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SECY 97-170

July 31, 1997

Contact:  G. Tracy, OEDO

ENCLOSURE A

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Issuance Inservice Testing of Workshop Meeting Minutes

On July 18, 1997, the Mechanical Engineering Branch issued a summary of four public workshops on inservice testing (IST) of pumps and valves held at each of the NRC regions in January and February of this year. The IST workshop meeting summary included responses to 202 questions raised by the participants that covered a broad range of inservice testing issues including scope, program documentation, component testing, instrumentation, acceptance criteria, and ASME OM Code adherence. Because many questions were Code-related, ASME formed a task force to work with the NRC to identify questions that were more appropriately addressed by ASME as code changes and code inquiries. Approximately one-third of the questions were identified by the task force and have been noted in the meeting minutes. The meeting minutes are being distributed to NRC, utility and public workshop participants, regional DRS Directors, and ASME working group and subcommittee chairmen. A copy has also been sent to the PDR. An electronic copy will be placed on the NRC homepage in the near future.

Onsite Review of the Comanche Peak PRA to Support Pilot Plant's Proposed Risk--Informed Inservice Testing (RI-IST) Program

Between July 14 and 18, 1997, the NRC staff (M. Cheok, G. Parry, D. Fischer) and its contractors (P. Davis, and R. Youngblood) reviewed probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models, backup calculations, and data at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES). The review was conducted as part of the staff evaluation of Texas Utilities Electric Company's (TUE's) proposed RI-IST program and was aimed at determining whether the CPSES PRA meets the quality and scope guidelines in draft regulatory guide DG-1061, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis."

On Friday, July 18, 1997, the staff met with representatives of TUE in a public meeting to describe the staff's review and to present preliminary observations regarding the adequacy of the licensee's PRA for the RI-IST (and other) applications.

The quality of the CPSES PRA was found to be generally adequate and backup calculations were well documented in most areas. Major review areas include: initiating event analysis; accident sequence analysis; mission success criteria; fault tree analysis; data analysis; dependent failure analysis including consideration of common cause failures; human reliability analysis; sequence quantification; internal flooding, fire, and tornado analysis; uncertainty analysis; and outage safety function guidelines. While the review team identified some minor problems with the CPSES PRA for the RI-IST application (e.g., missing success paths, inadequate documentation of human error probabilities, optimistic recovery factors for equipment repair, plant-specific performance data not having already been incorporated into the PRA), the review team concluded that these issues could be addressed through the licensee's expert panel process. The staff also identified an area in the calculation of sequence success that would need further clarification. The calculated core damage frequency from the licensee's base PRA will be on the order of 1E-4 per year when external event initiators and shutdown operations are taken into account. Thus, approval of the licensee's proposed RI-IST program, considering uncertainties, will be "subject to increased NRC technical and management review" as stated in DG-1061.

TUE stated that they would have a difficult time responding to the staff's March 12, 1997, and June 9, 1997, RAIs by August 1997 (reference memorandum to the Commission dated June 17, 1997). TUE estimated that it would take one staff-year of effort to adequately respond to these RAIs (i.e., to assess how their proposed RI-IST program comports with the staff's draft risk-informed regulatory guides). If the licensee's response is delayed, it will likely result in the delay in issuance of the staff's safety evaluation on the CPSES RI-IST program beyond the October 1997 planned SER date.

Vogtle Requalification Inspection Observation

During the week of July 14, 1997, the Operator Licensing Branch (HOLB), performed an onsite observation of the Vogtle operator licensing requalification examination. This observation of Region II performing IP 71001, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation," is part of the continuing effort to collect feedback on the NRC's examination process and to oversee regional operator licensing activities.

Dresden Initial Examination Audit

During the week of July 14, 1997, HOLB audited the initial operator licensing examination preparation process conducted by Region III at the Dresden facility. The audit, which was performed in accordance with HOLB Manual Chapter 320, "HOLB Program Review of Operator Licensing Functions at Licensee Facilities," is part of HOLB's continuing effort to collect feedback on the NRC's examination process and to oversee regional operator licensing activities.

Nuclear Utilities Software Management Group (NUSMG) Conference on the Year 2000 Problem in Nuclear Power Plants

On July 22 and 23, 1997, staff from the Instrumentation and Controls Branch (HICB) and the Office of Information Resources Management attended the NUSMG conference on the Year 2000 (Y2K) software problem in nuclear power plants in Kansas City, Mo. The purpose of the conference was to permit licensees to share information on their programs and activities to address the Y2K problem in the various computer systems at their plants. The NRC staff is aware of several date driven software systems in nuclear power plants (e.g. security computer, dose calculation programs, emergency response communications) that are potentially subject to failure due to the Y2K concern. The HICB staff participants presented information on the actions the NRC staff has taken to date to alert licensees to the Y2K problem and to address the problem in its computer systems. Based on the information presented, the staff will assess licensee efforts and determine if additional action is necessary to deal with the Y2K issue.

North Anna Severe Accident Management Training Exercise

During the week of July 20, 1997, members of the Human Factors Assessment Branch (HHFB) observed Severe Accident Management training and a demonstration of Severe Accident Management capabilities at the North Anna Power Station in Mineral, Virginia. The demonstration included a licensee presentation concerning the site-specific development and implementation efforts followed by a table-top exercise demonstrating the use of the severe accident management guidelines by members of the licensee's emergency response organization. The information obtained through this demonstration will be used in the development of a temporary instruction for evaluating licensee severe accident management programs. The meeting was also attended by representatives from the Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch, the Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch, NEI, and several U.S. nuclear plant sites.

Maine Yankee

The Board of Directors of PECo Energy met on July 28 to decide whether to pursue an agreement that would lead to the eventual purchase of Maine Yankee. On July 22, 1997, Mr. Corbin McNeill, President and CEO of PECo Energy, and Mr. Dickinson Smith, Senior Vice President - Nuclear, visited Maine Yankee and met with state and local officials. According to media accounts, the discussions included possible tax relief from the Town of Wiscasset if PECO Energy decides to buy Maine Yankee.

On July 22, 1997, the staff met with the licensee in Region I to discuss the licensee's proposed resolution of cable separation problems at Maine Yankee. The licensee discussed its revised cable separation licensing basis and provided copies of its 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation and revised FSAR pages. Pursuant to the staff's Maine Yankee Restart Action Plan dated May 23, 1997, the staff will review the licensee's FSAR revision and 50.59 safety evaluation, and inspect the licensee's implementation of the revised licensing basis.

The Maine Yankee Operations Stand Down Order was lifted July 22, 1997. The Order was issued on June 30 in response to valve lineup errors on June 26

and 28. The latter event resulted in inadvertent draining of 10,000 gallons of water from the reactor cavity to the reactor water storage tank. The fuel had been fully offloaded to the spent fuel pool and was isolated from the reactor vessel at the time of the event. The licensee's root cause evaluation found three common weaknesses in the events in the areas of procedure adherence, self-checking, and attention to detail. The root cause evaluation team also found widespread lack of acceptance of the licensee's new corrective action program. Concern about the future of the company was found to be a contributing causal factor.

Zion, Units 1 and 2

Radiation Protection Problems

Zion has had problems in the radiation protection area throughout 1997. As a result of a radiation protection inspection performed from 12/03/96-01/22/97, the licensee was cited for violations of its radioactive material transportation program. The violations collectively demonstrated an overall programmatic deficiency and resulted in the imposition of a $50,000 Civil Penalty on 06/17/97.

During another radiation protection inspection performed 03/24/97-04/14/97, the licensee was cited for poor radiological housekeeping in the auxiliary and turbine buildings. Many of the Severity Level IV problems were similar to those identified in other recent inspections.

On 05/07/97, 4 radiation protection area stanchions, a tape measure and a pneumatic tool with fixed contamination were found in the turbine building. The licensee was unable to determine how they got into the turbine building in an uncontrolled area.

During a radiation protection inspection performed from 06/02/97-06/06/97, some improvements were identified in aspects of the radiological protection program. It was noted that corrective actions to address previously identified radiation protection weaknesses were recently implemented, and continued assessment by the NRC staff was necessary to assess the results of the corrective actions for long term, sustained improvement.

A month after the above inspection, on 07/01/97, a radiation protection technician escorted two insulators into a locked high radiation area. After they were inside, the technician decided to do something else, so he closed the door, and put the lock through the hasp. He did not lock it, but the door could not be opened from the inside. The workers finished their work and were unable to exit. No excessive exposure resulted, because another radiation technician in the area let them out, and the area where they were waiting was only 1 mr/hr. However, securing the door to the high radiation area and leaving it unattended was a violation of station procedures. The licensee took administrative action against two technicians as a result.

The new radiation protection manager has been on the job for about a month and has been doing critical self assessments of the department. It is too early to tell what corrective actions will be developed. The resident and regional staffs will continue to monitor the licensee's progress in the radiation protection area.

Fitness for Duty Violations

Recent events at Zion have led the staff to take a close look at the station's compliance with its fitness for duty (FFD) program. The licensee's procedures require a determination to be made concerning recent alcohol consumption for the unscheduled call in of an individual for work. On 02/01/97, a supervisor and an employee failed to follow these procedures. The regulations and the licensee's procedures also require testing for cause following any behavior indicating possible substance abuse, including detection of the odor of alcohol on an individual's breath. Also on 02/01/97, three FFD trained supervisors failed to require a for cause test of an employee with the smell of alcohol in the protected area, who they knew had consumed alcohol within the 5 hour abstinence period.

On 03/11/97, a supervisor, after consuming alcohol within the 5 hour abstinence period, voluntarily went to work but did not request an alcohol test upon site arrival and entered the protected area without the test being conducted. This was contrary to the licensee's procedures.

In addition to these examples, in the following instances, failures by individuals to notify their supervisors of violations of the licensee's fitness for duty policy occurred that precluded the supervisors from acting in a timely manner.

An employee detected the odor of alcohol on a co-worker and did not notify his supervisor.

On 03/11/97, an employee did not notify his supervisor that he had violated the FFD policy by not requesting a test for alcohol when he voluntarily returned to the site outside of his normal work hours and had consumed alcohol within the 5 hour abstinence period.

On 03/11/97, an employee failed to notify his supervisor that he detected the odor of alcohol on a co-worker.

06/12/97, an employee detected the odor of alcohol on a contract employee but failed to notify his supervisor.

The resident and regional staff are following up on these issues and the region is considering enforcement action.

ENCLOSURE B

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

U.S. EURATOM Safeguards Bilateral Meeting

On July 17-18, 1997, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards staff participated in safeguards bilateral discussions between the U.S. government and EURATOM. The staff members presented papers on implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the U.S., safeguards for the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories, and U.S. views on IAEA implementation of Programme 93+2 Part 1 measures.

Physical Protection Inspection Accompaniment with GOSATOMNADZOR of Russia

On July 14-18, 1997, four representatives from the Russian regulatory agency GOSATOMNADZOR (GAN) accompanied Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards staff to Illinois to observe Braidwood Power Station's "Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation" (OSRE). This activity took place under Priority 6 of the Lisbon Safety Program, and included a visit to Nuclear Security Services Corporation (NSSC) in Chicago, Illinois, to observe state-of-the-art security systems now in use within the industry. The GAN delegation observed the facility's physical protection system and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's performance inspection program. They also held discussions with facility personnel, NRC regional management and OSRE inspectors. Discussions also were held to finalize GAN's requests for NRC to conduct joint workshops and inspections, and for NRC review and development support of GAN physical protection regulatory documents. GAN officials requested future assistance in developing a program similar to the OSRE program for Russia. Formal proposals from GAN for these activities are expected by the end of July. The proposals will be considered in relation to priority and resource implications.

On-site Representative Assigned to Richland, Washington

On July 21, 1997, Dr. Walter J. Pasciak was assigned to Richland, Washington, where he will serve as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission permanent on-site representative for the Hanford Tank Waste Remediation System project.

Meeting of ANSI Subcommittee N43-10 for Category IV Irradiators

On July 15-16, 1997, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Subcommittee N43-10 met at Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters to review and consider revision and reissue of ANSI N43.10, "Safe Design and Use of Panoramic, Wet Storage Gamma Irradiators," (Category IV). Meeting attendees included representatives of the irradiator industry (manufacturers and irradiator licensees), a representative from an Agreement State and a Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff member.

ANSI N43.10 contains suggested guidance and criteria for persons who design, fabricate, and use Category IV irradiators. Category IV irradiators are used for the irradiation of a variety of commercial products, e.g., for sterilization of medical supplies and for eradication of insects and microbial contamination in foodstuffs. The current version of the standard was approved for publication January 13, 1984, and has not been revised since that time. The Subcommittee suggested a number of changes to the standard to reflect current technology, historical experience, and requirements imposed by 10 CFR Part 36. In addition, the Subcommittee discussed the need for changes to the current requirements in 10 CFR Part 36 where the guidance in the revised standard would conflict with these requirements or where experience has demonstrated that current requirements may not be applicable.

The Subcommittee is expected to complete the review of the standard and begin finalizing the revisions at its next meeting. The NRC plans to send a representative to this and any subsequent Subcommittee meetings.

Envirocare Achieves Compliance with Special Nuclear Material Possession Limit

In response to a Confirmatory Order issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 25, 1997, Envirocare of Utah, Inc., submitted a compliance plan for management of wastes containing special nuclear material (SNM), on July 7, 1997. On July 21, 1997, NRC staff, in coordination with the State of Utah, forwarded comments on the plan to Envirocare, and requested a revised plan within 10 calendar days. In a related matter, Envirocare informed NRC on July 18, 1997, that it had reduced its unburied SNM inventory to less than the regulatory limits. In accordance with the terms of the Confirmatory Order, this means that Envirocare can resume receipt of SNM-bearing waste on July 24, 1997.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dockets Private Fuel Storage Application

In a letter dated July 21, 1997, the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission informed Private Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS) that its application for a license to construct and operate an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation on the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation had been accepted for docketing. The Reservation is located in Skull Valley, Tooele County, Utah. PFS represents a consortium of utilities which plans to store up to 40,000 MTU of spent fuel in approximately 4000 casks at the facility. A Federal Register Notice announcing this action will be prepared.

Northern States Power Requests Withdrawal of Goodhue County Application

On July 22, 1997, Northern States Power (NSP) sent a letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requesting withdrawal of the NSP application for a license to construct and operate an away-from-reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) in Goodhue County, Minnesota. NSP had been required by Minnesota law to attempt to find an acceptable off-site location for dry storage of spent fuel from the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. NSP attempted to comply with the state law and had submitted an application to NRC for the Goodhue County facility. Subsequently, however, the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board (MEQB) halted the facility siting process. On May 13, 1997, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled on a case brought by the Prairie Island Dakota Indian Tribe which challenged the MEQB decision. The Court affirmed the MEQB decision, which, in effect, resulted in termination of further action on the Goodhue County ISFSI facility. On July 10, 1997, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of the ruling, thus ending legal review of the MEQB decision.

ENCLOSURE C

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Millstone 2 Continued Operation Without A Startup Rate Trip

A startup rate (SUR) trip was originally provided in the older CE plants with analog protection systems (Palisades, Fort Calhoun, Maine Yankee, Calvert Cliffs, and St. Lucie) to provide protection against the classic startup accident in which control rods are withdrawn at a maximum rate from a subcritical condition. With the SUR trip operational, events initiated from subcritical conditions were assured of having much less consequences than events initiated from critical conditions. Thus, the original Millstone 2 FSAR, as well as current updated FSARs, discuss the more severe events that do not rely on crediting this trip for protection. This situation evidently led Millstone 2 and CE personnel to erroneously assume that the SUR trip was not credited in the plant's safety analyses.

Based on this, Millstone 2 requested removal of the SUR trip from the plant technical specifications (TS) in 1978. NRC allowed elimination of trip from TS and also required physical removal from the reactor protection system (RPS) to eliminate any possible degradation that could affect other safety related equipment. All other CE analog plants still incorporate this trip in their RPS, although not necessarily in their TS. CE has recently informed their utilities of the original design intent of this trip and the inadvisability of removing it from the RPS without due consideration of the events against which it provides protection. CE recommended that utilities considering removal of this trip function from the RPS should assure themselves that the power excursion events initiated from subcritical conditions, which are currently protected by the SUR trip, will be afforded similar protection by other trips remaining in the RPS. Based on this, Siemens Power Corporation, the current fuel vendor for Millstone 2, reanalyzed the uncontrolled control rod bank withdrawal event from a subcritical condition and credited the variable overpower (VOP) trip rather than the SUR trip. The Reactor Systems Branch has reviewed the revised analysis and has concluded that the VOP trip provides acceptable fuel protection against exceeding DNBR or fuel centerline melt limits and, therefore, continued operation of Millstone 2 without the SUR trip is acceptable.

Axial power Distribution Anomaly Caused by Crud Buildup

On July 1, 1997, a conference call was held between Region IV and NRR regarding an observed power distribution and reactivity anomaly at two Region IV Westinghouse plants, Callaway and Comanche Peak. The behavior is characterized by a gradual unexpected power shift toward the bottom of the core which continues until near end of cycle when the power shifts back to the top of the core. The anomaly is believed to be caused by subcooled nucleate boiling enhanced by crud deposition on the upper portion of the fuel. The impact of this anomaly on safety analysis considerations such as DNBR analysis and related accidents is of concern.

In addition to the anomalous power distribution, estimated critical control rod position (ECP) deviations between actual and predicted values increased with core burnup due to the unexpected power shift. Therefore, an additional safety concern is the potential adverse impact that the nonconservative ECP deviations might have on shutdown margin. Specifically, the licensee for the Callaway plant has indicated that they will need to begin reducing power in mid-August to maintain shutdown margin within the technical specification limits. They have increased their shutdown margin verification to almost twice a week.

NRR and Region IV are following this issue and have requested a meeting with Westinghouse within a month to discuss this anomaly in more detail.

Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2

At a meeting on July 15, 1997, with the NRC staff, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BGE) provided information on how they intend to operate the Calvert Cliffs salt water (SW) system and the service water system (SRW) when Chesapeake Bay water temperatures are in the range of 85 °F to 90 °F. Bay water temperatures in this range result in challenges to the heat removal capability and thus operability of these two systems.

The SRW system is a closed loop cooling system that rejects heat to the SW system. The SW system is an open loop cooling system that uses Chesapeake Bay water. During response to a design-basis accident, SRW provides cooling to the Containment Air Coolers (CAC) and the three emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchangers. The service water heat exchanger design margins are relatively small and changes in design input parameters, such as fouling factors, can pose a challenge to SRW system operability. The licensee intends to replace the heat exchangers in Unit 1 during the next refueling outage with larger plate-type exchangers.

In the meantime, one of the strategies BGE proposes to use when bay water temperatures reach the 85 °F to 90 °F range was to declare the SW header out of service and isolate one CAC. This isolation of one CAC eliminates heat addition to the SRW system thus providing additional margin. By taking this action the entire emergency core cooling train and EDG remain operable. BGE states that this action is safer than securing the entire SW header. This action would allow bay temperature to reach a maximum of 90 °F before the SRW exceeds its design temperatures. The licensee indicates that many variables exist which affect bay temperature to include tides, wind, and runoff from the Shenandoah.

The staff requested BGE provide a discussion in writing of how they intend to operate the SW and SRW systems during hot summer weather conditions.

Current water temperatures are in the range of 80-84 °F.

Salem Highlight Unit 2

Restart Schedule

Salem, Unit 2, is planning to cool down for approximately four days beginning on July 23, 1997, to perform several corrective maintenance items, including the repair of leaks in both the primary and secondary systems. The licensee is projecting criticality late July - early August 1997. The staff continued to closely monitor the licensee's readiness for restart.

Vendor Manuals

During the Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (RATI), a concern was raised about the magnitude of the vendor manual backlog. The response provided at the time of the June 27, 1997 exit indicated a relatively small backlog. Subsequently, the licensee corrected its response and indicated that the backlog was significantly higher. As a result, a five-member team visited the site from July 9 through July 11, 1997, to understand the vendor manual backlog and determine if items in the backlog represent a restart risk.

This team concluded that the vendor manual program is adequate. No program or document deficiencies at the restart level were identified that should hold up restart. However, a number of elements of the program are weak and warrant additional licensee attention.

St. Lucie and Turkey Point Nuclear Plants

Meeting with Mr. Thomas Saporito concerning 2.206 petition

On Monday, July 14, 1997, a meeting was held with Mr. Thomas Saporito to provide him an opportunity to discuss the substance of his 2.206 Petition dated April 23, 1997 and supplemented May 11 and 17, 1997. The Petition requests various actions as a result of previous alleged retaliatory actions on the part of Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) and their employees. NRC was represented at the meeting by staff from NRR, OE and OGC. The meeting was transcribed and the transcript will be placed in the Public Document Room. Members of the media were present at the meeting as observers, as was a representative from FPL.

Zion, Units 1 and 2

Operational Readiness Demonstration Program

The staff met with Zion station management on 07/11/97, to discuss its preparations for restart of Unit 2. One of the subjects discussed was the licensee's Operational Readiness Demonstration Program. The purposes of the program are to verify that 1) the operators and shift crews can implement

management's expectations for plant operations, 2) management supports operations through day to day plant activities, and 3) communication and directions for shift operations are effective. The licensee identified a series of plant operating tasks which includes routine and infrequent surveillance activities and off normal evolutions. These activities were then combined with the normal scheduled activities (maintenance repairs, preventive maintenance activities, out of services, etc.) to complete a station work and operations schedule. The licensee feels that this provides routine situations and challenging operational activities which provide the opportunity to validate plant readiness prior to returning to power operations. The demonstration program started on 07/07/97, and is expected to run through 08/15/97. The region will observe selected evolutions during the operations demonstration period.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Circulating Water System Pipebreak Analysis

In October 1995, the licensee identified that as a result of a newly postulated pipebreak scenario in the circulating water (CW) system, flooding of the turbine building could occur that would cause a loss of main feedwater as well as a loss of auxiliary feedwater.

The original licensing basis for internally initiated flooding at Davis-Besse comprised a double-ended rupture of the CW piping at the expansion bellows at the inlet to the main condenser. No other flooding from a pipe break scenario was analyzed.

In response to the expansion bellows rupture, the licensee installed (at initial plant licensing) pressure switches on the discharge piping from each CW pump to trip the pump upon sensing a break large enough to cause a sufficiently low discharge pressure. Because of this design feature, the newly postulated most-limiting CW pipebreak is now a slightly smaller break than that required to initiate the low pressure switches such that the CW pumps continue to pump and supply forced flow through the break.

Potential corrective actions were developed in late 1995 and an outside contractor was retained to perform a safety assessment. The results were provided to the site in May 1996 and indicated that the time from initial pipebreak to a loss of all feedwater (including AFW) was approximately six minutes in the worst case.

The licensee implemented compensatory measures (including additional measures subsequent to discussions with NRC) and is installing a system to provide a direct automatic trip of the CW pumps. The licensee anticipates the modification will be ready for final connection and testing by the end of the month. They are also evaluating whether they can perform the final work and safely conduct post-modification testing (PMT) while at power. If so, they intend to complete the work immediately thereafter. If not, the installation will be completed at the next scheduled or forced shutdown.

FERC Does Not Approve First Energy Merger

The possible anti-competitive effects of a proposed merger of four utilities prompted FERC to tell the companies (including the holding company over Davis-Besse and Perry) either to propose measures to mitigate potential market power problems or go to hearing. If the utilities opt for a hearing on competition issues, it will be a concurrent evidentiary hearing with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.

FERC reviewed the planned merger for its effect on competition, rates and regulation. FERC found that the companies submitted an inadequate analysis on competition.

ENCLOSURE F

Office of Administration
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Contract Award

On July 22, a cost plus fixed fee contract was awarded to Mega-Tech, Inc., under the 8(a) program, entitled "Office Equipment for Armenian Regulatory Authority." The contractor is responsible for providing all the necessary personnel, facilities, materials, equipment, etc., to enhance the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority capabilities to perform regulatory oversight of an operating nuclear power reactor through provision of needed office-related equipment, a local area network and associated supporting equipment. The contract award amount is $175,885.87, and the period of performance is July 22, 1997 through January 21, 1998, with 6 six-month option periods. The streamlining initiatives utilized included: electronic transmittal of SOW, reduced proposal preparation time, and oral presentations.

Radiological Criteria for License Termination (Parts 20, 30, 40, 50, 51, 70, and 72)

A final rule that amends the regulations concerning the decommissioning of licensed facilities to provide specific radiological criteria for the decommissioning of lands and structure was published in the Federal Register on July 21, 1997 (62 FR 39058). The final rule is intended to provide a clear and consistent basis for determining the extent to which lands and structure can be considered to be decommissioned. The final rule becomes effective August 20, 1997. Licensees may defer implementation until August 20, 1998.

Radiological Criteria for License Termination: Uranium Recovery Facilities (Parts 20 and 40)

A document requesting specific comment on radiological criteria for license termination for uranium recovery facilities was published in the Federal Register on July 21, 1997 (62 FR 39093). This action is intended to provide full consideration of the issues associated with the decommissioning of these facilities and the regulatory options for resolving these issues. The comment period for this action closes October 6, 1997.

NRC Security Program

The NRC Director of Facilities and Security met with the Lockheed Martin Corporation Director of Security on July 22, 1997, to discuss the NRC security program applicable to certificate holders and licensees including the provisions of 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95. They also discussed NRC's inspection and enforcement programs with respect to the USEC's Gaseous Diffusion Plants, since Lockheed Martin supplies the plants security support services in this area.

X-Ray Equipment Training

U.S. Capitol Police conducted x-ray training for NRC personnel from July 21-23, 1997, at NRC Headquarters. The training included classroom instruction on explosives and recognition of suspicious packages with "hands-on" experience on x-ray equipment; radiation safety; and an explosives demonstration held at Quantico, VA. Attendees included staff from Regions I and III, the Technical Training Center, Walnut Creek Field Office, as well as Headquarters staff (security and mail room staff/contractors).

ENCLOSURE G

Chief Information Officer
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Significant FOIA Requests Received during the 5-Day Period of July 18-24, 1997:

ENCLOSURE I

Office of Human Resources
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Orientation Session Conducted for New Members of the Senior Executive Service (SES)

On July 22, 1997, thirteen new members of the SES participated in a day-long orientation session. The participants met with agency officials to discuss budgetary and management matters concerning the agency. The Chairman presented SES certificates to all the new members.

ENCLOSURE M

Office of Public Affairs
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Media Interest

The WCFO reports there has been high media interest in the proposed shipment of nuclear waste through Concord Naval Weapons Station to a storage site in Idaho.

Region II has responded to media inquiries regarding violations imposed upon the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta.

School Volunteers Program

High school and middle school students from the Jefferson School visited NRC's Operations Center and Technology Center. Participating were: Richard McMullen, RES, Joe Giitter, AEOD, and Janet Thot-Thompson and Chris Hoxie, IRM.

ENCLOSURE O

Office of the Secretary
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Negative Consent Documents Release to the Public
Document		Date	Subject
1.	SECY-97-128	6/18/9	Removal of the Army Research Laboratory Portion of the Watertown Arsenal/Mall Site from the Site Decommissioning Management Plan
	- SRM on 97-128	7/16/97	(same)
Information Papers Released to the Public
1.	SECY-97-145	7/11/97	The Evaluation of Current State Agreements
2.	SECY-97-150	7/17/97	Weekly Information Report - Week Ending July 11, 1997
COMSECYs Released to the Public
1.	COMSECY-97-013	5/23/97	Steam Generator Rulemaking
	- SRM on 97-013	6/30/97	(same)

Commission Correspondence Released to the Public

1. Letter to Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt dtd 7/22 concerns DOI actions regarding the proposed Ward Valley low-level radioactive waste facility in California
   
   
2. Letter to Luigi Marras, Embassy of Italy, dtd 7/16 concerns the International Nuclear Regulators Association
   
   
3. Letter to Dominique Vignon, Framatome, dtd 7/16 concerns invitation to meet with Framatome and tour manufacturing and maintenance facilities
   
   
4. Letter to Perry D. Robinson, Winston & Strawn, dtd 7/16 concerns SECY-97-036, "Millstone Lessons-Learned Report, Part 2"
   
   
5. Letter to Donald L. Kallberg, Mayor of St. Helens, Oregon, dtd 7/16 concerns the shipment of the Trojan decommissioned reactor vessel
   
   
6. Letter to Representative Joseph McDade dtd 7/16 concerns proposed reduction to NRC's FY 1998 budget request
   
   
7. Letter to Senator John H. Chafee dtd 7/15 provides views on a provision in the Committee report to the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill for FY 1997.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Issuances

1. International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill; Alternate Feed Material); Docket No. 40-8681-MLA; Memorandum and Order (LPB-97-12) (Denying a Hearing) 7/23/97

ENCLOSURE P

Region I
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Regional Laboratory Meeting

Region I DNMS staff hosted a meeting to discuss regional laboratory operations. Representatives from NMSS/DWM, Region II, Region III and Region IV (telephone only) also participated in the meeting. Discussions during the meeting included QA/QC assessment of current laboratory operations in Region I and Region III, requirements for sample screening activities in Region II and Region IV, and regional interface issues regarding the NRC laboratories.

ENCLOSURE P

Region II
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Emergency Response Coordinators Workshop

On July 14, Region II hosted a workshop among the Emergency Response Coordinators Workshop within the NRC. The workshop included attendees from AEOD, NRR, NMSS, and all of the Regions.

Florida Power and Light Company

Representatives from Florida Power and Light Company were in the Regional Office on July 15 to discuss engineering initiatives and performance of their St. Lucie and Turkey Point plants. Topics discussed for both sites included the approach to have more engineering accomplished by the licensee rather than by vendor support; reorganization of engineering to enhance support to each site; staffing changes; software control; performance indicators; and design basis FSAR reviews. Topics discussed relative to St Lucie included control rod performance and system enhancements, and reactivity management. Topics discussed relative to Turkey Point included rod control system enhancements and improved Component Cooling Water heat exchanger performance.

General Electric Company

On July 16, Region II participated in the General Electric fuel fabrication plant emergency exercise. Region II's participation included a Base Team and two site participants. The exercise was fully successful with all objectives being met and no exercise weaknesses.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

The CDC met with Regional staff for a pre-decisional Enforcement Conference on July 17. The apparent violations discussed included failure to adequately secure licensed material, failure to conduct inventories of licensed material, failure to calibrate survey instruments (repeat) and posting issues. The licensee outlined corrective actions and plans to have an independent review of the radiation safety program performed.

ENCLOSURE P

Region III
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Zion Performance Improvement Program Status

On July 23, 1997, Region III staff members and representatives of Commonwealth Edison Co. met at the Region III Office, Lisle, Illinois, to review the status and effectiveness of the restart plan and plant performance improvement program activities at the Zion Plant.

ENCLOSURE P

Region IV
Items of Interest
Week Ending July 25, 1997

Fort Calhoun Station Predecisional Enforcement Conference

On July 21, 1997, representatives of Omaha Public Power District met with NRC personnel in the Region IV office to discuss the apparent violation identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/97-09. The issue related to an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65, (i.e. the maintenance rule) with regard to the extraction steamline event which occurred at the Fort Calhoun Station on April 21, 1997.

Power Resources, Inc.

At the request of NRC Region IV, a predecisional enforcement conference was held with Power Resources, Inc., for July 22, 1997, to discuss apparent violations found during a routine inspection. Attendees included members of the licensee's staff, NRC Region IV personnel, and Headquarters staff.

Callaway Plant

On July 23, 1997, the Committee to Review Generic Requirements visited the Callaway plant as part of their annual visit to reactor and materials licensees. The visit activities included a plant tour and discussion with operators and management on the impacts of recent generic communication and rulemaking.

Fort Calhoun Station

On July 25, 1997, the Regional Administrator and other members of the NRC staff attended a management meeting, open to public observation, with the Omaha Public Power District at the Fort Calhoun Station. Topics discussed included reactivity management, operations performance enhancement, and maintenance improvements.