Millstone 2 3Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:

Mar 31, 2005

Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding

FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS CONCERNS RELATED TO FREEZE PROTECTION OF THE OUTDOOR TEMPORARY AIR COMPRESSOR

The inspectors identified a self-revealing finding for the failure to adequately address issues related to the operation of an outdoor temporary air compressor and associated air dryer skid during cold weather conditions. On November 11, 2004, Dominion had identified that additional freeze protection actions were required to ensure the availability of the compressor during cold weather. Subsequently, the inspectors identified two occasions where actions taken to ensure availability of the compressor were not adequate. On December 17, 2004, the inspectors identified that a heat trace for the system dryer was deenergized. On February 1, 2005, the temporary air compressor failed causing the "B" instrument air compressor to start. Following the air transient, Dominion conducted an investigation and concluded that the cause of the temporary air compressor failure was freezing of the pre-filter on the air dryer skid. Dominion replaced the compressor, installed a tent around the air-dryer towers, and placed a heating unit inside the tent. The finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability at power. The performance issue associated with this finding was the failure to take adequate actions to ensure that adverse weather conditions did not affect the availability of the temporary instrument air system. The risk of this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), because, although the temporary air compressor system became unavailable, the standby instrument air compressor restored instrument air system pressure. The instrument air system pressure stabilized and recovered such that the instrument air header pressure did not cause a reactor trip. This finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution in that Dominion failed to take adequate corrective actions to prevent the air dryer skid from freezing.

Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)

Mitigating Systems

Significance: Mar 31, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES TO CORRECTLY INSTALL TEMPORARY COOLING TO THE EAST 480 VOLT SWITCHGEAR

The inspectors identified a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1a, "Procedures and Programs," for the failure to adequately implement the procedure for installing temporary ventilation through the East 480 volt vital switchgear room when normal cooling was disabled for maintenance. The procedure establishes the required flow path in the switchgear room when compensatory cooling measures were required. On January 12, 2005, operators failed to perform the procedure step that opens doors to provide for an exhaust path to allow warm air to leave the switchgear room. The finding was greater than minor because the failure to install the compensatory cooling system, per the procedure, caused the air flow through the East 480 volt switchgear room to be below the minimum required to support cooling of the 480 volt system for initiating events (transients), mitigating systems, and barrier integrity systems. The finding was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the initiating events and mitigating systems cornerstones, and the containment structures, systems, and components and barrier performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone. Since more than one cornerstone was affected, a Reactor Safety Significance Determination Process Phase 2 analysis was performed. The analysis resulted in a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because the improper installation of the compensatory measures did not result in an actual loss of the supported 480 volt AC system or electro hydraulic control functions. This finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance in that both Engineering and Operations personnel failed to correctly implement the procedure for compensatory cooling.

Inspection Report# : 2005002(pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:

Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

HIGH CONCENTRATION OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DURING FILTER TRANSFERS

Dominion did not use process or other engineering controls, to the extent practical, to control the concentration of radioactive material in air during handling of radioactive spent Unit 2 filters on September 29, 2004. As a result, elevated concentrations of radioactive material in air was generated and two workers sustained unplanned intakes of airborne radioactive material. This was a self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1701, "Respiratory Protection and Controls to Restrict Internal Exposure in Restricted Areas, Use of Process or Other Engineering Controls." The finding was greater than minor, in that it was associated with the program and processes for exposure control and monitoring attribute of the Radiation Safety Cornerstone attributes and did affect the objective of the Cornerstone. The finding was determined to be of very low risk significance (Green) using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, in that it involved an ALARA exposure control finding, but the three year rolling average collective occupational dose for Millstone did not exceed 135 person-rem. Dominion suspended the work activity and initiated a root cause investigation. This finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance in that Dominion did not use process or engineering controls, to the extent practical, resulting in exposure of two workers to elevated concentrations of airborne radioactive material..

Inspection Report#: 2004008(pdf)

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

<u>Physical Protection</u> information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified: November 30, 2005