

## Millstone 3

### 4Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

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## Initiating Events

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## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Oct 15, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY EVALUATE AND CORRECT AN IDENTIFIED DEGRADATION OF THE SERVICE WATER (SW) PUMP/MOTOR COUPLING**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to evaluate and correct an identified condition adverse to quality (physical degradation) associated with the "B" service water (SW) pump/motor coupling. The inspectors found that the licensee had not properly evaluated a degraded condition of the "B" SW pump/motor coupling and associated fasteners after a condition report documented the "B" SW pump packing and coupling degradation. Subsequently, the licensee declared the pump inoperable and replaced the coupling.

This finding is more than minor because the failure to evaluate the identified degradation of a mitigating system, and to take corrective actions, would have allowed further degradation and affected operability of the system. The finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and the objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the as-found condition and an analysis of the existing degradation that concluded the SW pump was capable of meeting its safety function.

Inspection Report# : [2003004\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure of the licensee to identify an error in design calculations involving the technical specification for emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank level, and failure to prevent translation of this error**

The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for inadequate design control measures to provide for the verification of a design and for failure to assure that regulatory requirements were correctly translated into procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify a calculation error from 1992 and 1993 regarding technical specification (TS) fuel oil storage tank levels, and then failed to prevent the error from being translated into the TS surveillance procedure that demonstrates EDG operability.

This finding is more than minor because required EDG fuel oil storage tank levels were incorrectly translated into technical specification surveillance procedures and the actual tank level calculations had to be reperformed to assure historical TS requirements were met. This is similar to example 3.i in Appendix E of Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), and is being

dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation, based on licensee analysis that determined no loss of safety function for the EDGs. This finding regarding the failure to identify the incorrect calculations and the subsequent error in the TS surveillance procedure is related to the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution process.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Physical Protection**

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## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : March 02, 2004