Paris, August 7, 1961, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8-761. Secret; Priority. Also sent priority to Vientiane and repeated to London, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Ottawa, and Geneva for Fecon. Repeated on August 8 to CINCPAC, New Delhi, Karachi, Rangoon, Canberra, Wellington, and Manila.

Secto 30. Verbatim text. Secretary, UK and French Foreign Ministers agreed August 7/2/ to following paper on Laos which had been prepared for them by tripartite working group officials:

/2/See Document 153.

"Having considered Laos situation with respect security all SEA, the officials have agreed recommend to Ministers that the three governments seek basis which would permit all three support Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of a neutral Laotian Government of National Unity. It was agreed that, in order to arrive at such a basis prior understandings should be sought with Souvanna and other Laotian leaders on four major matters of concern. These four are:

(A) Composition of a neutral Lao government;
(B) The role of the International Commission;
(C) The Laotian Army and the problem of the Pathet Lao forces;
(D) The French military presence.

It was agreed that the French Government was in the best position to make the initial approach to Souvanna. While discussing all four matters they would emphasize in particular items (A) and (C). In the British follow-up, they equally would review all four placing particular emphasis on (B) and (D). If the result of these approaches were productive the United States would undertake follow-up discussions with Souvanna on all points.

Simultaneously with the initial French approach, the United States will take the initiative to discuss with the Boun Oum-Phoumi group the Western requirements for support of Souvanna, inform them of the overtures being made and seek their agreement to conform with them in their own negotiations with Souvanna.

A--Composition of a Neutral Lao Government.

A first requirement is that Souvanna Phouma would support the monarchy and the constitution.

Regarding the composition of the cabinet itself, none of the key portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Defense, or Interior should be accorded to NLHX members or even to a member of Souvanna's group who was closely associated with the NLHX. Phoumi should be given a very high civilian post. A large center group should be drawn from those political figures who are not associated with either the NLHX or the present Royal Lao Government. A few NLHX members could be in the Cabinet, provided that they were not given key portfolios and that they were balanced by the inclusion of an equal number from the Boun Oum-Phoumi group.

We would also expect that, utilizing the provisions of the special powers granted to the King by the recent National Assembly action, Souvanna would postpone national elections until suitable provisions for handling the Pathet Lao military establishment have been put into effect, the non-Communist elements have been able to organize their political strength and a satisfactory degree of tranquillity has been restored to the country.

B--International Commission.

(1) We accept the present composition.

(2) The commission must have authority to supervise and control the cease-fire; the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and military equipment and thereafter the entry of such personnel and equipment; and, eventually, the elections.

(3) It must be able to conduct investigation in any region of Laos, at the request of the Laotian Government or of the commission, or of any member of the commission.

Prince Souvanna's view is that the consent of the Laotian Government is required for any investigation, but he has stated privately that consent would not be withheld. It should be explored with Souvanna Phouma how far he is ready to go in formalizing this understanding in order to provide that such consent by the RLG is never in fact withheld.

(4) The effectiveness of the ICC must not be hampered by veto powers and there should be provision for the ICC to make majority and minority reports.

(5) The ICC must have adequate teams and personnel to do its work.

(6) The ICC should have its own transport and communication equipment, which it would be free to use at its own discretion in carrying out the duties assigned to it.

(7) The security of the ICC must be assured by the RLG.

C--The Laotian Army and the Pathet Lao Forces.

We are agreed that a small army loyal to the central government should be formed and that all other military forces should be disbanded.

It should be explored with Prince Souvanna whether he has practical plans for achieving this aim in a manner likely to minimize Pathet Lao influence. In view of the great importance of this matter, it was agreed that this should also be discussed further among the three governments.

D--The French Presence.

We would expect Prince Souvanna to agree that the French military presence should be maintained under conditions satisfactory to the French. We consider that this responsibility will be of primary importance for the maintenance of Laotian independence."

Rusk

155. Memorandum From President Kennedy to His Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) and His Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Washington, August 7, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/1/61-8/7/61. No classification marking.

1. Would you prepare a memorandum of the situation at Geneva, the bargaining position taken by both sides on ICC matter and the other basic questions which are now before the conference. Should we ask Harriman to come home?

2. I presume that we are going to receive shortly a military plan for action in the panhandle of Laos and also for military pressure against Northern Vietnam.

3. By what means can we bring to world public opinion the action of North Vietnam in Laos in Southern Vietnam? I agree with you that groundwork has to be laid or otherwise any military action we take against Northern Vietnam will seem like aggression on our part./2/

/2/A note on the signed memorandum sent to Taylor indicates that Rostow would answer paragraphs 1 and 3 and that paragraph 2 was "answered orally on August 8." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor NSC, T-624-71)

In an apparently related matter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lemnitzer responded to a request from the President in a written memorandum of August 7 detailing the location, runway dimensions, surfaces, conditions, and the capacity of Wattay (near Vientiane) and Seno (near Savannakhet) airfields. Both airfields were in good condition and could accommodate respectively 36 and 60 sorties of C-130/C-124 aircraft daily in daylight only, but they would not be capable of supporting heavy traffic over a protracted period. (Memorandum from Lemnitzer to the President, August 7, CM-307-61; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Laos: General, 8/1/61-8/10/61)

John Kennedy

156. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Washington, August 8, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor NSC, T-624-71. Secret. An unsigned file copy indicates that copies of this paper were also sent to Robert Johnson and U. Alexis Johnson. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Laos: General, 8/1/61-8/10/61) In a memorandum of August 4, Robert Johnson provided comments on a draft of this paper to the effect that the pro-Western and neutralist positions were so weak in Laos that it would be almost impossible to prevent by diplomatic negotiations a Communist take-over. (Ibid.) A note on the memorandum indicates Taylor "noted" it.

SUBJECT
A Split vs. A Unified Laos

As we come closer to the crisis in the Geneva negotiations about Laos it is clear that on our side--and probably on the other side--there will be increasing thought about a split Laos. It is evidently a situation where all the alternatives involve risk; and none of the alternatives is particularly pleasant.

It is possible that the other side will confront us with a situation where a split Laos will be the most we can hope to achieve short of fighting a war to clean the Communist element out of the North.

If we continue on our present course without change, it is even possible that both the alternatives of a unified neutral Laos achieved by negotiation and a split Laos will be denied to us and that we will be faced by the alternatives either of undertaking a substantial military effort in Laos to hold the South or of permitting Laos to slip away wholly to the Communists. In Geneva we seem to be making no progress toward an agreement; on the ground in Laos, though non-Communist forces are by no means lacking in assets, their position in the north is very weak and in the south is gradually eroding away./2/

/2/In a memorandum to Rostow, August 4, Robert Johnson reported the views of a staff analyst responsible for Southeast Asia at the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was that staffer's personal conclusion that the Pathet Lao had developed a political organization and consolidated their hold on the villages in the countryside to the extent that Souvanna Phouma's independent political base was seriously undermined. Militarily, the Pathet Lao had the neutralist forces in a squeeze. The result, according to the staffer, was that a de facto partition of Laos would be very difficult. In a memorandum of August 5 to Rostow, Johnson reported that he had talked to Jenkins of FE/SEA who confirmed this view and responded, when asked by Johnson, that Harriman and the other negotiators at Geneva were shutting their eyes to the real situation in Laos. (Both ibid.)

Thus, we face a choice as to how hard we press at the conference, in possible bilateral talks with the Russians, and conceivably at the UN itself for a unified Laos with a tolerably effective ICC as opposed to resigning ourselves to a split and taking the action necessary to achieve one. Even if we press very hard, it is by no means certain that agreement will be achieved. It may be useful, therefore, to lay out dispassionately the pros and cons of a unified as opposed to a split Laos.

As far as a unified Laos in concerned, the most we can hope for is a unified Laos with a considerable Communist element in the government, which would give relatively free play to the further political development of the Pathet Lao party within Laos and which would exert on the government a strong Communist influence. If there were to be an ICC with adequate powers, including reasonable independence of the Lao government there is some hope that those political elements within Laos which are anxious to maintain the independence of the country would gain strength. But as the weeks go by without agreement this result is becoming increasingly difficult (and perhaps impossible) to achieve; for the Pathet Lao is strengthening its village-level political apparatus in all of the areas that it holds and has apparently gained complete control of the Kong Le neutralist military forces. Souvanna and the neutralists may rally their forces, and if all the non-Communists could make common cause the situation may not be lost. But without an effective, independent international presence, it seems most unlikely under the most favorable assumptions, that a neutralist Lao government could successfully resist pressures from Hanoi. To simplify the problem, therefore, we should compare the most favorable case we can envisage--a neutral government with a tolerably effective ICC with a split Laos.

The case for a neutral unified government is as follows.

1. There will be considerable Lao and international resistance to splitting another country. There will also be great resistance to taking--or supporting--the paramilitary or military moves that probably will be necessary to achieve a split Laos. In short, the weight of opinion in areas not directly involved or responsible will bear on us to accept a political settlement, even if the government and the ICC controls are ambiguous.

2. We would leave open the possibility that a gradual gathering of impulses in Laos for independence might reduce the Communist strength in Laos, notably if the ICC could force the removal of the Vietminh cadres from the army and protect the country from Vietminh penetration. The Meos and other non-Communist military units could meanwhile be a deterrent to drastic Communist action.

3. A unified country would permit the U.S. to disengage from direct involvement in a military-political situation that is extremely awkward and to concentrate in Southeast Asia on Thailand and Viet-Nam.

The argument against a unified neutralist government may be stated as follows.

1. Basically the argument against a neutralist Laos with an ICC is that once the American presence were withdrawn, it might be very difficult, whatever the diplomatic agreement may be, to prevent a subtle or progressive takeover by Communist elements. The continued prolongation of the negotiations in Geneva is likely to result in a further deterioration of the already very weak position of the non-Communists in North and Central Laos and to erode further their position in the South. As a consequence, the non-Communist base from which the non-military struggle in a unified Laos is resumed is likely to be quite weak.

2. We do not know how successful the ICC would be in protecting Lao-Viet-Nam and Lao-Thai borders, but, in view of the inherent difficulties involved, we should not be too optimistic.

The argument for a split is that:

1. As a practical matter, short of U.S. military intervention in Laos, it is the most we can hope to achieve. Even in a supposedly unified neutral Laos, the Communists will control the North.

2. It would provide a political base on which Thai and Vietnamese troops could be introduced into Southern Laos and would provide the possibility of a continued American military presence in the strategic southern part of the country.

3. It would give us time to build a more effective Laos government in the South than we now have.

4. It would put friendly forces along the Laos-Viet-Nam and along a part of the Thai border, south of the seventeenth parallel. Holding southern Laos may be the minimum condition necessary to keeping Thailand and South Viet-Nam non-Communist.

The argument against a split is that:

1. Under present circumstances it would be difficult, and might be impossible, to achieve an effective split without some U.S. military involvement. At a minimum, such involvement would be likely to entail a commitment to send U.S. troops into the South if effective control of that area cannot be achieved by the FAL with the support of the Vietnamese and the Thai.

2. It would virtually guarantee an extension of full-scale Vietminh control down to the southern border of northern Laos.

3. It is uncertain whether infiltration could be effectively checked from northern into southern Laos and thence into Viet-Nam. A split would also leave a long section of the Thai border quite open to infiltration. (For this reason the Thai would probably be unenthusiastic about providing military support to an operation designed only to secure southern Laos.)

4. Political and military viability of a southern Laos government under Phoumi is questionable.

Interim Conclusions

--It is too soon to decide. We are committed to accept a neutral unified Laos if a tolerable ICC is created. The first job is to see what kind of deal is possible on the Lao government and the ICC.

--If we get a tolerable settlement our job is to maximize the chance that we get its advantages and minimize the chance that it fails. Contingency planning to this end should be begun, including the following: how all the non-Communists could be brought closer together; how aid could be used to strengthen their hand; what covert operations we would envisage, including role of Meos; how the Viet-Nam and Thai borders could be protected against the weaknesses of the ICC; how more vigorous non-Communist political figures could be sought out and developed, etc.

--If a split emerges--or turns out to be our best option--we must plan not only military measures to clean out the panhandle, but also political measures to make a southern government more effective in maintaining links of sympathy and support with its people.

--In any case it is clear that, if we are to hold Southeast Asia, it must be held via Viet-Nam and Thailand. Laos will remain a can of worms.

157. Editorial Note

On August 10, a group assembled at the White House to hear a briefing on Laos military contingency planning by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer. In addition to the President, George Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, John Steeves, Allen Dulles, General C.P. Cabell, Richard Bissell, Desmond FitzGerald, McGeorge Bundy, General Maxwell Taylor, Brigadier General Paul Fontana, and Robert McNamara attended. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

No record of the briefing session has been found. From subsequent discussion, it seems that Lemnitzer presented three alternative strategies. The first was SEATO Plan 5/61, the longstanding contingency plan for the introduction of SEATO forces into Laos to seize vital areas such as Vientiane, Seno, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Thakhek, Savannakhet, Pakse, and tentatively Paksane, as well as vital lines of communications. SEATO Plan 5/61 was designed to release Lao Armed Forces for counterinsurgency operations which would be supported by SEATO air support, communications assistance, and special warfare advice depending on the nature of the insurgency. The plan required a request from the Royal Lao Government and unanimous SEATO member concurrence. (Plan 5/61, "A Plan To Assist the Royal Lao Government To Counter Communist Insurgency in Laos" (MS/623/1/61), April 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 333, SEATO Registry Microfilm, Reel S-3-61)

A second alternative that was presented to the President was based on a JCS paper entitled "Concept for Multinational Task Force Operations in Southeast Asia," which was developed by the Joint Staff and sent to CINCPAC for comments. The paper planned for a multilateral task force comprised of non-mainland Southeast Asia Treaty countries (the United States, Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia, United Kingdom, Philippines, and France) which would deploy to Thailand, South Vietnam, and southern Laos, thus allowing the indigenous armies of these three nations to conduct other military operations. The Multilateral Task Force would conduct offensive air, naval, and guerrilla operations from its positions against north Laos, North Vietnam, and southern China. At CINCPAC insistence, this plan would be "within the SEATO context" and would commit as many U.S. forces as contemplated in SEATO Plan 5, although emphasis would be placed on "conspicuous utilization of Asian forces." (JCS 2339/11, August 2, and JCS telegram 1051 to CINCPAC, August 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 9150/3100 (13 May 61))

A third option, which clearly interested the officials at the White House, was a plan, still in the formative stage, that called for clearing out southern Laos with the combined forces of Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Royal Lao Government supported by U.S. forces. If the cleanup was successful, U.S., Thai, and Lao troops would be moved in to occupy Savannakhet, Thakhek, and Vientiane with the object of securing the Mekong Valley. Much of the support for this plan came from the Vietnam Task Force which considered that it would probably be impossible to save South Vietnam without securing southern Laos. (Memorandum from Robert Johnson to Rostow, August 1, with attached paper on the Laos situation, July 20; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/1/61-8/10/61)

158. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, August 11, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor NSC, T-624-71, 1961. Secret. A note by Taylor on the source text indicates that it was read by the President on August 11.

SUBJECT
Military Plan for Southeast Asia

The following observations occur to me as the result of the briefing which you received from General Lemnitzer on the military planning for Southeast Asia./2/

/2/See Document 157.

The most interesting course of action is the third which was presented, based upon the cooperative action of Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to control the Laotian panhandle and as much of North Laos as possible, all with minimum U.S. support. If this course of action proves to be feasible, it offers us an alternative more attractive than dependence upon SEATO Plan 5, which is inadequate to restore the situation, or upon U.S. military intervention directed mainly at North Vietnam.

The first step, as I see it, is to verify that we have in this a truly feasible military plan. I was not convinced on this point yesterday, and am going to the Pentagon today to make a more thorough study of the plan in its present state. As General Lemnitzer indicated, the Joint Chiefs are still working on it.

If indeed the plan appears feasible, then we have the task of fitting it into the context of an overall plan for Southeast Asia which includes political and economic elements as well. There is a great deal of political action necessary to provide a basis for the implementation of this military plan. The State Department has already queried our ambassadors in Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon with regard to their views of the plan and the probable requirement for U.S. support in their respective countries.

As you can see, there is much work to be done to tidy up the situation in Southeast Asia. What it most requires is energetic leadership on the part of State in pulling together all components of this area plan. There is still no Task Force charged with the interdepartmental aspects. I am sure that greater intensity of effort is required to get this plan in order than has been expended to date.

Moreover, time is running out as the dry season in Laos approaches. I do not believe we can afford any further delay in this matter.

Maxwell D. Taylor

159. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, August 11, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/8/61-8/15/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was sent to Hyannis Port as part of the President's weekend reading for August 8.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asia

On Monday, August 7, you asked for: (a) a military plan designed to cover action in the panhandle of Laos and to apply military pressure against North Viet-Nam; (b) a memorandum on the situation in Geneva; and (c) a statement of the means by which the U.S. can bring the intervention of North Viet-Nam in Laos and South Viet-Nam to the attention of world opinion./2/

/2/See Document 155.

The initial response to the first request was the briefing you received from the military on Thursday./3/

/3/See Document 157.

With respect to that briefing I would make two observations:

--The spectrum of measures designed to put increasing pressure on the Vietminh needs careful study in order to assess the effects at each stage; and the political framework for such measures is still to be developed.

--The panhandle operation is on such a scale that it doesn't really give us what we are looking for; that is, an application of force in the area, which is more effective than the FAL operating alone, but less massive than SEATO Plan 5. There may be no serious alternative; but we should look a bit harder.

The attached statements prepared by the Department of State respond to the other two questions you posed./4/

/4/These undated statements were entitled "Negotiations on Laos--Recent Developments" and "World Opinion of Southeast Asia." The first is printed as an enclosure, the second is not.

The first of these statements, dealing with negotiations on Laos, is straightforward and satisfactory. The second, containing suggestions for publicizing North Viet-Nam's aggression, demonstrates quite graphically some of the difficulties with our present planning on Southeast Asia.

The first two and one half pages of this statement deal in a very general way with the techniques we might employ to publicize Vietminh activities; but the discussion is quite unrelated to any over-all objective or strategy. Its authors recognize that any program for informing world opinion must be related to a specific plan of action which might involve a phased buildup of military, political and diplomatic actions. But there is no indication of what those actions might be.

In consequence, the emphasis is primarily on publicity techniques. The paper refers, for example, to the use of the UN in making our case against North Viet-Nam; but it does not suggest how we would play that case in the UN; what kind of UN action we would seek; what we would do if we did not get that action.

The last part of the paper is essentially an outline of a military plan for an initial, limited, semi-covert military mop-up in Southern Laos. This has been developed by Cottrell in State; but it has no JCS blessing. It is proposed that the propaganda support for this operation be restricted to a generalized argument about the importance of the freedom of Southeast Asia. It does not link naturally to the case against Hanoi.

Where, then, do we stand?

1. We have a Laos conference position, to test whether a settlement acceptable to us is possible. To this the British and French agree, and the others on our side will come along a bit painfully.

2. We have a military contingency plan (5/16) [5/61] if the offensive is overtly resumed on a substantial scale. To this the British agree and, presumably, the rest of SEATO, except the French whom we would probably ask to stand down without veto. But this plan does not protect the Viet-Nam-Laos border.

3. We have the beginnings of a panhandle plan; but this is as heavy in Americans as SEATO 5/16. The question is whether this is politically viable and acceptable to you if what we face is either a de facto split or a creeping offensive in the South, rather than a major overt offensive.

4. We have some proposals for increasing degrees of direct pressure on North Viet-Nam; but these have not been fully assessed for their military and economic consequences. Nor have they been linked into a political and diplomatic framework. They would presumably be contemplated if the scale of Vietminh frontier-crossing--into Laos or Viet-Nam--should be increased.

5. We are vigorously collecting data on Hanoi's aggression; but we have no orderly plan to use it in any of the three possible forums:

--ICC Viet-Nam;
--Geneva Conference;
--UN

6. In a charming bureaucratic ploy we have a military mission going to Southeast Asia; but its instructions are not now linked in any systematic way into the thought of the town./5/ (They may be better coordinated after a meeting this afternoon between General Lemnitzer, General Taylor, Alexis Johnson, and myself.)/6/

/5/On August 1, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric requested that the JCS undertake a study of force requirements and logistical problems required to hold Southeast Asia--Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and the southern part of Laos--from Communist attack. Brigadier General William H. Craig of the Joint Staff headed the mission. (Memorandum from McNamara to Lemnitzer, August 1, enclosure to JCS 2339/12, August 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 9150/3410 (1 Aug 1961))

/6/See Document 160.

7. In short, we are making piecemeal progress in Southeast Asia planning; but we desperately lack a central mechanism to give the operation pace and coherence.

8. You may be interested in reading the attached memorandum I did for General Taylor on August 9 (copy to Alexis Johnson) on a SEATO (or Allied) Southeast Asia patrol force./7/ This modest and pacific operation might help stabilize the area, if we get a wobbly Laos settlement. It could be the least offensive military action we might take after surfacing the evidence on Hanoi's aggression.

/7/Not printed. The patrol would be primarily aimed at interdicting infiltration from North Vietnam, providing the "court of world opinion" tangible evidence of that infiltration, giving South Vietnam and Thailand a "plate glass" commitment, and providing them psychological reassurance at minimum U.S. cost.

Enclosure A/8/

/8/Secret.

Negotiations on Laos--Recent Developments

/9/See Document 161.

The Geneva Conference has settled down to discussing the various draft proposals relating to neutrality and controls. All of the drafts will be taken up provision by provision; where differences develop, debate will be limited and the Conference will move on to the next item leaving points in dispute to be settled later. Owing to the number of participants, the number of provisions involved (33), and Soviet obstructive tactics, the Conference is moving slowly. It is now dealing with relatively non-controversial matters related to the status of Laos as a neutral, but even these have been difficult to agree on. The only accomplishment of the Conference last week was agreement on the preamble to a Lao Declaration of Neutrality.

As for the ICC, the Conference has not yet reached the provisions on controls which will be the most controversial and will bring into the open our basic differences with the Communists on the question of the international presence required in Laos.

The central issue regarding the ICC is its power to supervise and control (a) the terms of a cease-fire agreement, (b) the withdrawal of foreign forces, and (c) the introduction of foreign military personnel, materiel and equipment. Our position is that unless the ICC has the power to act, any international agreement on the neutrality of Laos is meaning-less. Thus we have instructed Ambassador Harriman that we can accept any control formula which insures the ICC's unrestricted ability to move, to investigate and to report. The principal characteristics of such a formula are that the Commission must have:

a) Its own transport and communications equipment and unconditional control thereof;

b) Free and immediate access to all areas of Laos;

c) Authority to make decisions by majority vote and issue majority and minority reports;

d) Adequate teams and equipment to do the job;

e) Its security assured by the Lao Government.

We have told Ambassador Harriman that we cannot accept any formula which would limit the Commission's ability to supervise agreements reached at the Conference by built-in veto powers, requirements for unanimous decisions, limitations on transport or freedom of movement.

Although this subject has not yet been debated at length in the Conference, there is adequate reason to believe that the other side is determined that the ICC should be weak and ineffectual. Their strongly negative attitude towards certain interim powers proposed for the ICC and the drafts they have presented fully confirm our fears on this score.

The other basic issue to be settled is the formation of a government of national union. While this issue is not directly before the Conference, it has an important, if not crucial, bearing on the outcome of the Conference since clearly the Communists are pushing for a coalition government in the expectation that such a government would be weighted in their favor and would support their positions at the Conference. Phoumi and Souvanna met at Phnom Penh late last week without Souphanouvong to negotiate this issue. Their discussions were clearly inconclusive, but appeared to provide the basis for further meetings. The talks were relatively satisfactory as they involved neither premature concessions by Phoumi nor a breaking of contact. Ambassador Brown, however, doubts whether Phoumi is really negotiating with Souvanna in good faith and suspects that Phoumi may be stringing things out during the rainy season intending to turn to military action in the fall.

The issue of controls and the formation of a Lao Government were considered by the Secretary with the British and French Foreign Ministers in Paris over the week-end. They agreed on a paper recommending that the three governments seek a basis which would permit them to support Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister of a neutral Government of National Union. The basis for such support would be prior understandings with Souvanna and other Lao leaders on four major matters:

A) The composition of the Government;
B) The role of the ICC;
C) The Lao army and the problem of the PL forces;
D) French military presence.

A) Lao Government. We would support a government under Souvanna which respected the Monarchy and the Constitution, and in which none of the key portfolios (e.g., Foreign Affairs, Defense and Interior) would be given to Communists or fellow travelers. Phoumi should be given a key portfolio. There should be a large center group made up of political figures associated neither with the Communists nor the present government. A few Communists could be in the Cabinet with minor portfolios and balanced by an equal number of Phoumi's group. Elections would be postponed until tranquillity has been restored to the country.

B) ICC. The British and the French generally accepted the principles enumerated in the fourth paragraph above.

C) The Lao Army and the Pathet Lao Forces. A small army loyal to the central government should be formed and all other military forces should be disbanded. This should be done in a way to minimize PL influence.

D) The French Presence. The French Military Mission should be maintained under conditions satisfactory to the French.

It was agreed that the French would make the initial approach to Souvanna which the British would follow up. Our Ambassador (Brown) would approach Phoumi, and the French Ambassador to Laos (Falaize) would go to Xieng Khouang on August 10 to see Souvanna.

On August 9 Ambassador Brown reviewed the proposals with Phoumi, who was bitterly critical of the retention of the French Military Mission and of Falaize's trip to Xieng Khouang but made no comment on the proposed composition of the government or powers of the ICC.

In his memorandum the President asks whether Ambassador Harriman should be requested to return home, presumably for consultation. We do not believe that the Ambassador should return at this particular moment. He has just seen the Secretary, and was in Washington for Phoumi's visit. Furthermore, we believe that the next week or two should give us an indication of the kind of government we are likely to get in Laos. We believe the Geneva Conference should be allowed to proceed with as much momentum as possible. Ambassador Harriman's presence therefore seems needed in Geneva for the present.

160. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, August 12, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/8/61-8/15/61. Secret. Prepared by Taylor.

SUBJECT
Meeting on Southeast Asia, August 11, 1961

PRESENT
General Lemnitzer
General Parker
Secretary Alexis Johnson
Mr. Steeves
Mr. Rostow
General Taylor
General Fontana

1. The purpose of the meeting was to carry on the discussion of the Joint Chiefs' plan for Southeast Asia presented to the President on August 10./2/ It was established at the outset that General Lemnitzer felt that the friendly forces involved in this plan would be sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the plan. It was agreed that these objectives were or should be:

/2/See Document 157.

a. To minimize territorial loss in North Laos.

b. To protect the flanks of South Vietnam and Thailand.

c. To stabilize Southern Laos.

d. To encourage military cooperation among Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam.

e. To minimize U.S. military involvement.

2. In the subsequent discussion it was stated that there were several degrees of U.S. military participation which should be considered. In ascending order they were the forces necessary:

a. To reassure Sarit, Phoumi and Diem.

b. To obtain a maximum effort from the indigenous forces. (This was considered to require a major increase of military advisers with Lao units, probably extending them to company level. The figure of 2,000 additional military spaces, mostly U.S., was indicated as the probable requirement.)

c. To supplement the deficiencies in indigenous forces.

d. To act as an area emergency reserve.

3. It was agreed that the pressing requirement is for a comprehensive area plan based upon the assumption of a partition of Laos followed either by a visible stepped-up invasion from the North or by an increase of surreptitious infiltration with added pressures on areas presently in RGL hands. The conferees noted the danger of a quick attack at the end of the rainy season against key points such as Vientiane and Paksane.

4. Mr. Johnson expressed the view that only in the first case, visible invasion, would it be possible to invoke SEATO Plan 5 because of the probable reluctance of our Allies and of the American people to direct military involvement. In the second case, increased infiltration, it would be necessary to rely upon indigenous forces without any significant involvement of American troops.

5. The two situations were discussed and agreement generally reached along the following lines. In the first case, the military answer would be SEATO Plan 5, supplemented by the use of Thai forces to defend Laotian areas west of the Mekong, both in the north and in the south. Also, Diem would be encouraged to push out into the Panhandle for the purpose of clearing and holding that area. Hanoi would have been warned in advance that invasion would bring in SEATO forces and air attacks on targets in North Vietnam.

6. In the second case, the military plan would be to stiffen the FAL by additional military advisers on the scale indicated in paragraph 2 b above. Also, Diem's army would be increased over present levels to allow him the necessary freedom of action in the Panhandle. On the Thai side, Sarit would be offered additional assistance. Sarit and the others would have to be assured that SEATO Plan 5 would be invoked if, at any time, a major attack were launched from the North.

7. Accepting these two outline plans as reasonable points of departure for military planning, Mr. Johnson undertook to develop an interdepartmental plan which would relate appropriate political, economic and propaganda measures to the military plans discussed. While indicating that no formal interdepartmental task force was necessary, he agreed that the State representative, Mr. Steeves, should work closely with representatives of Defense, USIA, ICA and Treasury.

M.D.T./3/

/3/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

161. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, August 12, 1961, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8-1261. Secret; Priority.

Confe 512. From Harriman. Re Fecon 334./2/ Weekly evaluation.

/2/In Fecon 334, August 3, the Department informed Harriman that the President had requested a weekly progress report on the Geneva Conference which would include a narrative of important aspects and Harriman's own evaluation of important upcoming issues and developing dangers. (Ibid., 751J.00/8-361)

Overriding event current week affecting Laos Conference was U.S., UK, French Foreign Ministers' agreement adopted Paris August 7. Under terms this agreement, UK and France joined U.S. in stipulating conditions which all three Western Powers would consider prerequisite to our support Government of National Union under Souvanna Phouma. Latest reports from Vientiane indicate that Brown has encountered serious difficulties in persuading Phoumi desirability Western initiative conveying these conditions to Souvanna./3/ This difficulty may be explained in part by personality differences between Phoumi and French Ambassador Falaize who chosen as initial Western emissary to Souvanna. I am disturbed, however, that they may have their root in more fundamental problem; namely, Phoumi reluctance support any initiative which might result peaceful compromise Lao political situation and preclude him from effort involve U.S. in military enterprise designed reestablish RLG control over Laos by military force.

/3/As reported in telegrams 209 and 210 from Vientiane, both August 9. (Ibid.)

Conference itself has completed discussions on neutrality declarations as result which agreement in principle was reached on nine items, which were then referred to drafting committee for composing differences on wording. Ten items were disagreed and left for future negotiation. We have turned to consideration draft protocols on authority for ICC. Last several days have been marked by noticeably less acrimonious attitude on part of bloc representatives, particularly Soviets. While I will not speculate on cause this change of attitude, it has enabled us have more businesslike exchanges of views. However, there is no give on Soviet stubbornness on substantive issues.

Our discussions are now centered on major conference issue--authority of ICC to supervise and control withdrawal of foreign military forces and personnel from Laos and prevent their reentry. To assure withdrawal of Communist military, we have insisted on broad powers ICC. Bloc is rigidly resisting as interference Laos sovereignty. Bloc is aware that all political factions Laos oppose granting independent authority to ICC, which was unpopular with all Laotians in previous operations. This again points up our need convincing both Phoumi and Souvanna (as well as Indians) importance protecting Lao independence by effective ICC. We see faint glimmers of hope that Indians may be inching in this direction. On other hand, newly arrived Burmese representative seems far less helpful on this and other issues than Barrington, his predecessor. Cooperation among British, French, Thais, Vietnamese, Canadians and ourselves remains firm.

162. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, August 14, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor NSC, T-64-71C. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although it was probably drafted by Taylor or one of his staff aides. The following notes appear on the source text: "Pres. has original. Will discuss with Rusk 14 Aug. E" and "Read by JFK. To be used as talking paper with Sec State." The President and the Secretary met alone at the White House on August 14 from 4:45 to 5:15 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) No other record of their conversation has been found.

I would like to feel that we are moving forward rapidly and effectively in developing a comprehensive Southeast Asia plan for the case that we are obliged to accept a partition of Laos following a breakdown of the current Geneva negotiations. In such a situation, there might be a sudden resumption of active hostilities following the end of the rainy season next month. On the other hand, the military action might take the form of an increase in surreptitious infiltration which would be hard to prove but very dangerous in the long run.

Last Thursday I received a briefing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military planning which is going on./2/ My understanding is that while SEATO Plan 5 would be the appropriate response to a clear renewal of invasion from the north, it does not cope with the problem of infiltration and the need to protect the flanks of South Vietnam and Thailand from the Viet Cong. I am very much interested in the possibility of dealing with this latter case through the cooperative military effort of South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. However, even if such a course of action is feasible militarily, it will require very considerable effort to develop the political framework to support it.

/2/See Document 157.

I am informed that a State-JCS meeting took place last Friday/3/ where it was agreed to proceed rapidly with an interdepartmental plan based upon an assumed partition of Laos. This plan would undertake to minimize any territorial loss to the Communists in North Laos, to protect the flanks of South Vietnam and Thailand, and to stabilize South Laos, all largely through the use of indigenous forces with minimum U.S. participation. I hope that U.S. military participation can be limited to that required to assure the military cooperation of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, and to obtain maximum military effectiveness from the local troops involved, particularly the FAL.

/3/See Document 160.

I am very much interested in the prompt development of such a plan and would like to discuss it with you whenever you think it timely.

163. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, August 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/16/61-8/27/61. Secret. The source text is the copy that Rostow sent U. Alexis Johnson for his and Rusk's information. Rostow stated in a covering memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, August 18, that this would be his last memorandum before going on leave and that Taylor had "reviewed it in detail and urged that it go forward." Johnson sent a copy of this memorandum to Rusk on August 21 because he suspected that the President might raise it with the Secretary. Johnson related that he had discussed the memorandum with McGeorge Bundy and Taylor, would discuss it with them again, and urged Bundy to suggest to the President, if he raised Rostow's suggestions, that the Department be given time to come up with "something well-considered." (Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/8-2161) Rostow also sent a copy of this memorandum to Attorney General Robert Kennedy under a covering memorandum, August 18, in which he explained that the President would probably be making his "fundamental decision" on Southeast Asia while Rostow was on vacation. Rostow characterized the crux of the issue as follows: "the way to save Southeast Asia and to minimize the chance of deep U.S. involvement there is for the President to make a bold decision very soon." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/16/61-8/27/61)

Before going on vacation I should like to give you my thoughts on the present state of the Southeast Asia problem.

1. A Task Force exists; and a first report should be available by about Wednesday, August 23. This report will examine whether it is realistic to envisage a plan to protect the present de facto truce lines in Laos and to mop-up Pathet Lao forces in the south without substantial use of American forces in the area.

2. I suspect the answer will be something like this:

--Diem cannot spare enough forces thoroughly to clean up the Pathet Lao forces now located near his borders in Southern Laos. The Pentagon estimates there are 7,000 Pathet Lao in this area--a sizeable contingent.

--Sarit is unlikely to commit himself substantially in Laos unless he has the most iron-clad guarantees that we will not only pick up the check, but also that we would move massively in his support if the proposed action should lead to substantial renewed hostilities.

--We are most unlikely to conclude that Phoumi's forces could, on their own, give a very good account of themselves if they were to be substantially engaged with the Pathet Lao, although the introduction of American advisers down to company level might help.

3. I suspect your planners will tell you this: to hold the present line and to mop up behind it nothing will suffice very much short of the introduction of forces (or the firm commitment to introduce forces) into Southeast Asia from outside the mainland on the scale of SEATO Plan 5 if we are to overcome the three fundamental weaknesses we face: Diem's preoccupations; Sarit's uncertainties; and Phoumi's incompetence.

4. All of this argues, of course, that we should exhaust every possibility of a respectable negotiated settlement in Laos. Here, I suspect, the fundamental question that we will have to answer for the Communists is this: What will the Americans and SEATO do if we don't give them a satisfactory settlement? Their position on the ground is so good that I believe it unlikely that they will accede to our minimum terms unless they are convinced that the alternative is a substantial American and SEATO commitment to the Southeast Asia mainland.

5. Although you are now well acquainted with the fact that most contingency plans fail to turn up the situation which actually emerges, the best current guess as to how they would proceed is this: they will test the American reaction by stalling in negotiation and by resuming with increasing vigor operations in the south, while leaving the cities untouched for the time being. They may well judge that no American President could sit idly by and see an overt take-over of Vientiane, etc.

6. If this line of thought proves, on staffing, to be sound, what follows? We must produce quickly a course of action which convinces the other side we are dead serious; which convinces Sarit (and other potential partners) we are dead serious; which provides for prompt limited countermeasures to meet limited probes; which provides for the possibility of bringing in substantial American and other forces without initially introducing them.

7. How could this be done?

a. The first appropriate American move may well be to send a military commander and staff into the area to explore our plan with Sarit and Diem on a contingency basis. It is clear that only American leadership as well as American ultimate guarantees can pull these chaps together. For the time being Phoumi should be left out, since his inclusion would encourage him in his inclination to forestall a successful negotiation and to seek a military solution in Laos without our backing. Although the deal with Diem would be coordinated, it might well take the form of a side understanding, given Viet-Nam's special diplomatic status.

b. The ostensible initial purpose of this headquarters would be to concert planning with Thailand with respect to various future contingencies, including the contingency that a satisfactory settlement is found in Laos. As I pointed out in an earlier memorandum,/2/even under the best of circumstances we shall certainly wish to envisage a beefing up of border control arrangements inside Thailand if a Laos settlement is accomplished. In fact, the discussions and planning would envisage a much wider range of possibilities, including contingency action if a split of Laos is negotiated; if a de facto split emerges and Southern Laos must be mopped up; if the Pathet Lao increase their efforts in Southern Laos; and if the Pathet Lao should take off on a major offensive against the cities. The agreement of the U.S. to commit a commander and staff to the area might begin to give Sarit the guarantee that he needs to think forward realistically.

/2/ See footnote 6, Document 159.

8. Behind this staff operation (confined initially to ourselves, Diem, and Sarit) we need to open with our SEATO partners contingency planning for a much wider range of alternatives than those encompassed in our bilateral talks with the British. The discussions with the British have merely embraced one case; that is, the case of a major violation of the ceasefire by the other side. If we find that the British are not prepared to contemplate military action, except in this narrow circumstance, I believe the time has come to ask them to stand down, without veto, like the French.

9. With the situation thus cleared, we might envisage a series of actions--embracing the New Zealanders, the Australians, the Filipinos, and Pakistani--accommodated to each of the possible contingencies which might arise. We would be then, for the first time, in a position to mobilize outside forces for whatever level of military activity the other side imposed on us and we would be communicating the seriousness of the American commitment to the other side--as well as to Sarit--before it became necessary to send large numbers of American or other non-mainland troops into the area.

10. This sequence represents the best hope I can now suggest for a successful negotiation in Geneva; for holding southeast Asia at minimum cost if Geneva should fail to meet our minimum terms; and for beginning to build a framework of Southeast Asian cooperation for the long pull if Geneva should succeed in negotiating either a unified or a split Laos. At its core is the judgment that come what may--some coherent military planning on the Southeast Asian mainland is necessary; that SEATO should be the basis for this planning, with or without the British and French; and that initial American leadership and commitment is the only instrument for bringing about the coalescence of will and force required.

11. This is a hard decision; for our troubles with the British and French in SEATO have permitted us a bit of the luxury of the drunk at the bar who cries "Let me at 'em," while making sure he is firmly held by his pals.

12. On the other hand, to go this route is, in fact, to recognize commitments we already have upon us--but to act on them positively. Surely we are hooked in Viet-Nam; surely we shall honor our bilateral assurances to Sarit, as well as our SEATO commitment; and--I suspect--despite everything it implies, we shall fight for Laos if the other side pushes too far its advantages on the ground.

13. But my overriding concern is that we communicate with clarity and conviction to the other side the two things that matter: we are prepared for an honorable neutralist settlement in Laos; but we are not prepared to see Moscow's Hanoi agent take over Southeast Asia. Only if the latter message is lucid and persuasive do I see a chance for a livable settlement. And if we get such a settlement, we should be able to proceed with a much lighter military touch on the Southeast Asian mainland; although our troubles in Viet-Nam, Thailand, and, indeed, Laos would by no means be over.

14. Here, then, is the sequence of action implicit in this view of the matter.

Step One. Draft a plan covering the full range of contingencies in Southeast Asia--by August 25.

Step Two. Explore it with Sarit, introducing the man who would ultimately be the American field commander--by September 1.

Step Three. Simultaneously explore a contingency side deal with Diem--by September 1.

Step Four. Go to the British and tell them that they must either come in on this or stand down--by September 8.

Step Five. Take it to SEATO, and get the tasks allocated for the various contingencies--September 8-15.

Step Six. Surface the SEATO field commander and give him an international staff--by September 15.

Elapsed time: four weeks from time of your decision.

15. Your decision here is not easy. It involves making an uncertain commitment in cold blood. It is not unlike Truman's commitment on Greece and Turkey in March 1947; for, in truth, Southeast Asia is in as uncertain shape as Southeast Europe at that time. But--like Truman's commitment--it has the potentiality of rallying the forces in the area, mobilizing the will and strength sufficient to fend off the Communist thrust, and minimizing the chance that U.S. troops will have to fight in a situation which has further deteriorated. On our side is the fact that the Australians, New Zealanders, Filipinos, Thais, Vietnamese, and Laotians--plus our Pacific forces--are surely capable of dealing with the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, if they are organized and led. And the Communists know this. On our side also is the fact that Communist China is a deeply sick country (you should be fully briefed on this)--in no mood for great adventures, whatever Chet says; and, in any case, this is a wholly defensive plan. Moreover, Southeast Asia for Khrushchev is a matter of exploiting our weaknesses--and preventing Mao from exploiting them--not a primary area of concern.

16. This kind of revival of SEATO appears, then, the only way I can perceive of salvaging Averell in Geneva and laying the basis for holding the area for the long pull without excessive U.S. commitment on the mainland. But it takes a bold U.S. commitment in principle--very soon indeed.

164. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/

Washington, August 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/16/61-8/25/61. Secret. The source text is an unsigned copy for McGeorge Bundy.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asian Planning

1. Whatever the final plan for Southeast Asia, we now know that we will want to accomplish certain things. These objectives include the minimizing of any loss of territory in North Laos to the PL, the protection of the flanks of South Vietnam and Thailand from guerrilla infiltration, and the stabilization of the entire area with minimum U.S. military involvement. Accepting these purposes, we should undertake at once those actions which will contribute to the attainment of these objectives, and which will be necessary parts of any ultimate plan. Time is working against us so that it is important to telescope as many of these supporting measures as possible in order to reduce the lead time of results.

2. The following tabulation indicates some of the courses of action which should be initiated at once:

a. Political discussions should be started in Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon to determine the willingness of these countries to make a common front against the military and political threat from the North, and the determination of the price which the United States might be obliged to pay for effective collaboration.

b. SEATO Plan 5 should be examined to determine whether, with modifications and variants, it will suffice as the single military plan for the area. Once an affirmative conclusion has been reached, we should initiate action within SEATO to secure agreement upon the necessary modifications to the plan. We should try to get the Thais and Filipinos to raise their contribution of forces. Consideration should be given the early introduction of the SEATO Field Commander and staff into Southeast Asia to coordinate the efforts of the three local countries involved.

c. Plans should be made with Laos to increase the foreign advisers with Laotian units with the ultimate goal of providing them down to company level. Concurrently, press Phoumi to relieve incompetent commanders and replace them by the best available leadership.

d. We should plan to expand the Thai air capability to include fighter bombers capable of taking out ground targets in Northern Laos and Northern Vietnam, and reconnaissance aircraft capable of overt and covert missions in the North.

e. We should urge Diem to increase his capability for operations in the Laotian panhandle and for offensive action against North Vietnam. In connection with the latter point, particular attention is needed to the possibilities of operating by sea against coastal targets.

3. The principal question which remains unanswered at this moment is the amount of U.S. and outside military force which will be necessary initially and ultimately to accomplish our objectives--then how to disengage the forces brought in. It presently appears that we must be willing to make some commitment at the outset in order to assure Sarit's support. In any case, we must be willing to give a guarantee to the indigenous governments that, in case of major attack, we will come to their assistance with our own forces. Meanwhile, our study should be directed at establishing upper and lower limits of military involvement which we must be prepared to undertake in order to attain our objectives.

4. I recommend that the courses of action tabulated in paragraph 2 above be assigned for implementation to the responsible governmental agencies at once, and that we press forward in developing these points while the over-all plan is taking form.

Maxwell D. Taylor/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

165. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, August 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/10/61-8/31/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Laos

Status of the State Department's Paper

State is currently working on the second draft of the paper/2/ they plan to present to the President on Friday morning./3/ It will be discussed at a meeting of the Task Force at 5:30 this afternoon which Colonel Ewell and I will attend./4/ Steeves plans to have a revised version ready for discussion between Alexis Johnson and the Secretary on Thursday morning./5/ He also hopes to get at least a semi-final draft of the paper to us sometime on Thursday. This will give us an opportunity to look at the paper and prepare comments on it for the benefit of the President.

/2/Draft entitled "Plan of Action for Southeast Asia Covering Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos, "August 25. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Asia 000.1) The first draft, August 14, is in Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 69 D 169, Task Force on Laos, 1961, Jan-Aug.

/3/August 25.

/4/See Document 167.

/5/No record of the Johnson-Rusk meeting on August 24 has been found, except a notation in Rusk's appointment book that he met with Johnson and Ball at 6:25 p.m. on Southeast Asia. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

The Geneva Conference

Washington has been puzzled by the recent d[marches by the Russians in Vientiane and Geneva which suggest that they are prepared to reach agreement on an ICC and on the composition of a Lao government./6/ It occurred to me yesterday that the Russians may believe that the Communist political and military position on the ground in Laos has become so strong that the question of an effective ICC and even the question of the composition of the government have become of increasingly less significance. If the Communist political and military base in Laos is so strong that the Communists could hope to take over by political means (supported by guerrilla-type or other military pressure) without outside support, the effectiveness of the ICC in preventing such outside support could become irrelevant. In one of the Soviet demarches the Russians said that they would be prepared to pull both Viet Minh and Soviet personnel out of Laos even before an agreement on an ICC actually took effect. They have also indicated that the composition of the government didn't make much difference because any arrangement made now would be an interim arrangement which would be supplanted very soon by a government based upon new elections.

/6/As reported in telegram 283 from Vientiane and Confe 536 from Geneva, August 19 and 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8-1961 and 751J.00/8-2161)

When I talked this morning to Dick Usher, the Deputy Office Director in State who has primary responsibility for the Geneva Conference, I discovered that he has come to much the same conclusions. He was concerned that the Russians may be preparing a negotiating trap for us based upon the fact that we have so far emphasized only the two issues of the composition of the Lao government and the effectiveness of the ICC.

We have been aware of the fact that the reorganization of the Lao armed forces to prevent Pathet Lao control of those forces was also a very important problem. In a general instruction on conference tactics which was sent to Geneva on August 3,/7/ the question of integrating the Pathet Lao forces into a national army was raised. The views of the U.S. delegation were requested with respect to whether this subject should be tabled at the Conference or should be negotiated with the RLG and Souvanna.

/7/Not found.

On August 7, before any response was received from Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of the UK and France and the Secretary of State reached their general agreement on Laos in Paris on August 7./8/ That agreement provided that the organization of Lao army and the problem of Pathet Lao forces was one of the subjects on which a satisfactory agreement should be reached with Souvanna and other Laotian leaders as a condition to the acceptance of Souvanna as Prime Minister of a government of national unity. Substantively the agreement between the Foreign Ministers did not go beyond a statement that a small army loyal to the new central government should be formed and that other military forces should be disbanded. It was also agreed that Souvanna's idea on this subject should be explored and that the matter should be discussed further among the three governments.

/8/See Documents 153 and 154.

A new instruction is being prepared presently in State to reflect the above estimate of Soviet intentions./9/ The object of this instruction would be to surface at Geneva the question of the organization of Lao military forces as an additional major issue on which we would require agreement before we would be willing to pull out of Laos. This has been a somewhat difficult subject to raise at Geneva because it is much more open to the charge that the Indians and Russians have been making against our proposals with respect to the ICC--that it involves interference in Lao internal affairs.

/9/Telegram 202 to Vientiane, sent also to Geneva as Fecon 382 and to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, and Ottawa, August 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8-1961)

As a means of protecting ourselves against a political take-over through elections, we will continue to seek Souvanna's agreement that elections be postponed for some time. (He has been somewhat equivocal on this subject.)

I believe that there is a real danger of the kind that State foresees and that it is most urgent that appropriate instructions go forward. Would you have any interest in seeing the draft telegram before it goes out? Would the President have such an interest?/10/ I ask because it seems to me that, if the Soviet strategy is as estimated above, the issue of the reorganization of the Lao army could become the sticking point for the Geneva Conference. On the other hand, the immediate question can be viewed as one of tactics since, as reflected in the instruction of August 3 and the agreement of the Foreign Ministers on August 7, there is already high-level understanding that the question of the organization of the Lao army is an important one.

/10/Neither the President nor Bundy cleared telegram 202 to Vientiane.

I also raised with State the question of whether we were giving sufficient play to the violations to the cease fire by the other side. Usher indicated that during the meetings in Paris earlier this month, Ambassador Harriman and his staff had been wrestling with the question of at what point in the Conference we should make a big play on this subject. Current thinking was that such a play should be made at the time the Conference gets to discussion of the powers and independence of the ICC in about a week. I pointed out that if we are to emphasize the importance of reorganization of the Laotian army to minimize Communist influence, it might be very appropriate to use the case of the cease fire violations as an element of our supporting argument. Usher agreed that this was an interesting idea to which he would give some further thought.

Bob

166. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, August 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos, General: 8/10/61-8/31/61. Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was sent to Hyannis Port as part of the President's weekend reading.

SUBJECT
Weekly Report on the Geneva Conference (August 14-21)

1. Allied misgivings, in the face of General Phoumi's opposition, as to the wisdom of the French Ambassador's approach to Souvanna Phouma on the tripartite Paris decisions of August 7, delayed Falaize's mission to Xieng Khouang for over a week. With the authorization of the French Foreign Minister, however, he left for Xieng Khouang on August 22 via Bangkok, Souvanna having refused to meet him in Phnom Penh.

One of the major problems we are up against with Phoumi is his refusal to withdraw the RLG's cease-fire proposal which, if accepted, would deny the ICC adequate authority to supervise the cease-fire agreement between the Lao parties. In addition, Phoumi's disapproval of the Foreign Ministers' decisions, attributable to a number of factors, including (a) his dislike of the French in general and of Falaize in particular, and (b) his conviction that in the last analysis, it is useless to expect fruitful results from any negotiations with Souvanna Phouma, have led the General to adopt a rather intractable attitude. Ambassador Brown and Chief MAAG are watching the situation very closely as Phoumi might, as a last gambit, seek to draw us into a military action by renewing the fighting.

2. As of August 19, the Geneva Conference had completed about one third of its examination of the draft protocols on ICC with more items agreed to in principle and sent on to the Drafting Committee than the U.S. delegation had anticipated, though in some cases agreements were qualified by reservations such as to raise doubts on the Committee's ability to reconcile varying texts. The Drafting Committee on ICC is composed of the previous membership of the Soviets, Chinese Communists, UK, Indians, and French, with the addition of the U.S., Canada, and Poland.

3. Sharp exchanges early last week, especially on the part of the Chinese Communists, on the withdrawal of foreign military forces, were followed by milder debates on withdrawal procedures, prisoners of war, and restrictions on arms imports. Certain concessions made by the Communist bloc indicate increased Soviet willingness to reach agreement but probably only to speed up the Conference in order to get down to the basic issues on which the Communists and the West diverge.

4. The U.S. delegation, in the light of paragraph 3 above, underscores the need to develop U.S. and Allied tactics at the forthcoming crucial negotiations that will bring the Soviets to modify their present positions. Ambassador Harriman has returned to Washington to discuss this subject. The U.S. delegation comments, however, that the bloc will make no concessions so long as there exists any possibility that an eventual Lao government might accept their draft.

L.D. Battle/2/

/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Melvin S. Manfull of S/S signed for Battle.

167. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/

Washington, August 24, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Southeast Asia, National Planning, No. 2. Secret.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asia Planning

1. The concept as presented at the Task Force meeting Wednesday/2/ evening involves the implementation of ascending levels of pressure in Laos, initially to influence the Geneva negotiations and subsequently to assure, as a minimum, a partition of Laos.

/2/August 23.

2. Ambassador Harriman/3/ made the following comments:

/3/Harriman had returned from Geneva for discussions in Washington.

a. This type of operation will not assist him in his job at Geneva. In its present form and present time schedule, it will probably result in a complete breakdown of negotiations.

b. He supports the premise that we should be prepared militarily to defend our position in Laos. He recommends that the time table be slipped so that, in effect, we will respond to what he considers an inevitable provocation, rather than initiate that provocation ourselves and be branded as aggressors.

c. He feels that the British should be consulted before exploratory negotiations to prepare this plan, not after the plan has taken form.

d. He maintains that we should clearly state to the Soviet Union our resolve in Laos, rather than their seeing our intent by prior positioning of forces.

e. He considers a Communist violation of the cease-fire inevitable as soon as the ground is dry. That is the time to act militarily with the support of international sympathy.

f. He suggests using Laos as the weather gauge for military action, not Geneva.

3. Ambassador Harriman indicated that the scheduled preparatory actions to establishing a headquarters in Thailand, the positioning of a Carrier Task Force in the South China Sea, and movement of forces into Thailand would be provocative. He did not seem to object to immediate action to introduce U.S. and Thai cadres into FAL units.

4. Since the concept was based on supporting Geneva and therefore by maintaining the initiative, rather than reacting to clear Communist aggression, Ambassador Harriman's argument will require an altered concept. It was not clear last night to what extent Mr. Johnson intended to accede to Ambassador Harriman's ideas, except that he stated definite objections to prior consultations with the British. There is a Task Force meeting scheduled for 1:30 this afternoon to review the next draft.

5. Ambassador Harriman did not conjecture on the possibility that Pathet Lao operations commencing with the dry season conceivably could be so ambiguous that we would delay response until our two ports of egress--Savannakhet and Vientiane--were overrun.

W.H.B./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

168. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, August 25, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Southeast Asia National Planning, No. 2. No classification marking. Prepared by Taylor.

SUBJECT
Telephone Conversation with Mr. Alex Johnson re Southeast Asian Planning

1. Responding to my question as to where we stand following the Thursday evening meeting at State,/2/ he replied that he was working on the "Johnson Plan." The "Johnson Plan" apparently has two parts to be developed and applied concurrently.

/2/See Document 167.

2. The first part is to give a good "college try" to a consummation of the negotiations in Geneva. This will require putting the heat on Phoumi to get him to join in an honest effort. As the second part, in anticipation of lack of success at Geneva, we will concurrently move forward in preparations for expanding SEATO 5 into the enlarged version contained in the Steeves Plan./3/ Discussions would be started at once in SEATO to get agreement to this modification. The Soviets would be contacted in order to allow them to understand the seriousness with which we view the situation. In any case, they would likely hear of our discussions in SEATO.

/3/The Steeves Plan refers to the draft of August 25; see footnote 1, Document 165.

3. Agreement having been obtained, at about the advent of the dry season we would declare Condition Yellow under SEATO Plan 5. We could also begin introducing additional military advisers to the FAL and could probably persuade [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

4. In order to get cooperation from Thailand and the other countries in the area, our intention would have to be clear to support the situation by SEATO 5 if necessary. In order to make this intention clear, we could organize a military exercise requiring U.S. forces to move into Thailand.

5. The foregoing are apparently the principal points of the "Johnson Plan." It is being elaborated on over this week end and something should be available by Monday./4/

/4/August 28.

M.D.T./5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

169. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, August 30, 1961.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor NSC, T-624-71, 1961. Secret. Prepared by Taylor.

SUBJECT
Meeting in the State Department on 28 August Called for the Purpose of Reviewing a Plan for Southeast Asia

PRESENT
Mr. McNamara
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Allen Dulles
General Lemnitzer
General Taylor

1. This memorandum records business conducted at a meeting in the State Department called for 1700 hours on 28 August for the purpose of reviewing a plan for Southeast Asia. The meeting was chaired by Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson.

2. The first portion of the meeting was devoted to detailed criticism of the organization and concept of the proposed plan. The language of the concept was adjusted to indicate the United States may have to make direct contact with Souvanna Phouma in order to determine his acceptability as Prime Minister of a coalition Lao government.

3. It was decided that preliminary bilateral contacts with the SEATO Allies, to gauge the feasibility of the concept, would be made at the same time as a demarche to the Soviets alerting them to our vital interests and purposes in Laos.

4. It was decided that the number of advisers required for encadrement of the FAL to company level would be 1,000. The intent would be to use a maximum number of Thais, filling in the remainder with U.S. personnel.

5. There was a discussion as to a need for Thai participation in aerial reconnaissance of northern Laos.

6. General Taylor pointed out that the concept as written did not establish adequately the U.S. desire that indigenous forces be used to a maximum in Laos, in support of the FAL, in order to keep U.S. participation at a minimum.

7. There was a discussion as to the SEATO response to a clear Communist violation of the cease-fire. It was decided that rather than executing SEATO Plan 5 as proposed in the concept, phased implementation of an expanded variant of SEATO plan was preferable. It was envisioned that the expanded plan would permit initial commitment of indigenous forces with subsequent build-up of additional strength, including non-indigenous units, as the situation required.

8. There was discussion of the Felt-Luce reference to the May 3rd cease-fire line. A general restriction, conforming with the British idea that operations would be limited to re-establishing the May 3rd line would, in fact, leave numerous pockets of resistance throughout the RLG-controlled areas without authority to mop up. There was a consensus of opinion that this point should be clarified to permit operations as necessary to achieve wider control.

9. The question of positioning fast carrier task groups in the Gulf of Tonkin or the South China Sea was discussed and, on the advice of General Lemnitzer, decision was delayed as a matter appropriate for subsequent detailed planning.

10. There was intensive discussion as to the extent the United States would commit itself by virtue of preliminary bilateral negotiations regardless of the outcome of such negotiations. Mr. Johnson suggested the commitment would approximate 99-1/2%. It was brought out by General Taylor that a strong commitment already existed by membership in SEATO and approval of SEATO Plan 5. It was agreed that this was a fuzzy area, but that the United States probably had more maneuvering room than that indicated by Mr. Johnson. For presentation to the President it was decided to recast the plan's approach so that it was clear an additional commitment was not necessarily a foregone conclusion. There was a need to emphasize the fact that preliminary negotiations were essentially exploratory to determine the feasibility of moving ahead with detailed planning.

11. Secretary McNamara developed the point that a premature commitment in Laos, with possible evolution into a Korean-type situation, would be unwise at this time when we had to be ready to meet the crisis in Berlin.

M.D.T./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

170. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, August 29, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/29/61-8/31/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Meeting on Southeast Asia Planning, August 29, 1961

1. At the coming meeting/2/ Mr. Alexis Johnson will explain to you the status of the Southeast Asia planning. In general terms, the current plan/3/ provides for two parallel courses of action: the first consisting of an "honest try" to carry forward the Geneva negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion; the second, concurrent preparations in anticipation of failure at Geneva.

/2/See Document 172.

/3/See footnote 1, Document 171.

2. Depending upon the situation which develops after the failure of negotiations, the second course of action is broken down into two parts. If a cease-fire continues in an ambiguous military situation which the Communists exploit covertly, our reaction would be to feed in small Thai and South Vietnamese units into Laos to assist the Laotian Army in controlling the Communist guerrillas. At about the same time, a SEATO military exercise would be organized and executed to Thailand, after which a SEATO command headquarters would be left behind to coordinate subsequent SEATO rotational training and to be prepared for military operations. During this period SEATO forces (except for those involved in the exercise) would be alerted but not moved into Southeast Asia.

3. If failure at Geneva is followed by a clear resumption of fighting, the response would be the execution of the SEATO 5 Plan, presumably augmented by a maximum use of Thai and South Vietnamese forces. It is important to verify the intention to use these local forces as the point was under debate at the Task Force meeting yesterday.

4. In any circumstance, we would start at once to stiffen the Royal Laotian Army with additional U.S. and Thai advisory personnel. Also, it would be necessary to begin talking to our SEATO Allies at once in order to obtain their cooperation.

5. In the course of the coming meeting you may wish to raise some of the following questions:

a. How much is this plan likely to cost the United States in terms of military manpower and economic assistance? What do we stand to gain from it?

b. How can we verify the political and military feasibility of this plan without committing ourselves prematurely to this course of action?

c. If we adopt this plan, can we withhold a decision to implement if the world situation at the time so requires?

d. In adopting it, would we accept a political commitment beyond that presently implicit in our SEATO undertakings?

e. What actions need to be approved for implementation at this time?

Maxwell D. Taylor

171. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, August 29, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 80. Secret. The following note in McGeorge Bundy's hand is on the source text: "This is Alexis Johnson's summary--parallel to Taylor's--but note the gut paragraph [paragraph 2 was highlighted]. You may want to use this to guide decision." On August 28, the President had sent Bundy a one-sentence memorandum: "I would like to discuss Laos with you." (Ibid., Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/11/61-8/31/61)

SUBJECT
Plan for Southeast Asia

The attached Plan for Southeast Asia/2/ sets forth suggestions for: (a) continuing and expanding our efforts to obtain a peaceful solution based on a Souvanna government; (b) a course of action to be pursued if we are successful in achieving a peaceful solution; and (c) if we are not successful in achieving a peaceful solution, courses of military and other action in the event that (1) the Communists resume their offensive in Laos, or (2) while not clearly resuming their offensive, they continue their "whittling away" action.

/2/The plan was undated. A copy is ibid., Regional Security Files, Southeast Asia: General, 8/21/61-8/31/61. A summary of the plan is printed as an attachment below.

These courses are to a large extent interrelated as it is difficult to obtain Communist agreement to a peaceful solution unless we confront them with the alternative of our willingness to take more forceful action if a peaceful solution is not achieved. Correspondingly, it is difficult to obtain the cooperation of some of our allies, such as the Thais and the Viet-Namese, in seeking a peaceful solution unless they feel some confidence that we are prepared to consider more forceful action in the event a satisfactory peaceful solution is not achieved.

The principal points upon which your decision is needed today are as follows:

1. Authorization immediately to undertake talks with our SEATO allies both bilaterally and with the SEATO Council representatives in Bangkok, and also with South Vietnam, as appropriate, in which we would explore their receptivity to:

(a) enlarging the concept of SEATO Plan 5 so that if the Communists renew their offensive and the decision is made to implement Plan 5 the objective would be the expulsion of Communist forces from all of Southern Laos and the Mekong River line, including the Luang Prabang area. The establishment of such an objective would be conditional upon the willingness of Thailand and South Vietnam, and to a lesser extent possibly some other SEATO countries such as the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand, to commit additional forces to Plan 5.

(b) in the event neither a peaceful settlement is achieved nor has there been a sufficient renewal of the offensive by the Communists to justify consideration of implementing SEATO Plan 5, the carrying out of a SEATO exercise in Thailand about October 10 employing ground combat troops, supported by tactical air units and, on completion of the exercise, leaving behind in Thailand a SEATO command and communications "shell" prepared on a contingency basis to expedite the implementation of SEATO Plan 5,/3/

/3/Bundy wrote "No" in the margin next to this paragraph.

(c) undertaking additional rotational training of SEATO combat units in Thailand,

(d) introducing into Thailand a SEATO River Patrol along the line of the Mekong, and

(e) declaring at an appropriate time a SEATO charter yellow or charter blue condition.

2. Immediately increasing our/4/ mobile training teams in Laos and seeking Thai agreement to supplying an equal number of Thais for the same purpose.

/4/Bundy wrote at this point "milit. advisers."

3. Immediately increasing by 2,000 the number of Meos being supported so as to bring the total up to the level of 11,000./5/

/5/Bundy wrote "OK/JFK" next to this paragraph.

4. Authorizing photo reconnaissance by Thai or "sanitized" United States aircraft over all of Laos. (This has for the most part been suspended during the cease-fire.)

5. As soon as the details are worked out with ICA and Congressional action has been taken on the aid bill, a letter from you to Sarit offering a $150,000,000 line of credit.

Dean Rusk/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Attachment]/7/

August 29, 1961.

/7/Source: Kennedy Library, Regional Security Files, Southeast Asia: General, 8/21/61- 8/31/61. Secret. Apparently prepared in the White House.

SUMMARY OF STATE DEPARTMENT PLAN FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. Continuation of Present Efforts to Achieve a Political Solution in Laos

Continue to pursue, on the basis of the Paris Agreements, the following objectives with a likelihood of reaching agreement as indicated: (a) a government of national union (may be possible); (b) a continued French military presence (may be possible); (c) an effective ICC (much less likely); and (d) an adequately safeguarded reconstitution of the Lao Army and dissolution of Pathet Lao forces (improbable).

After tripartite discussion of tactics, pursue further negotiations (including direct U.S. negotiations) with Souvanna, and, if these are encouraging, seek a meeting of the three Princes. If Souvanna will not comply with the conditions of the Paris Agreements, endeavor to get him to withdraw from the scene. Develop tripartite recommendations on Lao Army reorganization, surface the issue at Geneva and urge the three Princes to tackle it. In a demarche to Moscow make clear our conditions for support of a Lao Government of National Union and "our unwillingness to tolerate further ambiguous aggression".

Following immediate bilateral talks with our SEATO allies, call a SEATO Council meeting to review, inter alia, alternative courses of action if a peaceful solution is not achieved and the timing and character of a SEATO exercise in Thailand. Meanwhile, stiffen the FAL with 1000 additional U.S. and Thai advisers, expand the Meo operation to support 2,000 new recruits (total: 11,000), improve photo reconnaissance, offer Sarit a $150 million line of credit and develop supporting economic and psychological programs (emphasizing in the latter the case against North Viet Nam). We recognize that stiffening the FAL could, if not carefully handled, reduce Phoumi's incentive to reach agreement with Souvanna.

II. Achievement of a Political Solution

Demonstrate U.S. firmness in Southeast Asia, inhibit Communist penetration from Laos into neighboring states, and forestall gradual Communist takeover in Laos by a series of measures including accelerated aid programs, establishment of a SEATO Mekong River Patrol, and action to support Souvanna against Pathet Lao pressures.

III. No Political Solution and a Clearly Recognizable Communist Resumption of Military Action

Implement SEATO Plan 5, beginning with action to restore the cease-fire on the May 3 line and, after consultation with allies, expanding it to include at least the clean up of Southeast Laos (primarily with Asian troops). Support actions through diplomatic and propaganda measures.

IV. No Political Solution and Continuation of Ambiguous Military Situation

Seek to maintain, and particularly in Southern Laos to improve, the military position of the FAL by training and by cautious introduction of Thai and Vietnamese para-military units. Increase the readiness of SEATO forces and about October 10 carry out a military exercise in Thailand (leaving a command and communications cadre behind following its completion). Step up other measures such as encadrement of the FAL with U.S. and Thai personnel and support of the Meo (to a total of 17,000). These courses of action would be pursued cautiously and related to any Communist escalation.

172. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, August 29, 1961, 11 a.m.-noon.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/29/61-8/31/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert Johnson. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON
AUGUST 29, 1961, TO DISCUSS SOUTHEAST ASIA

Secretary Rusk made a brief presentation of the four possible contingencies covered by the State Department's Plan for Southeast Asia. As the next step in the negotiation phase Ambassador Harriman should attempt to see Souvanna, preferably in Paris. If Souvanna would not come to Paris, Ambassador Harriman might see him in Phnom Penh. The Secretary referred to the reports on the Souvanna-Falaise conversations which have been quite unsatisfactory./2/ All of the individuals that Souvanna proposed for the neutral element of the cabinet were actually identified with the Pathet Lao. Thus, his proposed cabinet would have a 12-4 composition rather than an 8-4-4 composition. Perhaps Souvanna can be brought to modify his position if he understands our view clearly and appreciates fully the possibility that fighting may resume in the absence of an agreement. Whether Souvanna will play, however, is problematical. Thus, Secretary Rusk concluded, we should continue diplomatic negotiations but should be prepared, if the world situation permits, to take military action.

/2/The report of the 2-hour meeting between Falaize and Souvanna in Xieng Khouang is in telegram 340 from Vientiane and Brown's analysis is in telegram 348 from Vientiane, both August 28. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8-2861)

The President asked whether there were eight potential cabinet candidates who were pro-Souvanna but not actively involved with the Pathet Lao. In response, Secretary Johnson stated that there were other individuals in Laos who were not pro-Souvanna but who might be included in a center group. The President then ran down the list of the eight individuals mentioned by Souvanna/3/ and Mr. Steeves briefly characterized the background of each. In connection with this discussion, Secretary Rusk said that one possible arrangement that might work would be for Souvanna to retain the Defense portfolio while Phoumi was given responsibility for the economy. This would keep the more important governmental functions out of the hands of the Pathet Lao.

/3/ Souvanna's list included Quinim Pholsena, Pheng Phongsavong, Khamsouk Keola, Sisoumang, Khamsing, General Heuan, and Khampham Boupa. While there were only seven names, Souvanna himself would hold a ministry in the cabinet as well as being Prime Minister.

Secretary Johnson noted that if Souphanouvong were left out of the coalition government and retained a separate army he would be left in a very strong position and could negotiate as an equal with Souvanna Phouma.

The President asked whether it should be Ambassador Harriman rather than Falaize who should talk to Souvanna next. Secretary Rusk said that the French might be asked to arrange for such a meeting but that we should reestablish direct communication with Souvanna which we have lacked for some time. The President indicated that Souvanna should be told that we were anxious to get an agreement with respect to a coalition government nailed down, but that we did not think that his candidates were truly neutral. Secretary Steeves emphasized the importance of an agreement on reorganization of the armed forces; leaving the Pathet Lao army in being would unrack the non-Communist opposition.

Ambassador Harriman stated that there was not much chance of getting Souvanna Phouma to accept our views unless he had some direct indication of U.S. backing and support. He was under illusions with respect to the support that Khrushchev was giving him. If he does not feel that he has U.S. economic and political support, which he does not feel that he has at present, there was not much use trying to negotiate with him through Falaize. The questions of the composition of the government and the reorganization of the armed forces were of the greatest importance. Souvanna should be made as dependent upon the FAL as he was now upon the Kong Le forces. There were some indications of dissension within Kong Le's forces. He concluded by stating that Phoumi did not want a political settlement in Laos.

Secretary Rusk agreed that negotiation by the French on our behalf was not satisfactory. The French would probably be willing to accept any kind of a Lao government in order to avoid military intervention. They would also attempt to play down the significance of American support, a point on which we had to convince Souvanna. The President asked whether we would have difficulty getting Phoumi to go along with a political settlement. In response, Secretary Johnson stated that Phoumi was obviously not anxious to agree to such a settlement. Ambassador Harriman suggested that it might be important at some point to make a demarche to Khrushchev and to refer to his agreement with the President at Vienna.

The President suggested that it was important that Ambassador Harriman have available to him the assistance of Ambassador Brown or someone else who was expert on the backgrounds of the different possible cabinet candidates. As he saw it, there were three things that needed to be discussed with Souvanna--the character of the eight neutral members of the cabinet, the question of whether Souphanouvong was to be in or out of the government, and the breakup of the Pathet Lao. Ambassador Harriman agreed that he needed the help of someone such as Ambassador Brown [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to identify the individuals proposed by Souvanna. He thought it was important that, in these negotiations, we distinguish between individuals who were anti-American but neutralist and those who were pro-Pathet Lao.

In the further discussions of the topics to be covered in Ambassador Harriman's talks with Souvanna, Secretary Rusk referred to the need to assure Souvanna of our political and economic support if he really plays a neutralist game. Mr. Steeves pointed out that the four conditions specified in the Paris Agreements covered the essentials of what we would seek. The President agreed.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that it was difficult for Souvanna to talk frankly as long as talks were held in Xieng Khouang. Ambassador Harriman suggested that the situation of the Kong Le elements was important. If we could somehow bring together all of those who really wanted a neutral Laos and those who supported the King, we could be successful in achieving our objectives. In the subsequent discussion it was agreed that if Souvanna refused to come either to Paris or to Phnom Penh we would have to continue to deal with him indirectly through the French.

Ambassador Harriman suggested that if we fail in our efforts with Souvanna or if he lacks the capability to carry out the sort of actions we require, we should make a major effort to disaffect him and get him to quit. We would be in a better position if we were contesting directly with the Pathet Lao rather than supporting a supposed neutralist who was not really a neutralist. Everyone but the Thais and the Vietnamese favor Souvanna for Prime Minister. The President asked whether there was any possibility that Souvanna could be induced to count himself out. Secretary Rusk replied that there were some indications of such a possibility. The President, however, suggested that in Souvanna's conversations with Falaize he did not sound as though he were ready to count himself out. The President went on to state that we had said from the beginning that we wanted to get out if we could./4/ If we were not successful, however, we may have to consider military action. He asked General Lemnitzer to present the military plan.

/4/ McGeorge Bundy prepared a short record of this meeting which he described as minutes. Bundy wrote that "The President, in approving this pattern of negotiations, made clear that we would like nothing better than `to get out of Laos, if we can.' We have no objective there other than to reach an acceptable settlement which does not hand the country over to the Communists." (Minutes of discussion on Southeast Asia, August 29, by Bundy; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 9/1/61-9/20/61)

General Lemnitzer discussed some of the aspects of an expanded Plan 5. In the course of his discussion he said that the decision on expansion of the Meo operation to 17,000 could be made at a later time. Following General Lemnitzer's presentation, Secretary Johnson pointed out that if we went to an expanded SEATO Plan 5 we would seek an increase in the contribution of Asian troops. In particular, we would seek an increased contribution from Thailand and perhaps Australia. He also noted that in implementing Plan 5 we would move by stages. We would begin with an operation designed to achieve the original objective of Plan 5--the reestablishment of a cease-fire along the May 3 line. If this approach did not succeed, we would conduct a cleanup operation in the South and seek to achieve a divided Laos. It was important to undertake shortly the necessary exploratory talks. He doubted whether we should go ahead with any military action in Laos under SEATO Plan 5 unless we were also prepared to take the action necessary to clean up the South. He noted that if there were not a resumption of hostilities by the Communists we would take the lesser actions that General Lemnitzer had described. He suggested that we should immediately begin bilateral discussions and subsequently discussions in SEATO on both concepts.

Secretary McNamara suggested that, in discussing these alternative plans with our allies, we should make no commitment to undertake military action until we had reviewed the situation in Laos in the light of world problems at the time, especially the situation with respect to Berlin. We would not want to tie down substantial forces in Laos if these forces were required to deal with the Berlin situation.

General Lemnitzer pointed out that there had already been discussions between the South Vietnamese and Phoumi with respect to putting Vietnamese forces into Laos to block passage of North Vietnamese forces into South Viet Nam. This kind of planning was the sort of thing that we could, under the circumstances, normally expect.

Secretary Johnson stated that we had thoroughly examined all possible actions that we might take if there were no resumption of hostilities by the Communists. No such actions would give us assurance that we could clean up Communist pockets in Laos. We also had to play our cards in such a way as to avoid charges that we were violating the cease-fire. The State paper proposed that we take certain actions to show our determination [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] not so much to clean up areas held by the Communists as to prevent a deterioration in the position of the FAL. Secretary Rusk added that our objective was at least to create a state of confusion on the Communist side which would prevent their consolidation of their position.

General Lemnitzer noted that we hoped to have the Thai supply half (500) of the additional advisers for the FAL. We would add about 200 more Americans beyond the 300 additional Americans that we plan to introduce or that we were in the process of introducing.

Secretary Johnson suggested, with reference to Secretary McNamara's remarks, that we would have to talk quite freely about our plans if we were going to get the agreement of our allies to these plans. Mr. Bundy asked what these conversations involved. Secretary Johnson indicated in response that they would cover pretty much the concept set forth in the State Plan. Without committing ourselves to every point, we would want to talk pretty completely about all aspects of that Plan. Secretary Rusk said that he felt that Secretary McNamara's reservation was inherent in the international situation and that this reservation made it difficult to talk to our SEATO allies. He suggested that we should not at this time mention to our SEATO allies the contingency that concerned Secretary McNamara--the possibility that the Berlin situation would preclude military action in Laos.

The President suggested that we should make it clear that we were developing a plan, but were not agreeing now to implement it. General Taylor suggested that the discussions be played in a low key and that we make our approach in terms of bringing SEATO Plan 5 up to date. Secretary Johnson agreed that such an approach would be appropriate but that the negotiations involved would be rather delicate. In response to an inquiry, Secretary McNamara indicated that the actions that he was concerned about reserving our position on were those which were proposed in the event of overt Communist aggression. We were, for example, very short of air power in Western Europe. We couldn't take on another operation involving carriers and Air Force fighters at a time when these were required in Europe. He pointed out that the Soviet Union might very well take advantage of the Laos situation to drain off our forces from Europe.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that if we should get 40,000 troops in Laos they would almost all have to be supplied by the United States.

General Lemnitzer pointed out that one objective of the proposed Plan was to start off with a feint. This would be initiated through declaring first Charter Yellow and then Charter Blue for SEATO forces, to be followed by the proposed exercise in Thailand. The objective would be to encourage the Communists to cool off their own efforts.

The Attorney General asked how many American troops would be involved, assuming Communist aggression. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the Plan called for starting off with approximately 13,000 American troops, of whom 4,000 would be ground combat troops in Laos and nearly 9,000 would be supporting forces based in Thailand. The Attorney General inquired as to what could be accomplished with forces of this size. General Lemnitzer noted that these forces were intended to accomplish the original Plan 5 objectives. They would not move out from the Mekong River sites but would simply hold them and release the FAL for action elsewhere in Laos. Secretary Rusk added that the political purpose would be to get the Communists back to the conference table.

The Attorney General asked what would happen if the Communists then continued with their aggression--what American troops would be required then? General Lemnitzer stated that it depended on how much of an effort the Communists made and whether they were willing to accept the original May 3 cease-fire line. Secretary Johnson pointed out that we would not start implementing expanded Plan 5 unless we had assurances of help from our Asian allies.

The Attorney General recalled that, at a meeting to discuss the Laos situation two or three months ago, it had been proposed that we take military action in Southern Laos./5/ At that time it had been estimated that the Viet Minh could wipe out forces introduced into Southern Laos in two to three days. He wondered why we were being more optimistic now. General Lemnitzer said that there had been no change in view but that SEATO Plan 5 was a flexible plan and could be the basis for taking action going beyond its original concept. General Taylor said that it should be noted that the 30,000-odd troop estimate simply represented the initial cost of the operation, not the final bill.

/5/Robert Kennedy is apparently referring to one of a number of meetings that took place in late April 1961, perhaps the one described in Document 67.

The Attorney General suggested that, if the Communists were serious and could not be faked--as we must assume was the case--would the Communist reaction to an expanded Plan 5 mean that we would soon have to drop bombs on Hanoi? General Lemnitzer felt that we would not have to take such action very early in the game. He pointed out that it was difficult for North Viet Nam to supply any substantial body of forces in Laos. Nonetheless, he acknowledged, continuing Communist military action would necessitate the introduction of more U.S. and other forces. Secretary Johnson pointed out that Admiral Felt had estimated that a four-division force was the maximum that the North Vietnamese could support in Laos.

Secretary McNamara said that he was sure that if 13,000 American forces were tied down in Southeast Asia we would have to reserve a part of our remaining military power to deal with the Southeast Asia situation as it evolved. He thought the Soviet Union might very well find it advantageous to tie down substantial U.S. forces in Southeast Asia in the midst of a Berlin crisis. Accordingly, we had to give most careful consideration to any such move.

In response, General Taylor suggested that such a situation would force us to make another survey of our readiness condition. Secretary McNamara said it was inconceivable to him that we could ship six divisions to Europe and fight a war in Southeast Asia without total mobilization. General Taylor acknowledged that such a situation would require a greater effort than at present. Secretary Johnson pointed out that it was not intended that we would continue to pour troops into Laos if the Communists raised the ante. Rather we would draw back and attack North Viet Nam from the sea and from the periphery of Laos. Secretary McNamara acknowledged that this was the intent. But the problems associated with military action in Laos had been viewed as very serious problems two months ago, and that was before the Berlin crisis had fully developed, before we contemplated the introduction of six divisions into Europe and before we had become aware of the non-nuclear deficiencies of our forces. He felt that we should carry on our discussions with our SEATO allies in a way that avoided any commitments to military action. Secretary Rusk suggested that if we became involved in fighting in Southeast Asia and in Berlin, it was most likely that trouble would also begin to develop around the periphery of the Soviet Bloc--in Korea and elsewhere. It was, therefore, important to try to obtain a peaceful solution in Laos. If such a peaceful solution were not achieved, risks involved in military action began to mount very fast.

The President agreed that Ambassador Harriman had to do his best to get an agreement. We didn't want to be put in a position where we were only one man away from agreement with Souvanna on a cabinet. We didn't want to take on a war in Laos in a situation where we lacked French and British support and where public interest in the U.S. had greatly declined. Secretary Rusk said that he had not thought we would go in for a military build-up in Laos as we have done in Korea--rather, we would fall back and hit the Communists from the sea and from elsewhere outside Laos. The President indicated his agreement.

In response to the President's request, Secretary Rusk began to sum up the points on which the President's approval was now required. In doing so, he relied in part upon his memorandum of August 29 for the President. The first point was that, through Ambassador Harriman, the U.S. should establish direct contact with Souvanna immediately. We should be prepared to discuss specific names and particular portfolios with him. We should indicate our willingness to provide economic and political support to him while indicating that we cannot go along with actions which will lead to a covert turnover of the government to the Communists. If we cannot establish direct contact with Souvanna, we should make the same points through the French.

Second, we should go ahead with the stiffening of the FAL, adding Thai and U.S. advisers, conducting rotational training in Thailand and discussing with our SEATO allies the establishment of a SEATO River Patrol. We should also begin preparations for the arming of an additional 2000 Meo.

Third, we should talk bilaterally and in the SEATO Council about the revision of Plan 5 along the lines outlined in the paper. We should not, however, seek agreement now to a large military exercise in October. We need to give further thought to this proposal. Mr. Steeves interjected to say that these discussions of SEATO Plan 5 should be on the basis that we were making no commitments but wished to dust off the Plan and to obtain their support for changes that might be required. In the discussion of this statement, the President said that we should not commit ourselves to SEATO Plan 5 without regard to whatever else may happen in the world. Secretary Rusk agreed that the discussion should be on a planning basis.

The President wondered whether Souvanna Phouma may not believe that, if fighting is resumed, he may be able to win control of Laos without Phoumi. Ambassador Harriman said that Souvanna had indicated that he did not expect to be Prime Minister if the Pathet Lao took over the entire country. Mr. Dulles asked if we should not try to get Souvanna out of enemy territory. If he would move away from Xieng Khouang, this would be the best evidence he could give of his neutrality. Mr. Steeves pointed out that Souvanna considered Xieng Khouang his home territory. Ambassador Harriman added that he needed to stay there because of his problems in getting Communist support for the Kong Le forces.

Mr. Bundy asked whether we wanted to go ahead with the proposal for support of 2000 additional Meos, who would add to our problems if we got a peaceful settlement, in view of the possibility that we might be able to achieve such a settlement on the basis of the Paris Agreements. Secretary Johnson agreed that this was a good question but that State felt that on balance we should go ahead. Mr. Dulles pointed out that if we did become involved in fighting, we would need the help of the Meo. The President asked what would happen to the Meo in the event there was a peaceful settlement. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Dulles pointed out that if the new Lao government were unfriendly, there would be trouble. In this connection, Ambassador Harriman noted that the first cease-fire violations by the Communists were likely to take the form of an effort to get rid of the Meo. Therefore, the stronger the Meo are and the better able they are to harass the Communists, the better off we shall be. The President agreed that we should go ahead with the equipping of 2000 additional Meo.

In response to a question from Mr. Bundy, the President also agreed that we should go ahead with action to increase the number of U.S. advisers to the FAL to a total addition of 500 and that we should seek to obtain 500 additional Thai advisers.

There was some discussion of the proposal for photo reconnaissance [7 lines of source text not declassified]. In response to a question from the President, General Lemnitzer indicated that this reconnaissance would be performed at altitudes of 5000 feet and that it would be a continuous operation with twice-a-week flights over areas of reported enemy activity. The President approved the reconnaissance proposal. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

173. National Security Action Memorandum No. 80/1/

Washington, August 29, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, NSAM 80. Secret. Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 247-248.

Decisions approved by the President at the Meeting
on Southeast Asia, August 29, 1961

The President approved the following actions:

1. An intensification of the diplomatic effort to achieve agreement to the Paris proposals on the part of Souvanna, especially by direct conversations between Ambassador Harriman and Souvanna, with an emphasis not only upon the interlocking importance of the Paris proposals, but also upon U.S. support of Souvanna in the event that he accepts the Paris plan.

2. Authorization to undertake conversations with SEATO allies both bilaterally and with the SEATO Council, exploring the possibility of an enlargement of the concept of SEATO Plan 5. It must be understood that this exploration was in the nature of contingency planning and did not represent a flat commitment of the United States to participate in such an enlarged enterprise.

3. An immediate increase in mobile training teams in Laos to include advisers down to the level of the company, to a total U.S. strength in this area of 500, together with an attempt to get Thai agreement to supply an equal amount of Thais for the same purpose.

4. An immediate increase of 2,000 in the number of Meos being supported to bring the total to a level of 11,000.

5. Authorization for photo-reconnaissance by Thai or sanitized aircraft over all of Laos.

It is assumed that these actions will be carried out under the general direction of the Southeast Asia Task Force under the direction of Deputy Under Secretary Johnson.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia/1/

Washington, August 30, 1961, 11:49 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8-3061. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Johnson.

227. Eyes Only Ambassador from Secretary.

Problem in Laos is to try to get Soviets to agree to substance and reality of neutrality and not use that word to cover communist take-over by political rather than military action. Critical points are (a) composition of coalition government, (b) verified withdrawal all foreign military elements including Viet Minh, (c) international control commission arrangements for protection Laos as well as interested powers and neighbors against efforts to undermine neutrality.

French Ambassador's talks with Souvanna Phouma at Xieng Khouang on coalition government (see Vientiane's 340 and 348/2/ being repeated) most discouraging. Souvanna sees himself as Prime Minister and head of "center" group of eight, to whom would be added four from Pathet Lao and four from Boun Oum Phoumi group. Those he mentions for center group are almost all strong Pathet Lao sympathizers. These plus four Pathet Lao would clearly swing Laos rapidly into communist camp.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 172.

We are now trying to arrange talk in Paris between Souvanna and Harriman in order that we can impress upon him directly that our policy regarding neutrality is genuine, that we are prepared to support him as Prime Minister on basis his genuine neutrality, that center groups must be determined to maintain neutrality and should include several strong figures national standing not associated with either Pathet Lao or Boun Oum, and that we are prepared back neutral Laos with substantial economic and other aid.

Character government is crucial point: It would do us no good, for example, to trade concessions by us on this in exchange for concessions by Soviets on control commission since latter would then be a farce. Good point to press on Soviets is importance separating "hostile camps" by verified withdrawal all foreign troops in whatever guise including trainers, advisers, etc. Laotians left alone could go much further with neutrality than possible at present.

Linkage Laos and Berlin can be tricky. In our minds problem is how we can expect to make any constructive advance on complex and stubborn issues Germany and Berlin if we are unable to reach agreement on relatively simple and lesser problem Laos on which heads of government have apparently same objectives. We do not see profitable path in trading concessions on Laos for concessions on Berlin since this would be quite unmanageable in two widely divergent contexts.

If your Soviet colleague seems to discuss Laos on assumption that Pathet Lao will finish up its military action as dry season returns in September, you should warn him that they must not count on US and SEATO playing passive role. United States has gone very far in attempting reach peaceful solution Laos but if it becomes apparent Khrushchev's assurances to Kennedy on this matter were meaningless, US would have to look to its responsibilities. American government and people are showing readiness to respond to unprovoked pressures Sino-Soviet bloc and it would be serious mistake to underestimate their determination and capacity. Today's announcement Soviet resumption nuclear testing and obvious effort intimidation free world will merely reinforce conclusions American people are regretfully drawing about present course Soviet policy. Problem ought not to be who wins a war but how war is to be prevented. Laos is in situation where right step can be taken.

This might be enough fuel for a start, but we would try to respond promptly if any promising leads open up.

Your messages through State channels "Eyes Only" will be given special attention here and distributed only to me.

Rusk