Washington, May 22, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/17/62-5/25/62. Secret.

Governor Harriman's Conversation with the Lao Ambassador

Averell saw Prince Khampan on Friday and told him that we have lost confidence in Phoumi as a result of Nam Tha. Averell said he hoped that the RLG would select some additional political advisers to assist in the 3-Prince negotiations. (Vientiane's 1020)/2/ Comment: It is not unlikely that Averell spoke bluntly to the Ambassador, but I am confident that Averell was following the line which he felt had your approval that we should try to get Phoumi out of the political field and into the purely military field in order to minimize the possibility of Phoumi's breaking up the 3-Prince negotiations on his own.

/2/Telegram 1020, may 18, contains an account of the Harriman-Khamphan talk. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1862)

Ambassador Khampan reported to his Government on May 18th that Harriman had required a "reshuffling on the Royal Government in which Phoumi would not be included" (Vientiane 1585)./3/ Acting Foreign Minister Sisouk called Brown in on May 20th to ask whether U.S. policy had changed, since "Harriman has more than once stated that Phoumi had a future in the new government." (Vientiane 1586)/4/ Comment: Prince Khampan is, apparently, not a great admire of General Phoumi's and may have contributed to a misunderstanding.

/3/Dated May 20, (Ibid., 751J.00/5-2062)

/4/Dated May 20. (Ibid.)

In any event, on May 20th Harriman cabled Brown instructing him to clarify the misreported conversation with Ambassador Khampan saying, "I made no repeat no demand for resignation of cabinet or of Phoumi from Ministry of Defense or even from Deputy Prime Minister." (Deptel Niact 1022 to Vientiane)/5/

/5/Dated May 20. (Ibid.)

On May 21st Brown gave Sisouk and Phoumi the substance of Averell's explanatory cable and reported, "I believe RLG will now go ahead with negotiations on basis Phoumi's assurances to me." (Vientiane 1591)/6/

/6/Dated May 21. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-2162)

In the meantime Phoumi had apparently already complained to Marshal Sarit, who called Ambassador Young in on the morning of May 21st to complain (Bangkok's 1813)./7/

/7/Dated May 21. (Ibid.)

Last night (May 21) Averell answered Young instructing him to explain the situation to Sarit but cautioning not to give the Thais a story which would deviate from our policy of getting Phoumi to cooperate with us in bringing in new blood to the Government and accepting our advice in military affairs. (Deptel 1816 Niact to Bangkok, attached)/8/

/8/Dated May 21, not attached. (Ibid.)

Comment: Owing to a problem in communication, which I am trying to solve, you only got the foreign side of the story from your morning sources. I think that the net effect of possible bluntness by Averell and distortion by the Lao Ambassador has not been bad. While it may have raised Sarit's blood pressure a little, it may also have served to impress upon Phoumi again our seriousness. That this impression needs to be given is suggested by the fact that Phoumi has still not given us a concrete demonstration of real cooperation. The last word we have from General Tucker on May 18th suggests he is still having trouble getting Phoumi to settle down (Vientiane 1581, attached)./9/

/9/Dated May 18, not attached. (Ibid., 752J.00/5-1862)

I told Averell this morning after talking with you that I believe you felt that we should ease up on blasting at Phoumi and bear down on getting his cooperation on specific military and political moves./10/

/10/According to an account of the Daily White House staff meeting on May 21, McGeorge Bundy stated "in very soft terms" that he and the President "were both slightly watchful of Harriman's views on Phoumi." At the May 23 meeting, the same account stated that Forrestal reported that the President seemed "a little uneasy about our policy toward Phoumi," but Forrestal felt it had settled down and was "just about the right approach." (Memoranda for the record by Ewell, May 21 and 23; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White Houses Daily Staff Meetings)

Averell has a task group, including Defense and the Agency, working on just this matter now, and General Taylor's office is also giving him a hand on the military side.

You will, no doubt, get a report of their progress at the meeting of your principal officers, which I am trying to arrange as soon as possible.

375. Editorial Note

An advanced copy of SNID 58-5-62 was approved by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 23. It was entitled, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible U.S. Actions With Respect to Laos." and was prepared and submitted in response to specific assumptions and courses of action provided by the Laos Task Force under William Sullivan.

The estimate had as general assumptions that while Hanoi, Beijing, and Moscow might disagree on tactics, there were no fundamental differences on Laos. If the situation reached the point of armed conflict between the United States and China, this could change. However, the Soviet Union was not likely to abandon its influence in Laos and North Vietnam to China. The estimate stated that all the Communist powers probably suspected the United States of insincerity or at least procrastination in bringing Phoumi to serious negotiations. With Pathet Lao military successes, they had lots some interest in a coalition government. The Communists, the estimate continued, probably interpreted the U.S. troop movements to Thailand as an attempt to deter them from further military action in Laos, but they recognized that it placed the United States in an improved position to intervene. Under these circumstances, the Communists--the Pathet Lao directed by Hanoi and supported by the Soviet Union and China--would not alter their current tactic of suspending major military action while waiting for the RLG to accept their terms for a political settlement.

The estimate then examined the various courses of action under Assumption One: that neither side had openly repudiated the cease-fire or the principle of a negotiated settlement, and that U.S. policy sought a neutralist settlement. The first course of action was A, providing Laos with assistance to the level of South Vietnam. The estimate stated that the Communists would most certainly respond by increasing their military investment in Laos--more North Vietnamese, increased logistics support, more artillery, perhaps an expanded airlift, but they would almost certainly not take the towns along the Mekong. Under Course B, the United States building up its forces to 20,000 troops in Thailand, the response would probably be North Vietnamese reinforcements to Laos, Chinese troops to the border with Laos, and a resumption of negotiations. Under Course C, U.S.-Thai-and willing SEATO members' troops crossing into Laos and garrisoning Royal Lao Government-held areas with a clear indication that there would be no offensive action against Communist-held positions, the response would be additional North Vietnamese forces and probably Chinese "volunteers" into northern Laos with stepped up Soviet logistics support. The Pathet Lao would harass U.S. and allied forces, but would not attempt to drive them from Laos. The Communist side would probably revert to a negotiated settlement with the withdrawal of U.S.-Thai-SEATO forces as a condition.

Assumption Two held that the Communist side attacked the remaining towns in Royal Lao Government hands and U.S. policy shifted from a negotiated settlement to a de facto partition. Course of Action D had U.S.-Thai-SEATO troops taking the offensive to secure southern Laos. The Communist side would not be expecting this response, since their own attack would be based on the calculation that the U.S. would not intervene. However, they would resist strenuously with additional North Vietnamese troops and probably Chinese "volunteers" along with rapidly stepped up Soviet logistics support. They would assume that the United States would not be able to sustain a prolonged and unpopular war and in due course would seek a negotiated settlement. Course of Action E had the United States and its allies taking the action in D plus attempting to retake Sayaboury Province--with the exception of Luang Prabang--and the northern towns along the Mekong. The Communist response would be vigorous opposition, with North Vietnamese and almost certainly Chinese intervention, probably without the fiction that they were "volunteers." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62-6/5/62)

376. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, May 24, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 5/11/62-5/28/62. Secret.

Presidential Meeting on Laos

/2/A report, drafted by Sullivan and Cross on May 24, in response to section, "A. Political," is ibid, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 157. It is printed as an attachment to Document 379. This report was apparently a product of an inter agency working group established under the chairmanship of William Sullivan; see Document 370.

A. Political

(1) Progress toward a resumption of the three Prince negotiations.

(2) U.S. efforts to stimulate the negotiations and U.S. plans for broadening the political base on the RLG.

(3) U.S. planning for the period following the formation of a government of national union, including the role expected of the FAR; and the status of planning for other contingencies, such as a breakdown of negotiations or of the cease-fire.

B. Military

(1) Relative capability of the FAR to Communist forces now and after the withdrawal of foreign forces from Laos, and the mission to be assigned the FAR.

(2) Measures being recommended for the strengthening of the FAR, and progress in obtaining General Phoumi's cooperation in military matters.

(3) Plans for coordination of multi-national forces in Thailand in the present situation, and status of Thai/US bi-lateral planning for the defense of Thailand.

(4) Status of CINCPAC capabilities, in terms of forces and reaction times, to respond to contingencies.

377. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, May 24, 1962.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos SEATO 1962, T-641-71H. Secret.

SUBJECT
Meeting on Laos/Thailand at 4:30 p.m. 24 May

The meeting of principals on Laos/Thailand which you directed is being held at 4:30 p.m. this afternoon. State and Defense will undertake to respond to the points listed in the attached agenda dated May 23, 1962./2/ The principal subjects upon which you should receive assurance are the following:

/2/See Document 376.

a. What do we expect henceforth from the Royal Laotian Army: What are we doing about rehabilitating it?

b. What are the military contingencies for which we are prepared? What happens if the Pathet Lao attack another important objective as they did at Nam Tha, or infiltrate to the Mekong?

c. What sort of U.S./Thai planning is going on for the defense of Thailand? What guidance has been given General Harkins, our chief planner?

d. Are we satisfied that no more U.S. forces should be deployed to the Western Pacific at this time?

Maxwell D. Taylor/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

378. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 24, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 157. Top Secret. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the above addresses as NSAM 157, May 29. (Department of State, S-S/NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 157)

SUBJECT
Presidential Meeting on Laos, May 24, 1962

At the meeting on the situation in Laos held in the Cabinet Room at 4:30 p.m. today,/2/ the President requested contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the cease fire in Laos for action in two major areas:

/2/The meeting lasted until 5:25 p.m. and was attended in addition to the President by Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Lemnitzer, Gilpatric, Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Forrestal. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

(a) the investing and holding by Thai forces with U.S. backup of Sayabouri Province (being that portion of northern Laos to the west of the Mekong River); and

(b) the holding and recapture of the panhandle of Laos from Thakhek to the southern frontier with Thai, Vietnamese or U.S. forces.

In connection with the above contingency plans, the President desired an estimate of the military value of the Mekong River in Sayabouri Province as a defensive barrier in relation to the cost of taking and holding it.

The President also asked that the above planning be undertaken unilaterally by the United States without discussion at this time with the Thais or the Lao.

The President also indicated that he contemplated keeping U.S. forces in Thailand during the period of the 3-Prince negotiations and the early days of the government of national union, i.e. as long as they serve a necessary purpose.

The President observed that a cable would have to go in answer to Bangkok's 1844./3/

/3/In telephone 1844 from Bangkok, May 24, Young raised four policy questions and asked for guidance on them. They were: 1) defending the right bank of the Mekong in Sayaboury Province should the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces threaten it; 2) what to do if the Thai tried a pre-emptive occupation; 3) what to do in the case of a renewed breach of the cease-fire on the order of Nam Tha; and 4) the date for withdrawal of U.S. forces. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/5-2462) Telegram 1844 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXIII, Document 448.

Michael V. Forrestal/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

379. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, May 24, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos SEATO, 1962, T-641-71H. Top Secret. Prepared by Bagley.

SUBJECT
White House Conference on Laos/Thailand, 1630, 24 May 62

On return from a White House meeting on Laos/Thailand in which the Departmental principals met with the President, General Taylor indicated the following decisions were reached:

a. The United States does not want Thailand to move into Sayaboury Province unless there is a breach of the cease fire in Laos and such a breach must be so defined by the United States. The Ambassador is to be directed to play down any thoughts the Thais may have toward into the right bank area of the Mekong in Laos.

b. Contingency plans being developed by the Laos Task Force are to be ready for the principals on about 31 May.

c. The status of political planning was briefed in a paper tabled by State. This paper is attached./2/

/2/Not attached, but printed below.

d. General guidance is to be provided to General Harkins and Ambassador Young to apprise them of Washington thinking, to raise specific proposals under consideration here, and to invite their comments and recommendations. This would include action the United States would take in case of a breach of the cease fire in Laos, the possibilities of an operation to gain control of the Panhandle, and the use of aircraft based in Thailand to support friendly forces in Laos.

e. General Harkins' terms of reference are to be expanded to include Laos. He will be looked to as the chief military planner for the United States in the Southeast Asia area.

f. There is insufficient information on what is being discussed by General Harkins and Prime Minister Sarit in the bilateral US/Thai defense planning which has been authorized. Secretary McNamara indicated he would take action to obtain the required information.

g. Current assistance measures for the FAR will be continued and there is no immediate plan to resort to US assistance in Laos similar to that now being undertaken in south Viet-Nam. Our aid and relationships with the FAR are subject to Phoumi's reaction to General Tucker's current approaches.

Ground liaison and control teams will be required if US air support, based in Thailand, is employed in Laos.

h. US forces in Thailand should remain in that country as long as they serve a useful purpose in the achievement of US national objectives.

WHB

[Attachment]/3/

/3/Secret. Drafted by Sullivan and Cross.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

I) Progress towards resumption of three-Prince negotiations

A) Timing of Meeting

Phoumi has agreed to attend a three-Prince meeting at the Plaine des Jarres if Souvanna sees the King first, which Souvanna says he will do. Souvanna is reported planning to leave Rangoon for Khang Khay on May 25 and presumably will see the King in Luang Prabang within a few days thereafter. Meanwhile Boun Oum and Phoumi are going to Manila from May 28 through May 30. Souphanouvong and Nouhak of the PL are reported as being absent from Khang Khay. Thus the timing of the meeting is uncertain.

B) Conditions for Meeting

Phoumi has agreed to give Souvanna the ministries of Defense and Interior provided that all important decisions to be unanimous among the three factions and that military forces will remain intact pending an agreement on integration. The RLG has also reaffirmed its adherence to the Zurich, Ban Hin Heup and Geneva agreements of the three princes. Phoumi will not make the restoration of Nam Tha a condition for further tripartite discussion. Thus there do not appear to be any obstacles on the RLG side to the next meeting.

II) Broadening of Political Base of the RLG

Brown has pointed out to all the leading Lao political figures that we have completely lost confidence in Phoumi as result of Nam Tha and its aftermath. He has suggested to all concerned that Phoumi should devote his time to military affairs. The Lao have also been told in Washington and Vientiane that Boun Oum should strengthen the government by bringing in the wisest advisors available to assist him on the political side of the negotiations.

Brown has broached the idea of Phoui entering the government to Phoui directly and to others. Phoui expressed interest but did not wish to push the reorganization of the RLG himself or have it initiated prior to next three-prince meeting.

General Tucker is endeavoring to bring about a strengthening of the officer corps of the FAR end is introducing measures which if carried through will make the FAR more amenable to MAAG advice and control.

Sarit, when reassured that we were not aiming at the elimination of Phoumi or wholesale revamping of the RLG, undertook personally to urge Phoumi to cooperate fully with General Tucker and Ambassador Brown.

Although no changes in the RLG have thus far occurred, our efforts have caused widespread ferment among Phoumi and his followers and have undoubtedly reduced Phoumi's ability to obstruct further negotiations.

III) United States planning for the period following the formation of a government of national union, including the role expected of the FAR; and the status of planning for other contingencies, such as a breakdown of negotiations or of the cease-fire.

The recent action stationing United States forces in Thailand has given our planning for Laos a new background against which to build. We believe that the presence of these forces and the demonstration of United States ability to move such forces rapidly provide material assistance to the sort of plans which we contemplate. We would expect at least some of these forces to remain in Thailand until satisfactory progress is made in the establishment of a new government, the withdrawal of foreign military forces, and the integration-demobilization process for the Lao forces.

Essentially our post-Treaty planning for Laos involves four stages:

A) A carefully phased withdrawal of United States military assistance forces from Laos step by step with our satisfaction concerning the departure of Viet Minh forces from Laos.

B) An interim period (of indeterminate duration) during which there would be a "soft partition" of Laos under the provisional government, with the FAR retaining its integrity and its control over the areas now in friendly hands and the Pathet Lao similarly holding territory now in their control.

C) Steps toward integration of the armed forces on a pro rata basis and demobilization only when we are satisfied Pathet Lao have similarly demobilized.

D) Elections should be held only when we feel we have assurances that non-Communist elements in Laos have consolidated their political and administrative positions adequately to dominate the Communist minority.

Planning for each of these steps is as follows:

A) Armed forces departure

1) Providing maximum equipment and mobility to ICC in order supervise Viet Minh withdrawals.

2) Relying, however, primarily on our own intelligence which we would conduct in cooperation with the Thai. To this end we have "stay behind" plans for both Meo and Kha units to operate clandestinely in Laos and provide intelligence screened through points in Thailand.

B) "Soft Partition"

1) Stimulation of "troika" concept for interim Defense and Interior arrangements.

2) Efforts to improve capabilities of FAR (see B-2 under military).

3) Effort to obtain high calibre French military trainers.

4) Stockpile arrangements in Thailand for FAR which can be transposed into Lao depots.

5) Planning re financial assistance which would assure continued FAR payroll.

C) Integration and Demobilization

1) Understandings with Souvanna re the steps he will take to end the use of Laos as Viet Cong corridor (particular reference to elimination of Tchepore operation).

2) Understandings with Souvanna re steps to be taken to create a military force loyal to him and his government (particular reference to the role envisaged for Kong Le forces).

D) Non-Communist Political Control

1) Diplomatic efforts to assure appropriate distribution of portfolios in provisional cabinet.

2) Efforts to introduce more responsible elements into RLG in order provide cooperative non-Communist political basis.

3) Assistance, together with British and French, to help Souvanna maintain political independence from Communists.

4) Cataloging all competent non-Communist leaders and potential leaders as "talent pool."

5) Plans for economic assistance on bilateral basis with the new Souvanna government.

6) Encouragement of UN Technical Assistance group to remain quietly on scene and plan for expansion.

In consequence of the recent cease-fire breakdown at Nam Tha and the altered circumstances resulting from the stationing of United States forces in Thailand, an inter-departmental group has been reviewing and revising contingency plans. The first drafts of these revised plans will be completed May 25./4/ Essentially they cover the following contingencies:

/4/On May 25, Sullivan sent Harriman his interagency committee's first draft of contingency planning under cover of a memorandum which essentially is repeated below.

A) A prolonged stalemate resulting from Communist intransigence with increased Communist subversion, but no significant cease-fire violations.

B) Cumulative cease-fire violations of a nibbling variety patently designed to destroy the territorial basis of the RLG, and

C) A massive Communist rapture of the cease-fire with the intention of conquering Laos by military means.

Planning against these contingencies consists of a spectrum of integrated political-military acts, including:

A) Military assistance of the type now rendered Viet-Nam.

B) United States and SEATO military intervention for the purpose of reinforcing the cease-fire but continuing the political negotiations. (This would envisage stationing United States forces in Laos but avoiding combat with Communist forces.)

C) United States and SEATO military intervention in Laos with combat forces having a mission of clearing Communist elements from those areas of Laos considered strategically important to our interest and to the interest of our allies in Southeast Asia.

All of these contingent plans will be backed up by a Special National Intelligence Estimate examining the probable Communist reactions to the execution of each U.S. and SEATO action. This SNIE has been through two drafts and has received preliminary consideration by the United States Intelligence Board on May 23./4/ Final action on its is expected May 30.

/5/See Document 375.

380. Memorandum of Discussion/1/

Washington, May 26, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency DC1-McCone Files, [text not declassified]. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on May 28.

ATTENDING
The President and McCone alone

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

2. McCone reviewed recent SNIE on Laos/2/ explaining that an amendment would be forthcoming after the next USIB Meeting. The President was urged to read this Estimate carefully and he agreed to do so, taking a copy with him for the week end.

/2/See Document 375.

McCone pointed out that the thrust of these Estimates was to the effect that each increase in our effort in Laos, whether it involved additional support of the RLG or the placement of American troops in Laos, or the committing of American troops to combat in Laos would be met by an escalation in the Communist effort which would undoubtedly also be in stages involving additional North Vietnam combat units and are very probably covert and finally the overt commitment of Chinese Communists troops to action. McCone stated that he personally was convinced that this was a reasonable appraisal of trend of events in Laos and it represented the unanimous view of the Intelligence Community. However, it was pointed out to the President that he, McCone, had detected on the part of the military the feeling that the logistics problem of supplying combat forces in Laos would be a very inhibiting factor and because of this there was an attitude that perhaps the Communists would not escalate their effort in Laos to meet the increase in our own effort. McCone said that he disagreed with this viewpoint and while he recognized all of the logistics problems, he nevertheless felt that the Communists would keep the pressure on and what could not be accomplished one month or in one season would be an objective for the next month or the next season. This has been the history of the Communist effort as it moves southward toward Southeast Asia in the past several years.

McCone stated that he therefore would urge the President to recognize that the commitment of troops in Laos must be coupled with the decision to take actions against North Vietnam which at first would involve air strikes against military concentrations, airfields, supply depots, transportation facilities, and communications facilities; all of which were readily identifiable from recent photography. In other words, if we are going to commit our forces in Laos, we must not do as we did in Korea, provide the Communist forces with a sanctuary from which they can direct and supply their operations.

3. The President asked McCone again about the "London Times" article and McCone stated that we had exhausted every effort to determine the source and had, through a third party, been told that the "Times" correspondent originally wrote the article as a "think piece" using gossip and other information, and had then taken it to and had cleared it by a White House source, who he felt was responsible. The White House source was not and cannot be identified.

McCone said that he was so disturbed over reports of this nature and also conflicting reports on operations in Southeast Asia, he had decided to go to Southeast Asia leaving on the 3rd of June, returning about 10 days or 2 weeks later. Representatives of DD/I, DD/P would accompany McCone. Also, it was suggested that Mike Forrestal go along. The President agreed this would be a good idea, and suggested that McCone call the President on Monday, to confirm this arrangement.

The meeting lasted approximately 30 minutes with McGeorge Bundy being present for part of the time.

Note: Prior to seeing the President, I talked with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, covering in detail the substance of my proposed talk with the President, most particularly my view with respect to a decision to eliminate the sanctuary of North Vietnam in the event that we commit American troops to combat in South Vietnam. Also, I discussed with Bundy the extent to which the Harriman criticism of CIA over Laotian policy had filtered through the Washington press corps, largely as a result of gossip and talk on social occasions in Washington.

John A. McCone/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

381. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, May 31, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/26/62-5/31/62. Secret. Also sent to U. Alexis Johnson.

SUBJECT
Planning for Laos

1. After reading the recent cables from General Harkins (DA IN 234703)/2/ and General Tucker (ChMAAG Laos 300458Z)/3/ today, I would like to advance the following thoughts on the planning requirements for the Laos situation.

/2/In this telegram, May 29, repeated to the Department of State as 291345Z, Harkins argued against the potential Thai occupation of Sayaboury Province, "not a particularly valuable piece of real estate." Its terrain was mountainous and lines of communication poor. Any military gains would not be commensurate with international complications. A much better alternative, Harkins suggested, was FAR/SEATO securing of the Laos Panhandle and holding Vientiane. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2962).

/3/Not found.

2. Identification of Vital Interests in Laos. At this stage in our planning, we need to identify those breaches of the cease-fire which, if committed by the Pathet Lao, would cause us to consider a heightened response in Thailand or in Laos. It would seem to me that any one of the following situations would constitute infringements of vital interests which would warrant consideration of drastic action.

a. A general breach of the cease-fire throughout Laos.

b. A major attack or threat of major attack against Vientiane.

c. A major military movement penetrating or threatening to penetrate the Mekong line.

d. A breach of the cease-fire in the lower Laos Panhandle which would make difficult or impossible any subsequent extension of control of this area for the subsequent extension of control of this area for the protection of the South Viet-Nam border.

There may be other objectives which should be included in this list, but the listing is suggestive of the kind of identification of interests which is necessary.

3. Possible levels of US/SEATO reaction. Having made up our minds to the situations which might warrant us to raise the level of reaction, it then becomes a matter of determining the options open to us. Five such alternatives in ascending order are the following:

a. Bring additional forces into Thailand to constitute a base of strength from which to maneuver as the situation develops in Laos. At the same time, initiate measures in South Viet-Nam to improve control of the infiltration routes from Laos into South Viet-Nam.

b. Move forces into the key Mekong river towns in Laos in order to put pressure on the current negotiations and to impress opponents with the seriousness of our intentions.

c. Initiate retaliatory air and/or ground raids into Laos to punish the enemy for breaches of the cease-fire. The air raids could take out fixed installations as a reprisal for enemy attacks. The ground raids could be directed at the accessible points within Laos to punish the enemy and to acquire valuable information to support subsequent operational planning.

d. Move forces into the Panhandle for the purpose of closing the infiltration routes into South Viet-Nam and to mop up the key areas (this is essentially the plan to which General Harkins has responded).

e. Warn the authorities in North Viet-Nam that we will tolerate no further breaches of the cease-fire or further support of the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong. After having served such an ultimatum, attack targets in North Viet-Nam by air or make raids on sensitive targets along the seacoast.

There are probably other possible courses of action, but I believe that the foregoing cover most of the forms of reaction which we should consider at this time.

4. Further comments from General Harkins. As is often the case, General Harkins' reply to the Department of Defense directive raises new questions requiring new replies. I am struck by Harkins' early emphasis on the limitations of the Thai logistics system. We have always recognized that logistics would be a controlling factor on military operations in this area, but in the past the logistics analyses have been moderately encouraging. Now we have a responsible commander on the ground who is likely to take a much more realistic view of the situation than have the logistical planners in the past. It is of the utmost importance to determine now what are the limits of logistical supportability of the facilities in Thailand. If these limits can be established, they will set the notes and bounds for operational planning. We should get an early estimate from General Harkins as to the size of US/SEATO forces which he can accommodate in Thailand under present conditions, and request his recommendations as to short-term improvements to the logistics systems in Thailand and Laos which might be initiated.

We should also ask his comments on the alternatives listed in the preceding paragraph. With regard to the mop-up of the Panhandle, I think that the objective should be stated to him in terms which would allow him to recommend an operation less extensive than the complete clean-up of Southern Laos. In his recent cable, he seemed bound by an assumed requirement to control the territory all the way up to the narrow neck of the Panhandle in the north.

5. Retention of Flexibility. A final thought is that we should not freeze our thinking on any single course of reaction. I make this point because of an apparent trend in recent discussions to concentrate exclusively on a consideration of the occupation of the Mekong Valley towns. My experience has been that when the time of decision comes the favored course of action selected now will net be the one which fits the situation. I would recommend analyzing at least the five alternatives contained in paragraph 2 above, and cost them out in terms of manpower, equipment and logistical support requirements. Then it will be apparent which ones are feasible alternatives.

Maxwell D. Taylor/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

382. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, May 31, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/26/62-5/31/62/ Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Status of Laos Planning

As I mentioned to you this morning, the Interdepartmental Temporary Task Force headed by Bill Sullivan has agreed on a joint State-Defense recommendation to the President. At this point agreement has only been reached at the staff level; and neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense have given the staff recommendations their approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are meeting on the recommendations tomorrow; and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will meet on Saturday./2/ I have suggested but not advised anyone definitely that the President might be interested in having the recommendations on Monday./3/

/2/June 2.

/3/June 4.

Very briefly, the paper as it now stands sets forth the outlines of a recommended U.S. intervention in Laos in the event that developments move the President to order such an intervention. U.S. forces plus any other available SEATO forces would occupy the major river towns from Vientiane to Pakse for the political objective of enforcing a cease fire pending the achievement of a coalition government, and future military objective of improving the defences of Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam. The paper does not attempt to consider the circumstances under which the President might order such an intervention.

The paper, relying on SNIE 58-5-62,/4/ estimates that while the ChiComs and the Viet Minh would probably step up the scale of their military activities, they would probably not attempt to drive U.S. forces from the occupied areas.

/4/See Document 375.

The paper also emphasizes that if the achievement of a government of national union becomes impossible, or if U.S. forces were intolerably harassed, it would be necessary to seek another Presidential decision under which the United States might move militarily to occupy all of the Panhandle. Contingency planning for this event is also under way.

The points on which there is disagreement at the staff level have thus been postponed. The military are inclined to think that U.S. occupation of the entire Panhandle with the surrender of all of northern Laos is eventually inevitable. There is some indication that the Air Force (principally General LeMay) believe that the Communist military reaction to our moves will require planning for attacks on sources of supply in North Vietnam.

The State Department is more inclined to believe that moves to support the political objective of obtaining a cease fire will not escalate. They also say that the decision to intervene in support of the cease fire will not make a later decision to withdraw from Laos any more difficult than it is today. I am not sure I agree with this last thought.

MVF

383. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, June 1, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/6-162. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson

SUBJECT
Planning for Laos

Attached are the key papers for discussion with Defense tomorrow on Laos:

1. A draft memorandum for the President entitled "Plan for Possible Intervention in Laos"; and

2. Paper entitled "Analysis of the Situation for Military Planning re Laos".

The first paper is the work of the State-Defense-JCS working group and follows the concept upon which Harriman, Ball, McGhee, Hilsman and myself all agree. Briefly, it involves occupying the Mekong River valley from Vientiane south. The political objective would be that of restoring the cease-fire and getting back to negotiations. If this political objective was not achieved, it could result in a de facto partition of Laos which would do much to protect Thailand and Cambodia and materially inhibit the Communist ability fully to exploit the corridor into South Viet-Nam. If the Communists did not accept such a de facto partition and subjected the allied forces to significant attack and harassment, the plan contemplates seeking a decision to move militarily into an occupation of the panhandle.

The Defense and JCS position differs in degree, but important degree, in that, while they would allow a few days after occupation of the Mekong River valley for a cease-fire to be reestablished and political negotiations resumed, if this did not result they would move immediately toward occupation of the panhandle. That is, they would not admit of any de facto partition that would leave the panhandle in Communist hands, although they agree that there would be strong DRV reaction to such a move.

If time permits, I would be glad to discuss it further with you.

[Attachment 1]/2/

Draft Memorandum for the President

/2/Top Secret. Dated May 31.

SUBJECT
Plan for possible Intervention in Laos

The Secretaries of State and Defense are agreed that if the development of events requires U.S. intervention in Laos, the concept outlined below should be the basis for U.S. action:

A. Concept of Operations

1. U.S. forces, plus other SEATO forces as may be made available, would occupy key points in territory held by the RLG at the time operations are initiated, in order to establish control of the Mekong River valley and deny its use to the Communists. Under present circumstances this would initially mean occupying as many as possible of the following: Vientiane, Paksane, Thakkek, Seno/Savannakhet and Pakse. Thai forces might occupy areas in Sayabouri Province.

2. Possible FAR reinforcement of Saravane and Attopeu.

3. Continued harassment of enemy supply lines and patrols by Meo and Kha tribesmen.

4. The holding of Luang Prabang would depend upon the situation. If the PL/VM continue to demonstrate a reluctance to attack the Royal Capital and if the FAR can hold it without committing a disproportionate share of forces, it should not be abandoned. If PL/VM dispositions and actions indicate a major effort to take Luang Prabang, the FAR garrison and the King should be withdrawn. Alternatively, the intervening force might be ordered to occupy it at a later stage.

B. Political Objectives

1. Stabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia by demonstration that the U.S.:

a. Is willing to commit military forces to halt the further expansion of Communist-dominated areas and peoples.

b. Desires to enforce a cease-fire until such time as a unified, neutral Laos can be achieved under a coalition government and the Geneva Agreements can be put into effect.

2. A de facto partition of Laos until such time as there is evidence that a unified Laos could be assured of its territorial integrity and its existence as a neutral and independent state.

3. Assurance to the Free Nations of Asia that the U.S. will honor its commitments to assist in their defense against Communist aggression, direct or indirect.

C. Military Objectives

1. To deny to the Communists use of the Mekong River Valley.

2. To improve the defense of Thailand and Cambodia.

D. Circumstances of Initiation

This plan would be put into effect upon decision of the President. Prior understandings with the Thais, consultation with other SEATO nations and an appeal to SEATO by the RLG would be required. Appendix A contains proposed draft of RLG's appeal to SEATO./3/

/3/All appendices were attached, but none is printed.

E. Consultation with Congress

Presidential action would be preceded by consultation with the Congressional leadership. This consultation could result in a Joint Resolution, similar to the "Middle-East Resolution", if the leadership so desires. See Appendix B for proposed draft.

F. U.S. Action in SEATO and the UN

1. SEATO

a. The U.S. would proceed in the SEATO forum avoiding in the first instance resolutions, discussion of technical issues arising from treaty interpretation, and other excessively formal or legalistic treatment of the issue.

b. Accordingly, the United States would inform the other SEATO members that we will respond (or have responded) to the RLG request for assistance and encourage other SEATO members to do so. Voting on the issue should be avoided to minimize the risk that opposition to SEATO action would be recorded. In the absence of dissent there would exist a consensus accepting or favoring SEATO action and we could, as necessary, report that the conditions of Article IV, paragraph 2 have been met ("The parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense:).

2. UN

a. The United States will request an urgent meeting of the Security simultaneously with an RLG request to SEATO and the UN for assistance. This should be done when the RLG appeal is made public.

b. The United States will initiate in the Security Council a resolution which would endorse the neutrality and territorial integrity of Laos, call for restoration of the cease-fire, ask the ICC to verify the effectiveness of the cease-fire, and call for the conclusion and implementation of the Geneva Agreements which provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. A draft resolution is attached in Appendix C.

c. If such a resolution is not adopted in the Security Council because of a Soviet veto the United States should request immediately a special emergency session of the United Nations General where we would seek the adoption of the same resolution. Our purpose would be to have a United Nations or other international presence (ICC) effectively introduced as quickly as possible between SEATO forces and Communist forces in order to avoid military conflict.

G. Public Information

1. The U.S. would make clear to the world that our political objective is to restore the military situation existing as of the time a de facto cease-fire went into effect May 3 and to maintain that situation in Laos pending an effective cease-fire and the establishment of satisfactory controls so as to permit the achievement by negotiation of a unified, independent and neutral Laos. (Draft Presidential Statement in Appendix D.)

2. It would be made clear that the objective of the military action is not to "reconquer Laos." At the same time, it would also be made clear that the forces were authorized to take the actions required to defend themselves and to fulfill the objective.

H. Force Involvement

1. The initial force involvement would include the 5,000 U.S. ground forces (Battle Group and Marine Battalion) now in Thailand, plus required additional forces from Pacific Command resources, to a total of approximately 9-10,000 U.S. troops in Laos and an additional 8,000 U.S. supporting forces in Thailand. Two or three Thai battalions (1,800 or 2,700) could be committed. Early commitment of the Commonwealth Brigade (4,400) and a Pakistani reinforced battalion (2,000) would be sought. Air support, if needed, would be provided by the U.S., augmented by SEATO member nations. (UK and Australia each has one fighter squadron now based in Thailand.)

I. Initial Rules of Engagement

The U.S.-SEATO forces employed in Laos would take only such action as necessary (1) to protect their occupied areas and connecting lines of communication, (2) to solidify their occupation of RLG-held territory, (3) to prevent harassing or guerrilla action against their positions and (4) to resist any force threatening their positions. They would not expand their actions into PL/VM held territory, without prior authorization therefor. (It is not contemplated that operations would in any instance expand into territory held by PL/VM on May 3, 1961, without a Presidential decision to change the basic concept of this operation.) Air operations would be defensive only and directly in support of the occupying forces.

J. Control and Role of FAR

1. The U.S. would press for increased operational control of FAR, in order to best utilize its capabilities in supporting U.S.-SEATO forces.

2. it is essential to supplement the program to strengthen conventional RLG military forces by an effective program directed at the civil populace in order to develop support of the RLG, to improve security, to help provide the political component of the intelligence network, and most importantly, to combat the subversive or insurgent tactics which the Communists are almost certain to adopt under the circumstances postulated. The weak social and political structure of Laos will present attractive opportunities for such tactics.

K. Possible Communist Reactions

SNIE 58-5-62, 21 May 1962,/4/ estimates the enemy reaction to this plan as follows:

/4/The date of SNIE 58-5-62 is in error. It should be either May 23, preliminary approval, or May 31, final approval. See Document 375.

"The Communist side would probably suspect that the U.S. intent went farther than the stated purpose--preservation of the cease-fire. Their judgment of the real U.S. intention would rest to some extent on the size and disposition of the allied forces moving into Laos and the size and composition of the forces backing them up in Thailand. In any case, they would probably believe that the U.S., though still prepared to accept a satisfactory political settlement, was willing and ready to participate directly in the event of subsequent Communist military activity in Laos.

"North Viet-Nam would almost certainly introduce additional forces into Laos. The Chinese Communists might take this opportunity to move "volunteers" or perhaps even regular troops into northern provinces, and the North Vietnamese and Soviets, although they might not welcome this development, would probably accede. Soviet logistical support would be stepped up. The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese participation, would probably step up the scale of their military actions throughout Laos with the intent of confining U.S.-allied control of the specific areas occupied. They would probably harass U.S. lines of communications, outposts, and patrols. Communists agents would probably undertake terrorist and sabotage activities within US.-occupied towns.

"We do not believe, however, that the Communist forces would attempt to drive the U.S. troops from the areas they occupied. The Communists probably would consider that over the long run, confinement of U.S. and allied forces to these areas would place the U.S. in an awkward military-political position, and might cause the U.S. to withdraw. Meanwhile, they would probably revert to pressures for a negotiated settlement with the withdrawal of U.S. troops as the initial objective of any agreement."

L. Possible Subsequent Actions

The foregoing course of action is designed to serve the political end which has been the consistent goal of the Administration's policy--a unified, neutral and independent Laos. If the positioning of United States/SEATO forces in Laos does not accomplish this result in a reasonable period of time, the premises of the concept of operations will have to be re-examined. If, for example, U.S./SEATO forces were not subject to direct and significant Communist attack but were intolerably harassed over an extended period of time during which the Communists were clearly increasing their use of the Laos corridor and consolidating their control over the eastern portion of the Panhandle, the Secretaries of State and Defense would seek a new Presidential decision. It would be their current opinion that, in such circumstances, the United States should move militarily to occupy all of southern Laos below the Nam Ca Dinh, Nam Muone line. Contingency plans for this operational concept are being drawn up. They would, of course, require an increase in the forces involved and would increase the risks of significant military engagement with North Vietnamese and possibly Chinese Communist forces. It is believed, however, that the operation could be successfully accomplished without escalation into unrestricted warfare with the Chinese Communists.

[Attachment 2]/5/

/5/Top Secret. Drafted by Heinz and William Bundy on June 1.

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION FOR MILITARY PLANNING RE LAOS

1. Assumptions.

a. The basic U.S. policy is to prevent the domination of/6/ Laos by the Communists, thereby dangerously threatening the security of all Southeast Asia.

/6/Johnson wrote in the following at this point: "all of ?."

b. It is determined that military action is required in the furtherance of this basic policy.

2. Possible Circumstances of Initiation.

a. While no major breach of the cease-fire occurs, there is a failure of negotiations to reach agreement on a coalition government, with continued Communist military pressure and creeping extension of control; or

b. There is a major breach of the cease-fire by the Communist forces, accompanied by a resumption of offensive action, possibly including the seizing of one or more key Mekong centers.

3. Political Objectives.

Dependent upon the circumstance of initiation, the political objectives of military action would be:

a. To enforce a cease-fire and to restore the military situation existing as of the de facto cease-fire on 3 May 1961, and to establish satisfactory controls in order to permit the resumption of negotiations for a unified, independent and neutral Laos.

b. To gain control and secure key areas of Laos in order to provide maximum security for Thailand and South Vietnam and to prevent Communist exploitation of Laos as a supply route and base for further Communist efforts in Southeast Asia.

Note: The political objective would not include defeat of North Vietnam except possibly as a response to major DRV intervention and action against our forces.

4. Military Objectives. (Corresponding to Paras. 3 a-b)

a. To deny to Communist forces the occupation and use of territory held by the RLG on 3 May 1961 and to improve the defensive posture of Thailand.

b. To occupy and hold these areas of Laos necessary to safeguard the security of Thailand and South Vietnam.

5. Alternative Military Courses of Action.

a. To achieve objective 4 a only:

U.S. forces plus other SEATO forces as may be made available, would occupy key points in territory held by the RLG at the time operations are initiated, in order to establish control of the Mekong River Valley and deny its use to the Communists. This would initially mean occupying as many as possible of the following: Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek, Seno/Savannakhet, and Pakse. Thai forces might occupy areas in Sayabouri. Offensive air action would not be taken./7/

/7/The next following paragraph was crossed out, apparently by Johnson. It reads: "A variant for this course of action would be to use U.S. air in Laos, without commitment of ground forces. Air would support the RLG as one alternative, and would take offensive action throughout Laos as a second alternative."

b. To concentrate on objective 4 b:

(1) Occupy Vientiane area held by the RLG, and take action to occupy and establish control over southern Laos from the general line of Paksane-Nape south. Take offensive ground and air operations with Laos as required, including air operations against the Plaine des Jarres.

(2) As (1) above, except that the Vientiane area would be held only by RLG forces, assisted by U.S. tactical air as required.

(3) As in (2) above, except that the area of southern Laos to be occupied would be restricted to that general area south of a line from Thakhek to the border with South Vietnam at the 17th parallel.

These courses of action would include continued harassment of enemy supply lines and patrols by Meo and Kha tribesmen. The holding of Luang Prabang by the FAR would depend upon the situation. Thai forces would be employed in the major operation and would not be deployed to Sayabouri, The FAR would be used within its limited capability, but massive encadrement would not be undertaken. Its operations would be supported by U.S. units as deemed profitable.

6. Probable Communist Reactions.

a. Course of action 5 a. is essentially "Course C" analyzed in SNIE 58-5-62. It is there estimated that the Vietnamese would reinforce their strength in Laos and step up the scale of their military actions throughout Laos, seeking to confine U.S.-allied control to the specific areas occupied. They would probably harass U.S. lines of communication, etc., but not attempt to drive the US forces out.

b. Course of action 5 B. is (with some territorial variations) essentially "Course D" and "Course E" analyzed in the same estimate. (Although the SNIE assumed that these courses of action were in response to Communist reopening of hostilities, the estimates would probably be about the same if the actions were taken in the ambiguous circumstances stated in 2 a.) The estimate is that the DRV would react strongly, would add reinforcements, and would resist strenuously any effort to clear the area of Southern Laos running over to the South Vietnamese border. Chinese Communist introduction of forces is estimated as possible, with the odds going up somewhat as the territory assumed to be occupied increases to the north, but is not rated as probable.

7. Conclusions.

From the military standpoint alone, occupation of Sayabouri in itself is not regarded as useful, and military courses of action short of direct use of U.S. combat forces (encadrement of the FAR, an increased advisory effort, etc.) are judged useless in themselves except as auxiliary to the use of such combat forces.

Moreover, in light of the estimated enemy response to course of action 5 a., this course of action would quickly lead to a situation where the U.S.-allied forces would be pinned down at several river towns with small surrounding areas. The effort would be more effective if it included Saravane and Attopeu, but occupation of these points would almost certainly subject the forces to serious harassment and the imminent threat of encirclement. On the river towns only basis, the course of action would not contribute effectively to the defense of Thailand, nor would it really create any useful bargaining situation in Laos. Thus, to be effective toward either of the possible political objectives, it must be concluded that this course of action would have to be accompanied by such a high degree of affirmative military action that it should be assessed, and the military implications planned for, essentially on the same basis as course of action 5 b. to 5 b. as a practical matter, even though the limited actions of 5 a. might have political usefulness an an opening gambit over a very short period of time.

If thus follows that military planning should be focussed on the variants of course of action 5b.

384. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 2, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-262. Top Secret. 1 Drafted by Sullivan and approved in S on June 12. The meeting was held in McNamara's office at the Pentagon. Forrestal and Taylor also made records of this meeting: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62-6/5/62 and National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Das Buch, Laos. According to Rusk's appointment book, his next appointment was at 12:10, therefore the meeting probably ended before that. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

SUBJECT
Contingency Planning for Laos

PARTICIPANTS

White House
General Taylor
Mr. Forrestal

CIA
General Carter

State
The Secretary
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Sullivan

Defense
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Bundy
Gen. Lemnitzer
Adm. Heinz
Gen. Fontana

Secretary McNamara asked the Secretary to open the discussion. The Secretary said he had no problems on the political objectives. However, he had a number of questions he would like to pose on the military aspects of the intervention being considered. He was specifically concerned that our Military Commander have an adequate directive so that he knew precisely what his mission was and he was also concerned that the Commander have adequate forces appropriately positioned so that we would not suffer a succession of Dien Bien Phu's./2/

/2/According to Taylor's account, Rusk also stated at this point that he "recognized that military commanders would require air support, not only for direct defense but also to interdict Communist air and ground activity. We should be ready, also, to hit targets in North Vietnam." According to Forrestal's account, Rusk raised the question of whether the United States would not have to be prepared to attack North Vietnam and cited Korea as well as Dien Bein Phu as examples to avoid.

Secretary McNamara said perhaps the best way to focus on these questions was to list the things which the Defense Department would recommend against with respect to Laos. He then listed four such moves: (1) Defense would be against a solo effort by the Thais to occupy Sayabouri, (2) Defense would be against U.S. encadrement of the FAR, (3) Defense would be against the use of United States air in combination with the FAR alone, (4) Defense would be against the substantial use of South Vietnamese forces in Laos./3/

/3/At this point, Taylor's account has his own observation as a separate paragraph as follows:

"General Taylor commented that during the rainy season there was little danger of triggering a general offensive, although limited objective attacks were entirely possible. To punish the latter, he recommended the consideration of air reprisals from our side."

Secretary McNamara said there was a fifth negative which he would like to discuss in some detail. Defense would be opposed, he said, to a military plan designed to occupy and control the Mekong River Valley with only 8 or 10,000 United States forces. He feared that such a force would not be able to defend itself in the event of contingencies and could not depend upon the FAR for assistance. Therefore, Defense would propose a variant from the plans previously discussed. This variant would involve the use of approximately 40,000 U.S. personnel to handle the Mekong Valley operation, using most of these as a back-up in Thailand./4/ These forces would then be able to move rapidly to secure the Panhandle if the Mekong Valley scheme did not produce effective results.

/4/Forrestal's account had the conflicting detail that 30,000 of these troops would be in Laos and 10,000 in Thailand as a reserve. Forrestal also noted it would take 3 to 5 weeks to move such forces into the area after a decision to do so had been made.

After some discussion between the two Secretaries concerning the possible use of United States air as an immediate reprisal for Communist action, Mr. Harriman commented on Secretary McNamara's proposed variant plan. He said that any military action we undertook should have a political objective that world opinion would sustain. Secondly, our military action should be such as not to abandon protection of the Thai border. Finally, he felt we must recognize the possibility that our forces could be put in the Valley in pursuit of our political objectives and might have to stay there for a long period of time. He saw no inconsistency between this prospect and the need to have readily at hand adequate troops to protect those in the Valley in case they got into trouble.

General Taylor said that consideration ought to be given to further actions which we might not want to undertake. He had some doubts whether it was wise to contemplate the occupation of large areas which might lead us to a massive guerrilla pacification campaign. He felt that our primary purpose should be the protection of South Viet-Nam and Thailand and that we should not lose sight of that objective./5/

/5/Taylor's account has a fuller exposition of his remarks as follows:

"General Taylor also made the following points:

"a It is against the U.S. interest to undertake military operations in the form of a guerrilla pacification campaign.

"b. It is against the U.S. interest to attempt to occupy and hold any large areas in Laos.

"c. We should not undertake to save Laos by military action of the Laotian Army won't fight and/or if the RLG will not cooperate.

"d. If, as we now believe, the Laotian Army will not fight, there is no purpose in intervening to save Laos. Any intervention should be justified in terms of its contribution to the defense of Thailand and/or South Vietnam.

While the foregoing points were not formally accepted, there seemed to be no objection to them."

General Lemnitzer said he agreed that the issue was basically the security of Southeast Asia and that the main threat to that security was North Viet-Nam. He thought we should, therefore, give consideration to means for hurting North Viet-Nam in the event they continued to make trouble. He characterized the present fighting as very comfortable for the North Vietnamese because of the sanctuary they enjoyed in their homeland. He then outlined a plan which would involve an amphibious operation against North Vietnamese territory in the vicinity of Vinh, designed to cut across North Viet-Nam at that point and seal off all the infiltration routes into Laos and South Viet-Nam. The JCS considered that in many ways such an action was less dangerous than the massive occupation of the Laos Panhandle.

The Secretary said that he, too, was very much interested in hurting North Viet-Nam and making them understand that their home base was not immune. He believed, however, that in laying out our plans we had to consider a phased operation which would make this clear to the North Vietnamese by progressive action. Secretary McNamara agreed and said that we should start with the River Valley.

Mr. Johnson then summed up the understandings by outlining six phases of our potential military response: (1) A buildup of military forces (2) Occupation of the River Valley, (3) U.S. air action in Laos, (4) Forward movement in Laos to secure the Panhandle, (5) U.S. air action against North Vietnamese targets, and (6) Amphibious action against North Viet-Nam./6/

/6/In Forrestal's account, Rusk and Lemnitzer raised this issue and stressed the importance of harassing North Vietnam if the United States became involved in a conflict in Laos.

Secretary McNamara, in commenting on this outline, said that the buildup in the first place should be done quietly in such a way that it would not encourage Phoumi to further intransigence. Secondly, he said that he would contemplate U.S. air action in Laos only in conjunction with the movement of ground forces forward into the Panhandle. The Secretary, in commenting on these phases, stressed the need for a clear-cut directive to the Military Commander which would delineate the phase lines. Secondly, he stressed the need for readiness in Korea in the event the Communist response to our action took the form of North Korean, Chinese Communist, and possibly Soviet action at that point on the map./7/ Thirdly, he felt that any presentation of these plans to the President should make clear that our estimate of the enemy reaction cannot be defined with certainty. We are not sufficiently informed about their thinking to provide totally reliable estimates of their actions./8/

/7/In Forrestal's account, Rusk asked Lemnitzer if the United States could defend South Korea from an attack from the north. Lemnitzer responded that there were minimum forces--18 ROK and 2 U.S. divisions--to defend against North Korean attack, but not a large-scale Chinese attack.

/8/According to Forrestal's account, Taylor asked if there were not several steps which could be taken in support of a cease-fire before U.S. combat troops were introduced into Laos: air attacks on PL/VM targets for example, and he stressed the need "to avoid a lengthy guerilla combat which might start if we tried to occupy too large an area."

Considerable discussion then ensued among the participants concerning the basic question of whether it was really worth while taking any military action at all in Laos in order to protect Thailand and South Viet-Nam. While no firm decisions were reached, there was a consensus that, although Laos was not important in itself, the territory which it afforded, particularly in the Mekong Valley, was important for the defense of Southeast Asia. A similarly inconclusive discussion followed responsive to a question from General Taylor concerning the recommendations which the two Departments would make to the President in the event the Communists violently broke the cease-fire tomorrow. The meeting ended with a directive that State and Defense drafters prepare a memorandum which would form the basis for discussion with the President to be arranged for Tuesday afternoon./9/

/9/Forrestal's account has a brief report of a meeting among the President, Rusk, and McNamara after this meeting. It reads as follows:

"After the meeting Secretaries Rusk and McNamara conferred with the President. Messrs Bundy and Forrestal were also present. The two Secretaries reported on the substance of their earlier meeting; and the President confirmed that he would like the estimate of Generals Harkins and Tucker on the military value of holding various pieces of real estate in Laos."

385. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, June 4, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62-6/5/62. Secret.

SUBJECT
Contingency Planning for Laos

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have reported to you the highlights of the meeting on Laos which they held last Saturday with a few advisors./2/ They are on your calendar for 6:00 p.m., Tuesday,/3/ to carry forward the discussion.

/2/See Document 384.

/3/June 5.

Several thoughts came out of the Saturday meeting which I pass on now, as I may not be present at the Tuesday session. The first is the recent trend to concentrate on a single contingency the possible need to occupy the Mekong Valley towns to achieve a political effect by a demonstration of willingness to commit forces to Laos. The effect sought would be to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia and to convince the adversary that he should restore or maintain the cease-fire and proceed with negotiations for a coalition government.

The second point which came through clearly in the recent discussion is that the Department of Defense is raising its estimate of troop requirements for an initial movement into Laos. On Saturday, Secretary McNamara talked in terms of 40,000 U.S. troops as necessary to provide a force to move into the Mekong Valley, to maintain itself there, and later to be able to undertake initial operations in Southern Laos. There seemed to be general agreement that General Harkins' estimate of a four division force to clear and secure the Panhandle was low. At the end of the meeting, Secretary McNamara and others were wondering out lout whether there was a military solution for securing the Panhandle which was really feasible and not so costly as to cast doubt on the wisdom of making the attempt.

A third point in the discussion which struck me was Secretary Rusk's willingness to contemplate a freer use of U.S. air power in Laos and, if necessary, in North Viet-Nam. This to me was good news, as I have long felt that before we put a soldier into Laos to restore and maintain a cease-fire (an impossible military mission), we should consider taking reprisals in the form of air attacks in Laos on fixed targets and on the Communist supply transport.

My personal comments on the foregoing trends are as follows:

a. Are we sure that it is necessary to put U.S. troops into Laos to accomplish the desired political effect? The strategic build-up in Southeast Asia which Mr. McNamara is considering, plus an evidence of willingness to intervene in Laos by air, may do the trick without the movement of any troops into the Mekong Valley. At least, this course of action deserves a try as a preliminary to ground intervention.

b. If we go into Laos and the desired political effect is not attained, what becomes the military objective of our forces? While we would like to salvage those parties of Laos useful for the defense of Thailand and South Viet-Nam, it is very difficult for me to conceive of any ground military operation to clear and hold any significant area in Laos which does not run the clear risk of bogging down into endless counter-guerrilla fighting. I suspect that, when the returns are in from the military planners, we will be told that we can count on limited help from the FAR and from SEATO, and that we must depend almost exclusively on U.S. forces to establish and hold a partitioned Laos. At that time, we may well conclude that the price of direct intervention on the ground is too high for the uncertain gains, and that we had better shore up the Laotian borders as best we can from the outside, while retaliating against the enemy from the air and sea. This retaliation could extend to strikes against the enemy homeland in North Viet-Nam.

c. The rainy season which is beginning now makes it unlikely that the enemy will initiate major military moves for several months; however, he is always capable of a limited breach of the cease-fire like Nam Tha. We should be thinking now how to react to such a breach and how to use the next few months to improve our overall position in Southeast Asia. A pressing question is what to do about improving the FAR.

Maxwell D. Taylor/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

386. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, June 4, 1962.

/1/Source: Washington, National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Laos 381. McNamara purposely did not sign this memorandum and it apparently did not go the White House.

As Mr. Forrestal has explained to you, the draft memorandum of 4 June 1962,/2/ which you have read, was prepared by my staff in consultation with the Department of State. It had not been cleared personally by me or by Secretary Rusk. Upon looking it over carefully, I believe it requires the following major changes to reflect my views:

/2/Tab A to Document 387.

1. Recommendations 2 and 3 on page 9/3/ should be stated in terms of having plans ready for these contingencies. I am not prepared to recommend them at the present time. We are already preparing such plans in the DoD. Similarly, all the courses of action should be considered as possible plans rather than firm proposals.

/3/The last two recommendations of the paper.

2. The discussion of Stage 2, "Occupation of the Mekong River Areas," on pages 3 and 4, overstates the military usefulness of this course of action. Denial of the north-south road system in Southern Laos would not have any effect on the present supply route to South Vietnam, which appears to be adequate for the North Vietnamese to send in men and funds, although it undoubtedly has limitations on equipment. Even Communist control of these roads would still leave them with a major problem getting equipment onward from Attopeu.

3. Most important of all, page 4/4/ fails to make clear that we might confront the "threshold" within a matter of days after we had taken the first move in occupying these areas. The intelligence estimate is that the Communists would almost certainly respond by harassing actions and by seeking to consolidate and gradually expand their hold, particularly in Southern Laos. I cannot visualize our staying at this point long, and believe that as a practical matter we would have to move further to Stage 3 and 4 and possibly 5 and 6. In short, I see Stage 2 as a politically useful opening gambit which might conceivably restore a cease-fire and bring about resumed negotiations, but if it failed to do so would have to lead quickly to further action.

/4/McNamara is referring to subparagraphs "a and b" of paragraph 2, "Occupation of the Mekong River Areas."

4. For this same reason, I think that if we undertook Stage 2, we should have the 35,000 reserve forces referred to actually stationed in Thailand. It might prove feasible to have airborne units on call from the Philippines or Okinawa, but even these should have their necessary heavy equipment pre-stocked in Thailand so that they could go into action at once.

5. On page 6,/5/ the estimate of force requirements is currently 30,000 US forces rather than 45,000 in order to conduct firm offensive action. However, I am not convinced that these forces could do the job of really cleaning up the Panhandle without some additional reinforcement. Moreover, I would underscore the point that even if we defeat organized forces in the Panhandle, we would not have eliminated, although we might sharply reduce, the Communist supply route to South Vietnam.

/5/In paragraph 4, "Offensive Operations in Laos."

387. Memorandum from Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President Kennedy/1/

Washington, June 5, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Countries, Laos Security, 6/5/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.

Contingency Planning for Laos

/2/See Document 384.

The memorandum does not attempt to answer the question whether from a strategic point of view Laos or any part of it is worth defending. I understand that Defense is still waiting for estimates from the field on this question. In the meantime, however, Roger Hilsman at State has prepared a summary of the Rand report on the Military Geography of Laos, and the policy implications of the report. (Tab B)/3/ Roger's paper reflects Averell's thinking and that of the State Department up to Secretary Rusk, who has not yet taken a position on the question. Secretary McNamara will probably have his views ready on Thursday.

/3/Tab B was a 7-page summary which stated that the military geography of Laos was dominated by four features: its central position in Southeast Asia, the inaccessible Great Annamite mountain chain, the Mekong Valley lowlands, and the narrow defiles from the mountains into the lowlands. The major conclusion drawn by the study was that Laos was inherently vulnerable to infiltration from China and North Vietnam, and the same terrain which made it easy to infiltrate also acted as a natural barrier to large-scale military operations. Hilsman and INR concluded that if the Mekong lowlands of Laos were lost, the general U.S. position in Laos would sharply deteriorate, the threat to Thailand would increase sharply, and infiltration into South Vietnam would be easier.

You will note that the State-Defense memorandum recommends not only an occupation of the Mekong River areas, but also offensive action against the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh, both on the ground and in the air, and both inside Laos and in North Vietnam. These latter recommendations are contingent upon a build up of Communist military activity in the face of our occupation of the Mekong River area to a point which we would find intolerable. Averell recognizes that the military will insist on being given some guidance on what to expect if the enemy decides to escalate the military situation; but he feels strongly that you should have another look at the situation before authorizing offensive action against the PL/VM and particularly before you authorize any action against North Vietnam.

In this connection, you will also find of value the current intelligence estimate of Communist reaction to the moves recommended in the State-Defense memorandum. They are contained in SNIE 58-5-62, a copy of which is attached at Tab C. Course C on pages 4-6 contains the relevant estimate./4/

/4/See Document 375 and attachment 1 to Document 383, which extracts the portion of the SNIE that Forrestal recommended for the President's attention.

Tab A/5/

1-25577/62

June 4, 1962.

/5/Top Secret. The source text was attached to another copy of Forrestal's memorandum ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62-6/5/62)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Our efforts over the past year to obtain North Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos by international agreement have gained for us a great deal of political capital internationally. They should, therefore, not be abandoned lightly or before we have exhausted their possibilities completely. Accordingly, insofar as circumstances permit, any plans for the employment of military forces in Laos should be consistent with a continuation of those efforts. If, of course, the North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao proteges mount a major military drive into the Mekong Valley in an effort which is clear to all the world as a move to conquer Laos, the nature of our response could be equally sharp. If however, as is more probable, the North Vietnamese effort is more ambiguous, we will have to plan a graduated response in several phases.

In examining the possible range of courses of action, we have concluded that courses of action short of the introduction of U.S. combat forces into Laos in some form would not be effective. This applies specifically to the possibility of an increased advisory effort along the lines of the South Vietnam operation, or to massive encadrement of the Lao Army. We consider that the Lao Army's capabilities are so limited that any such measure would be of no use in itself, and of only limited use as an auxiliary to other actions. The basic brunt of operations in Laos must be borne by the U.S., and to a much lesser extent by Thai, forces. Every effort should be made to obtain substantial Commonwealth participation plus a token contribution from the Philippines. However, we have set forth strength requirements on the basis of U.S. forces except as noted.

We have also examined the desirability of Thai action to occupy Sayabouri province, west of the Mekong in Northern Laos, and have concluded that in isolation this would not be militarily helpful. It might, however, be considered if the Thais insist, as an adjunct to wider introduction of forces into Laos.

This memorandum outlines the sort of action which the Secretaries of State and Defense recommend to prepare for and to meet the contingency of a deterioration in Laos of such magnitude that the President considers it advisable to take military actions. Examples of such deterioration would be: (1) early collapse of the present efforts to form a coalition government, and an uneasy situation without any major breach of the cease-fire by either side; (2) a major Communist breach of the cease-fire, which could come at any time before or after the uneasy situation; (3) difficulties encountered even after a coalition government were formed.

Military Actions in Relation to our Political Objectives

1. Further military buildup outside Laos. So long as the coalition negotiations continue or at least until the current June 15 deadline of Souvanna Phouma's departure, a marked further visible buildup in Thailand would tend to stiffen Phoumi to hold out and break the talks off, and would put on the U.S. much of the onus for failure. But this should not preclude buildup measures that would not become clearly visible to Phoumi and the Communists. If the coalition talks had collapsed because of unacceptable Communist demands, then we could go much further and indeed seek to make our buildup as visible as possible, as a deterrent to a quick military bite and as an inducement to the Communists to return to the negotiating track.

2. Occupation of the Mekong River areas. This could be carried out on the basis of confirming or re-establishing the cease-fire and getting negotiations started again. However, there would be major military risks in sending into Laos only the 10,000 men hitherto envisaged, with only another 8-10,000 in reserve in Thailand. While we could stay at the 10,000 level for a period (plus Thai and possibly Commonwealth forces), we should have at least 35,000 other forces readily available if we are to avoid the substantial chance of a series of small reverses, or alternatively sitting in the valley while the Communists proceeded to flood over the rest of Laos. That is, we must be physically capable and ready. At the same time, the military necessity for this degree of readiness will greatly complicate the political objective of getting a cease-fire back and negotiations re-started. The Communists will find it hard to believe our objective is limited in any case, and still less so if they see this scale of reinforcements at the ready.

Occupying the Mekong River areas would have considerable political and military usefulness in itself in securing more of the Thai border and reassuring the Thais, in preventing the Communists from taking over the north-south roads of Southern Laos and thus greatly expanding their supply route to South Vietnam, and (provided the Vientiane area could be included) in maintaining ready access to the Meo. However, if no agreement were reached, this situation could conceivably leave United States/SEATO forces stationed indefinitely in control of the valley, largely immobilized and subject to guerrilla harassment, but spared from major attacks, while North Vietnamese, and perhaps even Chinese Communist, forces consolidate their positions in the remainder of Laos. A critical decision would then have to be made concerning further actions, depending on two elements:

a. The threshold of Communist activity beyond which we would find their actions intolerable (presumably because of their threat to our forces in the area and to the security of South Vietnam and Thailand).

b. The nature of the U.S. response if and when that threshold is crossed.

It is difficult and indeed impractical, to try to define the threshold. That could only be judged in relationship to the action which the Communists might actually take. However, it is important to focus on the nature of the United States response. Basically, there are two alternatives:

a. Seeking by territorial means to block Viet Minh threats along the Thai border and Viet Minh exploitation of Southern Laos as a full-scale supply route into South Vietnam. This could mean seeking to hold by military action the Panhandle area of Laos, either from the neck south or from the 17th parallel south, and also if feasible holding Vientiane and its perimeter.

b. Seeking to deter and inhibit North Vietnamese aggressive action by non-territorial means, i.e., by some form of selective military action directed at North Vietnam itself. This would be justified to the world as the only effective way to deal with their aggression against South Vietnam and Laos and clearly threatened aggression against Thailand.

These two possible objectives are not wholly mutually exclusive. We could combine territorial measures with warnings or actual attacks against North Vietnam in some combination. Or we could go all the way in one direction or the other. Clearly, attacks against North Vietnam raise the chances of Chinese Communist intervention in force, and also would involve us in charges of aggression in the UN to a far greater degree than would actions confirmed territorially to Laos. We must calculate on a maximum North Vietnamese response in any case, however i.e., that they would respond to any occupation of the Mekong River areas by creeping action to consolidate their hold and extend it where possible, and that they would resist vigorously any attempt to clean out the Panhandle.

In dealing with our allies, with India, etc., we will be in a much stronger position if we proceed by stages throughout, taking initially only those military actions that can be related to continued pursuit of one effort to neutralize Laos by international agreement and moving into other actions only as Viet Minh positive response (which is likely) gives us added justification for asserting by other means our fundamental political objective of protecting the rest of Southeast Asia. Toward North Vietnam, the problem is more difficult: hard and quick action might be the most effective course, and certainly any series of graduated measures must convey the clear threat of moving to the next stage as we carry out each single stage. But we will stand much better chance of a good over-all political result, and minimum damage to our position elsewhere in the world, if we can proceed by stages. Therefore, it is proposed that the next stages of action be as follows:

3. Air attacks against selected Laos targets. These could be used with some effectiveness against a Communist breach of the cease-fire, without introducing additional U.S. ground forces. They might deter but would not stop a really determined Communist offensive, however, and would run a risk of causing the Communists to step up what might otherwise have been limited action into a full-scale offensive. If we simply used air attacks, and then took no further action as the Communist offensive spread, we would have made the consequences worse from a psychological standpoint by an apparent display of impotence.

4. Offensive Operations in Laos. From the Mekong River areas, we could conduct offensive operations that would deal effectively with at least the present Communist strength in Southern Laos, using air action against other areas in Laos and to inderdict reinforcements and using ground forces of about 45,000 U.S. plus perhaps two Thai divisions in Laos, and with 20,000 to 25,000 U.S. reserve and logistic forces in Thailand. If we tried to clean out the Panhandle against the likely strenuous resistance of the Communists, more forces might be required to meet DRV reinforcements. Even then, the terrain is such that we would still confront a lot of guerrilla action and the supply route to South Vietnam would not be wiped out, although it would be cut down in scale. This course of action would compel us to maintain large forces in this area for an indefinite period, since--taken alone--it does not eliminate continued North Vietnamese pressure.

5. Air Action against North Vietnam. Attacks against the North Vietnamese end of the main supply routes into Laos could be a part of the preceding military course of action. Alternatively, selected air attacks on North Vietnamese targets could be undertaken as an accompaniment to occupying the Mekong River areas (without extended additional ground action). This would raise the ante somewhat and might increase the chances of Chinese Communist air coming in to assist the negligible North Vietnamese air capabilities. However, we would be able to do much better on such an exchange, using carrier as well as Thai-based aircraft. At the upper limit, massive attacks could be made against Hanoi itself, but these would so raise the odds of Chinese Communist intervention (since they would appear to portend actual destruction of North Vietnam as a state) that they should not be considered except as a last resort.

6. Amphibious Operations against North Vietnam. A division-strength landing in the Vinh area, followed by a cut west to the Laos border, would seal the main routes into both Laos and South Vietnam, and provide a slice of North Vietnamese territory that we might offer to evacuate in return for North Vietnamese withdrawal from both Laos and South Vietnam. The full military needs of such an operation must be developed, and its risks more carefully assessed. Among these risks would be that of Chinese Communist air action from Hainan or via Hanoi, so that our military posture would have to include readiness to deal with such threats, as well as with the wider threat of subsequent Soviet involvement with advanced aircraft and with naval operations against our supply lines. However, in the absence of Chinese Communist intervention, this might be a more persuasive and cheaper action than an attempt to win control of the whole Panhandle.

Consequences of Inaction in the Face of Possible Contingencies. In a contingency involving an uneasy situation without any major breach of the cease-fire, the Communists would still be able to consolidate both their hold on the North (including Nam Tha province) and their hold on the eastern part of Southern Laos, stepping up their supply route to South Vietnam although not, in the early stages, being able to control good north-south roads that would put this on a massive basis. Almost certainly, Viet Minh reinforcement would continue, and the military balance would shift more and more to the Communists, so that they would be in a position to bite off all the RLG holdings in an even shorter time than at present. Unless the U.S. resumed its financial aid and stepped up its military advisory effort, the result would almost certainly be a fairly rapid decay of the RLG position, and all would be ripe for a quick Pathet Lao takeover, perhaps without any necessity to resort to a quick military bite. Even if the U.S. did resume financial aid and step up its advisory effort, the RLG would remain weak and ineffective and always in danger of some weakening series of events.

The practical likelihood is that the Communists would sooner or later take the military bite, first at Saravane and Attopeu, then at Luang Prabang or Thahek, and finally at Vientiane. They might quite easily do the first two at any time even before the coalition negotiations had finally collapsed. Failure to react by the U.S. would mean quick collapse of the RLG.

Collapse of the RLG would mean Pathet Lao-Viet Minh control of all of Laos, with the resulting threat to the Thailand border along its entire length, and with the possibility that the supply route to South Vietnam would be put on a much more massive basis using the main river road via Pakse into Attopeu.

Recommendations for Immediate Action

1. Pending the outcome of the current negotiations, buildup measures orienting forces towards SEA, should be authorized only to the extent that these can be carried out without appearing to Phoumi and the Communists as a major strengthening of our position. This would permit some unit movements toward Thailand in the guise of possible rotation of forces now in Thailand, and possible movements of equipment and logistics personnel to nearby areas.

2. In the event of a Communist military move of "triggering" level before a major reinforcement is completed (which cannot be in less than three weeks), we should immediately seek UN action, and should accompany this by the use of air against Communist forces at least at the point of breach. Moreover, the Marine BLT and the Army Battle Group in Thailand should be moved promptly to the maximum number of key points which they could successfully occupy. These forces would be reinforced immediately by forces now in the Far East, and plans should be made to follow this with the most rapid possible deployment (assuming the Communists do not restore the cease-fire) to occupy all the Mekong River areas envisaged in Phase 2, and to build up ready strength in Thailand and Laos to the 45,000 level.