Washington, October 6, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 10/7/61-10/11/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT
Gromyko Talks--Southeast Asia

We are concerned at the slow progress of the settlement on Laos. The President felt that he had reached understanding in principle with Chairman Khrushchev but there seems to be difficulty in agreeing on the concrete terms. In the meanwhile the DRV is using the delay to infiltrate forces through southern Laos into South Viet Nam. We are very disturbed by these developments. If we cannot translate into concrete terms our agreement on principles for a settlement in Laos, it augurs poorly for a settlement with respect to Berlin.

The President was serious in his intent to achieve a settlement in Laos and has given Ambassador Harriman a wide measure of discretion to work to this end. He had hoped that by bilateral talks between Ambassador Harriman and Pushkin progress in the conference could be expedited. However, it did not seem that Pushkin had similarly wide discretion and they had not made much progress. The President called Ambassador Harriman back and discussed the matter yesterday with him. Ambassador Harriman will be back in Geneva on Monday and will get in touch with Pushkin. The President hopes that Pushkin will then have instructions that will enable them to resolve the outstanding questions at Geneva.

The President also hopes that the Soviets will exercise their influence with the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma so that there can be an agreement between the parties in Laos on the questions that have to be decided there. We have been exercising our influence with Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum and we are convinced that they are prepared to negotiate in good faith at the talks between the "three princes" that opened today at Ban Hin Heup. If Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao are in a similar mood, an agreement there should also shortly be possible.

However, the President desires that Foreign Minister Gromyko understand that any settlement must be a true compromise. Our willingness to reach an agreement should not be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a willingness to surrender Laos or South Viet Nam to communist control. We feel that Laos can and should be a truly neutral area and that there must be a cessation of the increasingly open attacks against South Viet Nam by the DRV. We are well aware that the Soviet aircraft have increased their airlift to Tchepone and that this airlift is evidently being used to support the DRV infiltration into South Viet Nam. Both the Soviets and the DRV should understand that we are deeply committed to South Viet Nam and cannot and will not accept its destruction.

With respect to Laos there are a number of essential points upon which we must and will continue to insist. We consider our position on these as representing reasonable compromise and had expected that if the Soviets desired an agreement these points would also be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

These points are:

(1) It is essential that there be satisfactory and workable agreement on the demobilization and reintegration of military forces in Laos. There must be an armed force loyal to the new government and it is not possible to accept that the Pathet Lao should be permitted to retain a private army. The agreement on this must be largely worked out by the Lao themselves but it is important that we and the Soviets agree on the principle. We both must see that such an agreement is worked out and adhered to.

(2) If there is to be a truly neutral government in Laos, it must be well balanced with a center including moderates from elsewhere in Laos than Xieng Khouang. We hope the Soviets will use their influence with Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao to come up with a really balanced government which could produce a neutral Laos and live up to its undertakings in that respect.

(3) The ICC in Laos must be able to operate effectively and observe that the agreement is being carried out in good faith. This is easy enough with respect to the Americans but is much more difficult with respect to the Viet Minh. We must insist on an ICC that is able to move freely around the country as well as establish fixed teams, especially on the routes for present DRV infiltration into South Viet Nam.

(4) We are interested in Pushkin's remarks to Harriman that the Soviet Union would be willing to accept responsibility for the faithful carrying out of any agreement by the "socialist states". Ambassador Harriman has been authorized to explore with Pushkin more fully exactly how this can be accomplished.

Dean Rusk

199. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

Washington, October 6, 1961, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky. The conversation took place at the White House.

SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler--EUR
Mr. Akalovsky--D/P (interpreting)

U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreter)

The President said he had talked to Ambassador Harriman yesterday and had instructed him to go back to Geneva. He hoped Ambassador Harriman could meet Ambassador Pushkin on Monday/2/ so that we could finally reach agreement on Laos, which is still a hazardous problem. The President said that there were two or three important points in this connection: 1) Both sides should use their influence on the Princes to come to a conclusion which we would regard as satisfactory. The President stated he understood that the Princes had met today and said that we had used our influence on Phoumi to get a really neutral government which would be in accord with the concept of a free and independent Laos. The President expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would, on its part, influence Souvanna to accept a government that would be really neutral and acceptable to our two countries. 2) Both our countries should exert their influence to have the armies in Laos dissolve so that there no longer be any private armies in that country and that there be only one native army under the control of a neutral central government under Souvanna Phouma. It would be unfortunate if private armies were to continue their existence and their mutual wars. 3) Laos should no longer be used as base for activities against Viet Nam, including such flights by Laos based aircraft as were observed in September. The President expressed U.S. concern that the fighting in Viet Nam would get worse and might prevent the achievement of the objective he and Mr. Khrushchev had agreed upon in Vienna. The President summarized these points in the following way: 1) a neutral government should be established in Laos; 2) all foreign troops should be withdrawn; 3) no private armies should exist; and 4) Laos should not be used as base for activities against Viet Nam. In conclusion the President expressed the hope that the two sides were not far from reaching agreement and that Ambassadors Harriman and Pushkin would be, in fact, able to reach agreement.

/2/October 9.

Mr. Gromyko said he understood that the main obstacle was the lack of U.S. agreement to Souvanna P.'s proposal for the composition of a new government. The Soviet Union does not see any reason for such objections. The Soviet Union does not even know the personalities suggested by Souvanna P. On the other hand, the Soviet Union believes that if the U.S. agree that Souvanna P. is truly neutral and capable of forming a neutral government, then there should be no difficulty in agreeing to the composition he is proposing. As soon as this obstacle is removed, Mr. Gromyko said, agreement could be reached. Ambassador Pushkin had been instructed to push for a prompt agreement. If Ambassador Harriman also has such instructions, then both sides could reach agreement and our two countries could cast away this needless burden.

Finally, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union was agreeable to having bi-lateral discussions through Ambassador Thompson on question of interest to our two countries. He said the Soviet Union believed that given the desire, agreement could be reached.

The President referred to the question of the composition of the Laotian Government and said that the U.S. had stated it would accept Souvanna P. rather than Boun Oum, the Prime Minister we had been supporting. Thus we are prepared to accept a Prime Minister whom the Soviet Union had been supporting and who is based on the territory of the Soviet side. We believe that if there is agreement that there should be four members from Vientiane and four from the Pathet Lao, then the center group is extremely important. However, this group, as suggested now, has a number of members from Xieng Khouang, who according to our information are extremely sympathetic to the Soviet Union and do not look like neutrals. The U.S. believes that it is not inappropriate for us to suggest other people who would be more neutral. In any event, Ambassadors Harriman and Pushkin probably know all of these people.

The President concluded by saying it would be good for the general international situation if the Laotian problem could be resolved at an early date.

Mr. Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union is also for a speedy solution of that problem.

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos/1/

Washington, October 6, 1961, 9:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-661. Top Secret. Drafted by Cross; cleared by McConaughy, Steeves, and Walter L. Cutler, Rusk's Staff Assistant; noted by Anderson, Cleveland, and William H. Leurs of SOV; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated as airgrams, eyes only for the Ambassadors in Moscow, Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok.

Fecon 484. Eyes Only for Ambassador Harriman. Following are your instructions which were approved by Secretary October 5.

Upon your return to Geneva you should continue your bilateral discussions with Soviet Delegate supplementing normal procedures of Conference. Purpose of these discussions will be to explore in depth possibility of bilaterally negotiating with Soviets on matters of particular concern to us agreement on Laos which will ultimately be acceptable to all parties at Geneva Conference. You are given wide discretion as to course you may wish to take in these negotiations but you should concentrate upon following crucial issues:

1. Demobilization and reintegration of military forces in Laos

You should endeavor to ascertain Soviet intentions as to what responsibility they will accept for disbanding and integration of Pathet Lao forces. It is noted that at Geneva Chinese Communists, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao have been equivocal on issue of demobilization of Pathet Lao, while Soviets have privately told you that they agree that all forces should be permitted to have independent force. They have also publicly avoided uncompromising position on this issue. Therefore it is believed that probing Soviets on this would provide clue to sincerity of their own intentions to provide stable military foundation loyal to prospective Souvanna Phouma government.

It is recognized that essential negotiations on demobilization of forces and reintegration of national Lao army will have to be conducted by Lao themselves. Our best means of influencing these negotiations will be through our advice to Phoumi. However you should press Soviets on type of assurances they would be willing to provide us that PL will actually disarm and accept integration into national army.

For your information, as of this moment, we have not reached consensus as to best method of demobilization and reintegration of Lao forces either within USG or with our Western allies. However, as you will recall from Secretary's presentation to Western Foreign Ministers at Paris/2/ we have leaned toward form of reintegration which can best be described as zonal in character.

/2/See Document 153.

Such zonal arrangement would not technically constitute "reunification" or "integration" but would be something closer to regroupment. It might result, for example, in forces dominated by PL remaining installed in Phong Saly, Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang, whereas pres-ent FAR forces would hold and secure strategic Mekong valley and most importantly panhandle area in south. Forces identified as strictly Souvanna units, such as Kong Le and Khamouane troops, could be given specific responsibilities, e.g. capital cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang and/or new capital area which Souvanna talks about constructing.

Crux of any such arrangement would be willingness of bloc tacitly to agree that Pathet Lao forces now in panhandle area would be withdrawn. Any such arrangement tacit or otherwise would constitute significant step for Soviets and would not be possible to negotiate with them directly. In course of your discussions on this general subject, however, it might be possible to explore other suggestions from Soviets if such suggestions appear to have intention on Soviet side of providing stable security arrangements against PL-Viet Minh-Viet Cong activity which would threaten southern Laos or integrity of Thailand or Viet-Nam. If Soviets wished to bring forth plan for discussion which would not provide them disguised PL foothold in panhandle, we would give it serious consideration whatever its other disadvantages.

2. Use of Laos as corridor for infiltration into South Viet-Nam

Our concern over security aspects of southern Laos is based upon use by Viet Minh and Viet Cong of territories of Laos for infiltration into South Viet-Nam. You should repeat frankly our serious concern over this infiltration, tying your remarks in with commitments which we have taken publicly before world to help preserve freedom and integrity of South Viet-Nam. You should endeavor to obtain from Soviets specific acceptance of principle that continued infiltration of South Viet-Nam by DRV would be breach of broad understanding on which we are entering into agreement on Laos. You should also discuss how Soviets would propose to enforce provisions against such infiltration and what responsibility Soviets would assume. You can, within your discretion and at time you consider suitable, inform Soviet Delegate that you are authorized to explore with him ways and means whereby relations between North and South Viet-Nam could be stabilized.

3. Composition of Lao Government

Although major burden of negotiations for acceptable Lao Government would be carried by Lao themselves, question of composition of government should be explored with Soviet Delegate. You should make clear to Soviet Delegate that we could not come to settlement on Laos unless we are satisfied that Lao Government is one which is capable of keeping Laos neutral and of living up to its undertakings in that respect. You should press him to use his influence with Souvanna and PL to produce balanced government which would include in its center represent-ative moderates from outside Xieng Khouang. In your discussions on this issue you should bear in mind that Soviets' need to have Souvanna as Prime Minister in order to rationalize alleged legitimacy of their actions in Laos constitutes bargaining factor in our favor since presumably they would be willing to pay price to obtain this particular end.

4. Responsibilities of Co-Chairmen

You should pick up and explore in depth Pushkin's remarks to you to effect that Soviet Union would assume responsibility for "seeing to it" that "socialist side" adhered to final agreement if UK Co-Chairman would do same for our side. Concept of Co-Chairmen's sharing responsibility for implementation of agreement on Laos would have advantage of putting onus directly on Soviets for Communist behavior concerning all aspects of whole agreement. However, we would need to know what specific obligations Soviets would be willing to incur, how these mutual obligations could be formalized, and procedures of implementation.

We assume that you would follow your usual practice in Geneva of keeping British and French generally informed of your meetings with Soviet Delegate. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

These instructions are being repeated eyes only to Ambassadors at Moscow, Vientiane, Saigon, and Bangkok strictly for their background information.

Rusk

201. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, October 10, 1961, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-1061. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Vientiane and Moscow and to USUN.

Confe 704. From Harriman.

At outset of my conversation October 9 with Pushkin, latter read to me from notebook text of message which he said he had received from Moscow October 5. Pushkin stated that message was Soviet Govt reaction to previous Harriman-Pushkin talks, on which reports had gone to Khrushchev himself. Gist of message, which Khrushchev himself had authorized, was as follows:

Soviet Govt found prior Pushkin talks with Harriman to be very interesting. It noted with satisfaction that US desired solution to Laos question and formation of neutralist govt under Souvanna Phouma. It welcomed US acceptance of concept of neutrality for state. USSR itself has always wanted fully sovereign and neutral Laos. It is essential to put out flames of war in Laos and to keep events in that small unhappy land from leading to wider conflagration.

Mutual understanding will help achieve agreement on mutually acceptable basis. Conference work is now at such stage that it can be finished rapidly, successfully, and in harmony with interest of Laos. Work at conference and agreement must ensure neutral and independent Laos.

This is all Soviet Govt seeks here. If US also wishes this and USSR assumes this is case then there is no obstacle to reaching early accord and signing agreement. As a result of great common effort here, basic outlines of declaration and protocol have already been worked out. Problem now is to concentrate on settling chief important unsettled issues. USSR is ready for this but US and other govts must speed up pace.

USSR shares Harriman view that settlement must be reached at same time in both Geneva and Laos. Soviets believe that Laotians will agree on govt of national unity based on principles of Zurich communique. However, US support of Boun Oum and Phoumi claims vis-a-vis coalition govt will not help achieve success. Success in Geneva will also facilitate success in Laos, important that all delegations work harder now to get agreement.

Soviet Govt has worked hard on study of all issues and on drafting declaration and protocol. It is clear that no agreements infringing on sovereignty of Laos will be accepted by representatives of Laotian people, and positions taken by Laotian Delegations at Geneva already show that this is true. All of them support concepts of neutrality, non-interference, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and all of them are ready to undertake obligations to bring these about.

Within reasonable limits and for fixed time, ICC activities can help achieve these aims, provided sovereignty of Laos is not violated. However, no ICC can protect Laos if 13 other nations at conference do not fulfill their obligations and if co-chairmen do not see to this (i.e., that other nations fulfill their obligations). Main control over agreements will not be ICC in Laos, but good will and conduct of 13 govts.

Like Harriman, Moscow is upset at delay in settlement of Laos issue as whole, wants speedy solution, and will support USDel in all efforts to reach goal of achieving neutral and sovereign Laos. If US and USSR act jointly on Laos question, this will have decisive influence on getting agreement. It will have favorable influence not only in reducing tension in Laos and in SE Asia, but, to certain degree, throughout world.

Moscow agrees with Harriman remark that US/Soviet relations could be different from those which now exist. Harriman has always been considered among those who sincerely want settlement of US/Soviet difference because such development would be guarantee for maintaining world peace. USSR seeks settlement of all world issues by means of negotiations and cooperation with US, and not by force of threats. Khrushchev sends his sincere greetings to Harriman and wishes him best health.

At conclusion of message, I asked Pushkin to thank Khrushchev for personal wishes and reciprocated them. I was also gratified to hear of Khrushchev desire to work out Laotian problems and achieve neutral and truly independent Laos and that Khrushchev believed settlement would have favorable influence elsewhere in world. This put special responsibility on Pushkin and me to come to speedy conclusion of work here.

I then took up concrete issues in accordance with instructions, which are reported septel.

202. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, October 10, 1961, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-1061. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Vientiane and Moscow and to USUN.

Confe 705. From Harriman. Following are highlights of almost 4-hour Pushkin-Harriman conversation Oct 9.

1. Pushkin read Soviet Govt message to Harriman on conference problems, which reported septel./2/

/2/See Document 201.

2. Pushkin stated he will leave Geneva at end week to attend Party Congress in Moscow and to see Khrushchev.

3. Harriman reminded Pushkin of his statement at a previous meeting that two co-chairmen should undertake to assure compliance of agreement, Soviets taking responsibility for Socialist states while UK our side. Harriman asked how Pushkin intended to formalize this understanding. When asked whether it should be a written agreement between the co-chairmen, Pushkin objected, but expressed readiness to add an additional sentence to article on co-chairmen which would give them responsibility for "seeing to observation of obligations" by 13 signatory states.

4. Harriman again reminded Pushkin of his statement to him at a previous discussion, to the effect that after the integration of the three Laotian Armies, the excess should be duly demobilized, leaving no private army to the Pathet Lao or anyone else. He asked Pushkin how conference could assure itself that this result would be achieved. Pushkin first adamantly maintained that this was an internal Laotian affair, whereas conference dealt with only international matters. However, Pushkin pointed out that ICC had responsibility for supervising cease-fire agreement and if a private army should start hostilities again, it would be a breach of the cease-fire, thereby giving ICC responsibility. Hence, ICC could stay in business, at least on this question, until Laotian Govt succeeded in disbanding all private forces. This was way in which conference could deal with this issue. Issue was left for further more detailed consideration.

5. Harriman expressed in strong terms concern of President and US Govt that Laos must cease serving as corridor for Vietminh incursions into South Vietnam, and consequent need for ICC to establish fixed teams and operating centers in south Laos. Pushkin remained unyielding on this issue and said US insistence could lead conference "to dead end." US could not have ICC take preventive measures in anticipation of violation of Laos agreement by Vietminh and still expect latter to sign agreement and co-chairmen to assume added responsibilities of assuring implementation. USSR had agreed to well-equipped mobile teams which could stay in area of suspected violation as long as necessary, but it would not give way on fixed teams. Pushkin said the Chinese had shown special concern in opposing fixed teams.

6. Pushkin raised SEATO issue and refused to be satisfied with Harriman assurances that SEATO protocol on Laos would become inoperative if Laotian Government renounced protection its declaration and SEATO members conference accepted Lao declaration. Pushkin stated Chinese were particularly distrustful of SEATO and together with the Soviets insisted on the removal Laos SEATO protocol. After lengthy argument in which Harriman explained why impossible to eliminate Laos protocol from SEATO at this conference, Pushkin agreed to look at language we proposed for declaration.

7. Pushkin then raised ICC voting procedure. No agreement was reached. Pushkin indicated USSR might accept majority vote on procedural issues if matters of principle would require unanimous decisions, but he strongly objected to idea that undertaking of investigations would be only procedural matter. He insisted that ICC must be considered as unitary organ for investigations and reports; otherwise it would dissipate its energies chasing all over Laos to check up on rumors. Harriman said that US would never agree to unanimity on investigations; in fact, unless they could be undertaken at request of any member of ICC, whole control machinery would be mockery. ICC was not unitary body, but 3 men each of them had to be able to report what he saw. Therefore, right of majority and minority reports essential as in any court with several judges. Harriman reminded Pushkin he had previously told him that voting procedure was discussible, but since it was by then nearly nine o'clock, question was left for further discussions.

203. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 11, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT
Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference, October 2-8, 1961

1. Developments in Laos

a. On October 8, second day of Ban Hin Heup talks, the three Princes agreed on: (a) Souvanna as sole candidate for the Premiership; (b) a 16-seat Cabinet; (c) a "truly neutral" center group (Phoumi intends to insist that half of the center seats go to non-Xieng Khouang neutrals). Both the Premier and Vice Premier may have an additional portfolio e.g., Defense or Interior./2/ Phoumi plans to fly to Luang Prabang October 10 to seek a royal audience for Souvanna, possibly for October 11. The actual composition of the government thus far untouched will probably be negotiated in Luang Prabang and may take several weeks to accomplish, partly because Souphanouvong refuses to go to the royal capital and partly because of the obvious difficulties of finding a formula satisfactory to the three parties.

/2/As reported in telegrams 562 and 563 from Vientiane, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-861)

b. We have instructed Ambassador Brown to urge Phoumi to attempt to secure for himself the Ministry of Defense or, at a minimum, Interior with Phoui Sananikone in Foreign Affairs, and also to press for prior agreement on the critical issue of demobilization and integration of the three forces./3/

/3/In telegram 322 to Vientiane, October 8. (Ibid., 751J.00/10-361)

c. The first Neutralist Party Congress is to open October 14 at Phongsavan with Souvanna as Chairman, Pheng Phongsavan and Kong Le Vice Chairmen, and former RLG Police Director Soukhan Vilaysarn Secretary General.

2. Geneva

At the Conference we have made some progress on the Co-Chairmen's role, ICC equipment, and prevention of possible Polish efforts to obstruct ICC's effectiveness by failing to attend working sessions. The principal aspect of last week's activities was the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen's bilateral talks and daily consultation among the Western and allied delegation for consideration of MacDonald's reports on those talks. On October 2 MacDonald presented to Pushkin the Western list of proposed modifications and deletions from the Franco-U.S. draft protocol, including certain concessions counterbalanced by those we desire of the Communist bloc. The list covers most of the points to be discussed before starting on the basic inter-dependent issues that will tell whether a final agreement is possible. Meanwhile, Pushkin is trying to bypass our list to reach those issues directly./4/

/4/This summary is based on the "weekly evaluation" in Confe 701, October 7. (Ibid., 751J.00/10-761)

On the basis of their recent assessment of Soviet tactics in Laos, the British feel we should take advantage of the present Russian mood to conclude a settlement satisfactory to all parties./5/ Our delegation disagrees and recommends that we not rush into making concessions at Geneva./6/

/5/As outlined in Fecon 473, October 3, in which the Department of State passed on a summary of a British summary analysis of Soviet policy and intentions at Geneva. (Ibid., 751J.00/10-361)

/6/As Harriman was in Washington at the time, the U.S. Delegation presented the rejoinder to the British, as reported in Confe 700, October 6. (Ibid., 751J.00/10-661)

We have instructed Ambassador Harriman to pursue his discussions with Pushkin to ascertain whether we can in fact negotiate bilaterally with the Russians on issues of special concern to us and that will in the final analysis be acceptable to the Conference as a whole. Harriman has been asked to concentrate particularly on: (a) the demobilization and integration of the three Lao forces; (b) the composition of the Lao government; (c) Communist infiltration into South Viet-Nam; and (d) the future role of the Co-Chairmen./7/

/7/See Document 200.

L.D. Battle/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Manfull signed for Battle.

204. Memorandum From the President's Military Adviser (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, October 11, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Countries Series, Southeast Asia: General, 10/11/61-12/31/61. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Discussion of Southeast Asia Planning, 10:45 a.m., Wednesday, 11 October 1961/2/

/2/At 11 a.m., October 11, the President met with Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Allen Dulles, Cottrell, Donald M. Wilson of USIA, Bissell, Ball, Gilpatric, and McGeorge Bundy. The meeting lasted until 12:25 p.m. and was characterized as "off the record." (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) For additional information, see Document 205.

1. It is my understanding that Mr. Alexis Johnson, representing State, will present to you the following principal topics.

a. The present situation in Southeast Asia. He will base this discussion upon the attached summary which you may have read among your papers over the last weekend.

b. The status of the military plan "SEATO 5 Plus",/3/ which is the old Seato 5 with a greater use of indigenous forces than in the original plan.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 188.

c. A new concept for the introduction of SEATO forces into South Vietnam./4/

/4/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 155, Tab B.

2. With regard to SEATO Plan 5 Plus, I believe that it is drawn properly to cope with an overt resumption of hostilities but, as you have commented, it is not designed to cope with continued infiltration into Southern Laos and across into South Vietnam. The principal unfinished business with regard to this Plan is to nail down the contributions to be made by the other SEATO countries, and to reach agreement as to the circumstances which would warrant implementing it.

3. The concept for strengthening South Vietnam will be presented to you to obtain general approval for its further development. Decision may be asked on some specific actions which are desirable in South Vietnam, regardless of whether the new concept is adopted in its entirety.

4. One important question which should be discussed is the possible U.S. force requirements (air and ground) if the SEATO Plan 5 Plus and the South Vietnam Plan should be implemented either singly or concurrently. While a decision to plan is not a decision to implement, in all logic we should have the forces available or in sight for these Southeast Asia plans and, at the same time, be able to meet our obligations to Berlin and NATO. In my opinion, our present military structure is not sufficient for both tasks. Thus, the capital question is whether additional forces should be mobilized now or the limitations of our military capabilities in Southeast Asia accepted as a permanent fact.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Attachment/5/

/5/Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. Present Situation

1. Soviets continue indicate desire reach agreement but there is little concrete move forward.

a. Soviets still insist on unanimity rule in ICC, are opposed to ICC role in demobilization and reduction of Lao forces and do not agree to any role for ICC that would enable it effectively to observe and report on transit of Viet Minh military personnel into South Viet-Nam.

2. In spite of Harriman mission and urgings from French and U.K. Ambassadors, Souvanna Phouma has not agreed to any satisfactory composition of his Government.

3. "Three Princes" are meeting Ban Hin Heup on October 6 to discuss formation of Government.

[Here follow sections B-G which are identical to the language in the attachment to Document 194.]

II. Additional Courses of Action

1. Through Ambassador Harriman, intensify bilateral negotiations with Soviets with objectives of:

a. Preventing renewal of hostilities in Laos.

b. Obtaining Soviet agreement for an ICC able freely to move and report without an internal veto and with cooperation of Lao Government, with particular emphasis upon the infiltration routes from Laos into South Viet-Nam.

c. An acceptable Souvanna Phouma Government.

d. Satisfactory arrangements for demobilization and reintegration of Lao forces, particularly to insure Pathet Lao do not retain private army.

e. Engaging to maximum Soviet responsibility for fulfillment of conditions by Communist side.

B. Laos--Military

1. Expedite completion present program for U.S. and Thai encadrement of the FAR.

2. Explore with Thailand and South Viet-Nam the organization of small Thai-Lao and Viet-Namese-Lao units, each with at least two U.S. advisers, having as a mission hit-and-run operations into Laos to prevent Communist solidification of their positions near the frontiers.

3. Encourage, including use of U.S. advisers, action against Communist aerial resupply missions, including introduction of special indigenous units on specific interdiction missions, particularly at Tchepone, or by ground anti-aircraft weapons.

4. If the necessity arises, authorize the use of U.S. military transport aircraft for logistic support, including troop lift to and within Laos.

[Here follow sections C and D, "South Vietnam--Political" and "South Vietnam--Military," which are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume I, Document 155.]

E. Thailand--Political

1. Explore with key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee change in the SEATO voting formula from present unanimity rule to a majority or three-fourths' rule. Urgently complete action on the Bowen mission and Embassy recommendations for an economic program in Thailand.

F. Thailand--Military

1. Expedite delivery of equipment for border police patrol on Mekong River.

2. Subject to agreement of Thais and working out of financial aspects for dollar and local currency costs, dispatch U.S. Army engineer construction battalion to Thailand for urgent construction of military supply route bypassing Bangkok.

3. Subject to agreement of Thais, rotate U.S. forces, initially of battalion-sized elements, to Thailand for combined training, either bilaterally or, if possible, within SEATO context.

4. If favorably recommended by survey team presently in Thailand, promptly establish combat development and test center.

G. Cambodia--Political and Military

1. Explore with Embassy possibility of tying modest increase in military aid to Cambodian willingness take more aggressive action combat Viet Cong use of safe sanctuary in Cambodia.

H. SEATO--Military

1. If Communists renew major offensive action in Laos, be prepared promptly to implement SEATO Plan 5 plus, in meanwhile continuing efforts to maximize other SEATO members' contingent troop contributions for and readiness participate in such action.

205. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, October 11, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asian Planning

In the course of the meeting this morning on Southeast Asia,/2/ General Taylor and I believe it would be wise if you were to make the following point.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 204. Records of decisions at this meeting on Laos are limited. A memorandum with the decisions on South Vietnam is printed in vol. I, pp. 343-344. NSAM No. 104, October 13, informed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence that the President authorized six specific actions at the meeting. Only action 5 related to Laos. It reads as follows: "Initiate guerrilla ground action, including use of U.S. advisers if necessary, against Communist aerial resupply missions in the Tchepone area." The NSAM concluded with the following general statement: "The President also agreed that certain other actions developed by the Task Force and concurred in by the agencies concerned, but which do not require specific Presidential approval, should be undertaken on an urgent basis." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, NSAM 104)

We may end up in Laos with a wobbly Souvanna government. Starting right now we need vigorous forward planning to maximize the chance that a Laos which might emerge from the present negotiations would, in fact, remain neutral and independent. We are all aware of the risks involved in this settlement, but we feel that a good many things could be done by all the agencies of government concerned to prevent the most unfavorable possible outcome. A note is attached to this memorandum suggesting some of the directions in which such planning and action might proceed./3/

/3/Secret. Drafted by Robert Johnson.

Attachment

October 9, 1961.

Illustrative List of Topics That Might Be Covered in a Plan for Strengthening Non-Communist Forces in Laos in the Event of a Political Settlement

2. Actions to Strengthen Non-Communist Political Organization. We need to examine the ways in which we can strengthen Souvanna's political organization; how we can achieve a coalition among the non-Communist political forces; and how we approach the problem of political organization if no such coalition is achieved.

3. The Army as a Political Force. We are already working on plans for reorganization of the armed forces. We need to consider how we can effect reorganization in such a way as to retain able non-Communist military commanders and place them in politically key spots. We need to consider how we can achieve rapprochement with Kong Le and his forces.

4. Development of an Adequate Police Force. The creation of an adequate police force with a significant anti-guerilla capability could be almost as important to preservation of Lao independence as a satisfactory reorganization of the Lao armed forces. A plan has been developed for reorganization of the police to provide an anti-guerilla capability and is to be discussed with the French. Whether we will want such a force will depend in part upon who gets the Interior post in the Cabinet.

5. Economic Development. We ought to seek to absorb the new government in the constructive tasks of economic development. As a first step we should be ready to insure that, as soon as a political agreement is concluded, an able economic advisor from some neutral country perhaps Sweden or India is made available to help develop a preliminary economic plan. We shall need to decide how aid can best be provided to a neutral Laos whether through the UN, through some kind of consortium, or bilaterally.

6. Creating an Awareness of Communist Techniques of Takeover. Employing related studies on Eastern Europe as a model, we ought to do a quick study of how the Communists might take over a coalition government from within. The study should cover such matters as which are the key cabinet posts, how the Communists are likely to infiltrate political organizations, Communist techniques of village level organization etc. This would be a guide for our own action and might also be translated into French and Lao for distribution to non-Communist political leaders in Laos. There should be a related study on how to forestall Communist success.

7. Making the ICC Effective. We ought to study the ways that we can make the ICC as effective as possible. The key will be the Indian attitude. A major communication from the President to Prime Minister Nehru may be in order.

206. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State /1/

Geneva, October 15, 1961, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-1561. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Vientiane and Moscow.

Confe 727. From Harriman. Fecon 334./2/ Weekly evaluation.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 161.

In week of long and intensive conversations with Pushkin, bilaterally and in small groups, we have concentrated on basic problems this conference. Pushkin informed us on Monday/3/ that he would be leaving for Moscow at end of week to attend Party Congress in Moscow and to see Khrushchev. Pushkin began week's discussions by reading to me long message from Khrushchev indicating USSR seeks settlement Laos problem and such a settlement would affect other issues which Soviets hope can be composed by means of negotiations and cooperation with US and not by force or threats./4/ Pushkin however continued argue vigorously in support Soviet position on tough issues here. He seemed expect US give in eighty percent if he offers twenty percent compromise./5/ By Friday/6/ afternoon situation stood as follows:

/3/October 9.

/4/See Document 201.

/5/As reported in Confe 715, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-1261)

/6/October 13.

On SEATO, Pushkin and ChiComs demanded Laos be removed from SEATO Protocol. They declared they would not be satisfied with anything less./7/

/7/The discussion on SEATO is reported in Confe 714, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-1261)

On voting, Pushkin indicated USSR might accept majority vote on procedural issues if matters of principle, including initiation of inspection required unanimous decisions./8/ Only break on this had been Pushkin's avowal that Laos agreement not tied to Soviet troika principle. Pushkin however rejected compromise suggestion to return to 1954 Geneva voting principles which specified unanimity in a few fairly well defined cases but left balance of ICC matters to be settled by majority vote.

/8/See Document 202.

Although still opposed our proposal for fixed teams and operations centers Pushkin gave some ground by offering that teams could stay in area of suspected violation as long as necessary and certain supply centers might be established./9/

/9/As reported in Confe 708, October 11. (Department of State Central Files, 751J.00/10-1161)

We discussed on several occasions with Pushkin problem of having conference in some manner take note of Lao Government integration and demobilization plan assuring no private armies and then indicate that failure to carry this out would amount to violation of agreement on which ICC would have investigative responsibility. Pushkin (although always stating no private armies should remain) had previously maintained that this was purely internal affair. Finally however he gave some ground. He said ICC had responsibility for supervising cease-fire and if a private army should start hostilities again, it would be breach of cease-fire thereby giving ICC responsibility. Hence ICC should stay in business, at least on this question, until Lao Government succeeded in disbanding all private forces, as existence of private armies was always a threat.

Perhaps most constructive and encouraging development of conference thus far was Pushkin's offer during week's negotiations to write into article on role of co-chairmen a provision under which co-chairmen would assume responsibility for seeing to observation of obligations by 13 signatory states. We had not asked Pushkin for this, and his willingness undertake it provides basis on which he agrees that we can hold Soviets responsible for Vietminh or ChiCom violations.

On Friday afternoon Pushkin informed MacDonald he had cancelled his intended visit to Moscow, presumably on instructions. When I met with Pushkin Saturday morning/10/ he admitted instructions to remain came from Gromyko as result his talk with President. He urged we proceed rapidly to reach agreement saying time had arrived in Laos conference when everything depended on US and USSR. Pushkin said USSR putting all its cards on table and we should proceed to work out compromise agreement on two most critical issues--voting procedure and SEATO.

/10/As reported in Confe 725, October 14. (Ibid., 751J.00/10-1461)

He made certain proposals on voting which we are studying with view of finding mutually acceptable counter proposals. Pushkin also pressed for some "middle ground" manner of handling SEATO issue. He suggested this might be found through accepting Indian Delegate's suggestion. He had expanded US proposal that US and other three SEATO members at conference would agree respect Lao Declaration renouncing protection military alliances by suggesting that four SEATO countries not present at conference might also in some appropriate way agree to respect Declaration of Laos Government.

MacDonald, Roux and I have recommended our respective governments that Pushkin's SEATO compromise be accepted and every effort be made to get other SEATO countries to agree. We concede thereby nothing in substance and present SEATO unity.

SEATO members might make public statements along line that SEATO gladly taking such action because Laos neutrality now being guaranteed by commitments undertaken at Geneva.

If we can reach agreement on Pushkin's two key issues, in both of which face saving for Khrushchev is primarily involved, it now looks as though we may be on verge of significant break-through which could lead to substantial agreement in near future, depending, of course, on outcome negotiations three Princes in Laos.

207. Editorial Note

On October 16, while on Cape Cod, President Kennedy wrote a long and personal letter to Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev. This letter was part of an ongoing informal correspondence between the two leaders. At Khrushchev's suggestion, the correspondence was kept wholly private and not to be disclosed in public statements or to the press. Kennedy assured the Chairman that the contents and even the existence of these letters would be known only to his Secretary of State and a few of his other closest associates in the government. The purpose of the correspondence was to exchange views on an informal and personal basis. Most of Kennedy's letter of October 16 concerned Berlin, but he concluded with a short segment on Laos which reads as follows:

"At the same time, however, our attention is urgently needed on those current problems which keep the world poised on the brink of war. The situation in Laos is one example. Indeed I do not see how we can expect to reach a settlement on so bitter and complex an issue as Berlin, where both of us have vital interests at stake, if we cannot come to a final agreement on Laos, which we have previously agreed should be neutral and independent after the fashion of Burma and Cambodia. I do not say that the situation in Laos and the neighboring area must be settled before negotiations begin over Germany and Berlin; but certainly it would greatly improve the atmosphere.

"It is now clear that Prince Souvanna Phouma will become the new Prime Minister if an agreement can be reached. But the composition of his government is far from settled, and without assuming either the knowledge or the power to select individual men for individual posts, you and I do have an obligation if we are to reach our goal to continue, in your words, `using our influence on the corresponding quarters in Laos' to make certain that Souvanna Phouma is assisted by the kind of men we believe necessary to meet the standard of neutrality. That standard is not met if the eight posts assigned to Souvanna are filled in a manner which heavily weights the scales in favor of one side or the other.

"As you note, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Laos is an essential condition to preserving that nation's independence and neutrality. There are other, similar conditions, and we must be certain that the ICC has the power and the flexibility to verify the existence of these conditions to the satisfaction of everyone concerned.

"In addition to so instructing your spokesmen at Geneva, I hope you will increasingly exercise your influence in this direction on all of your `corresponding quarters' in this area; for the acceleration of attacks on South Viet-Nam, many of them from within Laotian territory, are a very grave threat to peace in that area and to the entire kind of world-wide accommodation you and I recognize to be necessary. If a new round of measures and counter-measures, force and counter-force, occurs in that corner of the globe, there is no foretelling how widely it may spread. So I must close, as I opened, by expressing my concern over where current events are taking us." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)

Kennedy was responding to a September 29 letter from Khrushchev to him, in which Khrushchev accused the United States of trying to dictate the personnel of the Souvanna government. Khrushchev wrote, "let the three princes decide the question." Khrushchev also suggested that if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the principle of non-interference in the affairs of Laos, Souvanna could quickly form a government. Finally, Khrushchev expressed satisfaction that he and Kennedy were "of the same opinion as to the need for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Laos." Khrushchev informed the President that he had given instructions to the Soviet Delegates "in the spirit of the ideas described above," and hoped Kennedy would do likewise. (Ibid.)

The texts of all the Kennedy-Khrushchev messages are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI.

208. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Planning for the Strengthening of a Souvanna-Led Government in Laos

I have had a further talk with Charles Cross, the Laos desk officer, and have read the paper which he prepared within State on the subject of shoring up a Souvanna-led government./2/ This paper seems to me to provide a good beginning for an interdepartmental exercise.

/2/The paper was entitled "Souvanna Phouma Solution" and dated September 27. It made four assumptions: the United States would support Souvanna, he would be dangerously weak, the military option had been abandoned, and influence over Souvanna was limited. The primary U.S. objective was to prevent Laos from being used as a base for infiltration and subversion against Thailand and South Vietnam. Cross outlined actions to strengthen Souvanna politically, such as creating a pro-Souvanna political party under Phoui Sananikone and drastically reducing support of Phoumi. He suggested military actions, such as bringing Kong Le's forces closer to FAR and away from the Pathet Lao. Cross also outlined ways to assure Thailand and South Vietnam that support for Souvanna would not imperil their security. (Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 69 D 169, Laos Task Force, 1961, Sept.-Dec.)

I recommend that you propose at the Planning Group Luncheon today the establishment of an interdepartmental group at the working level to work under the Southeast Asia Task Force and to prepare a paper on this subject. The group might include representatives of State, Defense, CIA, ICA and the NSC Staff. I recommend that you suggest to Alexis Johnson that this working level group be under the chairmanship of the State desk officer, Mr. Cross, who is one of the few people in State who sympathizes with, recognizes the need for, and has done some thinking about this kind of planning. The general attitude of many of the officers in the FE Bureau of the State Department is that no Souvanna-led government offers a real prospect of keeping Laos neutral and non-Communist. While this pessimism is supported in general by intelligence appreciations, we are committed to this track and it seems to me essential that we make a real college try to make the effort succeed.

It seems to me that any planning effort be organized so as to have both a working and a policy level. The work of the SEA Task Force has suffered from the fact that working level arrangements have been very ad hoc in character, improvised for each redrafting effort. The SEA Task Force itself might have an initial meeting to discuss the general problem of strengthening a Souvanna government and then turn the problem over to the working level group.

It may be argued that we cannot do meaningful planning on this problem until we have a clearer picture of the outlines of a Geneva settlement. However, it seems to me that we can develop plans now which will: (a) analyze alternative approaches to various problems; and (b) at a minimum, lay down general guidelines. Thus, for example, there is a question as to whether, in helping Souvanna (or others) develop a political organization, the emphasis should be upon a mass-base organization which would compete directly with the Communists or whether it should be organized along the lines of traditional Lao political parties with emphasis upon family and other personal ties. We will need a clear plan of action the moment there is a political settlement. Work on a plan would provide the foundations on which detailed programs can be constructed and might even have some effect upon decisions that are made at Geneva and elsewhere as we make our final compromises in connection with a settlement.

As I indicated this morning, some planning, in addition to the paper that was done in State, is going forward in the government. Thus, ICA recently sent a message to the field requesting the recommendations of the Laos USOM on how the aid program should be reorganized in the event a Souvanna government is installed. CIA is said to have done some work on the subject and, of course, a certain amount of the planning that has been developed in connection with the Geneva Conference has a direct bearing. In particular, the quite detailed plan for the reorganization of the armed forces and the plan for reorganization and support for the police forces has immediate relevance.

There is attached for your information Walt's memo to the President and its attached illustrative list of the topics that might be covered in a plan./3/

/3/Document 205.

Bob

209. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 18, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT
Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference October 9-16, 1961

1. Developments in Laos

After considerable confusion generated by the failure of both RLG and Souvanna to respond to each other's questions on the next steps to be taken, Phoumi acceded to Souvanna's request that an RLG delegation go to Khang Khay to effect the arrangements for Souvanna's audience with the King, now scheduled for October 18. Kong Le troops and an ICC security force at Luang Prabang will guarantee Souvanna's safety. He will presumably see the King alone and then meet with Boun Oum and Phoumi for discussions on his government's composition; Souphanouvong, however, will probably not be present. One of the main issues is that of the distribution of the center seats, the Pathet Lao (PL) and Souvanna demanding all eight for the latter's "neutrals," while Phoumi insists on four for the non-Xieng Khouang neutrals. Furthermore, Phoumi reports that Souphanouvong requests Defense for the PL and, though Souvanna is refusing, this question may well hamper negotiations, particularly since Phoumi is seeking that post for himself and Western support to any RLG under the Paris Agreements cannot be given if Defense or Interior goes to the PL.

Souvanna for his part has been maneuvering thus far without success to obtain public recognition for his designation by having the Diplomatic Corps and ICC present at Luang Prabang. He does not realize that the King, who was displeased with the self-righteous tone of Souvanna's letter to him of September 27/2/ and who apparently has little regard for any of the three Princes, does not plan to designate him formally but merely to ask him to "try to form a government." The possibility also exists that the King may attempt to oblige Souvanna to go to the Assembly for investiture. A further problem is that of the timing of the Boun Oum government's resignation, Souvanna desiring it at once and Phoumi wishing to defer it until an agreement has been achieved on the new government. We recently learned that the French Government has been attempting to diminish Souvanna's dependence on the Soviets by supplying him with funds and certain other assistance.

/2/Not found.

2. Geneva/3/

/3/See Document 206 for more information on the week's events at the conference.

With the Conference at the critical phase, Ambassador Harriman over the past week has met frequently with MacDonald, Pushkin, and other delegates on a bilateral or small group basis in an effort to find a solution to the major hard issues: (a) ICC voting procedures, fixed teams and operation centers; (b) demobilization and integration; (c) infiltration into South Viet-Nam via Laos; (d) SEATO protocol; (e) Co-Chairmen's role. The Soviets are particularly adamant on opposing the fixed teams and in insisting on the removal of SEATO protection from Laos. Harriman feels that if these two problems could be resolved, it might then be possible to achieve substantial agreement relatively soon provided that the three Princes' negotiations are satisfactorily concluded.

With respect to SEATO, the British, French, and U.S. delegates recommend adopting the Indian proposal which Pushkin felt might represent "interesting middle ground," i.e., the SEATO powers participating at Geneva would undertake to respect the Lao neutrality declaration and the non-participating SEATO powers would publicly endorse this action on grounds that Lao neutrality was being guaranteed by the Geneva commitments. On ICC voting, Pushkin's only concession has been to admit that agreement here is not tied to the Soviet troika principle but he has rejected a return to the 1954 voting procedures offered by Harriman as a compromise. The most constructive development is Pushkin's voluntary suggestion to include a provision by which the Co-Chairmen would be responsible for ensuring that the thirteen signatory powers fulfill their obligations.

Of interest with respect to Khrushchev's message last week stressing the Soviet desire for an early agreement, is the fact that Pushkin who had planned to return to Moscow for the CPSU Congress and to see Khrushchev, cancelled his trip on Moscow instructions.

L.D. Battle/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Lawrence Pezzulo of S/S signed for Battle.

210. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 25, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT
Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference, October 17-23, 1961

1. Developments in Laos

At Luang Prabang October 18, Souvanna accepted the King's request "to attempt unofficially" to form a government of national union. In his press statement following the audience, Souvanna said four steps would be involved: a) the three Princes meet again and agree on the Cabinet's composition; b) Boun Oum offers his resignation to the King; c) at the same time the King officially designates Souvanna to form a government; d) Souvanna presents the government to the King and is invested by him./2/

/2/As reported in telegram 600 from Vientiane, October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-1961)

Souvanna's attitude at Luang Prabang as described by Phoumi is of some significance in that he appeared not only to acknowledge the King's sovereignty but accepted the constitutional necessity of remaining unofficial Premier-designate until a new government was agreed upon; he conceded the legality of the Boun Oum government and of the latter's remaining temporarily in office; and he did not attempt to claim legality for his own "government." Outside of the audience, little else was accomplished between Souvanna and Phoumi.

Souvanna's going to Luang Prabang in itself represents a major step. The RLG for its part made a helpful gesture in supplying some funds for Souvanna's forces and also published a conciliatory statement on the future Souvanna government. Prospects of a rapid formation of the latter seem slim with little or no action being taken at the moment. Boun Oum and Phoumi are unwilling to accede to Souvanna's request that the next Princes' meeting be held at Khang Khay; Boun Oum in fact has gone to Pakse by boat for an indefinite time. The Vientiane faction feels it is now up to Souvanna to come up with a proposed slate of ministers before another meeting. On the Pathet Lao side, Souphanouvong did not go to Luang Prabang and according to reports from Geneva, his group may be planning to react against Vientiane demands by some of their own, including one of the two key posts, Defense or Interior. Souvanna told Phoumi he would accept him as Vice Premier but wished to retain Defense for himself, making no mention of Interior, which he probably intends for one of his "neutrals." There is also the problem of investiture: Phoumi claims the King told Souvanna he preferred adherence to the normal constitutional procedures, i.e., investiture by parliament; Souvanna was non-committal but is unlikely to accept. A British Embassy officer with Phoumi's approval is flying to Khang Khay in an effort to persuade Souvanna to move ahead on forming his government.

On the question of demobilization and integration of forces, which Phoumi does not seem to regard as seriously as we do, Ambassador Brown has been instructed to press him to insist on a prior agreement on principles with the other two factions before accepting any new government formula. (A draft plan in this connection has been drawn up by the 3 Western Ambassadors and Australian Minister to be considered by the four governments for the eventual use of the Lao groups and also of the allied governments at Geneva.)/3/

/3/In telegram 371 to Vientiane, October 21. (Ibid., 751J.5/10-2061) Text of the agreed draft plan for regroupment, integration, and demobilization of Lao Armed Forces is in telegram 607 from Vientiane, October 20. (Ibid.)

The RLG, probably at the instigation of Sopsaisana, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, last week sent two stiff notes to ICC charging the latter with having broken its agreement on the transport of Souvanna forces to Luang Prabang. RLG-ICC relations at best are hardly harmonious but this marks a new low.

2. Geneva/4/

/4/More information on the week's events at Geneva is in Confe 760, October 20. (Ibid.)

Ambassador Harriman reports that the optimism generated in the early part of the week over progress with the Soviets had largely evanesced by week's end: Pushkin had appeared to consider our SEATO formula acceptable to the bloc as a whole and again stated he was prepared to have the neutrality declaration include a guarantee of the parties that Lao territory would not be used as a base or corridor of aggression. Pushkin's most useful concession was contained in his concept of three-stage ICC procedures: a) initiation of investigations; b) reporting, and c) recommendations; the first two of which, he said, would require only majority vote but the unanimity principle would have to apply to the third. However, this concession means little unless covered in the final Conference documents and Pushkin on October 20 failed to give Harriman the text he had promised, implying he was having trouble with the Chinese.

Phoui Sananikone, Chairman of the Vientiane delegation, has returned to Vientiane for consultations. According to Phoumi, he and Souvanna agreed last week on Phoui as head of the unified Lao delegation, the formation of which Souvanna considered of immediate importance. Their concurrence however may be based on an equal desire to eliminate Phoui from the Lao political scene.

Quinim Pholsena, Souvanna's deputy, and Pathet Lao delegate Phoumi Vongvichit also left Geneva for Xieng Khouang on a two-week consultation trip. Vientiane delegation surmises that in light of Pushkin's apparent eagerness to achieve agreement, the two will present to their respective groups the type of agreement the Communist bloc is prepared to accept.

While we continue our planning for a future Laos on the premise of continued French presence once agreement has been achieved at Geneva, the Soviets and Chinese are strongly opposed to it as "incompatible with a neutral Laos"; the two Co-Chairmen may now consult to devise an acceptable formula on this issue.

L.D. Battle/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Manfull signed for Battle.

211. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, October 26, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-2661. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Bangkok for Taylor. A note on the source text indicates that it was passed to the White House.

Confe 785. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman. Deliver 9 a.m. Reference: Confe 786./2/

/2/Document 212.

Reference telegram based on understanding the President's and Secretary of State's instructions/3/ to me still stand that President wants a peaceful settlement providing reasonable chance of resulting in neutral and independent Laos. As far as Geneva's contribution to that objective is concerned, it seems almost within our grasp, and as I have said, the most critical decisions are now in Laos.

/3/Document 200.

I fully recognize importance of Laos attached to crisis in South Vietnam. It seems to me, however, that we should drive ahead to conclude negotiation for the establishment of an acceptable Souvanna Government, understanding regarding demobilization forces, and conclusion Geneva agreement. If agreement reached, both Soviets and Souvanna have committed themselves to block use of Laos territory against SVN, for what that may accomplish. Regardless of other considerations, I continue to feel that SVN problem can best be solved in SVN, rather than trying to find solution by military action in Laos.

I fear that if SEATO forces introduced in Laos, it will be difficult to prevent extremely dangerous escalation and at best will have forces bogged down indefinitely. Introduction forces SVN would not be as dangerous or without terminus and would have possibility of far more world wide approval. I see nothing that has developed to change the decision the President made months ago to attempt peaceful solution, which seemed remote then, but is possible today if all hands will work energetically to that end. Also, I feel strongly we will be in better position to reach peaceful solution Berlin if Laos agreement concluded.

212. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, October 26, 1961, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-2661. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Bangkok for Taylor, niact to Vientiane, and to Saigon. A note on the source text indicates that it was passed to the White House.

Confe 786. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman. Deliver [garble] a.m.

Cable from Vientiane 624/2/ to Dept describing Hasey's talk with Phoumi confirmed my misgivings that Phoumi has no intention of negotiating in good faith with Souvanna for formation of a government, let alone an adequate agreement on integration and demobilization forces. Phoumi sees his supreme power slipping and appears reluctant to join Souvanna govt in working under him for neutral Laos. In conversation with British First Secretary, Souvanna gave right answers on integration forces and closing Laos to Viet Cong, but still unsatisfactory on composition government. On the other hand, he indicated Vientiane neutrals could be included, if cabinet enlarged to 18 or 19 posts. Phoumi or someone else has got to do some tough realistic trading on these two all important subjects, namely, government and military forces. Our negotiations in Geneva are now of second importance to agreements in Laos. I urge in the strongest terms that Ambassador Brown be instructed to use his full authority to tell Phoumi he must undertake negotiations in good faith. If he doesn't we must find some other way to handle negotiations with Souvanna. It would seem that not only the numbers but the individuals that Souvanna places in important posts is critical. If Phoumi had started to negotiate last July, perhaps he could have negotiated himself in a position of Deputy Prime Minister, providing he had come to a personal understanding with Souvanna to work together against penetration Pathet Lao and victory in elections. Now if Phoumi is to be Deputy Prime Minister, a Pathet Lao would also have to have similar post. If this is not desirable, he should abandon his demand for this position and get down to brass tacks on individuals to hold critical posts, as well as over all composition cabinet and demobilization. I don't see why Phoumi shouldn't go to Plaine des Jarres alone since Boun Oum refuses, now that Souvanna has visited Luang Prabang and indicates he will return there. The all important subject is that Phoumi begin to act in good faith and not by his inaction take over US Government policy making.

/2/Telegram 624, October 24, reported that Phoumi told Hasey that he feared for his safety if he went to Khang Khay for negotiations, but Charge Creel felt it was as much a desire not to negotiate himself out of office. (Ibid., 751J.00/10-2461)

I further recommend our Ambassador establish direct and continuous contact with Souvanna. It seems unrealistic for French and British Ambassadors and their staffs to travel to Xieng Khuang, while we remain aloof. We must gain and maintain Souvanna's confidence. If Ambassador Brown does not feel he has man on his staff to establish liaison with Souvanna, I will be glad to release Julian Fromer, who participated in our talks in Rangoon and Geneva, for this purpose, unless Dept prefers to send Christian Chapman.

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos /1/

Washington, October 27, 1961, 8:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-2661. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross, cleared in draft by Anderson and Cleveland and by McConaughy, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated niact to Vientiane and priority to Saigon and Bangkok.

Fecon 532. For Harriman.

Your 786/2/ emphasizes very well critical stage we have reached both Laos and Geneva. It is of utmost importance that we exercise greatest care as you suggest in leaving no stone unturned in influencing events in Laos in right direction. Although we would be unwise assume Phoumi has abandoned his personal ambitions, believe his latest conversations with Brown (Vientiane's 631, 632)/3/ among others are indications that Phoumi for present at least is pursuing general line we desire. Also we feel Phoumi assessment that PL will undoubtedly attempt block Souvanna from attaining truly neutral Laos is essentially accurate. Problem as seen from here seems to be Souvanna'a slowness in drawing up Cabinet list for negotiation and not Phoumi/Boun Oum unwillingness travel Xieng Khouang. Meeting in Luang Prabang with King was good beginning. It did not result in any embarrassment to Souvanna as he had feared. RLG went very far in allowing Russian planes to transport Souvanna troops in order to ensure his security, act which must have been very distasteful to King and RLG. Nevertheless they met in atmosphere cordiality which argues for Luang Prabang being proper place for continuation of unification talks. We also note report that Souphanouvong has left Xieng Khouang for Hanoi (Vientiane's 624)/4/ and we are concerned over fact that he does not seem amenable to joining in meetings unless they are held in his territory with all that implies. One of factors in three Princes rapprochement should be recognition of crown and institution of monarchy; this cannot better be symbolized than to have reconciliation meetings vicinity King.

/2/Document 212.

/3/These telegrams, both dated October 26, covered a number of issues, but in them Phoumi conceded that he was prepared to reconsider a visit to the Plaine des Jarres to meet with Souvanna if it might help to establish Souvanna in the royal capital and get him out of the Xieng Khouang atmosphere. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-2661)

/4/See footnote 2, Document 212.

We consider question of any demarche to Phoumi best left to Brown's discretion in light evolving local situation. If negotiations appear to falter due Phoumi's intransigence, Brown has adequate instructions authorizing him urge Phoumi in strongest terms negotiate in good faith (Deptel 287)./5/ Advice to Phoumi re negotiating on Cabinet positions covered Deptel 322/6/ and others. We in coordination British and French are now working on approaches to Phoumi and Souvanna re demobilization and integration forces (Deptel 371)./7/ We will be awaiting Brown's recommendations re establishing direct and continuous contact with Souvanna in light possible effect on our influence over Phoumi and our relationships with British and French. We must avoid lending degree of recognition to Xieng Khouang which it has not yet achieved at present stage of negotiations.

/5/See footnote 2, Document 189.

/6/See footnote 3, Document 203.

/7/See footnote 3, Document 210.

Rusk

214. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Steeves) to Acting Secretary of State Bowles/1/

Washington, November 1, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-161. Secret. Drafted by Steeves.

SUBJECT
What is At Stake in Geneva

Situation

Through a series of fallback positions over the period of the past few months in the drafting committee in which we have receded rather far from that which we originally determined to be our essential positions, we are now faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether or not we will concede to the Russians the few remaining points symbolized by the demand for unanimity vote on reports from the ICC. This point, although essential, is only illustrative of the gradual erosion of our position which has taken place and is as good a point as any upon which to stand fast if our purpose is to get an agreement out of Geneva that will provide us with the necessary and minimum safeguards.

There is attached a study prepared by the Department of Defense/2/ which analyzes the concessions which we have made and those areas in which the Russians in the drafting committee have made concessions to our views.

/2/The study is attached to a copy of this memorandum, ibid., FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, 350.4 14 Nation Conference, Nov. 1-Dec. 31, 1961 Laos. There is no attachment to the original in the Central Files.

While there may be a subsequent point in the drafting negotiations where we could decide to make the issue, all indications are that the criticality of the current points may be as good a time as any to review our position and ascertain whether or not we are coming dangerously near to taking a step which will be inimical to our future interests.

Factors to be Considered Favoring a Delay

1. General Taylor is returning to report on Friday./3/ It is essential that our plans in Viet-Nam be coordinated with our position in Laos.

/3/November 3. The Taylor Mission Report, November 3, is printed in vol. I, pp. 477-532.

2. Much of the negotiation in Geneva from here on depends finally on the participation of a Laos delegation representing a new government of national unification which has not yet been formed and is experiencing delays in this process.

3. The recent development of cleavage between Peking and Moscow may have crucial effects on the negotiations and a slight delay would seem advisable until the implications of this rift are a little clearer.

4. A reliable intelligence report indicates that a major portion of the Chinese delegation may be departing from Geneva.

Recommendation

Under these circumstances it would seem advisable to recall Ambassador Harriman in order to review our entire position and determine our future course. The benefits which might accrue from a delay and this consultation are: (1) allow an opportunity to assess outside factors mentioned above, and (2) to indicate to the communists that our position is hardening and that we will not make unlimited concessions merely for the sake of agreement.

While recommending this course of action, factors which argue against delay should also be stated. These are: (1) Some progress has been made towards reaching agreements and Ambassador Harriman's conviction is that if the momentum is stopped at this juncture the effect may be counterproductive. (2) Delegations such as the British, French and Canadians would not approve our taking a more severe line and believe that we should accept the present framework of agreement as about the best that we can get. This is also Ambassador Harriman's view.

Attachment/4/

Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Far Eastern Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McCormick), to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security (Williams)

Washington, October 27, 1961.

/4/No drafting or classification information appears on the source text.

SUBJECT
Status of Laos Negotiation Issues

This paper summarizes the concessions made by the United States and by the Communists, based upon the original neutrality declaration and terms of reference documents tabled by the two sides.

A. Concessions by the United States:

1. Enclosure 1 lists 27 major and minor concessions by the United States./5/ Most significant concessions include

/5/Attached but not printed.

a. Public announcement by SEATO members of their acceptance and willingness to respect Laotian renunciation of SEATO protection.

b. Acceptance of the necessity for the ICC to operate only "with the concurrence" of the RLG.

c. Acceptance of a somewhat ambiguous article on logistic support for the ICC (RLG to be primary source and no provisions for maintenance).

d. Deletion of prescribed entry and departure points for military personnel and equipment.

e. Deletion of prescribed operations centers (ICC may, however, get authority to establish logistic support bases).

f. Elimination of fixed teams.

g. Acceptance (only in principle thus far) that a majority vote of the ICC or a request from the RLG will be necessary to start investigations.

h. Acceptance of view that unanimous vote of the ICC will be required in some cases (Polish veto).

i. Deletion of requirement that ICC be provided a census of military forces and equipment.

B. Communist Concessions:

1. Acceptance of a provision requiring ICC member countries to have substitute ICC and team members promptly available.

2. Acceptance of a provision giving the Commission and its teams authority necessary for investigation, inspection and verification, and free access to all parts of Laos as necessary for performance of their duties. (It must be noted however that this article is circumscribed by others which, thus far, make this authority applicable only to investigations of cease-fire violations, and of entry and withdrawal of foreign troops. These ICC actions also require concurrence of the RLG. Further, the Communists have not yet agreed to stationing any permanent ICC personnel outside of Vientiane.)

3. Acceptance of a provision that ICC logistic support not available from the RLG may be obtained elsewhere.

4. Acceptance of principle of PW's being permitted to go to destination of choice (this apparent concession, however, is well-hedged by requirement that PW's first must be turned over to their national authorities).

5. Acceptance (so far only oral) of a provision in the neutrality declaration renouncing the use of Laotian territory for operations against neighboring states.

C. Significant Issues Remaining to be Negotiated:

1. Extent of matters which will require unanimous ICC vote.

2. Form and number of bases or centers which ICC may operate outside Vientiane.

3. Inclusion of provision giving ICC some general responsibility for overseeing implementation of neutrality declarations by Laos and other nations.

4. Form and scope of minority reports by members of ICC teams and ICC.

5. Length of tenure of ICC and procedure for its termination.

6. Time at which Articles requiring withdrawal of U.S. military assistance and personnel shall become effective.

7. French presence (or establishment of a neutral military training mission).

William T. McCormick /6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

31 Oct Addendum: Ambassador Harriman has just repeated his recommendation that he be authorized to accept Pushkin's latest proposals with minor amendment./7/ Approval would entail, inter alia, U.S. acceptance of:

/7/In Confe 794 from Geneva, October 30. (Department of State Central Files, 751J.00/10-3061)

a. A requirement that the ICC submit "agreed" reports, with all ICC conclusions and recommendations subject to the unanimity rule (Polish veto). The article establishing this requirement would also contain the ambiguous statement "nevertheless, if differences on particular questions emerge among the members of the Commission, these differences may be appropriately reflected on the report."

b. Deletion of all reference to ICC operations centers or logistic centers outside Vientiane.

c. A voting formula less acceptable than that in the 1954 Geneva Agreement wherein only reports of cease-fire violations "which might lead to resumption of hostilities" required unanimity. Under the current proposal all conclusions regarding cease-fire violations would require unanimity.

Added to the concessions already made (Encl 1), the net result would be nearly complete acceptance of the original Soviet draft and abandonment of nearly all of the original U.S. position.

215. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Bowles and President Kennedy/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 147, Chester Bowles' Telephone Conversations. Confidential. Transcribed in Bowles' office.

Washington, November 1, 1961, 4:25 p.m.

CB said he had a problem with Harriman and would like to get the President's guidance. Harriman feels he has come to the end of the road with Pushkin. CB said he had two or three or four points which some of our people feel are important. CB said that the normal thing would be to get Harriman right back to consult with JFK. CB said that he had not talked to Harriman but Johnson had;/2/ Harriman was very emotional about this. He is afraid the Chinese will walk out.

/2/No record of the U. Alexis Johnson-Harriman telephone conversation has been found.

The President asked where the agreement was and CB said it was not really an agreement but a long complicated problem. JFK asked what Ball, Johnson had thought of it. CB said they felt the normal thing was to ask him to come back. But he was so emotional with Alex that it was difficult to do this. CB said he had all the language problems. Harriman finished the agreement yesterday.

The President suggested that CB come over to the White House at 6:00./3/

/3/At 6:05 p.m. the President met with Bowles, U. Alexis Johnson, Kenneth Galbraith, and former President Harry Truman. The meeting lasted until 6:47 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

216. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, November 2, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was taken from the President's weekend reading folder of November 4.

SUBJECT
Memoranda on Laos Requested by the President

Enclosed are two memoranda concerning the recent fighting in the vicinity of Xieng Khouang and the role that General Phoumi Nosavan is playing in the three Princes' negotiations in Laos. These were requested from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs following the President's telephone conversation of November 2 with Ambassador Harriman in Geneva./2/

/2/See Document 217.

Also enclosed are comments of Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown on the attacks on Xieng Khouang city October 27-28./3/

/3/These comments, [text not declassified] are summarized in the final paragraph of enclosure 1, [text not declassified].

L.D. Battle/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Signature of the officer who signed for Battle is illegible.

Enclosure 1/5/

November 2, 1961.

/5/No drafting information appears on the source text.

Recent Fighting in Xieng Khouang

The October 27 firing on Xieng Khouang was naturally heavily exploited by Communist propaganda and was the subject of vitriolic comment by the Communists at the Geneva Conference. Harriman replied at a Conference session that the first fire came from Xieng Khouang city but did not admit that return shelling came from RLG forces. The latter was because Phoumi had stated he has no knowledge of the shelling nor admitted participation of Royal Lao forces.

There have been press reports datelined November 1 from Vientiane saying that Meo tribesmen have cut off the town of Xieng Khouang from the Plaine des Jarres airfield which lies to the West of the city. On October 31 the orders were sent to Meo forces not to harass or fire on the Xieng Khouang-PDJ-Khang Khay Road, nor on roads running east and south from Xieng Khouang ville within 5 miles of the city. Meo commanders at Pho Khe, Pa Souk and Tha Lin Noi have acknowledged receipt of this instruction on November 1. It is possible, however, that runners may not have reached some isolated units. In any event, no confirmation is available in Vientiane concerning the press report that the road between PDJ airfield and Xieng Khouang has been cut. However, it is quite possible that enemy forces are somewhat nervous about using this road in view of the recent attack in Xieng Khouang sector and have decided to advise the ICC not to use the Xieng Khouang airfield and the road to Xieng Khouang-Plaine des Jarres. In this connection, it is worth noting that Meo have been within 4 kilometers of Xieng Khouang city since last April and operating close to the Plaine des Jarres airfield. Since the cease-fire of May 3, the Meo have been under restraining orders limiting their activities to defense, small scale harassment, and diversionary tactics.

Commenting on the recent Xieng Khouang incidents, Ambassador Brown has said that as long as the Kong Le Souvanna government continues efforts to take over control of these Meo areas through military force and through conscription of personnel to carry ammunition, intimidation of village officials, and so on, it is inevitable that the Meos will resist and that they will attack elsewhere in order to divert pressure. In this last month, furthermore, there has been an increasing use of PL and Viet-Nam Communists forces in operations against the Meo and a decrease in the proportion of Kong Le forces. This use of foreign troops has further embittered the Meos.

Enclosure 2/6/

/6/No drafting information appears on the source text.

Phoumi and the Three Princes' Negotiations

Phoumi contends that if Souvanna is to play a truly neutral role, he must free himself from PL domination by coming out of Xieng Khouang to consult with various political leaders in other parts of the country. Phoumi also considers that Prince Souphanouvong must give proof of his good faith by participating in the inter-factional discussions. The RLG originally proposed that the next meeting of the three Princes take place at Vientiane and refused to go to the Plaine des Jarres, but more recently Phoumi has publicly stated that he and Boun Oum are willing to meet "anywhere". On October 31, however, Phoumi told Ambassador Brown he prefers that any talks among the three factions should take place in the King's presence at Luang Prabang, but that there should not be another meeting until Souvanna is able to present concrete proposals agreed to by Souphanouvong with respect to a coalition government and a unified Lao delegation to Geneva.

In their talk on October 31,/7/ Ambassador Brown suggested that Phoumi attempt to obtain from Souvanna a four-point commitment:

/7/As reported in telegram 651 from Vientiane, October 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-3161)

(a) A Souvanna delegation would go to Vientiane to make security arrangements for a Plaine des Jarres session.

(b) Souvanna and Souphanouvong would receive Phoumi even in the absence of Boun Oum.

(c) Souvanna has definite proposals to submit.

(d) Souvanna would meet subsequently in Luang Prabang.

The ICC would evidently play a go-between role in attempting to obtain such written assurances from Souvanna.

Souphanouvong, for his part, did not attend the Luang Prabang meeting in October and has given no indication of willingness to leave Xieng Khouang. He has openly objected to Souvanna's verbal engagement at Luang Prabang to appoint Phoui Sananikone as the head of a unified delegation at Geneva and seems to be preventing Souvanna from producing a Cabinet list for negotiation.

In Vientiane Ambassador Brown is putting strong pressure on Phoumi to give public evidence of his desire for a peaceful solution even if it means going to rebel-held Xieng Khouang. In return, we consider that the Soviets must exert a similar influence on Souphanouvong and Ambassador Harriman has been instructed to underscore with Pushkin the point that the PL now seem to be largely responsible for the delays encountered in forming a coalition government./8/

/8/In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, October 31, Battle noted that the White House received the weekly telegraphic reports from Geneva as well as other pertinent reports on Laos from other missions in the field. Battle suggested that the weekly memorandum prepared by the Department of State might no longer be timely or necessary. If this was the case the Department would like to discontinue it. On a covering note, November 3, attached to Battle's memorandum, Manfull noted that Bromley Smith had approved discontinuance of the mandatory weekly memorandum. (Ibid.)

217. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, November 2, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61. Secret. Prepared by U. Alexis Johnson. Sent to McGeorge Bundy at the White House by Battle under cover of a memorandum of November 2. In that memorandum, Battle explained that Johnson had not had an opportunity to review or sign the memorandum after dictating it that morning.

SUBJECT
Geneva Negotiations on Laos

On the evening of November 1, the President telephoned to Ambassador Harriman at Geneva to discuss the question of the draft section on reports by the ICC. (For ready reference following is the text which Ambassador Harriman desired to accept.)

"The International Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations. Nevertheless, if differences on particular questions emerge among the members of the Commission these differences may be appropriately reflected in the reports.

"Conclusions and recommendations of the Commission on investigations shall be adopted unanimously in accordance with Article ______ on voting."

The President expressed his concern as to whether the Poles could block the issuance of a report containing minority Canadian views in view of the use of the term "agreed" in the first sentence of the draft. Ambassador Harriman explained his view that this would not be possible and that all the principal delegations including the Soviets agreed on this. Ambassador Harriman explained that the U.S. was the only delegation withholding its agreement and that he felt it urgent we should proceed.

Following the conversation, DepTel Fecon 554/2/ was sent to Ambassador Harriman.

/2/Fecon 554, November 1, outlined the President's concerns. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-1161)

In response to that telegram, Ambassador Harriman telephoned the President at 8:00 a.m. on November 2. Ambassador Harriman stated that the draft gave Pushkin the "facade" that he was seeking while giving us the "substance" that we were seeking. He stated that investigations could be initiated and carried out at the request of the RLG or a majority of the ICC. With respect to reporting, all three parties could freely express their individual views to the degree that they desired, but that this would be incorporated in a single document which Pushkin desired to have called an "agreed report." Pushkin took the position that it would be "impossible to imagine" such a report being held up by the refusal of one member of the ICC to sign. While the first sentence used the term "agreed", the next sentence made it completely clear that minority views could be freely expressed. Ambassador Harriman stated that all the delegations agreed on this and that the Indians would confirm in writing. Ambassador Harriman stated that in addition to Lall, Desai of the Indian Foreign Office confirmed the Indian interpretation of this article. The controlling word was "shall" in the first sentence. Ambassador Harriman stated that all of his staff also agreed on this.

The President expressed his concern that if the Communists do violate the agreement that the Canadians and/or Indians be able promptly to report what they found and that the language of any document agreed upon would not inhibit this. Ambassador Harriman stated that if one member of the ICC refused to sign a report it would be a breach of the agreement and a breaking of the obligations of the members of the ICC. Ambassador Harriman expressed his concern that the conference could "blow up" and it was important to get ahead. He also expressed his concern that Phoumi was dragging his feet with regard to formation of a government and it was important that Phoumi act in good faith in this regard. While Phoumi can make excuses, the important thing is that he gets ahead. Ambassador Harriman also expressed his concern over the Meo shelling of Xieng Khouang. The President said that he understood one of the blocks was that Souphanouvong had gone to Hanoi.

The President said that Harriman should obtain from the Indians confirmation in writing of the interpretation of this article, and in the meanwhile, authorized Ambassador Harriman to go ahead and agree to the draft language of the article. The President asked Ambassador Harriman to send him a cable on the subject./3/

/3/See Documents 218 and 219.

The President requested Mr. Johnson to see what additional we could do to stop Meo attacks or other actions that might upset the situation and to get Phoumi moving better on the formation of a government.

U. Alexis Johnson/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

218. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, November 2, 1961, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-261. Secret.

Confe 809. Eyes Only for the President from Harriman. Reference Fecon 554./2/ Following confirms my telephone conversation with the President today./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 217.

/3/See Document 217.

The problem which Pushkin and I have frankly discussed, was the need on his part for a facade, and on my part, to obtain substance. On this basis, we have reached a general understanding.

Inspections by the International Commission are to be initiated and carried out, either at the request of the govt, or by a majority of the Commission. This has been stated in Pushkin's draft in precise language.

When it comes to reporting on these investigations, Pushkin proposes a method which is not far from the present method of reporting--namely, there shall be a single report in which the opinions of the three Commission members will be expressed, either unanimously, majority-minority, or separately. In expressing this, however, he insists on calling these reports "agreed" reports.

When I raised with Pushkin the possibility of one of the commissioners refusing to sign a report, expressing majority minority or individual views, he said that was imaginary. The ICC members could not refuse, since the next sentence makes that completely clear. Pushkin has said "each member has full scope for individual arguments, evaluations and expression of views."

Similar interpretation has been made by all of us here, including the Indian and Canadian Delegates, both of whom have told me they would put their oral statements in writing if desired. They explain that in the full sentence. "Commission shall submit agreed reports", the word "shall" is the control word. They state this means that all members must sign the report, whether or not the report contains differences of opinion, as provided in the next sentence, and also that reports must be made promptly, as is provided elsewhere.

The British and French Governments, as well as the Canadian and Indian Governments, have agreed to the submission of our revised texts to Pushkin. The President authorized me today to join in authorizing MacDonald to submit these revised texts to Pushkin this afternoon.

In answer to the President's question as to what would happen if Poles refuse to sign or unduly delayed report, I replied that the Pole would then have breached the agreement and the other members of the Commission would be free to send in their reports without the Pole's signature.

I mentioned my concern over reports of October 31 attacks by Meos in neighborhood Xieng Khouang airfield and also delays in Princes negotiations due to pretexts advanced by Boun Oum-Phoumi.

219. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, November 2, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11-261. Secret; Niact.

Confe 810. Eyes Only for the President from Harriman. Supplementing earlier message today (Confe 809),/2/ I had intended to mention on the telephone this morning if there had been time that there were two significant provisions already agreed to by Pushkin: first, that co-chairmen take responsibility for compliance with agreement by participating countries, the Soviets for Commie bloc, the British for the rest of us; second, Pushkin had agreed to include paragraph in 13-nation declaration that signatories undertake not to utilize Lao territory for interference in affairs of neighbors. This clearly covers both subversive as well as military action.

/2/Document 218.

Pushkin has told me that when agreement is effective, corridor traffic through Laos to SVN will not be permitted. He has not admitted, but has not denied, that corridor traffic exists today. Incidentally, Souvanna Phouma has also agreed to do all he can to stop traffic.

This gives us extraordinarily direct and early opportunity to judge Soviet good faith after agreement goes into effect. Complaints against signatories do not necessarily have to be substantiated by ICC in order to permit us to take up question of violation directly with co-chairmen if we have evidence we consider valid.

I hope I have made it clear that in this strange trade to break down the troika principle, Soviets have demanded facade in return for the substance we insist upon. We have therefore had to accept less precise and at times odder language than in normal agreements. Yet, if we can get revised texts now submitted to Pushkin, we will have, I believe, what we went out to obtain--a commission functioning in all essential areas on majority basis with full right of minority expression.

I recognize difficulty Dept has had in deciphering the hieroglyphics, but truly we haven't gone crazy here. Each step has been approved by the very competent and careful staff that has been given me. Canadian also is most meticulous as Green has his guard up.

I am grateful for your faith and support.

220. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington, November 2, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
The Geneva Negotiations

The attached telegrams were the subject of a very hotly fought argument between Harriman and the Department./2/ The Department view was that the proposed concessions went too far. Even before I learned of the continuing argument I had much the same reaction to them. They posed the question of whether we were going to accept a possible breakdown in the negotiations, which implies, of course, a willingness to intervene militarily if necessary, rather than accept ICC arrangements that represent no substantial advance over the 1954 Geneva Accords.

/2/See Documents 218 and 219.

The issue was the subject of discussion between Bowles, Alexis Johnson and the President on November 1 and a telephone conversation between the President, Harriman and Alexis Johnson on November 2./3/ Harriman won the argument. One of the few State officers who was sympathetic to the Harriman views characterized the likely result as "a 1954-type ICC plus helicopters". That is all he had ever expected.

/3/See Document 217.

While a stronger ICC would fall far short of providing the basis for ensuring a non-Communist Laos, it was the one thing of real value we might have got out of the Geneva negotiations themselves. The existence of negotiations has, of course, had the value of preserving a formal cease-fire though it has not prevented continuing erosion of the non-Communist position on the ground.

The task of forming a government has been proceeding very slowly. There was an argument about who was responsible for the delays between the Department and Harriman last weekend (cables with your reading material)./4/ The picture I have been able to get from the traffic is one that tends to confirm the Department's view that the delay is primarily Souvanna's fault. Phoumi has now gone so far as to indicate a willingness to go to Xieng Khouang for the next meeting despite the risks that could involve for his personal safety./5/ Souvanna, though now designated the cabinet-formateur, has not yet come up with a list of cabinet candidates. The usual shadow play about who, where and when to meet continues./6/

/4/See Documents 212 and 213.

/5/A note on the source text by Johnson at this point reads: "This somewhat less clear than I thought when I wrote this."

/6/A note on the source text by Johnson at this point reads: "See attached memo from State on above subject recently received." Johnson was apparently referring to enclosure 2 to Document 216.

It is now more obvious than ever that the effort to preserve some kind of non-Communist strength in Laos is going to revolve primarily around what can be done to put some strength into a probably very weak Souvanna-led government. I have been prodding State regularly in your absence for a paper on this subject. A paper is finally to be circulated today and some kind of interdepartmental meeting will be called on it in the future./7/ Planning for integration of the armed forces, etc., if actually implemented, is likely to foreclose at an early stage the option of attempting to preserve non-Communist strength in the South and a de facto division within the context of a theoretically unified Laos. But this is still an option that I believe we should bear in mind even as we begin to go down another road.

/7/Johnson is referring to the draft paper, "Souvanna Phouma Solution," September 27; see footnote 2, Document 208. A draft of it was sent by McConaughy to Johnson, November 2. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61)