Washington, November 9, 1962, 4:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-962. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Koren, cleared by Cross and with Forrestal in substance, and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Bangkok and repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, and CINCPAC.

502. For Ambassadors Unger and Young. Laos situation reviewed at meeting with the President Nov. 8./2/ Lao internal politics discussed together with US assistance programs. It was emphasized that our efforts are and will continue to be directed toward full support of Souvanna but if coalition fails we must try to assure Souvanna and true neutrals will be on our side and responsibility for collapse Geneva Agreements clearly on PL. President does not understand how arrest incident could have occurred and desires Amb Unger continue to emphasize to Phoumi that he must sincerely and practically cooperate with Souvanna to assure a wide non-communist front, not just the Phoumi Savannakhet faction. Phoumi must understand that if a break-up of coalition does occur U.S. and international opinion will hold him responsible if Souvanna has not been adequately supported by Phoumi's faction. If break occurs U.S. could not support Phoumi alone. Particularly disturbed that Phoumi unwilling to work with French military. Is Phoumi preventing French technicians sent out to replace ECCOIL from being used?

/2/See Document 432.

To what extent are you in contact with neutralists in Vientiane in effort convince them of need to resist PL pressures and work for non-communist objectives of independence? Do you need additional assistance for such purposes? (see septel concerning assistance to neutralist military forces/3/).

/3/Document 434.

For Bangkok: Desire that Amb Young take appropriate opportunity to emphasize again to Sarit for him to continue to counsel Phoumi to cooperate with Souvanna. Sarit's influence with Phoumi is indispensable in this respect.

Rusk

434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Washington, November 9, 1962, 4:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/11-962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Koren and in substance with Forrestal, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to London, Paris, Bangkok for JUSMAAG, and CINCPAC.

503. Ref A. Deptel 446,/2/ B. CHJUSMAG Bangkok MADC-L, C./3/ Vientiane Toaid 412, D. Vientiane A-104./4/ State/Defense message.

/2/In telegram 446, October 16, the Department agreed that Souvanna's request for assistance was in line with U.S. policy objectives and could bring Souvanna and Phoumi together. (Ibid., 751J.5/10-1562)

/3/Not found.

/4/Dated October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.56/10-1462)

Presidential meeting on Laos Nov. 8 reconfirmed authorization and emphasized desirability for assistance to neutralist forces (Ref A) through established MAP. If processed through Souvanna (rather than direct from Kong Le to Amb as indicated in Ref D), fulfillment of reasonable requests can be used to demonstrate further our determination to support Souvanna's efforts and as means of widening gap between neutralists and PL forces. Assistance should also be used as means of establishing regular channel of contact with Kong Le and other neutralists. Request you consider best means making such contacts perhaps through military attache [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. For present, supplies should be generally limited to select health and comfort items of the type contained in Kong Le request in Ref D, and should be screened by Country Team with advice from DepCh JUSMAG as may be desired. Request cited Ref B considered of appropriate magnitude and consistent with objective of demonstrating our desire to back Souvanna without detracting from FAR program to extent would endanger our effort to sustain cooperation between Phoumi and Souvanna.

Rusk

435. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/

Washington, November 14, 1962.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos #2, 7, T-265-69. Secret. Taylor initialed the memorandum.

SUBJECT
Situation in Laos

1. Attached at Tab A is a message from Ambassador Unger assessing the current unsettled situation within the coalition government of Laos. The message is not alarming, but acknowledges the possibility that the Souvanna government may fall in the near future, recognizes no clear alternate leadership to carry on a neutralist orientation is available, and suggests the US should continue to try to hold the Souvanna leadership in place./2/ A follow-on message from Vientiane today quotes the French Ambassador Falaize as stating his views that the prospects of an early Souvanna fall are exaggerated./3/

/2/In addition, in telegram 729 from Vientiane, November 12, Unger proposed to seek early discussions with Souvanna and, if useful, also with Kong Le within the "context of finding means to hold fabric of Souvanna regime together and increase effectiveness of Kong Le support to Souvanna, rather than throwing U.S. support to Kong Le as leader." (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-962)

/3/Apparent reference to telegram 739 from Vientiane, November 14. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1462)

2. It is clear, however, it is time once again to evaluate possible unpleasant contingencies and devise alternate ways of meeting them. It is with this purpose in mind that my separate memorandum to you on contingencies and military responses was prepared.

3. I talked with Mr. Forrestal this afternoon to get a feel for his current thinking and that of Governor Harriman's. The major points thereby developed follow:

a. Harriman and Forrestal feel the concern about Laos stems primarily from military sources in Vientiane. They are particularly heartened by Ambassador Falaize's views and Forrestal is passing that message into the President this afternoon to give some balance to what otherwise seems like a serious situation.

b. State has asked the UK to request the Soviets to have their Ambassador in Vientiane reassure Souvanna of Russian support while at the same time calming down the Pathet Lao. This is the President's idea and Harriman feels it will be rejected by the Soviets./4/

/4/In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, November 14, Forrestal stated that he understood "that the President is still concerned about the spate of gloomy reports from Vientiane," and that the President had asked Harriman that morning "to get the British to press the Soviets to buck up Souvanna and exercise more control over the PL." The JCS and the Department of State were exploring alternatives "short of intervention" if Souvanna eventually resigned. Forrestal asked Rostow's Policy Planning Council to contribute their thoughts. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/62-12/62)

c. Harriman feels the best immediate course of action is to assist Unger in propping up Souvanna and encouraging increased support for him by Phoumi and Kong Le. An approach will be made to Kong Le for this purpose shortly, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by Colonel Law [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

d. State will attempt to expedite ICC investigation for VM presence at Sam Neua and Tchepone without waiting for the Lao Investigating Commission to act.

e. Harriman and Forrestal recognize the need to approach the Russians on the question of Viet Minh presence and use of the Panhandle corridor. They have been fended off within State by the argument that the Cuba question has priority. They are determined to press this issue, and soon.

f. State is busy devising alternative governments which we might support in case Souvanna falls and a partition results. One alternative, reluctantly agreed to by Harriman, is to support a Phoumi administration and rally as many Vientiane neutrals and Kong Le sympathizers as possible. The second alternative is to exploit the reported conversations between certain FAR generals and Kong Le neutralists looking toward formulation of a combination neutral-right wing government that would exclude Phoumi. No one is particularly optimistic that the latter solution is a practical one.

4. Reiterating his remarks of two weeks ago, Forrestal said Governor Harriman and he continue to be worried with the lack of a composite picture of how we are doing in South Vietnam. They are considering the idea of sending a three man team to South Vietnam to assess the situation on the ground. Current thinking has the head man as either Mr. Hilsman or Mr. Rostow, accompanied by Forrestal and a representative from the JCS.

WHB

436. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, November 17, 1962, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1762. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Paris, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.

758. Policy. Embtel 729;/2/ Deptel 518./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 435.

/3/In telegram 518, November 13, the Department concurred with Unger's plans to "hold fabric Souvanna regime together and increase effectiveness Kong Le support to Souvanna." (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-1262)

1. Despite recent lessening in surface tensions in Vientiane past few days, we believe PriMin Souvanna's recent statements of intent to resign are serious as well as being tactical moves. If situation worsens and his pessimistic assessment is further strengthened he may act, perhaps precipitously, within a few weeks.

2. We believe Souvanna recognizes flat obstructionism of left as key problem but has found recent pressures from right (especially DNC) increasingly onerous, largely because they have result of sandwiching him in without vulnerability. (This at some variance from line British have been peddling that DNC actions "responsible" for Souvanna's present mood.)

3. Souvanna's task made to seem well nigh immovable in his eyes (and our problem of sustaining him made more difficult) by virtual collapse of center. Fissiparous tendency characteristic of Lao political life has struck first and hardest at neutralist element which, from beginning, was most amorphous segment of Troika team (Embtel 732)./4/ In political power terms, pyramid constructed at time of Plaine des Jarres agreement has become inverted, with Souvanna the balancing point at bottom rather than at apex. This inversion is largely Souvanna's fault and is clearly an unstable condition.

/4/In telegram 732, November 13, the Embassy summarized its contacts with the neutralists in Vientiane and assessed their views and personalities. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1362)

4. Major deciding factor in outcome present situation will be Pathet Lao actions. Recent behavior and anti-Souvanna propaganda suggest PL must now foresee early collapse of coalition (Viet Minh determination retain substantial forces in Laos may in part also reflect such an expectation). Souphanouvong could probably temporarily stabilize situation at relatively little cost to Pathet Lao interests: minimum concession would in present atmosphere assume exaggerated significance and might suffice to allay Souvanna's discouragement. Would also tend put Phoumi on defensive, in which case US influence could be made more effective. Such shift in PL tactics, however, would seem to require (a) PL Central Committee decision, (b) effort by Souphanouvong to get out from under hard-core PL political and military leadership, which would be beneficial in itself but would carry no guarantee of PL adherence to coalition solution, or (c) Soviet decision loyally support Geneva Accords whatever may be ChiCom and DRV positions, and whip-cracking to enforce this with PL.

5. At this precise moment US leverage with Phoumi is reduced. Prior to negotiation new aid program, we have limited aid to withhold, and we have been pressing him on variety of matters to act in good faith despite clear faithlessness on Communist side. We see little opportunity elicit greater cooperation short of unreliable alternatives of a) offering greater support if he proves more responsive our suggestions and b) warning him US will not support him even if he successful in returning leadership in post-Souvanna period. Until recently he has shown little disposition to "save" coalition and unlikely do so if it must be at expense his position vis-a-vis his own mixed stable of subordinates or of significant weakening his posture relative to fully armed and apparently tightly knit PL.

6. Neutralist group (para 3) offers little promise in terms reforming Troika along present lines. As indicated Embtel 732, we see no one equally acceptable who approaches Souvanna--who is willing--in ability command loyalty and active support. British seem to consider Pheng Phongsavan, Quinim or Ngon Sananikone as possible replacements for Souvanna. We believe Pheng would be highly unreliable maverick and fail to see how result in latter two cases could be other than two-part and most unstable coalition of left and some neutralists or right and other neutralists, respectively. Pheng, as well as Quinim, now target of criticism in Souvanna's neutralist party paper. Phoui Sananikone, Leuam Insisiengmay, and other conceivable choices have same defect of partisan identification.

7. We doubt Kong Le "lost" to other side and inclined credit statements of his present mood indicating preferences for alignment with some conservatives and US to continuation present straitened and uncomfortably exposed position. At same time we do not believe FAR as weak or Kong Le forces as strong as picture presented by Souvanna's advisors (Embtels 715, 727)./5/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ARMA reports have indicated parlous state Kong Le forces PDJ area. Open renewal of PL military action would undoubtedly find significant portion Kong Le units chewed up in quick order. Kong Le nevertheless is only strong element of power in support of neutralist position (Khamouane having probably been too compromised as result recent events and now too preoccupied with upheaval in his own back yard). While it seems most unlikely at present juncture any significant segment of FAR would subordinate itself to Kong Le, agreement for cooperation between them no longer seems absurd. Participation of Phoumi in such an agreement almost surely requires dissolution of present Phoumi-DNC relationship, and it is not clear, despite some tentatively encouraging remarks by Phoumi on reforming police, that he believes it either safe or wise for him to set army or country free from increasingly heavy-handed grip of Col. Siho. Without Phoumi, however, likelihood of violence as accompaniment any govt reorganization increases sharply.

/5/In these telegrams, November 10 and 12, the Embassy reported conversations with members of Souvanna's staff and Souvanna himself in which the Lao officials painted a grim picture of the situation in Laos. The neutralist forces of Kong Le were in danger in throwing in their lot with the Pathet Lao and Souvanna was contemplating resignation because neither side would compromise. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-1062 and 751J.00/11-1262)

8. We of course will continue and increase efforts sustain Souvanna's will, urge his supporters to give him real assistance and seek ways depress what we sense as growing hunger of extremists on both sides closing in for kill. We estimate long run chance of success about even, if we get through present critical period. If Souvanna goes, we believe clearcut forceful reorientation preferable to temporizing measures aimed at trying hold National Union Govt together under leaders who unlikely have authority to do so. Latter action almost assuredly would offer less chance of success than present govt and would only draw US into closer commitment to less plausible combination.

9. There follows listing of what we see as possible political and military difficulties arising in near future. Proposed US action appropriate to each situation will be discussed in subsequent message.

a) Souvanna may suddenly resign or be otherwise removed from scene leaving Souphanouvong and Phoumi as legal successors until a further lawful succession is determined.

b) Souvanna may resign or be removed consequent to an outbreak of hostilities between two or more of the factions trying to move into predominant position politically and physically.

Either of these events might well precipitate any of the following; however, if current tensions increase, any of the following might also occur independently:

a) Pathet Lao may increase test of harassing attacks on neutralist military forces, heightening severely the already strong neutralist feeling of being compressed between conservative and Pathet Lao pressures.

b) Neutralist elements may begin actions of reprisal and terror against conservative forces, particularly DNC, leading to increasing violence in Vientiane and other towns and to rapidly escalating public fear.

c) As a consequence of (a), Kong Le forces may suddenly move against Pathet Lao, in desperation and with predictable result of further reducing effective military and political support of center.

d) Pathet Lao may declare coalition at end and carry on govt their zone without any reference to Vientiane--here most immediately critical question would be neutralist political and military status in Phong Saly and Plaine des Jarres. Phoumi might do the same.

e) Neutralist forces, probably led by Kong Le, may attempt take over Royal Capital or, less likely, Vientiane in effort to establish either nucleus of government in Luang Prabang or total government in Vientiane.

f) Phoumi's group, rebelling against Phoumi, may attempt to take over FAR from him and then govt as a whole.

g) Phoumi may lead attempt to take over total government.

h) Pathet Lao may mount a military move on Vientiane in attempt to take over country suddenly.

Without rehearsing evidence that leads us to consider all of foregoing as oppressive possibilities, we see two major problems resulting:

a) A political problem as to what govt and which groups to support.

b) A political and military problem as to how far this support should go, e.g., whether or not the US ought to activate military plans to assure retention by West of essential portions of Laos.

Unger

437. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/

Washington, November 28, 1962.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos #2, 7, T-265-69. Secret.

SUBJECT
Shooting Down of Air America Plane in Laos

1. In my message summary of yesterday, I included the first report of the shooting down of an Air America plane in the Plaines des Jarres area, apparently by Pathet Lao forces./2/ This was a flight duly authorized by Souvanna and had been cleared to land by the authorities at the Plaines des Jarres airfield. This incident occurred against the background of reported difficulties, including possible armed clashes, between PL and Kong Le forces in the Plaines des Jarres. The character and extent of this activity is not known. The latest information on the aircraft incident is a telegram from Vientiane attached at Tab A./3/ This report indicates Souvanna is very concerned about the incident and understands the implications of such PL action within an area nominally under neutralist control.

/2/The message summary has not been found, but the message to which Bagley refers is telegram 806 from Vientiane, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-2762)

/3/Not attached, but reference is to telegram 808 from Vientiane, November 27. (Ibid.)

2. As you will remember, at the 8 November meeting with the President/4/ it was decided to approve provision of some US supplies to KL forces in the Plaines des Jarres area. Assistance rendered so far on this authority has consisted of blankets, medical supplies, and basic food items. However, in the past few days, Souvanna has requested US assistance for these forces that goes well beyond the approved comfort items. A summary of these requests is contained in the telegram attached at Tab B./5/ Amb Unger's comments in this telegram suggest he favors meeting these new and broad requests, including military items, if further detailed study indicates it is feasible. If pursued, the proposed assistance would go beyond that we are now giving the FAR and Phoumi. Further, it would be done in the face of other reports that some of the comfort items passed to KL have been shared with PL forces.

/4/See Documents 432-434.

/5/Not attached, but reference is to telegram 812 from Vientiane, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/11-2762)

3. ISA is alarmed by the inconsistency of considering expanded assistance to KL forces of this nature at the same time an Air America plane was shot down in KL territory. ISA believes that State should suspend all assistance to Kong Le until a pledge can be obtained from him that they will be used for the sole use of neutralist forces. Further, the question of whether munitions are to be included in assistance provided the neutralists should be reviewed immediately since ISA thinks it undesirable. A letter to this effect was forwarded to Alexis Johnson by Bill Bundy this afternoon./6/

/6/Letter from Bundy to Johnson, I-21745/62, November 28. (Ibid., 751J.00/11-2862)

4. A telegram has just been received in State from Governor Harriman which contains a number of recommendations on the aircraft incident./7/ These include activating the ICC, asking the British to press the Soviets for corrective action, urge the courtmartial of the PL battery commander, press Souphanouvong to make a public apology, and delay withdrawal of the Battle Group from Thailand. Mr. Koren called Admiral Riley on the Battle Group question; CincPac advises it is about 1/2 out now, the rest going shortly. State is telling Unger to consult with the British Ambassador in Vientiane and to see Souphanouvong if he considers it profitable, and has provided the President with necessary information to raise the matter with Mikoyen if desired.

/7/Not found.

5. A crucial lack of information on exactly what the situation is in the Plaines des Jarres between KL and PL forces makes it very difficult to decide on any action other than ICC investigation and the development of more facts. Public announcement has already been made on the Battle Group withdrawal. There seems to be little reason at this time to delay that withdrawal and it is impractical anyway. Other military actions can be considered as the situation clarifies. I recommend you note this issue, oppose any action to hold any part of the Battle Group in Thailand, and await results of diplomatic actions now being initiated.

WHB

438. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 29, 1962, 4:40-7:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/11-2962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Glenn and approved by the White House on December 13. The time of the conversation is taken from Kennedy's appointment book. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) The portions on Laos and Cuba were only a small part of this 3-hour conversation; for an overview of the entire conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Document 270.

SUBJECT
Laos--Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS
Miss N. Kushnir, LS

U.S.S.R.
Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Mr. Yuriy N. Vinogradov, Soviet Delegation to XVII General Assembly (Interpreter)
Mr. Igor D. Bubnov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

The President said that he wished to raise another question before the end of the conversation. This was the question of Laos. It has been agreed that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from that country. American military advisers have been withdrawn but there are still North Viet Nam troops remaining. The Soviet Union also agreed to use its full influence to prevent Laos from being used as a channel to infiltrate South Viet Nam. Reliable intelligence indicates that approximately 500 Communists infiltrators are reaching South Viet Nam through Laos every month. Thirdly, an American plane carrying food at the request of Souvanna Phouma--the Prime Minister whom the Soviets wanted to see as head of the government--was cleared for landing by the airport tower. It was fired on at that moment by Communist units and two Americans were killed.

The President expressed his concern that even while we are working at getting agreement on Cuba an earlier agreement is falling to pieces because the Soviet Union is not fulfilling its obligations.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he would convey the information he received from the President to the Soviet Government. He is certain, however, that the Soviet Union is fulfilling its obligations.

He would now like to go back to the question of Cuba.

The President said that he wished to speak a little more at length about some extremely important aspects of the Laos question. There has been agreement on Laos between Chairman Khrushchev and the President at Vienna. If this agreement is not fulfilled, it will appear that no other agreement with the Soviet Union can ever be expected to be successfully implemented.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the Soviet Union was fulfilling all its obligations.

[Here follows discussion of Cuba.]

439. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, December 19, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/62-12/62. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.

POSSIBLE VISIT OF PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG OF
LAOS TO THE UNITED STATES/2/

"Mike thought it would be a good idea to invite to Washington Prince Souphanouvong. This amused Bundy a bit in that he said he was not sure what Souphanouvong could constructively accomplish in Washington except lunch with `Averell and Marie'. However, there is no question whatever that he left the subject sufficiently open for Forrestal to continue to explore it, presumably with Governor Harriman and others. After the meeting, Dave Klein and I, independently outraged by this suggestion, approached [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Mr. Chester Cooper of CIA, and found them equally outraged. I believe that they will undertake to have CIA turn out a blistering appraisal of Souphanouvong so as at least to have something on the record with which the `doves' will have to cope." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White House Daily Staff Meetings, October 1962-February 1963, T-122-69)

Consideration is being given to the possibility of either inviting or permitting Prince Souphanouvong (the figure head of the Pathet Lao faction) to visit the United States early next year. The reasons favoring such a visit are as follows:

Souphanouvong is believed to be an intense Lao nationalist as well as a Communist. He is also believed to be the most energetic and intelligent of the native Lao leaders. He is one of the two Vice Premiers (Phoumi being the other) and is also Minister of Economy and Plan, which puts him in a critical position with respect to U.S. economic assistance to Laos. He is said to have expressed a wish to visit this country.

In recent months, evidence has been accumulating that Souphanouvong's position in the Pathet Lao organization may be slipping. He is probably third or fourth in power, real authority being exercised by Kaysone and Nouhak, who are Hanoi's representatives in Sam Neua. Nevertheless it is quite certain that Souphanouvong is the best known Pathet Lao leader and has the greatest political stature in his own country. It is thought that a trip to the United States would enhance Souphanouvong's prestige at home--possibly at the expense of other Pathet Lao leaders. If the reports of his technical competence and his energetic Lao nationalism are accurate, a carefully planned visit to this country might also have the effect of impelling him to realize that the United States has considerable resources in technical assistance which would be of particular value to his country.

We also know that Souphanouvong suffers an ailment which is gradually impairing his hearing and for which he received some treatment when he was in Moscow last. There is a possibility that we might also be able to give him some medical assistance for his hearing trouble.

Governor Harriman, Ambassador Unger, and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] all believe that such a visit by Souphanouvong is desirable from a foreign policy standpoint (Vientiane's 894 attached)./3/ Governor Harriman recognizes the domestic political problem but thinks it is not insuperable if the trip is properly handled. Governor Harriman suggests, subject to your approval, that I discuss the possibility of such a trip with Ambassador Unger in Vientiane next month, and that we indicate through Souvanna Phouma that the U.S. would not be averse to receiving Souphanouvong if he wished to visit this country. Such a visit would be as informal as we could make it and would be largely confined to technical matters in which Souphanouvong is interested, i.e. American technology in agriculture, civil engineering, mining, and the like. Whether or not he should see you is a question which can be postponed, and which would depend upon his attitude while here. (Chairman Khrushchev was particularly cordial to General Phoumi in Moscow earlier this month.)

/3/Dated December 18, not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12-1862)

There is also a possibility that Souphanouvong may accompany the King of Laos on his trip in February, assuming that we have no objection; and if this be the case, we might suggest that he stay on for a technical visit after the rest of the party leave the country.

You are being asked now only to approve the idea of a visit in principle, leaving the details to be worked out here and in Vientiane.

440. Paper Prepared by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/63. Secret. The handwritten date "1/15/63?" appears on the source text. Hilsman and Forrestal were in Laos January 9-14, 1963. They met with RLG officials and traveled to the Plaine des Jarres for discussions with Kong Le on January 11. An account of their trip and discussions with Kong Le is in airgram A-314, March 6, 1963; Department of State, Central Files, INT 7 Laos. Hilsman and Forrestal also traveled to South Vietnam and reported to the President; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. III, Document 2 ff.

REPORT ON LAOS

The Prime Minister has also been made the subject of increasing attacks from the Pathet Lao, who have been linking him more and more with General Phoumi.

General Phoumi, as usual, alternates between the mountains of over-confidence and valleys of despondency. His grip on FAR officials, while still strong, has been shaken largely because of uncertainties for personal futures. Also demobilization is not being effectively implemented. There is as yet no single plan which has been accepted by the Army. Part of the trouble may be real in that there has been great practical difficulty in returning men to villages which are under Pathet Lao influence. Primarily the problem is that most of the FAR commanders are unwilling to cut the basis of their power. Only one commander, General Pasouk in the south, has so far actually demobilized any troops (about 1500 at the time we visited him in Pakse). If the mobilization is to be made effective, it will have to be given more drive and planning from the American side.

As mentioned above, Souvanna Phouma's position domestically has deteriorated with the result that he has become more and more solely the creature of the Geneva Accords; that is to say, his position depends upon the fact that there is no other leader who can obtain the support of the great powers. His domestic basis of support needs to be strengthened. At the moment the best chance for doing this seems to be in the Plaine des Jarres where Kong Le still maintains a precarious hold. Kong Le is important for two reasons: not only does he represent an independent source of political support for Souvanna Phouma, but his military control of the Plaine des Jarres could, in the event of a division of the country, represent an important asset. U.S. policy, therefore, should be to support him fairly vigorously economically and politically and maintain at least his present military capabilities./2/

/2/On January 2, McGeorge Bundy sent a message to Forrestal in Saigon asking him "to have a particular look while in Laos at the possibilities of supporting neutralist forces loyal to Souvanna." Bundy continued that "at this distance it looks as if he or we may be missing an opportunity to build some strength in this area before it is absorbed or whittled away by the PL." Bundy confessed he was ignorant on the tactical possibilities and wanted Forrestal to keep his enquiries on a low level. (Unnumbered telegram from Bundy to Forrestal, January 2; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/63-2/63)

On January 9, Forrestal cabled Bundy asking the President's reaction to the possibility of a Souphanouvong visit to Washington, which Unger and he favored, but not as a matter of urgency. Bundy responded on January 11 that the visit was approved in principle. (Ibid.)

Kong Le claims to have de facto control of the Plaine des Jarres with about 3500 troops. Although he has a rather large amount of military equipment there, he probably over-estimates his strength. The Pathet Lao are definitely in evidence, although Kong Le claims they do not hold strong points. It seems likely, however, that if heavily attacked by the Pathet Lao, Kong Le could call upon Souvanna Phouma for help. His principal problem, of course, is that of defections. Since November 27th of last year, Kong Le has cut his last remaining ties with the Pathet Lao and they are now openly antagonistic. This has cost him some of his men, although it is difficult to say precisely how many. The French currently estimate that he has about 6,000 troops, about half of whom are scattered in isolated points outside the Plaine des Jarres.

In order to reduce the defections and consolidate Kong Le's position, it will be necessary to bolster both the security and the economy of the Plaine des Jarres. One is impressed with the building activity which is going on, particularly in Khang Khay, where Souvanna is trying to establish a summer capital as part of his plan to gain physical independence from both extreme tendencies. It would seem to be in our best interests to foster the development of this region by insuring that it becomes an attraction, not only for the inhabitants for Xiengkhouang Province, but also a power center for other neutral nationalists. To do this we should provide Kong Le through Souvanna Phouma with material support by giving him the necessities of life for his troops and perhaps extending into some small scale AID operations. We need to have one or two AID people in the area just as soon as security can be provided. On the purely military side we should try to insure that Kong Le has on hand enough military supplies to resist an overt attack by the Pathet Lao for at least long enough to enable the cumbersome Geneva machinery to operate and conceivably to enable Souvanna to call upon FAR or Meo help. We have inadequate information on Kong Le's real needs in this respect and, consequently, the Military Attache (who is well known to Kong Le) should get up to the Plaine des Jarres more often.

Air Supply and the Meo

The Meo remain one of the most difficult residual problems we face in Laos. Even if we could assure support for them in the future, the question would remain whether such support is worth their value as a source of intelligence or their value as a military asset in the event of a breakdown of the Geneva Accords. It is becoming evident that our capability to supply the Meo is being increasingly jeopardized.

At present, the Meo are being supplied by USAID through the facilities of Air America. The fact of the matter is that this arrangement simply will not stand up under intense political pressure. Despite the fact that our official position is to the contrary, we do not have a firm agreement with Souvanna on supply flights to the Meo; and under increasing Pathet Lao pressure, he is rapidly backing away from the tacit acceptance he has given them. Added to this is the problem with Air America itself. Morale among its pilots has dropped to a point where they cannot be expected to continue flights over enemy-held territory where they are subject to being shot down. While it is true that the danger has not increased significantly over what it was during the time of the fighting, it is a human fact that these pilots no longer feel that they are engaged in a war and consequently are no longer willing to accept the risks of their activities. In addition to this, Air America has become politically about the most unpopular institution in Laos. Its past associations are public knowledge, and indeed Souphanouvong has said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] almost any other form of American air activity would be an improvement. Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi both dislike it because its personnel have grown so accustomed to behaving as if Laos were not a sovereign country, that they have behaved on occasion in an arrogant way even toward right-wing officials in Vientiane.

Under these circumstances some new arrangement must be worked out if we are to continue supplying the Meos during the next year. Souvanna Phouma has made a suggestion which Ambassador Unger is trying to follow up. Souvanna Phouma has asked that some U.S. aircraft be given to the RLG to be piloted by American crews. His point is that Lao Government aircraft can theoretically fly to any part of the country. In practice such aircraft would be divided up among the three tendencies and used by them during the period prior to integration to supply their own needs. There is, of course, no assurance that such aircraft could be used to supply the Meo entirely, or even in some of the more sensitive Pathet Lao-held areas. Souvanna Phouma implies that eventually they could, but the impression from Souphanouvong is that the troika veto over such operations would be attempted. Nevertheless, things in Laos being what they are, much can be obtained by consistent pressure and taking advantage of opportunities to establish a practice. Consequently Unger should be supported in his attempt gradually to convert the Air America operation into one which is partially performed by RLG aircraft.

Another attack should also be made on the problem of Meo supply. It is essential that we establish as rapidly as possible a sound international political basis for the continued supply of food to the Meo, either by the RLG, or if they cannot, by our own civilian air services. To do this, Unger is preparing a White Paper on Air America relief operations since October 7, 1962 in an attempt to establish that these activities are not only permitted by the Geneva Accords, but are morally and humanely required as part of the process of bringing peace to Laos. The next step should be to convert Air America into a U.S.-operated air transport service for the Lao Government--its planes marked with Lao insignia and operating under the authority of Souvanna Phouma. The goal should eventually be that the subject of air supply to the Meo becomes a fitting subject for discussion under the Geneva Accords.

Despite all these measures, the possibility that during the next year resupply of the Meo might become impossible must be considered. Unger and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have started to tackle in detail the possibilities of self-sufficiency and resettlement. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and USAID have a high degree of expert talent available in this field, and some preparatory steps are already being taken. Nevertheless they will need guidance from Washington on long range policy. Some of the questions that have to be answered are: should an attempt be made to maintain a stay-behind intelligence ability, and if so in what areas; what is the extent of our moral obligation to these people, is it enough simply to set them on the path to self-sufficiency, or are we required to help them withdraw to military secure zones? Paradoxically, the Meo in the Province of Sam Neua are in better shape from a survival point of view than those in some of the areas around the Plaine des Jarres. Perhaps consideration should be given to the possibility of relocating as many Meo as possible into the Plaine des Jarres region to boost Kong Le. Considerably more study of this problem will have to be made by both Washington and the field.

ICC

The attitude of the Canadian and Indian members of the ICC is, to say the least, distressing. No one believes that the ICC is capable of evicting the Viet Minh from the Pathet Lao territory. Unfortunately, however, the non-Communist members do not believe that the ICC should take any action except on a unanimous basis, nor that the appeal machinery of the Geneva Accords should be used. Both Avtar Singh and General Bridle take the view that the Commission's ability to function even in a limited way must be preserved at all costs, and that nothing must be done to disturb the delicate balance within the RLG. The result of this thinking is immobility. It has been argued to both of them that far from helping Souvanna Phouma, they have increased the strain on his Government by permitting arguments about the scope of investigations which should be decided by the ICC itself to take place within the RLG. It has also been put to them that the machinery of the Geneva Accords are designed to be used, not avoided; and that it would be most helpful to force the wheel through one turn as soon as possible in order to keep the Russians engaged. These arguments have not had any effect in Vientiane; and further efforts should be directed to New Delhi and Ottawa. It might be pointed out incidentally that General Bridle has on some occasions been less forceful than his Indian colleague. [1 line of source text not declassified]

USAID

Progress is being made in the commodity import program despite Pathet Lao objections and the AID Mission seems to be doing a good job on its immediate problems.

There is an area, however, where additional thinking needs to be done in Washington. The USAID Mission in Laos is relatively large. It has now almost 150 people and more are said to be arriving. The reason for this large number of personnel appears to be largely logistic. If the USAID Mission is to provide a significant U.S. presence in the country-side, an abnormally large support staff is needed. Placing Americans in isolated areas in Laos where they undertake various rural development projects requires, among other things, the services of a small air force for liaison, the warehousing and handling of assorted supplies and equipment, and all the administrative personnel required to back up such an effort. One wonders whether we have carefully examined what kind of AID presence is desirable at this time. If a complete job is to be done such as what we are attempting in South Vietnam, the personnel requirements will be rather large. If, on the other hand, we wish to keep our programs and projects to the minimum necessary to maintain a political presence, one has the impression that the USAID Mission need not be increased and might even be reduced.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that political maneuvering by the Pathet Lao and left-wing neutralist Cabinet members is on the increase. If the situation in Laos is to remain even in an uneasy balance, a constant counteroffensive will have to be waged by Ambassador Unger and his country team. This will require rapid and flexible support from Washington and Honolulu. The situation is so unusual and dynamic that it can only be understood by our people on the spot. We can be thankful that they are among the best.

Michael V. Forrestal/3/

/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

441. Memorandum from Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, February 4, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/63-2/63. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.

U.S. Assistance to Kong Le

/2/Captain Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., USN, Naval Aide to the President.

/3/Not printed. Kong Le requested petroleum, oil, and lubricants to permit the completion of the Khang Khay-Plaine des Jarres road before the rainy season, and weapons, clothing, and equipment for his forces as reported in this telegram, February 2. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-Laos)

It has now become evident that Kong Le has been requesting more supplies than Souvanna Phouma has been willing to approve and is now requesting weapons. This raises a new problem with which Unger is now wrestling, i.e. do we support Kong Le independently of Souvanna? Such a policy runs two risks: first, it would be a split with Souvanna; and second, it could be construed as a violation of the Geneva Accords in that it would be providing equipment without the approval of the RLG.

At the moment we are confining ourselves to expediting all the supplies to Kong Le that Souvanna has approved, some of which have not yet arrived due partly to CINCPAC's reluctance. I am trying to help State by getting the JCS to prod Admiral Felt once again on this problem.

I think we ought to let Unger try to work this out in Vientiane by pressuring both Souvanna Phouma and the French to be more responsive to Kong Le's needs for assistance. He is doing this today.

442. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, February 14, 1963, 3:56 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Secret; Priority. Drafted by John C. Guthrie of SOV, cleared by Cross and Thompson, and approved by Harriman. Repeated priority to Vientiane.

1697. Assistant Secretary Harriman called in Soviet Ambassador Feb 13 to make oral statement on Laos./2/ He informed Ambassador his remarks amplified what President had said to Mikoyan/3/ and contained comments on Soviet statements.

/2/With Harriman's and U. Alexis Johnson's clearances, Koren drafted on January 23 an oral statement to be handed to Dobrynin, which was the basis for Harriman's presentation. (Ibid., POL 27-14 Laos)

/3/See Document 438.

As President told Mikoyan large numbers of Vietminh remain in Laos. These are in excess of 2,000. In this connection Khrushchev had referred to communique issued at Hanoi at time of Phoumi visit and Harriman wished make clear that North Vietnamese declaration concerning withdrawal Vietminh from Laos was unilateral statement which Phoumi did not endorse. North Vietnamese have also been using Laos to interfere in South Vietnam contrary to Geneva agreements. In U.S. judgment continued presence Vietminh troops in Laos having demoralizing effect on Souvanna Phouma's efforts establish peace and security. Souvanna trying to act in accord with Geneva Agreements and Zurich communique and U.S. doing everything it can to support him in this effort. However, there has been no integration of armed or civilian forces and the country in effect is divided into two areas. Cease-fire has been violated and Pathet Lao have made unprovoked attacks on Royal Army units, peaceful tribesmen and even neutralist forces. Most recent shocking incident was assassination previous day of Colonel Ketsana, one of Kong Le's commanders and strong supporters./4/ Unfortunately ICC has been stymied and its two investigations made under conditions which it protested. We are convinced withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces will require Soviet cooperation would offer start on path to peace and unity.

/4/The Department of State believed Ketsana was killed by the Pathet Lao because of his opposition to them. (Telegram 1693 to Vientiane, February 13, and telegram 1166 from Vientiane, February 14; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6-7 Laos)

The U.S. and USSR have responsibility to use their influence to help factions seek unity and from beginning U.S. has not only materially and morally supported Souvanna government but has also used its influence to see that he gets support of former Royal Government adherents. With regard to withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, all were withdrawn except for Attaches which ICC can easily verify. Similarly with regard to "adherents of Chiang Kai-shek" these are in fact without military significance and we have been informed none remain in Laos. As for American aircraft in Laos these are all civilian planes operating in response to Souvanna Phouma requests and open to inspection not only by ICC but all three factions.

Harriman noted former Soviet and American Ambassadors had cooperated effectively in Vientiane and he requested that Soviet Ambassador Vientiane be instructed work closely with U.S. Ambassador on making Agreements a success and to seek agreement on facts thereby helping eliminate obstacles to understanding between our two governments. Harriman also requested Soviets use their influence with Polish member ICC to seek his greater cooperation, noting that Indian Chairman preferred to operate on basis of unanimity.

Dobrynin said that while he did not necessarily agree with all of Harriman's statements, he would forward them to Moscow and noted that references to Souvanna could be discussed with him there.

Ball

443. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, February 20, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/63-2/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text by Forrestal reads: "Mac: The President has said O.K but he wants to know what our capabilities are to help?" A note in an unknown hand reads: "MF is finding the answers to the President's question."

Laos

Kong Le is, as you know, Souvanna Phouma's only domestic military support. We have been informed that Kong Le may only be able to hold out for a few days in the event the PL decide on a full scale attack. We feel it would be in our interests to put him in a position to hold out somewhat longer in order to give the West a chance to take the diplomatic offensive under the Geneva Accords. Later we might want to do more, depending upon the circumstances.

There are two courses Governor Harriman proposes. First, orders should go to the Embassy, JUSMAG Bangkok, and CINCPAC directing them to expedite the flow of supplies to Kong Le through channels which are approved by Souvanna Phouma. They should also be directed to determine what types of arms and ammunition should be provided to Kong Le in order to permit him to hold out for a reasonable period of time against the Pathet Lao assault.

Second, CINCPAC, JUSMAG Thailand, and the CIA should be directed to cooperate with the Embassy in Vientiane in preparing means to deliver materiel (including arms and ammunition) on an emergency basis to the Plaines des Jarres in the event fighting breaks out suddenly. These means might involve direct flights from Thailand to Plaines des Jarres if the situation got out of hand./2/

/2/In telegram 834 to Vientiane, sent also to Bangkok for the DEPCHJUSMAG and to CINCPAC, the Department asked the Embassy in Vientiane to prepare estimates of the quantity and types of equipment that would be needed by the neutralists and forward the estimate to CINCPAC. Concurrently, the Embassy, DEPCHJUSMAG, and CINCPAC should develop plans to rapidly deliver this material on an emergency basis. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-Laos)

No action other than preparation would be taken under the second proposal without your express authorization; but it does seem prudent to ensure that we be in a position to act if the necessity arises.

444. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 25, 1963, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/63-2/63. Secret. Drafted by Edmund S. Glenn and approved by the White House on February 28. According to Kennedy's appointment book, the meeting ended at 1 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) The Department of State prepared a briefing memorandum for the President in conjunction with the trip of King Savang and Souvanna to Washington, February 25-27. As the briefing paper made clear, Savang and Souvanna were on an initial round of visits to countries which had signed the Geneva Accords of 1962. Immediately before coming to the United States, they were in the Soviet Union. They would next visit Poland, China, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam before returning to Vientiane. (Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, February 21; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 Laos)

SUBJECT
Laos/2/

/2/On February 25 while the President was meeting with Savang and Souvanna, Rusk met with Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena. Rusk and Quinim disagreed on their assessments of how well the control mechanism of the Geneva Agreements was working. Rusk specifically noted that North Vietnamese troops were still in Laos as were Chinese road builders in the northwest. Quinim countered that the ICC had investigated these North Vietnamese withdrawals and was satisfied. As for the Chinese workers, they were there by invitation and were not troops. (Ibid., POL Laos) On February 26, Harriman met with Quinim and asked him why the Royal Lao Government did not ask the ICC to investigate the presence of foreign troops in Laos, who ordered the Air America plane shot down, and who killed Colonel Ketsana. Harriman then said that he wanted to be absolutely frank: why were the Pathet Lao starving out Kong Le and attempting to destroy his forces loyal to Souvanna? (Ibid.)

PARTICIPANTS

The United States:
The President
W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Leonard Unger, United States Ambassador to Laos
Michael V. Forrestal, The White House

Laos:
His Majesty Sri Savang Vatthana, King of Laos
His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
His Royal Highness Prince Tiao Khampan, Laos Ambassador to the United States

After an exchange of pleasantries, the President asked the King about the latter's impression of his visit in Moscow.

The King said that the Laotian Delegation had talks with Chairman Khrushchev, President Brezhnev, and other Soviet personalities. The King believes that the Soviets tried to prove their intention to establish a zone of peace in Laos. The popular manifestations in the Soviet Union on the occasion of the visit also had as their theme the desire for peace.

The President said it is our impression that the Pathet Lao does not share such peaceful intentions. Everybody has a lot at stake in Laos, and we feel that the Pathet Lao has not demonstrated its willingness to obtain military and civil integration.

The King said that this is not surprising, since the problem of Indochina has to be considered in its totality. We have tried to remove Laos from the quarrels in the other parts of Indochina, first by isolating it from the French strife with Viet-Nam and later among the Vietnamese themselves. This was tried in the 1954 Geneva conference without full success, however, since this conference did not succeed in embodying the real will of the Lao people. As far as the agreements are concerned, Pathet Lao adherence depends on the solution not only of the purely Lao problem, but also of that of Viet-Nam, the two problems being tied together. It was the will of the United States and of the other signatories of the treaty--at least in appearance--to obtain a neutral Laos. This would be very good if the agreements were respected by everybody. Since the signature of the agreements, however, it has appeared that they might not be respected by all sides. This is because the verification of the withdrawal of foreign troops depends on a government which is tripartite. The source of difficulty is that the verification of the withdrawal of troops can be carried out only on a very small part of the territory of Laos at any one time. Thus, those who do not intend to respect the agreement have every possibility to move their troops from the area about to be inspected and place them temporarily elsewhere. The King has felt already a tendency in this direction and cited as cases in point two investigations of little consequence which have already been undertaken.

The difficulty is that the point of departure is not the same for the two sides. The United States has stated with precision the exact number and location of its military in Laos. The other side said that they had no troops in Laos and therefore verification became immediately necessary. This is an unequal situation.

The President said that the question is now what can the United States do in order to help. What action can be taken to strengthen the friends of the Prime Minister, that is to say, those who represent a neutralist tendency? What for example can be done to help Kong Le, an important support for Prince Souvanna, whose situation at present seems to be exceedingly difficult?

The King said that up to the present the Crown has kept outside any partisan politics. It will therefore be up to the Prime Minister to say what he wishes, by what means the United States can help him to carry out his tasks, and, as a matter of fact, to save the country, and to carry out his promises made to the entire world, to the King, and to the people of Laos.

As for the Pathet Lao and the Communist Party, it shouldn't be expected that they will give up their long-range plans which are directed from abroad. It is difficult to see a final solution in Laos without one in Viet-Nam, in spite of the status of neutrality. If the Communists have hidden their troops and made the verification of their withdrawal so difficult it is for the purpose of carrying on their policies in regard to South Viet-Nam, since the easiest route of access is through Laos.

The President said that, in furtherance of the King's suggestion, he would like to ask the Prime Minister how the latter estimates the present situation. Has the situation remained more or less what it was or has it worsened? What action needs to be taken?

The Prime Minister said that on the whole the situation has not deteriorated. The atmosphere in Vientiane has improved. There were difficulties at the beginning because of a lack of caution on the part of General Phoumi to which the other side reacted. This was when a number of the Prime Minister's officers as well as Pathet Lao (Neo Lao Hak Xat) soldiers were arrested. These arrests almost led to the break-up of the government. The Prime Minister was forced to make the two sides understand better what the situation was and in particular that as long as the government did not yet have enough power to carry out police functions such incidents would be unavoidable. However, since September, October, or November the atmosphere in Vientiane has improved and there seems to be more reciprocal understanding on both sides (i.e., Neutralist and Phoumi).

As for the remainder of the country, there is no need for alarm. It is true that Neo Lao Hak Xat attempted to destroy neutralist forces so as to face only the Vientiane forces. They failed, however, at Phong Saly as well as at Xieng Khouang, and it is doubtful that they will repeat their attempts. After all they also want peace. They don't want war to break out again as this time they would be isolated and deprived of all the aid which they were receiving previously.

The fact remains that it is difficult to obtain, from one day to the next, assurance that former jailers and former prisoners will agree among themselves. There is a lack of trust between them. The Pathet Lao do not wish to see the repetition of the events of 1959. They have reproached the Prime Minister for having delivered them through his political actions to the government of Phoui Sananikone in 1958. They do not wish to see this experience repeated, and, as long as the other side keeps its forces, they will find it necessary to keep their own.

As for General Phoumi, there are two difficulties on his side. First, a number of senior officers want to retain their positions. Second, he does not trust the Pathet Lao any more than the Pathet Lao trusts him. This mutual mistrust slows down the task of national integration.

It will be possible, however, to arrive at a solution if everybody puts his cards on the table in good faith. In order to obtain that, a certain amount of pressure on the part of the great powers may be necessary. If the United States puts some pressure on Phoumi while the Soviets put some pressure on the Pathet Lao (as the Prime Minister has requested Chairman Khrushchev to do through the Soviet Ambassador in Vientiane) the situation will improve.

The President said that it seems to us that there exists a possibility of action within Laos itself in order to strengthen the neutralist forces. In order to strengthen these forces it will be necessary for the Prime Minister to make great efforts to create a pole of attraction in the center so as to rally support, thus making the two extremes less tempting.

The Prime Minister said that this is indeed his aim but that he lacks the necessary means to do so. For example, General Phoumi's troops are paid on time, but General Kong Le's troops have not been paid for seven or eight months. This is a source of difficulty at present which might be helped by a transfer of funds from General Phoumi. Such help, however, is not easy because if it became known that General Phoumi transfers funds to pay Kong Le's troops, Prince Souphanouvong would also ask for funds. Where would the money come from? It is for that reason that the Prime Minister has not acted, except, of course, in the case of civil servants. There is no problem in regard to this group since nine-tenths of them, even those in the provinces of Phong Saly, Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang, were in place before the 1960 event. Where the difficulty resides is in the military, who constitute the only pole of attraction and strength for the Neutralists. That is why additional means are necessary to create a pole of attraction as described by the President.

Ambassador Unger pointed out that since the King has left Laos, General Phoumi has made 40 million kip available to the Kong Le forces.

The King said that of course questions of partisan politics are not within his domain and he always remained above them. He would like to mention, however, as a friend of the United States, that the entire question is not one which is exclusively within the field of partisan politics. There are also racial elements in it, and there are also elements which involve the great powers. The Pathet Lao is not very much under Soviet influence, but is rather dominated by China; China is the third major element in this picture, one which must be taken into account. As for General Phoumi, too severe pressure upon him on the part of the United States might alienate him from the United States. The King does not wish to enter into anything that smacks of partisan politics but he feels that he must draw attention to the fact that the Laotian problem is a part of a broader context.

445. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 27, 1963, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Laos. Secret. Drafted by Toumayan and approved in the White House on March 3. The meeting, including the later discussion with the rest of the Lao party in the Cabinet Room of the White House, lasted until 5 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPANTS

The United States:
The President
Leonard Unger, United States Ambassador to Laos
Angier Biddle Duke, US Chief of Protocol
Michael V. Forrestal, The White House
Alec G. Toumayan, Language Services, Department of State

Laos:
His Majesty Sri Savang Vatthana, King of Laos

After welcoming His Majesty, the President pointed out that it was very interesting for us to hear that he was going to Peiping. With the exception of the occasional talks at Warsaw, we have had no contact at all with the Chinese Communists in over fifteen years and we had found them to be very hard. The King replied that having known the Chinese for a great many years, the Lao understood their intentions well: the Chinese intended to re-establish their rule over entire Southeast Asia, and, to that end, all forms of action, depending upon the particular moment or circumstances, would be used by the Chinese. Ancient records showed that centuries ago the Kingdom of Laos and the Empire of Annam had been vassals of the Chinese. The use of the Communist ideology was only one instrument applied by the Chinese to penetrate Southeast Asia and to re-establish their rule there. The King added that the Chinese cannot accept the fact that the Lao would escape their influence and come under the influence of the West; they cannot even accept that they would come under the influence of the Russians. The King said that he himself is the object of a very active Chinese Communist propaganda campaign.

To a question of the President, the King replied that Chou En-lai had extended an invitation to him indicating that he would receive a royal welcome. The President pointed out that, perhaps, the situation to which the King alluded might occur, but the relations between China and the Soviet Union were very complex. China was so far from being a great military power that times could change and the Chinese would turn to the North rather than the South. It was our interest, therefore, to maintain the internal position of Laos, to support the Prime Minister and General Phoumi and to support the neutralist and conservative elements. The President assured the King that his personal prestige as King would be a powerful weapon for any government. The King indicated that he understood that the Chinese were also interested in the North because the only soils which would enable them to find a rational solution to their problem were in that direction. To the South, the soils were not of very great quality and what there are, are outside of Laos; to the North the soils are of a much richer quality. The Russians, however, were forewarned and had established not only agricultural colonies, but also armed colonies, and, as a result, the King did not think that the Chinese would reach their objectives there. There remained only a takeover, economic and cultural, and this was more than likely at present. Later, when the Chinese were sufficiently developed, they might then turn to the North. The King told the President that he was worried about the Chinese developing a network of roads to penetrate Laos. In particular, a road was being built which could be extended either to the Mekong River or to Luang Prabang. When an international reaction would set in, that is when the United States reacts against this so-called pacific penetration of the Chinese, a very delicate situation would be created.

With regard to the so-called National Union Government, the King said the difficulty was that this Government was the result of an international process and was not suitable to anyone in Laos. Neither the Pathet Lao, nor the rightist, nor neutralist faction accepted it; no one accepted it. Only last month the King had been told of measures that would be taken as early as October to bring about the overthrow of this Government. Responding to a question of the President as to how the Government could be made to last, the King indicated that a man of strong character was needed, but said that no such man existed at present. The President asked the King if Prince Souphanouvong was a true Communist, and the King answered that the Prince did not carry much weight with the Communists. For example, the King said when decisions were made in the Cabinet and all three of them (Souphanouvong, Phoumi and Souvanna) agreed to a decision, the next day Souphanouvong would come and say that he regretted very much but his party would not go along with the decision. This sort of thing happened every day. When a disagreement came near the bursting point, a decision would then be made to issue a joint release, but it would not be implemented. The King added that he regretted very much having to tell the President these truths about his country, but this was something that all Lao people knew.

To a question of the President as to what means might be used to overthrow the Government, the King replied that in the present situation an overthrow would bring about serious international reactions and that all of the Lao were aware of this. Both left and right wings constantly hampered the Prime Minister; it could truly be said that no decision of the Prime Minister was carried out. The Pathet Lao might agree one day, but the next day would go back on their agreement. They might decide that all roads would be open and all the country open, but the Prime Minister himself could not go where he pleased, and, at one time, his plane (a Russian-made plane, not even an American plane) had been prevented from landing and he had to turn back to Vientiane. The King pointed out that this partition was not affecting the population; the people kept seeing one another and trading with one another; the partition was between the political factions.

To a question of the President as to what measures could be taken by the United States to help, the King replied that it was difficult to recommend the support of one government or another government, but in view of the support given by some foreign countries to one or another faction, it would be very difficult to reach an agreement if no agreement were reached among these foreign countries. If all foreign troops were cleared from Laos, there would be no difficulty because one would simply call on public opinion to elicit the true sentiments of the people. There were 95% out of sympathy with the Communists. The King stressed the importance of the departure of all foreign troops; if this departure did not take place, then no solution was in sight. The President indicated that the ICC could play a large role in troop withdrawal. The President added that American troops had been withdrawn, but we knew that the Viet Minh were present. The ICC has not operated as well as it could have, partly because it has been bound by the rule of unanimity, and partly because India and Canada have not pushed as much as they could have. The King explained that in the Agreements, the concurrence of the Lao Government has to be asked and each time this concurrence was asked there was no agreement on giving it; therefore, they were in actual fact prisoner of the text and the ICC could not operate. The President asked Ambassador Unger if he had any comments on that particular point and suggested to the Ambassador that he speak to the King directly in French. Ambassador Unger explained to the King the meaning of the particular clause of the Geneva Agreement referring to the concurrence of the Lao Government. Ambassador Unger pointed out that the United States and other signatories understand that the RLG, when it signed the Geneva Accords in July, 1962, at that time gave its approval to investigations by the ICC of violations of the Accords. Therefore it is not necessary for the ICC to secure the accord of the RLG to undertake an investigation; all that is required is the working out of the requisite practical arrangements, which the RLG is pledged to facilitate.

The King pointed out that one could not talk of three parties in the government because in the neutralist faction only Prince Souvanna was a true neutralist. Other persons had been sent by the Pathet Lao to infiltrate the neutralist party and in actual fact there were only two parties. The President stated that it is his feeling that Chairman Khrushchev does not want the situation to change and does not want the Chinese to take over in Southeast Asia. The King concurred and indicated that Chairman Khrushchev had told him so himself. The President pointed out that the Polish were responsible to the Soviet Union and would be able to influence the ICC by carrying out instructions they receive from the Russians. The King agreed that all parties received instructions with respect to the carrying out of investigations, but with respect to the objectivity of those investigations, the instructions were to block them completely. The King recalled that he had told the President that the Lao and the Indo-Chinese problem were tied; as long as there was no solution to the problem of South Viet-Nam there would be no solution to Laos. Even if troops had been withdrawn from one city or another, the barrier would have still remained at the point where the supply roads were beginning to go to the South. The task of the ICC has been clearly complicated by the fact that its scope of action has been limited to such a few miles, thereby permitting troops to be easily withdrawn in the interval before the decision to carry an investigation and the actual investigation. The King said that the ICC had received an authorization to land at Kieng Khouang and Phong Saly, but not to go to Tchepone. (At this point Ambassador Unger noted that the RLG has in fact recently requested the ICC to make an investigation at Tchepone.) In conclusion the King remarked that he was trying to keep the Communists from taking over his country entirely; the Communists were already there but he was trying to prevent their complete takeover.

The President pointed out that there were three positive factors: (1) that 95% of the population was neither Communist nor sympathizers; (2) that the Soviet Union did not want Laos to fall under the Chinese orbit and that Chairman Khrushchev wants to maintain the situation as it is at present; and (3) that the United States has made a commitment, as it has also for South Korea and South Viet-Nam and even though the Chinese number 750 million people, this commitment of the United States constitutes an important element. Nevertheless, the situation is very dangerous. In concluding, the President stressed the fact that the Russians could play an active role in Laos.

The President then escorted the King into the Cabinet Room where the King's Ministers were awaiting (the Prime Minister, Minister Phoumi Vongvichit, Minister Ngon Sananikone, Lao Ambassador to the United States Prince Khampan, Mr. Koren and Mr. Cross). The President expressed his thanks to the Ministers for having come with the King and indicated our concern for the success of the Geneva Agreements. The United States, he said, signed the Agreements in good faith and would endeavor to keep Laos neutral and independent because this was important, not only for peace in Asia, but for the peace of the entire world. If this effort failed, the efforts of all 14 signatories would then be reduced to nothing, Laos would not be neutral and independent and a very difficult situation would exist for the entire world. The President felt sure that the Royal Government and the people of Laos would strive toward the carrying out of the Geneva Agreements. The history of our century shows that whenever major powers have meddled in the affairs of small countries, such as in Serbia in 1914 and Korea in 1950, very dangerous situations have resulted. This is even truer in the nuclear age. The King responded by expressing his satisfaction and that of his Ministers for having received the hospitality of the President and the numerous attentions bestowed upon his party. They were deeply touched by the friendship of the United States for his small Kingdom. He wanted the President to be assured that they were taking back with them the impression that they had been understood by the President and by his government. The King assured the President that his efforts (the King's) and the efforts of all who surround him would be exerted so that Laos would not become the cause of a conflict in their part of the world. They would avoid precipitate actions or other actions lacking in reflection that might lead to war. The Lao, the King said, were fully aware of the gravity of the present circumstances. Finally, he expressed the wish that the political parties in Laos would understand this concept of neutrality and unite their efforts to relieve the country from all forms of insecurity and trouble.

446. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, March 21, 1963, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 Laos. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Moscow, London, Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, and Ottawa.

1311. Deptel 888,/2/ ARMA CX-42/3/ and Embtel 1265./4/

/2/In telegram 888, March 15, the Department suggested that the United States should not so tie itself down with technicalities of the 1962 Geneva Accords that it failed to support adequately non-Communist elements in Laos. The Department suggested that the Embassy consider "means whereby non-Communist sections of Laos could be geographically consolidated" if a partition became a likelihood or a stalemate continued. In this connection, the Department asked for the Embassy's assessment of extending non-Communist control into the Tchepone area and clearing up the Pakse, Attopeu, and Saravane triangle. (Ibid.)

/3/Not found.

/4/In telegram 1265, March 13, Unger reported a conversation with Phoumi in which Phoumi mentioned, inter alia, that Souphanouvong had stated to him in an off-hand manner that perhaps the best solution for Laos would be division into two zones along the lines of Vietnam in 1954. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 Laos)

Accumulated experience of past eight months when analyzed against background of our general understanding of Communist tactics and intentions suggests that for present and probably for some time to come, Pathet Lao will not permit any significant moves toward integration or reunification of Laos. I find this assumption being ever more widely held among Lao of conservative and neutralist tendencies as well as foreign observers. Virtually no one expects a sudden aggressive bid for power by Pathet Lao but rather an effort on their part to maintain all their assets intact and free of any outside influences so that they can thoroughly organize and control their own zone, while they seek through propaganda, infiltration, pressure, bribery, etc., to expand their influence.

Not possible to guess when this Communist strategy will change and what will be its new look but for present they appear ready tacitly to accept autonomy of each tendency within its zone (always hoping to expand their zone at expense of other two) under umbrella of internationally sanctioned and supported Government of National Union and giving lip service to Geneva Accords. Since Communists, in my view, want Laos to be example of successful "neutral" international solution which they can cite in urging same approach for So. Viet Nam, I do not foresee their upsetting present situation now. We should of course not assume that gradual freezing status quo would be distasteful to General Phoumi or for that matter that it would even be actively opposed by Souvanna Phouma. Phoumi probably sees same advantages for himself as Pathet Lao see for themselves while Souvanna may well already have concluded, in spite of his optimistic statements, that he must live for long time with present situation; he is not likely be attracted by rigorous struggle he would have to lead if real unification were to be achieved. Generally speaking, Lao tend feel they have been treated as international pawns and Government National Union with Troika and Geneva Accords have had to be accepted by them for peace among the nations. They maintain, however, that solution has no relation to political realities within Laos. Instead of trying to make impossible Troika work for internal affairs there are undoubtedly many who would prefer retain what would be in effect a partition of country for purposes of internal administration.

Partition is not only a dirty word but does not in fact express clearly what Laos may well be drifting toward. Some kind of loose federalism in which two or three divisions within country manage their own affairs and in which a central institution under the King provides for indispensable communication between the zones and for the conduct of, at least, foreign affairs is not too different from today's situation.

Acceptance of this situation realistically, however much we would continue to pay lip service to unification, Geneva Accords, etc., would appear to have following values in relation to U.S. objectives.

(1) The more developed and populous part of Laos would remain more securely in friendly hands.

(2) Thailand would be protected to extent of having buffer along its entire Mekong frontier.

(3) The U.S. could deal much more directly and effectively with the conservative and neutralist administrations than it now must deal under the intolerable complications of the Patroika and strict application of Geneva Accords.

(4) There need be no serious disturbance of the international facade and the neutral posture of Laos.

(5) Puts less of a premium on person of Souvanna Phouma who, after all, may resign on short notice. Under Lao "federal" arrangement Souvanna no longer indispensable man and PL and Phoumi would probably find it easier compromise on other figures for what would have become essentially figurehead position.

Acceptance of Lao federal solution, however, would have the following drawbacks:

(1) The Ho Chi Minh corridor would not be interdicted.

(2) Internal security under a Lao Federal arrangement would continue to be as precarious as today and indefinite division of the country might keep it always as a Southeast Asian tinderbox. Removal of restraints within Pathet Lao area might also make military and insurgency threat more acute from that quarter. Thus the cost to U.S. to help maintain Lao forces necessary for security of conservative-neutralist areas would be sizeable.

(3) Long-run economic viability in the remote future for a longitudinally divided Laos would probably be even less likely than under a unified country. Nonetheless it is probable that the Mekong Valley area could make out by itself in the years just ahead at least as well as it has in combination, if not better.

(4) It is hard to imagine a division, de facto or, especially, if arranged, which would not threaten to deliver substantial number of friendly hill tribesmen into Pathet Lao hands.

If a de facto federal arrangement emerges as an accomplished and accepted fact it appears likely that the neutralists will be prepared to work closely with the conservatives even though they might well insist on maintaining their identity and their separate zone. This would mean that from the point of view of international opinion it could be maintained that the obstacle to a unified Laos was the policy of the PL and not of the conservatives. If we can safely assume, as I do, that "true" neutralists of today are friends of West, it is preferable that they have their own zone since otherwise two-way division would inevitably yield more geography to PL; assuming as I do that it would involve split up of neutralist territory.

I see absolutely no possibility extending non-Communist control into Tchepone area if we do not wish run risk of real fighting or of escalating violations of cease-fire (see ref Deptel). Tchepone is probably key point in PL zone as far as Viet Minh are concerned and I cannot conceive of its being yielded without a fight of such proportions as to upset entire settlement. Complete cleaning out of Pakse-Attopeu-Saravane triangle also difficult to imagine although certain areas can be made more secure by such projects as road building already underway as demobilization project.

Foregoing discussion seeks do little more than identify trend toward acceptance of internal division Laos and stimulate thought on implications for U.S. policy. We could in first place seek to arrest trend and push hard for unification and full implementation Geneva Accords. Alternatively we could simply let matters drift toward ever wider acceptance of division of country until this becomes accomplished fact, losing any of the advantages which we might gain from taking some initiatives and shaping developments in desired direction. Finally, we could seek maximize possible advantages (relative, of course) of Lao federal arrangement and take initiative to guide events in useful direction. This would of course risk condemnation by some of our Allies, friends, for betraying Geneva Accords, criticism by many Lao for seeking divide their country, strong reaction from PL and Communists, possibly even including military action. There may be in-between course, as for example discreetly encouraging General Phoumi to pursue Souphanouvong's opening (if in fact latter really spoke as Phoumi reported) and draw out PL intentions. First time, however, we indicate readiness listen seriously to or discuss division of country we may have set in motion developments which in effect could assure that unified Laos will never be achieved.

We will continue give this question our thought and try soon to provide concrete recommendations. Meanwhile would appreciate Washington views.

Unger

447. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

OCI No. 0516/63

Washington, March 29, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/63. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. An accompanying map of Laos is not printed.

SITUATION IN LAOS

2. Current efforts by the Pathet Lao to consolidate and expand their influence are being made chiefly at the expense of the weaker neutralist faction rather than of the rightist camp, which has remained relatively intact. The Pathet Lao's mixed campaign of subversion and coercion has achieved some inroads into the neutralist political and military ranks. However, these very pressures have engendered a trend toward neutralist-rightist cooperation.

3. Souvanna Phouma's failure as yet to provide firm resistance to Pathet Lao machinations has led to criticism of his leadership by various neutralist figures, including neutralist military commander Kong Le. The Pathet Lao, employing "progressive neutralists" such as Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena and Colonel Deuane, a dissident neutralist military officer, probably hope that these elements eventually will gain ascendancy through Souvanna's own default. In such an outcome, the Pathet Lao would be able to retain a veneer of the Troika formula while actually controlling the key government positions.

4. General Phoumi, leader of the conservative faction, has played an ambivalent role in his relations with the other two groups in the coalition. He has represented himself as a strong supporter of Souvanna and the neutralist solution, but has taken care to retain the support of the right-wing military. It is likely that Phoumi expects an eventual collapse of the coalition and another confrontation between the two extreme factions. Having supported the coalition, he would be in a position to present himself once more as a candidate for major Western support in a campaign against the Pathet Lao.

5. Since the present coalition government was formed last June, there have been recurrent reports regarding a possible partition of Laos. With minor variations, such schemes have called for conservative control of the Mekong plains, leaving the hill country of northern and eastern Laos to the Pathet Lao. It is likely that partition would not be strenuously opposed by most conservative Lao figures, who have little sense of identity with the ethnically non-Lao mountain peoples, and who, furthermore, are in large measure apathetic toward the presence of the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" in eastern Laos.

6. The Pathet Lao, while ultimately determined to extend their control throughout the whole of Laos, might accept partition as a temporary measure in an attempt to formalize their sway over the major portion of Lao territory and enable them to initiate repressive actions against dissident groups particularly the Meos--who are a serious obstacle to consolidation of Pathet Lao administration. The North Vietnamese might concur in such a measure, which would ensure them unimpaired use of the corridor to South Vietnam. Thus, while the conservatives might accept a partition as a more or less permanent solution, the Communists--if they acceded at all--would almost certainly regard it as a temporary expedient, an opportunity to consolidate a strategic base area preparatory to further expansionist moves in Laos and adjacent countries.

7. On the Bloc side, the Soviet Union continues to exercise caution in respect to Laos. Moscow appears content with the Geneva settlement and confident that the weaknesses of the coalition government offer sufficient possibilities for ultimate Communist victory through infiltration and subversion to make unnecessary the risks of intervention by Western powers in the event of a renewal of hostilities. The USSR does not appear to have utilized fully its limited leverage in Laos, although it probably would seek to restrain the Pathet Lao from any course the Soviets thought might lead to escalation into broader hostilities.

8. North Vietnam serves as a primary logistics base for the Pathet Lao forces, and continues to provide significant cadre support to the Pathet Lao military units. While Hanoi exerts primary influence on Pathet Lao policy, its control over Pathet Lao actions has obvious limitations. Within the Pathet Lao there seems to be one faction favoring relatively cautious tactics, and another faction which is more militant. This serves to complicate Hanoi's guidance and control problems.

9. As in the past, the Chinese Communists seem content to let the North Vietnamese carry the ball in Laos, except in those border areas contiguous to Communist China. Chinese tactics are designed to exploit the weakness of the coalition government in carving out a sphere of influence in northern Laos. The Chinese have virtually completed an all-weather road linking Meng La, in Yunnan Province, to Phong Saly, where a Chinese consul--identified as a Chinese general officer--has been stationed since November 1961.

10. Despite denials in various quarters that Peiping also intends to improve existing roads and trails leading from China across northwestern Laos to the Thai border, there are reports that some work is already under way. Lao Foreign Minister Quinim, during the recent royal good will visit to Washington, firmly stated that the work on improving the road from Nam Tha to Ban Houei Sai would be completed. Leftist Information Minister Phoumi Vongvichit subsequently made the same claim during the royal delegation's stay in Bangkok. In addition to the reported presence of Chinese construction workers in northwestern Laos, Chinese Communist military elements apparently are also engaged in logistical and advisory support of Pathet Lao efforts in this same area to eliminate resistance pockets of anti-Communist Lao tribesmen.

11. Meanwhile, there is evidence of increased Communist infiltration and propaganda activity among the villagers in Thailand's northeastern provinces adjacent to Laos. The Thai Government, realizing its vulnerability in this traditionally neglected region, is now attempting socioeconomic reforms--with US support--to contain and reverse popular disaffection.

12. Laos remains a stepping stone for the Chinese Communists on the way to Thailand and for the North Vietnamese to South Vietnam. Both Peiping and Hanoi would hesitate to jeopardize their advantage by a resumption of large-scale hostilities in Laos.

13. The focal point of Pathet Lao pressure on the neutralists is the strategic Plaine des Jarres where Kong Le has his headquarters and where the bulk of Kong Le's forces is concentrated. The situation in this area has been tense for weeks, with the neutralists and the Pathet Lao maneuvering for control. Major conflict has been avoided to date, but any one of a series of incidents could precipitate full-scale hostilities. In an effort to tranquilize the situation, Kong Le has urgently requested Vientiane to arrange for the presence of the International Control Commission (ICC) in the Plaine des Jarres area.

14. Since last fall the Pathet Lao have been waging a mounting campaign to undermine Kong Le's position. Last November, a US aircraft resupplying neutralist forces in the Plaine des Jarres was shot down and Pathet Lao interdiction of aerial resupply continues a latent threat; Kong Le's flow of supplies from North Vietnam has been reduced to a trickle; two pro-Kong Le officials have been assassinated, including Kong Le's field commander in the Plaine des Jarres, Colonel Ketsana; and through Colonel Deuane, new efforts have been made by the Pathet Lao to defect Kong Le garrison forces.

15. Kong Le--who only six months ago was parroting the Communist line--has reacted to these pressure tactics by embarking on a purge of pro-Pathet Lao elements in his ranks, arresting some and transferring others. To improve his logistic position he has arranged for an airlift from Vientiane, utilizing ICC aircraft and American and Soviet planes at the disposal of the Vientiane government. At the same time he has asked the Lao army and US representatives for military supplies. Additionally, he has taken steps to strengthen his defensive posture on the Plaine des Jarres, including the concentration of most of his forces north and west of the Plaine des Jarres airfield and the construction of a "fallback" airstrip at Phou Keng for use in the event the Plaine des Jarres airfield is overrun.

16. In this context, Kong Le has made some moves to develop informal contingency defense plans in cooperation with right-wing military elements primarily Meo guerrilla units--envisaging joint action should the Pathet Lao initiate a major military move. Mutual distrust between the neutralists and Meos remains an obstacle to cooperation.

17. This tentative trend toward a neutralist-conservative alliance may cause the Communists to alter their tactics. There are reports of an increase, in the area east of the Plaine des Jarres, in the number of North Vietnamese troops acting in support of an estimated 2,500 Pathet Lao troops. These reports, from neutralist sources, conflict on the number of Vietnamese present with estimates ranging from two companies to two battalions. Many of the Vietnamese forces involved probably were already in the general vicinity but previously located in more remote bivouac areas; some others may have moved into the area from across the North Vietnamese border./2/

/2/Current order of battle holdings for Laos include 8,500 neutralist, 19,500 Pathet Lao, and 50,000 conservative forces plus 17,000 Meo guerrillas. North Vietnamese troops in Laos are estimated at 2,000 to 5,000 men, the majority serving as cadres in Pathet Lao units. The major concentration of neutralist forces--3,000 to 4,000--in the Plaine des Jarres, with the remainder scattered in various garrisons about the country. [Footnote in the source text.] 1