



U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

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THE U.S. & NATO

AN ALLIANCE OF PURPOSE

THE U.S. AND NATO: AN ALLIANCE OF PURPOSE



(State Department photo — Janine Sides)

When President George W. Bush welcomed NATO's newest members at the accession ceremony at the White House on March 29, 2004, he noted that unity and commitment to freedom had carried the Alliance to victory in the Cold War and would do so again in the war against terror.

“Today, our Alliance faces a new enemy, which has brought death to innocent people from New York to Madrid. Terrorists hate everything this Alliance stands for. They despise our freedom, they fear our unity, they seek to divide us. They will fail. We will not be divided,” he said. “Together, Europe and America can lead peaceful nations against the dangers of our time. Europe and America can advance freedom, and give hope and support to those who seek to lift the yoke of isolation and fear and oppression. That is the mission that history has set for NATO — this great and confident alliance of 26 nations — and we proudly accept this mission.”

The NATO Alliance is today, as it has been since its founding 55 years ago, a unique and invaluable organization. It is, as NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said, “a place where North America and Europe come together to discuss the most serious political issues on our agenda. It is where the countries that share most profoundly our common values agree on common action. And it is the platform for the most effective militaries in the world to defend our security, our values, and our interests, wherever required, together.”

When the 26 members of the Transatlantic Alliance meet June 28-29 in Istanbul, they will continue the transformational dialogue begun two years before in Prague and seek profound cooperation to meet the security challenges of this age.

This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the newly expanded NATO Alliance through a range of perspectives in articles, commentary, and references from national security experts within the administration, the Congress, and the public research and academic sectors.

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NATO REMAINS OUR ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE

By R. Nicholas Burns

U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)



For NATO's summit in Istanbul and beyond, the United States envisions five ambitious goals: a call for troops and resources for a more vigorous NATO presence in Afghanistan; a defined role for NATO in Iraq; expanded practical engagement with the Greater Middle East; improved relations between NATO and the European Union; and to elevate and strengthen NATO's relations with Russia. The United States remains committed to NATO, the essential Alliance, and effective multilateralism in order to achieve the common European and American vision for a secure, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous future.

Originally created to shield Western Europe from Soviet communist aggression, the modern-day NATO has adapted to 21st century threats, transformed itself politically, acquired new military capabilities, and embarked on important new missions confronting the global terrorism threat on its front lines. For NATO's June summit in Istanbul and beyond, the United States envisions five ambitious goals for the 55-year old Alliance. This venerable multilateral institution remains a vital transcontinental bridge linking the United States and Canada to democracies in Europe and extending security across virtually two continents.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies have been engaged in a top-to-bottom rebuilding of NATO. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, the allies agreed on a blueprint to create a new NATO — different in mission, membership, and capabilities than the old Cold War institution. The results of our transformation efforts will be evident at NATO's Istanbul Summit in June 2004.

This epochal transformation has been occurring simultaneously with the Alliance's greatest enlargement since its founding in 1949. The Istanbul Summit will mark the first meeting of NATO's heads of state with 26 member nations. The addition to NATO of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia completed the greatest round of enlargement in NATO's 55-year history.

Those seven nations joined NATO in late March of this year, helping to consolidate the democratic revolution in the former Warsaw Pact countries. Their accession re-energizes the Alliance and reaffirms the importance of security as a condition for progress and prosperity. These new members of NATO, in the words of Latvian President Vaira Vike-Friberg, "know the meaning and the value of liberty. They know that it is worth every effort to support it, to maintain it, to stand for it, and to fight for it."

As important as NATO's political transformation has been its evolution from a defensive and static military alliance with a huge, heavy army massed to deter a Soviet threat to Western Europe. NATO's past focused inward on Cold War threats directed at the heart of Europe. NATO's future is focused outward on the challenges posed by global terrorist networks and, in particular, to the security of its members from the arc of instability that stretches from South and Central Asia to the Middle East and North Africa.

To meet those new threats, NATO is beginning to acquire modern military capabilities to produce a more deployable force — capabilities such as strategic airlift and refueling, precision-guided munitions, air-to-ground surveillance, and combat service support. Last summer, NATO created a new, leaner military command structure and a new Alliance Transformation Command in Norfolk to plug European allies into revolutionary new concepts in training, doctrine, and technology being pioneered

by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Most significantly, the Alliance has also developed a flexible, agile, cutting-edge NATO Response Force (NRF) to which France has been a major contributor. The NRF is prepared for any mission — whether hostage rescue, humanitarian relief, response to terrorist attack, or high intensity conflict — deployable within days to wherever in the world it is needed, and sustainable once it gets there.

Today, NATO has more troops committed to missions at greater distances than ever before in its history. In addition to ongoing operations in Kosovo and Bosnia, and supporting the Polish-led multinational brigade in Iraq, NATO has embarked on a historic mission in Afghanistan, where it commands the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.

As we prepare for the NATO Summit in Istanbul and look to the future, the United States sees five goals for NATO. They constitute an ambitious agenda for our Alliance.

Our highest priority is helping the Afghan people rebuild their shattered country. NATO, which has command of the U.N.-mandated ISAF, must reinforce its long-term peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. The allies have agreed that we will move beyond Kabul to build a nationwide presence, and help the Afghan government extend its authority and provide security for nationwide elections. We are moving to create five new Provincial Reconstruction Teams. But NATO's success will depend on having the troops and military resources to do the job. The U.S. calls on European nations to contribute more troops and resources in order to construct a more vigorous NATO presence in Afghanistan.

Our second key goal is to examine how to set the stage for a greater NATO role in Iraq as President Bush has suggested. Recent events have clearly made this task difficult, but the proposal is supported by a large group of allies. After the interim Iraqi government assumes control on June 30, NATO allies will continue to serve as valued members of the coalition forces. NATO can offer something of inestimable value to help Iraqis make the great

transition from dictatorship to a democratic future. Defining such a mission will be a leading issue for NATO's heads of state to discuss at Istanbul in June and in the coming months.

Third, NATO should expand its engagement with the Arab world and Israel to help those countries find their way toward a more peaceful future in the Greater Middle East. The United States wants NATO to be one of the building blocks for our long-term engagement in this vast region. Recent Alliance consultations in the region have demonstrated some support for an enhanced relationship with NATO.

Long-term change in the Middle East will help to attack the foundations of the terrorism crisis and give democracy and civil society a chance to take root. This is a challenge that Europeans and Americans alike must embrace. We can transform NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue into a true partnership, offering military training and exercises and a closer political relationship, and also launch outreach to other countries in the region with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Our focus should be on practical cooperation with those countries that wish to have a closer relationship with NATO.

Our fourth goal is to improve relations between NATO and the European Union (EU), the two great institutions responsible for Europe's future, particularly in the Balkans. The spring 2004 enlargements of both organizations have advanced our common goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Toward that end, both organizations will remain active in maintaining the hard-won peace and stability in the Balkans.

NATO will likely conclude its successful peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in December 2004, and support a new EU mission under the "Berlin Plus" framework agreed to by the two organizations last March. But NATO should maintain a robust presence and a military headquarters in Sarajevo to help Bosnian authorities bring indicted war criminals to justice.

In Kosovo, NATO will continue the KFOR (Kosovo Force) mission, maintaining the security and stability that Kosovo needs as it works on an internationally-

backed plan to expand democratic institutions, protect minority rights, return and reintegrate displaced persons, and open dialogue with Belgrade. If it makes sufficient progress by mid-2005, the international community will then consider beginning to address Kosovo's future status. Together, NATO and the EU must continue to support the transition to stable, market-oriented democracies in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia.

Our fifth goal is to elevate NATO's relations with Russia. Our constructive engagement through the NATO-Russia Council has helped make our citizenry safer and more secure today than at any time in the last 50 years. NATO and Russia will participate in a major civil emergency crisis management exercise in Kaliningrad in June. Yet there is much more NATO can do with Russia — from search and rescue at sea to theater missile defense to greater cooperation in the Black Sea to joint peacekeeping. NATO needs to set its sights on a closer relationship that will put our past rivalry behind us forever.

One more obstacle must be overcome if the Alliance is to achieve its goals: the persistent and growing gap in military capabilities between the United States and the rest of its allies. If NATO's transformation and long-term missions are to be successful, our European allies will need to spend more — and more wisely — on defense. The U.S. will spend \$400 billion on defense this year; the 25 other allies combined will spend less than half of that.

In addition, there is the “usability gap” — of Europe's 2.4 million men and women in uniform, only three percent are now deployed in our priority missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Forces that are static, untrained, ill equipped, and not deployable make no contribution to NATO or to the larger cause of peace and stability in Europe and beyond.

After terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, and later in Istanbul and Madrid, there is no doubt among NATO allies that our security is indivisible. The most dangerous security threats of our globalized 21st century are themselves global: sophisticated terrorist networks seeking access to weapons of mass destruction. President Harry Truman, who led the United States into NATO, could have been speaking of the present day when he said in 1951, “no nation can find safety behind its own frontiers ... the only security lies in collective security.”

That is sound advice for the U.S. role in today's NATO. The United States will remain committed to NATO and to effective multilateralism in our effort to repair transatlantic divisions and rebuild NATO for the future. Allied cooperation on issues of international peace and security helped NATO win the Cold War, and will be indispensable to winning the global war on terror. The new NATO remains our essential alliance for achieving the common European and American vision for a secure, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous future. ●

THE U.S. AND NATO: A PARTNERSHIP IN ACTION

By A. Elizabeth Jones

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs



Despite recurring predictions that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has outlived its usefulness and is in decline, NATO is larger and more active than ever. The discussion at Istanbul will not be about whether NATO still has a purpose or whether NATO should be transformed. It will be about the military operations and outreach activities that NATO is undertaking around the globe to safeguard and promote the common values that are the Alliance's foundation: freedom and democracy.

There is a cottage industry of critics who make their living off the premise that NATO's demise is imminent. They've been predicting this since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The criticism died down after NATO's successful intervention in the Balkans, but was out in force again last year with divisions over Iraq. These critics argue that NATO is an alliance in decline, hopelessly riven by transatlantic differences that can no longer be bridged.

There is just one problem with these analyses: they aren't supported by the facts. As we approach the June 28-29 NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has just expanded by seven new members, with more countries knocking on its door, and it is more active than it has ever been:

- Former NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson said last year that NATO must go "out of area or it would go out of business." In Afghanistan, NATO has accepted this challenge, agreeing to lead and expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). NATO's number one priority is stabilizing Afghanistan and providing the security needed for democracy to take root. A successful mission may take years, but it will establish NATO's ability to play a key security role wherever necessary — not just in Europe but throughout the world.
- In Iraq, NATO is already playing an important role in support of the Polish-led multinational division in south-central Iraq. There have been many calls

for it to do more, and President Bush agrees that NATO should explore options to do so. At Istanbul, we look forward to an in-depth discussion of what role the Alliance could most usefully play.

- In Bosnia, NATO has laid down the blueprint for successful nation-building exercises. NATO brought peace and provided the security umbrella for reconstruction and democratization. At Istanbul, NATO will announce that SFOR (the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina), its mission complete, will terminate at the end of 2004. But NATO's role will not end. It will provide critical support to a combined military/police mission the EU will send to Bosnia in 2005 to help maintain stability and to foster faster integration with European institutions.
- In Kosovo, NATO intervened to stop genocide and then stayed to once more provide the security needed for reconstruction and development to proceed. Recent events have demonstrated the fragility of the situation in Kosovo and the need for NATO to remain engaged to ensure a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo, no matter what its final status.
- In the Mediterranean, NATO has established Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) to interdict maritime traffic and prevent the movement of terrorists. Through OAE, NATO warships and maritime patrol aircraft have conducted an unprecedented degree of surveillance of shipping of all kinds in the Mediterranean.

- NATO is undertaking an unprecedented expansion and deepening of its relations with its immediate neighbors to the south and to the east. With the Middle East, the Alliance plans to announce the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as well as a deeper relationship with the seven countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia). Both of these initiatives will bring the Alliance closer to the countries of the Greater Middle East and contribute NATO's expertise to helping realize President Bush's vision of a reformed, democratic region.
- NATO will make the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus the focal point of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Alliance's most successful outreach initiative, reflecting their importance in the war on terror. As part of this shift, PfP will refocus on its original goal of increasing military cooperation between NATO and its partners, rather than its recent focus of preparing partners for membership. As part of this initiative, NATO plans to announce at Istanbul its intent to open regional offices in both the Caucasus and Central Asia.
- NATO is pursuing closer cooperation with Russia, through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and laying the foundation for future joint operations. In April, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a permanent Russian mission at SHAPE (Supreme

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), and to expand the access of NATO's mission in Moscow. We hope to have a successful NATO-Russia meeting at Istanbul that will further cement this important relationship.

- The Alliance is also making progress in developing the new capabilities needed to win the war on terror, including developing expeditionary militaries that can meet threats wherever they arise. NATO took a major step in this direction last October when it "stood-up" the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF will eventually constitute a force of some 30,000 soldiers, able to react to a crisis in a matter of days and deploy virtually anywhere in the world.

This is quite an agenda for an alliance supposedly in decline. The discussion at Istanbul will not be about whether NATO still has a purpose or whether NATO should be transformed. It will be about the military operations and outreach activities that NATO is undertaking around the globe to safeguard and promote the common values that are the Alliance's foundation: freedom and democracy.

"Partnership," in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, "is the watchword of U.S. strategy in this administration," and NATO remains our vital partner. ©

NATO: AN ALLIANCE TRANSFORMING

By Ian Brzezinski

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs



The Prague Summit of 2002 and the Istanbul Summit of 2004 stand as bookends to a period of unprecedented progress by the NATO Alliance in transforming itself to meet the new and very different challenges found in the post-9/11 world. As NATO leaders convene the Istanbul Summit they will be directing an Alliance bound by common values, energized by a shared vision, and more responsive to the global challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's fundamental purpose remains collective defense, but the missions that flow from this responsibility are very different than those the Alliance planned for during the Cold War — and even from those executed in the last decade. Unpredictable, seemingly wanton terrorist attacks make clear the danger to open societies posed by those with a bent toward causing mass casualties. The scale of danger posed by terrorist organizations is especially alarming, given their desire for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

NATO protects the transatlantic community from this threat, and is working hard to improve the strength of its shield and the reach of its spear to confront and repel this global challenge.

Two NATO summits — Prague in 2002 and Istanbul in 2004 — serve as bookends to a period of unprecedented activity in the Alliance. In fact, more constructive change has occurred at NATO over the past two years than in any 10-year period of Alliance history. The Prague Summit set the stage for milestone initiatives in military transformation, and Alliance operations have been implemented with remarkable speed.

NATO invited seven partners to join the Alliance. In April 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became new members. Each has made contributions to the global war on terrorism. Soldiers of these Central European democracies serve with those of other NATO allies in

Afghanistan and Iraq. Their integration into NATO represents a significant step toward the common goal of building a Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and indivisible.

NATO took charge of the International Security Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. NATO agreed at the Prague Summit to take over the United Nation's mission to ensure security in Kabul. This is the first NATO mission outside of Europe. Today there are over 6,000 NATO troops deployed to Afghanistan to provide stability in Kabul and Konduz. The Alliance is considering an expansion of the ISAF mission, to include ensuring stability in the northern and western parts of Afghanistan and creating five new Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

NATO provided support to Poland when the latter took leadership of the multinational division in Iraq. When Poland stepped up to the difficult task of leading the 16-nation multinational division, NATO provided force generation, planning, and communications support. NATO's actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have decisively ended the debate over whether NATO "will go out of area or out of business." NATO is in both.

NATO continues Operation Active Endeavour. While launched before Prague, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was one of the first Alliance efforts to confront terrorism. As an important element of NATO's Article 5 response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, allied ships and aircraft contribute to the global war

on terrorism through maritime patrols in the Mediterranean and compliant boarding of suspected terrorist vessels. To date, OAE forces have led to the identification, tracking, and boarding of 48 ships suspected of terrorist-related activities in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and have escorted 421 civilian ships through the Strait of Gibraltar.

NATO has also established the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF, which is scheduled to reach initial operational capability in October 2004, is a 21,000 person joint force that is lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice (five to 30 days). The NRF is a vehicle for providing NATO with a distinctive, high-end capability for the full spectrum of Alliance missions, with allies committing forces on six-month rotations.

The NRF has already proven itself to be a profound driver of transformation. NATO military authorities are developing readiness and capability standards that NRF forces must meet, as well as a process to certify their ability. Alliance doctrine for NRF deployment will be standard curricula at NATO schools.

NRF-inspired transformation is being felt in Alliance capitals as well. Nations recognize the need to change laws that restrict employment of their troops dedicated to the NRF. Allies are ensuring that national laws smooth the way for quick dispatch of troops; most allies are increasing the number of forces that can be legally deployed.

A more nimble NATO command structure has been created. To efficiently handle quickly moving crises with deployable and joint military forces, the Alliance decided at the Prague Summit to modernize and streamline its command structure. This new structure, approved in June 2003, eliminated nine headquarters and provides for command and control of NATO operations anywhere in the world.

The Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has been established by NATO. As part of the command structure reform, ACT is developing new force planning and generation approaches, as well as developing Centers of Excellence and a certification

process for the NRF. As a driver of Alliance transformation, ACT promises to be the backbone of military interoperability within Europe and across the Atlantic.

NATO instituted a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) battalion. The multinational CBRN Defense Battalion, led by the Czech Republic, is already conducting readiness training and exercises. When fully “stood up,” it will be able to react rapidly to a CBRN attack, either alone or with a NATO force, such as the NRF. It will reach initial operating capability on 1 July.

What started at Prague will not end at Istanbul.

Allied contributions to military operations in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq reflect the increasingly demanding global agenda before NATO. These operations are straining Alliance resources and underscore the urgency of NATO’s transformation. They highlight long-recognized defense shortfalls in areas such as airlift and precision-guided munitions. Moreover, while some allies are reforming their force structures to increase their deployability, sustainability, and lethality, overall allied forces are still stuck with excessive numbers of static, territorial defense forces.

To help address this situation, the Alliance needs to give renewed emphasis to the Prague Capability Commitment, particularly in areas such as deployability, sustainability and combat effectiveness. NATO is also developing a set of initiatives for Istanbul that will improve the way the Alliance determines its future force requirements, and how nations can meet them. Allies need to eliminate Cold-War era forces no longer appropriate to NATO’s contemporary missions, and to reinvest any freed-up resources in deployable, usable forces.

As NATO moves into the future, it faces an agenda that is both regional and global in character. We must remember that Europe is still not complete. Seven nations tapped for membership at the Prague Summit will take their seats at the table for the Istanbul Summit, but Europe will still feature democracies seeking NATO membership. Our vision of a Europe

whole and free will not be fulfilled as long as countries like Ukraine, Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia are not full members of the transatlantic community. Allies new and old have an interest in assisting these nations to meet the political, economic, and military requirements of NATO membership.

In a region of Europe better known in past years for its violence, the Alliance will consider the successful termination of one of its first “out of area” missions — the SFOR (Stabilization Force) mission in Bosnia. The European Union (EU) is considering a new, follow-on mission in Bosnia under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, which governs cooperation between the EU and NATO. Even if the SFOR mission is ended, NATO will remain engaged in Bosnia to help foster Bosnian defense reform, among other missions.

From a global viewpoint, NATO must consider how it can contribute to peace and stability beyond Europe. The Bush administration’s forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East recognizes that as long as

freedom does not flourish in that part of the world, it will, as the president said, “remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export.”

NATO can contribute to reform and democracy in this region by enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue in which Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia currently participate. NATO can also create a wider set of relationships with selected nations of the Greater Middle East, working with them in the areas of counter-terrorism, counter-WMD, interdiction, and stability operations.

NATO recognized at Prague that it had to transform itself to successfully meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. Toward that end, unprecedented progress has been made. As NATO heads of state and government convene at the Istanbul Summit, they lead an Alliance bound by common values, energized by a shared vision for a Europe whole and free, and more responsive to the global challenges and opportunities before the transatlantic relationship. ●

THE NEW POLITICS OF TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE COOPERATION

By Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)



The Istanbul Summit will demonstrate how NATO confronts new threats in a new way — by projecting stability. The Alliance’s commitment to Afghanistan is the top priority. Also on the agenda are strengthened and expanded partnerships, better force generation and planning procedures in the transformation process, and follow-through on current military operations. Territorial defense remains a core function, but providing security requires addressing the potential risks and threats that arise far from our homes. Either these problems are tackled when and where they emerge, or they will end up on our doorstep.

The NATO Summit will cap a month of intensive, top-level diplomatic activity, including the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting, the U.S.-EU (United States-European Union) Summit and the Normandy commemoration. So the NATO Summit will have distinct goals and accomplishments, but will be part of a wider picture. In today’s fluid strategic environment, this is as it must be. NATO will act with its partners and other international organizations to defend against new threats in a new way — by projecting stability.

For the transatlantic community, projecting stability has become the precondition for our security. Territorial defense remains a core function, but we simply can no longer protect our security without addressing the potential risks and threats that arise far from our homes. Either we tackle these problems when and where they emerge, or they will end up on our doorstep.

The Istanbul Summit will demonstrate how the new NATO projects stability:

- By strengthening our relationships with an ever-growing list of partners, from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from Central Asia to the Mediterranean countries and the wider region;
- Through military operations in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and through Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea;

- And by modernizing the way we organize and deploy our forces for the new operations, far away from home.

My first priority for Istanbul — NATO’s priority — is Afghanistan. The importance of Afghanistan to our security is clear. Afghanistan may be halfway around the world, but its success matters to our security.

That is why NATO’s governments have committed to Afghanistan. Since NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) last August, things have turned for the better. Thanks to ISAF’s patrols, Kabul is safer than it has ever been. We are helping to secure heavy weapons in the capital. We have now started to expand our presence beyond Kabul. We are helping to retrain Afghan fighters, to help them reintegrate into civilian life. In short, NATO’s presence is making a tangible difference.

But we need to do more. I intend to be able to announce, at our summit, and alongside 26 heads of state and government, that we will further expand our presence in Afghanistan by increasing the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I want NATO to play a strong role in supporting the elections that the United Nations is organizing for later this year.

This article is adapted from a May 17 speech on “Defending Global Security: The New Politics of Transatlantic Defense Cooperation” delivered at the New Defense Agenda conference.

I want NATO to be able to say to President Karzai, and the Afghan people, that the Alliance is helping them toward a better future. A future of peace and security. A future of increasing prosperity. And a future where their country is contributing to international security, rather than threatening it. And I am confident that this is achievable. Operations like Afghanistan and Active Endeavour are important, and the ability to conduct such robust military operations makes the Alliance unique. But operations are only one tool available to NATO. We are also a forum for political consultations, especially regarding security issues.

So let me be clear: projecting stability means, first and foremost, building partnerships to maximize our collective ability to defend the peace. That's what our Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have always been about. And they are certainly delivering. Our partners are with us in Bosnia. They are with us in Kosovo. And they are making a very important contribution, indeed, in meeting NATO's priority number one: Afghanistan.

At Istanbul, we will enhance our partnerships to deliver more. We will concentrate more on defense reform to help some of our partners continue with their democratic transitions. We will also focus on increasing our cooperation with the Caucasus and Central Asia — areas that once seemed very far away, but that we now know are essential to our security right here.

One crucial partner is Russia. The NATO-Russia relationship alone is a vital bridge of security across Europe. Both NATO and Russia are safer now that we are partners. We are working on a range of projects, including terrorism, proliferation, civil emergency planning, and military-to-military cooperation. I visited Moscow recently, and I told President Putin that I hope the conditions will be right for him to come to Istanbul.

Ukraine is another vital partner. Its geographic position alone makes its success a key strategic goal. We are, and will remain, closely engaged with this nation, helping it build its democracy and helping

build our mutual security. We want to help Ukraine to integrate further into our Euro-Atlantic Community.

NATO is also working hard on building stronger relationships with the Mediterranean countries, and is reaching out to those in the wider region.

No one today can doubt that these regions matter. Demographics, economics, and transnational threats create an ever-closer interdependence between us.

Recently, my deputy went to countries in the region in order to explore the best way forward. We want to hear what these countries have to say, what they want in terms of dialogue and cooperation. Above all, we want to engage the countries in the region and to make sure that there is "joint ownership" of any new cooperative efforts to enhance our common security.

This is an ambitious undertaking. While the strategic necessity of our engagement is not in doubt, some may say that with things as they are in the Middle East, it is not the right time. Others argue, more persuasively, that we have no time to lose. The Group of Eight and the European Union are also considering new initiatives, and we will need to complement each other's efforts. The time has come to build new bridges to this pivotal region.

Let me add a word about Iraq. Our summit will take place just 48 hours before Iraq becomes, once again, a sovereign nation. Iraq will be in the news, and it will certainly remain on our agenda. But, as we all know, developments there are fast-paced. I cannot speculate now on what the situation will look like at the end of June. That depends on a range of variables, including necessary U.N. Security Council action, events on the ground, and last, but not least, the nature and views of the new government. Many allies have forces committed in Iraq, and NATO will continue to support the multinational division and follow events closely. Beyond that, I cannot rule out, or predict, possible decisions by the Alliance.

Istanbul will certainly also highlight the strategic value of a strong partnership between NATO and the

EU. Clearly, as NATO continues to transform, and the EU is finding its own distinct role as a security actor, our relationship will continue to evolve as well. We welcome a European Security and Defense Policy as a means to enhance Europe's contribution to our common security.

At Istanbul, we expect to announce that NATO's mission in Bosnia — Stabilization Force (SFOR) — can be successfully concluded at the end of the year. The EU has already stated that it would be ready to deploy a mission into Bosnia, in full cooperation with the Alliance, and with NATO's continuing support.

This will be a major step forward in a NATO-EU relationship that is increasingly guided by pragmatism, close consultation, and transparency. And it will help to advance NATO-EU cooperation in other critical areas, notably in combating terrorism and preventing proliferation.

The likely assumption by the EU of additional security responsibilities in Bosnia, plus NATO's growing engagement in Afghanistan, has led some to believe that NATO might depart from the scene in the Balkans. We will not. We will retain a NATO presence in Bosnia even after the handover to the EU. We will continue to help the country in its defense reforms — because our goal remains to welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Serbia and Montenegro, into our Partnership for Peace program in due course.

Our commitment to Kosovo also remains unflinching. Kosovo remains an enormous challenge. But the recent outbreaks of violence have only strengthened our resolve to see this through. When violence flared up in mid-March, we were able to quickly reinforce our presence and put out the flames. And we are now far more deeply engaged in the political process than ever before. There simply is no trade-off between

our missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. We can do both. Indeed, we are doing both.

Finally, Istanbul will also demonstrate that NATO's military transformation is delivering results. The NATO Response Force is up and running. We will have completed various initiatives from our Prague Summit, including enhanced airlift and sealift capabilities and a package of counter-terrorism and missile defense measures. And we will mark the full operational capability of our new Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Battalion.

But transformation means more than new military hardware. It also means deployability and usability. I intend to ensure that when nations agree to a mission, we also have the forces we need to carry it out. Our credibility depends on delivering on our promises. And better force generation and force planning procedures are critical in this regard.

Our Istanbul Summit will bring home that NATO is tackling the new challenges of the 21st century. It will bring home that the new NATO, the NATO of 26 members, is an Alliance that acts. It acts in the Balkans and Afghanistan, where our troops make the difference between war and peace. It acts in the Mediterranean, where our ships engage in anti-terrorist operations. It acts together with partners — old and perhaps new partners. And it cooperates ever more closely with other international institutions.

That is the new NATO we will showcase in Istanbul: an Alliance in which Europe and North America are consulting every day on the key security issues before them — acting together, in the field, to defend our shared security, and reaching out to build security where it is needed. ●

NATO'S ROLE IN BRINGING SECURITY TO THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

By Chuck Hagel

*U. S. Senator from Nebraska and
Republican Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations*



The threat to NATO today does not come from great powers, but from weak ones. The world does not have the luxury of choosing the challenges that it faces. Terrorism, poverty, endemic disease, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states, and protracted conflicts are complex and interrelated. The future success of NATO will be determined by its ability to deepen and expand cooperation in intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian action, especially in the Greater Middle East.

The durability of the Atlantic Alliance begins with the shared values, interests, and destiny of its members. At its inception in 1949, Europeans and North Americans understood the common purpose of the Alliance. There was no significant debate about whether the Soviet Union represented a threat to security and world peace.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the most successful alliance in history because it matched purpose with power and served the interests of its members. And in building the Alliance, the Alliance helped build a better world.

The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany raised new questions. Some argued that the European Union (EU) could not adjust to the reintegration of a united Germany into Europe. Some predicted that NATO could be a victim of its own success. In the absence of the threat from the Soviet Union, NATO's fate was uncertain. What now was its purpose?

The durability and vision of the Atlantic Alliance, however, was captured well by Henry Kissinger in his book, *Diplomacy*:

“The architects of the Atlantic Alliance would have been incredulous had they been told that victory in the Cold War would raise doubts about the future of their creation. They took it for granted that the prize

for victory in the Cold War was a lasting Atlantic partnership. In the name of that goal, some of the decisive political battles of the Cold War were fought and won. In the process, America was tied to Europe by permanent consultative institutions and an integrated military command system — a structure of a scope and duration unique in the history of coalitions.”

During periods of historic change, alliances and institutions must adapt to remain vital and relevant. During the 1990s, NATO began a process of adaptation as it sought to define a new role in world affairs — including an expansion of membership, welcoming new countries from Eastern Europe, and establishing a new relationship with Russia.

September 11, 2001, brought NATO's purpose into clearer focus. Today, the greatest threat to the Atlantic Alliance, NATO, and the world comes from international terrorist groups and networks, and the potential for these groups to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction.

The threat to NATO today does not come from great powers, but from weak ones. Terrorism finds sanctuary in failed or failing states, in unresolved regional conflicts, and in the misery of endemic poverty and despair. No single state, including the United States, even with its vast military and economic power, can meet these challenges alone.

The struggle in which we are now engaged is a global struggle that does not readily conform to our understanding of military confrontations or alliances of previous eras. It is not a traditional contest of standing armies battling over territory. Progress must be made in these countries with human rights, good governance, and economic reform, beyond military force, before we can expect lasting security and stability.

Military power will continue to play a vital role; however, the future success of NATO will be determined by its members' ability to deepen and expand their cooperation in the intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian fields.

Adapting to this new strategic environment will not come easily or cheaply and will require a new NATO strategic doctrine. As the Alliance adjusts to both an expanded membership and a new global strategic environment, NATO must address the gaps in military expenditures and capabilities of its members. The tough decisions cannot continue to be deferred.

It is essential that NATO members not allow themselves to drift into adversarial relationships over disagreements. The challenges and differences that will always exist among members must be resolved inside — not outside — of NATO. NATO can only be undermined by its own internal distractions.

President Bush has offered a plan for the Greater Middle East that is potentially historic in scope, and conveys the strategic importance of this region for U.S. foreign policy. America's support for freedom in the Greater Middle East must be matched with operational programs of partnership with the peoples and governments of the region to promote more democratic politics and more open economies. NATO is critical to this success.

Let me suggest five specific areas where NATO can play a larger role in bringing security and stability to the Greater Middle East: Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Mediterranean, and the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Tom Friedman, the Pulitzer Prize winner columnist for the *New York Times*, has described this era in world

politics as a "hinge of history." And Turkey hangs on that hinge. Our course of action with Arab and Islamic societies must emphasize building bridges rather than digging ditches — and the NATO Alliance can provide that mechanism. As Europe and NATO have reached out to a united Germany and the states of the former Warsaw Pact, we must now ensure that we apply the same inclusive approach to Turkey. Turkey has been a vital member of NATO. Its government has been a strong and honest force for the people of Turkey. It deserves credit and recognition for this effort.

Turkey is also a cultural and geographic bridge to the Arab and Islamic world. By drawing Turkey closer, the Atlantic Alliance will have a better chance of encouraging continued political and economic reforms and improving the prospects for resolution of disputes involving that country. If we were to push Turkey away, we would jeopardize our interests in bringing peace and stability to the entire region.

In Afghanistan, the Loya Jirga recently completed drafting a new constitution that sets a course for elections later this year and holds the promise of a democratic transition and the rule of law. The government of President Hamid Karzai and the people of Afghanistan have come a long way in the past two years. But the job in Afghanistan is far from complete. Reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces continue to threaten the fragile progress that has been made there.

NATO has assumed leadership of the United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Alliance's first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. And NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said more than once that "Afghanistan is the number one priority for the Alliance."

NATO's goal should be to eventually assume responsibility for all military and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan, including Operation Enduring Freedom. The expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul, and of NATO-led provincial reconstruction teams throughout the country, will strengthen efforts to manage the transition to stability and democracy in

Afghanistan. It is also critical that NATO assets promised for Afghanistan be there — on the ground and operational.

Third, NATO will need to play a significant role in helping bring security and stability to Iraq. Last year, NATO committed to providing support for Polish forces in Iraq. However, NATO should initiate discussions to take over the duties of the Polish sector in central Iraq, or possibly assume responsibility for a division in northern Iraq.

Bringing security and stability to Iraq is a shared global and regional interest for all NATO members. There may have been disagreements over how best to deal with Saddam Hussein's regime prior to the war, but that is behind us. The Alliance must be able to manage disagreements, as it has in the past. Suez, Vietnam, and the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Germany in 1983 come to mind. Iraq should be put in the same light.

If Iraq becomes a failed state, the liberation of Iraq will be a historic opportunity squandered — for Iraq, for the Greater Middle East, and for the world. Our common policies and interests throughout the Greater Middle East and the Islamic world — including the war on terrorism, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and global energy security — will be directly affected by the outcome in Iraq.

There is limited hope for Iraq's future without the full support and commitment of the world community, especially the United Nations and NATO, during this critical transition period. The United States cannot sustain a long-term policy in Iraq without the active partnerships of the U.N. and NATO.

Fourth, NATO should expand and deepen its partnership with the countries of the Mediterranean. There have been some significant achievements in this area; however, we should consider a modified version of the Partnership for Peace program for this region.

Over the coming years the Mediterranean will take on even greater strategic importance for NATO. It

should be considered as a critically important geopolitical region with its own dynamics. Terrorism, illegal trafficking in narcotics and persons, and other threats from this region are major security concerns for Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. The Mediterranean draws together Europe, North Africa and the Middle East and is, therefore, influenced by political developments in each area.

There is tremendous potential for expanded security cooperation, especially intelligence gathering and sharing, and economic and trade development in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. These countries are taking important steps toward political and economic reform. They need to do more, but all three countries are moving in the right direction. This progress can be undermined by instability in West Africa and by radical Islamic groups and terrorists based in this region. These areas require more attention from the Atlantic Alliance.

Fifth, NATO should begin to plan for a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I believe a NATO peacekeeping mission may eventually be called upon to help secure an Israeli-Palestinian peace. The day may come when NATO troops monitor the birth of a Palestinian state. NATO is the only institution with the credibility and capability to undertake such a critical mission. The time is not yet right for this development, but I believe we must begin to move our thinking, policies, and planning in that direction. The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be separated from our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Change is difficult, especially for institutions. It forces us to re-examine the foundations of our identity, purpose, and policies. The world does not have the luxury of choosing the challenges that it faces. They are complex and interrelated — terrorism, poverty, endemic disease, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states, and protracted conflicts — and they do not lend themselves to easy solutions.

The future of NATO will be determined by the outcome in the Greater Middle East. This is a

historic burden for all of us in a region that is rich in culture and history, but, so far, at odds with modernity. Our approach requires subtlety and vision, as well as determination and purpose.

There has never been a partnership or alliance historically as well positioned or more politically capable of leading the change to a safer and better world than this institution called NATO.

One of the great achievements of the last half of the 20th century was a reshaping of world order, bringing new freedoms and prosperity to millions of people who had known neither freedom nor prosperity. NATO helped guarantee much of this progress.

And so it will be for the 21st century. NATO's mark has been set. Its responsibilities are clear. This is the nobility of its inheritance. This is the reality of its destiny. ©

THE ISTANBUL SUMMIT: STEPPING UP TO THE CHALLENGE

By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

U.S. Senator from Delaware and Ranking Democrat on the Committee on Foreign Relations



Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the danger to the North Atlantic area has increasingly originated in Central Asia and the Middle East. The run-up to the Iraq war involved acrimonious debates in NATO. Whatever history's judgment on the war, the fact is that all Alliance members now have a vested interest in the success of the post-war stabilization of Iraq. Failure in this mission is unthinkable.

The Istanbul NATO Summit on June 28-29, 2004, comes at a pivotal time for the Alliance. Since the Prague Summit in November 2002, two momentous developments for NATO have occurred: the enlargement of the Alliance to 26 members, and the assumption of command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the first operation outside of Europe in NATO's 55-year history.

At the same time, NATO is confronted by an equally momentous challenge: whether to become active, as an alliance, in the increasingly grave situation in Iraq. I believe that it should.

It seems difficult to believe that little more than six years ago NATO was comprised of only 16 members, 14 from Europe and two from North America. The Alliance's membership had changed only slightly since the mid-1950s, with the addition of Spain in 1982 and the incorporation of the former East Germany after German unification in 1990. Except for Greece and Turkey, the European members came exclusively from the western part of the continent.

What a difference today! Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have been NATO members since 1998. This year, at the end of March, they were joined by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In Central and Eastern Europe, NATO territory now extends in an uninterrupted sweep from the Gulf of Finland in the north to the southern rim of the Black Sea in the south.

And what an infusion of new spirit and enthusiasm! The citizens of 10 countries that suffered for nearly five decades under the yoke of communism understand better than anyone else how precious freedom is. As a result, all the new members have participated in SFOR [the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina], or KFOR [the Kosovo Force] in the Balkans, or in Operation Enduring Freedom or ISAF in Afghanistan, or in Iraq — in many cases in all three theaters.

Moreover, as part of the process of qualifying for membership in NATO, several of the countries have resolved long-standing disputes with their neighbors, thereby enhancing European stability.

The new members of NATO are closely connected to the United States by the human ties of more than 25 million Americans of Central- and Eastern-European descent. They are also sympathetic to the United States because of decades of principled American foreign policy. Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians know that the United States, almost alone in the world, never recognized the forcible annexation of their countries by the Soviet Union in 1940. They, and other Central and Eastern Europeans, remember the annual "Captive Nations Week" celebrations in the United States. Thanks to their courage, and to American persistence in opposing Soviet imperialism, Europe is now on the verge of realizing the aspiration of being "whole and free."

Does this attachment mean that the new members

will uncritically fall in behind the United States in every intra-Alliance dispute? Of course not. It does mean, however, that at a time when policy-based criticism of the United States has been replaced by a reflexive anti-Americanism in many quarters in Western Europe, the new members of NATO, at the very least, are likely not to question America's motives, but rather to give Washington the benefit of the doubt in future crises.

The Alliance's formal assumption of the command of ISAF last August, after several individual members of NATO had taken turns at the helm, was another path-breaking event. Since the demise of the Soviet Union and its existential threat, the danger to the North Atlantic area has increasingly originated outside of Europe, in Central Asia and the Middle East. As early as the Alliance's Strategic Concept, agreed upon in November 1991 in Rome, NATO took note of the fundamentally changed environment. That document mentioned economic, social and political difficulties, ethnic rivalries, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as new threats.¹ Moreover, it specifically declared that "Alliance security must also take account of the global context."²

The Alliance's sixth and most recent Strategic Concept, approved at the Washington Summit in April 1999, went further by recognizing "failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states"³ as factors that could lead to local or regional instability. It also presciently declared that "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism...."⁴

Despite these fragmentary warnings, it took the terrible attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon to make clear the mortal threat to the West of failed states harboring technologically adept and ideologically fanatical terrorists.

On the day after the terrorist attacks, NATO responded by invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time. I believe that the United States missed an opportunity by not immediately utilizing the proffered allied assistance in a more

comprehensive manner in Afghanistan and, once the Taliban and al-Qaeda had been militarily defeated, by not rapidly expanding ISAF's area of peace-enforcing activity throughout the country. Eventually, most NATO partners did make major contributions to the effort in Afghanistan, both in war-fighting (Operation Enduring Freedom) and to ISAF.

On May 14, 2002, under the influence of September 11th and of the Afghanistan war, the Alliance took counter-terrorism to its logical conclusion in the final communiqué of its Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting, when it declared: "To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly *to wherever they are needed* (italics mine), sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives."⁵

Under the Reykjavik mandate, the Alliance assumed command of ISAF last summer, thereby "crossing the Rubicon" into out-of-Europe operations. As long as the terrorist threat emanates from outside of the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must continue to be ready to commit forces to the origin of the problem.

The run-up to the Iraq war in 2002 and 2003 involved the most acrimonious debates ever heard at NATO. Whatever history's judgment of the wisdom, or foolhardiness, of the war, the stark fact is that all 26 Alliance members now have a vested interest in the success of the post-war stabilization of Iraq. Failure in this mission is unthinkable. It would almost certainly result in civil war in Iraq, which would likely draw in neighbors like Turkey and Iran. Iraq might well become like Taliban-era Afghanistan, with the nominal central government ceding de facto control to terrorists bent on attacking Europe and America. Democratic Iraqis would be thrown to the wolves, moderates and modernizers in the region would be put on the defensive, and radicals would be catapulted into the ascendancy.

In the medium-term and long-term, of course, it will fall to Iraqis to guide their country to democratic stability. In the short-term, however, it is the international community that must "step up to the plate." As the necessary first step, I hope and anticipate that the United States — in concert with

the other four permanent members of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council — will craft a new resolution that gives the United Nations significant powers in the reconstruction of Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty on June 30, 2004. Such a U.N. resolution could also specifically authorize a role for NATO in the stabilization process.

Once the resolution is approved, I would urge the North Atlantic Council to move immediately to plan for NATO operations in Iraq. Areas of activity that come to mind are controlling the borders with Iran and Syria, demining, training the Iraqi army and police, and assuming command of northern Iraq and of the south-central sector currently under Polish control.

I am aware of the argument that NATO should successfully complete its ISAF mission in Afghanistan before taking on another assignment, but I find it unconvincing. First of all, the stakes in Iraq are so high, and the current situation so precarious, that temporizing is not an option.

Second, as heartening as allied participation in Afghanistan has been, the disinclination of several allies to make even modest contributions of materiel there has been extremely disheartening. The Alliance collectively is capable of making available much greater capabilities of troops and materiel.

NATO has always risen to the challenge. The need to do so has never been greater than at the present time. Therefore, I urge the Alliance to agree at Istanbul to participate in the vital task of stabilizing Iraq. ●

¹ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1991), Part I, articles 10 and 13.

² Ibid, Part I, art. 13.

³ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" (Washington: Press Communique NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999), Part II, art. 20.

⁴ Ibid, Part II, art. 24.

⁵ "Final Communiqué. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held In Reykjavik on 14 May 2002," article 5 (Reykjavik: Press Release M-NAC-1(2002)59).

A DEFINING MOMENT IN PURPOSE AND COMMITMENT

By Dr. Simon Serfaty

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NATO is facing a structural crisis resulting from three realities inherited from the Cold War and affected by the events of September 11, 2001: Europe and its unfinished condition, the United States and its preponderant power, and security and its new normalcy. To renew NATO, its members must make a commitment to a community of action for the fulfillment of common goals within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Within an alliance of purpose, the goal is not for all allies to do everything together; rather the goal is to make sure that all allies together do everything.

This is a defining moment, and the United States and the states of Europe have a blind date with history. Beginning with the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summits that will be held in Dublin, Ireland, and Istanbul, Turkey, in June 2004, decisions made on both sides of the Atlantic over the next five years, and the conflicts waged along the way – in and beyond Iraq – will leave Europe and its relations with the United States, as well as the EU and NATO, either much more cohesive and stronger or more divided and, therefore, weaker.

The Alliance of purpose built during the Cold War — and twice enlarged since — as a community of increasingly compatible values and compatible interests, must now be renewed as its members make the required commitments to a community of action for the fulfillment of common goals within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

As was seen during the Atlantic crisis of 2003 over Iraq, renewing the Alliance will not be easy. The crisis, which is hardly over, was neither bilateral — not even between the United States and France or any other EU country — nor personal — not even over Europe's mistrust of President George W. Bush and parts of his administration.

These difficulties point to conditions that have often existed in the past, and were readily resolved with a summit meeting (as was done in Williamsburg,

Virginia, in May 1983) or a swift display of U.S. leadership (as was exerted in Paris in October 1954, in Nassau in January 1963, in Washington in February 1973, and in Dayton, Ohio, in the fall 1995). Rather, the crisis of 2003 was, and remains, a structural crisis resulting from three broad and overlapping new realities, inherited from the Cold War and affected by the events of September 11, 2001: Europe and its unfinished condition, the United States and its preponderant power, and security and its new normalcy.

COMPLETING THE UNION

The transformation of Europe, from a fragmented and unstable mosaic of nation-states into an ever larger and peaceful union of member-states, already stands as the most significant geopolitical development of the latter half of the 20th century. That is cause for legitimate satisfaction in the United States.

To an extent, the idea of a united Europe is an American idea, not only as an inspirational demonstration of what a few hundred Americans were able to do in the New World 200 years earlier, but also because it is the postwar commitment of U.S. power and leadership that gave the states of Europe the resources, time, and security they needed to engage in a process of integration that its European Founding Fathers first started out of a shared sense of past failures, rather than on behalf of a common vision of the future.

For the past four decades, however, Europe's integration has depended on several conditions that determined the scope, pace, and effectiveness of each of its new initiatives:

- Robust and evenly shared economic growth, with primary benefits going to the most recent members or the more needy small economies — as shown by the history of European union after the enlargements of 1973 and 1986;
- Stable and confident centrist national leadership able to resist pressures from either extreme of the political spectrum — as shown by the transformation of the European Left in France, Spain, Italy, and Britain; and
- Regional stability, in the East during the Cold War (which now includes some of the new members) and also, especially since 2001, in the South — where lies the Greater Middle East, from the Persian Gulf through the Middle East and into North Africa.

In the midst or on the eve of finality, and threatened with a wave of terror to which Europe may well be far more vulnerable than the United States, these same features are currently lacking, and the EU may be more challenged — more at risk — than at any time in over 30 years. These are causes for apprehension not only in Europe but also in the United States, where the commitment to an ever closer and ever larger Europe paradoxically looks often more real than among many EU members.

As the EU nears the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties in March 2007, three issues appear to be especially contentious:

- the ratification debates for the so-called EU constitution;
- the renegotiation of the Stability and Growth Pact and the negotiation of a new six-year EU budget; and

- the effective integration of the 10 new EU members, including — most of all — Poland, and an effective management of current or upcoming additional applications, including that of Turkey.

This is not a small agenda. How well it is managed — and how — is up to the 25 EU members; but it is, nonetheless, of direct interest to the United States in the context of its relations with Europe within and outside the Alliance.

POWER AND WEAKNESSES

Europe's ability to produce more power of its own, especially military power, is cause for exasperation rather than apprehension. Admittedly, there are some concerns that a stronger Europe might ultimately emerge as a counterweight that would define, together with other ascending states, a new multipolarity at the expense of U.S. influence. Such concerns are exaggerated; and the competitive pressures that could result from a stronger Europe need not be, and are unlikely to become, adversarial. On the contrary, only a Euro-Atlantic partnership that escapes its current condition of perceived "power and weakness" can overcome a futile debate over the marginal relevance of European states that look mostly like dead weights relative to an America whose intrusive preponderance makes it look increasingly like an imperial bully.

In other words, only a stronger (and, hence, more united) Europe can assert itself as a credible counterpart within the Alliance, and only an Alliance that stands on two distinct weights — inevitably uneven but, hopefully, complementary — can point to a global order short of the bellicosity that characterized pre-1914 multi-polarity, but extends beyond the U.S. preponderance that defines the post-1989 uni-polarity. In short, there is nothing intrinsically wrong about the ideas of counterweight and multi-polarity because both help either side of the Atlantic rely on the other to unload or share some of the burdens of collective defense and global order.

However, the multidimensional nature of power imposes a discussion of weaknesses found in both the

United States and Europe. While U.S. preponderance is beyond challenge — on grounds of capabilities, saliency, and (now) zeal — Europe readily qualifies as a power in the world because of interests that are global in scope and vital in significance, capabilities that are at least competitive in all non-military dimensions, and a widespread reputation for leadership inherited from the past but also renewed for the better over the past 50 years.

The next few years will show whether the states of Europe and their Union are willing and able to also gain the military power, as well as the will to use it, without which they would remain unable to move up to the next level — as a power in the world that would also stand as a world power — or, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, a superpower but not a super state.

The reference to Tony Blair is not by chance: the key to Europe's development of a common foreign, security, and defense policy is, indeed, the participation of the United Kingdom — an ingredient that is even more indispensable, at least in the short term, than Germany's contributions.

Whatever skepticism or ambivalence there may be in the United States about the rise of a strong Europe, the decisions ahead will have to be made by the Europeans themselves — spend better, but also spend more, on behalf of interests and in defense of values that Americans need not fear, to the extent that these are, indeed, more compatible with U.S. interests and values than with those of any other part of the world.

In an alliance of purpose, the response to the preponderance of the one over the many lies neither in the quest for balance (as an adversarial “counterweight”) nor in the acceptance of followership (as a passive “counterpart”). Rather, the commonality of purpose suggests the feasibility of complementary actions on behalf of policies deemed necessary for the fulfillment of goals that are common to each of the allies, even when they are not evenly shared by all of them.

The idea of complementarity is not new. It is an idea that America and Europe, NATO, and the EU are enforcing every day in Afghanistan, and it is an idea that has been used repeatedly in Haiti, in the Balkans, in Libya, in Iran, and elsewhere. In the ongoing quest for a new global order in the unfolding century, the most reliable coalition partners remain the like-minded states that populate the Atlantic Alliance — and these states deserve at least a right of first refusal for any of the missions for which a coalition might be needed.

This means that for Europe to achieve its transition toward a complete union — complete geographically, as well as in terms of its access to power, but also complete within the continent as well as across the Atlantic — several key goals will have to be met:

- Complementarity of European membership in NATO and the EU — meaning that any European member of NATO should ultimately be a member of the EU, including Turkey, but also Norway (and others), and every EU member should be a NATO member, including Austria, but also Sweden (and others).
- Complementarity of NATO and EU relations with countries that are not members of either institution — meaning especially a more active coordination of U.S. and European policies toward Russia and other institutional orphans in Europe, as well as toward other countries that are not part of the Euro-Atlantic geographic area but are nonetheless seeking partnerships for peace and prosperity in its context — like North Africa.
- Closer U.S.-EU relations — as in Europe's acknowledgement of the United States' special status as a non-member member state of the EU, but also as in a U.S. acknowledgement of the EU as a vital, though unfinished, partner. Coming after the historical enlargements of both the EU and NATO, a new European Commission, as well as a new or renewed U.S. administration in the fall of 2004, ought to permit a new deal in U.S.-EU-NATO relations, including, at the earliest possible time, an unprecedented summit meeting between

the heads of state or government of all EU and NATO current members and applicant countries.

- Better coordination between NATO and the EU as two institutions whose parallel contributions to the war against global terror are indispensable if those wars are going to be both won and ended. The future of a European security pillar is tied to NATO, and NATO's future is dependent on its ability to act globally — on the basis of capabilities enhanced by a better coordination of non-military security tools between the allies, and a common understanding of the priorities they share based on a more compatible strategic view of the world they face.

NEW NORMALCY

That the vital interests of the United States in Europe, and America's central interest in the Union that is at the core of the new Europe, remain unaltered after the events of September 11, 2001, should be cause for little debate. If anything, the end of one global conflict and the start of another increased the need for closer and more closely coordinated Euro-Atlantic actions on questions of home and foreign security.

As shown in Iraq, even a nation without military peers cannot remain for long a nation without capable allies. For there, in Iraq, the coalition of the willing that was organized in early 2003 has proven to be insufficient to attend to the broader missions it faced after completion of the major combat phase of the war on May 1, 2003.

The significance of Iraq cannot be overstated. Failure there is not an option. An abrupt departure of coalition forces without delivering on the goals of stability and reconstruction for post-Saddam Iraq is not an acceptable choice.

Nor is any sort of blame game helpful — either within the coalition or with those states that failed to join it. This is not a game that can be won by anyone except their common enemies. Time is running out to end counterproductive theological debates and,

instead, bring into the mix the same multilateral framework used to end the war in Afghanistan after the Taliban had been defeated — a multilateral framework that adds to the global legitimacy of the United Nations the specialized capabilities of NATO and the EU.

Within an alliance of purpose, the goal is not for all allies to do everything together; rather, the goal is to make sure that all allies together do everything.

During the coming months, the coalition in Iraq will, therefore, have to be enlarged to attend to a mission that must be deepened. That mission is fourfold:

- Restore security — this may well require additional forces on the ground, including NATO forces, pending the organization of viable Iraqi military and police forces;
- Assert the national legitimacy of an Iraqi government that rehabilitates the Iraqi state — this demands a direct U.N. role in attending to a credible transfer of sovereignty on June 30, 2004, and national elections no later than January 2005;
- Pursue the reconstruction of Iraq, under the direct management of the new Iraqi government, with the support of all allies, whatever their disposition at the start of the war; and
- Ultimately achieve reconciliation not only within and among Iraq's main communities, but also between Iraq and its neighbors.

The criteria for solidarity in the new security normalcy inaugurated by the events of September 11, 2001 (and also of March 11, 2004), need not be limited to Iraq. The wars of 9/11 have many fronts; to argue that Spain, for example, dropped out of these wars because it withdrew its forces from Iraq is tantamount to arguing that the United States did not enter World War II until its forces landed in Normandy in June 1944 — with the qualification, however, that some of the Spanish forces withdrawn from Iraq must now be put to good, collective use on another front, like the front in Afghanistan.

Beyond the finality debates in Europe, which the United States cannot ignore, and beyond the war in Iraq, to which the states of Europe cannot remain indifferent because of the unthinkable and indivisible consequences of failure, the Greater Middle East is the defining geopolitical challenge of the new century — including, but no longer limited to, its Israeli-Palestinian fault line — in a region that is simultaneously of extreme volatility and of vital interest to the rest of the world.

The point should be self-evident: there cannot be any sort of global order if there is no order within that region. For such an order to emerge, U.S. power,

however indispensable it may be, will not prove sufficient unless it can rely on Europe's power which, however necessary it is, is obviously not sufficient alone either.

That is the challenge that must now be addressed with the same bold spirit, the same compelling compassion, and the same common purpose as was shown when the transformation of Europe began 50 years ago as a revolt against a failed past. ©

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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: CHARTING A COURSE FOR A NEW ERA

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The Partnership for Peace has renewed importance in fulfilling NATO's wider post-9/11 commitments. To retain its relevance and effectiveness, PfP must be transformed, adequately funded, and better integrated with bilateral and regional efforts to address new security challenges. The Istanbul Summit should launch an initiative to promote new, tailored PfP programs in the Balkans, Greater Black Sea region, and Central Asia.

With 10 of the original 24 Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners having achieved full Alliance membership, questions about the program's direction and long-term viability are raised.

The original strategic rationale for PfP — enhancing stability among and practical cooperation with the countries along NATO's periphery — has become even more compelling in the context of the Alliance's further enlargement, the war on terrorism, and growing Western interests in Southwest and Central Asia. That said, the key incentive that animated partner engagement in the program, that it was the “best path to NATO membership,” is diminished since the remaining partners are either not interested or not likely to enter the Alliance for many years.

To retain its relevance and effectiveness, PfP must be transformed, adequately resourced, and better integrated with bilateral and regional efforts to address new security challenges. The Istanbul Summit could launch an initiative, backed by serious resources from allies, to promote new, tailored PfP programs in the Balkans, Greater Black Sea region, and Central Asia.

POST-9/11 CHALLENGES

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO and many partner governments have struggled, with varying degrees of success, to reshape their defense capabilities to deal with the new risks posed by global terrorism. The United States increased

defense expenditures by \$48 billion — a sum equal to the entire defense budget of the United Kingdom. In contrast, the defense budgets of most other longtime allies have remained unchanged and, indeed, the overall capabilities gap between the United States and other NATO countries has widened further. And yet, in the aftermath of 9/11, NATO committed itself to a broader functional and wider geographic area of engagement.

The utility of the PfP was demonstrated as these partners bolstered and facilitated NATO operations in and around Afghanistan. At its first meeting after the 9/11 attacks, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) defense ministers affirmed their determination to use the partnership to increase cooperation and capabilities against terrorism.

In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S.-led military operation against terrorists in Afghanistan, many NATO allies —including two of the then newest — Poland and the Czech Republic — and six PfP partners rendered substantial assistance.¹

And when NATO assumed command of the International Security Force Operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) in April 2003, it did so with the participation of another six partners.² After Saddam Hussein was toppled in Iraq, NATO provided intelligence and logistical support to the Polish-led multinational division, comprised of many member allies and 11 partners.³

To better address the new challenges, the 2002 Summit approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), the new Command Structure, and the NATO Response Force (NRF). The centerpiece is NRF, with high tech capabilities for expeditionary missions that would allow NATO's European allies to contribute small *niche* units — for example: police, engineering, demining, chemical decontamination, alpine, and special forces units — with secure communications, ample readiness, and the capability of deploying, sustaining, and operating with U.S. forces through the entire conflict spectrum. If implemented, this would provide a more constructive burden-sharing arrangement for NATO.

TERRORISM AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The Prague Summit also endorsed the Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism that calls for “improved intelligence sharing and crisis response arrangements [and commitment with partners] to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan...against possible attacks by...chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents.” So too, through the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, adopted by the EAPC in November 2002, partners commit to taking a number of steps to combat terrorism and share their information and experience. Although the plan has not yet achieved much, it does establish a framework upon which necessary functions can be built.

A WAY AHEAD

Given that there are now more NATO allies, each struggling to transform its own armed forces and security institutions, than there are remaining partners (20, including the special cases of Russia and Ukraine) — and these are far weaker institutionally and have more diverse interests and broader needs than those which have already attained membership — if PfP is not seriously revived at Istanbul, it will be dead on departure.

Keeping PfP relevant requires focusing on the development of capabilities to combat terrorism and other transnational threats. New programs could

target sharing more intelligence from interior ministries, police, and border guards, as well as finance and banking information.

Budgets and functions also need to be re-examined and updated to support future counter-terrorist operations, including counter-proliferation efforts and missile defense systems.

A STRATEGIC VISION FOR PFP'S REVIVAL

Clearly the Istanbul Summit, marking 10 years since the inception of Partnership for Peace, requires a new strategic vision for PfP to deliver on NATO's commitment to wider geographic and broader functional engagement.

But for a revival to succeed, the program will need to be tailored to the needs of NATO's remaining 20 partners and two PfP aspirants who fall into the following eight distinct groups with very diverse needs, interests, and capacities:

- Five “advanced” partners — Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland — with no interest yet in joining the Alliance.
- The three Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners — Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia — who do aspire to membership and for whom NATO must keep its Open Door credible.
- Ukraine, who claims to be an aspirant with an Action Plan, and aspires to join the MAP.
- Russia, who does not aspire to membership but maintains a special relationship in the NATO-Russia Council.
- Two relatively inactive partners — Moldova and Belarus.
- Three Caucasus partners — Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,
- Five Central Asia partners — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; and
- Two Balkan PfP aspirants — Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro.

The incentives for PfP participation vary widely between Russia, with no interest in formal membership, and Ukraine, who aspires to join NATO.

PfP also provides incentive for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro because it remains their one pathway to Euro-Atlantic structures and legitimacy. While Moldova and Belarus remain relatively inactive in PfP, their role could change as they adjust to their altered geo-strategic environment after enlargement. The remaining 16 PfP partners comprise the following four groups:

Advanced Partners

All of the five advanced partners (except Switzerland) are already in the EU and remain outside formal NATO membership by choice. Their increased participation in PfP in recent years primarily focused on the Balkans and serves as an example of partnership participation being important in its own right, while *not* necessarily being a route to membership. These five, as well as NATO members, should be encouraged to establish a “buddy” system (as Sweden and Finland have already done with the Baltic states) with Caucasian and Central Asian partners (similar to what Lithuania has been doing with Georgia). This may not be easy, as the advanced partners have been and remain more active in local Baltic and Balkan peace support operations that have been inexorably shifting to the EU.⁴ Hence, it will be a challenge to keep them engaged in NATO’s wider geographic interests. One way might be to make NATO exercises in the Caucasus and Central Asia more flexible and allow non-aligned partners to take a greater part in their planning, while encouraging their security sector expertise.

Balkan Aspirants

NATO enlargement, the MAP process, and PfP have played, and continue to play, a very important but under-appreciated role in enhancing Balkan stability and security. Slovenian, Bulgarian, and Romanian membership in NATO forms a stable security foundation. The MAP — as long as Article 10, the Open Door policy, remains credible — keeps Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia positively engaged in activities consistent with NATO principles, and the incentive of joining PfP keeps Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina productively focused. Their continued engagement has become increasingly important in light of the transfer of NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony mission in Macedonia to the EU

(“Concordia”), and will become even more important after the likely transfer of NATO’s SFOR to the EU.

If PfP were to become moribund and lose credibility, security in the Balkans could be severely undermined because some nations might be tempted to move in unconstructive directions.

With this in mind, NATO should establish more precise goals for keeping its Open Door program credible for the three remaining MAP members. This is likely to become an issue for Albania and Macedonia, who have been in PfP for almost a decade, have had five years of MAP and annual national plan experience, and whose patience may wear thin. If NATO is unprepared to offer membership soon, it needs to establish the *prospect* of it. NATO might consider some version of a “regatta” to link Balkan MAP partner accession to the completion of specific, well-defined NATO “acquis” with a notional time horizon of roughly five-to-eight years — even though the regatta concept was rejected for the 2002 Prague Summit invitees because many politicians claimed that accession is ultimately a political issue, which it is.

PfP programs, with EU assistance, should be coordinated to security sector reforms to tackle the new security threats.

PfP needs to be linked to the successful sub-regional Southeast European Defense Minister (SEDM) process — which should also be broadened to include interior and intelligence functions, the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to combat trans-border crime, and the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in the Balkans. If this proves difficult in the Balkans, as it likely will beyond, then PfP’s mandate, consistent with the Prague Summit’s Action Plan Against Terrorism, ought to be broadened to include partnership goals with police activities. The objective is to improve interagency coordination and cooperation within and among Balkan states.

This could be accomplished within the annual SEDM meetings that began in 1996⁵ and have succeeded in enhancing transparency, cooperation, and security in

Southeastern Europe. In 1999, the SEDM approved the creation of the SEEBRIG, a 25,000-troop force that can be assembled as needed by the brigade's commanders and which *might* deploy to Bosnia sometime in the future.

It is time to build further upon SEDM's successes to deal with the new risk environment and broadened it to include civil emergency planning and interior and intelligence ministers, creating an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial (SEDIIM). This new SEDIIM should be encouraged to further coordinate its work with SECI⁶ which, among other things, combats trans-border crime involving trafficking of drugs and weapons, prostitution, and money laundering. Since Moldova is in SECI and Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina are PfP aspirants, they should all become SEDM observers, with the goal of ultimate NATO membership.

Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Caucasian Partners

The Black Sea has acquired increased strategic importance since NATO assumed command of Afghanistan's ISAF in August 2003, and assisted the Polish-led division in Iraq. Coupling the facts that NATO is now actively engaged out-of-area beyond the Balkans in the greater Black Sea region, and that all the Black Sea defense ministers have *never* met together, it is time to apply Central European and Balkan lessons to this region. The first step to stabilization is to build understanding through discussion of security risks, and then to build greater regional cooperation through implementation of military activities in support of a transparent agenda.

The Balkan's SEDM (and potential SEDIIM), SECI, and SEEBRIG can serve as models to further expand to the greater Black Sea littoral beyond the formation of the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) that was established in April 2001 among the six Black Sea states⁷ for search and rescue humanitarian operations, clearing sea mines, protecting the environment, and promoting good will visits. One can envision the creation of a Black Sea Task Force to deal not only with civil emergency contingencies such as the earthquakes that perennially strike the

region and potential CBR after-effects, but also to interdict the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans across the greater Black Sea region, especially with the participation of Ukraine, the Russian Fleet, and the Caucasus. Here, too, since the continued engagement of Ukraine in PfP is important, the Istanbul Summit might consider commencing intensified dialogues with Ukraine as a pre-requisite to joining the MAP, assuming Ukraine's presidential elections are held in accordance with OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) standards and adhere to Ukrainian constitutional procedures.

The Central and East European experience since the late 1980s also provides numerous successful examples of combined peacekeeping and/or civil-emergency units that should be explored for possible adaptation to improve interstate relations here.

The likely new United States presence in Bulgaria and Romania can be leveraged to improve interoperability through joint training and logistics facilities and in building an expeditionary Black Sea Task Force. Together with Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey — NATO's three Black Sea allies with a rich experience in SEDM and SEEBRIG — the U.S. presence could be beneficial in fostering wider Black Sea stability and cooperation under a revived PfP program.

Although all three Caucasus partners were 1994 signatories of PfP, their participation has varied considerably. This has been particularly evident with the PfP Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), which remains the core of transparent defense planning, accountability, and democratic oversight of the military and provides the foundation to enhance sub-regional cooperation. After 9/11, all three Caucasus partners joined the PARP.⁸

Though Armenia participates in PfP, NATO membership remains controversial because of unresolved problems with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia has close relations with Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria and remains very close to Russia. An original signatory of the 1992 Tashkent Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Collective Security Treaty with Russia, Armenia is the only Caucasus state to have renewed its commitment for another five years in 1999.

Both Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from the CIS in 1999. Azerbaijan remains in conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and has problems with terrorism, drugs, crime, and human trafficking. It cooperates with the United States in counter-terrorism and participates in KFOR, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Georgia participates in KFOR and Black Sea regional cooperation, wants NATO to play a role in solving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts on Georgian soil, and, in September 2002, its parliament adopted a resolution claiming the goal of NATO membership. The U.S. has assisted the Georgian armed forces through the Train and Equip program and in establishing control over the Pankisi Gorge near the border with Russia.

The U.S. has greater influence among Caucasian (and Central Asian) partners than NATO because NATO has been more hampered by what it can offer in terms of assistance.⁹ But this can change *if* the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) were more directly focused on the region and the PfP Trust Fund were made more robust.

The PfP Trust Fund, which has allocated \$4.2 million for destroying anti-personnel mines in Albania, Ukraine, Moldova and disposing of missile stockpiles in Georgia, must be expanded.

The NSIP, a much larger program with an annual budget of over \$600 million, covers installations and facilities dealing with communications and information systems, radar, military headquarters, airfields, fuel pipelines and storage, harbors, and navigational aids. Since NATO has assumed the lead in Afghanistan, NSIP funds now ought to be eligible for the ISAF operation and be applied to the broader Black Sea region to augment NATO air, road, and rail support. The Istanbul Summit should look at redirecting NATO infrastructure funds in support of NATO-led operations in Afghanistan.

In addition, the Summit should authorize the Secretary General to restructure the NATO

International Staff to consolidate PfP in one directorate,¹⁰ perhaps headed by its own assistant secretary general. This would symbolize the Alliance's commitment to a revived PfP, and highlight the program's renewed importance in fulfilling NATO's wider commitments.

After PfP's launch in 1994, when it became obvious that necessary resources were lacking, the U.S. started its Warsaw Initiative with \$100 million in annual funding. The program achieved enormous success with most of the key recipients now members of the Alliance. But the remaining 20 partners, particularly around the greater Black Sea, in the Caucasus, and Central Asia, have significantly *weaker* political, economic, social, and security and defense institutions and require *greater* assistance to bring their personnel and institutions closer to NATO standards.

The United States ought to launch a new Istanbul Initiative, funded at roughly the same amount as the current Warsaw Initiative, to focus on a more sophisticated program stressing the PfP basics in this region to promote the development of a Greater Black Sea Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial, and to support a Greater Black Sea Task Force to deal with civil emergency contingencies and interdiction operations.

It should challenge other allies to offer similar funding, including support for Central and Eastern European members to transfer the lessons of their security sector transition to these other partners.

Central Asian Partners

Four of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — were among the original signatories of the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty with Russia. When the protocol extending the treaty was signed in 1999, Belarus had joined, but Uzbekistan had dropped out. Four of the Central Asian states were among the 1994 signatories of PfP: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Only after 9/11 did Tajikistan finally join PfP and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan join PARP. Although it had been the intention to extend PfP to the Central Asian

successor states to bind them to Western values, their practice of political democracy has generally deteriorated over the past decade.

Though none of the Central Asian partners participated in any of the Balkan operations (IFOR [Bosnia Implementation Force]¹¹, SFOR, KFOR), they have supported U.S. and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq: Uzbekistan in OEF, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan provided airbases and overflights for U.S. and coalition troops for ISAF, and Kazakhstan supported Poland with demining troops in Iraq and permitted the overflight and transport of supplies and U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Increasingly, these activities have irritated the Russians. Hence, encouraging the active participation of Russia in a revived PfP and in the Russia-NATO Council will be increasingly important to reduce inevitable frictions and build on cooperative relations.

CONCLUSION

Although faced with greater challenges in the requirements of a post-9/11 era, PfP must remain true to the enduring values that prompted the original partnership a decade ago — that is, to promote political democracy, economic free enterprise, the rule of law, equitable treatment of ethnic minorities, good neighbor relations, and democratic oversight and effective management of not just the armed forces, but *all* security sector institutions.

If the Istanbul Summit fails to revive PfP, there are likely to be serious destabilizing consequences throughout the EAPC region, and NATO will find it increasingly difficult to fulfill its Balkan, Afghanistan and Iraq missions. If the Summit revives PfP, NATO's ability to achieve its broader functional and geographic objectives will be enhanced. ●

¹ Central Asian partners Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; Black Sea partners Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine; and MAP invitee Slovakia, with new members Poland and the Czech Republic, participated in Operation Enduring Freedom.

² PFP partners Finland, Sweden, and Austria; MAP-member Albania; and NATO invitees Romania and Bulgaria participated in ISAF.

³ MAP member Macedonia; MAP invitees Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea; Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus; and Kazakhstan in Central Asia participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

⁴ For example, Austria, Finland, and Sweden participated in Bosnia-IFOR, to be joined later by Ireland in SFOR. All five participate in KFOR. Only Finland, Sweden, and Austria have engaged in ISAF, and none are in OIF.

⁵ SEDM members include Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Slovenia, Romania, and Macedonia (with the U.S. and Italy as observers). Croatia joined SEDM in October 2000.

⁶ Launched in December 1996, the U.S. initiated and supported SECI to advance Balkan environment, transport infrastructure, and trade cooperation. In Bucharest, SECI includes Balkan members (without Serbia-Montenegro) plus Hungary and Moldova.

⁷ Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia.

⁸ The first PARP cycle launched in 1995 had 14 participants: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Sweden, Albania, and Ukraine. The second cycle, launched in 1996, which introduced interoperability objectives, had 18 partners sign up; and, eventually, there were 19, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and then Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

⁹ The U.S. has been working closely with Georgia (and Uzbekistan in Central Asia) on training forces to deal with their internal requirements for over a decade.

¹⁰ PfP "drift" has resulted in part to an earlier restructuring of the international staff so that PfP is now subordinate to two ASGs — to the Political Affairs Security Policy Division and the Defense Policy and Planning Division (DPP).

¹¹ The following 14 of 26 PfP partners participated in IFOR: Austria, Finland, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine

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WESTERN SECURITY EFFORTS AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

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There are strong, practical reasons for all Alliance members to cooperate on bringing security to the Greater Middle East, but doing so requires a realistic assessment of domestic politics, a true understanding of the long-term political and socio-economic problems in the region, and a commitment to deal with the root causes beneath the resultant instability, violence, and terrorism.

NATO retains a powerful role in bringing stability to Europe. It still provides a structure for uniting different European countries through a collective framework of security with the guarantee of U.S. military capabilities.

Now, however, the primary challenges to the West are “out of area.” The Balkans remain the only area in Europe that is not militarily stable, but North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia all present the threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Friendly regimes in these regions need security guarantees and assistance from the outside, and the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the West can do far more to deal with failed regimes and regional threats if it acts collectively.

FOCUSING ON THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

The Islamic extremism behind the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused the world’s attention on the threats emanating from these regions. The Bush administration’s position is that the Greater Middle East is a Western, not a U.S., responsibility, and the need for NATO missions is no longer a theoretical force-improvement priority, but, rather, a tangible and immediate need.

It is not yet clear how aggressively the administration will attempt to refocus Western security efforts;

however, it has begun to push for four major initiatives:

- A steady build-up of the NATO security presence in Afghanistan, creating a single NATO command in Afghanistan by 2005 that will effectively put NATO in charge of the peacemaking/nation-building effort, as well as defeating the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaida there.
- Modifying the posture in Iraq so there is a U.S.-led NATO command to deal with military and security assistance after the transfer of power, with a U.N.-led political and economic effort.
- Restructuring the U.S. force posture and deployments in Europe to suit greater interaction with the Middle East and Central Asia by reducing the U.S. presence in areas like Germany and creating new facilities and bases in Eastern and Southern Europe.
- Shifting from the creation of largely generic power projection capabilities in NATO to actual deployments.

Many European countries disagree with parts of this program, particularly with playing a role in Iraq. At the same time, however, both Europe and the United States have good reasons to cooperate in this region including the need to work together militarily,

dependency on Middle Eastern oil, and the threat of terrorism by Islamic extremists.

Force Transformation Problems

Even \$400 billion-plus defense budgets leave the United States with some of the defense modernization problems of its European allies. The Iraq war has shown that the United States faces serious strains in fighting even one prolonged low intensity conflict. This is not because the United States cannot use its immense advantages in high technology conventional forces to fight additional or much larger wars; it is rather because it cannot do so with its present force structure and maintain the deployment and rotation cycle necessary to retain its skilled professional forces. The major shifts necessary to enable the United States to fight asymmetric wars efficiently have only begun.

The United States, therefore, needs more than political coalitions. It needs war-fighting coalitions.

Yet, in spite of America's problems, European countries are all too aware that U.S. military modernization and force transformation is greatly outpacing their own. This is partly a result of far more efficient force structures and much clearer and more functional force improvement priorities in the United States. It is partly the result of the fact that most European nations are far more concerned about economic and social priorities and the future of the European Union (EU), than strategy and defense spending.

However, it is also because the United States devotes more money to defense. Although Europe cannot afford to replicate anything like the U.S. mix of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, precision long-range strike systems, infrastructure for power projection, and development of net-centric warfare capabilities, it is only spending something on the order of \$140 billion for limited coordination among traditional forces with no clear current mission.

Britain is the one European state that has really begun to find an effective compromise between independent action and the need to depend on U.S. systems and

support in major projection contingencies; but even it is still making gradual cuts in its forces and modernization plans.

France's force plans are less mortgaged by under funding, and more innovative. It has done better than many other European powers in finding a new balance between modernization, reform, and military spending — although a large part of French forces still lack meaningful deployment to any area where they may really be needed.

While Germany still has some highly capable force elements, it is spending less than half of what it was (by percent of gross domestic product) during the Cold War — and much less than France and Britain or even most of Europe, let alone the United States. This, simply, is far too little to modernize its forces. Moreover, Germany is now politically committed to gross under-spending through 2007, and the German approach to preserving outdated force structures and conscription may be politically correct in terms of domestic politics, but is extraordinarily wasteful in terms of military capability.

Most of the smaller European states have been slow to abandon their traditional approach to force planning and, instead, specialize for meaningful power-projection capabilities. Norway, for example, is one of the few smaller states to specialize effectively around missions like Special Forces, rather than try to sustain an unaffordable traditional mix of land, naval, and air forces. Poland and Spain have also shown that they can project forces with limited budgets. But far too many European countries are becoming a military home for the aging.

Energy Dependence on the Middle East¹

The Greater Middle East involves truly vital strategic national security interests for Europe as well as the United States. The industrialized nations of the world are becoming steadily more dependent on a global economy fueled by Middle East energy exports, and this dependence is growing rapidly regardless of whether or not individual states are increasing their direct imports from the Persian Gulf and North Africa.

This is because the size of direct imports of petroleum is only a partial measure of strategic dependence. The United States and European economies are increasingly dependent on energy-intensive imports from Asia and other regions. The U.S. Energy Information Administration does not make estimates of indirect imports of Middle Eastern oil — that is, the oil that the nations that export finished goods to the United States and Europe must themselves import in order to produce those goods. If these imports were included, the resulting dependency figure for the United States, for example, might well be 30-40 percent higher.

Moreover, the industrialized states are increasingly dependent on the health of the global economy. For example, with the exception of Latin America, Mexico, and Canada, all of the United States' major trading partners are critically dependent on Middle Eastern oil exports.

The Enduring Security Problems of the Middle East

The threat of Islamic extremism is another unifying strategic interest, and one that will endure long after today's problems with Iraq, the Taliban, and al Qaida are over. The problems of Islamic extremism and terrorism have a deep cultural and ideological genesis. They are affected by the broad failure of secular politics and ideologies in much of the Middle East, and by the radical social and cultural changes imposed by the collapse of many agricultural sectors, hyper-urbanization, and sweeping changes in media and communications like satellite television and the Internet.

The resulting "culture shock" and political problems almost ensure a long period of instability as many in the Middle East try to find security in religion and a rebirth of Arab culture. At the same time, the impact of Turkish and Western colonialism, religious tension, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and hostility toward the unaffordable materialism of the West combine to create hostility towards the United States and Europe. These problems are affected by major economic and demographic pressures.

Regional economic development has been poor since

the end of the oil boom in the late 1970s. The World Bank's report on global economic development for 2003 shows that growth in per capita income in constant prices dropped from 3.6 percent during 1971-1980 to -0.6 percent during 1981-1990, and was only 1 percent from 1991-2000 — reflecting static income over nearly 20 years in a region with extremely poor equity of income distribution.

Some states like Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have so much oil and gas wealth per capita that they may be able to buy their way out of their mistakes indefinitely. Most Middle Eastern states, however, suffer severely from economic mismanagement and excessive state control of the economy. Structural economic reform has begun in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Bahrain. This reform, however, remains highly uncertain and none has yet developed it to the point where it has a serious prospect of success.

The other Middle Eastern states have uncertain near-to mid-term economic prospects, and this is true of most oil exporters as well. Saudi Arabia, for example, has experienced over a decade of budget deficits and its oil wealth is becoming increasingly marginal as its population grows far more quickly than its economy. The Israeli and Palestinian economies have been crippled by war. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria are all experiencing serious economic and demographic problems, and the Iraqi economy is already weak and could face future shocks. The Iranian economy is in a serious crisis, compounded by deep ideological conflicts.

The end result is that a combination of fluctuating oil revenues, high population growth rates, and a failure to modernize and diversify the overall economy threatens to turn the past oil wealth of the exporting states into oil poverty.

These economic pressures are compounded by major demographic problems. The total population of the Middle East and North Africa has grown from 78.6 million in 1950 to 307.1 million in 2000. Conservative projections put it at 376.2 million in

2010, 522.3 million in 2030, and 656.3 million in 2050. This growth will exhaust natural water supplies, force permanent dependence on food imports, and raise the size of the young working age population (15-to-30 year olds) from 20.5 million in 1950 to 145.2 million in 2050. With over 40 percent of the region's population now 14 years or younger, there will be an immense bow wave of future strain on the social, educational, political, and economic systems.

In addition, political structures remain fragile and largely authoritarian regardless of the formal structure of government. In broad terms, no state in the region has managed to create a secular political culture that provides effective pluralism.

The resulting social turbulence is compounded by the region's extremely young population, overstretched and outdated educational systems, and the failure of the labor market to create jobs for many of the young men entering the labor force. Emigration creates another source of social turmoil, while religious and cultural barriers, and the issue of employment of women make greater other problems in productivity and competitiveness with developed regions.

IS 2004 THE YEAR OF NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST?

There are serious practical challenges to forging cooperation within NATO over the Middle East. Several key factors are involved:

Iraq

Regardless of the genesis and justification of the Iraq war, the nations of Europe now cannot turn aside and easily allow the U.S. and British-led coalition to fail. At the same time, Iraq's problems are as much political and economic as they are military, and it is far from clear what a NATO mission would really entail.

- Iraq simply may not become stable and viable enough for a major U.S./European role of the kind the United States envisions. Whether it will want the United States in any kind of leading advisory and tutorial role is another issue entirely — and it

may be only marginally more tolerant of NATO and a major European presence, unless it can play this off against the United States.

- The United States may well defeat the insurgents, but if it does not, it is asking NATO — specifically NATO-Europe — to take on an open-ended security mission that will involve real combat. The multinational division has shown that a very diverse mix of Polish, Spanish, Ukrainian, and other forces can work well in a peacekeeping mission in a relatively stable area using NATO procedures. Sustained low intensity conflict and terrorism may well be a different story. It is also unclear whether, even if a number of European defense ministries perceive this mission to be desirable, they will be able to obtain the necessary political support.
- The United States is talking about serious European power projection, and the EU and NATO discussions to date raise serious doubts about how well any European country other than Britain really understands the costs and difficulties of projecting large forces at long distances.
- Giving such a mission to NATO does at least indirectly challenge both the current French and German policies on Iraq, and means a major commitment to NATO versus other interests. A large German or French role also means major American compromises.
- Mission length will be an issue in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is easy to get into such roles. The fact that peacekeeping forces are in their fifth year in Kosovo and eighth year in Bosnia show it is much harder to get out.
- The economic and oil issues in Iraq will become steadily more important during 2004, and so will the questions of who gives and manages what in terms of aid, debt forgiveness, and reparations.

Afghanistan

Europe and NATO are already playing a major role in Afghanistan. Germany, in particular, has shown

leadership in dealing with Afghanistan's economic and political problems. However, there are the following practical issues:

- Progress in the Loya Jirga aside, the challenges of transforming "Kabulstan" into Afghanistan are going to remain serious and involve a host of nationwide political and economic challenges, as well as military ones. This nation-building presents more problems in terms of costs and resources. In addition, it simply is not clear that there is a feasible plan that can overcome Afghanistan's internal divisions, the weakness of its central government, and critical economic development problems.
- The security problem extends deep into Pakistan, and is heavily driven by Pakistani Islamic extremists, al-Qaida, and new Salafi movements. The role of NATO in dealing with these issues must be defined, and they may well present as many challenges as in Afghanistan.
- More generally, it simply is not clear where the "Greater Middle East" stops. If it can include Afghanistan and Iraq, it can also include Pakistan, the Caspian, and Central Asia. In the process, the risk that new tensions and differences will emerge over given cases grows.
- Afghanistan is in Russia's backyard, and involves Russian security interests. Unless Russia has a clear role, it may find the prospect of a major NATO mission there less than enticing. Also unclear is that such a mission can be fully decoupled from Islamic extremist movements in the rest of Central Asia. China and Iran will also be interested (and interesting) players.

The Arab-Israeli Challenge

An equally serious regional challenge is the Arab-Israeli peace process.

No issue does more to polarize the Arab and Islamic world than the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This aspect of hostility is directed largely against the U.S. and not against the West in general, as European

governments and public opinion are far more critical of Israel than any U.S. political party or the American people.

The Road Map appeared to offer a way out — a compromise around which the West could unite — but it remains inert. Israel and the Palestinians already have two failed leaderships and political structures unable to move towards a real peace. They may well have two failed peoples, where the majority on each side is too angry and fearful to compromise or see the other's valid needs.

A combination of the Israeli security fence and settlements and Palestinian terrorism could push Israel into taking steps that make a meaningful Palestinian state on the West Bank almost impossible — if, indeed, the demographics and economies of Gaza and the West Bank have not already done so. Certainly, the U.S. and European inability to agree on the details of Israel's borders and issues like the status of Jerusalem when formulating the Road Map are not going to become an easier challenge in the future.

This situation raises the following questions:

Can a NATO/European role in Iraq and Afghanistan be decoupled from the Arab-Israeli peace issue?

Probably in American eyes, but not in European ones, and probably not in those of Arab or Islamic people in terms of hostility towards missions closely tied to the U.S. A better option in peace-making would be for the leadership role to be taken by Britain and other European nations the U.S. is willing to trust as fully sensitive to Israeli concerns.

Can NATO ignore the possible need for a joint peacekeeping mission to deal with the Arab-Israeli crisis?

The war is not yet brutal and draining enough for the political leadership and popular opinion on either side to accept a peace of exhaustion and a peace of trust has long been impossible. The worse the prospects for a peace based on trust, however, the more some form of outside military role may be necessary. Reaching agreement on this within NATO is going to be far from easy, however,

and any military effort will almost certainly have to be linked to an equally long and expensive economic aid effort.

Iran

Europe may join the U.S. in seeking to block Iranian proliferation, but it does not see Iran as part of an axis of evil. Where the U.S. has sought to sanction Iran, Europe has sought dialogue, cultural exchanges, and economic ties — an approach that seems more successful and more likely to give moderate forces in Iran influence and power. The Bush administration may be turning away from sanctions and containment, but any unified security policy towards the Greater Middle East must deal with Iran.

The War on Terrorism

None of the previous discussion has come to grips with the need to deal with the broader problem of Islamic terrorism, and the need to develop better-integrated and more effective approaches to counter-terrorism and homeland security. In many ways, significant improvements are already taking place. There is far better intelligence sharing and cooperation between countries, better dialogue on homeland defense, and better cooperation in Interpol. NATO is developing a function as a clearinghouse for national intelligence and analysis.

The need to continue building on this progress and momentum is vital, but this raises almost as many issues about the level of spending, and the ability to agree on common policies as the military security mission.

The Clash Between Civilizations versus the Clash Within A Civilization

Finally, hidden away beneath all of these security and diplomatic issues is the broader question of how the West should address the conflicts and tensions within the Arab and Islamic worlds, and particularly the challenge Islamic extremism poses to the stability and political systems of the nations in the region and, therefore, to others.

The problems in the West's approach to the Greater Middle East are compounded by a lack of

understanding of Islam, Iran, and the Arab world, and sometimes by overt or tacit cultural and racial prejudice. In the case of the United States, both ties to Israel and the shock of 9/11 add to these misunderstandings. In Europe, the issues are colored by the attack on Spain this past March and the threat of future terrorism, as well as the cultural and economic shock of legal and illegal immigration — despite the fact that European demographics virtually force Europe to depend on labor immigration from the Arab and Islamic worlds for well beyond the coming generation.

Yet, Huntington aside [Samuel Huntington, author of *The Clash of Civilizations*], the real problem is not a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Arab/Islamic world, but the clash *within* the Arab/Islamic world. The real problem is whether it can deal with its own political, cultural, economic, and demographic pressures through reform and evolution or if it will face a prolonged period of violence and revolution. It is also whether Algeria and Iran are the avatars of what Islamic extremism will bring to the region.

It may well be that the forces at work within the Arab/Islamic world are so great and have so much momentum that the efforts of the West to support evolution and reform can only have a marginal impact, as in the past. There has been plenty of dialogue, some economic aid, a flood of wasteful arms sales, and little substantive progress. The same is true of military and security aid efforts. Some ten years of Mediterranean Dialogue in NATO have so far produced virtually nothing but dialogue. A more meaningful relationship there would be useful.

CONCLUSION

The West cannot hope to deal with the problems of instability, violence, and terrorism within the Arab/Islamic world unless it makes a real attempt to deal with root causes. It must also develop an ideological partnership with moderate regimes and Arab and Islamic intellectuals if it is to have any chance at defeating a hostile ideology.

The Bush administration has touched upon all these issues in its call for democracy in the Arab world, as have similar European calls for reform, but, so far, there is little evidence that anyone is shaping the nuanced and practical policies required to meet the very different needs of the very individual Arab and Islamic states. How do regimes with no true political parties or experience with pluralism become real and stable democracies? How do they resolve the need for a matching rule of law and human rights in secular political cultures? What is to be done to deal with the problems of demography and the need for major economic reforms? Intended or not, current efforts have generally appeared to those in the region to be calls for regime change favorable to the United States, rather than support for real, practical reform.

If the West only deals with the Greater Middle East in NATO security terms, the best it can hope for is a mix of containment, continued extremism, and occasional war. To eliminate terrorism or achieve energy security, the root causes of the region's problems must be addressed in as thorough and as practical a manner as any military mission. ●

¹ For specific information on global MENA oil dependency projections see Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook, 2003, Washington, DOE/EIA-0484 (2003), May 2003, pp. 42, 45, 185, 237; International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2002 Insights, Paris, IEA, 2002, pp. 91-93, 106-107; and BP/Amoco, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, BP, 2003, pp. 6-7, 17.

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PROPOSALS FOR RENEWING THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

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NATO must adapt to the new geo-political realities and forge new “rules of the road.” To move forward successfully, the Alliance must develop common policies on how to deal with irresponsible states, the use of military force, the role of multilateral institutions, and how to bring political and economic reform to the Greater Middle East. It is also time to clarify the purposes and benefits of European integration.

The accomplishments of the Atlantic Alliance are remarkable. History records few, if any, alliances that have yielded so many benefits for their members or for the broader international community.

Despite these accomplishments, the transatlantic relationship is under greater strain today than at any point in at least a generation. Many Europeans assume malign intent on the part of the United States. Many Americans resent European behavior and dismiss European perceptions of today’s threats. The conviction that the United States is a hyper-power to be contained has become fashionable in Europe. Reliance on coalitions of the willing to act when the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will not has become the policy of the United States.

The war in Iraq brought these strains to the point of crisis. France and Germany organized resistance to the United States in the U.N. Security Council — alongside Russia, historically NATO’s chief adversary. The Bush administration, in turn, sought to separate these states from other members of the Alliance and the European Union (EU). For a time, rhetoric replaced diplomacy as the primary instrument for taking positions, making criticisms, and shaping coalitions.

These events were, to say the least, unusual. The particular outcome was influenced by domestic politics, personality, miscommunication, and

unfortunate circumstance. What happened, however, was more than an intersection of unexpected developments, disputes over policy, and bad luck. The roots of the Iraq conflict extend at least as far back as 11/9, the day in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down; they were strengthened, in turn, by the events of 9/11, the day in 2001 when terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center, attacked the Pentagon, and killed nearly 3,000 innocent people.

When the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe collapsed, the greatest reason for NATO solidarity disappeared. If 11/9 increased the scope for disagreements between the United States and Europe, 9/11 created the grounds for disagreements that are truly dangerous for the transatlantic relationship. The attacks of that day produced the most sweeping reorientation of U.S. grand strategy in over half a century. Washington’s goal now would be not only to contain and deter hostile states, but also to attack terrorists and regimes that harbor terrorists *before* they could act. European strategies, in contrast, underwent no comparable revision. Indeed, many NATO allies complained of American unilateralism, while questioning the administration’s insistence that the security of all nations was now at risk.

This essay is an abridged version of the report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, chaired by Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers. Charles Kupchan served as the project director. For the full text of “Renewing the Atlantic Partnership,” see http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf.

These shifts in the relationship between the United States and Europe — the consequences of 11/9 and 9/11 — make it clear that the transatlantic relationship urgently needs reassessment. In the face of mounting challenges to the integrity of the West, what can be done to put the Atlantic partnership back on a sound foundation?

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

Europeans and Americans must now work together to ensure that the Iraq crisis becomes an anomaly in their relationship, not a precedent for things to come. To do so, the Atlantic nations should draw from the lessons of their common past:

Lesson One: No alliance can function successfully in the absence of a common strategy, or in the presence of competing strategies.

An alliance has meaning only when its members adjust their policies to take into account their partners' interests — when they do things for one another that they would not do if the alliance did not exist. If the transatlantic relationship is to continue to mean what it has meant in the past, both sides must learn from their failure over Iraq. The Americans will need to reaffirm the insight that shaped their approach to allies throughout the Cold War: that the power to act is not necessarily the power to persuade; that even in an alliance in which military capabilities are disproportionately distributed, the costs of unilateralism can exceed those involved in seeking consent. The Europeans, in turn, will need to acknowledge that the post-9/11 world is by no means safe for transatlantic societies, that the dangers that make it unsafe do not come from Washington, and that neither nostalgia for the past nor insularity in the present will suffice in coping with those threats. The objective is not so much a formal consensus — the quest for which can be debilitating and paralyzing — but a common sense of direction.

Lesson Two: A common strategy need not require equivalent capabilities.

Complementarity is an asset, not a liability. If the United States is the indispensable nation in terms of its military power, then surely the Europeans are indispensable allies in most of the other categories of

power upon which statecraft depends. Whether the issues are countering terrorism, liberalizing trade, preventing international crime, containing weapons of mass destruction, rebuilding post-conflict states, combating poverty, fighting disease, or spreading democracy and human rights, European and American priorities and capabilities complement one another far more often than they compete with one another.

Lesson Three: The time has come to clarify the purposes and benefits of European integration.

The pace and scope of European integration are matters for Europeans to decide. But the American response to this process will be affected by how the EU's leaders and electorates perceive the union's role. Casting the EU as a counterweight to the United States, even if only for rhetorical purposes, will surely fuel transatlantic tension and encourage Washington to look elsewhere for international partners. If, however, the EU frames its policies in complementary terms, as it has done in the past, Washington should continue to regard Europe's deepening and widening as in America's interest. A deeper Europe could ensure the irreversibility of union and could lead to a more militarily capable EU — one that could in time become a more effective partner of the United States. A wider Europe could ensure that peace, democracy, and prosperity continue to spread eastward, thereby converging with what could be similar trends in Russia.

Both sides of the Atlantic, therefore, have important roles to play in shaping the future of the EU. American leaders must resolve their long-standing ambivalence about the emerging European entity. Europe's leaders must resist the temptation to define its identity in opposition to the United States. Those who believe in Atlantic partnership need to be heard calling for a Europe that remains a steady partner of the United States, even as it strengthens itself and broadens its international role.

COMMON TASKS

As the Atlantic democracies work to renew their partnership, they should focus on the following common tasks:

Adapt NATO to New Geopolitical Realities.

Today NATO's principles remain valid, but not all of its historic practices do. There is no further need for a large American military presence in the middle of Europe; redeployments elsewhere are already taking place. The threats confronting the Alliance are more diverse than they were during the Cold War; hence American and European security interests will no longer correspond as precisely as they once did. NATO needs to be more flexible in its procedures and more ambitious in its missions than it has been in the past.

Even as the United States draws down the number of its troops deployed on the continent, it should maintain a sufficient presence to ensure both the interoperability and the sense of collective purpose that arises from an integrated military structure. At the same time, it must be more receptive to EU efforts to assume a more prominent role in the management of European security.

The overall direction of policy should be clear: that the United States continues to welcome what it has sought since the earliest days of the Cold War — a Europe in which Europeans bear the primary responsibility for their own security.

NATO must recognize the extent to which the aftermaths of 11/9 and 9/11 transformed the strategic priorities of the United States. As the United States redeploys its forces outside of Europe, the Alliance must find the appropriate balance between a new emphasis on out-of-area missions and its traditional focus on European security. Although NATO will continue to remain active both within and outside the geographical confines of Europe, there needs to be a common understanding that NATO must increasingly concern itself with threats emanating from outside Europe if the Alliance is to prove as central to the post-11/9 (and post-9/11) world as it was throughout the Cold War.

Establish New Guidelines for the Use of Military Force.

Over the past half-century, a hallmark of transatlantic partnership has been agreement on basic principles governing the employment of military capabilities.

Today, new challenges require a reassessment of those principles. The Atlantic Alliance can help to solve this problem by establishing “rules of the road” regarding preventive uses of military force. These could begin with a consensus on what not to do: for example, Europeans could agree not to reject preventive action in principle, while Americans would agree that prevention would be reserved for special cases and not be the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. Both parties could then acknowledge the progress that has already been made in specifying the conditions in which intervention is justified: to combat terrorism (as in Afghanistan), to back multilaterally sanctioned inspections (as in Iraq), or to achieve humanitarian goals (as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor). Recent EU planning documents have called for robust action to forestall threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as has U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. These trends suggest that the United States, NATO, the EU, and the U.N. might find more common ground on this issue than one might expect from the rhetoric.

Develop a Common Policy toward Irresponsible States.

Preventive strikes should always be a last resort. The Transatlantic Alliance should also agree on how to forestall situations that might require it. That means developing compatible policies toward states that possess or seek to possess weapons of mass destruction, that harbor terrorists or support terrorism, and that seek through these means to challenge the international order that Europeans and Americans have created and must sustain. Europeans should acknowledge the need for credible threats, not just inducements, in dealing with irresponsible states: coercive diplomacy is at times necessary to achieve results. Americans need to be prepared to include inducements in their strategy: threats do not in all instances produce acquiescence.

The Atlantic partners need to ensure that their search for common ground does not become a pretext for procrastination, thereby providing irresponsible states more time to develop their weapons capabilities. Ongoing initiatives should, therefore, be stepped up — including deepening cooperation on securing nuclear materials in the former Soviet

Union; strengthening links between U.S. and European intelligence services; expanding the recently launched naval search-and-seizure program more formally known as the Proliferation Security Initiative; closing loopholes in the nonproliferation regime that allow countries to legally accumulate stockpiles of nuclear fuel; and tightening enforcement mechanisms to respond to violations of existing counter-proliferation regimes.

Agree on the Role of Multilateral Institutions.

Disagreement over the efficacy and responsibility of international institutions has been a major source of transatlantic discord since at least the mid-1990s. In the aftermath of disputes over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Criminal Court, there is now a growing sentiment in Europe — and among critics of the Bush administration within the United States — that Americans are becoming uncompromising unilateralists, while Europeans are seen by their American detractors as uncritical and naïve multilateralists whose real aim is to constrain American power.

These perceptions miss the nature of the problem. Disagreements on policy, not differences over the utility of international institutions, have caused most of these clashes. Had Americans and Europeans reached a consensus on the issues involved, disputes over procedure would have seemed much less serious.

As the experiences of World War II and the Cold War made clear, when the United States and its European allies agree on policy objectives, the institutional frameworks for implementing them usually follow.

There are compelling reasons now, on both sides of the Atlantic, to revive this tradition of function determining form. Europe will find international institutions much less effective if the world's only superpower has stepped away from them. The United States loses support abroad when it is seen to be acting unilaterally, making it harder for Washington to enlist allies in pursuing its objectives and in marshaling domestic support.

Build a Common Approach to the Greater Middle East.

The Greater Middle East is the part of the world with the greatest potential to affect the security and prosperity of Europeans and Americans alike. The transatlantic community must tackle four central issues, the first of which is Iraq. Europeans and Americans must set aside narrow political and economic ambitions in the region and jointly shoulder responsibility for stabilizing the country. NATO, already demonstrating its value in Afghanistan, is a natural successor to the current international military presence in Iraq. If a substantial increase in financial and military support from Europe is to be forthcoming, the United States must be prepared for greater European participation in the political management of Iraq.

Iran is a second issue. Iran is experiencing considerable internal debate over the direction of its domestic politics and foreign policy. Americans and Europeans should coordinate their policies — if possible, with Russia as well — to ensure that Iranians fully understand how the international community will react to their decisions regarding proliferation, support for terrorism, and democracy. The importance of encouraging political reform in Iran and neutralizing potential threats should give Europe and the United States a strong incentive to act in unison.

A third issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The widespread perception in Europe that the United States one-sidedly favors Israel weakens support for American foreign policy in Europe. Meanwhile, many American policymakers see European policy toward the dispute as reflexively pro-Palestinian. Both sides need to make an effort to achieve a common position: the United States needs to define more precisely its concept of a Palestinian state; Europe must take more seriously Israel's concern for security.

A fourth area for transatlantic cooperation in the Greater Middle East concerns the area's long-term economic and political development. Many countries

in the region have lagged behind the rest of the world in moving toward democratic societies and market economies. Addressing this problem requires a concerted effort by Europe and the United States to promote political and economic reform. The goal should be not to impose change on traditional societies, but rather to work with local political, economic, and civic leaders in supporting a gradual process of reform.

CONCLUSION

Farsighted vision and political courage sustained the transatlantic partnership for half a century, to the overwhelming benefit of Europeans, Americans, and the world. Today's challenges are different, but the

benefits of partnership are still substantial — as are the costs if the partnership is allowed to erode. Recent acrimony demonstrates not only the difficulties that arise for America and Europe when they fail to act as partners, but also that pressing problems are best addressed together.

In the end, Europe and America have far more to gain as allies than as neutrals or adversaries. With enlightened leadership, governments and citizens on both sides of the Atlantic are sure to grasp and act upon that reality. ●

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