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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963, Volume I
Vietnam, 1961Department of State
Washington, DC
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IV. Vice President Johnson's Trip to Asia, May 9-24, 1961, and the Visit of Vietnamese Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan to Washington, June 12-17, 1961
53. Editorial Note
Following Rostow's memorandum to the President, April 12 (Document 27), planning began on the schedule for Vice President Johnson's trip to Asia. Initially, the Embassy in Saigon wanted him to arrive in Vietnam in time for Diem's inauguration on April 29, but this was not feasible. By early May, plans for the trip included visits to Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, India, and Pakistan, beginning May 9 and ending May 24. On May 5, President Kennedy announced at his press conference that he had asked the Vice President to undertake a special fact-finding mission to Asia. For text of the announcement and related questions and answers, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 354-362.
The Vice President, accompanied by Mrs. Johnson and President Kennedy's sister and brother-in-law, Jean and Stephen Smith, arrived in Saigon at 6:40 p.m. on May 11 and proceeded directly to the Gia Long Palace, the official government guest house. That evening the Vice President attended a dinner hosted by Ambassador Nolting, who had presented his credentials the previous day. On May 12, he held extensive conversations with President Diem starting at 8 a.m. followed by a day of ceremonial visits which ended with a dinner in his honor hosted by Diem. On May 13, the Vice President paid a brief farewell call on Diem at 8 a.m. before departing for Manila at 9. The documentation that follows presents the most significant aspects of his visit to Saigon. For a report to President Kennedy on the whole trip, see Document 60. Documentation on the planning for the trip, including briefing papers, schedules, records of conversations, and biographic materials is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CFs 1875-1883; ibid., Central File 033.1100-JO; and the Johnson Library.
54. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, May 13, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/5-1361. Secret; Priority. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Mendenhall and cleared with Nolting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 361.1) Also sent to CINCPAC for PolAd and repeated to Manila, Taipei, and Phnom Penh.
1740. Codel Johnson. Vice President's initial call on President Diem morning May 12./2/
/2/The meeting began at 8 a.m. with Mendenhall, who characterized it as cordial, interpreting. (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Vietnam Interviews, December 27, 1983) A nine-point check list of things for the Vice President to do at the meeting is in Johnson Library, VP Security Files, Program for South Vietnam. In telegram 1724, May 12, dispatched immediately after this meeting, the Embassy in Saigon commented that the visit had already done a great deal to establish the basis for increased and successful joint efforts to be undertaken in mutual confidence. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO/5-1261)
(This not cleared by Vice President.)
After opening visit with presentation to Diem of gift of American Heritage books, Vice President immediately moved into substantive purpose of visit. He told Diem his visit to Vietnam is expression of President Kennedy's letter to President Diem (Department's 1359/3/). Vice President noted letter represents President's thoughts on what might be done about situation in Vietnam and offers basis for what US role might be in cooperation with GVN. Vice President stressed that we could learn much from Diem's experience and he had come to listen to his views as well as present President Kennedy's.
/3/Telegram 1359, May 9 (ibid., 751K.11/5-961), transmitted the text of the letter to Diem; see Document 48.
Diem read letter and then proceeded outline situation in Vietnam both historic and present. He brought in particularly aspects of situation suggested by President Kennedy's letter and noted that he had proposed 20,000 force increase and MAP support for full Civil Guard several years ago.
Vice President succeeded in getting Diem's attention refocused on President Kennedy's letter and asked Diem specifically whether he agreed to various proposals in letter. Following is Diem's reaction point-by-point :
1. Agreed infuse into our actions high sense of urgency and dedication.
2. Pleased US has approved MAP support for 20,000 force increase but pointed to problem of paying local currency costs for this increase.
3. Agreed parallel political and economic action of equal importance with military measures but stated political and economic actions must be those appropriate to Vietnam as country which is underdeveloped and subject Communist subversion.
4. Agreed to increase in MAAG personnel.
5. Agreed MAAG support and advise self-defense corps.
6. Pleased MAP support for entire Civil Guard force of 68,000.
7. Likewise accepted offer material support for junk force.
8. Noted we prepared consider case for further increase in strength armed forces.
9. Agreed further urgent joint study on border control techniques.
10. Agreed consider establishment in SEA of research and development facility.
11. Agreed use military specialists to assist Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare, and public works activities at village level. Stressed, however, importance of tact of foreign officials in working in this field.
12. Agreed renew border control negotiations with Cambodian Government. (However reference to previous efforts by GVN to obtain Cambodian agreement on joint border action and to Cambodian "aggressiveness in seizing at least six Vietnamese Islands" indicate continued GVN tendency place onus on Cambodian Government for lack results in border control field, without displaying awareness that GVN has taken no initiative in other fields such as settlement its financial debt to Cambodia which might put Cambodians in better frame of mind for negotiations.)
13. Agreed on desirability of using foreign non-American experts in counter-guerrilla field but stressed it would be up to initiative GVN to request these experts and they would have to work under its control.
14. Agreed to proposal for despatch US economic and fiscal experts to work out financial plan as basis for joint efforts. Demurred at first, however, about accepting experts from US Government on grounds they would lack impartiality and objectivity but Vice President pointed out would be necessary from our point of view to use US employed experts if we were to come up with plan which would be basis for official US action.
15. Agreed we should work together on longer range economic development program.
Vice President urged Diem to provide letter of reply to President Kennedy as early as possible. Diem said he would do so prior to Vice President's return to Washington from trip.
Diem presented memo to Vice President on need for additional defense support aid./4/ Memorandum points to increasing local currency costs especially in defense field and states increased aid needed in order close balance payments gap and maintain foreign exchange reserves at minimum level $200 million. Requests increase of about $30 million "above 1961 average level" (i.e., presumably for FY 1962). Also recommends that Buv American policy should not be applied to aid program for Viet-Nam. Text memorandum being pouched.
Agreed at end conversation joint communiqué should be issued./5/
/4/Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 519 from Saigon, May 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO/5-1661)
/5/The Embassy in Saigon transmitted the draft of a communiqué in telegram 1731, May 12. (Ibid., 611.51K/5-1261) The draft had 13 agreed points, but the final communiqué had only 8. For its text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1043-1045. Since telegram 1731 asked Washington to be ready to comment by telephone early Friday, May 13, presumably the changes were made at that time.
Comment: While history negotiations with GVN shows frequent slippage on GVN side in maintaining relative schedule (e.g., in presenting counter-insurgency plan in February we proposed agreement on plan be reached within two weeks but took two and one-half months), we believe Diem will reply President Kennedy letter shortly. Meanwhile, joint communiqué today buttons up certain matters. Suggest immediate recruitment economic and financial experts (group should be small and good and headed by top-level, well-known figure) and team military specialists in civic action field, but neither body should be dispatched Viet-Nam prior receipt written reply President Kennedy's letter. Believe it would be useful have GVN memo on need for increased defense support aid (transmitted separately) examined by economic and financial group./6/
/6/An Embassy report on Johnson's talk with Diem after dinner on May 12 was transmitted in telegram 1743 from Saigon, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO/5-1561; see also Declassified Documents, 1981, p. 537) During this conversation, Diem said that he desired U.S. and/or SEATO combat troops in Vietnam only in case of overt aggression.
Nolting
55. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, May 15, 1961, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO/5-1561. Secret; Priority. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Mendenhall and cleared by Nolting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 361.1) Repeated to Hong Kong, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
1744. Codel Johnson. VP's final call on President Diem morning May 13./2/
/2/The meeting took place at 7:30 and lasted for 20 minutes. Another record of the conversation states that the Vice President appeared tired and distracted. (Memorandum of conversation, May 13; ibid., 350 GVN)
(This not cleared by VP)
VP emphasized to President Diem that he was very impressed with his visit to Viet-Nam and warmth of his reception here. He told President Diem he could feel sure that VP would be strong supporter of Viet-Nam in Washington. He outlined steps which he suggested President Diem take in near future:
1. Issuance of joint communiqué at conclusion of VP's visit./3/
/3/For text of the final communiqué, see American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1043-1045.
2. Quick brief letter replying to President Kennedy's letter to President Diem. This would be more a letter of acknowledgement than a substantive letter./4/
/4/The text of Diem's reply, May 15, is in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11. pp. 155- 156.
3. Follow-up letter from President Diem to President Kennedy timed to arrive in Washington with VP Johnson's return from trip abroad. This would be substantive letter and VP suggested Diem put into this letter his views on additional assistance which he feels Viet-Nam will really need to stem Communist tide in this country. He suggested letter might include reference to possible one hundred thousand increase in armed forces (over 20 thousand increase already agreed to) and measures of economic and social aid. VP advised Diem to work out cost estimate carefully with US officials in Saigon to insure they would be properly supported in Washington.
Nolting
56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, May 20, 1961, 7:41 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/5-2061. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and signed for the Acting Secretary by Cottrell and cleared with McConaughy and S/S. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1978, p. 112A. Telegram 1422, May 20, advised that the Presidential Program transmitted here listed only those items specifically approved by the President, most of which were extracted from the Task Force Report (see footnote 2, Document 51, and Document 42). It also advised the Embassy in Saigon that Task Force traffic should be slugged Task Force VN with the appropriate paragraph number corresponding to the Presidential Program. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/5-2061)
1423. Task Force VN. Following is the Presidential Program for Vietnam to be carried out on priority action basis with high sense urgency and dedication. Each action listed herein has been approved by the President.
Objective
To prevent Communist domination of Viet-Nam by initiating, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a political, military, economic, psychological, and covert character, designed to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society and to keep Viet-Nam free.
Program
Political:
1. Seek to increase the confidence of President Diem and his Government in the United States by a series of actions and messages relating to the trip of Vice President Johnson.
2. Attempt to strengthen President Diem's popular support within Viet-Nam by reappraisal and negotiation, under the direction of Ambassador Nolting.
3. Begin negotiations looking toward a new bilateral arrangement with Viet-Nam, but make no firm commitment to such an arrangement without further review by the President.
4. Negotiate in appropriate ways to improve Viet-Nam's relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia, and its standing in world opinion.
5. Strengthen border-control arrangements, particularly with Cambodia; encourage Diem to authorize the renewal of negotiations on this subject with the Cambodian Government. If he concurs, we will use our best efforts with the Cambodians to facilitate these discussions.
6. Cooperate with the GVN in planning the most effective use of assistance offered by other governments to assist Viet-Nam in its actions against the Viet Cong, including the provision of certain expert personnel with long experience, e.g., in Malaya.
7. Examine the diplomatic setting within which a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Viet-Nam might be undertaken.
8. Assess the political implications of increasing GVN forces from 170,000 to 200,000.
9. Ambassador Nolting is requested to recommend any necessary reorganization of the Country Team to accomplish 1 and 2 above.
Military:
10. Install as a matter of priority a radar surveillance capability which will enable the GVN to obtain warning of Communist overflights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air supply purposes.
11. Military Assistance Program support of 20,000-man increase in ARVN is approved.
12. Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure the effective implementation of the military portion of the program including the training of the additional 20,000 men.
13. Consider together with the GVN, if developments should warrant, the case for a further increase in ARVN strength beyond the 170,000 limit now contemplated.
14. Provide MAP support for the entire Civil Guard force of 68,000.
15. Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to provide support and advice to the Self Defense Corps with a strength of approximately 40,000.
16. Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force as a means of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into Viet-Nam by water, to include training of junk crews in Viet-Nam or at U.S. bases.
17. Give Special Forces training to assist the GVN in accelerating the training of its Special Forces.
18. Collaborate with the GVN in the use of certain military specialists to assist and work with the ARVN in health, welfare, and public works activities in the villages.
19. Study jointly with the GVN the problem of Viet-Nam's borders to develop techniques whereby crossing of those borders by unfriendly elements can be more effectively controlled.
20. Consider jointly the establishment in Southeast Asia of a facility to develop and test, using the tools of modern technology, new techniques to help the U.S. and GVN in their joint campaign against the Communists.
/2/On May 23, the Department of State transmitted the following text of a new paragraph 21 for insertion in the Presidential Program and requested that subsequent paragraphs be renumbered accordingly:
"21. A full examination will be made of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case of possible commitment of U.S. forces to Viet-nam." (Telegram 1432 to Saigon; ibid., 751K.00/5-2361)
Economic:
21. Despatch to Viet-Nam a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts who would meet with GVN experts and work out a financial plan on which joint U.S.-GVN efforts can be based.
22. ICA is authorized to move into a rural development-civic action program, to include short-range, simple, impact projects which would be undertaken by teams working in cooperation with local communities.
23. Undertake the development of a long-range economic development program as a means of demonstrating U.S. confidence in the economic and political future of the country by authorizing Ambassador Nolting to inform the GVN that the U.S. is prepared to discuss a long-range joint five-year development program which would involve contributions and undertakings by both parties.
24. Assess the fiscal and other economic implications of a further ARVN forces increase from 170,000 to 200,000.
Psychological:
25. Assist the GVN to accelerate its public information program to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions required to combat the Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in the GVN's determination and ability to deal with the Communist threat.
26. The U.S. Country Team, in coordination with the GVN Ministry of Defense, should compile and declassify for use of media representatives in Viet-Nam and throughout the world documented facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorist activities and the measures being taken by the GVN to counter such attacks.
27. In coordination with CIA and the appropriate GVN Ministry, USIS will increase the flow of information about unfavorable conditions in North Viet-Nam to media representatives.
28. Develop agricultural pilot-projects throughout the country, with a view toward exploiting their beneficial psychological effects.
29. Exploit as part of a planned psychological campaign the rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners, stressing the errors of Communism, and broadcast this material to Communist-held areas, including North Viet-Nam, to induce defections.
30. Provide adequate funds for an impressive U.S. participation in the Saigon Trade Fair of 1962.
Covert:
31. Program to be carried forward and coordinated at appropriate levels.
Fiscal:
32. The President reserves judgement on the levels of funding proposed in the Task Force Report and in the funding annex.
Bowles
57. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, May 20, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.110-JO/5-2061. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens. Young accompanied the Vice President on his visit to Saigon, Manila, Taipei, and Bangkok.
2101. Codel Johnson. From Ambassador Young. I believe the Vice President's timely and gallant enterprise of purpose accomplished the missions originally conceived in Washington. He reached the politicos, the administrators, and the people. Saigon, Manila, Taipei, and Bangkok will never be quite the same again, for a new chapter has opened in US relations with Southeast Asia. The friendliness and sincerity of the Vice President and Mrs. Johnson were felt and returned. They came, saw, and won over. We must now work to sustain this wave of good feeling and not let it recede.
A sound personal relationship has begun with Diem, Chiang and Sarit. The words of assurance and earnestness of discussion established that personal bond between men of power and authority so essential for effective dealing with Asian leaders. As earnest of cooperation Sarit has agreed to increase Thai Defense budget by ten percent of our contribution, which Embassy considers symbolically significant. Meanwhile Diem issued his own communiqué and directed quick preparation of positive reply to President Kennedy's letter,/2/ which is promising. I feel greatly heartened that we have at last opened a two-way channel of confidence at the highest level with these three men. Later might have been too late.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 55.
The "veep to the people program" also went over, notwithstanding the reserve and scepticism of the orthodox and the old timers Asians and Americans. What impressed me in all four capitals was the eagerness of the younger generation, particularly the school children to reach him. This was especially significant in Bangkok. Young people gathered everywhere to greet an American leader and spokesman for the President whose name was often sounded by voices among the crowds. The leaders of tomorrow and the people of the future were with the Vice President. He reached them in a new kind of dialogue despite the reserve of the receding generation. The Vice President dramatically carried the pedestal of power to the open places of the people far better than could long lectures or diplomatic notes. Witnessing an American Vice President mixing with the crowds and talking with them may serve to humanize political communications in Asia. It may jostle political leaders and their administrators out of their office sanctuaries, even if they are nettled by this typically American approach. Some officials felt challenged to go and do likewise; others betrayed their uneasiness over this intrusion into their supposedly well ordered and old-fashioned system of aristocratic aloofness.
This enterprise also succeeded psychologically. It boosted the badly-sagging morale of Asians and Americans out here. He pictured the new administration for Southeast Asians. It filled the newspapers and TV of America with Southeast Asia. Where our image has been blurred, the mission sharpened the focus. Where our dialogue had been garbled, the mission has corrected the pitch and spoken clearly as well as eloquently. However, we must not now just bask in the afterglow. The words of assurance must be followed by acts of support. Shrewd, tough leaders like Diem, Chiang, and particularly Sarit, are waiting to see if the US follows through quickly and vigorously with concrete actions. Owing to his deep concern over Laos and the vulnerability of his long frontier, Prime Minister Sarit is waiting to see what material steps we now take in Southeast Asia. Neither he nor Thai public opinion were pleased that the US could give no specific assurances on Laos. The visit exposed but could not fill our gaping silence on Laos for understandable reasons. If the visits to Bangkok and Saigon do not result in more real support, we will look terrible in Southeast Asia. Neutralism will spread; Geneva might then turn into a communist victory celebration. The follow-up of this visit is the heart of the matter now. Sarit, for example, wants some material benefit from the United States alliance to show his officers and people. In Vietnam will the government with our massive support take steps to ensure a political acceptability? In Thailand can we stimulate a political motivation among the armed forces and rural people to support a defense plan to secure the Mekong Valley?
A significant outcome of this enterprise was the parallelism of views expressed by the four leaders we met, particularly Diem, Chiang and Sarit.
A) They felt Laos is most discouraging but still not lost. They are really apprehensive over US policies and the uncertainty and inaccuracy in their view of US attitudes on Laos. They say the Lao can and will fight if adequately trained and equipped, which they never have been. It is a mistake to write Laos off despite difficulties in dealing there. Diem, Chiang and Sarit stressed the urgency of maximum training for the FAL while there is a cease-fire to anticipate any breakdown of the Geneva Conference or any renewal of hostilities.
B) For the time being these three leaders are allergic to putting US soldiers into the area. Diem showed no appetite for American combat troops mixing among the Vietnamese people. He told me privately that we should be extremely careful about such a proposal, and pleaded with me that American military personnel-and all Americans-exercise tact and restraint in Vietnam in this critical and delicate period. Sarit also quickly backed away from taking up any suggestion of putting US troops in Thailand either under SEATO or otherwise. He was not so reluctant over Laos where, if hostilities are resumed, he will wish to lend military support to RLG but only in company with US. I think we must be aware that this a sensitive internal issue for these leaders while there is no major provocation such as the outbreak of large scale hostilities or infiltration. What they want is adequate equipment and training rapidly and efficiently provided to assure them success in their military missions.
C) These leaders responded genuinely to the Vice President's emphasis on economic progress and social justice to give the people a stake in the present and hope for the future. These famous figures even began to talk like "new frontiermen".
Complimented by the Vice President's notice of their social and economic efforts, they seemed to accept the philosophy that a politico-social program is the soundest way to increase their popularity and protect their country, provided they have the military capability to deal with communist guerillas or divisions. The Vice President's private discussions, public speeches, and communiqués highlighted the administration's emphasis on social justice. Southeast Asia needs this emphasis from Washington. The leaders and the people will now expect us to continue this dialogue on a two-way channel at all levels.
D) Each in his own version implied a need for a new political departure of some kind in East Asia. While nebulous, their individual ideas seemed to spring from their disregard and even hostility for the French and British. While Chiang was most specific, his other Asian colleagues also wanted unhindered American leadership in Asia. Chiang proposed some new organization. Sarit thought this was a good idea. Diem, at least in my private discussions, again treated Southeast Asia as a whole and not piecemeal.
In conclusion, the next step is to capitalize the assets of this visit and disregard some of the minor liabilities or irritants that inevitably follow in the wake of such an ambitious enterprise: 1) First we must go all out to stamp out the Viet Cong in the Delta area of Vietnam. To implement a comprehensive politico-military program the President and his brother promised me that they would reply positively and in detail to President Kennedy's letter as the Vice President suggested. I urged Secretary Thuan carry the letter to Washington, but I would not be surprised if he were kept in Saigon where he is so needed. 2) We must draft a supplemental military program for Thailand and reverse the cutback for FY 1962 USOM program which seems to contradict reality out here (a really good team of experts should be sent to help on fiscal planning and economic development). 3) We need to clarify our contingency thinking on Laos for the benefit of Diem and Sarit. 4) We must use the opportunities the visit gave us to mount military, economic, social, and psychological reinforcement of Thailand, Vietnam and as much of Laos as possible to strengthen our hand at Geneva. 5) In order to retain the value of this trip I would urge USIS to compile a booklet of the speeches, communiqués, pictures and schedules of this visit for circulation in this area to play up its progressive gains.
This enterprising visit did not help our adversaries. It will hurt them in this area if we follow through quickly. We should be ready for their counter actions at least in propaganda and political action somewhere.
So, trip's results are summed up in comment volunteered by Bangkok taxi driver--"Your Vice President he good man. He talk people."
Young
58. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, May 22, 1961, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379/5-2261. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Saigon, Wellington, Karachi, Canberra, Manila, Vientiane, London. Paris. and Geneva.
2111. SEATO. Since my accreditation as US Council Rep accomplished, I chaired May 22 restricted session. At opening of session, New Zealand Rep welcomed me on behalf other council reps and Sec-Gen. Pakistan Rep then suggested that since Vice Pres Johnson's time had not permitted him report Saigon visit, I might give council reps outline of visit and talks with Diem.
Drawing on substance Pres Kennedy's letter to Diem and joint communiqué, I reported that Vice Pres had consulted with Diem on two major problems: (1) military pacification and (2) social-economic development. US position is insurgency must be eliminated. Pres Kennedy suggested following as principal means accomplishing this: (1) Immediate increase GVN armed forces by 20,000, with US and GVN to keep under review possible further expansion. Increase to consist mainly ground forces supplied by US. (2) Development new style civil guard stationed in and around villages to replace old civil guard who not properly trained, armed or organized. Estimated figure in neighborhood fifty to sixty thousand. (3) Assistance to GVN in developing larger, more efficient coastal patrol force with motorized junks and other small craft. (4) Sending of military research and development specialists to South Vietnam. Would explore all possibilities of developing new types equipment and weapons required for mobile warfare in Vietnam terrain. Expected to include work in electronics for ground and air surveillance of frontiers. I stressed point that old methods of defense by no means being abandoned but that we mean to supplement them with new developments particularly suitable to situation this part of world. If worthwhile developments result from R & D efforts Vietnam, they might well be applied to other countries of SEA. US is convinced prevention infiltration a most difficult task but is determined do everything possible to limit infiltration. Idea is to be sure we are trying every means to play game better than Communists. I reported that Pres Diem most receptive to U.S. proposals and arrangements now under way for early implementation.
I said Vice Pres and Diem also considered need for technical assistance, not only by US but by other UN members and interested countries. Particularly assistance in rehabilitation of villages subject to attack or duress from Viet Cong. I emphasized that this would be a major undertaking and that Vietnam would need extensive help from outside. I urged other SEATO govts, particularly those with experience in this or related fields, to lend assistance. I noted that general discussion also held on long-term economic and social assistance and that plans under way for establishing joint cost-sharing arrangement. I noted that long-term development concept consistent with Kennedy administration emphasis on long-range rather than "crash" projects. I informed colleagues we had appointed a task force to work with GVN; that in US view welfare of Vietnamese populace and their attitude toward GVN is key factor. We recognize this is matter of extreme delicacy and this was one reason Vice Pres Johnson personally given responsibility for approaching Diem.
I then emphasized that US horizons by no means limited to Vietnam and that Pres has placed very high priority on all SEA. He wishes be sure our commitments to Asian friends well understood not only by Asian govts and peoples but also by other side. Our present goal is stabilization of Laos and, in addition, prevention festering sore of communism spreading into neighboring countries. We have no illusions task will be easy but job is under way and we intend see it through. In answer Philippine question on morale GVN forces compared with FAL, I noted morale high and they willing to fight despite weariness of long campaign against Viet Cong. I cited new ranger units as particularly effective, not only as fighters and village watchdogs but because of their humane treatment of villagers which earning them real popularity and bringing people closer to Govt. French and Australian Reps commented that GVN troops have no misgivings about nature and intention Viet Cong, having confessed atrocities perpetuated such as wholesale assassinations, burning of schools and terrorizing children and teachers.
Turning momentarily to North Vietnam, French Rep said French official from Hanoi now visiting Bangkok reports severe famine in North Vietnam. Rice ration totals 9 kilos per month and only 500 grams meat when available. New ration cards required every fortnight, people fainting on streets, and police control tightening. In this official's view, famine is one major motivating factor behind Viet Cong guerrilla activities in South Vietnam. French Rep will have further consultations and expects receive extensive report which he hopes make available other council reps next mtg.
All council reps expressed deep interest in US plans for South Vietnam as I had outlined. Australian Rep particularly interested in new developmental plans but said he also pleased US not neglecting older method which possibly not fully exploited in past. Stopping terrorism and reinforcing rural populace is at heart of Vietnam problem he felt sure Australia would wish join US in program for South Vietnam and believes Australian experiences New Guinea and Malaya might be helpful. Philippine Rep believes his govt could provide expert advice and assistance in view its experience with Huk problem. He also suggested operation brotherhood medical activities might be extended to Vietnam. New Zealand Rep similarly expressed interest and felt his govt might take part.
[Here follow three paragraphs on Laos.]
Young
59. Paper Prepared by the Vice President/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 22.1 Vice President's Trip, GVN 1961. Secret. The source text was an attachment to Johnson's memorandum to the President, May 23, reporting on his mission to Asia. The text is printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 159-166.
It is not clear whether this paper was intended to be an annex to the memorandum to the President, a draft of the memorandum itself, or the report from which the Vice President briefed the Cabinet on May 25. The copy of the memorandum to the President in OSD Files also has this attachment, but copies in the Johnson Library and the Policy Planning Files do not. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330; FRC 65 A 3078; Johnson Library, VP Security Files, VP Visit to SE Asia; and Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Asia 1961)
Attached to the source text and the copy in OSD Files is a three-page paper on Thailand.
[Here follow sections A-C, the Laotian crisis and Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and the Philippines.]
D. Viet Nam
Among the countries which I visited, the threat to peace and progress is most direct and immediate in Viet Nam. That country has come a long way since the days when the Indo-China war was brought to a halt by the first Geneva Conference of 1954. Relative initial peace and a major land reform and other programs of self help have restored agricultural production and lifted it to new highs. Internal communications as well as the transportation system have been expanded. Industrial development has begun in earnest. Responsible political institutions have begun to function, as attested to by the recent election. Social progress in education and health and other fields has been significant.
This great constructive work was made possible by the personal dedication of President Ngo Dinh Diem, the efforts of the Vietnamese people themselves and by the infusion of large amounts of United States aid. While this aid has gone largely for the support of a large military establishment, it has enabled the Vietnamese to join their own resources with our economic aid for many constructive undertakings.
Unfortunately, the continuance of this constructive work is now threatened by a resurgence of Viet Minh terrorism in South Viet Nam. The number of these trained and organized disrupters has risen in recent months from three thousand to an estimated twelve thousand. Though relatively few in number, their capacity for disruption is very great. This is the nature of this type of activity as indicated by experience in Malaya, Burma and elsewhere. It may be that those with experience elsewhere with this problem could be most helpful in Viet Nam.
The basic problem in Viet Nam is not very different than it is for all of the nations of the region. The ordinary people need decent houses. They need schools. They need better conditions of health. They need the productive industries, the thriving agriculture and the safe and adequate transportation and communications which will make all of these things possible. They need an understanding government which is close to them and in which they feel a stake.
The will to achieve these improvements is present in Viet Nam. The determination and the energy to obtain them is present. Yet, the effort to achieve them is frustrated and disrupted by the agents of terrorism as well as by the ever-present shadow of the massive communist armed forces in North Viet Nam.
In short, that degree of material security which acts to release the full and constructive energies of peoples is not present in Viet Nam. Unless it is forthcoming in the near future, the great efforts and sacrifices, the vast amounts of aid which have poured into this country in the interests of peace and security may go down the drain.
I am assured by responsible officials-military and civilian-of this government and the government of Viet Nam, that Viet Nam can be made secure against the depredations of the organized terrorists who roam the countryside. I am assured, further, by these officials that the country can be made reasonably secure against invasion by the Viet Minh from the north.
An increase in military aid will be necessary for this purpose. New methods and new tactics for dealing with the problem of terrorism will be required. This will not be a short-term proposition. It will not be cheap. Yet, if this effort will in fact produce the security necessary for progress in freedom in Viet Nam, as those who are expert in these matters say that it will, then it is in our interests as well as the interests of the Vietnamese people and all free nations that the effort be made. The price of the failure to make the sacrifices now in Viet Nam will be paid for later in the increased jeopardy to the United States and other free nations. The failure to act vigorously to stop the killing now in Viet Nam may well be paid for later with the lives of Americans all over Asia.
Let me stress, however, that a mere increase in the level of military aid on our part to Viet Nam will not necessarily solve the difficulty. There must be new methods for the use of all such aid. It must be provided under clear-cut plans mutually agreed upon. These plans must be pursued with great vigor on the part of the Vietnamese and with the cooperation of other free nations as well as our own if this job is to be done.
Most important, there must be a simultaneous, vigorous and integrated attack on the economic, social and other ills of the Vietnamese peoples. The leadership and initiative in this attack must rest with the Vietnamese leaders. But our aid program must be closely integrated with practical plans of the Vietnamese. The agents of the aid program must work closely with the Vietnamese and their constructive effect will be clearly felt by the Vietnamese people as a whole. It would be most helpful in this connection if the Joint Economic Commission referred to in the communique which was issued in Saigon at the conclusion of my visit could be named and begin to function without delay.
There is a serious and immediate challenge to peace and freedom in Vietnam. It can be met if Vietnam and this country and other free countries will face it and act vigorously to meet it.
[Here follow sections E and F, Thailand and concluding observations.]
60. Report by the Vice President/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: University of Montana, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 110, Folder 3. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. A copy of this report was sent to Nolting by Cottrell as an enclosure to a letter dated May 29, along with the memorandum to the President, dated May 23; see footnote 1, Document 59. Cottrell noted in the covering letter that the President's brother-in-law, Stephen Smith, had briefed him on the previous day about the visit to Saigon. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 350 GVN-TF)
VIET NAM
A. General Observations
The situation in Viet Nam is more stable than is indicated by newspaper and other reports reaching Washington in recent weeks. Economic conditions within the city of Saigon are at least superficially good and that, in itself for the short run, is a prop to stability. Similarly, conditions in the rural areas are not believed to be desperate, although merchants in Saigon complain in some cases they are unable to supply their normal customers in the provinces due to increased Viet Cong activity.
The picture we receive at home has been colored by journalistic sensationalism. It may also be distorted by these other factors:
1. An obsessive concern with security on the part of many of our mission people and a tendency to incorporate this concern into interpretations of the general situation. After all, occasional murders in Rock Creek Park, deplorable as they may be, do not mean that the United States is about to fall apart.
2. A conscious or unconscious desire in various quarters to stimulate the flow of United States aid.
3. An excessive reliance by our mission on the evaluations of the situation by Vietnamese government officials, often checked only against other government sources or discontented Vietnamese intellectuals who are in opposition to the present government. This reliance stems in part at least from the government's discouraging of travel by Americans outside Saigon on alleged grounds of security.
4. An assumption, that because conditions have turned bad in Laos they must inevitably turn bad in Viet Nam.
To say that conditions in Viet Nam are not as they appear to be in Washington is not to say that they are not serious. There are certainly Viet Minh terrorists in the jungles and rice-paddies. Vietnamese government officials are being assassinated in significant numbers. There is anti-government, non-communist plotting going on in the city of Saigon. Yet, we must keep our perspective. We must not react in panic and in consequence, perhaps, do precisely that which will worsen the situation.
The perspective which seems closest to reality is that the existing political-military structure based largely on Ngo Dinh Diem and a palace bureaucracy in Saigon is not in danger of imminent collapse. That structure is not likely to be suddenly upset except by one or more of the following contingencies:
1. The removal of Diem through assassination by communist or non-communist opponents.
2. The removal of Diem by a palace-military coup-not an impossibility but an improbability for the present.
3. The sudden termination or drastic reduction of United States aid.
4. An actual invasion in preponderant force by the Viet Minh from the North.
Apart from these possibilities there is nevertheless a serious danger in Viet Nam. It is the danger of the progressive disintegration of the government's hold on the nation. This deterioration can be brought about by a combination of two factors:
1. The people of Viet Nam, in increasing numbers, may be terrorized or attracted into the Viet Minh camp.
2. The government and bureaucracy may fail to maintain and intensify its responsiveness to the social, economic and political needs of the people of Viet Nam, particularly in the rural areas.
Of these two factors, the second may well be of equal, if not greater significance, although it is not so seen by the present government or even by the preponderance of our own official observers.
In any event, if the present trend continues, there is the danger that the government will become a glittering facade. It will come to rest in the end, not on its people, but on a modern military establishment and an oriental bureaucracy both maintained for the indefinite future primarily by the United States Treasury. The power which is inherent in the ordinary Vietnamese people will be left to others to organize. In present circumstances, "others" can only be the Communist Vietnamese since there is little promise that effective leadership will emerge from the non-communist opposition to Ngo Dinh Diem at this time.
If the point of no return in the present trend is reached-that is, if the preponderance of the people move from support of or at least acquiescence in the rule of the government to support of or acquiescence in the Viet Minh movement-a grave dilemma will be posed for our policies. Then, whatever aid we supply to the government to fight communism in the abstract will also be directed, in the specific, against the Vietnamese people. And if we use our own forces to help put down Communist rebellion in South Viet Nam we will also bear the onus of helping to put down the Vietnamese people.
It should be emphasized that this point of no return has not yet been reached. It is probably not even on the immediate horizon despite the panic-type reports that have originated of late in Viet Nam. Nevertheless, the danger flags are flying. One indicator is the increase in Viet Minh terrorists from three or four thousand to 12,000 despite reported heavy casualties inflicted on them by government forces. Another, is the increasing tendency of the palace bureaucracy to isolate itself and President Diem from the people. Still another is the significant level of disaffection with the government which, although to some extent chronic, is present in the highly educated and politically conscious group. While numerically small this group is of importance in Viet Nam. It is the principal recruiting ground for dedicated public servants and high political leaders. Members of this group who are alienated by the government, will move in other directions, first to the non-communist opposition and if that offers no outlet, ultimately, to the Viet Minh. A disturbing number of this group is already in the first stage of alienation.
A final indication of the danger is the fact that the ordinary people of the cities and probably even more of the rural areas are starved for leadership with understanding and warmth. There is an enormous popular enthusiasm and great popular power waiting to be brought forth by friendly personal political leadership. But it cannot be evoked by men in white linen suits whose contact with the ordinary people is largely through the rolled-up windows of a Mercedes-Benz.
B. Principal Conclusions
1. The existing government in Saigon is the only realistic alternative to Viet Minh control in South Viet Nam. At this time, there is no other non-communist leadership which, in all realism, may be expected to replace the present military-political-bureaucratic structure that has been developed in Saigon.
2. There is no question of the will of the Diem government and its military forces to resist the Viet Minh communists; there is some question as to their capacity to do so effectively and as to the general efficacy of their present methods. And they certainly cannot resist it without continued and substantial aid.
3. The need has long been recognized that the government must develop stronger popular support. In theory, the government recognizes this need. In practice, there is grave question that the Vietnamese bureaucracy is now characterized by that degree of self-dedication and self-sacrifice which would serve to develop such support.
4. The government appears to be placing increasing reliance on military measures for producing stability and relatively less emphasis on popular political, economic and social measures. To some extent this is inevitable in view of the stepped-up campaign of Viet Minh terrorism. To what extent, however, is not clear. And there are disturbing suggestions that the government not only fears the Viet Cong cadres and terrorists but its own people as well.
5. Without the increased level of aid that has now been offered clearly the prospect would have been for a progressive but not necessarily rapid deterioration of the position of the Vietnamese government. Nevertheless, this aid is not in itself a guarantee that the deterioration will be checked. It is likely to prove effective only if the military campaign which the aid is designed to produce is pressed with vigor and yet with great discretion. Against the Viet Cong who terrorize the general populace, military force must be firm and powerful. But military force must not be used indiscriminately in an effort to stamp out all resistance to local government officials. Much of this resistance may well be justified as the only outlet against exploitation and oppression. How much, we do not know because the information we have is not adequate. But to the extent that such is the case military action will be costly and, probably increasingly ineffective. The only response which will meet this type of resistance is the redress of the grievances by the efforts of the government itself.
6. There is a great need for more direct and accurate observation and reports of developments outside Saigon by our own officials. The great bulk of the information now available is derived secondhand either from the Vietnamese government or non-communist Vietnamese opposition sources. Neither may be regarded as very objective or disinterested.
7. In present circumstances there is no visible solution to the instability in Viet Nam on the basis of neutralization. But if the steps we are now taking work effectively then, in time, the Saigon government may become less dependent on aid and lay a valid claim to represent the entire Vietnamese people, north and south. If the steps fail, however, we shall be able to hold even the present unsatisfactory situation only by larger and larger infusions of aid. Ultimately, perhaps even our direct military involvement may be required to hold the situation, a step which is not sought by the Vietnamese or required by the situation at this time.
C. Recommendations
The following course of action is recommended:
1. We should think in terms of a three year plan of increased aid-military and economic. The plan should be liberal but not extravagant. We should insist in private and with great tact that the details of this program be put on paper before the increased aid flows. The details should include specific measurable goals, specific responsibilities for the Vietnamese as well as ourselves, specific techniques, directed to the improvement of the safety, not only of local officials, but of the Vietnamese people and the improvement of the livelihood of these people.
2. We should make clear, in private, that barring an unmistakable and massive invasion of South Viet Nam from without we have no intention of employing combat U.S. forces in Viet Nam or using even naval or air-support which is but the first step in that direction. If the Vietnamese government backed by a three-year liberal aid program cannot do this job, then we had better remember the experience of the French who wound up with several hundred thousand men in Vietnam and were still unable to do it. And all this, without engaging a single Chinese or Russian. Before we take any such plunge we had better be sure we are prepared to become bogged down chasing irregulars and guerillas over the rice fields and jungles of Southeast Asia while our principal enemies China and the Soviet Union stand outside the fray and husband their strength.
3. This new aid commitment plunges us very deeply into the Vietnamese internal situation. The attitude of our mission people must begin immediately to reflect that depth.
a. Our military aid people must get out of their dress uniforms and into their fatigues more often and out of the cities and into the jungles.
b. Our economic aid people in far greater numbers will have to leave Saigon behind and move into the provinces, towns and villages.
c. Our foreign service officers must range the country on a systematic basis and observe directly and report first-hand and, accurately. Further they should be attached in considerable numbers to the M.A.A.G. operations to determine accurately and to advise accurately whether the new efforts at pacification are directed with discretion at the Viet Cong terrorists, rather than at those who have legitimate grievances. We must insist at the beginning that the Vietnamese government permit our representatives and military to go anywhere at all times in the country, regardless of the security situation. There will be perhaps some casualties in this approach but if we are not prepared to take them in small numbers now, how will we take them in the great numbers which will be involved if we become directly involved? This job cannot be done with talk of sacrifices from the comfort and safety of Saigon and Washington.
4. Our dealing with the Vietnamese government must be sensitive of their feelings but absolutely firm in the application of the agreed plan. We have got to have regard for their ways but we have also got to keep our own self-respect and guard against obsequiousness and the waste of our people's resources which are beginning to dry up for this sort of undertaking.
5. Our mission people must, by example and by subtle persuasion encourage the Saigon government from the President down to get close to the people, to mingle with them, to listen for their grievances and to act on them. Handshakes on the streets of Vietnamese leaders and people is the concept that has got to be pursued. And shirt-sleeves must be the hallmark of Americans. Unless we get this approach which we do not now have, on the part of Vietnamese officials or Americans this effort is not going to succeed.
6. By persuasion we must attempt to strengthen the National Assembly and other democratic institutions in Viet Nam. There is a practical reason to pursue this course apart from our own dedication to the practice of freedom. These institutions must throw up new leadership and some form of reliable transition will be imperative in the event something happens to Diem. In addition, these institutions can serve to rally the educated group to service with the government.
There is a chance for success in Viet Nam but there is not a moment to lose. We need to move along the above lines and we need to begin now, today, to move.
61. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President/1/
Washington, May 26, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret.
1. It is my view that the Viet-Nam situation is extremely dangerous to the peace and that we must push on all fronts to force a deflation of that crisis before it builds to a situation like that in Laos. If it comes to an open battle, the inhibitions on our going in will be less than in Laos; but the challenge to Russia and China will be even greater. Moreover, I fear what the strains of the current guerrilla battle may do to the political situation within Viet-Nam.
2. We are now working on two fronts. First, to build Diem's strength. Second, to heighten the awareness of the international community about the border issue and to make the ICC the focus of the Laos conference. This could help substantially in Viet-Nam.
3. But I believe a third front on which we must work is Mr. Khrushchev himself. Thus my efforts to get the town to focus on the role of Viet-Nam at Vienna. Thus, the attached memorandum./2/
/2/No memorandum was attached to the source text. In the course of their meeting at Vienna, June 3-4, Kennedy and Khrushchev scarcely mentioned Vietnam. Memoranda of their conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1906. A two-page briefing paper on Vietnam, PMK-B/3, May 26 is ibid., CF 1905.
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