July 23, 1997

SECY-97-159

FOR: The Commissioners

FROM: L. Joseph Callan /s/

Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: STAFF REQUIREMENTS MEMORANDUM (SRM) DATED FEBRUARY 21,

1997, RE: BRIEFING FOR COMMISSION ON CODES AND STANDARDS,

JANUARY 22, 1997

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this SECY paper is to provide the staff's response to the referenced

memorandum from the Commission.

BACKGROUND:

On January 22, 1997, the NRC staff and representatives from the American Society of

Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

briefed the Commission on the use of consensus codes and standards. Various aspects of

design and inservice inspection requirements for mechanical systems and components in

various Sections of the ASME Code were discussed. Design requirements are contained in

Sections B31.1 and B31.7 of the ASME Power Piping Code and Sections I, III, and VIII of the

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PVC), while Section XI of the B&PVC contains

inservice inspection requirements.

The staff reviewed the differences between new and old ASME Code Editions, as well as the $\,$

potential significance of these differences. As a result of that review, the staff concluded that

the newer design and construction codes do not necessarily provide a reactor design that has a

greater level of safety than older codes. When used correctly, both would provide generally

equivalent designs in terms of level of safety.

DISCUSSION:

In the referenced SRM, the Commission requested "that the staff identify those plants which

have reactor vessels or safety-related piping systems that do not fall under the design rules of

ASME Code Section III and identify the design rules or Codes that do

apply, characterize the

significant differences between ASME Code Section III and ANSI/ASME Codes B.31.1 and

 ${\tt B.31.7},$ and describe any inspection inconsistencies that could arise from the use of these

differing standards."

From Final Safety Analysis Reports, the staff has compiled plant-specific data on codes or

standards that were used to design reactor vessels, reactor coolant system (RCS) piping, and

remaining safety-related piping (see Attachment 1). The ASME B&PVC Section III was initially

issued in the early 1960s and later revised. As a result, most (i.e., 106 of 110) reactor vessels

at plants licensed to operate were designed to Section III. The remaining were designed to

Sections I or VIII. Safety-related piping systems of 67 plants were designed in accordance with

either USA Standard (USAS) B31.1, "Power Piping," or USAS B31.7, "Nuclear Power Piping,"

or a combination of them with portions of piping designed to Section III. The safety-related

piping systems of the remaining 43 plants were all designed to Section III.

Attachment 2 characterizes the differences in design requirements between Sections I and VIII

of the Code and Section III of the Code. In summary, Sections I and VIII did not require

detailed stress analysis, fatigue evaluation, thermal stress calculations, or the quality assurance

measures required by Section III. However, when Sections I and VIII were used for

construction of reactor vessels (and other Class 1 vessels such as pressurizers and steam

generators), they were supplemented by nuclear code cases that upgraded requirements so

that their initial integrity was approximately equal to that of the vessels designed to Section III.

Both the pre-Section III vessels and the early vessels designed to Section III were designed

before the ASME Inservice Inspection Code, Section XI, was issued. Therefore, these vessels

may not have been designed to permit access for conducting all tests and inspections required

by Section XI. For piping and systems, some pre-Section III Codes did not require a detailed

evaluation of thermal stresses. Pre-Section III Codes did not include specific provisions for the

increase in allowable stresses for safe shutdown earthquake or postulated pipe break loads;

however, additional criteria for these loadings were a part of the FSAR.

The inspection inconsistencies that arise from the differing design standards are mainly related

to accessibility issues. As noted above, vessels may not have accessibility to conduct tests and

inspections in accordance with Section XI, if they were designed before Section III was revised

to specifically include accessibility for inspections. Consistent with the requirements of the $10\,$

CFR 50.55a(f)(3) and 50.55a(g)(3), plants with construction permit (CP) dates later than July 1,

1974, were specifically required to provide configuration or access for Inservice Testing (IST)

and Inservice Inspection (ISI), as part of their design, as described in Section XI. Plants with

earlier CP dates were not specifically required to provide such configuration or access, and it is

impractical to meet all of the IST and ISI requirements of the latest edition of Section XI for

some components in these plants. In these cases, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(5),

50.55a(f)(6), 50.55a(g)(5), and 50.55a(g)(6), licensees may submit requests for relief from the

requirements considered to be impractical. The NRC staff reviews the requests and, if justified,

grants approval and frequently imposes alternative tests or examinations. Proposed

alternatives would be expected to provide an acceptable level of quality and safety. As required

by 10 CFR 50.55a(f) and 50.55a(g), operating reactor licensees must periodically update their

IST and ISI programs in accordance with the latest edition and addenda of Section XI that has

been incorporated by reference into 10 CFR 50.55a. The IST and ISI requirements of the

regulation are applicable to all plants, independent of the design codes or standards that may

have been used, to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials

of construction of the components.

In the referenced SRM, the Commission requested that, "The staff should discuss the

applicability of the ASME Code Section III or other design/construction Codes of Record to

operations, in particular, to those attributes that may not be addressed by the relevant Code

requirements referenced in paragraph (f) and (g) of 10 CFR 50.55a, and address the nature of

design/construction Code requirements in the context of operations and the current licensing

basis of operating plants."

In general, the licensing basis Design Code of Record (DCR) (e.g., ANSI, ASME) continues to

apply during plant operation. The DCR requirements applicable to operating plants fall into two

categories. One category contains requirements related to repair, replacement, or modification;

the other contains requirements related to tests and inspections. The DCR requirements apply

during operation for design related activities when a system or component is repaired, replaced,

modified or newly installed. The requirements defined in 10 CFR 50.55a(f) and (g) apply for tests and inspections.

The DCR is specified in the FSAR. The staff considers a failure to meet a DCR criterion to be a

nonconforming condition that requires a corrective action. For example, if the licensee's FSAR

specifies ASME Section III as the DCR, Section III design criteria would be applicable when a

system or component is repaired, replaced, modified or newly installed within the scope of Section III.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(f) and (g), the continuing performance of systems or components

designed under DCR is monitored and controlled by Section XI. However, Section XI may be

silent regarding monitoring certain aspects of the design. Nonconforming conditions identified

as a result of a Section XI required test or inspection must be corrected as specified by Section

XI in accordance with the DCR (or a later Code approved by NRC). Also if a nonconforming

condition is identified by some means other than a Section XI specified test or inspection during

plant operation, it must be corrected in accordance with the DCR consistent with commitments made in the plant FSAR.

In the referenced SRM the Commission stated, "Since the ASME Code is a product of a

consensus process, the staff should provide its rationale for applying backfit considerations

when endorsing later editions of the ASME Code. The staff should discuss its approach to

performing backfit analyses for the numerous changes that are reflected in ASME Code

revisions. In many cases, relaxations in one portion of the Code may be a result of consensus

agreement for increased requirements in other portions of the Code. In considering the option

of permitting licensees to selectively determine which requirements are applicable to their

facilities, the staff should discuss how the backfit analyses consider the consensus view. Staff

should also address the practicalities and implications related to the inspection and

enforcement of licensee's conformance to various different Code Edition requirements."

The process of incorporating by reference the ASME Code into the NRC regulations (i.e., 10

CFR 50.55a) has been in use since the first endorsement in 1971 (36 FR 11423, published

06/12/71). This has resulted in newer editions and addenda of the Code being incorporated

into the regulatory process on regular basis. Licensees are required to update their IST and ISI $\,$

programs every 120 months to the version of Section XI incorporated by reference in 10 CFR

50.55a. As discussed below, the staff does not perform a backfit analysis for revisions that

apply to components within the present scope of 10 CFR 50.55a.

The staff's position with regard to the backfit criteria in 10 CFR 50.109 first appeared in the

regulatory analysis for a final rule published in the Federal Register on June 26, 1987 (52 FR

24015). The regulatory analysis stated "It is the opinion of the Office of the General Counsel

that this amendment should not be subjected to the backfit provisions in 10 CFR 50.109. The

rationale is that, (1) Section III, Division 1 [Rules For Construction of Nuclear Power Plant

Components], applies only to new construction and to repair and replacements (i.e., the edition

and addenda to be used in the construction of a plant are selected based upon the date of the

construction permit and are not changed thereafter, except voluntarily by the licensee), (2)

licensees are fully aware that 10 CFR 50.55a requires that they update their ISI program every

10 years to the latest edition and addenda of Section XI that were incorporated by reference in

10 CFR 50.55a 12 months before the start of the next inspection interval, and (3) endorsing and

updating references to the ASME Code, a national consensus standard developed by the

participants (including the NRC) with broad and varied interests, is consistent with both the

intent and spirit of the backfit rule (i.e., NRC provides for the protection of the public health and

safety, and does not unilaterally impose undue burden on applicants or licensees)." Consistent

with this position, when incorporating later editions or addenda of Section XI into $10\ \text{CFR}$

50.55a, a backfit analysis is not performed for revisions that apply to components within the

present scope of 10 CFR 50.55a; although a more general regulatory

analysis is developed for every endorsement of the ASME Code.

As new subsections of the Code are issued, a backfit analysis is performed for those new Code

requirements that expand the scope of the 10 CFR 50.55a (e.g., the recently published

rulemaking that endorsed the new Section XI Subsection IWE, "Requirements for ISI of Metal

Containments and Metallic Liners of Concrete Containments," and Subsection IWL,

"Requirements for ISI of Concrete Containment Components.") A backfit analysis was

performed for this rulemaking that expanded the scope of 10 CFR 50.55a to require, for the first

time, inspection of metal containments and concrete containment components per Section XI.

Thus, a new component inspection, such as metal and concrete containments which expand

the scope of 10 CFR 50.55a, is subject to the backfit criteria, and credit is not given for the consensus process.

Because ASME Code changes sometimes consist of offsetting relaxations and increased

requirements, it has been the practice of the staff to endorse complete Code editions and

addenda. Two recent examples of Code requirements being relaxed in one area but increased

in another are the areas of support examination and pump testing. The number of supports

required to be examined was decreased; however, in a directly related change, a sampling

program was instituted to concentrate the examinations on areas where known problems were

being detected. For pumps, prior to 1994, tests and measurements were generally performed

quarterly. In 1994, the frequency for the quarterly test was standardized but the test criteria

were made less stringent. In a directly related change, more stringent pump testing and

measurement were required to be performed every two years. In order to incorporate the

changes in pump test requirements, revisions to numerous paragraphs and tables were

required. These examples support the practice of the staff to endorse complete Code editions and addenda.

The Foreword to the ASME Code cautions that complete sections should be utilized to meet the

intent of the Code. While 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(4)(iv) and (g)(4)(iv) permit the licensee to use

portions of subsequent editions or addenda to the ASME Code approved for

use by the NRC,

such use is conditioned on meeting "all related requirements of the respective editions or

addenda." This reflects the NRC's recognition that many Code provisions are interrelated and

that licensees should not indiscriminately use individual provisions from later editions and $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right$

addenda approved for use by the NRC.

The issue of permitting licensees to selectively determine which requirements are applicable to

their facility was related to a license amendment request from ${\tt Entergy}$ ${\tt Operations}$, ${\tt Inc.}$, which

submitted a request to continue use of earlier editions and addenda of the ASME Code rather

than updating to a later version as was currently required by $10\ \text{CFR}$ 50.55a. The staff viewed

this request as a potential Cost Beneficial Licensing Action (CBLA). Entergy subsequently

withdrew the request.

Since the staff was in the process of revising 10 CFR 50.55a to endorse a recent Code edition,

the staff began to discuss this plant-specific request as an option that could be included in the

ongoing rulemaking. As the staff developed the rulemaking package, Direction Setting Issue 13

(DSI-13), "Role of Industry," and the Commission's decision on this issue as reflected in $\ensuremath{\text{Commission}}$

 ${\tt COMSECY-96-062}$ identified additional questions related to Codes and Standards. The

questions include consideration of the consensus process and application of the current backfit

rule when the staff adopts updated Codes and Standards. Issues such as how the backfit

analysis considers the consensus process and inspection and enforcement practicalities will be addressed in the implementation of DSI-13, which will also involve interactions with industry

groups, professional societies, technical institutes, and other stakeholders.

L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations

Attachments: As stated

Attachment

Design Codes

The design codes listed in the following table are taken from two

sources. The information for reactor vessels is taken from NUREG-1511, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Status Report," and the information for safety-related piping is taken from the FSARs. Code cases mentioned in the table are defined and described in Attachment 2.

DESIGN CODES USED FOR REACTOR VESSEL AND RCS PIPING

Plant Name Unit

CP
OL
Reactor
Vessel
RCS Piping
Remaining Safety-Related Piping

Arkansas Nuclear One
1
12/06/68
05/21/74
ASME III
USAS B31.7
USAS B31.7

Arkansas Nuclear One 2 12/06/72 09/01/78 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

Beaver Valley 1 06/26/70 07/02/76 ASME III

ANSI B31.1 ANSI B31.1

Beaver Valley
2
05/03/74
08/14/87
ASME III
ASME III

ASME III

Big Rock Point

1
05/31/60
05/01/64
ASME I, Code
Cases 1270N,
1271N, and
1273N
ASA B31.1
ASA B31.1

Braidwood 1 12/31/75 07/02/87 ASME III ASME III ASME III

Braidwood 2 12/31/75 05/20/88 ASME III ASME III

Browns Ferry

1

05/10/67

12/20/73

ASME III

USAS B31.1

USAS B31.1

Browns Ferry 2 05/10/67 08/02/74 ASME III USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Browns Ferry

3 07/31/68 08/18/76 ASME III USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Brunswick 1 02/07/70 11/12/76 ASME III

USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Brunswick 2 02/07/70 12/27/74 ASME III

USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Byron 1 12/31/75 02/14/85 ASME III ASME III ASME III

Byron 2 12/31/75 01/30/87 ASME III ASME III

Callaway 1 04/16/76 10/18/84 ASME III ASME III Calvert Cliffs

1
07/07/69
07/31/74
ASME III
ASME III and
USAS B31.7
USAS B31.7

Calvert Cliffs
2
07/07/69
11/30/76
ASME III
ASME III and
USAS B31.7
USAS B31.7

Catawba 1 08/07/75 01/17/85 ASME III ASME III

Catawba 2 08/07/75 05/15/86 ASME III ASME III

Clinton 1 02/24/76 04/17/87 ASME III ASME III ASME III

Comanche Peak 1 12/19/74 04/17/90 ASME III ASME III ASME III

Comanche Peak

2

12/19/74

04/06/93

ASME III

ASME III

ASME III

Cooper

1

06/04/68

01/18/74

ASME III

ASME III

USAS B31.1

Crystal River

3

09/25/68

01/28/77

ASME III

USAS B31.7

USAS B31.1

Davis-Besse

1

03/24/71

04/22/77

ASME III

ASME III and USAS B31.7

ASME III

D. C. Cook

1

03/25/69

10/25/74

ASME III

USAS B31.1

USAS B31.1

D. C. Cook 2 03/25/69 12/23/77 ASME III

USAS B31.1

USAS B31.1

Diablo Canyon 1 04/23/68 11/02/84 ASME III

ASA B31.1

USAS B31.1

Diablo Canyon 2 12/09/70 08/26/85 ASME III

ASA B31.1 USAS B31.1

Dresden 2 01/10/66 02/20/91 ASME III USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Dresden 3 10/14/66 03/02/71 ASME III USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Duane Arnold 1 06/22/70 02/22/74 ASME III

USAS B31.7, USAS B31.1 and ASME III ASME III and USAS B31.7

Edwin I. Hatch
1
09/30/69
10/13/74
ASME III
ASME III
USAS B31.7

Edwin I. Hatch
2
12/27/72
06/13/78
ASME III
ASME III
ASME III

Fermi 2 09/26/72 07/15/85 ASME III USAS B31.7 ASME III

Fort Calhoun

1

06/07/68

08/09/73

ASME III

ASA B31.1 and

USAS B31.7

USAS B31.7

Ginna 1 04/25/66 12/10/84 ASME III

ASA B31.1 ASME III and

ASA B31.1

Grand Gulf

1

09/04/74

11/01/84

ASME III

ASME III

ASME III

Haddam Neck 1 05/26/64 12/27/74 ASME VIII, Code Cases 1270N and 1273N ASA B31.1 ASA B31.1

H. B. Robinson 2 04/13/67 09/23/70 ASME III ASA B31.1 AWWA Class C.200 and ASA B31.1

Hope Creek
1
11/04/74
07/25/86
ASME III
ASME III
ASME III

Indian Point 2 10/14/66 09/28/73 ASME III ASA B31.1

ASA B31.1

```
Indian Point
      3
      08/13/69
      04/05/76
      ASME III
      ASA B31.1
      ASA B31.1
James A. FitzPatrick
         1
      05/20/70
      10/17/74
     ASME III
    ANSI B31.1
    ANSI B31.1
  Joseph M. Farley
         1
      08/16/72
      06/25/77
      ASME III
      ASME III
      ASME III
  Joseph M. Farley
       2
      08/16/72
      03/31/81
      ASME III
      ASME III
      ASME III
     Kewaunee
        1
      08/06/68
      12/21/73
      ASME III
    USAS B31.1
    USAS B31.1
   La Salle County
          1
      09/10/73
```

08/13/82

ASME III

ASME III
USAS B31.7 and
ASME III

La Salle County 2 09/10/73 03/23/84 ASME III

ASME III
USAS B31.7 and
ASME III

Limerick 1 06/19/74 08/08/85 ASME III ASME III

Limerick 2 06/19/74 08/25/89 ASME III ASME III ASME III

Maine Yankee 1 10/21/68 06/29/73 ASME III ASME III

USAS B31.1

McGuire
1
02/23/73
07/08/81
ASME III
ASME III
ASME III

McGuire 2 02/23/73 05/27/83 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

Millstone 1 05/19/66 10/31/86 ASME III

ASME I, ASA B31.1 and ASME III ASA B 31.1 and ASME III

> Millstone 2 12/11/70 09/26/75 ASME III

USAS B31.7 and ASME III USAS B31.7, USAS B31.1 and ASME III

> Millstone 3 08/09/74 01/31/86 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

Monticello 1 06/19/67 01/09/81 ASME III ASME I and USAS B31.1 ASME III

Nine Mile Point

1
04/12/65
12/26/74
ASME I, Code
Cases 1270N
and 1273N
ASME I and ASA
B31.1
ASME I and
ASA B31.1

Nine Mile Point
2
06/24/74
07/02/87
ASME III
ASME III

ASME III

North Anna 1 02/19/71 04/01/78 ASME III USAS B31.7 USAS B31.7

North Anna 2 02/19/71 08/21/80 ASME III

USAS B31.7 USAS B31.7

Oconee 1 11/06/67 02/06/73 ASME III USAS B31.7 USAS B31.7

Oconee 2 11/06/67 10/06/73 ASME III USAS B31.7 USAS B31.7

Oconee 3 11/06/67 07/19/74 ASME III USAS B31.7 USAS B31.7

> Palisades 1 03/14/67 02/21/91 ASME III

ASA B31.1 ASA B31.1

Palo Verde
1
05/25/76
06/01/85
ASME III
ASME III
ASME III

Palo Verde 2 05/25/76 04/24/86 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

Palo Verde 3 05/25/76 11/25/87 ASME III

ASME III. ASME III

Peach Bottom 2 01/31/68 12/14/73 ASME III

USAS B31.1 and ASME III USAS B31.1

Peach Bottom 3 01/31/68 07/02/74 ASME III

USAS B31.1 and ASME III USAS B31.1

Perry
1
05/03/77
11/13/86
ASME III
ASME III
ASME III

Pilgrim 1 08/26/68 09/15/72 ASME III

ANSI B31.1 and
ASME III
ANSI B31.1, and
ASME III

Point Beach

1

07/19/67

10/05/70

ASME III

USAS B31.1

USAS B31.1

Point Beach 2 07/25/68 03/08/73 ASME III USAS B31.1 USAS B 31.1

Prairie Island 1 06/25/68 04/05/74 ASME III USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Prairie Island 2 06/25/68 10/29/74 ASME III USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

> Quad Cities 1 02/15/67 12/14/72 ASME III

USAS B 31.1 and ASME I

Quad Cities 2 02/15/67 12/14/72 ASME III

USAS B31.1 USAS B 31.1 and ASME I

> River Bend 1 03/25/77 11/20/85 ASME III ASME III ASME III

> > Salem 1 09/25/68 12/01/76 ASME III

USAS B31.7 and ASME III USAS B31.7 and ASME III

> Salem 2 09/25/68 05/20/81 ASME III

USAS B31.7 and ASME III USAS B31.7 and ASME III

San Onofre
2
10/18/73
09/07/82
ASME III
ASME III
ASME III

San Onofre 3 10/18/73 09/16/83 ASME III ASME III ASME III Seabrook 1 07/07/76 03/15/90 ASME III ASME III ASME III Sequoyah 1 05/27/70 09/17/80 ASME III USAS B31.1 and ASME III USAS B31.1 and ASME III Sequoyah 2 05/27/70 09/15/81 ASME III USAS B31.1 and ASME III USAS B 31.1 and ASME III Shearon Harris 1 01/27/78 01/12/87 ASME III ASME III

South Texas Project

ASME III

1 12/22/75 03/22/88 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

South Texas Project

2 12/22/75 03/28/89

ASME III

ASME III ASME III

St. Lucie 1 07/01/70 03/01/76 ASME III

USAS B31.7 USAS B31.7

St. Lucie 2 05/02/77 06/10/83 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

Summer
1
03/21/73
11/12/82
ASME III
ASME III
ASME III and
USAS B31.1

Surry 1 06/25/68 05/25/72 ASME III ASA B31.1 ASA B31.1

Surry 2 06/25/68 01/29/73 ASME III ASA B31.1 ASA B31.1

Susquehanna

1 11/02/73 11/12/82 ASME III ASME III ASME III

Susquehanna

2 11/02/73 06/27/84 ASME III ASME III

Three Mile Island

1

05/18/68

04/19/74

ASME III

USAS B31.7

USAS B31.7 and

USAS B31.1

Turkey Point 3 04/27/67 07/19/72 ASME III ASA B31.1 ASA B31.1

Turkey Point 4 04/27/67 04/10/73 ASME III ASA B31.1 ASA B31.1

Vermont Yankee

1
12/11/67
02/28/73
ASME III
ANSI B31.1
USAS B31.1 and
ANSI B31.1

Vogtle 1 06/28/74 03/16/87 ASME III

ASME III

Vogtle 2 06/28/74 03/31/89 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

Washington Nuclear

2 03/19/73 04/13/84 ASME III ASME III

Waterford 3 11/14/74 03/16/85 ASME III ASME III ASME III

Watts Bar

1 01/23/73 02/7/95 ASME III ASME III

Wolf Creek 1 05/31/77 06/04/85 ASME III

ASME III ASME III

Zion 1 12/26/68 10/19/73 ASME III

ASA B31.1 and USAS B31.1 USAS B31.1

Zion 2 12/26/68 11/14/73 ASME III

ASA B31.1 and USAS B31.1 USAS B 31.1

Attachment 2

Design Differences in Applicable Codes

Codes for Reactor Vessel Design

Early reactor vessels were designed in accordance with Section I or VIII of the Code. These

codes originally were written for non-nuclear vessels used in fossil power plants. NUREG-0081, "Evaluation of the Integrity of Reactor Vessels Designed to ASME Code Sections I and/or

VIII," published in June 1976 documents that only ten commercial power plant reactor vessels

were designed to pre-Section III codes. Four of these ten vessels (at Big Rock Point, Haddam

Neck, Nine Mile Point 1, and Oyster Creek) are in nuclear power plants licensed to operate.

The purpose of NUREG-0081 was to establish the level of integrity of reactor vessels not

designed to Section III. This report was published in response to an ACRS request that a

documented review be made of the status of older vessels designed in accordance with Code

Sections prior to the issuance of Section III. As documented in NUREG-0081, the results of the

review were stated to be "Although these vessels were designed to ASME Code Section I $\,$

and/or VIII, their design and material acceptance standards were supplemented by $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1\right$

requirements of the Navy Code, various Nuclear Code Cases, and manufacturing specifications

so that their initial integrity was approximately equal to that of the vessels designed to Section

III." A Code Case is an alternative to a specific portion of the Code. The Code Cases undergo

the same consensus approval process as the Code.

It should be noted that later reactor vessels were all designed in accordance with Section III of

the Code. The major differences between this code and earlier ones can be summarized as follows:

Section I and VIII did not require detailed stress analysis, thermal stress calculations, or the

quality assurance measures required by Section III. Section I and VIII also did not require

fatigue evaluation. Both the pre-Section III vessels and the early vessels designed to Section III

were designed prior to the issuance of the ASME Inservice Inspection Code, Section XI; so they

are not specifically designed to permit access for conducting all the examinations that the latest

editions of the Code require. Thus, there are areas in these vessels that are inaccessible to

inspection. As permitted by $10\ \text{CFR}\ 50.55\text{a}$, licensees request relief from the NRC from

inspections that cannot be performed.

Navy Code, "Tentative Structural Design Basis for Reactor Pressure Vessels and Directly Associated Components"

The design of pre-Section III vessels was based on a U.S. Navy Code, various early ASME

Nuclear Component Code Cases, and supplementary requirements of the vessels vendor. The

Navy Code was a forerunner of the first design subsection of Section III. It was primarily written

for design of reactor vessels in the early Naval Reactor Program, and like Section III, the Navy Code:

- 1. Utilized the same stress analysis methodology that was incorporated into Section III.
- 2. Required calculation and classification of all stresses and applied different stress limits

to different categories of stresses as Section III of the Code does.

3. Required a detailed fatigue analysis and provided rules for prevention of fatigue failure.

ASME Nuclear Code Cases

- 1270N Provided "General Requirements" for Nuclear vessels:
- 1. Vessels would be constructed to ASME Sections I or VIII modified by the requirements of the Nuclear Code Cases.
- 2. The order of precedence between possible conflicting requirements of the

 Nuclear Code Cases and ASME Section I and VIII was established, i.e.,

Nuclear Code Case requirements were to have precedence.

3. Vessel purchase specifications would include additional requirements to

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life of the vessel.

1271N - This Code Case provided guidance on selection and utilization of pressure

relieving devices for use in conjunction with a radioactive working fluid. In

addition, it recommended that a minimum of two such devices be utilized.

- 1273N Significant requirements of this Case include:
- 1. Steady state thermal stresses were to be combined with primary and

secondary stresses resulting from the design pressure. The resulting

combination of stresses was limited to three times the allowable stress at

 $$\operatorname{the}$$ design temperature (similar to procedure used in ASME Section III).

2. Maximum allowable design stresses for bolting material, operating at temperatures up to $8000 \, \mathrm{F}$, were limited to one-third the

material yield

strength at temperature (similar to ASME Section III).

3. Detailed design and inspection for both full and partial penetration

pressure boundary welds were included. Similar requirements were

ultimately written in ASME Section III.

Codes for Piping Design

Currently, 10 CFR 50.55a requires safety-related components to be designed and fabricated to

the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. $10\ \text{CFR}\ 50.55a$

requires reactor coolant pressure boundary components to be designed to the ASME Code

requirements for Class 1 components and the remaining safety-related components to be

designed to ASME Code Class 2 or 3 requirements. The primary difference between the $\$

Section III design requirements for Class 1 piping and Class 2 and 3 piping is the Section III

requirement for a fatigue evaluation of the Class 1 piping which includes an evaluation of local

thermal stresses. Section III of the Code generally allows higher stresses for the evaluation of

Class 1 piping in conjunction with the requirement for a more detailed evaluation of the stresses

and more stringent fabrication and inspection requirements. Although Section III does not

require an explicit fatigue evaluation of Class 2 and 3 piping, it does provide criteria for

addressing cyclic thermal expansion stresses. These stresses are caused by the restraint of

free thermal expansion at rigid support locations when the piping heats up and cools down.

The Code requires the allowable stress limit for thermal expansion/contraction stresses to be

reduced if the number of full-temperature cycles exceeds the specified value in the Code.

Piping at many older facilities was designed to the requirements of USA Standard Code for

Pressure Piping (USAS) B31.1, "Power Piping." The first code specifically written for nuclear

power plant piping, USA Standard (USAS) B31.7, "Nuclear Power Piping," was initially issued

for trial use and comment in 1968 and then formally issued in 1969. The B31.7 Code required

a fatigue evaluation of the Class 1 piping. It also required that the Class 2 and 3 piping meet

the B31.1 Code design criteria. The design criteria for Class 1 piping in B31.7 were

incorporated in Section III of the ASME Code in 1971. The design criteria for Class 2 and 3

piping were taken from the B31.1 Code and also incorporated in Section III in 1971. Therefore

the design requirements for ASME Class 1 piping originate from the ${\tt B31.7}$ Code, and the

design requirements for ASME Class 2 and 3 piping originate from the B31.1 Code. Although

there have been numerous changes in the details of the ASME Code piping design criteria

since 1971, the basic design philosophy of higher stress limits coupled with a more detailed

evaluation of the stresses and more stringent fabrication and inspection requirements for ${\tt ASME}$

Class 1 piping has not changed.

The primary difference between the current ASME Section III design criteria and the B31.1

design criteria is the ASME Section III Class 1 requirement for a fatigue evaluation, including an

evaluation of local thermal stresses, in conjunction with higher allowable stress limits. As a

consequence, the use of the B31.1 criteria generally resulted in piping with a greater wall

thickness for a given design pressure than the use of the ASME Code Class 1 criteria would

have required. However, the ASME Class 1 criteria would have required a fatigue evaluation of

the piping, including an evaluation of local thermal stresses. A discussion of the differences in

design criteria for piping between ASME Section III Class 1 and USAS B31.1 is contained in

Attachment 2 of SECY-95-245, "Completion of the Fatigue Action Plan." In it an assessment of

a sample of piping components designed to the B31.1 Code using current ASME Class 1

criteria found that the current ASME fatigue limit was met for the components designed to the

B31.1 Code. The details of the sample assessment as well as a more detailed discussion of

the Code criteria is contained in NUREG/CR-6260, "Application of NUREG/CR-5999 Interim

Fatigue Curves to Selected Nuclear Power Plant Components." In Attachment 2 of SECY-95-245, the staff concluded that the lack of a specific fatigue analysis in the design of piping

components at older plants does not constitute a significant safety concern.