3Q/2006 ROP Action Matrix Summary

The assessment program collects information from inspections and performance indicators (PIs) in order to enable the agency to arrive at objective conclusions about the licensee's safety performance. Based on this assessment information, the NRC determines the appropriate level of agency response, including supplemental inspection and pertinent regulatory actions ranging from management meetings up to and including orders for plant shutdown. The Action Matrix Summary listed below reflects overall plant performance and is updated regularly to reflect inputs from the most recent performance indicators and inspection findings. Physical Protection information is not publicly available and the associated performance indicators and inspection findings are not integrated into the Action Matrix Summary.

Notes have been added to plants that are not in the licensee response column of the Action Matrix.

Plants with current substantive cross-cutting issues are so noted with "PIR," "HP," and/or "SCWE" designations as applicable. Clicking on these designations will take you to the <u>ROP Substantive Cross Cutting Issues Summary</u> for additional information

additional information.				
Licensee Response Column	Regulatory Response Column	Degraded Cornerstone Column	Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column	Unacceptable Performance Column
Arkansas Nuclear 1	<u>Braidwood 1</u> ¹	Kewaunee ² HP/PIR	Perry 1 ³ HP/PIR	
Arkansas Nuclear 2	<u>Braidwood 2⁴</u>	Palo Verde 1 ⁵ HP/PIR	Point Beach 1 ⁶	
Beaver Valley 1	Brunswick 1 ⁷	Palo Verde 2 ⁸ HP/PIR	Point Beach 2 ⁹	
Beaver Valley 2	Brunswick 2 ¹⁰	Palo Verde 3 ¹¹ HP/PIR		
Browns Ferry 2	<u>Byron 2¹²</u>			
Browns Ferry 3	<u>Callaway</u> ¹³			
Byron 1	Calvert Cliffs 1 ¹⁴			
Calvert Cliffs 2	<u>Dresden 2¹⁵</u>			
<u>Catawba 1</u>	Millstone 2 ¹⁶			
Catawba 2	Oyster Creek 17 HP			
Clinton	Quad Cities 1 ¹⁸			
Columbia Generating <u>Station</u> PIR	Seabrook 1 ¹⁹			
Comanche Peak 1	South Texas 2 ²⁰			
Comanche Peak 2	Summer ²¹			
Cooper	<u>Surry 1</u> ²²			
Crystal River 3	<u>Surry 2²³</u>			
D.C. Cook 1	<u>Turkey Point 3²⁴ PIR</u>			
D.C. Cook 2	<u>Turkey Point 4²⁵ PIR</u>			
<u>Davis-Besse</u>	<u>Vogtle 1²⁶</u>			
Diablo Canyon 1	<u>Vogtle 2²⁷</u>			
Diablo Canyon 2				
Dresden 3				
<u>Duane Arnold</u> Farley 1				
Farley 2				
Fermi 2 ^{PIR}				

FitzPatrick

Fort Calhoun

Ginna

Grand Gulf 1

Harris 1

Hatch 1

Hatch 2

<u>Hope Creek 1</u>

Indian Point 2²⁸

<u>Indian Point 3²⁹</u>

La Salle 1

<u>La Salle 2</u>

Limerick 1

Limerick 2

Limetick 2

McGuire 1

McGuire 2

Millstone 3

Monticello

Nine Mile Point 1

Nine Mile Point 2

North Anna 1

North Anna 2

Oconee 1

Oconee 2

Oconee 3

<u>Palisades</u>

Peach Bottom 2

Peach Bottom 3

Pilgrim 1

Prairie Island 1

Prairie Island 2

Quad Cities 2

River Bend 1^{PIR}

Robinson 2

Saint Lucie 1

Saint Lucie 2

Salem 1

Salem 2

San Onofre 2

San Onofre 3

Sequoyah 1

Sequoyah 2

South Texas 1

Susquehanna 1

Susquehanna 2

Three Mile Island 1

Vermont Yankee

Waterford 3

Watts Bar 1

Wolf Creek 1

- ▲ Note 1: Braidwood Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one white finding in the Public Radiation Cornerstone originating in 2Q2006.
- ▲ Note 2: Kewaunee is in the Degraded Cornerstone Column due to one white finding in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone originating in 3Q2005 and one yellow finding in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone originating in 4Q2005. In particular, the white finding originating in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone was held open in accordance with MC 0305 for greater than 4 quarters while corrective actions were being developed by the licensee to address this issue. An IP 95002 supplemental inspection was satisfactorily completed in 3Q2006; therefore, the white and yellow findings will be closed effective October 1, 2006.
- ▲ Note 3: Perry is in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column due to the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone being degraded with multiple White findings being held open for greater than 4 consecutive quarters. In particular, the White finding initiated in 3Q2003 associated with the ESW pump failure is being held open in accordance with MC 0305 for greater than 4 quarters because corrective actions were ineffective and the pump failed again in May 2004. In addition, the White finding initiated in 4Q2003 for inadequate venting of the RHR/LPCI keep fill system is also being held open in accordance with MC 0305 for greater than 4 quarters pending the implementation of effective corrective actions.
- ▲ Note 4: Braidwood Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one white finding in the Public Radiation Cornerstone originating in 2Q2006.
- ▲ Note 5: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 are in the Degraded Cornerstone Column because of one Yellow finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 4Q2004. The significance determination for this final Yellow finding and corresponding Notice of violation were issued on April 8, 2005. The supplemental inspection was completed in December 2005. The team determined that the Yellow finding would remain open, because not all of the licensee's root and contributing causes were fully developed, many of the corrective actions were narrowly focused or ineffective, and effectiveness reviews were not adequate. The licensee subsequently informed the NRC that they have completed additional corrective actions and are ready for the followup IP 95002 inspection. Region IV completed the followup inspection on September 1, 2006, and determined that the Yellow finding would remain open.
- A Note 6: Point Beach Unit 1 is in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column due to a red finding and a yellow finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 1Q2002 and 1Q2003 respectively. Both findings are being held open in accordance with IMC 0305 for greater than 4 quarters pending the implementation of effective corrective actions to address performance deficiencies. In addition, a white finding in the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone originating in 4Q2005 is not being considered in the action matrix due to a deviation approved by the EDO.
- A Note 7: Both units are in the Regulatory Response column due to a White performance indicator in the Mitigating System cornerstone (Emergency AC Power Systems) originating in 2Q/2006.
- Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 are in the Degraded Cornerstone Column because of one Yellow finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 4Q2004. The significance determination for this final Yellow finding and corresponding Notice of violation were issued on April 8, 2005. The supplemental inspection was completed in December 2005. The team determined that the Yellow finding would remain open, because not all of the licensee's root and contributing causes were fully developed, many of the corrective actions were narrowly focused or ineffective, and effectiveness reviews were not adequate. The licensee subsequently informed the NRC that they have completed additional corrective actions and are ready for the followup IP 95002 inspection. Region IV completed the followup inspection on September 1, 2006, and determined that the Yellow finding would remain open.
- A Note 9: Point Beach Unit 2 is in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column due to two red findings in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 1Q2002 and 1Q2003 respectively. Both findings are being held open in accordance with IMC 0305 for greater than 4 quarters pending the implementation of effective corrective actions to address performance deficiencies. In addition, a white finding in the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone originating in 4Q2005 is not being considered in the action matrix due to a deviation approved by the EDO.

- Note 10: Both units are in the Regulatory Response column due to a White performance indicator in the Mitigating System cornerstone (Emergency AC Power Systems) originating in 2Q/2006.
- A Note 11: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 are in the Degraded Cornerstone Column because of one Yellow finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 4Q2004. The significance determination for this final Yellow finding and corresponding Notice of violation were issued on April 8, 2005. The supplemental inspection was completed in December 2005. The team determined that the Yellow finding would remain open, because not all of the licensee's root and contributing causes were fully developed, many of the corrective actions were narrowly focused or ineffective, and effectiveness reviews were not adequate. The licensee subsequently informed the NRC that they have completed additional corrective actions and are ready for the followup IP 95002 inspection. Region IV completed the followup inspection on September 1, 2006, and determined that the Yellow finding would remain open.
- ▲ Note 12: Byron Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White Performance indicator in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone originating in 2Q2006 (Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System)
- ▲ Note 13: Callaway Plant is in the Regulatory Response Column because of a White MSPI for the Heat Removal System. This was due to failures of pumps resulting in the unavailability of auxiliary feedwater system.
- ▲ Note 14: Calvert Cliffs Unit I was in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White inspection finding in the Mitigating System cornerstone originating in 3Q2006. The White finding involved inadequate design control that resulted in the incorrect over-current trip setting for the 1A emergency diesel generator support system supply breaker.
- ▲ Note 15: Dresden Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White Performance indicator in the Initiating Events cornerstone originating in 3Q2006 (Initiating Events, Scrams With Loss Of Normal Heat Removal)
- ▲ Note 16: Millstone 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one WHITE Performance Indicator in the Initiating Events Cornerstone originating in 1Q2006. The WHITE Performance Indicator was related to unplanned scrams with loss of normal heat removal. The supplemental inspection (95001) for the White finding was completed in September, 2006.
- ▲ Note 17: Oyster Creek was in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White inspection finding in the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Cornerstone originating in 3Q2005. The White finding involved an inadequate response to an event involving grassing of the intake structure. The finding remains open for greater than four quarters pending additional supplemental inspection to confirm that broad corrective actions have been implemented.
- ▲ Note 18: Quad Cities Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one white finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 2Q2006.
- ▲ Note 19: Seabrook was in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White performance indicator(PI) in the Mitigating System cornerstone originating in 3Q2006. The White PI was related to Emergency AC Power Safety System unavailability.
- ▲ Note 20: South Texas Project, Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column because of a White MSPI for Emergency AC Power Systems. This was due to a major failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 22 on December 9, 2003, which required significant time to repair. Region IV conducted the supplemental inspection and the results are currently under review.
- ▲ Note 21: The unit is in the Regulatory Response column due to a White inspection finding in the Public Radiation cornerstone (Failure to Properly Prepare a Radioactive Material Package for Shipment) originating in 10/2006.
- ▲ Note 22: Both units are in the Regulatory Response column due to a White inspection finding in the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone originating in 1Q/2006. During a Full Scale Exercise Critique, the licensee did not identify a weakness associated with a risk-significant planning standard (RSPS).
- ▲ Note 23: Both units are in the Regulatory Response column due to a White inspection finding in the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone originating in 1Q/2006. During a Full Scale Exercise Critique, the licensee did not identify a weakness associated with a risk-significant planning standard (RSPS).
- A Note 24: Both units are in the Regulatory Response column due to a White finding in the Mitigating System cornerstone (AFW inoperable) originating in 4Q/2005.
- ▲ Note 25:

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- ▲ Note 26: Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response column due to a White finding in the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone originating in 3Q/2006.
- ▲ Note 27: Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response column due to a White finding in the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone originating in 3Q/2006 and a White performance indicator in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone (Cooling Water Systems) originating in 3Q2006.
- ▲ Note 28: On October 31, 2005, the EDO approved a Deviation from the ROP Action Matrix to provide a greater level of oversight for the Indian Point 2 and 3 plants. The Deviation includes oversight activities to monitor licensee action to: 1) Characterize and remediate tritium found onsite, and 2) improve the reliability of the emergency siren system.
- ▲ Note 29: On October 31, 2005, the EDO approved a Deviation from the ROP Action Matrix to provide a greater level of oversight for the Indian Point 2 and 3 plants. The Deviation includes oversight activities to monitor licensee action to: 1) Characterize and remediate tritium found onsite, and 2) improve the reliability of the emergency siren system.

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