Beaver Valley 1
1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Mar 29, 2003
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY CONTROL SCAFFOLD ACTIVITIES CAUSES MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE AND REACTOR TRIP
Failure to properly preplan and control maintenance activities (scaffold erection) in the vicinity of the ‘C' main steam isolation valve (MSIV) actuator led to an unplanned Unit 1 safety injection (SI) actuation and reactor trip on February 24, 2003. Procedure BVSG-002, "Scaffold Erection and Tagging," Rev. 3, required an operations department review and approval of the scaffold erection activity. The review for this activity failed to identify precautions to protect safety-related equipment such as the MSIV actuator rupture disk. This represented human performance errors in both the pre-evolution risk review and the scaffold erection activity. This finding was an NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 and was of very low safety significance because the issue did not affect the availability of mitigation equipment.
Inspection Report# : 2003002*(pdf)*

Significance: G Mar 29, 2003
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
FAILURE TO PROPERLY TEST 4.15 kV BUS PROTECTION RELAY MODIFICATION CAUSES LOSS OF 4160 VOLT BUS EVENT
Human performance errors during preparation of a ground fault relay setpoint modification caused an inadvertent deenergization of the Unit 1 ‘D' 4.16 kilovolt (kV) switchgear. The event resulted in a partial loss of feedwater transient, brief deenergization of the ‘DF' emergency 4.16 kV switchgear, and auto start of the 1-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG). The modification lowered the relay setpoint from 200 amperes to 120 amperes without adequately evaluating sensor error or motor starting current for large loads on the bus. The existing ground fault current error was not measured nor accounted for in development of the test procedure which could have prevented the loss of the ‘D' bus and subsequent unplanned plant transient. The finding was an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI "Test Control" for failure to address and test the effect the modified relay setpoint had on normal ‘D' 4.16 kV electrical bus operation. The finding increased the likelihood of an initiating event, but remained of very low safety significance because alternate power supplies remained available.
Inspection Report# : 2003002*(pdf)*

Significance: G Dec 28, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: FIN Finding
INEFFECTIVE PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION OF DEGRADED PRESSURE INSTRUMENT RESULTS IN MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
Station personnel failed to fully identify and resolve degradation of the Unit 1 turbine motoring condition alarm

differential pressure instrument in 1999 and again in 2002. Ineffective problem identification and resolution, and a resulting lack of preventive maintenance led to an unplanned Unit 1 reactor trip. This finding was of very low significance because the issue did not effect the availability of mitigation equipment. The issue was not a violation because the differential pressure instrument is not subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Inspection Report# : 2002007*(pdf)*

Mitigating Systems

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 30, 2003