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Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey Released by the Office of the Historian Cyprus 247. Memorandum of Conversation //Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Atherton and approved in S on March 11. In a separate memorandum of conversation, Rossides brought up the possibility of a visit by Makarios to the United States. Rusk responded that the United States would defer a reply to this request, pending a study of problems related to the visit, but expressed a desire for a visit at a future date. (Ibid.) Washington, March 3, 1961. SUBJECT 1. United States Foreign Policy PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Rossides extended congratulations to the Secretary on his appointment, and expressed gratification with regard to the foreign policy positions taken by the new Administration. He considered it essential to adhere to moral principles in international relations, and felt the United States could and should provide moral leadership for the Free World. The Ambassador then stated that he wanted to explain briefly to the Secretary the problems of Cyprus. The London - Zurich Agreements which created the Republic were in many ways divisive./1/ This was unfortunate but a fact with which Cyprus had to live. The problems which this caused were compounded by economic difficulties. Archbishop Makarios was a strong and effective leader, but he needed support. Some help would be forthcoming from the United Nations, with which Cyprus had just concluded a technical cooperation agreement./2/ In addition, however, Cyprus looked to the United States for technical and economic aid. In this connection he understood that a proposed Technical Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Cyprus was now awaiting approval in the Department./3/ /1/For text of the communique containing the Zurich agreements, see The New York Times, February 12, 1959. For text of the London agreements, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765 - 775, or Conference on Cyprus. Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House February 19. Command 680. (London, 1959) /2/For text of the U.N.-Cyprus technical cooperation agreement, signed February 24 in Nicosia, see 3 UNTS 389. The Secretary replied that this matter was well advanced and that we hoped to be able to do something very soon. The Secretary then inquired concerning the status of the Thorp Report on the Cypriot economy./4/ /4/Reference is to the report of a U.N. Economic Survey team, headed by Willard Thorp, provided to President Makarios in December 1960. Ambassador Rossides replied that publication of the Report was expected in the near future. He thought the Report generally a good one, but felt that it overestimated indigenous Cypriot investment capabilities. While there were Cypriots with investment capital, they were reluctant to take the lead. In his opinion, it would first be necessary to obtain outside help in order to encourage Cypriot investment. The Secretary commented that, in his opinion, it was psychologically important for the Cypriots themselves to set the example by investing in their country's economic future. The Ambassador agreed but said that unfortunately private individuals tended to think first of their private interests. What was needed was to find a middle way, with investment capital coming from both Cypriot and outside sources. Areas in which help was particularly needed, the Ambassador said, were port improvement and the development of water resources. Since Cyprus was basically an agricultural country, development in these fields was necessary in order to expand agricultural production and the facilities for exporting agricultural products. The Thorp Report stated that the water development program could be domestically financed, but the Ambassador doubted that this was possible. In response to the Secretary's question concerning the status of Cypriot Commonwealth membership, Ambassador Rossides explained the political and constitutional background of the parliamentary decision to apply for membership for a five year period, and opined that Cyprus would soon become a member. During a recent discussion with Prime Minister Macmillan, he had gathered that there were no obstacles to the acceptance of Cyprus as a full Commonwealth member. As the Ambassador was leaving, the Secretary expressed gratification with regard to the Cypriot delegation's role during the fall session of the General Assembly, to which the Ambassador was his country's chief delegate. The Ambassador thanked the Secretary and commented that he had been particularly pleased by the United States position when the Congo question last came before the Security Council. 248. National Security Action Memorandum No. 71 //Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 71. Secret. Washington, August 23, 1961. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State Having read the Department's status report on the Cyprus situation,/1/ I am concerned over its gloomy tone. The inadequacies of the Makarios government, as contrasted with the discipline, energy, and able leadership of the local Communist Party, are most worrisome. /1/The ``Status Report on Cyprus," August 18, outlined the state of political and economic development in Cyprus during its first year of independence. (Ibid.) Perhaps we need some preventive medicine here to forestall further deterioration of this situation. Shouldn't we at a minimum push the UK, Greece, and Turkey to take a more forthcoming approach? Moreover, in view of their limited resources, we should carefully review our own policy of relying on these guarantor powers to shoulder the principal share of the Western burden. Since Cyprus' real estate and strategic location are of considerable importance to us and to our allies, I would be grateful if the Department of State would advise me on what measures would best insure our holding on to it, including whatever use of US resources may be required. John F. Kennedy 249. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) //Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 71. Secret. Drafted by Coon and cleared by NEA, BNA, GER, and ICA. Washington, September 7, 1961. SUBJECT Proposals for United States Action in Cyprus The enclosed study has been prepared in response to the President's National Security Action Memorandum No. 71./1/ After describing certain trends and recent developments in Cyprus, the paper recommends that the United States should assume a more active role in Cyprus than in the past, a role of leadership amongst the Western nations in preserving and strengthening Western interests on the island. One of the principal reasons for recommending this policy shift is the need to retain our strategically important communications facilities. /1/The paper, entitled ``Proposals for United States Action in Cyprus," is not printed. (Ibid.) NSAM No. 71 is Document 248. Specifically the paper reports the following courses of action: 1. The Department has asked ICA, on an urgent basis, to explore the possibility of assuming a major role in assisting the economic development of Cyprus, including the possibility of financing one of the three major foreign aid projects in Cyprus' new First Five-Year Plan. 2. The Department will urge the UK, the IBRD, the IDA and perhaps West Germany to finance other major projects. 3. We plan to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Cyprus regularizing the status of our communications facilities on Cyprus, exploiting the favorable atmosphere engendered by our aid offer. 4. We intend to continue existing and planned United States programs and activities in Cyprus, particularly in the labor field. 5. We plan to continue to consult with the UK, Greece and Turkey, without, however, forfeiting our own freedom of action. L. D. Battle/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Melvin L. Manfull signed for Battle. 250. National Security Action Memorandum No. 98 //Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 98. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence. Washington, September 25, 1961. TO The Secretary of State (REFERENCE National Security Action Memorandum No. 71) The President approves the program outlined in the State Department's memorandum on ``Proposals for US Action in Cyprus" of September 7, 1961./1/ He agrees that the US should assume a more active role in Cyprus than in the past and desires that the program to this end be pushed vigorously [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to contain and reduce communist strength. He further requests that we impress upon Greece, Turkey and the UK the importance we attach to helping Cyprus and urge them to step up their efforts as well. McGeorge Bundy /1/See Document 249. 251. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80A/10 - 761. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, October 7, 1961, 1 p.m. 188. I had hour's frank and friendly conversation with Makarios this noon (October 6), first since seeing him prior to month's leave commencing end of August. During that time several important developments have taken place, including Belgrade Conference,/1/ commencement of UNGA with unhappy death of Hammarskjold,/2/ and Syrian revolt,/3/ all of which might be expected to have effect on Cypriot attitude toward international affairs. Subjects covered wide range, including these subjects and other reports here and in separate messages. /1/The Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations held September 1 - 6. /2/Hammarskjold died in a plane crash in the Congo during the night of September 17 - 18. /3/On September 28, Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic. At outset I told Makarios Washington had telegraphed US President Kennedy had decided on increased US aid to Cyprus, but we would be unable to say how much would be available (Deptel 195)/4/ until there had been an opportunity to study new aid legislation and to consult with Cypriot official. I described this as yet another indication of American interest in Cyprus and said it had been most fortunate there had been UN report and subsequent study by GOC, as reflected in Makarios statement of August 21. Third stage, it seemed to me, was IBRD study which was now beginning./5/ Because of this sequence of events, GOC had moved long way toward studying and assessing its needs which should thus soon have fruitful results. /4/Telegram 195, October 3, summarized NSAM No. 98. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80A/10 - 361) /5/Reference is to the Thorp mission. Makarios expressed great pleasure on learning of President's decision re US aid and indicated he realized it might take a little time to work out details. He asked whether US assistance would be handled through international consortium, as I had previously informed him, or on bilateral basis. I said I had no new information, but would assume it still true there was better chance of early success of GOC's obtaining required amounts of capital through international consortium in which USG would participate (septel 399)./6/ At same time, I saw no reason why American contribution to consortium might not be worked out on bilateral basis. I suggested, however, we defer discussion until more information was in hand. /6/Not found. Makarios said Kyprianou had been pressing him for approval of latter's visit to US as follow-up of his conversations with Under Secretary Bowles here re economic assistance (Embtel 107)/7/ and asked me whether I thought Foreign Minister should undertake this journey. In view of Foreign Minister's earlier conversation with me,/8/ I said if Kyprianou should go to UN, it might be useful for him to drop down to Washington for discussion of some of these matters. Makarios agreed in principle, but feared there would be Cypriot criticism on grounds of expense if another Cypriot official journeyed so far overseas and because Cypriot Ambassador was already there. I did not pursue matter further because, while there might be some advantage in building up Kyprianou through visit to UN and Washington, it would probably in long run be preferable to discuss these matters with Makarios on spot. Wilkins /7/In telegram 107, August 19, Wilkins suggested an expansion of the U.S. response to Makarios' request for economic assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, 880A.00/8 - 1961) /8/Not further identified. 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80A/12 - 1361. Confidential. Drafted by Coon, cleared by S/S and NEA, and approved by Marcy. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Bonn, Nicosia, and Paris for Tuthill. Washington, December 13, 1961, 4:30 p.m. 3222. Ref. CW 3004./1/ Under Secretary McGhee called in UK Amb Ormsby Gore Dec 12, gave him aide-memoire/2/ stating: USG concerned Cyprus trends, has decided expand its role there, hopes cooperate fully with HMG, GOG and GOT; USG working out expanded aid program emphasizing water development, hopes HMG can also increase effort, e.g. in electricity project; USG intends affirm active support London - Zurich agreements to GOG and GOT and urge them continue urge prudence and moderation on respective Cypriot communities. /1/This telegram, October 3, outlined plans for a more active U.S. role in Cyprus. (Ibid., 611.80A/10 - 361) /2/Dated December 12. (Ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 98) CW 4858 pouched Dec 13 to addressee posts/3/ transmits text aide-memoire and Dept suggestions re further representations. /3/Dated December 13. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.80A/12 - 1361) Ball 253. Memorandum of Conversation //Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2004. Confidential. Drafted by Brown and approved in S on December 24. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence. Kyprianou was attending the conference of Cyprus guarantor powers, which was being held at the same time as the NATO Ministerial Meeting. US/MC/7 Paris, December 14, 1961, 7:30 p.m. NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING Paris, December 13 - 15, 1961 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Mr. Brown Cyprus Foreign Minister Kyprianou SUBJECT Economic Assistance for Cyprus The Foreign Minister said that Cyprus needs outside assistance to carry out its five-year development program. It is self-financing about 30 million pounds for the period and needs external aid of about 32 million pounds. Cyprus hopes to be completely self-sustaining in seven to ten years, provided it can get its plan financed and operative. The Secretary said that we have re-organized our approach to aid. We have put the responsibility on our Ambassadors in the field who are equipped to aid new countries explore the sources available to them. We also want to see the new nations turning to the Western European countries, especially towards those who had been associated with them in the past. We do not want our aid to replace that formerly given by others but rather to supplement their assistance. The Foreign Minister said that they were exploring these sources. He did not expect much from the UK. Some assistance has been received from the Federal Republic. There are some pressures in Cyprus, which the Government is resisting, to accept aid from the Soviets, who have already made offers. The Government is confident the US will help, however. It hopes that assistance will be bilateral as well as through a consortium; bilateral assistance from the US will have a significant political impact. The Secretary said we would take account of these suggestions. The attitude of the Bank would be of great importance. If the Cypriot Government convinces the Bank that it has a logical plan, this would affect favorably the attitude of governments. He expressed the hope that the Cypriot people themselves would be seized with the idea of development. It's a persuasive argument for aid when the people themselves are moving. He asked the order of priorities. The Foreign Minister said that water is the immediate problem. Extensive surveys are needed. Much of the development plan money will initially go into water projects. Later the mines can be developed. Other projects include a new port and the improvement of tourist accommodations. Finally, agriculture must be modernized and perhaps transformed into the production of more exportable commodities. The Secretary said that tourism could be a most profitable resource. He suggested Cyprus try to attract international meetings. We will try to get conclusions soon on assistance. In the meantime, Cyprus should present its plans to the Bank and talk to other countries in Europe, especially DAG members./1/ /1/On December 15, the Cypriot Foreign Ministry issued an official statement regarding the Rusk - Kyprianou meeting that included the statement: ``Mr. Rusk assured Mr. Kyprianou that American aid will cover a considerable part of the five-year development plan." The text of the Cypriot press release was sent to the Department of State in airgram A - 110 from Nicosia, December 27. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.80A/12 - 2761) 254. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1 - 562. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. London, January 5, 1962, 6 p.m. 2518. British Government seriously concerned over statement January 4 by President Makarios of Cyprus that he would seek amendment certain provisions Cyprus constitution./1/ In talk with Ambassador January 5, Jamieson of Central Department said Makarios effort this direction not only illegal in terms basic agreement but could stimulate communal violence in Cyprus. /1/In the January 4 statement, Makarios stated that he would ``disregard or seek revision" of parts of the Cypriot Constitution because their abuse by the Turkish minority was endangering the Republic's existence. 1. UK instructing Embassy Athens see Greek Government and state move by Makarios could provoke crisis reopening Cyprus settlement and possibility invocation treaty of guarantee. UK desires avoid this at all costs. Embassy to ask Greeks to urge moderation on Makarios. 2. Although doubting representations to Turks would be helpful at moment, British Ambassador to urge patience on Turkish Government. UK does not desire, however, raise question treaty of guarantee with Turks at this point. 3. UK Embassy Cyprus will also be instructed urge moderation on Makarios. 4. UK Embassy Washington being instructed review various UK messages with Department and request some parallel US action./2/ Jones /2/In telegram 302 to Nicosia, January 6, the Department noted that the British request for parallel action had been relayed on January 5. The telegram requested the Embassy's analysis of the internal situation in Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1 - 562) In telegram 318 from Nicosia, January 8, the Embassy reported that ``we doubt that Makarios actually intends press for constitutional revision at this time," and that the British High Commission shared this judgment. However, both Wilkins and the High Commissioner planned to ``counsel moderation" at separate meetings with Makarios. (Ibid., 780A.00/1 - 862) 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1 - 1262. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London. Nicosia, January 12, 1962, 8 p.m. 329. Department telegram 302; Embassy telegram 318./1/ /1/See footnote 2, Document 254. I spoke with Foreign Minister this noon re current communal crisis, urging restraint and moderation and saying it seemed to me pending questions could best be resolved once Greek and Turkish Cypriots met again to discuss them. Foreign Minister expressed appreciation of our interest and went on to stress Makarios believed that as President he could not permit obstruction of functioning of state if Turkish Cypriots utilized tax veto provision to force pace of implementation of constitution to disadvantage of Greek Cypriots./2/ Makarios had responsibility for Greek Cypriot majority as well as Turkish Cypriot minority. /2/The Cypriot Constitution gave the Turkish minority a veto over taxation bills. Makarios was seeking to put into law a bill permanently setting tax rates. The Turkish Cypriots insisted that any tax bill must be on an annual or biannual renewal basis. Foreign Minister added Makarios was making efforts to discuss matters with Turkish Cypriots and had recently talked with leader of Turkish Cypriot rebel group in House re tax matters. Foreign Minister thought some Turkish Cypriots now believed they had gone too far and would be more reasonable on additional tax legislation pending in House. Foreign Minister drew distinction between more moderate Turkish Cypriots under Kutchuk and more radical ones under Denktash and Ali Riza, saying Kutchuk had always been helpful, but Denktash and company seemed convinced only hope for Turkish Cypriots lay in separating themselves from Greek Cypriots to widest extent possible. Foreign Minister thought GOT would best be able to persuade Turkish Cypriots to see reason and suggested it would be helpful if US would use its influence in Ankara to this end. I replied that although we were not guarantor power, we wanted to be helpful and were in fact urging restraint and moderation in Ankara and Athens as we were here. Foreign Minister commented that he hoped we might go step further and express opinion on substance of current dispute in support of Makarios petition. GOC was moving as fast as possible on 70/30 and division of municipalities. Present Turkish tactic of forcing pace through tax veto was harmful. Foreign Minister concluded GOT could really help by urging Turkish Cypriot rebel group to abandon opposition and cooperate with GOC. Wilkins 256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0080A/2 - 762. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Coon; cleared by AID, G, S/S, and NEA; and approved by Marcy. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Washington, February 8, 1962, 7:01 p.m. 334. Ref: Embtels 367 and 368./1/ Dept and AID seriously concerned possible implications increasingly exaggerated Cypriot press fabrications re US aid plans. From here it seems buildup popular expectations, in which GOC apparently acquiescing if not actually contributing, likely unless firmly handled henceforth to cause GOC domestic political problems, as well as embarrassing US, as necessarily gradual nature US aid approach becomes public knowledge. /1/Telegram 367, February 7, summarized an erroneous press report on U.S. aid to Cyprus. (Ibid., 811.0080A/2 - 762) Telegram 368, also February 7, warned that the Cypriot press was ``beginning to run wild" over the issue of future U.S. aid, apparently based on information provided by Cypriot Government officials in Washington and Nicosia, and suggested means of curbing these stories. (Ibid.) Proposed Makarios visit Washington (Deptel 331),/2/ which we assume you plan discuss with Makarios Feb 9, would presumably further arouse Cypriot expectations when announced unless steps taken to counter. As noted previously, firm USG policy precludes use this visit as occasion for major aid announcements. Dept's preliminary thinking is that if situation develops to point where it seems probable visit unaccompanied by major aid handout would cause popular disillusion sufficiently serious endanger US-Cypriot relations, we might be forced in interest such relations regretfully to consider deferral invitation. Appreciate your comments. /2/Telegram 331, January 2, instructed the Embassy to sound out Makarios about a June visit to the United States. (Ibid., 780A.11/1 - 262) Suggest you convey our concern to Makarios at Feb 9 meeting, noting particularly that figure of <#00A3> 20 - 25 million without any basis whatsoever, is misleading Cypriot public, and is likely embarrass both GOC and US. Not for us to advise Makarios how to handle own press but would hope for some official statement setting record straight while noting continued US intent aid Cypriot development in significant way. As you know, not one alleged ``factual" statement in Eleftheria article as summarized Embtel 368 has any basis in fact. Department reserving decision whether call in Rossides pending account your talk with Makarios./3/ Rusk /3/In telegram 377 from Nicosia, February 9, Wilkins reported that he had met with both Makarios and Kyprianou in an effort to control misinformation. Both men promised to ``try to calm the situation." (Ibid., 811.0080A/2 - 962) 257. Telegram 391 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus Washington, March 31, 1962, 10:28 a.m. [Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/3 - 3162. Secret; Priority. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 258. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.11/4 - 762. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, April 7, 1962, 9 a.m. 454. Deptel 397./1/ I discussed question of Turkish representative with FonMin and VP Kutchuk in February, but it has not come up since then either in talks with Greek and Turkish Cypriot officials or with representatives of three guarantor powers. We have thus concluded Turkish Cypriots were going along with present arrangements and that for us to raise issue during recent communal crisis would have involved US in dispute. Situation has, however, been improving during past few days and I will pass word to Makarios through Georkadjis that communal relations might be further benefited if higher ranking Turk such as Plumer could accompany him to US./2/ Wilkins /1/Telegram 397, April 5, reads: ``We are inclined believe inclusion ranking Turk in Makarios official party for Washington visit would not only be appropriate but might be useful contribution to badly needed improvement communal relations on island. If you agree, please ensure Makarios made aware our views through whatever means you consider best." (Ibid., 780A.11/4 - 562) /2/In telegram 460, April 10, Wilkins reported that Makarios declined to include a Turkish Cypriot in his delegation on the grounds that the visit was not ``official in the sense that it was not for negotiation," but would include a ranking Turkish member of the Cypriot Embassy in the official party. (Ibid., 780A.11/4 - 1062) 259. Memorandum of Conversation //Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2115. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and approved by the White House on July 2. Separate memoranda of this conversation on Cypriot communal problems and the EEC are not printed. (Ibid.) The President and Archbishop also met on June 6; see Document 260. Washington, June 5, 1962. SUBJECT Meeting Between The President and Archbishop Makarios PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Ambassador to Cyprus Mr. William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, AID Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus H.E. Spyros Kyprianou, Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Zenon Rossides, Cyprus Ambassador Mr. Alseddin Gulen, Counselor of Embassy of Cyprus Aid The President then turned to the subject of aid, saying we are eager to help Cyprus, although our balance of payments problems and our defense requirements impose heavy burdens upon us. We are now spending $3 billion for defense, one-half of which goes to NATO. We also have the problem of obtaining sufficient money from Congress to do what we would like to do. He hopes that European nations will assume an increasingly larger share of the aid program. He understood that in Cyprus the problem had been partly one of a lack of proper planning and that the Archbishop might feel we had been rather slow. He then asked Mr. Gaud to summarize the aid situation as he saw it. Mr. Gaud said that he believed the Archbishop would agree that there is a very satisfactory understanding between the Archbishop on the one hand, and our Ambassador and Mission Director on the other, as to our aid program and problems. Our program consists primarily of PL 480 and Technical Assistance--much of the latter in the planning field. Steps are underway to move from planning into projects and we are ready to examine whatever projects the Cypriots develop and see whether we can help with them. The Archbishop declared that water was the main problem. There had been a delay in deciding what to do in this field, but he hoped he would soon be ready to move. He was not looking for any radical solution. He is thinking of changing the island's legislation so as to nationalize water and control pumping. A geological survey is needed, decisions must be reached as to where dams should be built and experimental drilling is in order. He hopes that projects in this and other fields will be ready for discussions soon. The Archbishop then stated that he was optimistic about the future of Cyprus. He hopes to make the island less dependent on agriculture by developing appropriate industries. An oil refinery and a fertilizer plant are now under discussion. Tourism is growing and the necessary accommodations--such as a new Hilton Hotel in Nicosia--are in prospect. The President stated that it would be a fine thing if desalinized water could be produced at a commercial rate. The Archbishop agreed and pointed out that the British are putting up a plant in their base area. It is his understanding that at the present time, water can be produced at rates appropriate for drinking but not for irrigation. He has resisted the efforts of some experts who have tried to convince him that he should build several desalinization plants near the sea. He prefers to wait and see if the British plant succeeds. Ambassador Wilkins suggested that the Office of Saline Water might take another look at Cyprus and see what, if anything, they thought could be done along this line. The President agreed that this might be desirable. 260. Memorandum of Conversation //Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and approved by the White House on June 25. The meeting was held in the White House. Washington, June 6, 1962, 3:15 p.m. SUBJECT Meeting Between The President and Archbishop Makarios PARTICIPANTS United States The President Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, AID:AA/NESA Fraser Wilkins, Ambassador to Cyprus Cyprus Archbishop Makarios, President S. Kyprianou, Foreign Minister Zenon Rossides, Ambassador to the United States A. Gulen, Counselor of Embassy The President opened with the comment that he knew our people had been speaking with the Archbishop's government about establishing a VOA transmitter in Cyprus, and he hoped the Archbishop would be able to consider the suggestion sympathetically. Archbishop Makarios replied that personally he would like very much to approve the request. However, he must consider seriously the political implications. There were some fears that if the Government of Cyprus agreed to this proposal some other countries would no longer view it as being non-aligned. Apart from that one fear, he would like to have the installation in Cyprus ``especially as I have been told that it would be established in my own region." With a twinkle he added that this might be the main reason that would weigh in the balance when he came to a decision. The President thanked him for his willingness to weigh all the factors, adding that, as he had said in their previous session, he appreciated the Cypriot hospitality to our other communications on the island, without which we would be in difficulties with our communications farther east. The President and the Archbishop agreed to the text of a communique to be issued at the conclusion of their talks./1/ /1/For text of the communique, see Department of State Bulletin, June 25, 1961, p. 1011. The Archbishop observed that he had had good talks in the morning with Secretary Rusk and Mr. Fowler Hamilton./2/ The latter had taught him that in economic assistance matters the United States too knew how to remain ``uncommitted." Mr. Gaud reviewed the conversation between the Archbishop and Mr. Hamilton, who had discussed the various kinds of aid relationships. He thought everything was now on the tracks, including an assurance that we will do something about the water problem. The President expressed himself as pleased with the Secretary of Labor's statement at luncheon that a labor leaders' exchange program has been arranged between Cyprus and the United States./3/ A free and active labor movement contributes not only to the welfare of its members, but also helps society generally. The Foreign Minister mentioned in this connection that the Government of Cyprus regarded the establishment of a social insurance program as very important. He noted that the question of getting foreign assistance for this program had been raised with the AID officials. Ambassador Rossides added that the Government of Cyprus was also very much interested in having an American University established in Cyprus. He pointed out that in their view it would bring a useful Western influence into Cyprus and would have a beneficial effect on the local community by bringing Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into the same classes. He said that students might also be brought from neighboring countries to attend classes. In response to a question by the President, Ambassador Wilkins commented that this was a complicated matter that would need exploration before we could decide what could be done. Some had suggested that consulting the American University in Beirut might be useful. The President agreed that this might be a good thing to do. /3/Apparently a statement made to President Makarios by Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg during the luncheon at Blair House hosted by the President. Before the Archbishop left to meet with Senators and Representatives on Capitol Hill, he and the President exchanged expressions of warm satisfaction that the Archbishop had come to this country and that they had opportunity for friendly and useful talks. 261. National Security Action Memorandum No. 169 //Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 169. Secret. Washington, June 28, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, USIA The Director, CIA The Administrator, A.I.D. SUBJECT Maintaining Momentum of Makarios Visit The President desires that we take full advantage of the momentum generated by the recent visits of President Makarios and other high-level Cypriot officials. In NSAM 98/1/ last September he endorsed the State Department's Proposals for US Action in Cyprus which called for development of an aid program that would give us ``the key role" in assisting Cypriot economic development. He realizes that the inexperience of the Cypriot Government has hampered this effort and that it is difficult to find as yet development projects suitable for loan support. However, with the prospect of an improved Cypriot effort following President Makarios' return, he would like to see our program take definite shape just as soon as feasible. We should also do all we reasonably can toward aiding and encouraging the Cyprus Government to cope with its serious Communist problem. /1/Document 250. Specifically, the President is anxious that we give the Cypriots answers as quickly as possible to suggestions they raised during President Makarios' visit--particularly on assistance to their proposed social insurance program, a possible American university in Cyprus, and water development. Will you therefore report to him by 13 July what progress you feel we have made as a result of the visit and what follow-up steps we are taking to get our aid program moving? McGeorge Bundy 262. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) //Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 169. Secret. Drafted by Coon and cleared by Bergesen and Talbot, AID, and USIA. Two annexes, ``Progress Report on U.S. Economic Programs in Cyprus" and ``USIA Plans for Expanded Cyprus Programs," are not printed. Washington, July 13, 1962. SUBJECT Results of the Makarios Visit; Maintaining the Momentum it Generated REFERENCE NSAM 169 of June 28, 1962/1/ /1/Document 261. We believe the Makarios visit strengthened our prestige and influence in Cyprus and furthered specific U.S. objectives for the island. The goodwill the visit generated has, in our opinion, improved our prospects for continued undisturbed access to our communications facilities. Makarios returned to the island convinced of the need to act on our VOA proposal and asked the Cypriot Council of Ministers for a decision. The prospects for early approval seem good. During the visit we were also able to persuade Makarios of the need for more effective Cypriot planning for economic development, a basic requirement for the strong US aid program we expect to mount during coming months. In more general terms, the visit served as a public affirmation of our intention to play an active and constructive role in Cypriot affairs, a policy first enunciated in NSAM 98 of September 25, 1961./2/ This intent has now been recognized and gratefully accepted by all sectors of the Cypriot public except the communists. As a result, we believe our prestige and influence in Cyprus are at an all-time high. /2/Document 250. Vital U.S. interests--our communications facilities, the need to counter the communist threat, and preservation of peaceful relations between the Greek and Turkish communities--require us to maintain our influence at a high level. For this purpose our most immediately applicable instrument of policy is our economic aid program. We believe this program is developing into an effective means of advancing both short term and long term U.S. objectives on the island. Annex 1 summarizes recent progress toward giving tangible shape and substance to our aid program, as well as further steps we propose to take during the next several months. As to the specific projects discussed during the visit and cited in NSAM 169: AID is providing technical assistance in the field of water development and is considering a loan for heavy equipment to be used in part for the Cypriot water program. We have indicated the improbability of our being able to fund their social insurance project but are implementing our commitment to provide technical assistance for it. An AID expert has completed a preliminary investigation in Cyprus of the possibility of establishing an American-sponsored educational institution. His principal conclusions are that any such effort should initially be on a modest scale, and further study is necessary. AID is currently reviewing the proposal and consulting private foundations and educational institutions, preparatory to discussing the matter with the Cypriots in more specific terms. USIA has increased the scope of its Cyprus program recently and has assigned first priority to that program for any augmented appropriations available to the Near Eastern area operations of the Agency in FY `63. (See Annex 2) A major facet of our present policy in Cyprus is to encourage other Western countries and international lending organizations to contribute more actively toward building up a dominant Western presence on the island. The IBRD, with our encouragement, has offered substantial amounts of loan capital for the Cypriot economic development program, and the West Germans have, on their own initiative, committed themselves to a sizable aid program. During the past year we have consulted frequently with the Governments of the Guarantor Powers (the UK, Greece and Turkey) on our common problems and objectives in Cyprus. We believe this consultation has contributed to the fact that the Greek and Turkish Governments are now consulting regularly with each other and cooperating closely on Cypriot affairs, and in particular are in complete agreement on the need to support the existing constitutional framework. Given the continuing impasse between the two communities on various constitutional issues, this cooperation between Athens and Ankara is most important. We intend to explore further with the Greek, Turkish, and British Governments, as well as with appropriate Cypriot leaders, ways and means by which our joint influence can be brought to bear to create areas of agreement between the two communities and to discourage efforts of some Cypriots to upset the existing constitutional order. Two of the aid projects we are currently beginning to implement--the police training program and the labor program--are specifically designed to increase Cypriot capabilities for resisting communist subversion. On the diplomatic level, we intend to continue our efforts to persuade President Makarios and other Cypriot leaders to pursue more active anti-communist policies, following up the President's remarks on the subject during the visit. While we cannot count on any sudden and radical stiffening in Makarios' policies in this regard, we hope that our efforts will have a significant cumulative effect over coming months. Already there are signs the Cypriot Government is planning increased support for the anti-communist wing of the labor movement. The Central Intelligence Agency is submitting a separate memorandum which deals with certain other plans and actions directed against the communist threat in Cyprus. William H. Brubeck/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. George Anderson signed for Brubeck. 263. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100 - JO/9 - 362. Secret. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia. Athens, September 3, 1962, 5 p.m. 308. CODEL Johnson. Following is summary of conversation between Vice President and Makarios at Government House 6:45 PM August 30./1/ Memorandum prepared by Ambassador Wilkins and Bowling. Also present were Ambassador Rossides, Komer and Foreign Minister Kyprianou. Mrs. Johnson was present during latter part of conversation only. /1/Vice President Johnson visited Cyprus August 30 - 31 during a 5-nation tour of the Mediterranean and Near East. In course greetings and exchange of compliments, Makarios referred to his visit to Washington as greatest event of his life, and expressed gratitude to and esteem for President Kennedy. VP praised GOC for way in which it was handling its development program, recalling how it had arranged for UN group headed by Dr. Willard Thorp to come out here and formulate suggestions for a program and how this step had been followed by an International Bank survey group. VP continued that we continued to stand ready to help with technical assistance and development loans. He wished Cyprus well citing Makarios visit to US as Presidential guest and VP's return visit to Cyprus. Vice President noted both US and Cyprus were new countries and thus had many similar problems. Makarios said that Cyprus was greatly honored by Johnson's visit and that GOC, although inexperienced in receiving State guests, in fact VP was first, was making every effort to make his short stay a happy and memorable one. Makarios continued that although they had perhaps set out in the right way on their development program he personally thought they were moving too slowly and that they must pick up speed. Makarios made no requests for any specific American aid. Vice President noted danger of growing Communist threat for next election in 1965, and suggested need for Makarios to organize a non-Communist party, reminding Makarios of success Communist tactics in other countries. Makarios spoke at some length about political parties in Cyprus to the effect that only left was organized, in AKEL, the Communist Party, and PEO, the left wing labor movement. The right wing, he said, was not organized, in fact each Greek was a political leader of his own political party as was case in Greece. Makarios said he could not lead a political party, in response to VP's question, because he was of the Church and was President of Cyprus, and that he must be above politics--but added that his successor might well come from a political party. Makarios said that when John Clerides of the Orthodox Right had run for President against him in 1959 he had had Communist support and had commanded 33 per cent of the vote in the Greek Cypriot community. At same time Makarios did not think that all of this 33 per cent were true Communists but merely temporary followers of a well organized party and that, in fact, Communist strength was decreasing. What was important, Makarios said, was that the Cyprus development program move forward so that the general public would see the benefits flowing from the present regime. Vice President commented that situation seemed to be one which should be watched with great care because, as had been the case in some other countries, the democratic leaders had wakened one morning and found that the Communists had taken over. VP said we would regret such a development in countries which were our friends. Makarios closed his eyes, nodded, and said another party might be formed some day, but there was plenty of time before the next elections. Vice President mentioned VOA negotiations now in progress, bringing out economic benefits accruing to Cyprus and value of permitting world to hear unbiased news and facts. Makarios replied that matter would be considered by the Council of Ministers before he departed for Commonwealth Conference in London on September 9 and a decision reached. He said he must consider this from two aspects: economic and political. He would not now discuss economic side in detail except to say that he understands that the US cannot help Cyprus as much as Cyprus would like. On political side he said he had doubts of effect which VOA station might have on Cyprus non-aligned policy. He described Cyprus as extreme ``right wing" of neutralist states. Other neutral nations would no longer regard Cyprus as neutral, he remarked, and Cyprus feels that it can be more effective on the international scene and of help to the US with whom its true bonds lie, than if it became merely another member of the Western bloc. He asked if Vice President did not think that Cyprus should be non-aligned for this reason. Vice President replied that US wants only friendship and progress of Cyprus but failed to see how providing facilities for broadcasting the truth could damage Cypriot interests. Makarios said definition of difference between truth and propaganda was matter individual interpretation. Said he himself doubted that VOA agreement would be consistent policy non-alignment. Wilkins added that Ceylon, which was generally considered more neutral than many, had only last spring signed a new VOA agreement and also that a VOA station in Cyprus would be called an IBS or an International Broadcasting Service station consisting of medium wave for Cyprus and short wave for us which might be heard in Cyprus but could not be understood because it would be in Eastern European, Central Asian and South Asian languages and the programs would not indicate that the programs were coming from Cyprus but from Washington through an Eastern Mediterranean station. In this context, he said, a station in Cyprus will have no real effect on Cyprus non-aligned policy. Vice President, seconded by Mr. Komer, emphasized decision could not be delayed for long, because US had other opportunities obtain sites in the area, although we prefer Cyprus. Makarios said all points made by Vice President were of interest and assured Vice President he would give careful consideration to the matter during the coming week. Robert Komer at suggestion Vice President briefly stated US policy re Chinese representation urging support by Cyprus for continued seating of GRC and opposition to admission of Red China. Makarios said he pleased state that Rossides as UN Representative had instructions follow US lead on Chinese representation question. Labouisse 264. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100 - JO/9 - 362. Secret. Repeated to Nicosia. Athens, September 3, 1962, noon. 307. JODEL. Following is summary record of conversation between Vice President and leaders Turk Cypriot community August 31 at office Vice President Kutchuk. Summary prepared by Bowling and cleared by Vice President. Also present were Denktash, President Turkish Communal Chamber, Min Defense Orek, Min Health Meyera, Min Agriculture Plumar, Ambassador Wilkins and Komer. The Vice President expressed his pleasure at being in Cyprus and his appreciation over welcome given him by Cypriot people. Kutchuk presented VP memorandum on position Turkish Cypriot minority (will be forwarded by pouch)/1/ stating he felt VP was a real friend and that he would do what he could for Turk Cypriot minority if he understood facts. He turned to other Turk leaders to present Turk Cypriot views orally. /1/Transmitted to the Embassy in Rome for the Johnson delegation as unnumbered telegram from Nicosia, September 13. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2149) Min Defense went over recent historical background Cyprus, pointing out Turk Cypriots had given up their goal of partition and wanted make concept bi-communal Cypriot nation work, while Greek Cypriots had apparently not given up their goal of union with Greece. He said Turk and Greek communities had made agreement to work together, and rules of their cooperation in Cypriot nation, agreed to by both, were embodied in provisions Constitution. Turk Cypriots wanted apply those rules, he claimed, but Greeks unfortunately refused implement vital elements Constitution to which they had agreed; this puts the Turkish community in very serious position. Min Defense said Constitution obviously gave Vice President important role in determining foreign policy, but Makarios proceeded make public declarations basic foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment without consulting Vice President. He complained of interminable delays in formation Cypriot Army. Min Defense ended by saying Turk Cypriots wanted US to understand their position and assist them. Denktash said Turk Cypriots agreed 100 percent with VP's remarks and speeches on importance of independence and integrity of Cyprus. He stated solution communal problem necessary prevent further spread Communism in Cyprus. He added that to his surprise and horror, he had just discovered that even Turk Cypriot community had been penetrated by Communists. A vital Turk Cypriot community is an essential obstacle to the spread of Communism in Cyprus, he said. The Greek majority, he claimed, keeps pushing constantly on rights of Turk Cypriots, who feel selves being gradually maneuvered into a corner. Denktash warned that if Turk Cypriots should find themselves hopelessly cornered and deprived their rights, they might react in blind desperation with unpredictable consequences. As years go by, said Denktash, the two communities will under good conditions slowly draw together in one Cypriot community. Until that time, he warned, basis of government in Cyprus must be bi-communal, not centralized in a Greek-dominated central regime. He complained of failure central government implement separate municipalities, 70 - 30 ratio in civil service, and alleged reduction central revenues to Turkish education, alleging Greek Cypriots wanted communal chambers to be forced levy heavier taxes in order reduce their standing and support. Denktash said Greek Cypriots refused entertain plan for national university. Wilkins said GOC had not yet made a decision on this subject. Denktash also asked for US aid to be channeled through communal chambers rather than through central government. He claimed only such aid now was school food programs. Vice President asked Ambassador Wilkins about this and Wilkins said it was true because education alone was officially in hands communal chambers instead of central regime. VP said US cannot act like Russians and attempt impose our solutions on problems independent nation no matter how much we might sympathize or not sympathize with one side of a problem. VP promised read Turk Cypriot memorandum and have responsible US officials study it carefully. VP promised that the US would continue to see that all US aid to Cyprus was utilized fairly and without communal discrimination. VP ended by saying ``your kind of people are our friends". Denktash returned this sentiment on behalf Turk Cypriot community and affirmed VP visit had given Turk Cypriots new heart and determination to make the Republic work and progress. Labouisse 265. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/10 - 862. Secret; Niact. Nicosia, October 8, 1962, 5 p.m. 222. Minister of Interior Georkadjis mentioned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in conversation today that discussions were now taking place which would lead to new Cypriot right-wing political party, but that matter would probably not jell until Makarios approved. We have had similar information from other sources. Georkadjis expressed hope that we would continue to support this concept in conversations with Makarios as President Kennedy did in June and Vice President Johnson did in August. We shall so do here. In view of these developments, we also recommend that proposed letter by Vice President Johnson to Makarios/1/ contain, as recommended earlier today (Embtel 216),/2/ support for formation of right-wing political party./3/ Wilkins /1/The Department of State transmitted the draft text of the letter in telegram 195 to Nicosia, October 5. In the letter Johnson noted the U.S. commitment to aid Cyprus and the Cypriot Government's agreement in principle to establish a USIA relay station, but advised Makarios that Congress would be unwilling to pay the sum requested by his government since the price was well out of line with the prices paid for other stations. (Ibid., 811.0080A/10 - 562) /3/In telegram 198, October 9, the Department of State instructed the Embassy: ``You authorized support discreetly in talks with Makarios concept of anti-communist Greek-Cypriot political party. VP's letter, however, will not refer to this issue, since if leaked it could give opposition and others grounds for pressing charge U.S. interfering in internal Cypriot affairs." (Ibid.) 266. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0080A/10 - 1362. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Washington, October 13, 1962, 9 a.m. 234. Embtel 228;/1/ Deptel 798 [198]./2/ Makarios told me this morning that in addition to press reports on Mr. Bowles' memorandum on American assistance,/3/ there was another subject which disturbed him. He referred to New York Times article of early September/4/ which reported on Vice President Johnson's visit to Middle East and his conversations with Makarios. Makarios read excerpts touching on Makarios' attitude re Communism and formation of right-wing political party and said that this account hardly did justice to his views and to what he was trying to do here. /1/Telegram 228, October 11, reported on official and press reaction to the publication of a memorandum on economic assistance by special envoy Chester Bowles. (Ibid., 811.0080A/10 - 1162) /2/See footnote 3, Document 265. /3/In this memorandum, Bowles proposed ending aid to states lacking the ``compassion, organization and will" to effectively utilize U.S. aid. A summary of the memorandum, with extensive quotations, was published in The New York Times, October 8, 1962. In telegram 233 from Nicosia, October 13, Wilkins reported that Makarios had complained that Bowles' comments on the Cypriot economy failed to take into consideration Cyprus' less than 2 years of existence and the progress it had made in that period. Wilkins had responded that Bowles' views were personal, not an expression of U.S. policy. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.80A/10 - 1362) /4/The article appeared in The New York Times, September 9, 1962. Makarios continued that he had been trying to counter international Communist activities in Cyprus and was preparing way for 1965 elections in Cyprus. Gist of Makarios' argument was that many Cypriot Communists were merely paying lip service to party and left-wing labor union for present benefits and that since they were supporting current GOC policies, it was preferable to retain their cooperation than to risk factions and possibly armed clashes within Greek Cypriot community. Makarios was convinced that Cypriot Communists did not now pose any serious threat here and that if danger should subsequently develop he would utilize any means to resolve matter. Makarios said: ``There is no doubt about my anti-Communist views. At same time I must make use of them now and concentrate on making new Cypriot Government work and getting economic development program under way. I cannot risk dissension within Greek Cypriot community, but I will crush Communists if they try to take over our democratic republic." He said, for example, that former EOKA fighters continue hell-bent to attack Cypriot Communists with force, but that he had with difficulty restrained them in interests of peace in Cyprus. Makarios commented re right-wing political party that we in US had well-established democratic system with educated electorate and only two political parties; Cyprus did not have well-established democratic system and many of its people were unsophisticated politically. It was true Communists were organized; at same time it was too early similarly to organize right wing because, as in Greece, every Cypriot wanted to be political leader. Makarios feared that instead of one right-wing political party there might be two or more. ``What if one of them were called `party for union with Greece'? Could I disavow such a party or such a policy?" Makarios added that it would be difficult for him as President and as Archbishop to engage directly in political affairs. For time being it was preferable to handle matter indirectly until Cypriot politicians themselves were conscious of need for single organization in opposition to left-wing grouping. Makarios thought that this development would not take place until eve of 1965 elections. I recalled that, during conversation with Makarios last June, President Kennedy had referred to Mao's reliance upon organization for successful political control and that Vice President Johnson had said that preparation for political elections could not be delayed until last moment. I said that I would make known to Washington his analysis of local situation and his judgment as to how it could best be handled. Meanwhile we could continue to watch situation and work together. Wilkins 267. Editorial Note On December 30, President Makarios released a press statement asserting that constitutional provisions regarding separate municipalities were unworkable and that the Government of Cyprus would assume all the legislative and administrative functions previously performed by the separate municipalities. The Embassy commented: ``Unpublicized but secretly welcome by-product of expiration of law re municipalities is removal Communist mayors from Larnaca, Limassol and Famagusta. Commie Deputies, who urged extension of separate municipalities, now expected to join Greek-Cypriot Deputies in vote against extension in order avoid public alignment with Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Communal Chamber passed a law December 29 to assure extension Turkish municipal councils, in case municipalities law is allowed to expire. Greek-Cyps charge this law unconstitutional--fact which they expect to undermine Turkish-Cyps ability exercise authority and collect taxes in their communities. While Greek-Cyps say only economic pressures will be exerted on Turkish-Cyp community and violence is not likely, situation can be expected grow tenser and more volatile." (Telegram 300 from Nicosia, December 31; Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/12 - 3162) 268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1 - 763. Confidential. Drafted by Bowling; cleared by Bracken, RPM, and BNA; and approved by Grant. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, and London and repeated to Istanbul. Washington, January 9, 1963, 8:19 p.m. 276. Ankara tel 738./1/ Department is concerned lest current dispute between Cypriot communities develop into serious conflict between hardened and irreconcilable positions. Such conflict could afford opportunities for expansion communist power in Cyprus, endanger Greek and Turkish Governments and seriously weaken NATO. /1/Telegram 738 from Ankara, January 7, reported that Turkish Foreign Office representatives had expressed concern about the hardening of positions by Greek and Turkish Cypriots and warned that Turkey would support the Turkish Cypriot position. (Ibid.) We continue to believe that prospect of politically viable Cyprus lies not in inflexible constitutional provisions nor in solutions imposed from abroad but in pragmatic adjustments of relations between two communities and gradual development of Cypriot rather than communal interests and values. We believe at present that any effort by either party to draw us into dispute should be politely but firmly rejected. We feel that belief on part either community that it has solid foreign backing will discourage compromise and encourage extremism. It appears that efforts at solution should concentrate on informal negotiation between communities and ad hoc, though perhaps awkward, accommodations. To the extent either party uses formal legal procedures, positions will probably harden. Thus Greek Cypriot action in legally dissolving municipalities and Turk Cypriot reliance on letter of London - Zurich agreements cannot be constructive in long range. For Nicosia: Avoid indications undue U.S. concern. Counsel moderation and mutual adjustment to leaders both communities. Continue report developments, emphasizing temper of rank and file two communities. For Ankara: Indicate to GOT our sympathy for difficult position in which GOT has been placed, and our hope that GOT will exercise its influence on Kutchuk to end that he will continue seek ad hoc compromise with Makarios. Report any indication GOT considering formally invoking right as Guarantor Power to intervene directly, through calling Guarantor Power conference or otherwise. For Athens: At convenient opportunities, continue counsel GOG to urge Makarios to seek solution with Kutchuk. Emphasize our feeling that a viable future for Cyprus depends to great extent on common sense and moderation these two leaders, and that any successor to Kutchuk would probably be less receptive to moderate pragmatic adjustments. For London: You may inform British that while we feel formal consultations between guarantor powers would be counterproductive at this time, Britain, as a guarantor power, has unique opportunity consult at length very informally with Turkish and Greek Governments. Such consultation, we hope, would be based on general considerations outlined above and would assist in obviating adoption of hard uncompromising position in either Athens or Ankara. Rusk 269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1 - 1463. Confidential. Drafted by Coon, cleared by NEA, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Ankara, and Istanbul. Washington, January 15, 1963, 7:08 p.m. 624. References: (A) Embtel 691 rptd Nicosia 41, London 21, Ankara 47./1/ (B) Ankara's 769, rptd Nicosia 46, London 95, Athens 79./2/ /1/Telegram 691 from Athens, January 14, reported that Foreign Minister Averoff had expressed concern that the Cyprus situation was becoming dangerous and stressed the Greek Government's desire for a moderate solution and its efforts to restrain Makarios. Averoff urged the United States to restrain Turkey. (Ibid.) /2/Telegram 769 from Ankara, January 14, reported on increased Turkish concerns regarding Cyprus and warnings from Foreign Office officials that Prime Minister Inonu would completely back the Turkish Cypriot leadership. (Ibid., 780A.00/1 - 1363) We welcome Averoff's frankness in communicating his views on Cyprus situation and are encouraged by his continued emphasis on need for both communities exercise moderation and realism in efforts work out compromise solution current problem over municipalities. We believe position you took with Averoff in para 7 reftel was proper one,/3/ and do not at this time wish suggest further points you might make with him. /3/The relevant part of paragraph 7 reads: ``I told Averoff we do not wish to become involved in situation, as we considered this a matter for parties to work out." Labouisse added that the United States would urge all parties to ``take a moderate approach." FYI: We recognize situation may soon develop to point where effective prosecution US interests in area will require us come out in support of specific approaches toward resolution of dispute, instead of restricting our role to counseling moderation. However, we still hope latter stance may, by discouraging Cypriots from expecting outsiders to bail them out, contribute critical margin necessary to get Cypriots solve problem themselves. Much depends on GOT position, as well as events and current talks in Cyprus; we are awaiting further information from Ankara and Nicosia. Averoff's proposal for one year extension old municipalities arrangement strikes us as having merit, but we prefer refrain from endorsing it, or other possible approaches, either with Averoff or with other interested parties, pending basic decision as to whether our present stance continues be viable. End FYI. Rusk 270. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1 - 1663. Confidential. Nicosia, January 16, 1963, 4 p.m. 323. Vice President Kutchuk asked me to call this morning, saying he wanted to tell me about recent discussions re question of municipalities. Kutchuk had with him his Under Secretary Muftizade, who reviewed talks which had resumed following Makarios' return from Turkey last November. Muftizade also gave me copies of relevant documents. Kutchuk said he had made courtesy call on Makarios yesterday. They had discussed his recent visit to Ankara, but neither had mentioned question of municipalities, contrary to local press reports this morning which speculated that talks had been resumed and new proposals put forward. Kutchuk and Muftizade said that Turkish Cypriots during recent conversations had sincerely tried to find solution, within Constitution, by agreeing to joint boards and at same time maintaining separate municipal councils. This was essence of agreement immediately before Christmas, but Makarios had subsequently insisted there could be no separate municipal councils, and had endeavored to place blame for breakdown of talks on Kutchuk by saying he had withdrawn his consent. Fact was Kutchuk had never given consent to abolishment of separate councils. Turkish Cypriot public opinion would not accept this change at this stage. Kutchuk and Muftizade said that Makarios' insistence on abolishing separate municipal councils and thus unilaterally changing Constitution illustrated his policy since independence. Makarios had from beginning believed that Turkish Cypriots had gained excessive privileges under Constitution and did not intend to let them have them. Makarios had also not permitted full implementation of provisions relating to civil service, taxation and Cypriot Army. Greek Cypriot officials had not withdrawn, as promised, civil service cases pending before Constitutional Court, nor had Public Service Commission functioned fairly. Turkish Cypriot rights relating to foreign affairs and executive power were being set aside. Turkish Cypriots were convinced that if they compromised with Makarios on municipalities, it would represent first legal breach in dike of Constitution which would thereafter be undermined and swept away. Kutchuk and Muftizade said they were anxious to discuss all of these matters with Greek Cypriots, but had found Makarios and other Greek Cypriot officials basically unwilling fully to carry out provisions of Constitution. They planned, however, to await return to Cyprus of Glafkos Clerides, as they had more confidence in him and as they believed he might be able to develop new proposals within scope of Constitution. They thought it might be advisable first to discuss other unsettled issues and leave municipalities until last and thus arrange some sort of package deal. Kutchuk and Muftizade said they had yesterday discussed these matters with British High Commissioner, who had told them Makarios was still opposed to separate municipalities, but would not for time being interfere with administration of Turkish Cypriot municipal councils. British High Commissioner had favored, they said, their plans for awaiting Clerides' return and discussion of other matters prior to making further proposals re municipalities, and had said he would explain Turkish Cypriot attitude to Greek Cypriot Ministers. Kutchuk said they hoped that we also would support Turkish Cypriot views. I said that we had all along counseled moderation and restraint on both sides in reconciling differences of opinion and that it would seem still to be possible to find some compromise for municipalities within framework of Constitution. It also seemed to me that as several years had elapsed since drafting of Constitution, their subsequent experience might make possible practical changes without undermining the whole. We in US, for example, had found it necessary to make ten amendments to our Constitution not long after its adoption. I was not suggesting that they give up important rights, but that there might be adjustments which would be acceptable for good of all. I was glad to hear they stood ready to resume talks with Greek Cypriots, and expressed belief that, with Clerides' assistance, they would be able to find some accommodation. Wilkins 271. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara. Nicosia, February 7, 1963, 11 a.m. 359. Vice President's Special Assistant Muftizade told me last night that Kutchuk and other Turkish Cypriot leaders were surprised and dismayed by press reports yesterday (Embtel 358)/1/ that GOC might withhold pounds 400,000 annual grant to Turkish Cypriot communal chamber unless municipalities issue was resolved. Muftizade attributed this warning directly to Makarios as other details in press report about meeting with Kutchuk could only have come from him. Kutchuk would not now meet with him again as threat of this kind would make it politically impossible to justify to Turkish Cypriots further discussion with Makarios. Muftizade was at loss to understand why Makarios was creating this new roadblock and could only surmise Makarios was not prepared to compromise. /1/Dated February 7. (Ibid.) I asked Muftizade if they had completed their study of Clerides' revised proposals (Embtel 355)/2/ and hoped Denktash would still be meeting with Clerides to discuss them, even if Kutchuk did not wish to. Muftizade at first said this also would not now be possible for some time, but after discussion agreed Clerides' revised proposals had many advantages and although Makarios' last tactic made further discussion difficult, it would be wise to move ahead with additional talks. /2/Telegram 355, February 5, reported that a Makarios - Kutchuk meeting on municipalities failed to achieve any progress and that Clerides had provided the Turkish Cypriots a paper detailing Makarios' proposals. (Ibid.) A copy of these proposals was sent to the Department of State in airgram A - 1821 from London, February 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL - Cyp) Wilkins 272. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London. 372. Deptel 311, Ankara's 930, Embtel 366./1/ I believe US intervention Cyprus municipalities issue at this time would offer no new prospects for agreement, as we lack leverage and it might provide excuse for further delay in resolution of problem. Reasonable basis for agreement, after necessary modifications, appears presently available in Makarios' proposals of last March as subsequently modified, which offer prospect of guarantees which should accord Turkish community substance, if not form, of what they desire. I doubt Makarios will now accept lengthy continuance separate Turkish municipal councils, even with addition of joint municipal boards. /1/In telegram 311 to Nicosia, February 12, the Department of State requested comments on telegram 930 from Ankara. (Ibid.) Telegram 930, February 9, reported Foreign Minister Erkin's proposals for a Cyprus solution together with his appeal for U.S. intervention. (Ibid.) Telegram 366 from Nicosia, February 12, reported that Greek Government representatives in Cyprus were urging U.S. intervention to broker a solution. (Ibid.) Key will be whether GOT allows Turkish Cypriots sufficient negotiating flexibility. This connection, I believe it important that all three guarantor powers, especially Athens and Ankara, who know best how to influence their communities here, should through continuing close consultation coordinate their efforts in Cyprus to encourage agreement on reasonable compromise solution. Turkish Ambassador Ozkol reportedly discussed substance of municipalities issue on several occasions recently, especially in three-hour session with FonMin Kyprianou February 11. There is also prospect of informal talks between House President Clerides and Turkish Communal Chamber President Denktash during Vice President Kutchuk's visit to Germany. I consider our most effective action is to continue to counsel moderation, restraint and accommodation within spirit, if not letter, of Constitution in interest of all concerned lest situation deteriorate with risk of violence. Wilkins 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, Istanbul, Paris, and Rome. Ankara, February 14, 1963, 7 p.m. 953. Paris pass SHAPE POLAD for information. Rome pass CINCSOUTH POLAD for information. Embtel 930./1/ /1/See footnote 1, Document 272. GOT's growing concern with consequences Cyprus municipalities dispute reported reference telegram and its position on dispute and ramifications thereof have been reported Embtel 851/2/ and previous. Purpose this message is clarify political basis for GOT position. /2/Telegram 851, January 29, reported the views of the Turkish Government on the Cypriot municipalities question. (Department of State, Central Files, 780A.00/1 - 2963) GOT has reacted strongly to possible termination Turkish municipalities primarily because it considers such move threat to principle of inviolability Cyprus constitution and London - Zurich Agreements. Turks' view, reiterated to us on many occasions, and stated categorically by Foreign Minister Erkin during recent GNA debates on foreign policy, is that if infringement or deviation from constitution is once allowed it will open door to proposals and pressures for further changes, thus undermining whole carefully balanced Cyprus structure. Fundamental underlying concern is that breakdown GOC structure would lead to Enosis with Greece. Consequences, they believe, could be disastrous not only for Cyprus but for Turk-Greek relations and NATO solidarity. Also relevant to understanding GOT attitude is importance which Foreign Office officials have always attached to developing climate confidence between Greek and Turk Cypriot communities. Now appears that as result Makarios handling municipalities question GOT has lost much of faith it may have had in his assurances good intentions toward Turk community. Would be mistake interpret GOT position of moderation and patience as sign of weakness. Since May 1960 revolution GOT has based its Cyprus policies on full support and respect for London - Zurich Agreements and has refrained from attempting exploit problems Turkish Cypriots for domestic political purposes. On contrary when feelings have begun rise here, e.g. following bombings of Bayraktar Mosque, GOT has taken hand in keeping them within bounds. However, this does not mean that GOT views Cyprus with decreasing importance but simply that GOT has tried to follow what it believes to be correct, consistent policy on Cyprus. Moreover, difficulties and vulnerability present coalition government vis-a-vis its various domestic opponents impel it resist any attempt undermine rights and guarantees afforded Turkish Cypriot community by agreements and constitution. GOT sincerely wishes avoid serious trouble between Cypriot communities, yet government has probably concluded that to acquiesce in concessions on constitutional principle involved in municipalities question might well cause it insuperable difficulties with GNA, press and public opinion. Recent consideration Turk foreign policy and Foreign Office budget in GNA has clearly demonstrated GNA solidarity on Cyprus policy, and criticisms confined generally to demands for tougher line implementing that policy. Thus, given Prime Minister Inonu's determination make present coalition work because alternatives seem fraught with uncertainty, we assume he will exert strong effort prevent Cyprus becoming potentially serious issue for his government. What may therefore appear as rigid GOT attitude on municipalities question is product of conviction necessity maintaining Cyprus constitution coupled with sense self-preservation on part coalition government. Hare 274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by King, cleared by GTI and BNA, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Washington, February 16, 1963, 10:34 a.m. 4387. Cyprus municipalities dispute has reached a point where we feel we must supplement our present policy of counseling moderation with more positive action. We fully agree that any direct US approach to the factions in Cyprus would be counterproductive and would saddle us with problem for indefinite future. On other hand, UK is in peculiarly strategic position as Guarantor Power with abiding interest in island and with significant influence on parties concerned. In past few days British have demonstrated willingness to involve themselves more deeply in question by approaches to Turks in London and Ankara and to factions in Cyprus. However, indications are that their approach is too piecemeal and is not having desired effect. We note that GOT and GOG positions are remarkably close although neither seems fully aware of this (Erkin position reported in Ankara's 930 to Dept;/1/ similar position described by Pilavaki, in Athens' 808 to Dept,/2/ as possibly providing basis for negotiation). Formal tripartite consultations might promote a common position but are undesirable because they would formalize positions in propaganda arena, leave less room for maneuvering, reduce possible areas of compromise, etc. /1/See footnote 1, Document 272. We believe US - UK estimate of situation now basically in accord. We feel time has come for British consistently push informal approach in all three capitals. We want British to emphasize to Greeks and Turks similarities their present positions and guide them to common stance and coordinated 3-power pressure on Cypriot communities. We are calling in a senior British Embassy officer, probably on Tuesday, to urge this course of action./3/ Embassy London should, if it agrees, make a similar approach to CRO. If British demur, we will offer to join them in their approach to Greeks and Turks or, if necessary, tell them we will make the approach ourselves and ask for their support. /3/The demarche was made on February 20, when Assistant Secretary Talbot met with British Counselor Killick. In the course of their discussion, Killick stated that his government was concerned by apparent Turkish intransigence and by its control over the Turkish Cypriot negotiators. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., POL Cyp. At same time, we are asking Ambassador Labouisse to utilize his return to Athens to point out to GOG closeness its position with that of GOT. Request comments from both action and info posts./4/ /4/Telegram 3190 from London, February 18, endorsed the suggestion of prompting the British Government to take more decisive action, but also noted that the United Kingdom already was active in both Athens and Nicosia. (Ibid., POL 18 Cyp) Telegram 376 from Nicosia, February 18, endorsed the proposed action but stressed the need for leaving the United Kingdom with the greatest possible latitude. (Ibid.) Rusk 275. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and London. Ankara, February 20, 1963, 4 p.m. 983. Deptel 728./1/ Embassy's assessment of municipalities issue as seen by GOT set forth in Embtel 953./2/ We continue believe approaches to GOT to be effective must be within framework of what GOT conceives to be its basic interest in matter. /1/Printed as telegram 4387 to London, Document 274. While GOT has conditionally accepted idea of integrated municipalities as eventual development (Embtel 930)/3/ it does not want be rushed in getting there, and FonMin Erkin has shown strong unwillingness preside over liquidation Turk municipalities near future. On other hand, believe GOT can live with present situation, even though it lacks legal foundation valued by GOT. Therefore, if way can be found persuade Makarios go slow on what Turks consider harassing tactics, breathing spell should ensue during which it may be possible bridge difference in Turk and Greek positions on length of period separate municipalities should continue operate before turning over all authority and functions to committees of coordination. /3/See footnote 1, Document 272. Since USG now involved in sensitive Jupiter - Polaris negotiations with GOT we do not believe this is the time for us to push Turks on Cyprus problems. On other hand Embassy sees value in encouraging UK attempt close gap GOT and GOG positions on Cyprus municipalities as prelude to coordinated three-power pressure on parties to dispute. Judging from our conversations with UK charge here, he seems have better understanding of GOT policy and basic underlying factors, and approach through British might have something of catalytic effect at this time. Hare 276. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. London, February 23, 1963, 2 p.m. 3261. Deptel 4477./1/ We met yesterday with Crowley of CRO and Jamieson of FonOff to discuss Cyprus situation. They had report Talbot - Killick conversation including suggestion promoting informal bilateral talks between GOG and GOT designed to achieve coordinated approach to respective Cypriot communities. In course two-hour review Cyprus situation, following points emerged: /1/Telegram 4477, February 21, reported the substance of the February 20 Talbot - Killick discussion. (Ibid.) See footnote 3, Document 274. 1. HMG is gratified at Department's initiative and will welcome any assistance which USG feels able to give to resolve municipalities dispute. 2. HMG has serious doubts, however, that any GOG - GOT talks are likely to be constructive step to advance settlement municipalities dispute. In HMG's view, crux of problem lies in GOT and Makarios' attitudes. 3. Re proposed GOG - GOT talks, Jamieson expressed doubt they likely soften GOT's rigid position. He recalled that when municipalities dispute first developed, Erkin wrote to Averoff suggesting they meet in Istanbul or Alexandropolis to discuss problem in context ``gentleman's agreement" reached during Zurich Accord as preliminary to tripartite meeting. Averoff told UK Ambassador Athens he knew of no such ``gentleman's agreement" and never replied to Erkin's proposal. Nevertheless, in British view, GOG has consistently hewed to constructive line and has endeavored, thus far successfully, to keep current municipalities dispute out of Greek politics. British are fearful that GOG - GOT talks will quickly degenerate because of existing tensions between two countries most recently prompted by (a) abrupt GOT action in proclaiming twelve-mile limit, (b) unresolved Maritza case, and (c) GOT attitude toward Patriarchate. Sour taste left by these issues likely carry over to Cyprus talks and, in HMG view, could force GOG introduce municipalities issue into Greek politics, which British believe would be retrogressive step. Moreover, GOG's influence on Makarios very limited. 4. Latest GOT position known to HMG is that reported Embtel 3257./2/ Jamieson recalled GOT suggestion possible need of guarantor powers hold informal tripartite talks (Embtel 2987)./3/ HMG sees ``grave objections" to this since whatever disguise may be given them, they are still likely be viewed as talks under treaty of guaranty. /2/Telegram 3257, February 22, reported that the Turkish Government was taking a hard line on the Cyprus issue. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp) /3/Dated February 6. (Ibid.) Instead, HMG believes effort should be made to persuade GOT remain quiet for time being to enable Greek and Turk Cypriot communities to arrive at solution. Jamieson pointed out that if solution acceptable to Turk Cypriot community can be developed, especially if it contains reasonable safeguard such as willingness scrap joint councils after one year if they prove unsuccessful, this should go long way make it palatable to GOT, Turkish Parliament and public. In this connection, any help which Department believes US Ambassador in Ankara can give to restrain GOT from curbing Turkish Cypriot community's efforts to work out fair settlement with Greek Cypriots will, in HMG's view, be most helpful. We recalled USG currently engaged in delicate negotiations with GOT which might make direct US pressure in Ankara re Cyprus problems somewhat difficult (Ankara's 983),/4/ but agreed put British suggestion to Department. /4/Document 275. 5. Re Makarios, HMG remains deeply concerned at his flippant and provocative attitude. When UK/HICOM in Nicosia saw Makarios last week to tax him on his attitude, Makarios apparently quite unrepentant but did agree take no further steps to implement unified municipalities scheme pending further talks with Kutchuk. Crowley suggested that any help US Ambassador in Nicosia might give in stressing to Makarios need for a ``statesmanlike" approach to delicate communal relations problem will be greatly appreciated. If Department willing have US Ambassador Nicosia approach Makarios along these lines, Crowley suggested consultations between Ambassador Wilkins and UK/HICOM Clark to determine how they may best work in concert. 6. HMG suggests that any ``coordination" of UK - US initiatives re Cyprus municipalities dispute be done in London. Jones 277. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and London. Ankara, April 1, 1963, 1 p.m. 1170. In general review of pending problems Saturday, FonMin Erkin said was particularly troubled by recent statements of Makarios (Nicosia 441)/1/ which seemed to make it clear that, if decision of Constitutional Court was not favorable to Greek point of view, Makarios would disregard it. /1/Dated March 28. (Ibid.) Erkin said he was at loss understand how such things could be said in light of existing formal agreements. With reference to municipalities Turks had made specific proposal which would have end result of accomplishing what Makarios seeking. Turks know this and made proposal deliberately with that knowledge in mind but what they must insist on is that procedure be such that existing and solemn agreements not be violated. To do otherwise would be enact ``first act of long tragedy". That Turk apprehension in this regard well founded, said Erkin, was substantiated by Makarios' own reference in another part of his press statement to fact Greeks in Cyprus cannot have other than Greek conscience, which seemed be just another way of saying that Enosis remains objective. Was Makarios deliberately trying drive problem to point of desperation which could lead to use of force? It seemed fantastic. But what are Turks to think? Then, speaking very seriously but unemotionally, Erkin said he was at complete loss know what to do in this situation and felt only recourse was to turn to us for advice and assistance. All he was asking was that agreements be respected. He couldn't believe that was asking too much since it is merely recognition of basic principle of international relationships. I replied would report to my government with view eliciting any thoughts which might be helpful. But in meantime I would observe that we had, of course, been following matter attentively with view encouraging parties reach agreed solution and we had felt at one time recently that some progress being made toward narrowing issue re municipalities. In circumstances I was distressed hear GOT felt recent Makarios statements had made situation even more difficult than before. However, I had word of counsel, which was that, if GOT felt Makarios statements excessive, thing to avoid would be to reply in kind. To do so would merely escalate problem to greater degree of difficulty and would also not reflect favorably on position of reasonableness which GOT asserts be its purpose. There is sometimes temptation in such circumstances to resort to tit-for-tat tactics but to do so usually self-defeating. Erkin expressed agreement, saying he was conscious of desirability of maintaining dignified posture but added this difficult, noting bitter anti-Turk campaign now being carried on in Greek press as contrasted calm being preserved here. In this connection, he said there had been plan for visit of Greek journalists to Turkey last fall which had been postponed till March 28 only to have it cancelled at last minute on ground Greeks did not feel it appropriate come to Turkey at time when their press so aroused. ``What", asked Erkin, ``can we do in such a situation?" I then asked Erkin if there had been any developments toward discussion of these problems with the GOG. Erkin said that there had not and that his proposal to meet Averoff was still without reply. As contrasted pondered nature rest of conversation, this was said with distinct bitterness. I then noted that proper communication would seem be part of problem since, for instance, we had report from our Embassy Athens that Averoff had publicly expressed appreciation for release Greek fishermen in replying press criticism (Athens 948)./2/ Erkin said this interesting news to him and he only wished might have been possible for GOG say as much to GOT. /2/Dated March 22. (Ibid., POL 33 - 4 Gr - Tur) Comment: Although this is a many faceted problem which defies simplified solution, it would appear that there is one factor in it which can be segregated as being constantly and needlessly noxious. This is tendency of Makarios personally to take positions and make statements which not only exacerbate situation here by confirming worst suspicions of Turks but also seem to be in clear conflict with policy of moderation which GOG reportedly endeavoring exert. If this correct, would seem that this particular problem is of type which might be approached as thing in itself. Problem is who is going to bell the cat. Hare 278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by King; cleared by GTI, UNP, NEA, L, and BNA; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Athens, London, and USUN. Washington, April 4, 1963, 7:49 p.m. 371. Ref: Ankara's 1170 and 1184 to Dept; Nicosia's 438, 441, 443, 444, 446, 447 and Toaid 313 to Dept./1/ /1/Telegram 1170 is printed as Document 277. Telegram 1184 from Ankara, April 2, reported on Turkish reaction to Makarios' March 31 speech commemorating the 1954 uprising against British colonial rule and suggesting his commitment to eventual enosis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp) In telegram 438 from Nicosia, March 28, the Embassy reported that Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin's talks in Rome apparently were a critical factor in Makarios' decision to take a tougher stance on both the municipalities issue and possible Turkish intervention. (Ibid.) Telegrams 441 and 443 are not printed. (Both ibid.) In telegram 444, March 29, Wilkins reported on his discussions with Turkish Cypriot leaders. (Ibid.) Telegram 446, April 1, transmitted the text of Makarios' March 31 statement commemorating the 1954 uprising. (Ibid., POL 17 - 4 Cyp) In telegram 447, April 2, Wilkins reported on his discussions with the British High Commissioner in Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 18 Cyp) Telegram Toaid 313 has not been found. We agree that recent Makarios statements unhelpful in both content and timing. In absence clear-cut evidence his immediate motives, it not possible to tell whether he reacting to Erkin's talks in Rome, attempting placate die-hard pro-enosis elements among backers, or trying to exacerbate situation to point that Cyprus question is in effect reopened, presumably to his advantage. We conclude Makarios' long-term objective is not union with Greece but rather elimination or neutralization those provisions London - Zurich agreements and constitution which in effect circumscribe sovereignty of Republic. Among these would be most of special guarantees for Turkish community and intervention rights of Guarantor Powers. We assume that his recent statements and in fact all his actions relating to communal matters are designed to carry out this ultimate objective while maintaining his position and strength on island. Makarios appears prepared make move toward objective whenever he feels attitudes of interested powers will let him get by with it. In this frame of mind, he may interpret US and UK counsels of restraint and moderation as evidence of reluctance to reopen issues, become further involved, or see problem escalate. Furthermore, he cannot fail be aware of US and UK concern over current tensions between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, of which Cyprus problem one part. Consequently, he may feel he can with reasonable impunity take hard or defiant line with island Turks and Ankara, and in final analysis rely on UK and US keep GOT off his neck for sake of peace and quiet. He also appears confident he can always refer issue to UN and receive wide support uncommitted and neutralist nations in his struggle against outside (i.e., Turkish) intervention (Nicosia's 447). In our judgment, Makarios' ability to utilize UN instrumentalities and to mobilize support in UN would be decisively influenced by circumstances in which possible Turkish intervention might arise. In general, without making any final judgment re merits of case, we feel there would probably be a good deal of sympathy and support for Makarios in UN where members would have reserved attitude re intervention of other powers, regardless of provisions of Treaty of Guarantee. Makarios may believe, therefore, that referral to UN, or (more probably) threat to do so, would impel UK and US exert pressure on GOT to be ``reasonable", i.e., to give him what he wants. From US viewpoint, he is mistaken in this belief, but perhaps present sensitive period not appropriate time to make point. (We believe Turkish attempt at direct military intervention most unlikely even though in last analysis intervention not involving recourse to force would not be meaningful. Move against Cyprus by Turkish military might mean clash with Greece and might also bring down great pressure by interested outside powers. This does not mean, of course, that GOT will not continue hint darkly at possibility such intervention when it considers such a tactic useful.) With regard to immediate problem rising from recent Makarios statements, we consider Embassy Ankara and Embassy Nicosia have fielded question in best possible manner in contacts with Turks. Embassy Nicosia: Ambassador, at his discretion, should utilize appropriate opportunity make following points to Makarios: 1. We having great difficulty finding anything in his recent statements which makes contribution toward solution problem. On contrary, coming on eve Constitutional Court decision, statements appear even to sympathetic outside observer as deliberately provocative. 2. We forced reaffirm our view re continuing validity London - Zurich agreements and constitution, although we realize that all constitutions subject to gradual changes in interpretation based on experience and general consensual acceptance by citizenry. 3. We assume, if Constitutional Court rules against both Greek and Turkish recourses and Government assumes responsibility municipalities administration, Government will attempt forestall critical Turkish reaction by making it publicly clear this is interim measure to provide local authority while efforts find permanent solution continue. 4. We note with great concern that communal differences have reached point where program as sensible as development bank jeopardized. Not only have Greek and Turk differences succeeded in postponing availability US and German aid funds earmarked for bank but actions will discourage inflow of badly needed foreign investment as well as return of Cypriot money from abroad. 5. We believe a future Cyprus in which two large communities remain at daggers drawn, immobilizing all initiatives for progress, spells nothing but hardship and sorrow for all Cypriots. A Cyprus in which one-fifth of the population is effectively denied a voice in determining national destinies would be equally tragic. It is task of true statesmanship to avoid these dead ends and build a true Cypriot nation. As Makarios must be aware from his sojourn in US, we Americans know from bitter experience of century ago that all must be willing compromise cherished objectives within flexible framework of constitutional democracy or national tragedy is inevitable./2/ /2/In telegram 454 from Nicosia, April 5, Wilkins reported that he had met with Makarios and delivered the demarche outlined here. Makarios downplayed the differences between the two communities and underlined his plans to seek a negotiated solution. (Ibid.) On April 25, the Cypriot Constitutional Court held that both the Greek Cypriot Municipalities Boards and the Turkish Cypriot Municipal Councils were unconstitutional. On April 26, President Makarios stated that the Court's decision required immediate action in order to continue the provision of basic services. He announced that he would meet with Vice President Kutchuk on April 27 to seek a solution that would lead to the restoration of former unity and cooperation. Embassy Ankara: Ambassador may wish follow up subject with Erkin by pointing out when suitable occasion arises that US regards London - Zurich settlement (including Cyprus constitution with, of course, its provisions for amendment and change) as still valid. At your discretion, GOT may also be informed of general nature of our approach to Makarios, including content of first and second points outlined above. Has Erkin considered a letter to Makarios along lines his ``formula", as follow up to Makarios' visit to Ankara?/3/ /3/In telegram 1227 from Ankara, April 9, the Embassy reported that Erkin, while expressing gratitude for U.S. efforts, was suspicious about Makarios' objectives. (Ibid.) Ball 279. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and London. Athens, April 27, 1963, noon. 1100. 1. FonMin Averoff has advised me that the letter to Makarios referred to in Embtel 1049,/1/ has been delivered. /1/Telegram 1049, April 17, reported on discussions between Labouisse and Averoff on the range of Greek foreign policy problems. During the conversation, Averoff reaffirmed the Greek Government's desire to induce Makarios to moderate his behavior. (Ibid.) 3. GOG is prepared to continue to help Cyprus to reach reasonable solution, as in past, but if Makarios should seek to force revision of Constitution, Greece and Cyprus must then go separate ways. Greece has always honored its signature and will continue to do so. It can never subscribe to doctrine of unilateral revision of international agreements. Grave dangers lie in such a course. Much emphasis is placed on bearing of Cyprus problem on Turkish-Greek relations, and importance preventing further deterioration those relations. It is said that unilateral action could lead not only to aggravation tension in Greek-Turkish relations, but also to deterioration position of Patriarch. Letter warns that GOG is so strongly committed to avoidance extra-legal action that, if necessary, government is prepared go before public with statement upholding London - Zurich agreements. Letter acknowledges government realization such a public stance will pose most serious internal problem in Greece, but states that if pushed to extremes, it is prepared to submit question to people either through new elections or plebiscite. 4. Averoff believes his letter has made deep impression on Makarios who ``turned white" when he read it. It is Averoff's opinion that Makarios had every reason to believe Greeks are not speaking idly and that Makarios will realize GOG is deadly serious. 5. Averoff feels strongly that, following action of Constitutional Court, time is ripe to exert further pressure on Makarios ``to work something out." He therefore urges that US and UK make immediate demarche to Makarios. Averoff does not want to approach British personally and he prefers we not quote him to British. He considers time of the essence if Makarios is to be steered into sensible course. He hopes we will act this week end and, if possible, persuade the UK to do likewise. 6. I reminded Averoff that we had been counselling moderation for a long time. He expressed his appreciation this fact but replied that it was most important at this moment, following the Court action, to press Makarios again. 7. I shall appreciate receiving Department's reaction ASAP as I shall be seeing Averoff again shortly. Labouisse 280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Schott and King, cleared by BNA and S/S, and approved by Cottam. Also sent to Athens and repeated to London, Ankara, and Tehran for the Secretary. Washington, April 28, 1963, 5:50 p.m. 409. Athens' 1100 to Dept; London's 4246 to Dept; Ankara's Secto 4; Deptel 371 to Nicosia, 851 to Athens; Nicosia's 454 to Dept./1/ /1/Telegram 1100 is printed as Document 279. In telegram 4246, April 28, the Embassy in London reported that it had conveyed the substance of Averoff's note to the Foreign Office. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp) In Secto 4 from Ankara, April 26, Secretary Rusk commented that the Averoff letter was a ``conscientious and serious effort" to bring Makarios into line, undertaken despite political risks. (Ibid.) Telegram 371 is printed as Document 278. Regarding telegram 454, see footnote 2 thereto. 1. Athens' letter to Makarios appears to be mature statesmanlike declaration GOG's respect for rule of law and demonstration its determination do all possible, even at risk being attacked by political opposition, to persuade and pressure Archbishop into adopting similar responsible outlook and to minimize Cyprus as bone of contention with GOT. GOG willingness lay its own future on the line to clear up Cyprus problem could be pivotal step in improvement Greek-Turkish relations. It represents move of major significance, and calls for appropriate response and support from other interested parties, including US. For Athens 2. You may indicate to Averoff that we commend GOG initiative and support GOG approach. 3. Inform him of our plan make general demarche to Makarios along lines indicated below. 4. We endeavoring influence UK go along. We believe, however, Averoff should also personally contact British Ambassador Athens and attempt directly elicit UK support. In our view and from our experience, UK as fellow guarantor power and NATO ally of Greece more likely respond favorably to GOG request than if unilaterally approached by us in behalf GOG. For Nicosia 5. You should arrange see Makarios to provide effective support requested by Averoff. Inform British colleague before making call and coordinate your approach with any he may be authorized make. 6. Avoiding any mention our knowledge existence or contents GOG letter, you should make clear to Archbishop we feel Constitutional Court decision provides unique opportunity move toward permanent legal solution vexing municipalities problem which has for too long diverted energies both Cypriot communities from pressing problems of economic and social development. 7. Reaffirm our view, as expressed to him on April 5, that London - Zurich agreements and Constitution have continuing validity and that necessary changes can be accomplished through agreement both communities based on mutual trust and confidence. Ball 281. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, April 30, 1963, 5 p.m. 500. I had appointment to see Makarios this morning to discuss various economic matters and took advantage of opportunity to discuss question of municipalities along lines of Deptel 409./1/ I emphasized that now that Constitutional Court had handed down its judgments, there was new opportunity to solve this issue for political and economic benefit of Cyprus. I also reiterated our continued belief in validity of London - Zurich agreements, subject to changes which reasonable men on both sides might find necessary, as had been case with our own Constitution. /1/Document 280. Makarios said he appreciated spirit which motivated our interest and that he had been endeavoring, following Court decision, to calm situation and to put forward new proposals (Embtel 496),/2/ but that Turkish Cypriots had returned them and were insisting that communities be completely separated. Makarios regretted this action because experience had shown administration could not in practice be completely separated and that Article 173 of Constitution did not require that this status be permanent. /2/Telegram 496, April 30, transmitted the text of Greek Cypriot proposals regarding municipal reorganization. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp) Makarios said that he nevertheless still planned to meet with Kutchuk this afternoon to discuss matter and to ascertain whether Turkish Cypriots had any suggestions of their own as to how matter might be resolved. If present proposals were not acceptable, best solution might be to request House temporarily to give GOC responsibility for day-to-day administration of municipalities until such time as final solution was worked out. I said I thought Makarios was on right track in endeavoring to calm situation and in making constructive proposals, and that at this stage it was important Greek and Turkish Cypriots continued to meet and discuss matters. I added that as I had occasion myself to talk with other Greek Cypriot leaders and especially with Turkish Cypriot leaders, I would urge them to move forward. Earlier today Kutchuk asked me to call this afternoon, at which time I shall urge him to continue talks with Makarios and other Greek Cypriots and to solve this present problem which started out as of minor importance and has now been blown up to unreasonable proportions./3/ Wilkins /3/In telegram 502, April 30, Wilkins reported that Turkish Cypriot leaders were proposing a mix of common and separate administrative institutions. They claimed to be ready to negotiate but feared the Greek Cypriots did not really desire a solution. (Ibid.) 282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by King; cleared by IO, BNA, NEA, and GTI; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to London, Athens, and USUN and repeated to Ankara and Ottawa for the Secretary. 463. Ref: Nicosia's 573 to Dept, 192 to Athens, 110 to London, 161 to Ankara./1/ /1/Telegram 573 from Nicosia, May 21, reported Makarios' pessimism over the possibility of a compromise solution to the municipalities issue. (Ibid., AID (US) 15 - 8 Cyp) 1. Dept views with growing concern Makarios' apparent developing idea that solution certain of his basic problems may lie in appeal to UN. We aware he has mentioned this possibility before but interpreted it as vague thought on his part to threaten referral in order to render UK and Greece more amenable his point of view. Now he may be seriously contemplating use of UN, perhaps as result (1) recent Averoff and Canellopoulos statements before Greek parliament (Athens 1151 to Dept)/2/ to effect GOG might ask for changes in governing treaties or Constitution through negotiation, and/or (2) exaggerated and illusory notion, engendered by Amb Rossides during recent consultations Nicosia, of backing GOC might expect in UN. /2/Telegram 1151 from Athens, May 11, reported that Averoff had suggested that Greece might request revision of the London agreements. (Ibid, POL Cyp - Gr) 2. We realize any eventual Makarios appeal to UN might be framed in indirect manner which could impose necessity difficult judgments and choices on US and UK as well as Greece and Turkey, and which might elicit wider UN member response than more straightforward question of sanctity of treaties, etc. 3. However, Dept feels it highly desirable promptly disabuse Makarios of preconception, which we consider dangerously erroneous, that any Cyprus appeal to UN would have backing, sympathy or even acceptance by US; we feel strongly that solution current aspect communal problem can and should be found in Cyprus by Cypriots. We suspect also that Greece, when chips are down, would be guided in its reaction to GOC attempt elicit its support for appeal to UN by considerations more important to it than Cyprus, i.e., relations with Turkey, UK and US, position within NATO and Common Market, etc. 4. We believe it desirable therefore have early separate approaches to Makarios by British and ourselves to provide him clear knowledge UK and US attitudes in this regard and to give him possibly more realistic view UN scene than he is likely to get from Rossides. For London 5. You should elicit CRO and FonOff views approach described above and attempt obtain agreement that UK HICOM Nicosia will make similar demarche. Inform British we will make approach in any event. For Athens 6. Further information or comment on Averoff and Canellopoulos statements referred to above would be most useful in attempting analyze GOG thinking this issue and foresee its possible plans. At your discretion, you may wish informally alert responsive level GOG to US lack of sympathy for UN involvement in any aspect Cyprus situation and, if possible, learn if GOG would be willing discourage Makarios from any plans in that direction. Suggest you coordinate with UK Ambassador. For Nicosia 7. In May 21 conversation,/3/ Makarios may have been throwing out idea of possible appeal to UN to test US reaction before moving further with plans. It important, therefore, he be fully alerted as soon as possible to our thinking. Suggest, at early appropriate occasion, and after consultation with British HICOM Clark, you convey to Makarios substance US attitude as indicated first sentence paragraph 3 above. FYI: In your presentation you might wish avoid implication we overly concerned this matter and simply inform Archbishop of facts of life. End FYI. /3/Wilkins reported on his conversation with Makarios in telegram 573, May 21. (Ibid., AID US 15 - 8 Cyp) For USUN 8. FYI. Would be useful if US and UK dels would consult and provide Dept with your assessment re above. Line taken in this tel is designed to discourage GOC from bringing matter to UN. We appreciate fully that Cypriots could refer matter to UN in such a way as to mobilize substantial support for UN third party intervention. We wish emphasize our belief that discussion with Rossides would not be helpful at this stage, but would appreciate having any indication you may be able to obtain discreetly regarding any steps he may be taking. Ball 283. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, June 6, 1963, noon. 642. Pass AID. Toner and I called on Makarios this morning for further discussion of several economic matters. At close I commented that it was heartening to observe economic progress which Cyprus was making and expressed hope similar political progress would soon be made. Makarios said that, as matter of fact, he had been preoccupied with other questions and there had been no new political developments in past few days. He himself had not discussed political matters either with his Greek Cypriot Ministers nor with Turkish Cypriots. Makarios added, however, that he was still considering, as he had told me during our last conversation (Embtel 573),/1/ how to resolve Cyprus' current political difficulties. /1/See footnote 1, Document 282. Makarios said that he had reached conclusion in his own mind that it would be necessary to revise Cypriot Constitution. He had, however, not as yet decided what timing and procedure would be for revision. Many articles of Constitution were unamendable; consequently careful consideration would be required as to when and how revision should be handled. Makarios also observed that there were varying interpretations with respect to Treaty of Guarantee. Some thought it meant guarantor powers could intervene in Cyprus. He did not agree with this interpretation. He did not think Cyprus could be described as independent country if other countries had right of intervention and had their troops stationed in Cyprus as Greece and Turkey did. British bases in Cyprus were different matter as they were subject of separate bilateral agreements. Makarios added that he would prefer to become member of NATO rather than be guaranteed by Greece and Turkey. I said I was disappointed to learn that there had been no further political talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in recent days. I said that following my last conversation with him I had seen several Turkish Cypriot leaders and had urged them to continue earlier talks./2/ I said they had discussed current questions in reasonable way and had agreed to get in touch with Clerides. I added that it seemed to us solution to political difficulties could best be found in direct talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It seemed wiser to approach matter in this way than by adopting some more radical approach, such as reference to UN. I made it clear, in line with Deptel 463,/3/ Cyprus could not expect US support if it embarked on this course. /2/In telegram 610, May 30, Wilkins reported on his efforts to press both sides to renew talks. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp) Makarios replied that it seemed to him time had come to revise Constitution and Treaty of Guarantee. There no longer seemed any real possibility of solution through direct talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Although he had reached this conclusion, he had not as yet decided when to go about it or how to proceed. Cypriot Constitution would not, in any event, be subject which could be considered by UN, although other matters, such as Treaty of Guarantee, might be. He hoped by next week to summarize on paper his thoughts regarding present and future of Cyprus and would give us copy. It seems clear from this analysis by Makarios and Kyprianou's earlier remarks (Embtel 638)/4/ that Greek Cypriots have become frustrated by their inconclusive discussions with Turkish Cypriots during past six months and as result are now considering other ways of finding solution to current problems, such as reference to UN and to guarantor powers. I nevertheless pressed Makarios very hard to continue direct talks with Turkish Cypriots as sounder method of tackling these problems and as one which would avoid complications which would arise in calling for revision of London - Zurich agreements. /4/Dated June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 Cyp) Wilkins 284. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, June 21, 1963, 1 p.m. 693. Verbatim text. Embtels 642 and 681./1/ Following memorandum from Makarios labelled confidential was handed to Ambassador Wilkins just before his departure this morning. Comment will follow. /1/Telegram 642 is printed as Document 283. Telegram 681 is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp) Begin text (unnecessary words omitted): At time when agreements establishing Cyprus State were signed in London in February, 1959, it was more than obvious that number of provisions of those agreements would create difficulties in functioning of state, constituting at same time sources of friction between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, with grave consequences affecting relations between Greece and Turkey. In course of conference in London--at which UK, Greece and Turkey participated--Archbishop Makarios had then expressed serious reservations with regard to certain provisions contained in agreements and, in fact, proposed some amendments, which were not, however, accepted. In his desire to see end to bloodshed, on one hand, and on other hand to see Cyprus attaining independence, he had finally decided to sign agreements, upon which Constitution of Cyprus was subsequently based. Since independence, it has become abundantly clear that certain constitutional provisions are unworkable in actual practice, as for example provision with regard to separate municipalities in five main towns of island. Other provisions, one, for example, requiring separate majorities for enactment of taxation legislation, create many obstacles in smooth running of state and seriously hinder government's efforts to apply sound policy of economic development. It might, perhaps, be argued that constitutional provisions in question have been devised in such manner as to provide certain safeguards to Turkish minority. It should not, however, be difficult to find other ways and means of safeguarding interests of minority, without necessarily hindering efforts for progress of people of Cyprus as whole, and without creating permanent sources of friction between Greeks and Turks. Anomalous state of affairs, created as result of various internal difficulties arising from Constitution, is made even worse by so-called Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance. Mere existence on paper of those treaties is in itself source of danger, although no one could successfully argue that those two treaties might serve any useful purpose at all. Furthermore, these treaty arrangements are in direct conflict with very essence of true independence. Any attempt by any one or other three countries to intervene would unavoidably lead to very serious situation in Cyprus, with great possibility of wider conflict between Greece and Turkey. Any interference by other countries in internal affairs of Cyprus must be considered as completely unacceptable. Argument might be advanced that Turkey is interested in fate of Cyprus for military reasons of its own, due to geographic proximity between two countries. In view of Greek Cypriot leadership, Turkey's concern, whether genuine and legitimate or not, might be met by other and perhaps more effective arrangements. There is no doubt that certain provisions of Constitution of Cyprus should be revised. Question which arises is what procedure should be followed in order to meet situation. Greek Cypriot leadership have come to conclusion to raise officially question of revising Constitution, and for this purpose they will approach others concerned. It would have been very good thing indeed if all interested parties would acquiesce such revision. But if, on other hand, it were to prove impossible to have consent of others, then Greek Cypriot leadership will proceed with revision of Constitution, employing internationally accepted democratic methods and procedures. In such case, it is contemplated that people would be called upon to elect special representatives to Constitutional Assembly, which would be entrusted with task of effecting necessary amendments to Constitution of the state. Before, however, final decision is taken on procedure to be followed, opinion of highly qualified constitutional experts will be sought. Whatever line that may have to be pursued, one of main objectives should be not to allow Cyprus to continue to be bone of contention between Greece and Turkey with unavoidable repercussions within and outside island. End text. McKiernan 285. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara. Nicosia, June 27, 1963, 11 a.m. 712. Embtels 693, 696./1/ Discreet soundings with Greek Embassy and UK HICOM have produced no indication they have copies President Makarios' memorandum on amendment of Constitution and new arrangements to replace Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. Thus, while memo appears drafted also for ultimate UK and Greek consumption, GOC may be seeking initial reading from us before passing memo to others. /1/Telegram 693 is printed as Document 284. In telegram 696, June 24, the Embassy reported that Greek Cypriot officials had stated that only Wilkins had received a copy of Makarios' memorandum outlining the President's ``current thinking." The Embassy commented: ``We find it difficult to accept at face value this explanation of Makarios restatement of extreme Greek Cypriot revisionist demands and threat of unilateral action." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp) Basic purpose of memo appears to be inspire US and perhaps UK apply pressure on Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots to accept less radical proposal of House President Clerides (A - 560)/2/ for joint committee on constitutional amendment. Basis of information here, however, there is little likelihood Turkish-Cypriots or GOT will agree to either Clerides or Makarios proposal for constitutional revision. /2/Airgram A - 560, June 14, forwarded Clerides' proposals together with an Embassy analysis. (Ibid., POL 15 Cyp) Although memo has appearance of trial balloon, we believe it reflects genuine Makarios determination bring about modification pres-ent situation partly to resolve practical problems and partly to build useful record which will unite Greek-Cypriots behind Makarios in 1965 elections. In talk with Ambassador (Embtel 680),/3/ Makarios appeared discouraged over impasse and casting about for way out. If Turkish-Cypriots refuse discuss constitutional amendment, as we expect, next step, a Cyprus request for ``opinion of highly qualified constitutional experts", might form basis for appeal to UN or World Court. Makarios might consider such new forum could suggest fresh approach to solution, possibly relating to rules of procedure and terms of reference for constitutional assembly. /3/Telegram 680, June 19, summarized the main points of discussion at the Wilkins - Makarios meeting that day. (Ibid., POL 1 Cyp) Critical remarks in memo about Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance may appear give undeserved importance to this aspect of Cyprus situation but may reflect Makarios' concern over possible physical Turkish intervention to counter specific measures he may have in mind. ``More effective arrangements" may involve concentration of guarantor responsibilities in UK, as FonMin Kyprianou suggested earlier (London's tel 4719)./4/ /4/Telegram 4719, May 23, reported on British approaches to Makarios and the British Government's judgments of his objectives. (Ibid., POL 18 Cyp) Makarios action in presenting memo to us alone faces us with dilemma: if we withhold comment GOC might be given some encouragement move forward with drastic course of action; if we seek discourage such action, we will become involved more deeply in Cyprus communal question, tending to confirm in Cypriot minds oft-stated allegation that we take the part of Turkish-Cypriots in these matters./5/ McKiernan /5/In telegram 5 to Nicosia, July 2, the Department of State commented that it regarded the Makarios memorandum as a ``briefing paper" and would avoid making any comment on its contents. (Ibid.) 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by King; cleared in OC, INR, BNA, and GTI; and approved by Bracken. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara. Washington, August 15, 1963, 5:57 p.m. 74. Nicosia's A - 45 of Aug. 2 and A - 52 of Aug. 9./1/ We agree Embassy's view that Makarios' current campaign constitutes maneuver pressure U.S. into coming off fence and expressing support Greek-Cypriot position vis-a-vis constitution and treaties. /1/Airgram A - 45, August 2, reported on Makarios' July 28 speech calling for the withdrawal of the Treaty of Guarantee and public reaction to his statement. (Ibid., POL Cyp) Airgram A - 52 reported Greek Cypriot maneuvers designed to pave the way for constitutional revision and abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee. (Ibid., POL 15 Cyp) Appears also that Makarios may be attempting plant idea of differences between certain Guarantor Powers or between U.S. and U.K. re Cyprus problem, possibly for public consumption on island or possibly on theory allegations may become reality if repeated often enough. He may also hope create state of affairs where he could offer guarantee our access to telecommunications facilities in return for forthright U.S. support Greek-Cypriot position. Our views on validity constitution and treaty continue same as Ambassador expressed to Makarios in April 1963 (Embtels 454, 500)./2/ We continue convinced solution overall Cyprus problem lies in patient piecemeal solution specific problems such as municipalities issue and that this possible achieve on island if both sides willing exercise moderation. We against any attempts by-pass Guarantor Powers or involve U.S. or U.N. We will resist any possible blackmailing tactics re facilities, and do not consider that recent press campaign should alter present plans re facilities arrangements. /2/Regarding telegram 454, see footnote 2, Document 278. Telegram 500 is printed as Document 281. Likely that any specific U.S. reaction to present Greek-Cypriot pressures, other than most routine continuation our past admonitions re restraint, could lead eventually to greater U.S. involvement (as sought by Makarios) and could embarrass us in relations with Guarantor Powers. When Ambassador sees Makarios he may wish in his discretion express mild surprise that Archbishop, who knows U.S. position so well, would permit press use his good name in attempts give credence to misstatements and misconceptions re U.S.-Cyprus relations. Rusk 287. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Nicosia. Athens, August 16, 1963, 9 p.m. 276. 1. In talk with Prime Minister Pipinelis today, he said that, although some may think Cyprus situation is relatively quiet, he considers it most serious. In his view, there could be an explosion at any time. Accordingly, he had sent message to Makarios to effect that Greek Govt understood the problems facing Govt of Cyprus and realized that it would be necessary at some time to have some constitutional amendments. The message stated, however, that Greece would not recognize ``coup" or unilateral action by Cyprus and that any constitutional changes must be done through agreement of all interested parties. (I asked Pipinelis whether his govt was prepared for a meeting of the guarantor powers. He replied that he could not say definitely but that he personally thought it was the only sensible way.) 2. According to Pipinelis, Makarios replied to his message saying that the Makarios statement about constitutional changes had been ``misinterpreted"; all Makarios was doing was to appoint committee to study legal problems, etc. and that he had no intention of any ``coup" or unilateral action ``at least before next year." Pipinelis added that, in view of the explosive nature of the Cypriot problem, it was well for the other parties in interest not to assume that the situation was quiescent and that they could safely wait ``until next year." (Pipinelis made it clear that he was not asking US to do anything but merely wanted to inform me of his personal views.) 3. Pipinelis then discussed matter of Greek-Turkish relations and said he believed that, through quiet step-by-step actions, much could be done to improve those relations. He mentioned that he had been able to work out with Erkin an exchange of letters (``long held up because of a foolish failure to agree on wording") which enabled work in the Evros River region to go forward. He said that the most difficult outstanding case (other than Cyprus) had to do with the proposed Turkish territorial waters legislation. Here again he stated that he felt progress had been made. Two days ago he had sent to Ankara a proposal for a joint consortium relating to the fishing rights in the waters between the Greek islands and the Turkish coast. In his discussion with Erkin some time ago at the airport here, Erkin had indicated that he considered joint consortium as a desirable approach. According to Pipinelis, Erkin has also agreed to put a provision in the territorial waters legislation postponing six-mile extension of fishing rights for two years. ``This would leave plenty of time for Greece and Turkey to work out their mutual problems." 4. Pipinelis said that through arrangements such as these he hoped it would be possible to establish a new atmosphere of confidence which would tend to make the solution of the crucial Cyprus problem easier. 5. Pipinelis' optimism re Greek-Turkish relations was reflected several days ago by Turkish charge in call on DCM. charge spoke in similar vein of progress being made on problems raised by territorial waters legislation (which he predicted would be passed in about two months' time) and commented that Cyprus remains the only problem between Greece and Turkey capable of engendering serious difficulties. Labouisse 288. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London. Nicosia, August 27, 1963, 3 p.m. 130. I saw Makarios this morning for first time since returning to Cyprus from US. During past three or four weeks Makarios has made number of statements touching on difficulties flowing from Constitution and treaties indicating need for change. Press has seized upon these statements for wide speculation. This morning I found Makarios relaxed and confident that Greek and Turkish Cypriots would eventually be able solve their current problems. He was doubtful, however, if Turkish Cypriots or Ankara would be willing to make any arrangement right now. For this reason Makarios thought he might be forced to take unilateral action, but believed Turkish Cypriots would in end see merit in his suggestions for changes and accept them. I commented that I thought he was on wrong track in handling matter in this way, adding that it would seem wiser quietly to make some arrangement behind scenes with Turkish Cypriots and with Ankara. I also said that it seemed to me recent statements to press made it more difficult to make such arrangement as they hardened attitudes. I recalled our support for continuing validity of Constitution and treaties, as stated last April and subsequently (Deptel 74),/1/ subject to normal change by agreement between parties. /1/Document 286. I also said that on my way back to Cyprus I had stopped off briefly in London, Athens and Ankara and had heard many observers in each capital express belief that Greek and Turkish Cypriots would yet find solution among themselves./2/ I suggested to Makarios that he have another talk with Kutchuk and also arrange conversations with Turkish officials in Ankara. /2/Wilkins' talks were reported in telegram 655 from London, August 8 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Cyp), telegram 245 from Athens, August 12 (ibid., POL Cyp), and telegram 198 from Ankara, August 14 (ibid.). I strongly urged that such talks be held without publicity. Possibility of success would thus be increased. Makarios was dubious if Turks were now in mind to talk, but said that he would discuss matter with Clerides who was returning in few days and would find some way of probing situation with Kutchuk and with Turkish officials in Ankara. I strongly urged Makarios to make sincere effort along these lines. I believe I made some headway this morning in persuading him to make another quiet effort with Turkish Cypriots and with Ankara, but Makarios is firm believer in using press for purpose of negotiation; consequently it remains to be seen how far he will go in seeking quiet talks with Turkish Cypriots and with Ankara. Wilkins 289. Memorandum of Conversation //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by Bowling and approved in S on October 2. The source text is labeled ``Part I of II." A second memorandum of conversation dealing with U.S-Soviet relations is ibid. SecDel/MC/61 New York, October 1, 1963, 12:30 p.m. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York--October 1963 SUBJECT Situation in Cyprus PARTICIPANTS American The Secretary of State John W. Bowling, NEA Foreign H.E. Feridun Erkin, Foreign Minister of Turkey PLACE USUN, New York Foreign Minister Erkin opened the conversation by describing a talk he had arranged the day before with Cypriot Permanent Represent-ative Rossides, at Rossides' request. Rossides attempted to assure Erkin that the current actions of President Makarios did not mean that the constitutional guarantees of the Turkish Cypriots were in question. Erkin told Rossides that Turkey had signed the London - Zurich agreements in the firm belief that they would be thoroughly and solemnly implemented. Turkey considered the London - Zurich agreement to be a sui generis document, recognizing the existence of two communities on Cyprus, and believing it to be a good and feasible instrument for the attainment of the welfare and happiness of all the people of Cyprus. Turkey had found, unfortunately, that this spirit was not shared by ``others", who appear determined to destroy the agreement and reduce the Turks to the status of an ordinary minority left helpless under the Greek majority. A symbol of this conflict, said the Foreign Minister, is the municipalities question. It is not a question of perpetual partition of the municipalities, but rather a question of good will and mutual confidence. Turkey feels that the sooner the Greek Cypriot leaders are able to create the necessary degree of inter-communal confidence, the sooner the partition of municipalities can be ended, at which point no one could be happier than Turkey. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot leaders, rather than acting to create confidence, had abruptly served a three-months ultimatum to the Turkish community on the municipalities question. Greek Cypriot leaders have apparently forgotten the principles of London - Zurich, and are openly talking of a unilateral revision of the Constitution, and of Enosis. The Foreign Minister noted that he had at several times been forced to act publicly and privately to keep the Turkish minority in Cyprus from exacerbating the situation. The Government of Greece appears to share Turkey's basic outlook and has several times attempted with little success to warn Greek Cypriot leaders of the probable consequences of their folly. The Secretary asked if the Greek Government had done this publicly; the Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative. The Foreign Minister went on to say that Turkey had addressed remonstrances to the Cypriot Foreign Minister, but he had replied that communal problems were a matter of domestic concern to Cyprus. The Secretary asked how serious is Greek Cypriot talk of Enosis. The Foreign Minister replied that it is difficult to say, and that much of it may be only lip service to an outworn idea. However, the Foreign Minister continued, the creation of a Republic of Cyprus based on a simple political majority would in a mystic way represent Enosis to many Greek Cypriots, since Enosis has facets other than simple political union. The Secretary asked if the Constitution provided for amendments and if it was an integral part of the London - Zurich accords. The Foreign Minister said it had no provision for amendment and that it was an integral part of the London - Zurich agreements. The Secretary asked for Erkin's comments as to the time factor involved, noting that the Greek Cypriot leaders are threatening to take further steps soon. The Foreign Minister replied that he was not certain, but quoted Makarios to the effect that the Cyprus Revolution is a continuing process and that its objectives will soon be attained. The Secretary asked about the British attitude, and Erkin replied that the British had made repeated representations to Makarios in favor of the existing relations between the communities and warning against unilateral changes. The Secretary noted, and the Foreign Minister agreed, that the Greek Government had been a moderating influence. The Secretary asked who had any real influence over Makarios, and Erkin said that while House Speaker Clerides was the only other really important figure in the Greek Cypriot community, it was apparent that no individual possessed any real influence over Makarios. The Secretary remarked that Makarios had not been completely frank with U.S. officials during his American visit. Erkin said Makarios had been described to him by a leading Greek statesman only two weeks ago as an example of the worst type of politician. During Makarios' visit to Turkey in November he had made a flat promise that on his return he would speak at length with Turkish Cypriot leaders, and had broken his promise without even an apology. He has no intention of creating a spirit of confidence in Cyprus, and rather wishes to create confusion, on which he thrives. Erkin suggested that U.S. aid to Cyprus might be withheld to pressure Makarios into adopting a more sensible communal policy. The Secretary replied, and Erkin appeared to agree, that such action, even if otherwise deemed desirable, would allow Makarios to turn to the Bloc and thumb his nose at the U.S. and the West. Erkin went on to say that he had never mentioned partition of the island as a solution, since he realized the hardships and difficulties which would be involved. However, if compelled by circumstances, Turkey would have to fall back on partition as the only way to save the Turkish minority. Replying to a question by the Secretary, Erkin said that partition would require mass movement of population. He added that Turkey didn't want partition, and that he was not proposing it; Turkey wanted a continuation of the existing Constitution of Cyprus. Erkin recalled that Makarios had accused the Turkish Cypriot leadership of misusing its prerogatives. Turkish leaders had assured him that they wanted to make Cyprus survive as a bicommunal state, and that they would be happy to exert influence on Turkish Cypriots who misused their prerogatives, if Makarios would provide details. The Secretary asked what the effect of joint representation by the three guarantor powers would be. The Foreign Minister replied that this would be a grave step which is not justified by events so far. The British Government, which advises calmness and continued negotiations, might not be willing to go so far, and any Greek Government which participated would face extremely serious domestic problems. The Secretary promised to talk with Lord Home about Cyprus and to look into the Cyprus problem with particular reference to U.S. policies and plans. 290. National Security Action Memorandum No. 266 //Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 266. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence. Washington, October 17, 1963. MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of State SUBJECT New Action Program for Cyprus The President is concerned over reports that we may be headed for trouble in Cyprus. He feels we should do all we can in cooperation with the Guarantor Powers to prevent a showdown between the Greek and Turkish communities. He would like the Department of State to provide him by 28 October with its recommendations on what measures might be taken to this end. McGeorge Bundy //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, and London. Ankara, October 20, 1963, noon. 498. Talbot, Jernegan and I called on PriMin Inonu and Deputy PriMin (Acting FonMin) Feyzioglu separately yesterday morning. Both devoted most of their remarks to Cyprus. PriMin went into less detail, but it was clear both wanted to impress us with importance they attach to question and firmness Turkish position. Essence of presentation was: 1. London - Zurich agreements and Cyprus Constitution represented compromise hammered out with great difficulty and involving sacrifices all concerned. 2. Turkey could not contemplate any revision. Turkish popular reaction to any change affecting Turkish minority would be ``volcanic" and no Turkish Govt, present or future, could possibly stand against this reaction. 3. Makarios and Greek Cypriots were not attempting execute provisions of Constitution in good faith. During Archbishop's visit to Turkey, he had hinted at need for Constitution changes; Turks had tried gently but firmly to impress on him impossibility of such action, but this evidently had failed to change his attitude. 4. If London - Zurich agreements and Constitution were not upheld, only alternative would be partition of island, which would be tragic return to bitter conflict prior agreements. Strain on NATO Alliance both in this region and generally would be most unfortunate. 5. Greek electoral campaign introduced special dangers. Cyprus issue would figure in it and undesirable statements would undoubtedly be made for local political purposes in Greece which would have serious repercussions here. 6. Turkey attached special importance to role U.S. could play in influencing Cypriots and guarantor powers. Talbot expressed our continuing concern over Cyprus situation and our desire that it be worked out among the parties. Urged that Turkey should remain in close and continuing consultation with other guarantors. On this point, Inonu asserted Greece and Britain could not act freely and impartially because of special relationship of each to Cyprus. This emphasized importance of U.S. role. When Talbot suggested Turks should not oppose all change in Cypriot Constitution and pointed to demonstrated advantages of flexibility U.S. Constitution, Feyzioglu replied firmly that, while certain modifications might be made in due course, Turkey could not possibly agree to modifications of those constitutional articles which London - Zurich agreements excluded from amendment process. (At lunch afterwards, Secy General Bayramoglu said it would be impossible for Turks and/or Turk-Cypriot [garble] talk on basis of constitutional changes but that talks between two communities on island could well be undertaken if they were directed toward interpretations and means implementation of constitutional provisions in dispute. Added that if it seemed desirable guarantor powers could be brought into such discussions, always provided fundamental constitutional changes were not involved.) Comment: This approach by Turks unusual largely because of high level and intensity. Believe intervention of PriMin probably caused by concern over repercussions likely to be caused by imminent Greek elections. Hare 292. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) //Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 266. Secret. Drafted by Bracken and cleared by G/PM, BNA, S/P, M, L, NEA, G, CIA, and the Department of Defense (ISA). Washington, October 28, 1963. SUBJECT NSAM No. 266: New Action Program for Cyprus/1/ National Security Action Memorandum No. 98, of September 1961,/2/ approved proposals for United States action in Cyprus. The action proposed was primarily along economic lines in an effort to lessen communal tensions and enhance the chances for a settlement of Greek-Turkish-Cypriot differences through cooperation in Cyprus' economic development. As a result of the measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, various European contributors, as well as the Cypriots, the economy has strengthened. /2/Document 250. However, the relations between the Greek and Turkish communities have deteriorated in the process of putting into practice the provisions of the Cyprus Constitution and some of the unusual guarantees given the Turkish minority at the time of the Cyprus settlement in 1959. More direct political action is required to alleviate the worsening situation. The enclosed memorandum/3/ notes the recent deterioration of the Cyprus situation and points to the strong possibility of communal violence in 1964. It recommends that the United States adopt a new course of action designed to avert a breakdown of order on Cyprus and the consequent strain on relations between Greece and Turkey, to stabilize the Cyprus Government as a deterrent against increased Communist influence, and to ensure favorable conditions for the maintenance of our important communications facilities on the island. /3/Not printed. On October 21, the British gave us the details of a new approach they will carry out in the near future./4/ Their plan restricts itself to efforts to promote new negotiations between the Cypriot communities based on ``fair and reasonable" Greek-Cypriot proposals, to persuade Turkey to consider reasonable suggestions for constitutional change and to arrange a subsequent informal meeting of representatives of the Guarantor Powers and the Government of Cyprus to approve the changes negotiated by the Cypriots. Our approach serves, therefore, as a fallback position to the British plan. /4/The British plan was transmitted in telegram 1973 from London, October 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 Cyp) In specific terms, the United States approach proposes: 1. The Department will urge the United Kingdom to call on Greece and Turkey to agree to a three-power approach to Cyprus President Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk, with an assurance of United States support. 2. The three-power approach will require the Cypriot leaders to reaffirm support of the London - Zurich agreement and the Cyprus Constitution. 3. The approach will require that the municipalities dispute be settled by the establishment of separate town councils as specified in the Constitution but with the understanding that the separate councils will be superseded by joint municipalities after a test period. 4. The three-power approach will also in effect revise the London - Zurich agreement to allow the two communities to use normal amendment procedures in the case of two presently unamendable but highly contentious articles of the Constitution. Benjamin H. Read/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Grant G. Hilliker signed for Read. 293. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, November 4, 1963, 3 p.m. 260. Deptel 193 (paragraphs 6 and 7)./1/ We continue doubt Makarios would be willing join with Kutchuk in public statement as proposed in paragraph 4 of US Plan of Action./2/ For Makarios it would mean reversal of all he has been saying in recent years and, to him, would be politically impossible (Embtel 251)./3/ Establishment of time period for municipalities under Article 173 is now but one of several goals Makarios seeks in revising Constitution. /1/Telegram 193, November 1, authorized a more active U.S. role in the crisis and commented on the British plan for resolving the Cyprus issue. (Ibid.) /2/See Document 292. /3/Telegram 251, October 30, reported that Makarios was unlikely to respond favorably to the British approach. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyprus) Placing this article, as well as others, under Article 132 would not attract Makarios, as two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots in House would still have to approve changes, which means six Turkish Cypriots could block revision. Makarios will accordingly be unwilling to make proposed political statement for advances which are of no real advantage to him. Principal changes desired by Makarios are 1) unification of municipalities within definite time period, 2) no separate majorities for tax measures, 3) small army or none at all, 4) civil service employment on more rational basis, 5) elimination of Vice President's veto powers, 6) consolidation of judicial system, and possibly 7) elimination of communal chambers. Cancellation of Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance is also desired. At same time, Makarios is realistic and knows formal changes in Constitution and treaties to this broad extent will be unacceptable to Turks. Makarios will accordingly, in my opinion, pick up Clark's suggestion of ``interpretations" of Constitution/4/ and will in end be content with unification of municipalities and limitation on tax measures. Makarios would, I think, be willing to make public statement with Kutchuk with respect to these interpretations of Constitution. If Makarios does not pick up Clark's suggestion of interpretations, I believe he will continue to move toward consultation with guarantor powers and, if no progress is made, calling of Constitutional Assembly as indicated in his memorandum to us of last June (Embtel 693),/5/ in which event Makarios' minimum demands would be greater. /4/The British plan called for both sides to reach a mutual agreement on the interpretation of the Constitution that could ``after some years" be accepted by both as constitutional amendments. (Telegram 2913 to London, November 6; ibid.) /5/Document 284. Greek Cypriots will continue opposed to present treaties, but will realize difficulty of ``interpreting" them and will be willing to let them stand for time being if changes in Constitution could be made. Wilkins 294. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, and London. Ankara, November 6, 1963, noon. 577. Deptel 384./1/ London for Jernegan. /1/Telegram 384 to Ankara, October 24, reported that the British had provided the United States with a copy of its action plan and instructed U.S. Embassies to coordinate their activities with British officials, providing all requested support to the British effort. (Ibid.) 1. Embassy has reviewed proposed U.S. action plan for Cyprus and endorses orientation toward checking Makarios' plans for unilateral moves while attempting give him something of what he wants. 2. Six months ago GOT would obviously have been pleased and relieved if ways could have been found induce Makarios legalize de facto separate municipalities. However, as FonMin Erkin has just told Ambassador (Embtel 570),/2/ they no longer issue for GOT since statements by Makarios and other Greek Cypriot leaders in interim have confirmed long-standing Turk fears that Makarios would now begin pressing openly for ultimate objective of abolition Treaty of Guarantee and revision Cyprus Constitution. Therefore, we do not believe that belated willingness by Makarios legalize separate municipalities would at this stage suffice restore GOT's faith in his good intentions. Moreover, severe restrictions on GOT's maneuverability arising from new situation are compounded by domestic considerations. /2/Dated November 5. (Ibid.) Relative weakness of coalition government and of any visible successor makes strong Cyprus policy political ``must". Believe it most unlikely, therefore, that GOT would agree kind of public statement contemplated by U.S. plan which might be exploited by principal opposition party and press as offering unpardonable concession to Greek Cypriot ambitions. 3. Appears to us that GOT trying be reasonable on Cyprus question, where it realizes it has nothing gain but much to lose if situation turns sour. It will, however, continue insist on putting horse before cart and expect see some concrete evidence good faith on part Makarios before it prepared make concessions. We believe FonMin Erkin accurately summed up GOT position when he told Bristish Ambassador Allen GOT not opposed to discussion between Greek and Turk Cypriots and if Makarios acted like President of state with two communities instead of leader of only one community, two communities could settle differences and even agree some modification of Constitution (Embtel 554)./3/ /3/Telegram 554, November 11, reported that Erkin had told Hare that the Cyprus problem had escalated from a question of municipal government to a ``broad attack on the Constitution" not simply by Makarios but also by Clerides. Erkin added that Inonu agreed with this analysis. (Ibid., POL 15 Cyp) 4. Surest way open to Makarios demonstrate good faith toward Turks would be give all constitutional provisions fair and uninterrupted test over reasonable period time. In meanwhile, believe would be difficult persuade GOT at this stage agree to anything more than quiet undertaking consider possible constitutional modifications after period of full implementation Constitution. Latter would permit development mutual confidence and good will between two communities which GOT holds essential to any real progress on Cyprus problems. Within this framework GOT has indicated would be willing for Greek and Turk Cypriots discuss and agree on how disputed constitutional provisions might best be implemented (Embtel 498)./4/ Such discussions might in fact lead to minor operational adjustments and prepare way for formal constitutional changes at later date. /4/Telegram 498, October 20, reported on Talbot's talks with senior Turkish leaders. (Ibid., POL 15 - 5 Cyp) 5. Meanwhile we encouraged by interest expressed Cypriot Turk Deputy Halit Ali Riza in Clerides' idea for quiet, informal Greek-Turk meeting to review whole Constitution (Nicosia's A - 173)./5/ If something tangible should come out of such consultation we believe we would be in good position urge GOT accept results as step forward. /5/Dated November 1. (Ibid., POL 15 - 5 Cyp) Hare 295. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, November 26, 1963, 3 p.m. 295. Embtel 288./1/ Makarios told me this morning he had virtually completed memorandum listing approximately ten constitutional provisions which required amendment, together with argumentation supporting need for change. Makarios said he planned to send memorandum to each of guarantor powers with copy to Dr. Kutchuk for his information. Makarios added that memorandum would deal only with Constitution and not with Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, as it was his view that other powers could not intervene in Cyprus. Makarios also planned to hand us copy of memorandum and thought it would be ready to be sent by end of this week. Makarios hoped that Dr. Kutchuk would study memorandum and would later be willing to negotiate and that guarantor powers, as well as we, would be willing to speak with Ankara whose ties with Turkish Cypriots were close. /1/Telegram 288, November 19, reported on a discussion between Wilkins and Kutchuk in which Kutchuk stated that he was ready to consider Greek Cypriot proposals for institutional change but would reject ``out of hand" any document presenting them as amendments to the Constitution. (Ibid.) I commented that, as Archbishop Makarios knew, we had long favored direct talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and would welcome fair and reasonable Greek Cypriot proposals which would resolve present difficulties. I suggested that they not be put forward as amendments, but as suggestions for improving functioning of Constitution. I added we understood UK had urged Makarios proceed in this way and that we strongly supported British views./2/ /2/In telegram 282, November 15, Wilkins reported on his conversation with High Commissioner Clark on Clark's discussions with Makarios. (Ibid., POL Cyp) Makarios replied that he would do his best to keep situation calm and that he was giving careful attention to question of wording. At same time he was convinced that amendments or improvements in Constitution were required and that if Turkish Cypriots, with backing of Ankara, refused, it would be necessary to seek changes in other ways. I again said it would seem far wiser for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reach agreement, and was confident that if fair and reasonable Greek Cypriot proposals were forthcoming friends of Cyprus would be more able to urge their acceptance by others. Wilkins 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bracken and Schott and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London. Washington, November 27, 1963, 8:01 p.m. 225. Ref: Nicosia's 295./1/ Deputy PM Venizelos/2/ made following points on Cyprus problem during recent contacts with Department officers: /1/Document 295. /2/Venizelos was a member of the Greek delegation attending the funeral of President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22. 1. He said it was essential make some amendments to Cyprus constitution and indicated GOG has British support. He had spoken to Inonu and Erkin here in Washington in general terms about Greek-Turkish problems and will see latter again at NATO meeting and when guarantor powers meet in Paris. Venizelos asked that we contribute finding solution. Makarios envisages matter as question of negotiation amend certain articles constitution while simultaneously making some concessions to Turks. In response we reiterated our interest maintaining good Greek-Turk relations and stable Cyprus and hoped GOG would talk with GOT and UK. Emphasized hope for solution through negotiation between parties directly involved. 2. British Embassy Washington informed of general pitch of Venizelos statements. 3. For Nicosia: We commend points made your response Makarios plans disclosed reftel. Seek early opportunity inform Makarios we are greatly disturbed at his constant references to ``amendments" of constitution. Our reading of situation is that presentation of such a memorandum to guarantor powers as stated would stop GOT and Turk-Cypriot cooperation before it got started and that ultimately he needs this cooperation to solve problem. 4. For Athens: Venizelos' several references in Washington conversations to amendments also cause concern. We believe he has misread British support for his position. Rusk 297. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, November 30, 1963, 1 p.m. 304. Cypriot FonMin asked me to call at noon today and handed me copy of memorandum entitled ``Suggested Measures for Facilitating the Smooth Functioning of the State and for the Removal of Certain Causes of Intercommunal Friction". Kyprianou said Makarios had given memorandum to Kutchuk this morning and had [at that] time outlined its principal points. Kyprianou added Kutchuk had not, of course, had opportunity to read it but his preliminary reaction had been ``very bad". Kutchuk had, however, said he would study it and would need about a week. Kutchuk had been accompanied by Muftizahde and for time being Kutchuk plans to go over it alone with him and not to discuss it with other Turk Cypriots. Kyprianou also said Makarios had tried to persuade Kutchuk changes in Cypriot Constitution were required and there was no real reason to delay. Possibility of change of basic laws was acceptable in most countries. Makarios had also made point, in effort to persuade Turk Cypriots to move toward change, that it was much more difficult for him politically to recommend changes than for Turk Cypriots. Reason was Makarios would be trying to improve Constitution and thus committed to its support. Attitude reflected by these moves would not be appreciated by Greek Cypriots who favored union with Greece. Kyprianou said copies of memorandum were being handed to reps of guarantor powers for information this morning. No request for four-power meeting was being made as Cyprus considered matter internal question but British planned to urge favorable consideration upon Turkey. It was hoped that other guarantor powers would lend such support to proposals as they saw fit. Kyprianou added that Turk Amb's reaction had been favorable when he had received and run through memorandum this morning. I expressed hope that Kyprianou memorandum was not at this stage being made available to press and steps would be taken to prevent leaks. Kyprianou said it was being very closely held although correspondents were aware of meetings which Makarios and he had this morning and were pressing for information. I also asked Kyprianou if Greek Cypriots were making any efforts to explain their points of view to Turk Cypriots in addition to more formal meeting between Makarios and Kutchuk this morning. Kyprianou said he could see considerable merit in this suggestion and would get in touch with Muftizahde whom he knew well and spell out Greek Cypriot rationale for change. Kyprianou also said he would now leave for Paris on December 8 for various annual international meetings. There were no plans to discuss Greek Cypriot memorandum at these meetings but Kyprianou anticipated informal talks might take place. Kyprianou planned to stop off in Athens for few days enroute as he had not yet had chance to meet Papandreou and Venizelos since formation of new Greek Cabinet. He had no plan to discuss memorandum with them but assumed it will arise during talks. Highlights of text of memorandum are being sent by separate telegram. Argumentation, which is rather lengthy, will follow by pouch December 2. Our own comment and any local reaction will be sent early next week./1/ Our preliminary reaction is that memorandum is well-reasoned legal document with some minor advantages for Turk Cypriots. /1/The Embassy in Nicosia transmitted the highlights in telegram 305, November 30. (Ibid.) The Embassy commented on the proposals in airgram A - 212, December 2. (Ibid.) We hope that Turk Cypriots will take advantage of it for discussion and negotiation but their attitude toward constitutional change as expressed up until now makes it seem unlikely. Wilkins 298. Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 Cyp. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Nicosia and repeated to Athens, London, and Istanbul. Ankara, December 7, 1963, 11 a.m. 705. Embtel 700--Cyprus./1/ Foreign Minister Erkin telephoned just before dinner last night to say that Cabinet discussion on Cyprus had resulted in decision reject Makarios proposals definitively and publicly at this time. In fact, he was in process preparing public statement that effect. /1/Telegram 700, December 6, reported that the Turkish attitude regarding the Cyprus question was stiffening. (Ibid.) I observed this news very disappointing because, irrespective of nature proposals, Foreign Minister's previous decision to study carefully and reply specifically had seemed wisest course. Erkin replied this had been considered by Cabinet but rejected because it would be considered evidence of weakness. Unclear at this point as to position in which this reversal leaves Erkin since he has had ground cut from under him on issue on which he had not only made decision but committed himself to both British and ourselves. Also interesting note that strong personal feeling of Inonu was probably a, if not the, deciding factor in action taken since Erkin told me previous day in connection conversation reported reference telegram that Inonu had been quite wrought up in discussing Cyprus question and had felt situation possibly developing to point where partition could again become active issue. Finally, this regretfully goes to prove warning which has repeatedly been given of danger of putting pressure on GOT in time of political strain. Perhaps this merely coincidence in present case but result same. Text Erkin statement reported separately./2/ Hare /2/In telegram 707 from Ankara, December 7. Its operative portion reads: ``Since it is impossible accept such a proposal for opening of discussions on these documents which guarantee vital rights and interests of Turk Cypriots, Council of Ministers has decided to reject it." (Ibid., POL Cyp) 2 299. Memorandum of Conversation //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by Greene on December 13 and initialed by Jernegan. Washington, December 12, 1963. Cyprus PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador Mr. Ilter Turkmen, Counselor of Turkish Embassy NEA--John D. Jernegan GTI--Myles L. Greene Ambassador Menemencioglu came in on instructions from Ankara to discuss GOT views on the current situation in Cyprus. He opened the conversation by tracing recent events revolving around the proposals made by Archbishop Makarios to Vice President Kuchuk. He tied this to the Cypriot crisis of the 1950's which he explained in terms of Greek and Turkish public opinion developing extreme opinions and dragging their respective Governments into similar positions. The GOT wants to avoid a repetition of this now. The Ambassador said his Government had known that Makarios was about to present some thoughts, but had no idea they would go as far as these proposals. The proposals skip over incidentals and go to the heart of life-and-death issues involving Turk-Cypriots. First among these is the veto power. This is particularly important as a safeguard against communist strength on Cyprus, a subject which President Kennedy had referred to in his conversation with Foreign Minister Erkin last June./1/ Other critical proposals made concerned the army and police. All of this had been put forward purposely by the Archbishop at a time of Cabinet change in Turkey. Makarios failed to understand that any Turkish Cabinet would have precisely the same reaction as the Inonu Government. /1/President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk met with Foreign Minister Erkin and Ambassador Menemenciouglu on June 1 from 9:45 to 10:10 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) No memorandum of conversation has been found. Ambassador Menemencioglu reviewed the Makarios visit to Washington in June 1962. It was his impression that Makarios had been disappointed by the firm USG statements to the effect that present communal arrangements on Cyprus must remain unchanged. He continued that of course the GOT would be pleased to cooperate in making the implementation of present arrangements easier, but neither the GOT nor Turk-Cypriots could consider changes in the arrangements themselves. He hoped the USG could urge moderation on the Archbishop. Mr. Jernegan replied that the USG had, in fact, been urging moderation on all parties concerned in the present dispute. We too had been surprised at the sweep of the Makarios proposals, but we do not share the GOT view on the impossibility of studying and replying to the proposals. We have been slightly hopeful over reports that Kuchuk will take some time before making a reply. We very much regret the quick public reply from the GOT. At the very least, the GOT could have refrained from making any comment. The Ambassador said the GOT had no choice but to reply. For one reason, there are no real Cypriots, only Greek-Cypriots and Turk-Cypriots, and the Turkish Government must, as certainly the Greek Government would also do, speak up for its fellow nationals. Once Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos commented saying the proposals were entirely an internal Cypriot affair, the GOT had no choice but to give its own views. In reply to Mr. Jernegan's question about possible points that might be discussed, Ambassador Menemencioglu replied that there is the question of joint community arrangements. Above all things, however, Turk-Cypriots could not accept the Makarios proposals as an agenda for any kind of discussion. Mr. Jernegan then commented that it would be best for all if Kuchuk would at least reply by listing points that he would be willing to discuss. The Ambassador said that might be possible. Then in reply to Mr. Jernegan's question, he said the only way to get the Cyprus situation back to something resembling a balance was for Makarios to accept the fact that Cyprus is an exceptional place requiring exceptional governmental arrangements. The heart of such arrangements is the present minority guarantees, without which the situation would be most grave. In further discussion of a reply to the Makarios proposals, Mr. Jernegan commented that it would be a most serious error if Kuchuk submits a flatly negative reply. Not only would this harm the international image of the Turk-Cypriots, but it would also give Makarios an excuse for more extreme future steps. The Ambassador agreed with both of these points, adding that perhaps Kuchuk might reply by listing issues that fall short of the life-and-death category. He then repeated his request that the USG speak up with Makarios on the need for moderation. Mr. Jernegan concluded the conversation promising that we would continue to do all that is possible to urge moderation on all parties. This would be done within the limitations placed on us by the fact that prime responsibility rests with the guarantor powers. This particularly refers to the United Kingdom, whose present efforts toward a solution of the Cyprus problem we are prepared to support. 300. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Confidential. Rusk was in Paris December 13 - 18 to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting and in London December 18 - 19 to meet with British officials. London, December 18, 1963, 7 p.m. Secto 40. Cyprus FonMin Kyprianou accompanied by Pelaghias called on Secretary at 12 noon, December 18, at Embassy Paris. After initial expression of condolence over death of President Kennedy, entire conversation centered around proposed amendments Cyprus Constitution. FonMin said Makarios had made proposals for constitutional changes not to deprive Turkish minority of its rights but to remove division of Greek and Turkish communities. Makarios had some hopes for negotiation but now Turkish Government has rejected his proposals. Meeting in Paris of Greek, Cypriot and Turkish FonMins appears still scheduled for Friday, December 20. Its purpose is to discuss the Treaties of Alliance but FonMin expected constitutional proposals also to be discussed. Turkish Government rejection is not a favorable indication for success. Secretary glanced over constitutional proposals provided him by FonMin and observed that against background of Zurich agreement these appear to be fairly far-reaching changes. FonMin denied this saying four or five of the thirteen items benefit Turkish community. Purpose of proposals he reiterated is merely to remove divisive elements. FonMin said troublesome aspect of problem is inclusion of outsiders. Matter has become internal political issue in Greece and Turkey. To solve Cyprus problem once and for all, one of two possible alternatives indicated: 1) union with Greece or 2) independence within British Commonwealth cutting alliance with Greece and Turkey. He said Greek and Turkish alliances were merely sources of friction. Troops maintained in Cyprus cannot defend the country and can only turn possible internal conflicts into broader ones. Greek and Turkish forces should leave and UK remain. Secretary asked if this could be worked out between the two communities in Cyprus. FonMin replied only problem is Turkish Government. Greeks will agree and UK is favorable. If Turkish Cypriots refuse to negotiate dangerous situation will develop. Secretary pointed out if changes made by agreement no one could object; if attempt made carry out changes without agreement explosive situation would be created. FonMin said independence should be real independence. People of Cyprus should decide for themselves. Greeks make up 82 percent of population and matter should be decided by ``democratic means". FonMin went on at some length on theme that proposed constitutional changes would remove division in communities, in legislature and judiciary. Fact that proposal moderate demonstrated by opposition of extremists who desire union now with Greece. Although there is interest in union with Greece, FonMin maintained ``Commonwealth solution" best. Secretary said US feels that the two communities should work out this problem in the first place and then the guarantor powers. In response to FonMin's request US intervene with Turks to persuade communities to negotiate, Secretary said US does not need this additional problem. We hope moderation will prevail and a way be found to continue negotiation. Violence should be avoided. Secretary asked FonMin to keep Ambassador Wilkins informed. US primary concern is that whatever comes out of this be worked out by agreement. FonMin said ``on personal basis" he would like Secretary to give thought to ``wider solution" for Cyprus. Secretary was noncommittal. He said FonMin would have no trouble with US with whatever was worked out by negotiation and agreement. Rusk 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, December 22, 1963, 11:59 p.m. 341. This afternoon Acting British High Commissioner and I together had separate talks with Makarios and Kutchuk. We each stressed deep concern of our two govts re recent incidents. We made points suggested by Washington and London/1/ emphasizing situation was being followed with close attention because of threat to Cypriots and our own countrymen alike. We especially hoped that Makarios and Kutchuk would find immediate ways of calming situation. /1/In telegram 247 to Nicosia, December 21, the Department of State informed the Embassy of the British desire for a joint representation to Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders with the aim of restraining both the police and Turkish rioters in the aftermath of violent clashes between members of the two communities that resulted in five deaths. The Department of State instructed Wilkins to coordinate his demarche with the British High Commissioner. (Ibid.) By chance we saw Kutchuk first and found him extremely pessimistic. Both he and Muftizadhe described recent developments as new steps in Greek Cypriot plan to alter Constitution and treaties. Kutchuk said Greek Cypriot police had for some time been harassing Turk Cypriots at night and that Greek Cypriot Minister of Interior had been irresolute and biased in his reporting to Makarios and in his handling of events. Kutchuk said he had persuaded Makarios to issue joint call for moderation and restraint and to make joint visit to scene of one altercation. He had also suggested quick setting-up of commission of inquiry which will be considered by Ministerial Council tomorrow morning. Kutchuk said he would continue to urge moderation and restraint but was uncertain how long he could control his people in face of continual Greek Cypriot provocation. Makarios was serious and objective stressing that facts re various incidents were incomplete, contradictory and exaggerated and it seemed to him incidents were isolated and unconnected although he admitted some of minor developments might have been retaliatory. Minister of Interior had been asked to ascertain facts soonest and to instruct Greek Cypriot police to restrict themselves to outskirts of Turk Cypriot areas and not to act in provocative way. Makarios said he had agreed with Kutchuk on desirability of joint Greek/Turk Cypriot police patrols and commission of inquiry. There might be some legal question in way of establishment of commission but he favored it and would urge it in Council tomorrow. Makarios hoped that measures along foregoing lines would be helpful in bringing down tension and restoring peace. Makarios also added that because of high state of tension he would not now move forward as quickly with his plans for constitutional change. I took this reference to mean that he would slow up carrying out plan for changing Constitution which he outlined by memo last June and to which he has alluded from time to time in subsequent conversations. I said it seemed to us preferable to work out solutions with Turk Cypriots through discussions and that it still seemed to me that changes could be effected within framework of Constitution. Makarios doubted, however, it would be possible to move forward in this way as interpretations or understandings of constitutional provisions would not, he believed, be sufficiently binding. Renewed clashes broke out this evening as I finished drafting preceding account of conversations with Makarios and Kutchuk. These reports are fragmentary but seem to indicate grenade and gunfire in several areas. Further message will follow as soon as we have clear information./2/ We have no reports any Americans are endangered. All were asked yesterday to stay out of crowded areas and remain quietly at home. /2/Wilkins reported on subsequent developments in telegram 342, December 23. (Ibid., POL 25 Cyp) Wilkins 302. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Confidential; Immediate. Passed to the White House and repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and London. Ankara, December 23, 1963, 4 p.m. 758. Foreign Minister Erkin (who returned last night) asked me come in urgently see him at 2:15 PM today. Said he had several ``very fruitful" conversations with Venizelos in Paris/1/ in which mutually recognizing that break on Cyprus would mean disruption of otherwise constructive Greek-Turk relationship, they had come to agreement that effort should be made by both parties in Cyprus to work out difficulties under constitution at this stage in thought that unreasonable to declare constitution unworkable until honest effort made apply it. In consequence Venizelos had given assurance he would send message that effect to Makarios and make clear he would stand with Erkin if Makarios refused compliance and Erkin had given similar assurance with reference Kutchuk. Kyprianou was present at one of meetings in which this policy laid out. /1/Their discussions took place during the December 20 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor powers on Cyprus issues. As consequence Erkin had left Paris greatly reassured only to hear on return of serious disorders which had taken place and as result of which he summoned by Inonu to headquarters of Turkish General Staff to discuss what to be done in light of rapid deterioration in situation and increasing danger to Turkish community. Erkin said he had first suggested consultation as provided by treaty but Inonu felt this would be too slow to meet possibly imminent holocaust and felt should proceed forthwith to intervention. He accordingly instructed Erkin so propose to British and Greek Governments through their Ambassadors here and also make same request of USG through me. I said distressed hear GOT had reason believe situation so serious as call for such extreme action but, if that its evaluation, understood approach to British and Greeks as guarantors under treaty. What I did not understand however was basis on which we being approached since our only status in matter hitherto had been as friend of all concerned trying be helpful. Erkin acknowledged this was the case and would have to leave it to us how approach matter. Formalities aside, it was opinion of GOT that our participation could be decisive even if only on token basis. Further than that he did not feel he could go. Comment: I gathered that Erkin realized he was making unusual request but that he was acting under orders which he did not feel able question. Hare 303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bowling, cleared in G, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, Paris Topol, Rome, and USCINCEUR. Washington, December 24, 1963, 10:51 a.m. 548. Paris pass Burns and James. Rome for Burris. For Ambassadors. Ankara 766 to Department, repeated Athens 73, London 129, Nicosia 74./1/ /1/Telegram 766 from Ankara, December 24, reported on Hare's meeting with Erkin during which Erkin stated that Inonu demanded that attacks on Turk Cypriots cease and held Makarios responsible for the violence. Erkin also stated that Turkey resented U.S. efforts to restrain it from the use of force. (Ibid.) 1. Check immediately with UK Ambassador who should by now have received detailed HMG proposal including tripartite appeal GOC and community leaders and offer good offices. 2. Inform Erkin USG and UK have quite different reading from that of GOT on events in Cyprus. We believe hostilities not planned by either side, that leadership both communities making genuine effort halt fighting, and that armed underground organizations both communities are out of control. Extremists on both sides accuse leadership of other side of plotting attacks. 3. Inform Erkin USG as sincere friend Turkey and of people both communities on Cyprus urges GOT to contribute to calm on island and consult with other guarantor powers. With permission UK Ambassador you may state HMG even now ready present urgent action plan, and that Duncan Sandys will arrive Nicosia in few hours. 4. Responsible leadership both communities even now making desperate efforts stop fighting. GOT should act to help this leadership through exercise of its own high sense of responsibility to re-establish peace and order. 5. All addressees support new British diplomatic initiative as you deem most effective. Rusk 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by Bowling and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, and Istanbul and repeated to Rome, Paris Topol, and USCINCEUR. Washington, December 24, 1963, 5:56 p.m. 553. Turk Ambassador Washington December 24 requested see Assistant Secretary Talbot. Stated he calling on urgent instructions; described worsening situation Cyprus, emphasizing alleged merger of police units with EOKA organization and attacks on Turk Cypriot women and children. Described pressure Turkish public opinion on GOT as increasing; thanked US for helpful actions thus far; asked USG do everything necessary restore situation. Talbot replied that USG shared GOT concern over violence in Cyprus and would continue be helpful in any way possible. Talbot pointed out primary responsibility of Cypriot communities and special role of guarantor powers, congratulated GOT for participating in tri-partite cease-fire and good offices appeal just announced, and emphasized necessity GOT staying in line with other Guarantor Powers. Turk Ambassador, noting he now departing from his instructions, said real element of pressure was that Turkish armed forces would act with or without civilian government. Talbot said both US and UK are convinced that leaders both communities in Cyprus sincere in deploring bloodshed and seeking cease-fire. Turk Ambassador appeared mildly skeptical re Makarios but did not argue point. Rusk 305. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp/NATO. Secret; Flash. Received at 9:33 a.m. Passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CIA, and the White House and repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, London, Athens, and Rome. Paris, December 25, 1963, 2 p.m. Polto 881. Reference: Topol 847./1/ NATO Council meeting held this morning 1015. Turkish Perm Rep read long statement divided in two parts: 1) information as to current situation in Cyprus indicating Turkish community in danger of massacre by Greek Cypriot community (all this later contested by Greek Perm Rep) and 2) information on intention of Turkish Government to act unilaterally by sending Turkish NATO-assigned forces to Cyprus, if tripartite action by guarantor powers proves unable to control situation. /1/Topol 847, December 2, instructed Finletter to coordinate his actions with those of the British NATO Representative if Turkey announced the withdrawal of some of its forces from NATO. (Ibid.) The firmness of the Turkish Perm Rep's warning that unilateral action might be taken by Turkish forces was ominous. British and Dutch Perm Reps spoke to me privately of their concern lest Turkish statement implied that decision to intervene unilaterally had already been made or was at least under most serious consideration. Sentiment of whole Council was strongly for moderation by Turks and expressed firm hope tripartite action would be successful. Acting SYG summed up firm NAC consensus that all members expected Turks would inform NAC before taking any unilateral action. Turkish Perm Rep said he would report this desire of NAC to his government. Because of precipitate action in calling meeting Council was not aware of NAC resolution of 14 December 1956/2/ which decided that disputes between NATO members not capable of settlement directly be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework and recognized the duty of member governments and of SYG to bring to NAC's attention matters threatening solidarity of Alliance. Suggest that if situation worsens you may want to consult with UK as to whether they wish to invoke this Council procedure and, if so, whether you wish to support it. Have informed UK Perm Rep of this 1956 resolution. /2/For text of the December 14, 1956, NAC resolution, see Department of State Bulletin, December 31, 1956, pp. 981 - 982. Council agreed that if today's meeting became known to the press they would be told merely that Council met to hear a report on situation in Cyprus. SecGen requested delegations to remain accessible in the event further emergency meetings are required as situation develops. In view of possible further NAC action, request Department and all addressees to Paris USRO. Finletter 306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Bowling and cleared by Johnson and Talbot. Also sent to Ankara and Athens and repeated to Rome, London, Paris Topol, and USCINCEUR. Washington, December 25, 1963, 10:15 a.m. 258. Paris pass Burns and James. Rome for Burris. For Ambassadors. UK has, according US Embassy London, called in Greek and Turk Ambs London and proposed joint military intervention Cyprus soonest, conditional on invitation from Makarios. Intervention would be under UK command and at least at first be confined to military units now on island. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Embassies Athens and Ankara authorized provide full support to British initiative, after consultation UK colleagues re tactics. Embassy Nicosia authorized cooperate fullest extent in persuading Makarios issue invitation, but should consult with UK re timing, which apparently will depend on speed of GOT and GOG acceptance UK proposal. Rusk 307. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Confidential. Received at 2:52 p.m. and relayed to USUN; the White House; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and CIA. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and London. Ankara, December 28, 1963, 1 p.m. 795. Embtel 792./1/ Immediate reason for meeting with FonMin Erkin was reported in reftel but he also commented further re more long-range aspects of problem and asked this be reported to Department as background. /1/Telegram 792, December 28, reported on Turkish reaction to the Government of Cyprus' request for a U.N. Security Council meeting on the island's future. (Ibid.) Turks now coming to conclusion that Makarios real purpose is to make life so unendurable for Turks that they will be forced leave unless more effective arrangement made to assure equitable status. (In this connection Erkin noted report that Turk police in Cyprus not being paid and that Makarios threatening retaliatory action against them. This GOT would not tolerate.) Indicating his general agreement this line of thought Erkin recalled that only way Greek-Turkish enmity transformed to friendship in twenties had been by extreme measure of transfer population. Now confronted by similar situation and, if Greek-Turkish friendship not to be tragically lost, will be necessary have recourse to ``radical" solution. What form it might take frankly not yet clear to him. Partition comes to mind but he had counselled responsible Turkish journalists not to stress for fear partition might become public fixation and prevent proper consideration some other possibly preferable solution. Resolution of this longer term problem, said Erkin, will be difficult and ``explosive" and he expressed hope we would keep open mind and avoid premature conclusions. Only specific thing he could now say was that break down of confidence so great that necessary continue tripartite responsibility for maintaining security until new solution reached. Hare 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Moffitt; cleared by Talbot, NEA, and UNP; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and London. Washington, December 28, 1963, 3:56 p.m. 1777. Cyprus SC Meeting. 1. Dept hopes adjournment of meeting with your statement that further discussion be held ``if and when" SC members deem it appropriate will make it possible avoid another session. We recognize this may depend on developments in Cyprus. 2. Following is guidance re US role in any further meetings: (a) UK, Greece and Turkey have treaty responsibilities. We look to UK to take lead to keep debate in constructive channels. Dept is in touch with British both in London and Washington to make this clear. (b) US should take back seat during debate but should discreetly seek keep discussion in moderate key, particularly when in chair. (c) We assume, however, it will be necessary for US to speak. Our statement should not discuss merits of Cypriot complaint against Turkey or of background issues which brought on recent communal violence, but should stress need for those concerned to work out their differences. In this connection we should call particular attention to existence of consultation machinery under Treaty of Guarantee to which all four parties are signatory. That Treaty calls on GOC to respect provisions of Cyprus Constitution and provides that, in event any breach of treaty, Govts of Greece, Turkey and UK shall consult with view to making representations or taking necessary steps to ensure observance of Treaty provisions. Treaty provides further that, should concerted action by three guaranteeing powers not be possible, ``each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs established by the present treaty." In replying to Cypriot complaint, Turks may invoke this provision to justify their overflights Cyprus territory and ship movements. (d) Greek Cypriot strategy is abundantly clear. They want involve UN in Cyprus problem. As Rossides indicated at meeting last night, Greek Cypriots would like an SC Res calling on parties (i.e. Turkey) refrain from threat or use of force in Cyprus situation. Greek Cypriot leadership has for past year or so hinted they might refer their difficulties with Turk Cypriots and Cyprus Constitution to UN. Makarios has since independence 1960 assiduously cultivated Afro-Asian group with view in part to developing support for Greek Cypriot position on constitutional problem. In recent months Greek Cypriot leaders have been propounding doctrine that revision of Constitution is internal matter and that Treaty of Guarantee and provisions of London - Zurich Agreement infringe Cypriot sovereignty and right of self-determination. Rossides touched on these points in his statement last night. Greek Cypriots thus far frustrated in their desire amend Constitution by Treaty of Guarantee and by London - Zurich Agreement. Basic provisions of Constitution taken from London - Zurich Agreement and can be changed only with consent all parties to those agreements. We feel Greek Cypriots hope to leap-frog treaties by involving UN in Cyprus question and by invoking right of self-determination and claiming infringement of sovereignty. While USG has urged leaders both Cypriot communities sit down together in effort resolve their differences, and has in recent weeks been supporting a British effort to this end, we would not want do anything to abet Greek Cypriots in their efforts bypass treaties which made Cypriots a nation. (e) We believe it likely Soviets, and possibly Ghana, will support Greek Cypriots in SC. Communist party in Cyprus, which is essentially Greek Cypriot, has strongly supported Makarios in his efforts to amend Cyprus Constitution. Soviets might also see opportunity improve their position in Cyprus and sow discord between Greece and Turkey with implications for NATO solidarity. (f) We would hope SC by consensus and without formal resolution would take note of consultation machinery under Treaty of Guarantee and urge all parties employ this machinery in effort resolve Cyprus problem. Harriman 309. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State //Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 Cyp. Confidential. Passed to the White House; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; CIA; and USUN and repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Nicosia, December 31, 1963, 5 p.m. 423. As cease-fire arrangements are progressively improved, there is more and more speculation as to political future of Cyprus and attitude not only of guarantor powers, but also US, USSR and UAR. I have had talks with Lebanese, Chinese, Italian, French, Israeli and Greek Ambs. I have not seen Brit HICOM lately as he has been out of running with bad throat part of time and tied up with Sandys in meetings at other moments, but I have been in touch with his deputy. Turk Amb has generally been inaccessible, although I spoke with him by phone. It is commonly believed that Republic of Cyprus has been dealt deep wound which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to heal. Some believed after Christmas that Makarios' political position within Greek Cypriot community had been weakened because he agreed to cease-fire before Greek Cypriot forces had achieved their objectives and because he agreed to ask UK to come back and command tripartite group supervising it. This view may still be heard, but has been partially replaced by comment that present situation proves Makarios has been correct all along in calling for changes in Constitution and treaties and is now more than ever justified in moving ahead to revise them. Recent statements by Makarios, Kyprianou, Kutchuk and Denktash are cited in evidence that old order has been severely damaged. Greek Cypriots' remarks are interpreted as continuing to call for amendment to Constitution and dropping of Greece and Turkey from Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. Turkish Cypriot remarks are read as calling for partition although we believe Turkish Cypriots might settle for autonomy with more effective guarantees, such as larger Turkish military contingent. Most observers do not see how these divergent views can be reconciled. Political discussion, much less meeting of minds, between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is presently unlikely in view of prevailing tension accompanied by charge and countercharge here and elsewhere. Many observers suggest that guarantor powers should again take up this problem as they did in 1959. Others suggest UN or US or combination of all of these. In past US has been charged, without foundation, of favoring Turkey. During recent violence this Greek Cypriot myth was again heard. More recently, however, rumors from Athens that American Sixth Fleet was in Aegean and would prevent Turkish invasion of Cyprus have appeared and American name is again in better standing. In past few days, there have been some press comments that Cyprus should seek assist-ance from USSR. This may be Soviet or Communist ``fishing in troubled waters" or it may be prompted by Makarios who is prone to make use of press and if true may be designed to pressure Turks. Greek Cypriot leadership has still not welcomed Greek Cypriot Communists into fold. It did not, for example, arm them or make use of them in recent fighting, although Communists must have pressed hard to be included in hope of washing away stigma that they stood aside during fight with British several years ago. UAR Amb has called on Makarios two or three times during past few days. UAR may be trying to get back into Makarios' good graces; Makarios would listen because he still would like to have Arab support at UN. Cyprus' political future on eve of new year is thus far from clear, but with consolidation of cease-fire and gradual calming of passions, Greek and Turkish Cypriots may think about this future more rationally. I would hope that, instead of turning to radical solutions, such as partition which might lead to movement of population, they would maintain unity of Cyprus by moving toward some form of federation. Turkish Cypriot call for partition might be countered with suggestion that Turkish Cypriot community be allowed to manage its own affairs for time being, with help whenever possible from central government, and that this set-up continue until there is time for further discussion as to political future of Cyprus. Separate municipalities, for example, have been functioning in this way without geographic division of areas since 1958. Wilkins Return to This Volume Home Page |
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