358. Letter From the charge in Turkey (Cowles) to the Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Thurston)

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/1 - 1061. Top Secret; Official - Informal. Cowles was serving as charge after the departure of Ambassador Fletcher Warren on November 15, 1960.

Ankara, January 10, 1961.

DEAR RAY: There are a few angles of the recent Turkish request for additional military budget support, not explicitly mentioned in the wires, which we thought might interest you and General Norstad. One is that the request was made completely outside normal channels. Colonel Tunckanat of the Committee of National Unity (which has been the Turkish Government, above the Cabinet), assisted by some military officers, presented the Turkish request. The ministers who normally deal in budgetary matters played a silent role and in some cases made known their opposition. As you know, the highly competent Finance Minister, Alican, resigned because the Committee insisted on carrying through the pay raise and other benefits for the military which threatened his budget and the government's financial stability. General Alankus, former General of the Ground Forces and new Minister of Defense, has told Embassy staff members that he opposed very strongly the request for additional aid at this time.

A second interesting point is the divergence in Turkish presentations of their own intentions. According to your wires 28 and 31/1/ to Ankara, General Sunay in his conversation with General Norstad, proposed force levels which are in consonance with NATO planning. He has reiterated these levels in a subsequent conversation with General Morin. In Colonel Tunckanat's briefings (Embtels 788, 789 and 805 to the Department),/2/ however, we were told that unless the GOT received the requested aid, it would reduce the level of its forces by 35 - 40%, which would mean a reduction in army personnel to a point far below that mentioned by General Sunay and very drastic reductions for the Air Force and Navy as well.

/1/Telegram 28 from Paris to Ankara, December 14, 1960, reported on Norstad's informal discussions with Sunay on the Turkish Air Force aid program. (Ibid., 782.00/12 - 1460) Telegram 31 from Paris to Ankara, December 31, analyzed the Turkish request for military aid. (Ibid., 782.5/12 - 3160)

/2/Dated December 10, 11 and 17, respectively. (Ibid., 882.10/12 - 1060, 882.10/12 - 1160, and 882.10/12 - 1760)

Although we do not know what the outcome will actually be, certain factors will undoubtedly be taken into account in arriving at a decision. One is, if the military budget finally comes out at the 1.788 billion TL, as proposed by the Minister of Finance, and if this limited budget must absorb a large pay increase and other benefits for military personnel, substantial reductions in force levels will have to be made. We cannot estimate at this juncture whether or not under these conditions it would be possible for the Turks to support the level of forces which General Sunay indicated.

Although General Sunay is in a most influential position as Chief of Staff, his is by no means the only voice which must be heard in arriving at a decision on the military budget. The Committee of National Unity, as mentioned above, has been the Government of Turkey in this revolutionary period, and its decisions on funds and force levels, which would presumably be determining, cannot be ignored by General Sunay. After we informed him of the adverse U.S. decision on his request for additional aid, Colonel Tunckanat of the Committee told us that the Government would proceed on the basis of the smaller budget involving reduced force levels. It will be most interesting to see how this squares with General Sunay's projected levels.

A complicating factor is the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly. Review of the budget is one of the specified powers of this body. Hence while we may know about the proposed budget soon, it is unlikely that we will know the final figure until Assembly action has been concluded, a process which could take some weeks. Although the Committee's power will be less now that it constitutes only the upper house of this new organization, it still retains an ultimate veto power since an average of 51% of the vote of the two houses (voting separately and weighted equally) is required to reach a decision when there is a difference between them.

We have one question about your wire No. 31 to Ankara. In paragraph one it is stated that General Norstad sees no need for the Turks to pursue discussion of their aid request with the Embassy in light of the procedure to be followed involving General Sunay's memorandum as to the breakdown of forces and General Norstad's prospective recommendation thereon. We are pleased that the Turkish problem is now in the hands of the competent NATO authorities which is in keeping with our own recommendations (Embtel 789). However, since we delivered the Department's reply to the Turkish request for aid, which was a fairly categorical ``no", it appears to us that the main discussion is over and there is nothing left to pursue.

There remains, I suppose, the possibility that General Norstad might himself wish to effect a change in the U.S. Government's negative position when he has studied General Sunay's program. This would resemble somewhat the process which occurred in connection with the Turkish request for $12 million of ``additional" aid last August. Leaving aside the question of the merits of additional aid, we can see some difficulties for you in this process. The Turks may get the notion that an approach to SACEUR is the most profitable means of obtaining aid which is otherwise difficult or impossible to secure. The Turkish Government can allocate its existing resources, including counterpart, to cover any budgetary requirement it wishes, leaving others uncovered. The present budget, for instance, apparently includes increased appropriations for health and education to be met out of existing resources. This is one reason why the military are receiving less in the approved budget, leaving their needs partially uncovered. Since the Turkish Government can thus control to a large degree the sectors of their budget for which external aid must be sought, it may not be entirely a matter of chance that it is the military sector which has been selected on this occasion.

By the way, we note from your wire No. 28 to Ankara that General Sunay mentioned our letter of November 12, on the Turkish budget process. As you will have guessed, it offered no encouragement regarding increased aid, as he claimed, but it did make major recommendations for a more orderly budget making process. I am enclosing a copy as of possible interest to you./3/

Sincerely yours,

LLC

/3/The letter was not found. In telegram 965 from Ankara, February 7, the Embassy reported that the budget presented to Parliament by the Turkish Government included a significant increase in defense expenditures financed by new taxes and a reduction in military manpower. The Embassy cautioned, however, that the Turkish Government might resurrect its request for substantial new U.S. financing of its defense program. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/2 - 761)

359. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.06270/2 - 561. Secret. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to Athens, Bonn, London, Tehran, Rome, and Paris Topol.

Ankara, February 5, 1961, 11 a.m.

957. Paris for Thurston, Rome for Rood. During call on Foreign Minister Sarper February 3 he prefaced remarks re action Soviet Ambassador Rijov by urging that information be handled with greatest care since his (Sarper's) usefulness and perhaps mine would be seriously impaired if this discussion leaked out.

Rijov had visited him earlier in day to deliver note re IRBMs. Note said Soviets had seen references in press to fact IRBMs being constructed Turkey under NATO auspices but US command; USSR did not like development which might bring Turkey to ``dangerous adventure". Sarper said note not provocative and contained no threat but clearly implied IRBM would be impediment to development good neighborly relations. In course conversation Rijov also stated U - 2 flight had ``complicated" Turkey-Soviet relation since Turkey was original base for plane./1/

/1/Reference is to the May 1, 1960, downing of a U.S. aerial reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union. The aircraft took off from a base in Turkey.

Sarper said he promised Rijov formal GOT reply in due course but made following points orally as his personal opinion: (1) Turkish leaders would never lead people into ``dangerous adventure"; (2) GOT as NATO member would lose no opportunity improve its defensive strength; (3) Turkey already ``surrounded" by countries equipped with atomic weapons all types and ranges. Hence for GOT deprive itself these means of defense would be limitation its sovereignty; (4) GOT nevertheless would be happy see end of atomic weapons and conditions which made them necessary through proper international agreements and controls. Abandonment atomic weapons question of global international import.

Sarper then went on discuss current activities of Soviet Ambassador. He said Rijov was visiting various Cabinet Officers and CNU members for general discussions which almost invariably included description of various economic and technological advances made by USSR and concluded with statement US-Soviet relations improving very rapidly under new US Administration to point where agreement might soon be reached which would leave Turkey ``outside the club". Obvious implication not overtly stated was that before Moscow and Washington finally got together Turkey should improve relations and reach agreement with their strong and powerful northern neighbor which had demonstrated ability to conquer type of economic problems Turkey faced.

Sarper said that Rijov had not tried this line with him or even in recent call on Inonu since both too sophisticated to swallow it but that he was using it on many more naive officials. Gursel aware Rijov activities which he considered nuisance and overstepping proper bounds. Described as being furious and demanding Rijov be stopped ``or else". Sarper said he had urged restraint since first they did not wish take any action which would imply Turkey afraid of Russia and second any action taken against Rijov might only drive this type of activity underground. Sarper said he felt it better continue as at present but to keep close watch over Soviet activities.

Cowles

360. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/4 - 461. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Istanbul, Izmir, and Iskenderun.

Ankara, April 4, 1961, 6 p.m.

1193. During first courtesy call on Foreign Minister Sarper/1/ I referred to great interest of American people in Turkey despite relative absence of press stories and of hope all Americans shared that current difficulties would be solved. Sarper immediately said Turkey had two very great problems today, one was economic situation and other was Yassiada trials.

/1/The Senate approved President Kennedy's nomination of Raymond Hare as Ambassador to Turkey on February 24. Hare presented his credentials to President Gursel on April 5.

Elaborating on trials he said violence occurring in heat crisis understandable but is accepted with much greater difficulty after months of calm and opportunity for reasoned judgment. He added, however, that both General Gursel and Ismet Inonu were watchfully waiting and hoped that ``everything would work out for best" though final decision of course rests with CNU and assessment current political situation at time might be important determinant. Recognized possible impact abroad but said domestic impact just as serious for future of Turkey. He added that high court showing ``amazing independence" and that Gursel said Chief Judge Basgol had even indicated might resign if more pressure brought on him to expedite trials.

I commented that I had not intended raise this subject and had no instructions but since it had come up in conversation I would venture express some personal views. Yassiada trials and final verdict were of course internal matter and so regarded by us. Nevertheless it was internal matter which under certain circumstances could lap over into foreign field and produce strong reactions. In my judgment American people ready accept ``adjusted" solution but not ``ultimate" (death sentence) decision. Latter could in my opinion very seriously damage image of Turkey which Americans had formed, which would be most unfoertunate. Additionally could not but place USG in difficult position, as I believed had been prviously brought out./2/

/2/In telegram 1029, February 24, the Embassy reported on the results of earlier discussions with senior Turkish officials, advising the Department that it was unable to submit a ``meaningful" estimate of the likelihood of executions following the trials. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/2 - 2461)

Sarper said he understood and would in his own time and way pass on my thoughts to Gursel which he felt he knew how to do but he advised against my mentioning subject during first call on Gursel. I said I had no intention of raising with Gursel and reiterated that I had only mentioned them since he himself had raised subject.

I gained impression that while Sarper in no sense confident of what outcome of trials might be and fully aware of serious implications internally and externally of death sentences he was seeking give impression that efforts being made within existing law to guard against such extreme action. Fact that this gave uninhibited opportunity reiterate our concern may also have served useful purpose.

Hare

361. National Security Action Memorandum No. 35

//Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 35. Top Secret.

Washington, April 6, 1961.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Deployment of IRBM's to Turkey

In approving the Record of Action of the March 29, 1961 meeting of the National Security Council,/1/ the President directed that a group representing the Departments of State (Chairman) and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency should review the question of deployment of IRBM's to Turkey and make recommendations to him.

/1/Not found.

Accordingly, it is requested that the above agencies undertake this review as soon as possible and present their recommendations to the President through this office.

McGeorge Bundy

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5612/4 - 2061. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Owen and McGhee; cleared by S/S, EUR, and NEA; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Rome and repeated to Ankara, Moscow, and Paris.

Washington, April 20, 1961, 2 p.m.

4936. Paris for USRO and Thurston.

1. President has asked State and Defense Departments and CIA to report views concerning early implementation recommendation made to him by interdeptal NATO Task Force headed by Mr. Acheson/1/ to effect that Turk resources would be more effectively employed and their interests better served by planned commitment US Polaris submarines to NATO instead of provision first generation IRBM squadron now scheduled for Turkey.

/1/The recommendations of the Acheson task force were discussed at the March 29 NSC meeting. See Document 361.

Reasons underlying recommendation were (i) doubts value substantial investment MAP and Turkish resources in first generation IRBM's this late in the game, in view of oncoming availability US Polaris missile subs for commitment to NATO, (ii) desire avoid deploying strategic weapons whose vulnerability makes them useful only for ``strike first" purposes in country on Soviet border--especially since eventual Turkish manning contemplated. Question raised whether (failing foolproof physical safeguards to maintain US control after Turkish manning) such deployment might increase risk of war by miscalculation, either (i) because of firing by Turks of weapons in case of local ``incident", when US would not want them fired, or (ii) because Soviets (fearing Turks' firing) might feel compelled to attack and destroy weapons pre-emptively in case of grave international crisis.

Same recommendation made in report of Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy,/2/ which stated that weapons are obsolete, that their retaliatory value is highly questionable, and that USSR would be likely to strike at them pre-emptively. President has informed Committee its recommendations will be carefully considered.

/2/Not found.

2. Secy will discuss with Embassy Ankara, when he goes to Ankara for forthcoming CENTO meeting,/3/ approach by him along fol lines to GOT based both on technical military considerations and on need to revise projected MAP country programs in view of present FY 1962 $1.6 billion ceiling:

/3/Scheduled for April 27 - 28.

(a) New Polaris missile system has developed more rapidly than expected. US expects to commit some Polaris subs to NATO as they become available. This will help meet SACEUR initial MRBM requirements, and place powerful force at disposal NATO for protection NATO area.

(b) Question arises, in view of this fact and FY 62 $1.6 billion MAP ceiling, whether projected IRBM squadron represents most effective use Turkish and limited MAP resources from military standpoint.

(c) If Turks agree MRBM requirement better met through upcoming Polaris availability, US would be prepared provide Turkey more MAP for other purposes desired by Turks, e.g., aircraft, Nikes, patrol boats, trucks and/or armored personnel carriers, than could otherwise be provided under projected MAP program in view of need to expend substantial sums on IRBM program. (Would have to be made clear to Turks, in this connection, that under $1.6 billion FY 62 ceiling, major reductions below 5 Year Plan levels will have to be made in all programs, including Turkish program. If we go forward with IRBM's, substantial reduction will be necessary in non-IRBM items in Turkish program. If IRBM's were not to be provided, more non - IRBM items could be provided.)

(d) If Turks agree with our views re logic of adjustment in program under these circumstances, we would propose joint approach to NATO, under which adjustment would be represented to NATO as technical and military matter, arising from more rapid expected commitment US Polaris subs to NATO and from changes in over-all level US FY 62 MAP program. Could be pointed out--if UK and Italy wished--that UK and Italian MRBM's, in view their early development, helped to fill pre-1963 MRBM gap but that longer time required for Turkish program made its usefulness for this purpose uncertain, in view rapid Polaris progress.

3. Embassies London, Rome, USRO and Norstad advice would be most welcome. Do Embassies London and Rome think UK and Italian Governments should be consulted prior or simultaneously with approach to GOT? Embassy Rome FYI: On November 28 Italian Ambassador here asked Department whether Polaris would substitute for existing IRBM's and was told wld be additional but eventual substitution conceivable./4/ What possibilities do you consider exist for successful negotiation with Italians for substitution, both on merits of proposal and as a means of obtaining Turk agreement?/5/

/4/No record of this meeting has been found.

/5/In telegram 4181 from Rome, April 24, the Embassy outlined its rationale for a separate approach to the Italians on the issue of missile replacement. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5612/4 - 2461)

4. Obviously, we do not want any aspect of foregoing considered outside US channels at this time.

Bowles

363. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.6512/4 - 2561. Top Secret; Niact; Noforn. Also sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and repeated to the Department of State and U.S. Element CENTO. The source text is the Department of State copy.

Paris, April 25, 1961, 5:50 p.m.

ALO 403. Personal for SecDef McNamara and CJCS from Gen Norstad. Department for Secretary Rusk only. Chief USELM CENTO Ankara for Gen Lemnitzer only.

1. Reference the Jupiter squadron for Turkey which is considered in the report, ``A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future"/1/ and State message no. 4429,/2/ I am sure the detailed background is familiar enough to Washington to obviate repeating it here. I wish remind you only that the project was initiated as part of a NATO requirement and was proposed to the Turks by NATO authority through Allied channels. The Turkish squadron is part of a requirement for six IRBM squadrons which appeared in MC 70./3/ NATO did not, of course, specify the particular missile to be used; the United States selected the Jupiter for this purpose since the research and development on it was complete and the project had reached the stage where there were at least production commitments, if not an actual production program.

/1/Not found.

/2/Printed as telegram 4936 to London, Document 362.

/3/MC - 70, ``Minimal Essential Force Requirements, 1958 - 1963," was prepared by the Military Committee of NATO early in 1958 as guidance and a yardstick for the 1958 and successive Annual Reviews. Documentation regarding MC - 70 is in Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 314 ff.

2. You know my views on the need for mid-range ballistic missiles in Allied Command Europe. The critical shortage of missile-delivery systems, which it was anticipated would continue up into 1963 to 1965, was an added factor when the Jupiter program was established. This was considered important militarily, but was perhaps of even greater significance from a psychological or political standpoint. In both these respects, I believe the program continues to be of value.

3. The Polaris submarine is clearly a superior weapons system, but I am impressed with the fact that these weapons will be in short supply for a number of years. The question therefore is not whether a Polaris submarine in Eastern Mediterranean will be better than a Jupiter squadron; rather, it is whether submarine plus squadron gives us greater strength than submarine alone. I believe that it does. If this question of quality is introduced, I hope thought will be given to the effect talk of obsolescence would have on the British Thor and Italian Jupiter positions.

4. Any kind of fixed installation, whether in Europe or North America, is vulnerable. This includes air bases and some of the longer range missiles on which NATO and the United States must place major dependence for the next several years. Even surface ships, when deployed close-in enough to be subject to continuous visual or radar surveillance, cannot be considered invulnerable.

5. Although I am convinced that custody and control arrangements either exist or can be developed to prevent unilateral action on the part of the Turks, the U.S. must still man these units to a considerable extent and for considerable time. In fact, the present program provides for almost complete U.S. manning until Jan 1964 and very probably this will have to be extended. Thus we could easily make a virtue of this necessity and continue substantial U.S. manning for the useful life of the Jupiter squadron. I do not believe, therefore, that the control problem referred to in the cited message is a valid concern.

6. From figures available here, about 80 percent of this project's cost through FY 63 has been spent or is committed, and thus is not recoverable. It appears that much of the remaining 20 percent (maintenance, operations, etc.) would have to be spent on the same general items if another system replaced the Jupiter. All in all the savings over two years would be relatively small and would not make an impressive contribution if applied to other Turkish Armed Forces projects.

7. Since this project was initiated by NATO authorities through NATO channels, I believe it would be contrary to U.S. as well as NATO interests for the U.S. to consider it now on a bilateral basis. Should there be any modification of the program, action should be taken first through NATO rather than Turkish authorities. It is an admission against interest to say so, but I must express my belief that it may be possible to mold Turkish attitude so as not to bar such a change, even though the mere suggestion of a curtailment of the project would cause NATO and the United States some embarrassment.

8. In conclusion, it is my opinion, as you know, that this is the time to create strength, not reduce it. I believe therefore that this project should continue.

364. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/6 - 1461. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Geneva and Ankara.

Paris, May 14, 1961, 2 p.m.

4972. Department pass Defense for Nitze. Geneva for Secretary. From Stoessel. Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper called on General Norstad at SHAPE May 12. Sarper indicated call was made at direction of Gursel. During two-hour conversation following subjects discussed:

1. Sarper stated NATO Oslo meeting/1/ had made very favorable impression. Substance of meeting in itself not so impressive, but atmosphere and spirit were excellent and general tone had been positive and constructive. Sarper praised Secretary's contribution as vital factor in success of meeting. He also felt Stikker's quiet, effective manner had been most helpful.

/1/May 5 - 8. For documentation, see volume XIII.

2. Sarper reviewed his discussion with Secretary concerning installation Jupiter missiles in Turkey./2/ He reported that Secretary had stated Jupiters obsolete, had little if any military value, and in effect would serve no purpose except provide target for Soviet attack in event emergency. Moreover, Polaris system superior and deployment in eastern Mediterranean of Polaris would provide more effective deterrent than land based Jupiters. Under circumstances, Secretary had inquired if Turkey would not prefer stop Jupiter project. Sarper said he had informed Secretary that, while unable judge military value of Jupiters, Turkey considered it necessary go through with project for psychological and political reasons.

/2/No record of their conversation relating to missiles has been found.

3. After relating his conversation with Secretary, Sarper queried Norstad, in his capacity as responsible Allied Commander, regarding his honest evaluation of Jupiter from military standpoint. Norstad in reply summarized appropriate portions of recent message to Secretary Defense on Jupiter (ALO 403 251750Z),/3/ noting his view that it was not question of whether Polaris superior to Jupiter but of whether both systems together would not give greater strength than Polaris alone.

/3/Document 363.

4. Sarper then said Gursel had requested him obtain Norstad's opinion of over-all military program submitted by Sunay last month. Norstad replied that program in general looked good and was along lines his earlier conversation with Gursel. Certain details remained to be worked out through JUSMMAT.

5. Sarper remarked that substantial military assistance would be required to meet new program, he wondered if Turkey could therefore expect considerable increase in level of military aid. Norstad said military assistance plans are tentative and have not yet been submitted to Congress. However, from what he knew of President's program, which contemplates total of $1.6 billion in military assistance, he thought it would be optimistic for Turkey expect same level of military assistance in 1962 as in 1961. It was certainly unrealistic to think in terms of substantial increase in aid. Sarper said if this were situation, what did US have in mind in suggesting increased conventional forces? In reply Norstad merely said that Turkey's needs had always received most sympathetic consideration from US and he was confident that US would continue recognize Turkey's special position in future.

Sarper next raised problem of G - 91 fighter (Topol 25 from Oslo, sent Department Secto 52, Ankara 2),/4/ saying Turkish Chief of Staff does not want G - 91 which had very short range, conventional capability only, and is limited to close support role. Turkey would prefer F - 104's. Norstad explained considerations which made G - 91 useful to Turkey. He said no one wished force Turkey accept G - 91, even though Turkey had clearly accepted G - 91 as early as 1958 and most of project already paid for. Norstad remarked that it was hoped Turkey in time would have some 104's but they are in no sense alternative to G - 91. He also noted G - 91 is about 1/7th cost of 104. Sarper clearly uninformed on details this situation. He indicated Tansel and Sunay would continue discussions when they are in Paris for SHAPE - X.

/4/Dated May 10, this telegram reported discussions between Rusk and Sarper. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1 - OS/5 - 1061)

7. Sarper then raised final point, which he labelled as ``most important of all" and one which he was specifically instructed by Gursel to discuss with Norstad. He began by recalling Ribbentrop - Molotov agreement of 1939 by which Soviets were to have free hand in moving toward Persian Gulf and eastern Turkey. These are traditional Russian objectives which they have not abandoned. Sarper said ``new US strategic concept" has caused concern in Turkish Government from standpoint NATO opposition to Soviet pressures in this area. For example, what would NATO do if Soviets moved into Kars Province and then stopped, presenting West with fait accompli? Norstad said NATO commitment was clear and he read Sarper Article 5 of NATO Charter. All NATO countries are to act individually or collectively to resist attack against NATO member and to restore territory of country attacked, using force if necessary. Norstad was confident this commitment would be honored and he recalled that US had reassured Turkey in this sense on many occasions. US has the forces available in Europe to come to Turkey's assistance.

8. Sarper said this was very encouraging. Would NATO use conventional or atomic forces to assist Turkey? Norstad replied that assist-ance would be in form of conventional and/or atomic forces as appropriate to circumstances. Norstad went on to say that, over and above NATO commitment, Sarper should realize that it was matter of vital self-interest for US to defend Turkey. If US permitted any territory of any NATO member to be occupied the whole foundation of US policy would collapse. Sarper in concluding conversation said he was reassured by Norstad's statements and would advise Gursel that he could now have peace of mind.

Gavin

365. Memorandum of Conversation

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/6 - 1361. Top Secret. Drafted by Magill and approved in S on June 26.

Washington, June 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

IRBM's for Turkey

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

General Norstad

Mr. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense

Mr. Talbot, Assistant Secretary for NEA

Mr. Stoessel, Political Advisor to General Norstad

Robert N. Magill, Deputy Director, European Regional Affairs

The Secretary and General Norstad reviewed their respective conversations with Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper on the question of the IRBM program in Turkey. The Secretary said he thought the way the Vienna talks/1/ had gone created a somewhat different situation and that we should re-examine our approach on this question./2/ Mr. Nitze thought that the Vienna talks reinforced the undesirability of asking Sarper again to consider cancellation of the IRBM program. General Norstad agreed and said that it had been the same need for demonstrating increased allied nuclear power, in the context of the ``missile gap," that had prompted the IRBM program for Europe, including those for Turkey, in the first instance.

/1/Reference is to the Vienna summit meeting between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev June 3 - 4.

/2/In a June 9 memorandum for Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler noted that as a result of the positions taken by the Soviet Union at the Vienna summit meeting, ``any move to phase out the IRBM project would have very unfortunate repercussions in Turkey and in other NATO countries as well." He recommended suspending the phasing out of the missiles in Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5411/6 - 961)

The Secretary asked whether General Norstad had any doubts regarding the ability of the U.S. to control the use of the IRBM's in Turkey. General Norstad said he had none whatever. He affirmed that it would be impossible for the Turks to take over the entire system during the life expectancy of these weapons and said that it should also be possible to develop a more effective two-key system. The Secretary thought that the main factor in this regard was not the two-key arrangement but whether or not the Turks could obtain the necessary know-how for operation of the entire weapon system. He said the Turks were greatly concerned about their possible isolation in the face of Soviet aggression and thought they might therefore be tempted in an emergency to take over the U.S. key by force. General Norstad said that the IRBM program could be handled in such a manner as to ensure that the Turks would not obtain operational knowledge of the entire system during its effective life. He agreed with the Secretary's observation about the Turkish fear of isolation and said that both the Greeks and Turks have this concern. They regard the NATO strategic concept of ``local hostile action, infiltration or incursion" as a rationalization which the major NATO powers might use to avoid a nuclear response to Soviet action against the NATO flanks. General Norstad said that he did not know quite why the Greeks and Turks felt this way but that he had been careful to reassure them and thought he had been successful.

The Secretary concluded that there was a consensus that the IRBM program should not be held up or cancelled and asked Mr. Talbot to inform the White House of the recommendation of the group./3/

/3/In a June 22 memorandum from McGhee to Bundy, the Department of State reported that the deployment of IRBMs to Turkey should continue, noting that Norstad concurred with this judgment. (Ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 35)

Note: After the meeting had broken up, General Norstad said he thought it would be unwise to volunteer anything more to the Turks on the matter. The fact that we would be proceeding with the program would be evidence enough that we had abandoned the idea of suspending or cancelling the program.

366. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

//Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 35. Secret.

Washington, June 22, 1961.

SUBJECT

Turkish IRBM's

1. This memorandum is intended to discharge the obligation which the President laid upon me when he asked that I study and report on the matter of Turkish IRBM's./1/

/1/See Document 361.

2. It has been concluded that action should not be taken to cancel projected deployment of IRBM's to Turkey.

3. This conclusion is based primarily on the view that, in the aftermath of Khrushchev's hard posture at Vienna, cancellation of the IRBM deployment might seem a sign of weakness. Moreover:

(a) When the Secretary of State raised this matter with the Turkish Foreign Minister at CENTO, the Turkish reaction was strongly adverse.

(b) When the Turkish Foreign Minister discussed the problem with SACEUR, General Norstad underlined the military importance of sending IRBM's to Turkey. This made it unlikely that any attempt to persuade the Turkish military that they should abandon this project would succeed.

4. The Secretary of State has discussed this conclusion with General Norstad, who concurs.

George C. McGhee/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

367. Editorial Note

A referendum on a new Constitution for the Turkish Republic was held on July 9. The referendum marked a major step toward the return to a system of civilian responsibility for government. However, the process of constitutional restoration was marked by evidence that many military officers opposed a return to party government and by signs of civilian discontent with the role that the military had assigned itself in the new constitutional order. The Embassy reported on these tensions in telegram 1156, March 29 (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/3 - 2961) and telegram C - 324, June 9 (ibid., 782.5/6 - 961). The restoration of civilian rule in Turkey began on January 12, when the military government authorized the formation of new political parties. The government permitted the parties to resume activity on April 1. On May 27, the Constituent Assembly approved a draft Constitution and decreed that national elections to approve a new Constitution would be held on July 9.

The elections resulted in the approval of the new Constitution by approximately 62 percent of those voting. On July 21, the Constituent Assembly agreed to hold parliamentary elections on October 15.

368. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/8 - 761. Secret.

Ankara, August 7, 1961, 3 p.m.

187. Embtel 151./1/ Saw Sarper August 5 to review Nicosia conference/2/ and discuss Yassiada and other matters prior Paris meeting with Secretary./3/

/1/Telegram 151, July 31, reported that the West German Government had urged Turkey to avoid ``draconian" solutions in the punishment of the members of the Menderes regime. (Ibid., 782.00/7 - 3161)

/2/Apparent reference to the Nicosia conference of Ambassadors to the Eastern Mediterranean states, chaired by Under Secretary Bowles July 31 - August 2. Documentation on the meeting is ibid., NEA Files: Lot 66 D 5, Regional Operations Conference.

/3/Secretary Rusk visited Paris August 3-8 for meetings with the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany and a separate meeting with the NATO Permanent Representatives.

As it turned out Sarper himself opened Yassiada question, saying that he being very active in matter having discussed with Gursel, Inonu, Aksal and entire Cabinet, all of whom favor moderation. He had also just had two-hour talk with General Sunay who, as head TGS, key figure in army and he believed could now be counted on to work quietly against executions. There had also been some approaches by diplomatic representatives but matter is now one where ``job can only be done here" and he believed maximum efforts being made. He requested I pass this on to Secretary in pursuance their previous discussion.

I replied Sarper had jumped gun on me a bit since I too had come prepared discuss Yassiada and had in fact prepared some notes on subject in order be as clear as possible. I then spoke from notes to following effect:

1. Matter discussed on several occasions previously on understanding that an internal issue but nevertheless one having potential international ramifications.

2. As trials appear be drawing to close I wished as representative of close friend and ally review again on informal basis but under discretionary authority my government.

3. Turkey has important role in world today as example of country in evolution through democratic process which at same time recognized world responsibilities, serving as bridge between East and West and old and new.

4. Military coup of last year was rational and bloodless; free world had been impressed.

5. Imposition death penalty could alter this image, bearing in mind, among other things that political executions usually associated with non-democratic regimes.

6. Also desirable all NATO powers put best foot forward in this time of danger.

7. These thoughts not new and I had been assured they known to those in decision making positions.

8. Aside form restating our views, I understood some missions had expressed their views more formally and I wished be assured that informal character of our approach, which had seemed appropriate in light delicacy of situation, should not be regarded as indication any lesser concern than more formal representations of other good friends of Turkey.

Sarper replied could assure that nature our approach would not mitigate its effectiveness; in fact, he still felt would have been inadvisable for us do otherwise since, in light closeness Turco-American relationship, formal intervention could easily be regarded as threat. He also wished assure that Secretary's views had been communicated to appropriate government authorities.

Finally, noticing that I had spoken from paper, Sarper asked if I intended leaving it with him. I replied it not prepared for that purpose and asked if he actually wanted something or would himself make record of conversation. Sarper said did not think document of usual diplomatic character would be in order but might be useful if he could be given points covered on plain paper.

I said would do so and am inclined feel this rather useful device to get our position on record while still maintaining informal character of our approach, especially since would appear any more formal approach would have to be at presidential level in order equate with British, German and perhaps other messages. Text will be possible see Sarper to deliver before departure Paris. If not CFA will do so immediately on return. Foregoing discussed with Assistant Secretary Talbot during his short stopover here August 5 to change planes en route Delhi./4/ He indicated approval both substance approach to Sarper and intended method of informal written confirmation, draft text of which read to him./5/

Hare

/4/Talbot participated with Under Secretary Bowles in a regional Ambassadors meeting in Delhi August 6�.

/5/Text of the paper handed to Sarper was transmitted to the Department of State as airgram A�7, August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/8 - 861)

369. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/9 - 261. Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified].

Ankara, September 2, 1961, 11 a.m.

332. Department telegram 212./1/ We have reviewed with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in detail their reports on Turkes. We feel plans and intentions revealed entirely consistent with our assessment of Turkes. As to likelihood these plans for coup could succeed, following factors need be borne in mind:

/1/Telegram 212, August 24, noted reports of a coup plot led by Alparslan Turkes and requested the Embassy's assessment ``in light uncertainties revolving around termination Yassiada trials and impending elections." (Ibid., 782.00/8 - 2461)

1. Effective power in Turkey today held by established military with no apparent split at top level. We do not consider so-called forces solidarity a separate movement but rather form of undertaking among those presently in control to support certain principles. As long as this unity of purpose continues, it will be exceedingly difficult to organize effective coup.

2. Most Turks in military and practically all in civilian life today desire return to civil government through free elections. While military and civilians might well disagree on role military to play after elections, there is agreement on basic objective. Therefore any move toward coup would have to run against current of popular sentiment. While many people are concerned about outcome of trials and elections, base for organizing coup hardly exists today.

3. We do not know size of so-called Turkes organization but what we do know indicates that it comprises relatively junior officers without many people in key jobs. While one must assume there is larger organization unknown to us, there is no evidence to suggest larger organization would include military leaders with important command positions. Turkes also faces problem of operating from outside country./2/

/2/Turkes, together with 12 other ``radical officers" involved in the May 1960 overthrow of the Menderes regime, had been arrested and flown to Turkish Embassies on November 13, 1960. Turkes was assigned as a political officer to the Embassy in New Delhi.

4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Embassy have reports of unrest among junior officers in army. Their restlessness apparently still takes form of criticizing democrats for present ills, belief trials dragged on too long without needed punishment, desire see more reforms before government returned to corrupt politicians. It is our belief this group is unorganized and not one and same with Turkes supporters, though it could easily become fruitful field for Turkes philosophy.

On balance we conclude that successful coup by Turkes in relatively near future unlikely. Different hypothetical outcome of trials and elections would not alter this conclusion. On other hand, if political scene deteriorates seriously after the elections, Turkes and his supporters would be able to improve considerably their position within armed forces and hence chances for successful coup. Question then might be one of timing. If established military moved first to reassume control of government, chances of coup by Turkes against military would be small. But if military allowed things to rock along with civilian government making demonstration of its inability to cope with problems of government, opportunity for successful move on part of younger officers would be enhanced.

Foregoing observations directed primarily to answering Department telegram 212. Fact that our present reading of situation is such as to indicate that coup not logical product should not be interpreted as indicating that we regard present situation including both military and civilian aspects as something about which one can feel relaxed. In addition dissatisfaction of junior officers noted above there is tenseness between political parties and certain air of expectancy among people. If disturbances occur as result trials there is always question in current atmosphere whether ordinary soldier would participate wholeheartedly in repressing civilian unrest even if there were no particular problem at officer level. Hopefully army will, as they repeatedly assert they can, keep situation under control. There is also possibility public reaction may not be as strong as some fear.

In sum we seem to be going into situation where another coup in immediate future does not appear in cards for concern. Turkey will face several moments of truth in next few months and how people and government forces react to each could have determining influence on future course events.

Hare

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/9 - 1561. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling.

Ankara, September 15, 1961, 8 p.m.

398. Immediately on receipt President's message/1/ I got in touch with Foreign Minister Sarper with view to arranging see Gursel. Sarper was in Cabinet Meeting at time in another Ministry but returned to Foreign Office to see me. Upon explaining my mission he said he had been expecting me since he had short time before received telephone call from Turkish Ambassador Washington, which had subsequently been confirmed by telegram, conveying identical message communicated to Ambassador by Secretary Rusk except for detail in version sent me to effect coincident arrival our troops could be ``acutely embarrassing"./2/

/1/In telegram 276, September 15, Secretary Rusk instructed Hare to seek a meeting with Gursel and, on behalf of President Kennedy, express deep concern regarding the prospective executions and urge their postponement. (Ibid.)

/2/U.S. troops were scheduled to take part in a NATO exercise, ``Checkmate." Rusk may have delivered the message by telephone because no record of a conversation between the Secretary and the Turkish Ambassador has been found and Rusk's Appointment Books contain no indication of a meeting. (Johnson Library)

Sarper said immediately following telephone call from Washington he had gone to see Gursel who was in company of Oz Ilek and Ulay. Since CNU was due to meet shortly thereafter (i.e., 6 p.m.) Gursel asked Sarper to put message in writing as soon as confirmed and send text to him during CNU meeting. In my presence Sarper then dictated message to Gursel relating both to confirmatory telegram from Turkish Ambassador and message transmitted through me, stressing that I was at that time in his presence. (Message was being sent to Gursel as I left office.)

I then asked Sarper if there was anything more I could do, noting that I had been instructed to see Gursel personally but circumstances seemed to have overtaken that. Sarper replied very categorically that there was absolutely nothing further that either my government or I could do. Our conscience should be clear in that regard.

I asked Sarper if 6 p.m. meeting would be definitive and if so what outcome might be expected. He said Cabinet had been in virtually continuous session for past week and had met on two occasions with CNU. In course joint meetings Sarper, Minister Finance Kurdas and Minister Justice Turkoglu had expressed views on behalf Cabinet as quite strongly advising that possible death penalties should not be carried out. Sarper said, in addition to Cabinet, Gursel and all armed forces commanders shared this view. As regards CNU, committee was divided with ``seeming majority on our side". Everything possible being done and we could await results.

Sarper added that present situation is turning point in Turkey's history and both sides fully aware of that. Problem is that on one side is reason and experience and on other rashness and disposition resort to brute force.

Concerning reported illness of Menderes, Sarper said Menderes had apparently kept supply sleeping pills for occasion and had taken overdose but that efforts now being made revive him. Sarper commented it was indeed ironic to be making such effort to save his life merely to be able to hang him.

Sarper also noted that there had been irresponsible rumors that attempts might be made against his life and lives of other Ministers supporting cause of clemency but Cabinet members had not been impressed and were sticking to their positions.

In conclusion Sarper requested that this frank discussion be held very closely since any leak could be quite disastrous./3/

Hare

/3/In telegram 400 from Ankara, September 16, Hare reported that Sarper had provided a detailed summary of the discussions within the CNU over clemency. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/9 - 1661) Ultimately, the Turkish leadership reached a compromise that commuted the death sentences of 11 former government officials. The CNU also agreed in a separate action to spare the life of former President Bayar because of his advanced age. Turkey executed former Foreign Minister Zorlu and former Finance Minister Polatkan on September 16 and former Prime Minister Menderes on September 17.

371. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/10 - 2461. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Istanbul.

Ankara, October 24, 1961, 2 p.m.

525. Deptel 366./1/ In seeming contrast Tulga statement that acceptable four party coalition now impossible, question of nature of new civilian government still under negotiation in Ankara between military and political leaders according early morning reports. While we cannot rule out possibility of divisions within military, it seems likely Tulga generally reflects thinking top Ankara commanders but latter have not yet finally closed door to some acceptable resolution of issues between parties and military.

/1/Telegram 366, September 24, informed the Embassy that Tulga had sought U.S. endorsement of a military takeover and instructed: ``In reply any responsible Turk inquiry, you may if you consider it desirable, privately suggest that second Turk military takeover could have most damaging effect on Turkey's international position." (Ibid.)

CNU made clear its position in light election results week ago (Embtel 502)/2/ and has continued pursue this approach in discussions ever since. We believe their position basically in accord with top military. In addition desire see Cabinet not under former DP control, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] military seeking agreement on following principles:

/2/Telegram 502, October 17, reported on the likely composition of the Grand National Assembly and the political implications of the elections. (Ibid., 782.00/10 - 1761) Turkish elections were held on October 15. The Republican Party won 36.7 percent of the vote and 173 seats. The two parties constituted from the leadership of the Democratic Party, the Justice Party and New Turkey Party, received 34.8 percent (158 seats) and 13.7 percent (65 seats), respectively.

(1) Gursel to be President,

(2) No exploitation Yassiada verdict,

(3) No amnesty for political prisoners,

(4) Ataturk and CNU reforms to be supported, and

(5) CNU decisions on military retirements and reforms to be maintained.

Critical point has apparently been reached with impending opening GNA and military desire see satisfactory agreement prior that time but negotiations are still in process. Party leaders met with CNU and military commanders until early hours of morning lend [and?] [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are back in session now with Gursel and Commanders. Until we know final decision it difficult tell just where we stand, but in light views attributed to Inonu in Embtel 519/3/ one cannot rule out possibility of modus vivendi which would bridge gap for period of time. Critical questions would then be whether party leaders could bring newly elected deputies along with them and whether commanders have full control of military.

/3/Telegram 519, October 21, commented on possible formulas for a governing coalition. (Ibid., 782.00/10 - 2161)

As to its position we agree entirely with line set forth in reference telegram. At same time it important bear in mind that, failing agreement with political leaders, military likely take over on their terms aims become future government. [sic] Therefore any indication US views should be made with delicate touch so as not run risk needlessly exacerbating future relations. Tulga query in particular set forth in such terms that it does not lend itself to flat answer. Therefore reply should be in terms that US does desire stability and pro-Western orientation but we would hope these could be found within democratic traditions of Western world./4/

Hare

/4/In telegram 526, October 24, the Embassy reported that the military had offered a list of its candidates for governmental positions to Inonu and that negotiations were proceeding. It added: ``At one point in discussion when Inonu suggested these issues be held for decision after GNA convened, Ulay, who participated in meeting as rep mil rather than CNU, is reported to have laughed and said GNA would not convene unless these points all settled first." (Ibid., 782.00/10 - 2461) Turkish civilian leaders accepted the military's conditions and signed a protocol confirming these accords on October 24. The Grand National Assembly elected Gursel as President on October 26.

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Embassy in France

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/10 - 2661. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 540, which is the source text.

Ankara, October 26, 1961, 6 p.m.

68. Paris pass Stoessel from Ambassador. Your telegram 21./1/ As indicated our telegrams 506 and 522/2/ there is not in our judgment uniformity of thought and objectives between military forces and political parties in Turkey today. Basic conflict between parties and military has been important factor during election period, has been especially highlighted over past few days and could become decisive in future. Regret if our reporting has not made clear basis for this conclusion, but following analysis of forces at issue, as we see them, may help clarify.

/1/Not found.

/2/Telegram 506, October 19, gave the Embassy's analysis of the outcome of Turkish elections. Telegram 522, October 24, reported on negotiations for the election of a President. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/10 - 1961 and 782.00/10 - 2461, respectively)

Essential difference between military and civilian concerns role of military forces in government. Party leaders and independent intelligentsia visualize Democratic system more or less as we know it in US, with military subordinate to duly elected civil authority. At same time, however, there is somewhat contradictory and perhaps grudging awareness of fact military on whole conceives of their role as protectors of Constitution and of future of Turkish people as they see it. As consequence most Turks initially welcomed May 27 coup as bloodlessly ending period of great strain and potential strife. Developments since, however, have in general alienated civil elements, who have come to desire end of military and return to civil rule.

Military forces themselves are by no means united on political goals. There are those, probably encompassing present top commanders, who desire return to civilian government but with military holding watching brief on conduct that government. There is also group younger officers who are disenchanted with politicians, have never favored return to civil government. This group, probably unorganized in any formal sense, may include elements which per se favor military dictatorship and those which simply believe there remains basic job of reform and education before government can again be entrusted to civilians. Difficult specifically delineate these groups and reports regarding them vary widely [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] identifying individual officers representing various schools of thought within military.

Among parties military as whole and CNU favored RPP since that party shared enmity for DP regime. As one major party surviving May 27, RPP went along with coup and subsequent military government, but determiners this policy always viewed it as best approach in terms national welfare and one most likely get military out of government. RPP therefore prepared accept CNU reforms, refrain from any punitive measures. As such it became party most acceptable to CNU and military. While many military officers and some CNU emotionally prejudiced in favor of RPP, area of support party recently won in these circles based far more on feeling party was safe, would preserve reforms on which military insist. This is not because RPP has been tool of military but because party leaders consider this course best means of gaining power and ultimately reestablishing proper balance between military and civil authority.

Justice Party is something quite different. Original impetus for its formation came from retired officers who hated CNU because these officers were retired and took to political forum in hope reversing August 1960 purge of military. Furthermore and even more importantly as party, JP has successfully appealed to voters in wide areas of country as logical successor to former Democrat Party, whose members primarily interested in rectifying wrong of May 27 and some of whom desire avenge execution their leader. Party if it came to power would therefore offer little physical security for former CNU members, little support for so-called reforms CNU considered important.

If RPP had won majority, transition to civil rule would probably have taken place without incident. Fact that elements basically opposed to regime of last seventeen months won majority maximized fears that reform may be reformed and even Yassiada repeated with new cast. Fact that no group won majority and future involves uneasy coalition strengthened elements in military which oppose return to civil rule, argue that average Turk voter not ready for democratic government. Military leaders (meaning leaders regular military establishment and not CNU) have in past few days pressed for four-party coalition which would have silent military backing and probably control. While this might appear minimize immediate concern within military over danger of hostile corrupt civilian politicians coming to power, it is but a temporary palliative and not solution and basic conflict between military and parties will remain of continuing concern.

Hare

373. Memorandum for Record

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5-MSP/11-1461. Top Secret (Secret When Separated From Enclosure). Prepared in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The enclosure, General Sunay's prepared statement, is not printed.

Washington, November 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

Conversations Between General Lemnitzer, Chairman, JCS and General Sevdet Sunay, Chairman, Joint Staff, Turkish Armed Forces, 1100 Hours, 13 November 1961

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey

General Sunay, GJS Turkish Armed Forces

Admiral Orkun, Turkish Naval attache

Brigadier General Enginsoy, J-4 Turkish General Staff

Colonel Naiboglu, Interpreter

United States

General Lemnitzer USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Major General Parker, USA, Special Assistant, CJCS

Colonel McCaffrey, USA, Chairman's Staff Group

1. General Sunay delivered a prepared statement outlining his views for the improvement of the Turkish Armed Forces. (Copy attached hereto.) In summary, General Sunay stated that increased effectiveness in MAP could be obtained through closer cooperation. The Military Assistance Program should be jointly prepared based on mutually agreed requirements and priorities. Otherwise, automatic supply would continue causing waste, delay, and misunderstanding.

2. MAP should be improved qualitatively and quantitatively.

3. US economic aid administered by agencies such as ICA should be directed primarily toward activities relating to defense posture. General Lemnitzer's support on this measure was requested.

4. General Sunay suggested a conference as soon as possible with staff representation on the highest military staff level aiming at the attainment of an improved and accelerated MAP. He suggested this meeting could be held at General Lemnitzer's convenience or on 15 December at EUCOM at the conclusion of the NATO meetings. In conclusion, General Sunay expressed appreciation for the meeting and the opportunity to make his views available.

5. General Lemnitzer stated that he was grateful for the statement of views by General Sunay. With respect to MAP, the Chairman stated he had had many years of experience in defending the program before the US Congress. Last year, Congress gave us less than we asked for and this required world-wide readjustments. The Turkish program is now the largest grant aid program in NATO. The US is, of course, not able to meet all the requirements advanced by all governments for military aid. However, within the resources allocated to Turkey, every effort is made to meet the most important requirements of Turkey. General Lemnitzer emphasized it was not a Washington program. Turkish requirements prepared in Ankara are the basis of the program. JUSMMAT was established there for this purpose.

6. In response to a question for specifics, General Enginsoy, J - 4, Turkish Armed Forces, stated that some equipment (AF tires) of the wrong type had been delivered. He was also of the opinion that there was an improper balance in communications equipment furnished. The Turks desired a logistics system based on requirements, not on automatic supply.

7. In answer to General Lemnitzer's query as to what would be the object of a meeting to be held at the conclusion of the NATO conference in Paris on 15 December, General Sunay stated the purpose of the meeting would be to achieve an effective and expedited military assistance program to meet the Berlin crisis in order to get the best results from the aid program.

8. General Lemnitzer stated that he had one or two problems to discuss with General Sunay. We would like to know how we could progress the establishment of a tropospheric scatter site in the vicinity of Ankara. This communication facility was essential to provide links to the US custodial sites in accordance with US law so that nuclear weapons can be prepositioned for use by the Turkish Air Force. General Lemnitzer made it clear that while these weapons were now available, they would not be delivered to US storage sites in Turkey until the communications problem was solved.

9. General Sunay stated that Turkey does not object to the US having custody of the radar and signal sites and to the US operation of them. They feel, however, that their own personnel should have access to these sites and to receive training in operating them. A second point concerned area acquisition. The US had contacted and made certain agreements with local people without the knowledge of the Turkish General Staff. Later the Turkish General Staff was requested to pay for the acquisition of land and in this way became aware of the problem. (Note: Ambassador Hare has reported that ``after considerable research JUSMMAT and TUSLOG had been unable to locate examples unauthorized use of land as claimed Sunay . . . "--Ankara No. 262, 18 August 1961./1/

/1/Not printed. (Ibid., 711.52/8 - 1861)

10. General Lemnitzer suggested that two different problems were involved. One problem concerned telecommunications and the other referred to communications receiving sites. However, negotiations last July between Admiral Frost's group and the Turkish General Staff did not work out well. General Lemnitzer suggested that negotiations be resumed as soon as possible.

11. With respect to the proposed conference after the December NATO meetings, General Lemnitzer stated he felt it would be unwise to delay this long and suggested a date as early as 24 November 1961 which was agreed upon as acceptable to Turkey. He suggested that General Enginsoy during his contacts with US staff could identify issues and work out solutions where possible. If any problems remain, they could be discussed between General Sunay and himself in Paris at the conclusion of the NATO meetings.

12. General Lemnitzer emphasized that the established channel from the Turkish General Staff to the Department of Defense via JUSMMAT and EUCOM was the one that should be followed in dealing with MAP matters. He stated it was his experience that whenever one tried to short circuit this channel it not only did not expedite matters but in fact delayed them.

13. General Lemnitzer summed up by stating that there was action required by both General Sunay and himself. General Lemnitzer stated he would make arrangements with Admiral Smith of the Joint Staff for Brigadier General Enginsoy to discuss specific MAP problems with appropriate US staff representatives. He urged General Sunay to take the necessary action in his area to resolve the problems related to the construction of the troposcatter communications facilities in order that this facility, which is so important to both countries and to NATO could be completed as soon as possible. General Lemnitzer felt the conference had been very helpful to him and he appreciated having the benefit of General Sunay's views.

374. Memorandum of Conversation

//Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2004. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden and approved in S on December 30. The meeting was held in the office of the Turkish NATO Delegation.

US/MC/14 Paris, December 15, 1961, 7:30 p.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Paris, December 13 - 15, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Sarper

Secretary of State

Assistant Secretary Kohler

Mr. Russell Fessenden

SUBJECT

Aid For Turkey

Foreign Minister opened the conversation by recalling Ambassador Hare's conversation with himself and President Inonu./1/ After describing the relatively favorable post-election situation Turkey, Sarper outlines the following principal tasks facing the new Government:

/1/Hare reported on this December 8 meeting in telegram 674, December 9 (ibid., Central Files, 811.0082/12 - 961) and in telegram 681, December 12 (ibid., 882.00/12 - 1261).

1. Putting the Turkish Army back in the position ``where it rightly belongs."

2. Healing the wounds of the recent past such as the trials and hangings.

3. Instituting a regime of economic austerity in order to strengthen the economy.

Sarper stressed that continued political stability in Turkey and the success of the newly-elected democratic government depends heavily on a sound economic situation. Austerity measures about to be instituted will be unpopular and can weaken the government. Hence US aid is most important. Military aid presently is inadequate in quantity and quality--especially in quality. It is impossible to carry out the tasks assigned to Turkey by SACEUR with aid at its present levels. Turkey needs $100 million additional military aid and $200 million additional economic aid over and above the level of past years. The situation is made more difficult because of $126 million repayment of consolidated debts under the OEEC program. Sarper said he was most anxious to be able to convey something encouraging to President Inonu as a result of the conversation with the Secretary. In response to the Secretary's question, Sarper explained that the government's Interim Plan for 1962 is completed and accepted. The Five-year Plan for 1963 - 68 has been written and is being translated into English. Sarper indicated the text would be available to Mr. Van Dyke of the US Embassy in Ankara. In response to the Secretary's question as to whether IBRD would be brought into the picture, Sarper implied it would be, adding that he felt Eugene Black had been somewhat mistreated by the former government and that he hoped Black would be more prone to cooperate with the new government. The Secretary pointed out that limitations on the overall amount of aid of various types present very difficult problems in meeting Turkey's requests. Supporting assistance in particular has been cut back. This type of direct budget support aid has been under very great pressure in Washington. The military aid situation is also tight. More flexibility has been obtained for DLF loans. In general the requested large increases over the present level will prove very difficult. The US will also want to see whether some other international agencies cannot help in Turkish situation.

Re PL 480,/2/ Sarper said he had heard a rumor that US plans to work out a $90 million arrangement with Egypt, whereas only $70 million is contemplated for Turkey. Sarper complained that this seemed unreasonable. Nasser gets more for being ``nasty." Sarper made a strong plea for help to the new Turkish government, saying that Turkey itself desperately needs the new democratic government, and the US needs it just as much. Sarper said he had gone through the revolution and knew what it meant. The underlying problem for the new government will be economic. It is hard to say what will happen in Turkey if the new government does not succeed. The Secretary repeated that the major problem is the large figure for additional aid. He said he was unable talk in terms of specific figures at this time, but that the US will do the best it can. He wanted, however, to avoid saying something now that would lead to later disappointment in Ankara when the final figures become known. The Secretary pointed out that we had already made considerable aid commitments to the revolutionary government. This was, after all, still aid to Turkey.

/2/Formally titled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted July 10, 1954. For text, see 68 Stat. 454.

Sarper said this was true, adding that our aid to the revolutionary government had been instrumental in helping the elections come out as well as they did. Our aid has helped lay the basis for a good government now.

In concluding the Secretary promised to do the best we can. Specifically:

(1) The US will do what is possible on supporting assistance, although direct budget support type of aid is not looked on with favor in Washington and the amounts have been cut back.

(2) DLF aid is another possibility. It will, of course, be better applied if there is satisfactory long-term Turkish planning.

(3) As for PL 480, the US is ready to start talks immediately.

(4) International agencies are yet another possibility. The OECD is important here.

(5) As for MAP, end-item assistance is very important, and will receive due attention.

The Secretary pointed out that Ambassador Hare will be the key man in dealing with this problem. The Secretary emphasized the important role which President Kennedy has assigned to Ambassadors in coordinating all programs. The Secretary concluded by saying Sarper could report complete assurance regarding our interest in getting the new Turkish government moving on a satisfactory basis. Although the amount in dollars may not be what the government feels it requires, we will certainly do what we can.

375. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/1 - 362. Secret. Repeated to Paris and Izmir.

Ankara, January 3, 1962, 5 p.m.

736. Paris for USRO and Stoessel. Deptel 501./1/ Saw Inonu this morning and, with Sarper translating, gave him carefully prepared statement on military and economic assistance based on guidance from Department supplemented by locally generated information and argument. Spoke from ``talking paper", leaving copy for subsequent reference on understanding it not to be considered formal document but rather informal presentation subject to further explanation or elaboration as required. This deemed essential in view complexity of problem and difficulty otherwise of having anything approaching accurate record of what said.

/1/Telegram 501, December 21, 1961, provided the Embassy with specific guidance on military and economic policy regarding Turkey. (Ibid., 782.5/12 - 1361)

Inonu was very tentative throughout and frequently asked questions indicating he not only interested but had much better grasp of subject than at our first meeting./2/ Somewhat unexpectedly, he was especially responsive to those parts of presentation emphasizing planning and self-help. He also seemed accept without question limitations under which we work in assistance field and to appreciate suggestions made to invigorate assistance program within our capabilities.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 374.

At conclusion of presentation he made these observations.

Firstly, he expressed appreciation for our effort to clarify aid situation. Said he now had some understanding of complexity of assistance processes and believed our presentation would be useful guide. He would turn it over to officials concerned with aid for study and necessary action.

Secondly, he said he was still troubled regarding military situation. If by misfortune war should come, result could be quick and decisive. That meant advance preparedness at necessary level to meet responsibility. But war now extremely expensive and difficult see how Turkey can continue burden, even with present level assistance of US. While emphasizing his preoccupation with this subject he also indicated that his ideas not yet thought through but he said would want discuss again since he very troubled.

Thirdly, he said wished make clear that Turkey, while wishing avoid needless provocation of Soviets, is firm adherent of Western bloc and will not change. At present time, Soviets conducting ``aggressive peace offensive" which will foreseeably fail and be followed by concerted campaign of abuse by Soviets and their satellites but Turkey is used to such tactics and will know how to maintain its position in the future as it has in the past. In this connection, he gave summary his conversation with Soviet Ambassador Rijov which corresponded exactly with Sarper version as reported Embtel 731./3/

/3/Telegram 731, January 3, reported on Rijov's efforts to pressure Turkey into abandoning its alliance with the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.82/1 - 362)

At conclusion, I mentioned recent spate of pernicious press articles on US aid, saying I had kept silent so far but would suggest might be counteracted by taking line that situation with regard aid good and merely question trying make it better as contrasted press tendency to discuss in terms of rectifying intolerable situation. Inonu agreed and asked which of us should take initiative. I suggested both of us and he acquiesced.

Although nature of our response was in quite different vein from that of Inonu's original request for large lump sums for supplemental assistance he not only refrained from pressing his original demands but actually seemed be appreciative of lengths to which we had gone in trying understand his problem and in taking action or making suggestions to assist. It is, of course, to be expected that development of specific points will involve tough bargaining later and that further demands will be made but would seem that we may have at least gotten Inonu back on track and in surprisingly good spirit.

Hare

376. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56340/1 - 1962. Secret. Repeated to Paris and Wiesbaden Air Force Base.

Ankara, January 19, 1962, 8 p.m.

786. Department pass USIA and Defense. Paris pass Stoessel and McGuire. In conversation yesterday with Chief JUSMMAT, General Sunay stressed urgent desire Turkish armed forces continue maximum classification MRBM bases Turkey. He specifically asked him ``make representations through Ambassador" indicating he was quite disturbed by stories on MRBM bases here appearing outside Turkey. He also asked ``USIS and other information agencies" be requested ``observe his desires in this matter."

While advantages revision Turkish attitude towards MRBMs in view our declassification clearly understood here, it is apparent General Sunay reflects strongest possible feelings Turkish armed forces on this point. Since this is request of Turkish military, we should give great weight to it. Since it is also exactly in accord with GOT policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, it deserves even more weight. Russians undoubtedly know missiles here, but publicity over matter like waving red flag at bull and would contradict the rather strong and very good statement Prime Minister Inonu made to Soviet Ambassador on Turkish-Soviet relations (Embassy telegram 731)./1/

/1/See footnote 3, Document 375.

As regards external press coverage Turkish MRBM, we have obviously little control. However, we should seek minimize coverage resulting from pending firings Turkish battalion Cape Canaveral and avoid official links or DOD releases which might suggest we are treating subject less discreetly in US than desired by General Sunay./2/

/2/In telegram 592 to Ankara, January 26, the Department of State requested that the Embassy inform Sunay that it would make ``every effort" to minimize press coverage of Jupiter test firings but pointed out that the existence of U.S.-Turkish Jupiter deployment arrangements had been public knowledge for a ``long time." Department of State, Central Files, 782.56340/1 - 1962)

Hare

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/1 - 2962. Secret; Limit Distribution.

Ankara, January 29, 1962, 1 p.m.

823. Embtel 801./1/ In course informal talk with Foreign Minister Sarper evening January 27 he indicted awareness current unrest and plotting within military, saying rumor now circulating to effect this Embassy sympathetic military take-over. He said he knew us too well believe any such thing and had so told Prime Minister but wondered how such stories could get started. He speculated might be Soviet inspired or propagated by interested Turkish officers.

/1/Telegram 801, January 23, analyzed the causes of plotting against the civilian government within elements of the Turkish military. (Ibid., 782.00/1 - 2362)

I gave Sarper categorical assurance we completely support civilian government and this is line our entire staff instructed to take. Said he could so confirm to Prime Minister. Re origin of stories, I said nature our relationship such that we naturally have extensive contacts with Turkish military which might be adversely exploited if any such officers were of restive type as I suspected few might be. However, this would be gross misrepresentation since our stand absolutely clear.

Sarper said Chief TGS Sunay aware of activities of what he termed military junta. He described it as having origins in loosely organized group of military officers who last summer became concerned that principles of May 27 coup would not continue be applied. He said at that time Sunay told those officers he supported same principles and asserted right as senior general to lead defense those principles by military. By inference he indicated however this not relationship existing today between Sunay and those anxious for military take-over.

Sarper's comments indicative fairly widespread knowledge and concern about military plotting among top commanders and civilian government leaders including Inonu. Evidence they actively trying counter this movement provided by Sunay's current visit to Istanbul and his meeting with officers there January 25 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Inonu also went Istanbul January 28. Announced purpose his visit is contact with business community but it also reported [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He may take opportunity present case for civilian government to military officers there. Press reports Inonu talked to Sunay for hours after his arrival Istanbul January 28.

Hare

378. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/4 - 362. Secret. Repeated to Ankara.

Paris, April 3, 1962, 8 p.m.

4677. From Stoessel. Following is report on General Norstad's visit to Ankara April 2 at invitation Prime Minister Inonu. General Norstad concludes that primary purposes of invitation were (1) to re-emphasize strong Turkish ties with US and (2) to express concern regarding what Turks fear may be tendency of US to differentiate between ``general war" and ``local actions", with result that US would not come to Turks assistance in event of latter. General Norstad also took occasion to stress his view of importance of stability in Turkey and role which armed forces could play in this. Details follow.

General Norstad had long, extremely cordial talk with Prime Minister Inonu [who] said he wished give Norstad most positive assurances that Turkey would live up to its commitments to NATO, to the US and to West. He expressed himself in strong terms and reiterated this point several times.

He spoke very warmly of US. He mentioned that one of problems in last two world wars was doubt as to whether US would enter conflict. Now uncertainly regarding US role has been prevented by membership of US in NATO. Nevertheless, he went on to say that Turkey is somewhat concerned about repeated discussions of difference between general war on one hand and, on other hand, incursions, infiltrations and local actions. One of Turkey's great worries is that local aggression against her would not be regarded as important enough to warrant response by US or other NATO countries.

General Norstad responded that NATO treaty does not differentiate between types of attack; if country can not deal with situation itself then other NATO countries would come to its aid. US had demonstrated amply its ability to support Turkey in event of attack, and he referred to presence of Sixth Fleet in Mediterranean, Exercise Checkmate, et cetera. He also mentioned development of mobile force. Dispatch of mobile force to assist in coping with local incident would serve to put defense against such incident on NATO-wide basis. General Norstad said there should be no question on part of Turkey about sincerity and determination of US in doing everything necessary to defend Turkey.

Inonu picked up Norstad's reference to requirement that country attacked should attempt to cope with attack by its own means in first instance. He said this raised question of status of Turkish forces and need for help in equipment and supply of forces. He thanked Norstad for US support in past and asked understanding for continuing Turkish need in this regard. Army requires increased mobility. Navy needs modernization. As for Air Force, Inonu said ``it needs everything". General Norstad said US is aware of Turkish problems concerning equipment. He reminded Inonu of extensive US aid to Turkey in past and said he was sure that US would continue to accord special consideration to Turkish needs. He mentioned that this also was NATO problem and that he would insure that other NATO countries were made aware of situation.

General Norstad strongly recommended that Turkish authorities deal closely with US Embassy and JUSMMAT on aid problems. Inonu spoke very warmly of Ambassador Hare as good friend of Turkey with deep understanding of country. These comments concerning Ambassador were echoed in later conversations with Foreign Minister Erkin and General Sunay.

General Norstad saw President Gursel in afternoon. General Sunay also participated in conversation. General Norstad found that there had been great change physically in Gursel since he last saw him about a year and half ago./1/ Although his mind seems clear, he appeared to speak with some difficulty and had lost his former animation. Gursel also spoke of ties with NATO and emphasized his view that NATO countries should stand together as one, ``like a chain." Gursel said that suppression of recent attempted revolt had left government in stronger position. He had been pleased with manner in which Constitution had been established and Parliament installed, remarking that these actions had caused less trouble than anticipated. For future, Gursel foresaw gradual improvement in situation.

/1/Gursel had suffered a stroke on April 27, 1961.

General Norstad in his remarks (which were particularly for General Sunay's benefit) emphasized that political stability is essential to over-all improvement. Undoubtedly some public funds could be obtained for economic progress, but real requirement was for private capital. This could only come if confidence is established in government. He felt this was biggest task facing Turkish authorities, both military and political. Gursel readily agreed with these remarks. Sunay obviously took them in but showed no reaction.

In separate talk with General Sunay, General Norstad likewise stressed importance of stability. He said armed forces have been successful in controlling situation and overcoming crisis; now attention should be given to building up strength and cohesion of armed forces, bearing in mind contribution they could make to stability of Turkish Government.

General Norstad met briefly with Foreign Minister Erkin and Defense Minister Sancar. These conversations were quite general and no specific problems were raised. As in other talks, stress was on Turkish ties with NATO.

In more general discussion, Inonu expressed concern about discussion of Rapacki plan in Geneva/2/ and mentioned news report that provisions of plan would result in limitations being placed on Greece and Turkey. Norstad said he was not aware of extension of plan to these countries, in any case, Rapacki presentation was simply new version of old plan which had been rejected in past by West.

Gavin

/2/For text of the Rapacki Plan for a Denuclearized and Limited Armaments Zone in Europe submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on March 28, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 201�5.

379. Telegram From the Consulate in Istanbul to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100 - JO/8 - 3062. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Baghdad, London, Nicosia, and Rome. There is no time of transmission on the source text.

Istanbul, August 30, 1962.

55. CODEL Johnson./1/

/1/Vice President Johnson visited Ankara during a 5-nation tour of the Middle East and East Asia.

[Here follows an account of Vice President Johnson's meeting with President Gursel.]

2. Following is record of conversation between Vice President and PriMin Inonu in latter's office August 27. Also present were FonMin Erkin, Ambassador Hare, Asst. Secretary Rowan, Chief of Protocol Erez, Komer and Ashford.

VP voiced his happiness at being in Turkey, and great pleasure which visit had afforded him. Said he had just been in meeting with President Gursel in which Gursel had expressed concern over slowness modernization Turkish Armed Forces.

VP observed that even in US, military cannot get all things it feels it needs. Aware there is concern in Turkey over type of aircraft possessed by Turkey as against those which Iraq has received from USSR. Noteworthy, however, that modern Iraqi plane had been shot down by what Turks described as old American supplied aircraft, showing what great fighters Turks are.

VP said our represent military assistance plans, which will be discussed in more detail later, provide for delivery two squadrons F - 104 - G's to Turkey. PriMin asked when these aircraft would be delivered.

VP replied US officials would be able to talk about details later. Foreign aid bill itself is still under debate in Congress. Turkey would also receive 225,000 M - 1 rifles.

VP noted these are difficult years for US GNP and government revenues have been less than were anticipated. National debt limit must be raised by statute from $300 billion to 308 billion. There will be considerable deficit this year and next. New tax measure will be acted on in Congress this week, and President will send broad tax reform measure to Congress in January. We must spend in area of $60 billion in coming year for military and space programs. We also have commitments to provide foreign assistance in various forms, economic, military, or defense support in a few instances.

Since World War II we have already spent more than $80 billion in various foreign programs. We have political problem much like one the Prime Minister would face if he wished to make large Turkish Government expenditure in some faraway place like Texas. In [omission in the source text] one with whom we would [garble] we have more confidence than we have in Turkish people. VP said he was proud of position he took as young Congressman on Greek-Turkish aid 15 years ago when former Vice President Wallace was opposing. His philosophy was that if you allow a bully to force you off the street and make you [garble] home down an alley, he will come up the next day and kick you off your front porch. We very proud of performance of Turkish people. Since passage of original foreign aid bill, we have put almost $4 billion into aid to Turkey. This is almost as much as total annual federal budget when VP first came to Washington. Times have chanced since then; in FY '63 we are tentatively planning to provide Turkey in neighborhood of $185 million in military assistance and $140 million to $150 million in economic assistance as well as $50 to $60 million in defense support.

All information from projected levels of aid for Turkey is highly classified and should it become known in other countries exactly what we are doing in Turkey there could be unfortunate consequences. These figures have been cited to indicate our great confidence and interests in Turkey. ``They are not just conversation; we put our money where our mouth is." VP concluded by asking Prime Minister for any thoughts and comments which could be taken back to Washington.

At this point the PriMin asked his interpreter to take notes on the aid figures mentioned by the Vice President. VP repeated figures and added that he had approved $33 million development plan to Etibank for hydro-electric dam project, though we did not want to make public announcement of loan at this time. Moreover all projected aid figures are subject to change by Congress. These figures represented our thinking at time aid request was submitted to Congress, and amount projected for Turkey is about $400 million. This information extremely confidential. With regard development loans, cash flow may vary from year to year, depending on many factors, but this indicated range of our thinking. This information on US [aid] to Turkey does not constitute commitment. We are saying to Iran, Greece and to other NATO countries that we cannot give them defense support, but we are not saying this to Turkey. Prime Minister Inonu said VP had brought to Turkey an atmosphere of security. Fact that greetings of friendship from President Kennedy had been brought by such a distinguished representative constituted cause great happiness for all Turkish people. Vice President's statements show US following Turkey's problems closely. After passing through severe crisis, Turkey has reached solid decision to adopt democratic system and stick with it. VP knew that other countries passing through similar crises were unable recover in such short time. Results of past year are very promising.

A second problem occupying Turkey, said Prime Minister, is institution of planned development. We have been working for a year to secure the agreement among our friends which implementation of our plans will require. We have found US a helpful friend in these matters in NATO and other international organizations. Securing the required legislation in connection with development plans is not easy. Just this morning he had discussed this problem with his colleagues and had talked to President Gursel about it.

Prime Minister Inonu said President Gursel was taking advantage of the presence of so distinguished a visitor to explain Turkey's military requirements. They had already discussed these requirements several times with distinguished military representatives and with Ambassador Hare. These discussions are continuing. They are asking several things from US and US is doing its best to meet these demands. Of course, US is trying to meet demands of other countries and has heard each one claim that it is more important than others.

PriMin said he had one specific point to make in this connection, which is necessity of accelerating delivery of military aircraft to Turkey. In current attitudes of Iraq he perceived a dangerous situation which originated with the ideas of the Iraqi Head of State. NATO defense is a big problem, concerning aggression by major powers, and with the extensive planning required left in hands of NATO commander. The area of Iraq, however, is theroretically out of NATO, and Iraq is engaged in arms race with Turkey as concerns military aircraft. They have done well in first lap of this race. It should be expected that Turkey's small neighbors might take advantage of smalll incidents which affect adversely their relationships with Turkey. We have plans for modernizing our armed forces, and some measures have been taken to implement these plans, however, we badly need acceleration of deliveries to provide our requirements in military aircraft. We touched by VP's appreciation of skill of our armed forces, but strength of our military aviation is closely tied to quality of our equipment. Acceleration of delivery of M - 1 rifles would be greatly appreciated, and we expect the two squadrons of F - 104 - G's to arrive as soon as possible. In light of recent developments it would be desirable add another squadron these aircraft.

With regard to economic plan, PriMin Inonu said situation has not matured sufficiently to explain latest developments even to Ambassador Hare. GOT believes strongly, however, that implementation of its plans will require closest interest and probably additional assistance on part of US. One of results of our determination to adopt a democratic system following revolution is that our social problems have become more important and more heated, and success of our system will depend largely on implementation of our development plans. We feel our political difficulties will be resolved if our planned economic development is successful.

PriMin Inonu said US-Turkish relations were best possible. Ambassador Hare being regularly informed of our internal and external policies. We have nothing to hide. Two countries with mutual destinies require mutual confidence and understanding. VP's visit has strengthened our confidence in America. Every word of VP's has been very important to us. We request him take back to President word of our close friendship and partnership, our heartfelt greetings, and our warmest regards. Gradually, as our economic and military plans are implemented, our position will be better understood. We hope Vice President will take with him pleasant memories of Turkey.

The VP replied that he would take away best of memories, particularly of PriMin.

PriMin remarked he wanted find out from Ambassador Hare just when new aircraft would arrive. Turk military attached great importance to these aircraft.

VP said that he would have US military talk to Ambassador Hare about it. We will have problems on delivery time but Ambassador Hare will find out what is best that can be done. Such aircraft are of course a highly competitive item. My authority to convey news of their programming indicates importance we attach to Turkey.

In subsequent brief private discussion with Prime Minister Inonu and Foreign Minister Erkin, VP re-emphasized that the aid figures he had mentioned to President and PriMin should be recognized as those being considered by the Executive branch and still subject to cutting by the Congress. He cited difficulties that we are having with the Passman committee, indication it might cut as much as $90 million from new aid appropriation. He told FonMin Erkin that, as a former Turkish Ambassador in Washington, he would remember complications of our appropriations procedure and that as a result no aid figures could be taken as final. FonMin Erkin said that Turkish Government fully understood this problem.

Mr. Komer added that VP had deliberately chosen to mention specific aid planning figures for Turkey in FY '63 as unprecedented mark of confidence in Turkish Government. Turkish Government should bear in mind that (1) as indicated by VP, these are planning figures of what we hope to do, not what we necessarily could do; (2) it was most important that Turks regard such figures as highly confidential; if other Allies became aware of how much aid we plan to provide Turkey and which we are not planning to provide to these other countries, it could be most embarrassing for us.

FonMin Erkin assured those present that full security would be observed, and that Turks well understood problems which publicity would create. Mr. Komer mentioned again to FonMin Erkin as VP was leaving that we had really leveled with Turks and they should realize that our final aid figures might perforce come out somewhat differently.

3. Above memoranda have been approved by VP and Ambassador Hare.

Brown

380. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/10 - 2562. Secret; Priority.

Paris, October 25, 1962, 9 p.m.

Polto 506. Eyes only for Secretary. Department may desire repeat Ankara and Rome eyes only Ambassadors. Policy. Reference: Department telegrams 2345 and 2349./1/

/1/Telegrams 2345 and 2349, both October 24, sought assessments of the implications of removing Jupiter missiles following the Cuban missile crisis. (Ibid., 611.3722/10 - 2462)

1. Turkish PermRep here has consistently made it clear that Turks set great store in Jupiters placed in Turkey. He makes very clear that Turkey regards these Jupiters as symbol of alliance's determination to use atomic weapons against Russian attack on Turkey whether by large conventional or nuclear forces, although Turks have been most reluctant admit presence IRBMs publicly. Fact that Jupiters are obsolescent and vulnerable does not apparently affect present Turkish thinking. My impression is that symbolic importance represents a fixed GOT view, although of course Hare can comment much better than I on this point./2/

/2/Telegram 587 from Ankara, October 26, reported that Turkey would resist any removal of Jupiter missiles that appeared to take place in the context of the Cuban crisis and outlined alternative means for dealing with the problem. (Ibid., 611.3722/10 - 2662)

2. For above reason any arrangement of kind suggested reference telegram which would not have received prior complete support by GOT would, it seems to us, be most damaging. I emphasize prior consultation, and I think it should be an arrangement freely arrived at by them. My guess is that any arrangement that would not substitute some other considerable kind of atomic capability in Turkey for Jupiters would be rejected by them. See suggestions paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

3. I am sure Turkish delegation here would resent being openly equated in any deal with Cuba. They are very proud of being members of North Atlantic alliance, and particularly, I know personally, of their splendid role in Korea. Here again Hare can advise better than I as to GOT attitude.

4. In my opinion we must be most careful in working out any horse trade of this type to be sure it does not set pattern for handling future Russian incursions in other parts of world (perhaps in other western hemisphere countries). Unless we can avoid setting such pattern, this could foreshadow dangerous and divisive situation for NATO alliance because other members may wonder whether they too might not be asked give up some military capability at time of next Soviet manufactured crisis. Therefore, any deal re Cuba should be compensated for by other arrangements such as those suggested paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

5. In this connection, would appear preferable, since Cuba is by definition outside NATO area, to offer close down some US nuclear-capable base outside NATO area rather than making deal involving Turkey or Italy. Such deal would then be strictly US - USSR trade rather than involving one of our NATO allies in any deal.

6. I think that we must be fully aware there is real possibility that, outside of any arrangement made in over-all disarmament context, whole alliance might be dismayed by such a deal which would compromise and invalidate firm US action re Cuba which has received substantial approval from alliance. As all know, these weapons were put in Europe as result of heads of government decision in 1957 in response to boastful Soviet MRBM threat to Europe, and alliance might very well conclude that US was willing weaken nuclear defenses in Europe in order to remove threat in western hemisphere. However, cannot discount possibility that some members alliance might be willing accept Cuba-Turk deal ``to avoid nuclear war", i.e., Norwegians, Danes and maybe even British.

7. Re question of removal Jupiters accompanied by stationing of Polaris submarines in area, doubt whether mere deployment Polaris would be attractive to Turks since they really would have no say in use of Polaris in time of crisis and they turned down similar proposal in April 1961. Nevertheless, one might argue Turks really have no say over Jupiter use now because of custodial arrangements, but they feel some assurance in having weapons on their territory and somewhat in their hands. Turkish concern re Polaris substitution might be partially met by consulting them on targeting so as to assure that targets of interest to them are covered by Polaris. Also could point out that three Polaris submarines in area would effectively more than double coverage presently afforded by obsolete Jupiters. Doubt, however, above arrangements would adequately compensate Turks.

8. Re suggestion reference telegram concerning some other significant military offset such as NATO seaborne multilateral nuclear force, we believe most expeditious way do this would be set up small southern command multilateral seaborne force on a ``pilot basis". If such firm suggestion made this should be acceptable arrangement to Turks to compensate for loss of obsolete Jupiters. Such offer would take form of converting a number of merchant-type vessels to MRBM force, utilizing Polaris A - 2 missiles along general lines of US studies and presentation to NAC by Smith on 22 October. Ships could be deployed in Eastern Mediterranean and could be manned by Turkish, Italian and American mixed crews and also possibly Greeks, with appropriate targets of interest to Mediterranean allies covered. Although implementation of this type of force could be realized in short period of time, it would be necessary, as interim step before comes into being, to station Polaris, as suggested reference telegram, in Eastern Mediterranean. Polaris deployment would then fill gap caused by removal of Jupiters, while southern command multilateral force was being put together. At same time, rest of alliance could be investigating possibility of setting up NATO-wide multilateral seaborne force. Southern command MLF might well serve as model for larger force and could be expanded as other allies indicated desirability to join arrangements this type. To make this whole alternative palatable to Turks and others would require clear US support to implement multilateral seaborne-type force, and if properly presented to Turks and Italians we could highlight flexibility and greater efficiency this type force over Jupiters. Our impression here is that Italians more prone to dismantle Jupiters if proper substitute can be found.

9. Such pilot arrangement, which would not come into being immediately, could permit US offer Soviets withdrawal obsolete Jupiters as face-saving device for Cuban withdrawal (Polaris deployment would cover in interval). Whether or not this would be acceptable to Soviets, the gesture could be made and might well look good in face of world opinion. Whether or not they accept this type of trade, we believe that in any event strong consideration should be given to withdrawing Jupiters and creating pilot MLF since this would strengthen NATO nuclear capability in Eastern Mediterranean. Although Turks didn't agree to stop Jupiter program in 1961, even when faced with facts Jupiters obsolete, of no military value and good Soviet target, they might be willing now to accept substitute in MLF which more effective from all angles.

Finletter

381. Memorandum of Conversation

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/10 - 2962. Secret. Drafted by Helseth.

Washington, October 29, 1962.

SUBJECT

Turkish Missiles and the Cuban Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Irwin M. Tobin, Deputy Director, RPM

GTI--William A. Helseth

The Turkish Ambassador, acting on the urgent instructions of his Government, called on Mr. Tyler on October 29. First, he said, he wished to extend the thanks and gratitude of his Government for President Kennedy's refusal of any ``deal" with the Soviet Union regarding the missile bases in Turkey.

Secondly, he wished to inform the United States Government that the Turkish Government had instructed its permanent representative in NATO to ask urgently for a special session of the North Atlantic Council. At this special session, the Turkish permanent representative would review the events which led up to the IRBM's being stationed in Turkey and would emphasize that the IRBM's were placed in Turkey not merely for Turkey's defense but for NATO defense. The Turkish permanent representative would state that the Turkish Government regretted that, when dangers subsequently appeared, some seemed to regard Turkey as at fault. Turkey wished to discuss this turn of events with its allies. (The Ambassador the referred to press comments in various allied countries and to some non-United States personalities who spoke in the same tone.)

Mr. Tyler stated his appreciation for the advance information the Ambassador had given us and said he wished to repeat and to reinforce what the Ambassador had said regarding the circumstances that led to the placing of the missiles on Turkish soil. The United States Government, he said, looked at these from the point of view of the NATO complex. These missiles were for the defense of the NATO area and that defense was indivisible. The United States viewed our commitment in all areas of NATO as being equal. Furthermore, he hoped that Ankara would not pay too much attention to our own press comment which had ranged far and wide. Even we, he said, wondered at times whether a given article had been inspired, was a trial balloon or what. Ambassador Menemencioglu interrupted to say that he recognized the freedom of our press but had noticed that it was disciplined when the facts were known and mentioned particularly that the line taken by the press today (October 29) was a very good one. Mr. Tyler said that the Secretary had recently talked with the press on a background basis.

Mr. Tyler stated that the Cuban crisis was not yet settled and that we would know tonight if work on the bases had been stopped. We had, he said, resumed aerial surveillance today. Mr. Tyler stated that he wished to reassure the Ambassador again that there had been no ``deal" regarding Turkey. The Ambassador responded that he had no doubt of that. He remarked upon the audacity of Khrushchev in drawing a parallel between Turkey and Cuba. Mr. Tyler said that there was nothing in the arrangement with the Soviets which implied a guarantee of the Castro regime. We had only stated we would not attack Cuba. We had based our action on the Rio Treaty.

(Note: On the way out of the building, Ambassador Menemencioglu informed Mr. Helseth that his Government would be especially pleased with Mr. Tyler's response to the Ambassador's approach.)

382. Memorandum by the Policy Planning Council

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NATO Weapons. Secret. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, October 30.

Washington, October 30, 1962.

SUBJECT

Turkish IRBM's

1. Problem: To review planning regarding Turkish IRBM's in the light of recent developments.

2. US Objectives:

(a) To set in motion actions that will lead to removal of Turkish IRBM's so that we will not continue to be embarrassed by a deployment of obsolescent and vulnerable weapons that is not, in fact, in the US interest.

(b) To avoid clouding the appearance of US resolution conveyed by our recently demonstrated will and ability to get Soviet offensive weapons removed from Cuba without any trade-off of US and allied interests.

3. Discussions: One way of achieving these objectives would be through an arms control agreement involving reciprocal concessions, e.g., some general limitation on MRBM deployment or on offensive strategic nuclear bases. This possibility is being explored by ACDA. For purposes of the discussion that follows, however, it is assumed that this possibility is not sufficiently promising to obviate the need for now taking steps that would facilitate a unilateral Turkish decision to remove the IRBM's.

The Turks will only take such a decision in good grace if they feel that an adequate substitute is at hand. Deployment of US Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean would not constitute such a substitute, even if it were accompanied by such other steps as pre-stocking of US equipment in Turkey, rotation of US forces to Turkey, military aid to Turkey etc.--helpful though these steps would undoubtedly be.

The heart of the matter is this: The Turks now have in the Jupiters a nuclear missile system which they own, which they are beginning to man, and in whose control they can participate. They would take poorly to any arrangement which deprived them of that system without equivalent participation in another nuclear missile system in return.

Their reaction to such an arrangement would suggest urbi et orbi that their security had been sacrificed by the US for its own interests; a general suspicion that this was, in fact, the case could have an unnerving effect on the alliance as a whole and eat into the prestige dividends we have so far earned in Cuba.

The only way to avoid this reaction would be to offer the Turks the alternative of either another national Turkish MRBM force or of a multilateral MRBM force, to replace the IRBM's. Of the two, the latter is clearly to be preferred; another Turkish national force would generate the same Soviet and other pressures that are now being directed against Turkish IRBM's.

4. Proposal: Ambassador Finletter has suggested a pilot NATO Southern Command multilateral sea-based force, in which the Italians, Turks, Greeks, and US (and perhaps the Canadians) might take part.

We should now consult with the countries concerned about such a force, as part of the follow-up to the US October 22 MRBM presentation to the NAC. To this end, we should now send our travelling MRBM team on the road, as we indicated on October 22 that we would, beginning with Ottawa, Rome, Ankara, and Athens, where it could surface the concept of the small pilot southern force. While the team was thus doing business in home capitals, we would be consulting with the Embassies concerned here, and Ambassador Finletter would be consulting the appropriate PermReps in Paris.

Since the size and cost of a pilot force would be limited, the Italians--who have been doing some work on their own in regard to sea-based deployment--might see an opportunity for alliance leadership in opening up this possibility in the NAC.

It is not inconceivable that agreement in principle could be reached by the countries concerned fairly rapidly. Both the Turks and the Italians reacted favorably to the October 22 concept; they would also see the advantages of getting on with the pilot force, as a means of gracefully phasing out land-based IRBM's, which they would expect to be the object of increasing pressures in the post-Cuban period. The Canadians have also shown themselves favorable to the multilateral concept.

The US would have to participate, and to be prepared to evidence its oft-repeated willingness to bear its fair share of multilateral MRBM cost, if the pilot force were to come into being. This force might be about the size (48 missiles--6 ships) of the Turkish and Italian IRBM force that it would replace, instead of the 200 missiles and 25 ships that have been discussed for the total NATO force.

We could make clear that the US contribution to this pilot force would be all that the US would contribute in the way of money to any NATO multilateral force, since the other European countries which might form a larger force after EEC negotiations should be able to pay their own way. (Indeed, these countries could buy out the US and Canada, if they wanted to set up an all-European force at that time.)

In a force with the membership of the pilot force, pressures for a control formula excluding US participation would probably be minimal. US warhead custody could be maintained, as the Germans have suggested, while the problem of long-term control arrangements was being studied. This would ease our problem with the JCAE, although the problem would remain of the Committee's past concern as to whether meaningful US custody is possible aboard non-US ships.

The British ought not object to agreement now being reached on a small pilot Southern Command force, since this would not directly affect the politically sensitive issues of Germany's nuclear status or of post-EEC Franco-British nuclear relations. The British will, furthermore, be as anxious as anyone to see Turkish IRBM's phased out and the relation of a Southern Command force to such phasing out will not escape them.

Once agreement had been reached in principle on the Southern Force by the countries concerned, it would probably not be difficult to move the Turkish and Italian governments to indicate, in the course of NAC discussion, that they would wish to phase out IRBM's at an appropriate time, since they would not need and could not afford both to operate IRBM's and to participate in the pilot force.

These Turkish and Italian statements could then be made public, which should help to reduce pressures and agitation over Turkish IRBM's.

Once that agitation had died down, it might be possible to persuade the Turks to start taking out the IRBM's long before the Southern Force came about, in view of the prospect of that Force and the interim coverage provided by US Polaris.

In acting along these lines, the alliance would have not only met the Turkish IRBM problem in a constructive fashion; it would also have taken a concrete step toward strengthening nuclear aspects of the partnership. Such a step would be useful in meeting European concerns over the Soviet MRBM's; these concerns are likely to grow in the wake of a crisis triggered by deployment in Cuba of one tenth as many MRBM's as now threaten Europe. And such a step would establish a pattern and precedent, which would be extended after EEC negotiations, if the other NATO countries concerned were willing to pay the freight.

5. Conclusion. We should now consult with the Italians, Turks, Greeks, and Canadians about the concept of a pilot Southern Command multilateral force (i) in home capitals; (ii) with Embassies here; (iii) with PermReps in Paris. In light of this urgent consultation we can then determine when and how best to launch NAC discussion of this concept, in order to create a framework for appropriate Turkish and Italian IRBM statements.

383. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/11 - 1362. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Rome, and Paris Topol.

Ankara, November 13, 1962, 5 p.m.

619. Policy. Paris Polto 533 and 541 to Department./1/ Concept seaborne nuclear fleet little known here and has not generated any particular interest so far. Following comments therefore based on our assessment not on any comments by local officials.

/1/Polto 533, November 3, reported on discussions among the NATO Permanent Representatives on the MLF and Jupiter removal proposals. (Ibid., 740.5611/11 - 362) Polto 541, November 8, discussed the MLF. (Ibid., 375.75611/11 - 862)

1. Location Jupiters Turkey considered by GOT symbol Turkish possession modern weapons, tangible evidence value NATO membership and key means strike at Soviets. They could not be lightly traded off without satisfactory quid pro quo.

2. While awareness obsolescence exists some quarters, this probably not sufficient offset factors listed above. Fact Jupiter first strike weapon and significance of this in terms NATO strategy probably not generally understood within government.

3. Soviet proposal US missiles be removed Turkey in conjunction Soviet removal missiles Cuba and continued airing similar proposals by prominent western journalists have introduced element rigidity into any GOT consideration removal Turkish-based Jupiters. Important that terms, presentation and timing any proposals to GOT avoid implication bilateral bargain with Soviets in which Turk security part of price we willing pay.

4. On other hand Turks have for some time sought minimize Turk-Soviet bilateral irritants and transfer this relationship into broad pattern East-West confrontation. Substitution local Jupiters for multinational area force could constitute contribution to this policy objective without being concession to Soviets.

5. Therefore if GOT could be convinced Jupiters obsolescent and seaborne force more modern effective weapons system, they would foreseeably be willing consider proposal presented in NATO rather than Cuban context. Important consideration would be persuade them that, by offering substantial participation in command, control, manning, force would actually come to their aid in event Soviet attack.

6. Presentation regarding any proposal phase-out Jupiters should illustrate sharp contrast Soviet action in committing removal Soviet missiles Cuba without apparent adequate consultation Castro. Process here should involve NATO decision with full knowledge and consultation GOT. Timing should be deliberate, step-by-step process with formation seaborne force ideally preceding removal Jupiters.

7. On basis above analysis I agree with Ambassador Finletter that Turks likely be responsive, if force adequate provide necessary symbol of NATO ability defend Turkey. I doubt participation of non-Mediterranean powers would be significant factor as far as Turks concerned. Essential minimum condition would be participation of US plus strong and evident NATO flavor.

8. Financial aspect of MLF would constitute real and perhaps most important issue. GOT now in situation where MAP deliveries do not fulfill [garble] NATO force goals and GOT unable economically supplement MAP deliveries. Resulting feeling of inadequacy is quite extreme, as brought out in connection Cuban crisis and also recent reports of arms build-up in Iraq. Turks do not have foreign exchange to invest in MLF and if agreed financing were in any way to mean reduction in current level MAP for Turk National Forces we could expect really strong opposition.

9. As to timing, I suspect it might well take some months for GOT reach executive decision, and if resulting decision involved some form of agreement, further loss of time and complication could result from seeking necessary legislation. This question cannot be answered with assurance prior consultation but one recalls Menderes Government severely criticized for not seeking ratification Jupiter Agreement and pres-ent Constitution does not provide for Executive-type agreements.

At risk of underlining obvious, might also be mentioned that if, as has been adumbrated, removal Jupiters should be taken up in terms of relaxing East-West tensions, we could have presentation and public relations problem since plan acceptable Turks could hardly be expected relax Russians and vice versa. This would lead to conclusion that, if larger concept maintained, Jupiter-MLF plan might best be considered along with other moves in tension-reducing direction.

Hare

384. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 7821.56311/12 - 1862. Top Secret. Drafted by Weiss and Johnson; cleared by Talbot, Davis, Kitchen, Kent, and the Department of Defense (ISA); and approved by Johnson. Also sent to Rome.

Washington, December 18, 1962, 8:17 p.m.

523. Eyes only for Ambassadors Reinhardt and Hare. Subject: Jupiter Missiles.

1. This message is strictly FYI. No distribution should be made of this message and tight security should be maintained.

2. The Secretary and Secretary McNamara, in separate conversations at Paris discussed subject of removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey with Sancar and Erkin, and McNamara discussed removal of Jupiters from Italy with Andreotti./1/

/1/Rusk reported on his conversation with Erkin in Secto 3 from Paris, December 12. (Ibid., 811.82/12 - 1262) Memoranda of the McNamara - Sancar and McNamara - Andreotti discussions are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2198.

3. Proposal advanced by McNamara was for dismantling of the Jupiters by April 1, with these missiles to be replaced by Polaris stationed in Mediterranean. Each government informed they could participate with SACEUR in targetting of Polaris.

4. Proposed replacement was explained in terms of a desire to modernize Alliance missile capability removing a highly vulnerable system which, during the Cuban crisis, provided inviting target to the Soviets should US have been forced to undertake military action against Cuba. In view of high vulnerability and advancing obsolescence, these systems should be replaced with more modern and effective system prior to onset of any new crisis which might, for example, occur in the near future over Berlin. In this way Alliance would have benefit of more effective deterrent force while denying to the Soviets an opportunity to bring political pressures to bear by threatening attacks against vulnerable Jupiter missiles.

5. Andreotti appeared not overly disturbed by the US proposal though he indicated to Secretary McNamara that Italy would not itself wish to raise question and that initiative would have to come from the US. Also stated important that action, if taken, should be prior to spring elections in Italy.

6. McNamara also indicated to Andreotti that while US was of view that SETAF should be taken over by Italians, US was prepared to continue support for at least an interim period and that we would be prepared to modernize SETAF by replacement of Corporals by Sergeants, such action to be related to Jupiter removal.

7. Turkish MOD Sancar appeared more cautious and reserved in his response. Though he agreed to ``submit and expose" US views to Turkish government, he said substitution of more secure weapon system for Jupiter must take into account all political and military factors. Indicated that core of problem was Turkey's confidence in its Allies; that there was need to avoid moral depression either in people or Army. Warned against creating impression that ``best of Allies was leaving Turkey to a condition of aloneness." McNamara indicated that replacement by more efficient and invulnerable Polaris system should preclude these concerns.

8. Sancar also raised question re delay in delivery of F - 104 - G's. Requested acceleration of delivery. McNamara indicated dificult to accelerate but would work to resolve problem. McNamara stated that it would be appropriate to link announcement of an earlier delivery date with replacement of Jupiters.

9. At Lord Home's dinner for NATO delegations, Turkish PermRep (with several NATO nationalities represented at same table) opened Jupiter question himself and in strong terms expressed resentment that Turkey had been victimized through being pressed to receive Jupiters when most other members NATO turned them down. Tenor his conversation was that Jupiters were no good, that they created special problems for Turkey and that NATO decision to deploy Jupiters was irresponsible in that other members did not really cooperate.

10. Following McNamara's talk with Defense Minister, Erkin mentioned matter informally to Secretary in a friendly and relaxed mood saying that he saw no difficulty provided ways and means were found to make it clear that US was continuing a military presence in Turkey and was firmly committed to Turkey's defense.

11. Importance of maintaining strictest security was emphasized in conversations with Turkish and Italian governments. Should you be queried by representatives of Turkish or Italian governments, Secretary does not think it advisable for you to attempt to amplify US proposal. We are now working out next steps for following up on US proposal. For example, we have in mind that Secretary of Defense McNamara might soon visit Southeast Asia and would stop off in Ankara for discreet talk with highest Turkish officials. If, therefore, matter is raised with you suggest you merely refer to talks in Paris and indicate will request further instructions.

Rusk

385. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/12 - 2662. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

Ankara, December 22, 1962, 2 p.m.

693. Department telegram 523; Embassy telegram 692./1/ In discussing Nassau statement with Foreign Minister, only specific question he raised was what effect proposed British-American agreement would have in respect other NATO members. I called attention to part of statement specifying that allocated units of United States strategic forces, United Kingdom bomber command and tactical nuclear forces now in Europe would be assigned as part NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance NATO plans, that same provisions also applied Polaris force, and that this seen as step toward multilateral NATO force.

/1/Telegram 523 is printed as Document 384. In telegram 692, December 22, Hare reported that he had delivered the full text of the Kennedy - Macmillan Nassau statement to Sarper who would pass it to Inonu. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.5612/12 - 2262) For text of the December 21 Kennedy - Macmillan statement, see Department of State Bulletin, January 14, 1963, pp. 43-45.

Foreign Minister said this clear and what he really had in mind was any possible pertinence of this development to his discussion with Secretary re removal of Jupiters from Turkey, i.e., would British-American agreement constitute means by which Polaris substitute might be made for Jupiters.

I replied that, speaking personally, it would seem that, if a multilateral nuclear NATO force were immediately in prospect, Jupiter case might be considered in that context but, since even British-American agreement will take certain time to implement, I would assume that any early substitution for Jupiters would be made under different guise.

Foreign Minister said this seemed logical but, since Jupiter question so important to GOT, he would appreciate any corroborative or supplemental comment which might be available from Washington.

I said would be glad inquire, and would appreciate guidance as to reply which Department desires made.

Hare

386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5611/1 - 563. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Cleared by Meloy, Hare, the Department of Defense, and Bundy; and approved by Kitchen and Ball.

Washington, January 5, 1963, 7:31 p.m.

556. Verbatim text. There follows for immediate delivery to Minister of National Defense Sancar a letter from Secretary of Defense McNamara. Signed original being pouched. No public release planned.

``5 Jan 1963.

``Dear Mr. Minister:

``You will recall that, during our conversation in Paris on December 13,/1/ I expressed the view that the Jupiter missiles should be replaced by improved missiles now becoming available.

/1/See footnote 1, Document 384.

``In 1957 when the decision was made to install these missiles they, along with the Thors, were the only strategic ballistic missiles the Alliance had ready for operation. The Jupiters helped greatly to build up our early ballistic missile strength, but, with the rapid advances in technology and the accelerating growth of missile forces, they no longer form a major part of the Alliance's missile strength. In this year alone, the number of operational strategic ballistic missiles in the Alliance will increase from about 450 to abut 850. More importantly, as a first generation missile these Jupiters are easily located by the enemy and vulnerable to both conventional and nuclear attack. It is questionable whether they would survive a Soviet surprise attack. Such a system today promises to be relatively ineffective and it presents a vulnerable and tempting target--conditions which we should seek to avoid if we can find an alternative weapon system which better meets our military needs. This is especially true since we must continue to anticipate Soviet stimulated crises of comparable or even greater intensity as for example might occur at any time over Berlin.

``It seems to us desirable on these counts to replace the Jupiters with an alternative weapon system which better meets our common needs and, in connection with the replacement, to accelerate the delivery of another modern weapon system, the F - 104Gs.

``We believe the best available alternative to Jupiter would be the Polaris missile submarine system. In addition to being less exposed than the Jupiters, these missiles would have a very much higher probability of survival in the face of a sudden nuclear attack. We propose that Polaris submarines operate in the Mediterranean, be assigned to SACEUR and be targeted by him with Turkish participation. This Polaris force can be on station by April 1.

``I strongly agree with the sense of your comment to me as to the importance of our Allies and our enemies understanding that the substitution of this modern weapon system creates a more formidable military posture for Turkey and for NATO. It has been our policy and will continue to be our policy to assist our Allies in the provision of increasingly effective military defenses through a measured and continued phase-in of modern weapons. In this way the Alliance can have the benefit of the most effective deterrent force we are capable of devising while denying to the Soviets an opportunity to bring political pressures to bear by threatening attacks against highly vulnerable weapons of more limited military value.

``We wish it to be clearly understood that in advancing the proposal for substitution of Polaris for Jupiters, we envisage working out all aspects in closest harmony with the Turkish government and would of course be responsive to your view on how the substitution can most expeditiously be effected. Finally, we would believe that Alliance interests would best be served if the substitution were conducted in a low key as a natural evolution to a better weapon system, as in fact is the case, rather than having the substitution misrepresented in any way. In this connection, I think we might consider making clear to the Alliance that our two governments previously discussed this matter as far back as April 1961.

``Since my return from Paris I have looked into the possibility of associating an acceleration of the delivery of F - 104G aircraft to Turkey with the replacement of the Jupiters. By a series of emergency actions, I believe it would be possible to deliver sufficient aircraft to Turkey to equip the first squadron in April 1963; this could be done as part of this modernization program.

``If your government agrees with these proposals, appropriate staffs of our two governments in cooperation with SACEUR could begin discussions immediately with a view to working out specific arrangements. Ambassador Hare shortly will raise this matter with the Turkish Government.

``Sincerely"

Ball

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5611/1 - 863. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bowling; cleared by Meloy, Lubkeman, Hare, Talbot, S/S, EUR, RPM, the Department of Defense, and the White House; and approved by Kitchen. Repeated to Rome and Paris.

Washington, January 8, 1963, 7:22 p.m.

566. Paris for Finletter and CINCEUR. Joint State - Defense message. For Ambassador.

1. USG desires replacement Jupiter systems in Turkey and Italy as soon as possible. You should therefore begin consultations at appropriate level GOT as soon as possible, following on letter from Secretary Defense to Turk MOD, and using approach outlined below.

a) With decisions reached at Nassau Conference, process of revitalizing and modernizing nuclear defense of NATO area has begun. USG envisages staged evolution toward effective multilateral NATO force, integrating existing independent nuclear forces, and with eventual control and manning arrangements in which Turkey as well as other smaller NATO powers would participate. Precise shape and timing this evolution not yet certain, but it is inevitable conclusion train of events started at Nassau. USG, during coming years of evolution this force, intends utilize its influence to see that final configuration will include significant participation by Turkey, which we regard as an especially close and dependable ally and as a basic military pillar of NATO. We hope and expect that Turkey will, in the course of future movements toward more effective NATO nuclear defense concepts and structures, continue as it has in the past to give its best efforts toward strengthening of the NATO alliance.

b) While many basic steps toward improvement NATO nuclear posture will of course require time for technical arrangements as well as cooperative re-thinking of problem on part of NATO allies, there are other steps which can be taken in near future which would not only improve present NATO defense posture but would provide valuable impetus toward re-examination of basic postulates by industrialized NATO countries which is a prerequisite for meaningful progress in new directions. One such step, on which we wish consult with Turkey, is the substitution of more modern weapons systems for the existing obsolescent Jupiters now stationed in Turkey and Italy. Simultaneous consultations are taking place in Italy. You might refer to the British decision to dismantle Thor IRBM's as an example of the fact that the first generation of IRBM's is obsolete.

c) We are ready, as an interim arrangement toward the eventual NATO multilateral force envisaged at Nassau, to assign Polaris missiles under SACEUR to the Mediterranean with the intention of having at least three boats for the Mediterranean force. Missiles will be on station by April 1, 1963. This weapons system, with an extremely low degree of vulnerability to an enemy first strike, would, along with our own rapidly expanding Minuteman force, be able to cover the targeting assignments previously handled by the Jupiter system. Turkey and Italy, through SACEUR, would of course be expected to participate in the targeting of the Polaris system. Once the submarines force is assigned, we would be happy to make such arrangements as Turkey might feel desirable for short visits to Turkish ports, with attendant publicity, in order that the Turkish people may be reassured that they are constantly guarded by this undersea force.

d) Some time in 1963, the United States will begin the dispersal to Turkish airfields of nuclear weapons under United States custody for use with Turkish aircraft.

e) The U.S. will never forget, and will always be grateful for, Turkey's swift response to collective security needs in agreeing to accept and man the Jupiter installations on Turkish soil. The need at the time was great, and IRBM's were the best response the Free World could make to the Soviet threat as it was then apparent to us. The value of weapons systems changes, however. Nuclear delivery systems falling between the first efforts and the first generations of highly invulnerable, fast, accurate, and reliable systems such as Polaris and Minuteman have been shown to have a very short lifetime of military usefulness. We feel that the Jupiter system has simply been outmoded. Its vulnerability and relatively slow reaction time make it a standing temptation for an enemy first strike, nuclear or conventional, and its manning and maintenance make it a drain on resources which could be put to better use. The Jupiters on Turkish soil do not represent a military error; they have performed a perhaps critical duty in deterring aggression against the alliance. But, like all other weapons, they eventually reach obsolescence, as we mentioned to you in April 1961. The immense efforts we have devoted to the improvement of our nuclear delivery capacity have rendered their period of useful life shorter than is the case with other types of weapons. Jupiter was from the beginning a stop-gap.

2. You may during course of these discussions request the presence in Ankara of a senior U.S. military officer. You may also make reference to the importance of obtaining SACEUR's views. You should be guided by following considerations:

a) USG desires Turkish agreement as soon as possible for replacement of Jupiters at earliest time possible following stationing of the Polaris force in the Mediterranean.

b) If Turkey agrees in principle, it should at earliest possible time after consultation with SACEUR (we will also consult SACEUR) approach NAC through SACEUR, and jointly with the US notify NAC of its intention dismantle Jupiters after Polaris missiles are on station. Timing of announcements, including possibility even of trilateral announcement, is subject to arrangement, and we would go as far as we could toward meeting Turkish preferences. We do not feel, however, that we can authorize announcements or inspired press comment until NAC has been formally notified, since we must avoid impression that three NATO states have altered NATO defensive arrangements without consultation with other NATO allies.

c) Technical details of dismantling and withdrawal Jupiters could be discussed between Turkish General Staff and JUSMMAT.

3. Contingencies:

a) Should Turks at any time intimate that they suspect they are being equated with Cuba, you are authorized respond such intimation that when Soviets, in course of Cuban crisis, attempted compare Jupiters in Turkey with Soviet missiles on Cuba, we responded flatly and publicly that we absolutely refused accept any such comparison; our position was and will unalterably remain just that. If it appears desirable to strengthen the presentation, you may in your discretion wish to indicate along the lines of Secretary McNamara's December 13 conversation with Defense Minister Sancar/1/ that the Cuban crisis did not even remotely inspire us toward making a deal with the Soviets involving the security of a faithful and trusted ally; it did bring home to us uncomfortably the dangers and incongruity of maintaining such obsolescent weapons systems as Jupiter when better and far less vulnerable systems are available in growing quantities.

/1/In telegram 576 to Ankara, January 10, the Department of State noted that a portion of the guidance had been omitted from paragraph 3a. The missing portion reads: ``If it appears desirable to strengthen the presentation, you may in your discretion wish to indicate along lines Secretary McNamara's December 13 conversation with Defense Minister Sancar that the Cuban crisis did sharpen in our minds the dangers to NATO's military posture and to world peace of the existence of obsolescent systems such as that of Jupiter within range of Soviet conventional forces. We naturally were forced to consider that Soviets might be tempted strike at Turkish Jupiters. Should this have occurred, we would have been forced respond with adequate countermeasures, and entire world would have been in imminent danger escalation to thermonuclear exchange which was not desired by either side." (Ibid., 782.5611/1 - 1063)

b) Should Turks indicate they may balk at Jupiter replacement unless further improvements are in sight for their conventional military capability, you are authorized to state that Turkey will be given first priority on F - 104G aircraft as they come off the assembly lines. Fourteen F - 104G's will be delivered in April 1963 if the Turks agree to the Jupiter proposal. You may not make any commitment as to delivery of the second squadron.

c) FYI. USG is reviewing current policy affecting following bilateral problems having connection with Turkish defense and Turkey's status as U.S. ally:

(1) Soviet chrome ore shipments to U.S.

(2) U.S. support of Turkish consortium.

(3) Interpretation of Status of Forces Agreement.

(4) US attitude toward Turkish association with EEC. End FYI.

Rusk

388. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/1 - 1863. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Rome and Paris.

Ankara, January 18, 1963, 8 p.m.

792. Paris for Finletter and SACEUR. Deptel 566, Embtels 765 and 788./1/ FonMin Erkin has just given me account of meeting on Jupiter replacement this afternoon attended by himself, Defense Minister Sancar and Service Chiefs and presided over by Prime Minister Inonu. Results basically favorable by decision accept in principle but issue needlessly and disappointingly complicated by FonMin's mistaken impression that Polaris submarines would be manned in some way by Turkish crews. In order avoid just some such difficulty I had given Erkin at our first meeting an informal memorandum of points covered and we know from questions asked that head of NATO section of FonOff who translated memo and has acted as Erkin's adviser in matter clearly understood. Against this background, following are conditions for acceptance of our proposal;

/1/Telegram 566 is printed as Document 387. Telegram 765, January 12, reported that Erkin agreed with the United States on removal of the missiles, but believed that his government faced a major public relations effort in explaining their withdrawal to the Turkish public. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/1 - 1263) Telegram 788, January 18, reported that Erkin had repeated and endorsed the substance of the U.S. position in a statement before the Turkish Senate and expected to seek final government and military approval for withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles in a January 18 meeting. (Ibid., 782.65311/1 - 1863)

1) Two submarines should be placed under Turkish commander in NATO capacity.

2) Two ``spare" crews should be sent to the United States for training for duty on Polaris.

3) Number of 104G's of first squadron should be increased to 18.

4) Training for 104G pilots should be furnished by sending US training group here and sending Turk pilots for training in US.

5) Date for second squadron of 104G's should be set.

Erkin also mentioned as ``different matter" need of Turkish Navy for submarines, destroyers and patrol boats such as furnished Greece if Turk fleet not to cease being effective force by 1967 (this obviously part of current naval drive as reported A - 647/2/ and believe no necessity to consider as directly related Jupiters). Erkin said decision would be communicated immediately to three Deputy Prime Ministers and then submitted for Cabinet approval next week. He asked my reaction.

/2/Airgram A - 647, January 15, reported on discussions with the West Germans regarding assistance to the Turkish Navy. (Ibid., 882.5621/1 - 1563)

I replied baffled by reference to subs under Turkish command with Turkish crews since there had been no such suggestion in our proposal. Erkin said in that case his presentation to meeting had been in error. He would however request that Turkish conditions be presented USG as given, presumably in order not be forced admit his error, although there is minimal possibility affair staged as tactical manoeuvre.

At this point I felt very glum indeed but Erkin then proceeded say Turks want very much to avoid giving impression of having been outdistanced by Italians and, depending on what put out following Fanfani talks, would like make announcement of comparable action here, hopefully next week. In this connection, he also indicated that Turkish reaction regarding assignment and manning Polaris subs would foreseeably be influenced by nature our agreement with Italians. He asked we submit our views as soon as possible in order move ahead.

I realize foregoing must sound grotesque but that is way it happened, and viewed in even such short retrospect, situation may not be as difficult as impossible Turk conditions would indicate. As matters stand our ace in hole would appear to be such agreement as reached with Italians and strong Turkish [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] urge not let appear that Italians beating out Turks in this particular field.

Hare

389. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/1 - 1963. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bowling; cleared by Meloy, Talbot, Rusk, McNamara, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Kitchen. Repeated to Rome and Paris.

Washington, January 23, 1963, 12:17 p.m.

623. Paris for Finletter and SACEUR. Joint State - Defense message. Embtel 795./1/ Following is USG response to Turk ``conditions" on acceptance our proposal. You may use your own discretion as to timing and channel conveyance to GOT, and supplement as circumstances require with other background information in your possession. Re penultimate para reftel, we continue share Turkish preference NATO channel. You will be informed on progress discussions with Italians. You may indicate to GOT general status these discussions and that there is no thought of giving Italians advantages over those offered Turks.

/1/Telegram 795, January 19, provided the Embassy's analysis of Turkish objectives and suggestions for U.S. negotiating strategy. (Ibid.)

1. As set forth previously in Under Secretary's talk to NATO and in recent State of Union message to Congress,/2/ U.S. is aiming at creation of multilaterally-controlled and manned NATO seaborne nuclear force, and we count on Turk cooperation in forthcoming negotiations and discussions within NATO. We intend pursue this vigorously with our NATO allies, but process will doubtless be very long and involved. Acceptance of our proposal for replacement Jupiters with Polaris would, we feel, be important psychological step toward eventual agreement for force we envisage, but Polaris Mediterranean force now proposed is not model for multilateral force. Any attempt by US and Turkey to so shape the Mediterranean force might disrupt the process of reaching consensus on true multilateral force in NATO, and might set in motion process resulting in misunderstandings and jealousies. We cannot undertake to endanger and possibly undercut vast project of NATO multilateral nuclear force by considering at this time question of command and control on bilateral basis. Therefore Turk suggestion re command of Polaris vessels cannot be even considered at present time. We urgently request Turks to prevent leaks to effect that this subject was even brought up during course our discussions.

/2/For text of Ball's January 23 statement on European unity, see Department of State Bulletin, February 11, 1963, pp. 195 - 197. For text of President Kennedy's January 14 State of the Union Message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 11 - 19.

2. Turkish proposal for training of full spare crews Polaris submarines implies, as does Turkish proposal for specific command structure, bilateral decisions on future shape of NATO multilateral force, assuming as it does that Polaris submarines will be manned by Turkish crews. Question of eventual Turkish role in manning and control of projected NATO multilateral force must be resolved in larger context NATO-centered discussions. At present time US laws regarding access to nuclear propulsion plants constitute barrier which US must consider in context overall legislative requirements in moving toward multilateral force objective.

3. Question of Turkish observers aboard Polaris submarines remains to be worked out before commitments can be made. Program of observers would pre-empt and hamper effort toward NATO acceptance mix-manned concept eventual NATO nuclear force. There would be no objection to having SACEUR staff officers, including, of course, Turkish officers, as observers on board Polaris submarines from time to time at the discretion of the force commander. Turkish officers could participate, of course, in the targeting and operational planning of the Polaris submarines.

4. USG shares obvious Turkish concern re early operability in Turkey of F104G weapons system. Filling out of initial F104G squadron by four additional aircraft as desired by Turks will be done as rapidly as the aircraft are available, within a few months after arrival of the first 14 aircraft. Training of both pilots and maintenance personnel is a priority matter if early delivery date is not to be wasted. Turk instructor pilots will be sent to earliest opening US 104G school, and intensive training program contemplated for Turkey. At present moment, full mobile training unit with equipment which had previously been scheduled for overseas service in another country is being held in US on standby basis, ready to proceed to Turkey immediately upon conclusion of agreement replace the Jupiters. Turks are aware difficulty and complexity training program, we therefore confident Turks will understand seriousness our purpose in anticipating sensible date delivery second squadron F104G's approximately one year following delivery first squadron.

5. Turkish Navy is vital element in defense of NATO area. USG has no intention abandoning Turkish Navy in allocating appropriations for military assistance. In fact, we are requesting appropriations for FY 64 which will permit us to fund additional vessels for Turkey.

Rusk

390. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/1 - 2763. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

Ankara, January 27, 1963, 6 p.m.

845. Embtel 844./1/ As result reftel we are in position of having two replies our proposal substitution Polaris for Jupiter missiles, one official government position conveyed by FonMin and one from MinDef. Both accept our proposal in principle but then raise different specifics in terms of reaching final agreement. Sancar letter gives endorsement our proposal but then makes four conditions first of which namely, delivery of nuclear weapons for F - 100 strike squadrons before replacement Jupiters, can prove difficult if Turks really insist. Three numbered conditions are worded in general terms and possibly could be handled by general assurances and explanations. However, since these are termed ``initial conditions", paragraphs one and two may turn out have more concrete meaning as negotiation advances; for instance, mention of ``modernization" of Turkish Armed Forces may raise question multi-year MAP with inclusion much-desired items and mention of ``legal participation" in point two might, as previously indicated, raise question some form Turkish presence on Polaris force. Reference in last paragraph to ``other NATO countries" obviously means Italy and tends to confirm our earlier assumption that fact negotiation not being confined Turkey is helpful factor.

/1/Telegram 844, January 28, transmitted the text of Defense Minister Sancar's reply to the U.S. proposal for Jupiter replacement. (Ibid., 782.56311/1 - 2863)

Transmission of letter would seem leave open two courses of action: (1) take governmental reply as given us and act thereon as soon as we have received additional instructions requested Embtel 831/2/ or, (2) having allowed several days for assumed transmission of letter, make reply of composite nature to Erkin, including reaction to points raised by Sancar. My feeling now is we should go ahead on basis (1) above and see what happens leaving open possibility of blending two channels on assumption that Erkin will reflect MinDef points if they become government policy./3/

/2/Dated January 25. (Ibid., 711.5611/1 - 2563)

/3/In telegram 651, January 29, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to proceed with the first alternative outlined here, using the Foreign Ministry as the direct channel for negotiations. (Ibid., 782.56311/1 - 2763)

Hare

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 Tur. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Rome and Paris.

Ankara, February 1, 1963, 5 p.m.

872. Paris for Finletter and SACEUR. Deptel 623./1/ Saw Foreign Minister Erkin this morning to deliver reply to Turkish ``conditions".

/1/Document 389.

Without attempting debate crew question Erkin said very disappointed we unable to agree to some sort of formula which would associate Polaris with Turkish Command. Said he under constant pressure and criticism by those who maintain that substitution of Polaris for Jupiter represents indication of reduced American interest in Turkey and that, when he attempts rebut such allegations, he is told that he is just saying what they would expect from a Foreign Minister and that his critics therefore remain unconvinced.

While I recalled that fact is this is important move toward modernization in Mediterranean by which NATO generally and Turkey specifically will benefit, Erkin said he understood but this was not sort of argument that convinces critics. Problem is essentially psychological and something more obviously demonstrable required than visits to Turkish ports or visits Turkish officers to Polaris subs.

I then suggested that, aside from continuing to point out that Polaris substitution is strengthening move, public relations line to counteract current criticism should be given positive twist by putting emphasis on multilateral force in which NATO partners, including Turkey, will in fact be given opportunity for different types of participation, including mixed manning. Erkin somewhat grudgingly agreed but still maintained something more tangible regarding Polaris would help out a great deal.

I also requested as instructed that care be exerted to avoid any leak that Command question had even been discussed. Erkin said he absolutely agreed but had been distressed to note that there had in fact been such a reference in yesterday's Aksam. He was at loss know how it had happened and I feel quite certain his unhappiness was not feigned.

We next turned to 104 - G's and I transmitted supplemental information as instructed. Erkin said understood in certain Turkish quarters that original fourteen would be additional to two squadrons programmed and he would appreciate my inquiring if this correct. I replied unnecessary do so since I had knowledge that what we are doing is to respond to oft-repeated request of Turkish Air Force to expedite delivery of programmed planes; not question of expanding program at this point. Any such discussion would have to take its place in normal context of MAP procurement.

Erkin then noted with approval that US training group being held for quick assignment to Turkey and asked if they would bring training planes with them since 104 - G's would not be arriving until later. I said uninformed of details but assumed training group would have what necessary to perform their function competently.

I then noted that we had received letter from Minister Defense Sancar for transmission to Secretary Defense McNamara, asked if Erkin familiar with it and, if so, whether there was anything of significance in it which might have bearing on our discussions. Erkin said had read it and would send me copy. Regarding contents, he said nothing of importance going beyond what already communicated to us previously. In this connection he heartily endorsed idea of single channel of communication henceforth.

Foreign Minister then asked what next to be done, mentioning presumed necessity of agreement to remove Jupiters to replace existing agreement. I said this also my understanding and also necessary supplement informal advice to NAC on January 30 by joint written communication. However, what is essential at this stage is clearly to establish that we are in agreement on the basis of our proposals as explained and supplemented today. Once this done, we could start wheels moving in respect formalities and also practical implementation and sooner this can be done the better.

To this Erkin replied he assumed ``we will have to accept" but he would have to consult Prime Minister first and would hope give me definitive answer some time next week. I took precaution of inquiring whether prospective reply would be definitive governmental position, referring in that connection to Sancar letter. Erkin said it would be governmental position.

Later Erkin telephoned to say had acquainted Prime Minister Inonu with our discussion and would brief Turkish General Staff Monday, being himself occupied tomorrow by presentation budget to Parliament. Indicating also he had had some military contact he asked that 104 - G training team come immediately and be sure to bring trainer planes since would be unable operate effectively otherwise. I suggested best reach definitive basic decision first and then proceed action phase. However, I would advise Washington of GOT interest in expediting training team in order that they might be alerted for action. Erkin said felt no doubt as to outcome and would expect give me final reply shortly after meeting with TGS.

Hare

392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 Tur. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bowling and cleared by EUR. Repeated to Rome and Paris.

Washington, February 2, 1963, 2:33 p.m.

670. Paris for USRO and Stoessel. Turkish acceptance in principle without unfulfillable conditions of replacement Jupiters is now a principal hinge point in moving forward toward completion entire weapons system modernization project. Italian acceptance accomplished, and Italians believed ready proceed next stage approach SACEUR.

Your report on results your latest approach to GOT and your comments on general climate opinion key elements GOT are awaited.

Rusk

393. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 Tur. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Rome and Paris.

Ankara, February 16, 1963, 1 p.m.

959. Paris for Finletter and SACEUR. Embtel 944 and Deptel 721./1/ Erkin told me this morning that he discussed Sancar letter/2/ at length with Inonu yesterday afternoon and had suggested matter be withdrawn because of confusion it causing. In so doing he presented my views on six numbered paragraphs of Sancar letter and said they also represented his understanding of situation. At end of conversation Inonu said he hesitated demand retraction of letter for fear of hurting feelings of military but suggested question might be resolved by making clear that points specified by Sancar were not conditions but rather expression of Turkish needs and desires.

/1/In telegram 944, February 13, the Ambassador reported on discussions with Erkin regarding Defense Minister Sancar's position on removal of the Jupiter missiles. (Ibid.) In telegram 721, February 13, the Department of State outlined the position it would take on Polaris deployment if the issue were raised by the press. (Ibid., Def 12 NATO)

/2/Sancar's February 12 letter to McNamara was transmitted in telegram 943 from Ankara, February 13. While accepting the U.S. proposal for Jupiter withdrawal, it raised a number of issues of linkage between Jupiter withdrawal and supply for the Turkish armed forces. (Ibid., DEF 12 Tur)

Erkin said he had agreed and said he would see Sancar and then advise me. He doubted if he could do so before first of next week due his own and Sancar's immediate preoccupation with budget presentation to House. However, he would do so as soon as possible, using same arguments he had with Inonu and hoping Sancar might actually agree to revising letter. Meanwhile, however, it should be considered as having status suggested by Inonu. He also expressed opinion that points raised by Sancar would not in any event be appropriate for inclusion in bilateral agreement.

I observed this latter point very important since Sancar letter as received had referred to possible ``deadlocks" in implementation which I could only interpret as suggesting removal Jupiters could be held up if specified conditions not met. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Erkin said Sancar had no authority impose such conditions since decision exchange Polaris for Jupiters had been taken by Cabinet and represented government position.

Erkin then inquired regarding approach to NATO saying he could understand Stikker's impatience and indicating he was ready proceed as soon as he heard from us how we proposed going about it. I told him I was expecting information in this regard momentarily and would get in touch with him as soon as it was received. (Deptel 721 received after this conversation.) In light foregoing, I agree with suggestion in Deptel 721 that Secretary Defense reply to Sancar be deferred. Re contents, I would hope to be in better position submit suggestions after I have been advised of outcome Erkin's talk with Sancar.

Suggest we be advised soon as possible regarding nature approach to NATO so that we can proceed with joint approach as we originally proposed to Turks. Advantages joint approach might justify short postponement of presentation in NAC, should that be necessary obtain full understanding in advance. Also suggest Ambassador Finletter may wish keep Birgi informed in detail our plans for NAC presentation in order keep all lines clear. In making these suggestions we cognizant Polto 28/3/ but, since notification of intention to NAC was on tripartite basis, we would assume this concept would be retained in some way in succeeding steps.

/3/Polto 28, February 14, reported Stikker's views on how to present the Jupiter replacement to Turkey. (Ibid., Def 12 US/NATO)

Hare

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 Tur. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris and Rome.

Ankara, February 18, 1963, 8 p.m.

973. Paris for Finletter and SACEUR. Reference: Deptel 721 and Embtel 968./1/ Recommendations re content and timing Secretary Defense reply to Sancar messages require us step back momentarily from detail of negotiation and survey general course developments here. Although we do not know what if any suggestions Turks may have for textual changes beyond that mentioned Embtel 970,/2/ Erkin's comments to me on draft NAC memoranda reported reference telegram indicate likelihood we can go ahead with joint presentation on schedule. Turkish willingness proceed in this way underlines firmness government's decision accept substitution of Polaris for Jupiter missiles reported by Erkin February 9 (Embtel 928)/3/ and indicates we may be approaching conclusion main elements of political negotiation.

/1/Regarding telegram 721, see footnote 1, Document 393. Telegram 968, February 18, reported Sancar's insistence that agreement on the removal of the Jupiter missiles was conditioned on the arrival of munitions and simultaneously pressed for the delivery of a third squadron of F - 104s. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 Tur)

/2/Telegram 970, February 18, reported on Hare's conversation with Erkin in which Erkin stated that he had only one substantive change to suggest to the proposed draft of an agreement over Polaris deployment. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 928, February 9, reported that Erkin had telephoned the Embassy to say that the Turkish Government approved the replacement of Jupiter missiles and had attached no conditions. (Ibid.)

Concurrently with this political decisionmaking process Turkish military have raised number of points combining psychological and material elements which have appeared both in Sancar messages and in Foreign Minister's conversations with me. While latter has made it clear on several occasions these points do not affect GOT's major decision accept substitution, are nonetheless important. Thus, favorable political decision has left behind it turbulent backwash of unresolved questions which will affect both implementation our arrangement, including possibly exchange of notes, and our future relations, political as well as military, with Turkey. Moreover, we can go too far in considering military attitudes separate from main stream of official and public thinking here because attitudes of Turkish military reflect very much same psychological problem that Erkin has emphasized as GOT's main concern (Embtels 872 and 944)/4/ and Turkish press has increasingly veered this direction over past three weeks.

/4/Telegram 872 is printed as Document 391. Regarding telegram 944, see footnote 1, Document 393.

In above context SecDef reply to Sancar takes on basic significance for success of detailed negotiation and implementation of new arrangement, though not for essential political decision which now made. Key sentence second message underlying numbered points is that ``it constitutes unavoidable necessity that during replacement of Jupiters obvious substitution should be made within Turk territory and in structure of Turk armed forces" (Embtel 943)./5/ Considering significance and strength these Turkish military feelings as well as limits to action US can take, we suggest consideration of following themes in SecDef reply to Sancar, which are arranged in order used Sancar's last letter referred to above.

/5/See footnote 2, Document 393.

``First": Here we have excellent opportunity for complimenting GOT on its comprehension dynamics of modern war and constant changes in weaponry this requires as well as on cooperative spirit it has shown in this entire negotiation.

``Second": If it not possible move forward date delivery nuclear weapons under US custody to Turkish F - 100 Strike Squadrons, we could at least point out that military actions which we plan to begin in April will take several months to complete (i.e., time needed for training of crews before Turks can utilize fully 104s, et cetera), and that delivery of bombs will be part of same general cycle of development.

``Third": We could remind Turks that TAF will be occupied some time in absorbing 104 Squadrons now committed. Similarly we busy making extensive preparations required consummate accelerated delivery schedule and making adjustments in delivery schedules to other countries in order provide planes for Turkey. Therefore, we cannot yet make promises for a third squadron, but TAF's further requirements will be in forefront our thinking as we plan disposition future aircraft production.

``Fourth": Aside from requirements for rotational squadron which is now scheduled to be transferred from Incirlik to Cigli approximately 1 March and transfer of certain Air Force administrative facilities from Izmir to Cigli, which has already taken place, we do not know of any new US functions which it is essential be performed there. We recognize that American military would naturally like utilize at least some of installations previously devoted Jupiters, but this point does appear one area where US could make substantial adjustment in direction meeting Turkish desires and we recommend Secretary Defense reply reflect willingness be forthcoming as we possibly can. In fact, this may be key to success of implementation process.

``Fifth": We cannot be sure what interpretation place on this point and, unless State and Defense have further information, we suggest Secretary Defense ask for more specifics while pointing out review of force targets should be continuous process through SACEUR and NATO in which US always ready play active role.

``Sixth": We can only agree with objective Turks wish to achieve here and might well indicate willingness discuss this matter with them.

In addition to questions raised these two letters, we should add anything we can of positive nature to our presentation. For instance, in view obstacles over Rota, use of Turkish base for Polaris, such as Marmaris, could be very helpful in meeting our psychological problem as Foreign Minister suggested to me. We did not actually use fall back position authorized Deptel 646 concerning inclusion Turkish Naval officers on NATO staffs at Naples and Ankara on some Polaris trips as thinking appeared then in process development but, if feasible, it might still prove useful courtesy to offer even though it would by no means fill Turk desire participation in Polaris system. Of more importance as material demonstration our continued interest in Turk military capability is possible formal offering of Hawk system to GOT in near future, which we understand CINCEUR is now appraising at Secretary Defense request. In other words, we should offer all concrete indications of interest within our power at this stage which will improve flavor of our general proposition.

We recommend reply to Sancar come to him from Mr. McNamara since it now becoming clear our difficulties are focused in MOD and TGS and reply through less direct method would be correspondingly less effective. Secondly, GOT agreement to missile substitution and NAC approach mark transition from major decision which political in nature to implementation phase which, though it has strong political implications, is military in essence. However, in order avoid confusion of dual channels, I suggest reply be forwarded to me for transmission Sancar through Foreign Minister.

We have been giving considerable thought over ways of meeting requirement voiced by Sancar for negotiations between American and Turk delegates, which in principle we believe may have merit. Personal discussions covering Turkish military desires and our reaction to them in greater depth than is possible by letter might clear air in MOD and TGS which has now apparently become pretty cloudy. Such meeting would also symbolize our continued interest in Turkish defense and give important boost in right direction to detailed phase our negotiation and perhaps play vital role in obtaining approval exchange of notes.

As regards location of meeting, we can see certain advantages in having Turks go to Washington, but we believe GOT would have difficulty sending anyone with sufficient authority negotiate and in any case Turks would then have to come back with something quite significant in hand. While visit of US official here would not eliminate this problem, it would not arise in such compelling form, so that better plan might be for senior DOD official, who can speak with authority, to visit Turkey when NAC presentation concluded and Bayram holiday here is over on February 27./6/

Hare

/6/On March 8, General Robert Wood, acting as Secretary McNamara's personal representative, flew to Ankara for talks with Defense Minister Sancar and other Turkish Defense Ministry and General Staff officials. In discussions with Turkish officials, Wood was able to achieve agreement on the outstanding issues relating to the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles and Turkish supply requirements. After a stopover in Paris to report to NATO officials, Wood returned to Washington on March 15. Documentation concerning the Wood mission is in Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 65 D 325, Jupiter--March - April 1963.

395. Memorandum of Conversation

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Tur - US. Secret. Drafted by Komer and approved in the White House on October 30.

Washington, September 30, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Alican of Turkey, September 30, 1963

PARTICIPANTS

Deputy Prime Minister Ekrem Alican

Turkish Finance Minister Ferit Melen

Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu

The President

Deputy Assistant Secretary John Jernegan

R. W. Komer

Deputy Prime Minister Alican said President Gursel and Prime Minister Inonu sent their best wishes to the President and had asked Alican and Melen to tell him about Turkey's problems. The present Turkish Government was a coalition of three parties, which he described. Turkey's situation was becoming more stabilized every day, even though coalition government was a new thing (it was actually the second in modern Turkish history). The Turks were also facing a new experience in planned economic life. The Five Year Plan was in its first year. Planned economy was not easy to run; there were difficulties--especially in external financing. However, the Consortium had come through, with United States help./1/ Alican asked the President to help continue the Consortium approach and resolution of such difficulties as existed.

/1/At its July 5 meeting, the OECD's Turkish Aid Consortium discussed increasing the aid pledges of its individual member nations with the objective of assisting Turkey to meet the goals of its Five-Year Plan.

He stressed that Turkey's very friendly feelings toward the United States were from the people, from the nation itself, and not just the government. Through all the events since May 1960, there had been no change in the friendship of the Turkish people toward the American people--no sign of animosity toward Americans. Turkey's friendship came from the nation itself.

Today Turkey was not hesitating at all in its basic political philosophy. It was loyal to Western principles, and loyal to NATO. But the economic problem remained--if Turkey could get through the Five Year Plan successfully, everything would go well. But if the Plan failed, there was trouble ahead. As to internal financing, the Turks had made every sacrifice and met Plan goals. They had levied 1.5 billion TL in new taxes in the first Plan year. While they understood the difficulties facing their European and American friends, they needed our help in the Consortium. Since things were going a little slowly, they were spending their own reserves. Alican said, ``If the United States supports us, the rest of the Consortium will too. The economic problems of Turkey are vital in this phase of Turkish life; if the Five-Year Plan is a success, Turkey will turn the corner." The President responded that ``Our relations with Turkey are one of our strongest ties. We regard Turkey as essential." He commented that we had put a lot of money into Turkey, but it was largely military aid, so the domestic economy had not been able to expand very much. Therefore, the President thought it proper we concentrate our energies on economic matters now. Turkey had greater military security today than ever before. Khrushchev was in trouble with China and at home. We had a hostage in Cuba--if he attacked elsewhere we could do the same in Cuba. This did not mean we could relax. We had been close to collision three times--Cuba, Laos, Berlin--in the last three years. The President did not see much hope of a real detente, but neither did he see much likelihood of Soviet attack. The United States was keeping our defenses strong, and would continue to do so. Next year's United States military budget would be greater than this year's. The President agreed with Alican we should concentrate on the economic front. Turkey should keep its guard up too, but the President did not see much military threat. He did see other risks, however. The Communists were still strong in Italy, there might be a popular front in France after De Gaulle, the Communist Party was still strong in Greece--here were the places where Khrushchev could make trouble. Turkey had not had these problems, but they might occur if the Turkish people did not begin to see a better life.

The President then described his aid problems on Capitol Hill and the likely cuts. He said we would still regard Turkey as a major recipient, but we would not have the resources this year we had last year. We had balance of payments problems too, though we could manage these over time. In any case, our security commitment to Turkey was ``strong". We saw it as the keystone of the CENTO/SEATO system. We would continue to work with the Consortium. We should maintain our military strength but focus on the domestic economy. This was the most important battle for the next few years. We had helped Turkey a lot, especially militarily but had not helped much economically.

Alican responded that United States economic aid too had helped. Also military aid had helped Turkey avoid trouble with small neighbors like Iraq and Syria. If Turkey could improve its economic situation, its army would be maintained at its present strong level. ``Our most important program is the Five-Year Plan. If it fails, the Turkish nation's hopes will decline. We have accepted economic planning, and are going for a 7% GNP rise annually. We are trying to maintain a balance between the developed parts of the country and the under-developed eastern parts where Kurds live. The Five-Year Plan is vital to Turkey."

There followed some discussion of the problems Turkey confronted in the Consortium. The $250 million first-year target had been met, but Alican complained that the terms offered by various Europeans were unsatisfactory. Ambassador Menemencioglu interjected that Turkey would probably be unable to use some of the credits for this reason. Alican concluded that for 1963 the Consortium contribution would be satisfactory but that this was less likely for 1964. He urged our help with the Europeans, saying if ``the United States will support us, we will make it."

The President assured Alican, ``We will work with you." He said we too wished we could get the Europeans to give better terms. We had had the same trouble in the Indian and Pakistani cases; we would do the best we could. We thought Turkey was essential. Our chief problem now was to get aid through Congress so we could help. Our guarantees were strong and we were pretty sure we could avoid war, so we should give emphasis to economic problems. We would maintain our strength because Khrushchev was out to cause us what trouble he could. Alican wished the President every success in this endeavor.

396. Memorandum of Conversation

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Tur - US. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and approved by the White House on December 2.

Washington, November 26, 1963, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Turkish-U.S. Relations

PARTICIPANTS

President Johnson

Under Secretary Averell Harriman

Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot

Prime Minister Ismet Inonu of Turkey/1/

Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin of Turkey

Ambassador Menemencioglu of Turkey

/1/The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were in Washington to attend the November 25 funeral of President Kennedy who had been assassinated in Dallas on November 22.

In a conversation marked by warmth of mutual confidence and respect, the principal exchanges were, in paraphrase, as follows:

President Johnson: It is a great tribute to you as well as to the late President that you have come on this sad occasion. There is no one of the 92 representatives here I more appreciate having come than you, not only because of my great regard for your leadership, loyalty and convictions, but also because of our great affection for the Turkish people. We face many difficult problems, which seem to be constantly arising, but I am happy that we are resolving them together.

Prime Minister Inonu: This great tragedy that has befallen the American nation has caused deep grief to the entire Turkish people. The sentiment dominant in Turkey now is to share your grief and to feel that if there are any duties we can carry we should be ready at this moment.

President Johnson: I am grateful. That sentiment would be typical of the Turks and we know this to be your feeling.

Prime Minister Inonu: I am aware that the entire world is represented here this moment and how busy you are. It is with great gratitude that I am received by you and I will tell the Turkish people of your kindness.

President Johnson: I could not let you go back home without seeing you because I need the inspiration I always get from the Turks. One of the most stimulating experiences of my life was the reception given to me in Turkey. My feeling for Turkey has been of long duration. I was one of the first Congressmen, as a young man, to go into the well of the House to speak in support of the Truman Doctrine.

Prime Minister Inonu: The fact that you have such contacts with the Turks is a source of consolation and confidence to us. Your visit is still warmly remembered.

President Johnson: I was quite concerned when we started talking about the removal of the Jupiters last year for fear the Turks would worry, but I became convinced that the new arrangements would give you more modern protection and thus would be good for the people for whom I have such high respect. We realize that a great deal must still be done by your people but I want you to know that our commitments are complete and will be respected.

Prime Minister Inonu: In our foreign policy Turkey has a series of commitments but for us the basis and cornerstone of them all is our close alliance with the United States. It is true we have had internal discussions and divergences in recent years. This can happen in any country. What is important and unshakable in our national life is what I have just mentioned to you. Whatever Government there may be in Turkey, its basis will be close association with the United States.

President Johnson: I am confident the same is true of the United States. This Administration ends in January 1965. But whatever administration there may be, our friendship and alliance with you would be American foreign policy.

Prime Minister Inonu: The second point I wish to express is that so far as our internal situation goes the one most important matter is the economic situation. The question of economic betterment is a vital problem for us. I beg of you to pay attention to this concern of ours.

President Johnson: I certainly will, and you may be sure that we will do what we can, within the limits of what Congress permits. You know that we have the same problems in our country as you have in yours. Foreign aid has been going on for 17 years, taxes are high--as high as 90% for some, the people are tired, and we have our difficulties. But we also know that no one is participating in our common efforts more strongly than the Turks, and we are glad. You have come to see me in good company, with one of my dearest friends, Averell Harriman. If there is any detail of these problems that you wish to bring to our attention, mention them to Governor Harriman and we will try to do something about them. I hope you may come again to see us.

Prime Minister Inonu: Thank you. That will be a fine day.

397. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Tur. Secret; Priority. Relayed to the White House and repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, London, and Moscow. Rusk and Erkin were in Paris to attend the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting December 16 - 17.

Paris, December 15, 1963, 7 p.m.

Secto 8. Following summary of Secretary's December 15 conversation with Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin is uncleared, subject to revision and not for dissemination to foreign officials.

Erkin called on Secretary alone; Tyler participated on US side.

1. Turkish political scene. Describing political situation in Turkey, Erkin made three points: (A) He had urged Inonu to form coalition government composed of Justice and Republican parties but Inonu reluctant to form such coalition; (B) if present impasse continued, early elections might be required; (C) whatever new government formed, Turkish foreign policy would remain unchanged.

Erkin then raised following four topics with Secretary, speaking from paper which he left with Secretary and which will be pouched Department and Ankara: (A) NATO strategy; (B) NATO force planning exercise; (C) equipment requirements of Turkish army; (D) Turkish economic requirements as compared with her defense contribution. Also raised subjects Cyprus and Turkish-Soviet relations.

2. NATO strategy. Erkin said NATO military committee discussions on strategy (MC 100/1)/1/ were based upon assumption NATO's conventional forces should be raised to levels necessary to resist any Soviet conventional attack. Turkey, however, was concerned because it was unlikely that NATO could reach required force levels. Problem for Turkey was distinction between conventional and nuclear war. Turks understood that aggression against Greece or Turkey would be met with conventional forces but questioned whether conventional response would be adequate if Turkey attacked.

/1/MC - 100/1 was a draft document of the NATO Military Committee outlining the long-term threat analysis facing the Alliance.

Secretary replied no one would accept injury to any NATO partner and alliance would respond with whatever weapons were required. Noted that attack on Turkey would lead to total war and emphasized there were no special geographic distinctions in NATO. Secretary recalled that NATO countries were still covered by Athens guidelines regarding use of nuclear weapons,/2/ showed Erkin copy of Athens guidelines, and pointed out that these guidelines made no reference to limited war. Erkin commented that main thing he wanted was reassurance.

/2/Reference is to the NATO communique of May 6, 1962; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 28, 1962, pp. 862 - 863.

3. NATO force planning exercise. Erkin questioned whether this was appropriate time to undertake basic study of alliance defense effort in view of economic differences between US and Common Market, among Common Market countries and between EEC and EFTA. Secretary noted we were interested in review of NATO forces, in part, because of questions being raised in the US about equitable burden sharing within alliance. US was only country which had met its force requirements on central front. There was feeling in US that if others did not meet commitments why should US.

4. Turkish military and economic requirements. Erkin cited deficiencies in Turkish military forces, especially in Thrace, and observed that domestic economic requirements limited Turkey's ability to increase its defense expenditures. Situation could force Turkey to reconsider her contribution to NATO and, for this reason, he planned to raise at NATO Ministerial meeting methods by which NATO as whole could provide assistance to Turkey.

Secretary, after observing that recent Turkish consortium had not been satisfactory, said we will continue to do whatever we could ourselves and would press our allies to do more. He urged Turkey also to press other NATO allies. In addition, Secretary agreed support Erkin proposal that Turkish requirements be studied by permanent council.

5. Cyprus. Erkin said Makarios's proposals to amend Cyprus Constitution were highly unsatisfactory. Warned that if Makarios did not continue to respect Constitution, Turkey might find it necessary to request guarantor powers to intervene in Cyprus, either individually or collectively. Makarios's proposal seemed designed to destroy Constitution, which recognized 2 separate groups on Cyprus, and instead to establish unitary state. If Makarios continued to press point, Turkey might be forced to ask for partition of island. Erkin urged US to make strong representation in Cyprus emphasizing to Makarios that his proposal endangered peace in area.

Secretary was noncommittal. Said US took position that guarantor powers were ones which could best resolve the Cyprus problem. US already had enough problems on its agenda without taking on the Cyprus dispute. However, he agreed to discuss Cyprus with Butler and Venizelos and to talk again with Erkin before conclusion of NATO Ministerial Meeting.

6. Turkey and USSR. Erkin said he had been invited to USSR and planned to go to Moscow in March if he was still Foreign Minister. He had made it clear to Soviets that there would be no point in discussing Turkish adherence to the Western Alliance during his Moscow visit because Turks had no intention of changing any of her commitments. Erkin told Secretary, however, that his trip to Moscow might be valuable if he could play some helpful role as intermediary between West and USSR.

Secretary did not respond directly to this point. However, he volunteered to send Ambassador Hare basic status report on East-West relations just prior to Erkin's departure to Moscow, which he thought might be useful to Erkin during visit. Erkin expressed appreciation. During concluding discussion, Secretary briefly reviewed status of some of outstanding multilateral East-West problems--such as the proposed non-aggression arrangements and non-dissemination proposal--and also reviewed US-USSR bilateral negotiations.