### Catawba 1 2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

## **Initiating Events**

# **Mitigating Systems**

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Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation Inadequate Cooling Water Flow Test Procedure

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section XI, Test Control because a test procedure was inadequate to assure that the 1A containment spray (NS) heat exchanger (HX) would perform satisfactorily in service. The licensee's test procedure acceptance criteria limit was set too low to meet the intent of the stated purpose of the test and was inadequate to obtain test data that could be trended appropriately to adequately assure that the HX would perform satisfactorily in service. This allowed the 1A NS HX to become inoperable. The finding was more than minor because the heat exchanger actually became inoperable, which directly affected the cornerstone objective of preserving the containment boundary. The finding was only of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual reduction of the atmospheric pressure control function of the reactor containment since the other train was available and was designed for one hundred percent capability to meet design requirements. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)



Significance: Jan 31, 2003 Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### Failure to Update and Maintain Control of Design Calculations

A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for inadequate control of design calculations. This finding adversely affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and is greater than minor because there were multiple examples of Type II calculation deficiencies that were significant enough to require revision of several design calculations to ensure the component cooling water system met design criteria. Specific examples of inadequate design calculations included failure to use appropriate and/or current calculation inputs, out of date active design calculations, and the failure to incorporate design calculation revisions did not show that the component cooling water system was operating outside of it's design criteria. (Section 1R21.231 b) Inspection Report# : 2002008(pdf)

## **Barrier Integrity**

# **Emergency Preparedness**

# **Occupational Radiation Safety**

Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Perform Adequate Routine Surveys** 

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to perform adequate radiological surveys as required by 10 CFR 20.1501, General, paragraph (a). Three radiological surveys conducted in the chemistry laboratory over a three month period were insufficient to detect radiation levels from potential radiological hazards that could create radiation areas. The finding was more than minor because they were associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring to protect the worker from exposure to radiation. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because it was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 2OS1.2) Inspection Report# : 2003003(pdf)



Significance: Jun 28, 2003 Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### Failure to Post a Radiation Area

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to post a radiation area as required by 10 CFR 20.1902, Posting Requirement, paragraph (a), Posting of Radiation Areas. Radioactive samples having a dose rate greater than 5 millirem/hour at 30 centimeters were stored in the chemistry lab in such a manner that an individual could receive a whole body dose from the stored material without the proper radiation sign posting. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the process attribute of exposure/contamination control and monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, because this finding was not an overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose, nor was it an ALARA issue. (Section 20S1.1) Inspection Report# : <u>2003003(pdf</u>)

#### Significance: N/A Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Falsification of Radiological Survey Records**

A Severity Level IV violation that was characterized as an NCV of Technical Specification 5.4 and 10 CFR 50.9 was identified for a period of at least January 1 through June 4, 2002. This involved a health physics technician failing to perform required, routine radiation surveys on numerous occasions and deliberately fabricating data on the radiological survey records, which are required to be maintained by 10 CFR 20.2103. Because this issue involved willfulness on the part of a licensee employee and inaccurate information which impacts the regulatory process, it was not subject to the provisions of the Reactor Oversight Process, and was dispositioned in accordance with traditional enforcement. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was willful and involved required radiation surveys, some

involving high radiation areas, that were not made over an extended period of time. (Section 4OA5.2) Inspection Report# : 2003002(pdf)

# **Public Radiation Safety**

### **Physical Protection**



Significance: Dec 20, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### Failure to comply with Interim Compensatory Measure B.4.f

A non-cited violation of Provision III.A of the February 25, 2002, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Catawba was identified. The finding was more that minor because it was associated the "Response to Contingency Events" attribute and affected the objective of the Physical Protection Cornerstone to provide adequate assurance that the physical protection system can protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. It was determined to be of very low safety significance in that it involved a failure to meet regulatory requirements and represented a vulnerability in safeguards systems or plan; however, there have not been greater than two similar findings in the previous four quarters. (Section V.F Inspection Report# : 2002009(*pdf*)

### **Miscellaneous**

Significance: N/A Aug 23, 2002 Identified By: NRC Item Type: FIN Finding

#### **Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection**

There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The inspection concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs (PI&R). However, during the inspection, several isolated examples were noted of incomplete corrective action implementation and a lack of detail in operability reviews. Inspection Report# : 2002007(pdf)

Last modified : September 04, 2003