).
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        159. DOE held three regional hearings in Dallas, TX,
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   Sacramento, CA, and Washington, D.C. and invited the public to
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   express oral views, data, and arguments on the proposed rulemaking
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   and submit written comments. Id.
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        160. DOE was unable to meet the December 15, 1996 deadline for
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   early rulemaking. Notice of Termination of Proposed Rule, 62 Fed.
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   Reg. 19701 (Apr. 23, 1997). As a result, the Act requires DOE to
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   follow the later rulemaking procedures. Under these procedures,
   DOE was required to begin rulemaking by April 1998, 42 U.S.C. §
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   13257(c)(c), and publish a proposed rule for a fleet requirement
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   program before May 1, 1999, with hearings and public comment to
    follow. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13257(d).
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         161. DOE was required to issue a final rule determining
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   whether a fleet requirement program is or is not necessary by
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    January 1, 2000. <u>Id.</u> at §§ 13257(e)(1), 13257(f)(2), 13257(g)(1).
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         162. On April 17, 1998, DOE published an advance notice of
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    proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearings for the Act's
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private and municipal fleet requirement. Advance Notice of

2 Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearings, 63 Fed. Reg.

19372 (Apr. 17, 1998). DOE held public hearings in Los Angeles,

CA, Minneapolis, MN, and Washington, D.C. Id. DOE missed its May

1, 1999 deadline for issuing a proposed rule.

of a one-time extension of the January 1, 2000 deadline for 90 days, which the Secretary did on December 29, 1999. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Extension of Deadline, 65 Fed. Reg. 1831 (Jan. 12, 2000). As a result, DOE's final determination was due on April 1, 2000. However, DOE still has not even issued the proposed rule due on May 1, 1999, a deadline with no statutory provision for

extension provisions, in July 2000, DOE announced that it is "pausing its rulemaking efforts regarding whether and what to propose as regulatory requirements on local government and private fleets with respect to alternative fueled vehicles until after consultations with State and local government officials have occurred." Notice of Public Workshops and Opportunity for Public Comment, 65 Fed. Reg. 44987 (July 20, 2000).

165. In a separate publication, DOE provided the following tentative timetable for complying with the fleet requirement

an extension.

program deadlines: (1) it will meet the May 1, 1999 deadline by May 2001; and (2) it will meet the January 1, 2000 deadline by January 2002. <u>Unified Agenda</u>, 65 Fed. Reg. 73763, 73764 (Nov. 30, 2000). 3 FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 4 (Violation of the Energy Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1)) 5 166. Each and every allegation set forth above in the 6 Complaint is incorporated herein, by reference. 7 167. Defendants Commerce, DOI, DOJ, GSA, DVA, DOT, NRC, EPA, 8 USDA, DOD, HHS, HUD, DOL, State, Treasury, NASA, and USPS have 9 violated the Energy Policy Act by failing to meet the Energy Policy 10 Act federal fleet acquisition requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 11 This failure constitutes agency action unlawfully 13212(b)(1). 12 withheld, unreasonably delayed, and contrary to law within the 13 meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 14 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 15 (Violation of the Energy Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §13218(b)(1)-(3)) 16 168. Each and every allegation set forth above in the 17 Complaint is incorporated herein, by reference. 18 169. All Defendants have failed to make AFV acquisition 19 compliance reports available to the public on the Internet and 2.0 notify the public of the existence and location of these reports 21 through publication of this information in the Federal Register. 22 Defendants' failure to comply with section 13218 of the Energy 23

Policy Act constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld, unreasonably delayed, and contrary to law within the meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 3 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 4 (Violation of the Energy Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13257) 5 170. Each and every allegation set forth above in the 6 Complaint is incorporated herein, by reference. 7 171. Defendant DOE has violated section 13257 of the Energy 8 Policy Act by failing to issue a proposed rule and final 9 determination on the necessity of a private and municipal fleet 10 program by May 1, 1999 and April 1, 2000 respectively as required 11 by the Energy Policy Act. Defendant's failure constitutes agency 12 action unlawfully withheld, unreasonably delayed, and contrary to 13 law within the meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 14 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 15 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court enter judgment 16 providing the following relief: 17 Declare that Defendants Commerce, DOI, DOJ, GSA, DVA, DOT, 18 NRC, EPA, USDA, DOD, HHS, HUD, DOL, State, Treasury, NASA, and USPS are in violation of their nondiscretionary duties under 42 U.S.C. § 20 13212(b)(1). 21 22 23 24

Complaint For Declaratory & Injunctive Relief

- 1 2. Declare that all Defendants are in violation of their
- 2 nondiscretionary duties under 42 U.S.C. § 13218(b) of the Energy
- 3 Policy Act;
- 4 3. Declare that Defendant DOE is in violation of its
- 5 nondiscretionary duties under 42 U.S.C. § 13257 of the Energy
- 6 Policy Act;
- 7 4. Order Defendants Commerce, DOI, DOJ, GSA, DVA, DOT, NRC, EPA,
- 8 USDA, DOD, HHS, HUD, DOL, State, Treasury, NASA, and USPS to comply
- 9 with 42 U.S.C. § 13212(b)(1) of the Energy Policy Act.
- 10 5. Order Defendants Commerce, DOI, DOJ, GSA, DVA, DOT, NRC, EPA,
- 11 USDA, DOD, HHS, HUD, DOL, State, Treasury, NASA, and USPS to offset
- 12 future conventional vehicle purchases with the number of AFVs
- 13 necessary to bring Defendants into compliance with the Act's 1996,
- 14 | 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 percentage requirements.
- 15 6. Order all Defendants to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 13218 of the
- 16 Energy Policy Act;
- 17 7. Order Defendant DOE to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 13257 of the
- 18 Energy Policy Act;
- 19 8. Retain jurisdiction over this action to ensure compliance with
- 20 | the Court's decree;
- 21 9. Award Plaintiffs their costs of litigation, including
- 22 reasonable attorneys' fees; and
- 23 10. Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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4	Dated December 27 , 2001.	
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7		Respectfully submitted,
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