

# Farley 1

## 2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings

---

### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Sep 25, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Backhoe Struck Support in High Voltage Switchyard**

A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow procedure for control of switchyard activities in accordance with TS 5.4.1.a. which resulted in a backhoe striking and damaging a 500KV bus support in the high voltage switchyard.

This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Event cornerstone for switchyard activities. The licensee considers activities in the high voltage switchyard as risk significant. The damage to the support occurred due to not following the procedural requirements in place to reduce the risk for work in the high voltage switchyard. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a reactor trip or the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance.

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

---

### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2005

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling**

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failure to follow procedure in accordance with Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, which resulted in a loss of both trains of Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling for nine hours and a 12 degree Fahrenheit rise in SFP temperature.

This finding is more than minor because it adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding was determined to be of low safety significance because the SFP temperature was below Updated Final Safety Analysis Report limits, peak temperature only reached 100 degrees and water level in the fuel pool was normal. This finding also involved the cross-cutting aspects of human performance in that the operators failed to properly follow the procedure requirement to successfully swap pumps in operation.

Inspection Report# : [2005003\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2005

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Follow TS for Inoperable Train of SSPS Logic**

A self-revealing NCV was identified for failure to implement the proper Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) associated with Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation when one train was inoperable. The licensee initially entered a LCO for failed channel (TS 3.3.2.D), but later determined that a logic card failed that impacted the Unit 1 A train of solid state protection system (SSPS) and subsequently entered TS LCO 3.3.2.C.

This finding is more [than] minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Unit 1 A train of the SSPS logic initiation was unavailable for a time that exceeded the allowed time permitted by TS. This finding is of very low safety significance because the B train of SSPS logic initiation was maintained operable at all times.

Inspection Report# : [2005003\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2005

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### Loss of Running RHR Pump

A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. Procedures for conducting surveillance testing were not appropriate to the circumstances and resulted in the loss of the operating residual heat removal pump during shutdown operations.

The finding is greater than minor since it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone for equipment availability and because it affects the associated Cornerstone objective. Specifically, the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the opposite train RHR pump was started within one minute and an adequate shutdown cooling (SDC) thermal margin was maintained. The SDC thermal margin was verified as maintained by a calculated reactor coolant system time-to-boil of greater than 20 hours.

Inspection Report# : [2005002\(pdf\)](#)

**G**

Significance: **G** Sep 25, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### Failure to Properly Reactive Senior Reactor Operator License

A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-TCP-17.5, License Administration, as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This resulted in the incorrect certification of the reactivation of two SRO licenses.

The inspectors determined that the finding is greater than minor because it involves the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective of the reliability and capability of operators to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The NRC considers the reactivation and proficiency of licensed operators an element of the human performance attribute which helps to minimize potential human errors. The finding was evaluated using the Operator Requalification Human Performance significance determination process and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because more than 20 percent of the reactivation records reviewed had deficiencies.

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

---

## Barrier Integrity

---

## Emergency Preparedness

---

## Occupational Radiation Safety

---

## Public Radiation Safety

---

## Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

---

## Miscellaneous

Last modified : August 24, 2005