Limerick 2
1Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Sep 30, 2005
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to scope emergency service water back-up supply to turbine enclosure cooling water into the Maintenance Rule program
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) because Exelon did not scope an emergency service water (ESW) valve open function, used in the emergency operating procedures, into its maintenance rule (MR) monitoring program. Exelon did not demonstrate that the valve's performance was effectively controlled through the conduct of appropriate preventative maintenance such that the valve remained capable of performing its intended function. As a result, Exelon did not perform additional corrective actions to determine the cause and correct the condition when the valve failed to open on demand during the last two valve tests in 2002 and 2004. Exelon added the ESW valve open function into the MR program and entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution (IRs 370575 and 370904).

This finding affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because equipment performance problems were such that Exelon could not demonstrate effective control of component performance or condition through preventative maintenance. This finding is more than minor because it is similar to Example 7.d of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix-E, "Examples of Minor Issues." The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function for equipment designated as risk significant, and was not risk significant for external initiating events. (Section 1R12)
Inspection Report# : 2005004*(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: G Nov 15, 2005
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Emergency Response Organization Exercise Performance Issue
The inspectors identified that the Exelon exercise evaluators failed to identify an ERO exercise performance issue that had the apparent effect of unnecessarily prolonging a simulated radiological release to the environment. Specifically, the exercise scenario presented conditions of fuel damage and the failure of one MSIV to close. Operators inappropriately opted to de-pressurize the reactor using the main condenser bypass valves rather than the SRVs. This created a pathway that allowed radiation from the failed fuel to be released to the environment.
Inspection Report# : 2005009*(pdf)*

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Physical Protection information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

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