

North Anna 2

2Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Jun 30, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Secure the Unit 2 Safety Related Pressurizer Heater Cabinet Doors as Required by Procedure VPAP-0312

Failure to Secure the Unit 2 Safety Related Pressurizer Heater Cabinet Doors as Required by Procedure VPAP-0312

A Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V was identified by the NRC for failure to properly accomplish a procedure to ensure doors on safety-related pressurizer (PZR) heater cabinets were adequately secured to maintain seismic requirements. On March 15, 2007, during a plant status tour the inspectors identified that all five of the PZR heater cabinet doors were improperly secured. The problem was documented in the licensee's corrective action program as condition report 013992.

The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected it would cause a more significant safety concern. The finding was of very low safety significance, Green, because it was potentially risk significant due to a seismic initiating event, and the loss of the equipment would not sufficiently degrade the TS required system that supported the intended safety function as described in Phase 1 of the significance determination process. This finding has aspects relating to the cross-cutting area of human performance (H.4.(b)), based on procedural compliance and failure of personnel to follow procedures.

Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Implementation of a Non-quality Procedure Results in Reactor Trips

A self-revealing finding was identified for inadequate implementation of a non-quality procedure associated with the equipment reliability process. This led to a 'run-to-failure' classification for two different 7300 System cards which each resulted in a reactor trip on Unit 1 and 2.

This self-revealing finding is greater than minor because it resulted in a perturbation in plant stability by causing a reactor trip. The finding was of very low safety significance because, although it caused a reactor trip, it did not increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, did not contribute to a combination of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment functions, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood. The licensee entered the problem involving Units 1 and 2 into their corrective action program. This finding involves the safety-significant and risk significant decisions aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee incorrectly determined that operators had sufficient time to take necessary actions to preclude a plant trip when the cards failed.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Procedure Resulting in the Inoperability of 2J Emergency Diesel Generator

A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified for a failure to adequately implement a surveillance procedure which resulted in the inoperability of the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The licensee restored the EDG to operable status and initiated actions to evaluate the problem and determine the appropriate corrective actions.

This finding is more than minor due to its impact on the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and its attribute of human performance. The finding is of very low safety significance because the 2J EDG was not out of service for longer than the allowed Technical Specification time. The cause of the finding involved the procedure compliance aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area because personnel failed to correctly perform a procedure step, which included a separate verification.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Identify Unsatisfactory Performance of a Fire Brigade Crew

The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of the Fire Protection Program because the licensee's assessment of a fire brigade drill was inadequate. Fire brigade performance was not accurately critiqued to identify deficiencies requiring corrective action. The licensee entered this problem into their corrective action program for appropriate action.

This finding is more than minor because it had a high negative impact or degradation on the ability of the fire brigade to effectively carry out its manual fire fighting control and suppression function. This finding was of very low safety significance because the observed crew was only one of four crews of the site fire brigade team, and that the overall condition of the fire detection and suppression systems had been satisfactory. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution.

Inspection Report# : [2006005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection for the AFW System

A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified by the NRC on July 10, 2006, for the failure to adequately protect auxiliary feedwater (AFW) components from tornado generated missiles. The licensee installed a modification to protect some of the identified components and is planning to modify their design basis to address the remaining components.

The failure to assure adequate tornado missile protection had a credible impact on reactor safety because of the exposure of all three trains or subsystems of the AFW system to tornado induced damage. The finding is more than minor due to its impact on the Mitigating System cornerstone and the related attribute of design control. A phase III evaluation concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance given that the facility is located in a part of the country with a low incidence of tornados, i.e., the initiating event frequency for a tornado is low, and systems other than AFW are available to help mitigate the event.

Inspection Report# : [2006004](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Corrective Action to Upgrade Breaker Operating Mechanism

A Green, self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified as a result of inadequate corrective action to upgrade the operating mechanism for a Unit 2 Quench Spray pump breaker. The licensee initiated corrective actions that involved replacement of the breaker with an upgraded spare breaker and extent of condition review.

The failure to implement corrective action had a credible impact on safety due to the impact on the component's accident response time which exceeded the analyzed value. The finding is more than minor because it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and the related attribute of equipment performance. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in that it did not result in a loss of operability due to a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant due to possible external events. The cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution.

Inspection Report# : [2006005](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : August 24, 2007