

## Brunswick 2

### 3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

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## Initiating Events

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## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Sep 20, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SERVICE WATER STRAINER BLOWDOWN LINE CLOGGING**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for the licensee's failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is related to inadequate corrective actions to prevent recurring nuclear and conventional service water pump functional failures caused by clogging of the associated pump's strainer due to marine growth in the service water intake bays. This resulted in six failures in twelve months.

This finding is greater than minor because it resulted in an increase in the likelihood of loss of nuclear and conventional service water initiating events. In addition, the finding affected the operability, availability, and reliability of the nuclear and conventional service water pumps. The finding is of very low safety significance because redundancy existed in the nuclear and conventional service water systems and the relatively short duration of unavailability of the pumps.

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Implement Procedure 0PM-STU500, Service Water Intake Structure Inspection and Cleaning**

Green. An inadequate implementation of Preventive Maintenance Procedure 0PM-STU500, Service Water Intake Structure Inspection and Cleaning, resulted in the 1A Nuclear Service Water (NSW) pump becoming inoperable, with a loss of function, due to the pump's discharge strainer becoming clogged with oyster shells during a diving evolution. A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1a was identified. This issue was considered to be more than minor because it affected a cornerstone attribute and an associated cornerstone objective. The mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability, availability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events was affected by equipment performance and human error. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significant because the risk was mitigated by the availability of the conventional service water pumps which were utilized in accordance with the abnormal operating procedures to restore service water flow.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

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## Barrier Integrity

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Implement Procedure 0ENP-54, Building Ventilation Pressure Control Program**

Green. An inadequate implementation of Procedure 0ENP-54, Building Ventilation Pressure Control, resulted in a breach of the control room habitability envelope that exceeded the allowable leakage criteria to maintain both units' control room emergency ventilation (CREV) systems operable. A non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1a was identified. This issue was considered to be more than minor because it affected a cornerstone attribute and an associated cornerstone objective. The barrier integrity objective and containment functionality attribute of configuration control and human performance in post-accident and event performance were affected. Additionally, if this issue was left uncorrected, it would have been a more significant safety concern. The finding involved the barrier integrity cornerstone in which the control room barrier was degraded and represented a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke and a toxic atmosphere. This issue was evaluated to be very low safety significant. The impact of chlorine gas intrusion (toxic atmosphere) into the control room during the period the door was blocked open was limited to the human factors concern of control room response while wearing breathing apparatus. Also, the CREV systems for both units were returned to operable status within the TS allowed time frame. Operator actions of interest were those required to respond to an initiating event that happened during the short time of vulnerability.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

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## Miscellaneous

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