115. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, June 21, 1961, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2161. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Paris, New Delhi, Vientiane, and to Moscow.

Confe 244. From Harriman. Most reports from Zurich/2/ indicate Souvanna taking rigid attitude with RLG of victor vis-a-vis vanquished, closely parallel and perhaps even more inflexible than line of Souphannouvong. I have already reported from here absurd self-confidence affected by Souvanna that he can control Pathet Lao and win election if held three months. Whether he just sincerely naive or wilfully deceptive, fact is Souvanna seems to need some concerted effort especially on part Western friends to (A) get him to act like real neutral he claims to be; (B) give him facts of life about Russian tactics particularly for dumping once Soviet designs achieved those who count on their support; (C) tie-in with non-Communists as much as possible such as inducing non-Communist Lao to join him in move away from complete dependence on Pathet Lao.

/2/On June 19, Princes Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong, and Boun Oum along with Phoumi met at Zurich to discuss formation of a government of national union. 1

To have any hope for future Laos independence, Souvanna must be induced to face reality he will be taken over by Pathet Lao unless he builds strong support from non-Communists within Laos and outside Laos to offset Soviet and other Communist pressures; also that strong ICC essential to protect his independence.

French undoubtedly have leverage with Souvanna, but so far they don't seem to have exercised it. I sought unsuccessfully, partly because of limited time, to go into this during Couve's recent visit here. I suggest that both in Washington and in Paris we attempt urgently to induce French to use their fullest influence with Souvanna to accept French draft copies machinery and to recognize dangers to him of dependence on Soviets and upon his ability to control Pathet Lao.

In discussion with MacDonald he fully agreed, and I believe he will suggest Foreign Office concert action with US and French. Will have a tripartite meeting with Chauvel this afternoon./3/

/3/The report of this meeting is in Confe 261, June 22. Harriman encouraged Chauvel to pressure Souvanna to face the "facts of life" of the danger relying on the Soviet's "without strong anchor to the West." Chauvel thought French influence could be done after the government of national union was formed. Harriman stated that would be too late. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2261)

116. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, June 22, 1961, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2261. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Moscow, to London, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane.

Confe 256. From Harriman for Secretary. It has become clear that Soviets by their statements and positions taken in Geneva are attempting to undermine and corrupt meaning of phrase "effective cease-fire" contained in Vienna communique. They have taken stand that:

(A) Pathet Lao is permitted mop up and eliminate all isolated RLG military units operating "behind lines" in areas which they claim to have "liberated" as an act of maintenance of law and order;

(B) Any effort supply or reprovision these units constitutes "provocation";

(C) Any entry of RLG forces into positions which they did not physically invest at moment of cease-fire is violation and can be used (as in case villages north of Paksane) as justification for Pathet Lao attack to drive these RLG forces out of such positions;

(D) ICC can investigate only at points major concentrations opposing forces and not at any point "behind lines". Therefore, ICC should not have equipment which would give it independent capability. This attitude towards ICC derives not only from Soviet desire permit Pathet Lao continue to improve their military position without interference by ICC, but also from their effort avoid precedents of ICC authority which they are unwilling to accord in future through agreements at conference.

They will continue to explain away every new PL violation with some new distorted interpretation which will make the cease-fire a meaningless farce.

Soviet interpretation of "effective cease-fire" is causing us difficulties here with such friendly delegations as Thai and Vietnamese, who are already grumbling that we have "lost" cease-fire issue, and with some press representatives who are asking why we don't bring recent violations to attention of conference as I promised. I believe we can expect constant whittling away of RLG military positions which will accentuate the situation. There is little we can do here to bring situation under control except to make as many issues as we can devise, such as adequate equipment to ICC or to walk out. If we recess again on this issue it would seem that we would have to stick it out unless or until the cease-fire is unmistakably in force and ICC given effective instructions and tools. This risks permanent break-up of conference.

I feel strongly that arrogant attitude reflected in Gromyko's note sent you in Confe 232/2/ should be firmly answered. This attitude, if unchecked, I believe will have significant influence across the board in US and Soviet relations, specifically on such matters as Berlin.

/2/Gromyko's reply in Confe 232, June 20, was in response to a message from Rusk; see footnote 2, Document 111. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union considered the Phoumi side responsible for the fighting in Padong. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2061)

I therefore recommend that either you send vigorous reply to Gromyko note or that Thompson make representations highest levels Moscow to hammer home this question of Soviet bad faith in cease-fire, or both.

It would be most helpful to have your thinking and guidance in how we handle ourselves here.

117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva/1/

Washington, June 23, 1961, 1:14 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-361. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Martin and Bowles; cleared with Jenkins, U. Alexis Johnson, McConaughy, and Anderson (in draft); and approved by Rusk.

2222. Eyes Only for Harriman from the Secretary.

I was very much interested in your suggestion (Confe 210)/2/ about the possibility of your having a quiet discussion with Chen Yi. I certainly share your feeling that we should attempt avoid unnecessarily strained personal relations with ChiCom delegation which might leave us at disadvantage in dealing with ChiComs as compared with attitude of other key Western delegations. Our posture should be polite and correct at all times. Nevertheless, while I believe a discussion between you and Chen Yi might be useful at some point in the Conference I rather doubt that it would be of particular benefit at this point, inasmuch as friendly delegations should be able to fill us in on Chinese attitudes. It seems unlikely that such a meeting could be kept secret, since the Chinese Communists might consider it advantageous as a means of increasing their prestige and making us appear weak and anxious, to leak the fact that you had taken the initiative to approach them. The repercussions of our taking the initiative for such a private meeting on our Asian SEATO allies as well as on the governments of the divided Asian countries would be adverse, particularly if there seemed to be no tangible advantage to us from the discussion. The Canadians and French who occupy far less important roles in the Far East than ourselves can hold such meetings with Chen Yi without these risks.

/2/In Confe 210, June 17, eyes only for Rusk, Harriman suggested that he meet with the head of the Chinese Delegation, Chen Yi, through the good offices of the British to discuss Laos. Harriman noted that the Chinese and Soviet positions on Laos were "somewhat different." (Ibid., 751J.00/6-1761)

I would be glad to receive your further thoughts on this matter particularly if developments at the Conference should warrant our taking this significant step.

In meanwhile I suggest you and members your delegation gradually adopt a "correct" attitude in and out of Conference toward Chen Yi and other members Chinese Communist Delegation generally not taking initiative toward additional contacts but also not rebuffing any Chinese Communist initiative. However, if you feel it useful there would be no objection to testing Chinese Communist response by having Steeves make casual and informal approach to Wang Ping-nan in delegates lounge or any other such occasion where both happen to be present./3/

/3/In Confe 279, June 26, Harriman reported that he, Mrs. Harriman, and Steeves on the evening of June 25 introduced themselves at a social reception to Chinese Ambassador Wang Peng Nan, who was carrying on the U.S.-Chinese talks at Warsaw. While the conversation was nonsubstantive, the Chinese Ambassador remarked that at neither Geneva nor Warsaw were U.S.-Chinese relations improving, but he hoped that the United States would take the initiative to change that. Also at this meeting, Harriman shook Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's hand and exchanged a few words. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-2661)

Rusk

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, June 23, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2361. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC for POLAD, Geneva for Fecon, and Canberra.

2316. In certain of our position papers partition is suggested as a fall back position preferable to an unsatisfactory coalition government controlling the entire country.

At the risk of stating the obvious I would like to give my reasons for believing after the further reflection promised Bangkok's 2185 to Dept/2/ that a partition acceptable to our side would be difficult if not impossible achieve simply by negotiation in view of the present power realities on the ground.

/2/Document 109.

A map presented by Xieng Khouang to the ICC shows the areas claimed to be under control of the other side. This area embraces the entire country except for pockets of varying sizes around Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek, Savannakhet and Pakse.

On our own appraisal, we can confidently claim as firmly in RLG control a) all of Sayaboury, b) most of Nam Ha, c) an enclave of about twenty miles width around Luang Prabang city, d) an area ranging from 20 to 50 miles in depth running from about thirty miles west of Vientiane, along the southern/western border of Laos to the Cambodian border, e) a pocket about twenty miles in diameter around Saravane, and f) a number of small pockets scattered throughout the country.

RLG has 7,000 to 9,000 troops in various parts of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua, but these cannot be said to control more than local areas. They can for a long time provide effective guerrilla harassment, if they could be supplied, but could not hope alone to regain control of centers such as PDJ. They could eventually probably be picked off one by one by the enemy, though this would take time and much effort.

Running east and north from the area of firm RLG control there is a further area of from 15 to 75 miles in depth in which RLG has predominant, but uncertain control for the moment, a control, however, which it would be difficult for it to maintain against aggressive attack without help of outside forces.

The situation is precarious in the south. Let us not delude ourselves into thinking that we have a firmly held southern redoubt into which to withdraw. The PL, for example, are very strong around Nape, the area of Laos near the 17th Parallel, and for a depth of 20 to 30 miles inside Laos along the south Vietnam border south of the 17th Parallel. It would require a considerable military "nettoyage" to clean this out.

It is unrealistic to think that the PL would honestly abide by the terms of a proposal for both sides to withdraw their forces from behind each others' lines. The Communists will want to keep open the Ho Chi Minh trail at all costs.

The RLG by itself has no greater capacity to hold any partition line sufficiently extended to protect the whole Lao/Thai border than it has to hold present cease-fire line. To do so effectively would probably require assistance in form of combat troops from US and/or SEATO.

If we should decide to abandon the effort to maintain a buffer along the whole Mekong border with Thailand and divide the country say at the Nam Ca Dinh/Nape line, and if the FAL could be largely concentrated in the southern area, it could probably achieve necessary nettoyage. I would assume however that this would be unsatisfactory as it would involve abandoning important northern areas including both northern and western reaches of the Mekong, Luang Prabang and probably Vientiane and Paksane.

Under these circumstances, and for the reasons suggested paragraph "second" of Bangkok's 2185 to Dept, it seems unlikely that our adversaries will accept any partition satisfactory to US simply as a matter of negotiation.

The suggestion of a three way division with a neutral buffer zone is ingenious, but seems to me quite unrealistic under the present power position latest developments at Zurich and known attitudes of Souvanna and Souphanouvong especially in view of the area contemplated for the neutral zone.

It follows, therefore, that to gain and hold an acceptable partition, we would have to be prepared to fight for it if necessary with troops from outside Laos.

Thus it seems to me that partition would present us with the same grave choice that military intervention posed for us in the pre-Geneva days. It would probably also involve problems with our Western Allies.

In considering alternate courses of action, therefore, we must recognize that partition does not now offer us any easy and peaceful way out.

One possibility in this connection which cannot be entirely excluded is that Phoumi may decide, regardless of foregoing considerations and any position we may adopt, to attempt to withdraw the RLG and FAL to the South. This might or might not be attempted in connection with similarly independent Thai occupation of Sayaboury and/or Vietnamese action in southern Laos. We have no present indications that he is actively contemplating such action.

Country Team concurs.

Brown

119. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/

Washington, June 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2361. Secret. Drafted by Chapman and cleared by Anderson. A marginal note on the source text indicates that a search was made for the original which was apparently not found.

SUBJECT
Your meeting with the JCS June 23, 1961/2/

/2/No record of this meeting has been found.

Laos

The Conference has recessed until Monday, June 26. At Zurich the three Princes issued a communique on June 23 (Tab A)./3/ They have agreed on the future domestic and foreign policies of Laos, and on the formation of a provisional government according to a procedure of exception. The King will choose the government which, however, will not be invested by the National Assembly. It appears that Boun Oum and Phoumi have made concessions on important issues (including renouncing the protection of any military alliance [SEATO])./4/ However, there are to be further conversations on the composition of the provisional government. This is the key issue and, until it is resolved, the agreement between the parties cannot be implemented.

/3/For text of the so-called Three Princes Communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1017-1018.

/4/Brackets in the source text.

The Conference has not seriously undertaken substantive discussions. The Soviets have tabled a draft protocol on the Withdrawal of Foreign Troops and Terms of Reference for the ICC; the French have tabled a protocol on Terms of Reference for the ICC--which we support; we have tabled an additional ten articles to the French draft on Military Provisions./5/ The Communists, however, have refused to enter into detailed discussions of these drafts. Mr. Harriman has pointed out that the Soviets are attempting to undermine the meaning of the phrase "effective cease-fire" (Confe 256, Tab B)./6/ It appears that acting from a position of strength on the ground, the Communists are playing for time until the "three parties" in Laos can reach an agreement on a coalition government and a single delegation to the Conference. They are confident that such a government would be weighed in their favor and that with a cooperative RLG they could then obtain full endorsement of their position from the Conference.

/5/The official records of the Laos Conference, including the conference documents, are in Department of State, L/EA Files: Lot 70 D 453, General Conference Documents.

/6/Document 116.

On the ground in Laos, the Pathet Lao have continued to mop up isolated FAL posts, to carry out small-scale attacks and generally to consolidate and improve their positions. The RLG (i.e. Phoumi) is considerably demoralized. The King has refused to step forward and accept to become head of a provisional coalition government; Sihanouk has apparently switched his support to Souvanna; and the U.S. has given no evidence of its future intentions in the event of a break-down of the Conference and a resumption of the PL offensive.

120. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington, June 25, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/2/61-6/26/61. Top Secret.

For your information only at the moment, I am attaching a copy of a memorandum on Laos/2/ which Walter McConaughy and I discussed with the Secretary on Sunday./3/ I had in mind that the memorandum could form the basis of a "talking paper" to discuss the matter with the President.

/2/The enclosed paper, not printed, was a third draft, June 25, of a memorandum which was circulated to the NSC for use at its meeting on June 29. For the paper as circulated, see Document 125.

/3/June 25.

The Secretary really feels that we need to know more about what went on at the meeting of the three Princes in Zurich and what Phoumi's thoughts and plans are. We are asking Harriman to see Phoumi if possible, and also suggesting that, if Phoumi is returning to Vientiane now, he might come by way of Washington to give us an opportunity to talk with him.

I am also enclosing a copy of a memorandum on South Viet-Nam prepared by Cottrell/4/ which contains some sobering statements and some useful ideas into which I am looking further. I have discussed in a very tentative way with the Secretary the concept of possibly getting the South Viet-Namese and Thais to assist Phoumi in an effort to clean up the panhandle. However, I feel that such decisions must rest on the basic one of whether we are going to try to make the best of a Souvanna government with ineffective ICC controls, or encourage Phoumi to hold out.

/4/Cottrell's paper, June 24, which is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/2/61-6/26/61, was summarized for Rostow by Robert Johnson; see Document 121.

UAJ

121. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/

Washington, June 26, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/2/61-6/26/61. Secret. Johnson was also the alternate member of the Vietnam Task Force.

SUBJECT
Laos and South Vietnam

The new version of Cottrell's paper (attached)/2/ focuses primarily on the implications of developments in Southern Laos for the defense of South Viet Nam. The paper is being submitted to Messrs. Johnson and McConaughy in the hope that they will send it to the Secretary for possible transmission to the President. Cottrell advises that a just-received message from Vientiane (2316)/3/ makes similar proposals. I have not yet seen it./4/

/2/See footnote 4, Document 120.

/3/Document 118.

/4/Johnson wrote an addendum at this point which reads: "now received and attached."

The Problem. The Communist military actions in Southern Laos which are the basis of Cottrell's concern were, according to the attachment to his paper,/5/ undertaken in late April. (The paper does not indicate when they were concluded.) They were thus undertaken before the cease-fire (May 3) and we must have been aware of them at the time the President approved the recommendations of the Task Force on Viet Nam in mid-May. It is, therefore, rather difficult to make a case that we are faced by a new situation.

/5/Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/2/61-6/26/61)

Nevertheless, there is genuine cause for concern. Following their military action in the area the Communists have been engaged in roadbuilding which, one must presume (though the paper presents no direct evidence on this subject), has been used as a cover for the extension and consolidation of their influence. The gradual takeover of Southern Laos would indeed make the problem of the defense of Viet Nam and Thailand much more difficult. We have looked upon de facto partition as possible outcome of the Geneva Conference. But both partition and a genuinely neutral Laos will be precluded if the Communists use a prolonged conference to consolidate their power in Southern Laos.

The Strategy. The Cottrell strategy is based upon the assumption that we can effectively employ the Communist tactic of a gradual military-guerrilla action and succeed, as they have done, in avoiding any strong counteraction. The following questions may be asked:

a. Is such a gradualist approach possible without provoking strong propaganda and military counter-moves by the Communists? (Cottrell's argument is based upon the belief that the Chinese and Russians would be militarily deterred by the fact that they probably do not want to fight a major war in Laos (p. 6). But they would not face such a prospect unless the U.S. intervened or clearly committed itself to intervene.)

b. Do we have a very strong propaganda case against the Communists if we are forced to justify Vietnamese, Thai (and ultimately perhaps U.S.) intervention?

c. Would the Thai and Vietnamese commit forces to the proposed operation without a firm commitment in advance that the U.S. would intervene militarily if necessary?

d. Is it a good idea to involve the Vietnamese directly in the war in Laos? Such action would tend to merge the two wars on the ground and in Geneva.

e. From a military point of view, could an operation like that proposed by Cottrell succeed? A road may make a convenient boundary, but without much larger forces can boundary-crossing be effectively prevented?

All of these questions tend to force us back upon the fundamental question of whether the U.S. should itself intervene in Laos. Present planning for U.S.-SEATO intervention is based upon the assumption that there is a clear-cut violation of the cease-fire. It seems to me that we ought to broaden our contingency planning to cover the much more probable situation where the cease-fire is not clearly broken, but where the Communists nibble away at the non-Communist position. We need to decide at what point such nibbling will demand political and, possibly, military counteraction. Such planning should proceed urgently and be discussed with the President at an early date. We also need to improve our information on what is going on in Southern Laos./6/

/6/Johnson wrote an addendum at this point which reads: "The Brown message from Vientiane has further information on this subject."

In conclusion, I do not believe that the Cottrell paper presents a very feasible concept, but it does raise the important question of whether we may not have to take military action if we are going to salvage even a partitioned Laos./7/

/7/Johnson wrote an addendum at this point which reads: "It is this general point that Brown's message from Vientiane makes."

Bob

122. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, June 26, 1961, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J11/6-2661. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, priority to Vientiane, to Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.

Confe 287. From Harriman. Confe 278./2/ After discussing invitation Souvanna visit US (reftel), I sounded out Souvanna on as many subjects as seemed feasible, considering he was obviously tired after long day including reception, and planned early departure following morning.

/2/In Confe 278, June 26, Harriman reported that at the same meeting with Souvanna late in the evening of June 25, he renewed the invitation to the Lao leader to visit Washington. Souvanna, who was leaving the next morning for a 10-day stay in Paris, declined. Harriman reported that he did not twist Souvanna's arm, but suggested that Gavin in Paris could raise the issue again if the Department wished. (Ibid.)

1. Souvanna did say flatly Phoumi was best of Vientiane group and if he quit army, Souvanna would have him in his cabinet. He didn't want any military men in govt. It was men around Phoumi who caused trouble, they didn't want to lose posts they had. Souvanna dismissed Boun Oum as not really being interested. He described Phoui (and his tone was unfriendly) as "ambitious," supported only by his family. Confirming meeting reported Confe 267, Souvanna said had called in Phoumi but gave no meaningful details./3/

/3/In Confe 267, June 23, the Delegation reported that Souvanna and Phoumi had a private talk. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-2361)

I said highly advisable have "strong men" like Phoumi on right to help stand off pressure PL. That always his policy, Souvanna replied, recalling when he in Vientiane last fall he sought Savannakhet group return before he brought PL back into govt.

2. Souvanna repeated several times three Princes had to get together in Phnom Penh or Laos to decide on PriMin. Only after they had agreed Souvanna should be PriMin would he go see King in Luang Prabang. If he went before, might leave impression he was soliciting job. He had no ambition, as head of family related to royal family it wasn't his duty try bring peace to country.

3. King could appoint provisional govt without going through Assembly. Assembly could stay on shelf until dissolved 90 days before elections which should not be held till country was normal. I recalled he had said might take year normalize situation. Souvanna replied year would not be necessary once inventory of men and arms completed. His idea was to put armed forces all three sides into single army. That would provide info on men and arms, following which govt would demobilize excess. As neutral country, Laos wouldn't need "very large" army. If things went well, conditions might be settled to extent honest elections possible before end of year.

4. Re my question French presence, Souvanna noted communique proviso and said this was something would have to be worked out bilaterally with France. I commented departure uniformed American military mission personnel would be easy but how about other side. Souvanna said no Vietminh troop units as such present, only "technicians." I said like artillerymen. He said they all Lao--his "nephew" was in charge. (Under questioning he said nephew named Tiao Lath (phonetic), who had been senior year Lycee Pavie and former boy scout. Laughingly Souvanna added many artillerymen, also ex-scouts, presumably fled Vientiane with Lath.)

5. Talking of Lao neighbors, Souvanna said neutral Laos need expect no trouble from north. In spite of my reference to example Cambodia, he maintained Vietminh transit through Laos could be stopped once Laos neutral.

Heightened DRV/SVN tension coincided with troubles in Laos. Souvanna thought Thailand would be neighbor more difficult to have friendly relations with than Vietnam. Thailand plagued by 8 million Lao in northeast many of whom wanted rejoin Laos. Recent troubles there described by RTG as Communist plot just to cover up. Souvanna denied any desire or interest stir up such feelings, said once Laos neutral and again peaceful with development prosperity many Lao in northeast Thailand would desire return Laos. For that reason, in Thai interest keep Laos in state unrest.

6. I said we felt would be in Laos best interest have strong ICC controls for several years. Souvanna, recalling he had asked ICC to leave in 1958, said he wanted ICC to stay on a while but must be under orders RLG. ICC teams should be sent out from Vientiane on RLG request to investigate specific incidents. When I pointed out under 1954 agreement teams were stationed at a number of points in countryside, Souvanna said experience had shown that certain team members had indulged in propaganda activities. I asked whether these were Indians or Poles. Souvanna (first closing open terrace window) lowered voice and said "Poles."

7. I indicated US only interest was support for a really neutral and independent Laos and coalition government if it had those ends. We could help particularly in economic development program. Souvanna said that was essential. PL breeds on discontent. He aimed at getting villagers to support him by doing something to help improve their standards living. If this done, nothing to fear from NLHX. He personally, when in Xieng Khouang and elsewhere, lived like villagers and soldiers. Too many people at top thought only of themselves. At another point, Souvanna recalled his brother Souphanouvong was author of Lao five-year plan, and said latter never against US economic assistance.

In emphasizing danger Souvanna faced from PL, I speculated that perhaps he might be succeeded by Souphanouvong. Souvanna said firmly this would never happen. He was beholden to no one. He had repeatedly said in Moscow and other bloc capitals that he was against communism in Laos.

Comment: Souvanna made a point of seeing me without any of his associates. He seemed more relaxed last night and made fewer sweeping statements. He attempted to justify positions he took. He admitted there would be difficulties with the Pathet Lao and spoke of ways he could protect his govt. While he showed his usual self-confidence, he appeared to be more realistic towards the difficulties he was facing.

123. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (McConaughy) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)/1/

Washington, June 26, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/27/61-6/30/61. Secret. Sent through J.W. Scott, INR/DDC. Drafted by Cleveland and cleared by Anderson and Chapman.

SUBJECT
Contingency Plans for Support of Meo

This refers to your oral request to Mr. Scott regarding the status of contingency planning for future support of the Meo tribesmen in Laos.

We have been providing arms, ammunition, and other support to about 7,700 Meo tribesmen in Laos who are members of the Auto-Defense Corps of the Lao Army. Most of these are situated in Northern Laos back of the enemy lines. Owing to the hostilities, a large number of Meo and their dependents have lost their usual means of livelihood. Owing to their traditional enmity to the Viet-Minh and PL, their future in any post-Geneva Laos is quite uncertain.

We are now giving emergency relief aid to approximately 10,000 Meo refugees. This number may increase by 3 to 4,000. Because of the destruction of their crops and their failure to plant, relief may be required over the next 18 months, at least, and may cost between $3 and $5 million.

In view of the current negotiations at Geneva, we have considered internationalizing this aid program by requesting the League of Red Cross Societies to undertake it. However, our Mission in Geneva pointed out that it would not be desirable for a third party to make such an approach at this time and suggested that a more appropriate request emanate from Vientiane. We are cabling our Embassy there to make this suggestion to the Lao Government.

The Country Team in Vientiane is studying the subject of the overall problem of assistance to the Meo during conditions likely to prevail after the Geneva Conference.

124. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, June 27, 1961, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2761. Top Secret; Niact. Also sent to Vientiane as telegram 242 and repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC.

Confe 288. Prince Boun Oum, accompanied by General Phoumi, has just called on me./2/ In discussing situation in Zurich, Phoumi explained that Souvanna Phouma-Souphanouvong attitude from the beginning of talks was one of victor over vanquished. They assume position of political and military strength, in short, practically demanding capitulation. In general talks on government formation, they used rough ratio of two-thirds-one-third. Requested RLG abandon close association with non-Communist world. In fact, Phoumi interpreted attitude as one of abandoning neutrality.

/2/Apparently Harriman.

In direct answer to my question as to whether Souvanna Phouma had offered him position in government of National Union, Phoumi said that Souvanna had only indicated that he would not accept any military people in his government, implying that if Phoumi would remove his uniform, he would be acceptable.

In only interjection by Boun Oum during entire conversation, he compared present situation to condition created by Souvanna Phouma Kong Le demands which caused the fall of Somsanith cabinet in August. At that time, although decision in forming of government was left to discretion of King, military threats and pressures were used to induce King to name Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister.

In the face of Souvanna Phouma's proud and arrogant manner with feeling that political fortunes and military situation all on his side, the only thing Phoumi felt he could do in Zurich talks was to salvage what little he could and to buy time until matter could be referred to the King. The one concession he felt that they had succeeded in wresting from the opposition Princes was the matter of gaining at least temporarily recognition of constitution and prerogative of the King. They felt, however, that in the showdown talks yet to come either in Phnom Penh or Luang Prabang that the same tactics would be used in forcing the King to accept their will.

Phoumi then set forth his position very clearly. Additional reason to that given above why he could not take stronger position in Zurich was uncertainty regarding U.S. position. This was one of the main reasons he had come through Geneva in order to talk with me. In response to my question, Phoumi was completely unequivocal in saying that a negotiated peaceful solution under present circumstances was impossible without resulting in almost complete capitulation to Souvanna Phouma and the PL. If there was to be any true negotiation, the military equilibrium would have to be established which could only be done by strong support from SEATO or the U.S. In this connection, he said that he did not feel that foreign troops in Laos mandatory but at least U.S. would have to take a very firm posture which would clearly indicate to Viet-Minh and Pathet Lao that any attempt to take over Laos completely by military force would be met by force./3/

/3/In telegram 2332 from Vientiane, June 28, Brown commented on the discussion with Phoumi. Brown stated that the Embassy could not agree with Phoumi's assertion that a military equilibrium could be reestablished without the introduction of foreign troops, nor did it believe token foreign forces occupying a few key points along the Mekong have any appreciable effect. Therefore, Brown recommended if the United States decided to intervene in Laos, it should be prepared to fight "at least a Korean type or perhaps a larger war." (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2861)

I asked Phoumi directly whether he thought Souvanna Phouma had any freedom of action and whether he was capable of maintaining a neutral stance or leading non-Communist neutral state. Phoumi's answer was that this impossible. Souvanna Phouma depends completely on Souphanouvong's PL forces; that Souvanna's reference to his own forces is a fiction; that if this were not true Souvanna Phouma political position would not continue to receive Souphanouvong's support.

I told Prime Minister and Phoumi at this juncture that as had been indicated to them last night, I have been authorized to extend invitation General Phoumi to go to Washington in order that our leaders derive direct benefit his assessment Zurich talks and situation in Laos. I explained to Prince Boun Oum reasons why visit by Prime Minister at this time would not be advisable and requested his permission for General Phoumi to proceed to Washington in this informal manner. I also informed him that I would precede him by a short time to be in Washington during his visit.

Phoumi has two ideas. One is to go back see King first, then proceed Washington, arriving Sunday. Other is to proceed directly Washington, thence home. He will give us final answer in few hours.

In summation: Phoumi finds himself in position where he must make decision to face political military facts and capitulate as gracefully as possible, salvaging what he can through use of constitution and King and by cooperation with Souvanna retain some of RLG and other non-Communists in the eventual coalition government under Souvanna. The only other alternative, as he sees it, is for U.S. to make it possible militarily for him to take stronger position with the assurance that if he and the King decide not to accept a dictated solution, that they have our military backing if negotiations break down.

125. Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for the National Security Council/1/

Washington, June 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/27/61-6/30/61. Top Secret. Prepared in FE and discussed by McConaughy, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rusk on June 25; see Document 120. A covering note indicates that it was circulated to the NSC only as a basis for discussion.

SUBJECT
Problem of Laos

I. Situation

Substantive discussions undertaken but without any give on Communist side. Soviets have tabled draft protocol on Withdrawal of Foreign Troops and Terms of Reference for ICC incorporating double veto; this step backward from powers given ICC at Geneva in 1954.

French have tabled protocol on Terms of Reference for ICC and we have tabled additional ten Articles on Military Provisions./2/ Together these documents give ICC considerable power, scope of action, and means to do effective job.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 119.

Cambodians have prepared draft, which in most respects follows that of Soviets. After discussions, they have decided not to table it and state they will support any agreement acceptable to Lao parties.

Indians are also reported to have prepared a draft document which they have decided not to table until after coalition government formed.

Principal issues confronting Conference have been 1) seating Lao representatives, 2) the cease-fire, and 3) giving ICC sufficient means and authority to do its job. RLG have been unwilling sit on equal terms with Pathet Lao but have agreed to fill seat with representative of non-Communist parties. Communists have systematically distorted violations of cease-fire and blocked all proposals to strengthen ICC. Communists apparently playing for time until "three parties" in Laos can reach agreement on coalition government and single delegation to Conference. They are going to see to it that such a government would be weighted in their favor. With cooperative RLG they could then obtain full endorsement of their position from Conference.

Communists have given no evidence they prepared to arrive at compromise with free world on framework within which neutral Laos could exist. They have not budged from position that after ICC had returned to Laos and the Conference convened, cease-fire was matter to be negotiated among Lao factions and resolved by political settlement leading to coalition government.

B. Situation in Zurich

Three Princes on June 22 issued communique/3/ setting forth agreements on 1) internal and external policies of future government, 2) procedure to form a government, and 3) continuing talks to decide who would be Prime Minister and who would compose government. While RLG (Phoumi) has conceded many points, last two questions are crucial. On their resolution will depend implementation of rest of agreement. Phoumi gained important point by agreement that King name new government.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 119.

Souvanna and the Pathet Lao are asking that Souvanna be Prime Minister and that they have two-thirds of the portfolios.

C. Situation on Ground

Pathet Lao have continued to consolidate and improve their positions by systematic clean-up of isolated FAL pockets and logistical build-up. At Ban Padong they launched major assault against FAL (Meo) position they considered potentially threatening. Are also notably expanding south from Tchepone toward Saravane parallel to Vietnamese frontier. They are believed able to take any of major cities now held by RLG. RLG are making some effort to improve position, mostly by minor probes and moving into areas where unopposed.

Communists have been able to block the ICC from taking any effective action on the ground.

There have been number of reports of friction between Kong Le and Pathet Lao. Kong Le forces not paid since [December]/4/ February.

/4/Brackets in the source text.

D. Military Planning with UK

Some weeks ago the UK proposed Admiral Felt and Admiral Luce (the US and UK SEATO Military Advisers) work out a contingency plan for military intervention in Laos. In discussing the terms of reference for those talks/5/ the UK seemed to agree that some strictly defensive SEATO military action would be required if there was a major resumption of the Communist offensive.

/5/A summary account of discussion between Admirals Felt and Luce, at Okinawa, June 20, is in a memorandum from Colonel Francis J. Roberts to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, June 28. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Laos 381 (Sensitive), June-Dec 61)

E. Attitude of Allies

Thais and Vietnamese are extremely concerned and want us to fight in Laos rather than expand fighting in their territory. They consider that: SEATO has failed, principally because of UK and French influence on US; Souvanna government will bring about Communist Laos; Conference cannot save Laos; seating Pathet Lao and undertaking substantive discussions without obtaining effective and verified cease-fire are indications of free world weakness. They now feel exposed to Communist threat and are uncertain how to meet it.

British and French agree with us that ICC should be given adequate means and powers to do job and that we should continue to insist on an effective and verified cease-fire.

They consider Souvanna only man who can be Prime Minister of neutral Laos and believe we should seek to give him enough support to insure he can maintain position vis-a-vis Communists. They have advocated early formation of coalition under Souvanna. We have continued to argue we should have clearer idea of international controls that Conference might produce before agreeing to such a government.

Australians and New Zealanders deeply concerned over course of events and to large degree share views Asian SEATO members re UK and France.

Canadians concentrating on ICC which main subject their speeches at Geneva. Taking stiffer attitude than at beginning, Canadians have told Indians they would have to reconsider their position if they had to assume responsibility without authority.

F. Attitude of Neutrals

Neutrals, notably India (Menon), have not been as helpful as we had hoped. Sihanouk has tried role of intermediary but his primary pressures have been on RLG to make concessions to other side. Burmese, from whom we expected little, have shown firmer attitude than we anticipated.

G. Soviet Attitudes

Soviets and Chinese Communists have shown no disposition to make any compromise whatsoever. Soviet drafts on ICC include "Troika" principle and are designed to make ICC even less effective than under 1954 Geneva Agreement.

They appear determined obtain international recognition of PL's favorable position on ground. Despite public support for cease-fire they are distorting "effective cease-fire" by a) their justification of rebel violations notably at Pa Dong and b) persistent refusal to provide any means to ICC.

In letter to Gromyko June 7 Secretary said Pa Dong action was not compatible with the discussion he had with Gromyko in Vienna. Gromyko's reply was arrogant, curt and unresponsive./6/ He said incident at Pa Dong was a consequence of violation of airspace held by Communist side and of airlifting troops and equipment.

/6/See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 111.

No material dichotomy between USSR and ChiCom-Viet Minh-PL has appeared at Geneva.

II. The Problem

(a) If we decide that we are not willing to commit US forces to achieve the US objective, we would continue negotiations at Geneva and accept the best political settlement that we can achieve. This would probably mean accepting a Communist-dominated government of national union under Souvanna and ineffective ICC controls. It is also probable that this would result in Communist control of all Laos. It would abet and provide a route for increased Viet Minh operations against South Viet-Nam. It would also provide a route for increased Communist infiltration of Thailand.

(b) If we decide that we are prepared to commit US forces In Laos if necessary to attain our objective and that this would be advantageous in the over-all confrontation with the Communists, we would pursue political negotiations with a firm determination not to make concessions, and would encourage and support the RLG to refuse to capitulate further to opposition pressures. If political negotiations fail, we would undertake military operations in Laos through SEATO or with those SEATO members prepared to participate, or if necessary, unilaterally. This would then furnish us a military backup position for further negotiations. This course of action is further explored in attachment.

Attachment

Alternative "B"

The principal elements in alternative course "B" would include the U.S. making it clear to the Communists, to Souvanna Phouma, and in the Conference that the U.S. intends to stand firm on the principles set forth in paragraphs two and three below, and in encouraging the RLG to stand firm on these same principles in its negotiations with the other two Princes.

If political negotiations to attain U.S. objectives fail, and if the Communists continue to consolidate their military position in Laos, the United States would be prepared quickly to initiate military operations in Laos through SEATO or with those SEATO members prepared to participate, or, if necessary, unilaterally.

2. U.S. Position in the Conference

The U.S. would stand firm in its position that we propose to attain: (a) A legally constituted government of national union which is not Communist dominated; (b) International agreement to respect an independent, neutral government in Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatened by no one and free from any domination; (c) An effective ICC to maintain the peace; (d) Adequate provision for internal security forces.

We would make it perfectly clear to the other participants in the Conference, and particularly to the Communists, that our position regarding an acceptable solution to the Lao problem is absolutely firm. We would also make the point directly with the Soviet Government.

3. U.S. Advice to Phoumi

In discussions with Phoumi, we would urge the RLG to be firm in their negotiations with the Souvanna-PL group. Specifically we would urge the RLG to hold out for a predominantly non-Communist composition of any government of national union, both with respect to numbers and to importance of positions held. We would urge the RLG to insist on observance of agreements reached at Zurich for nomination of a cabinet by the King, to oppose early elections and insist that these be held only after the situation of the country has become more normal.

We would tell Phoumi that the U.S. intends to make no further concessions at the Conference, that it will stand firm in its objectives, and that we are resolved that our position will be backed up militarily if necessary.

4. U.S. Relations with Souvanna

We would make clear to Souvanna that the United States position on the points noted in paragraph two above is firm, and that we would be prepared to support a Lao government headed by him only if he is prepared to accept and also to support those positions. We would work to bring Souvanna around to these positions directly, as well as through the French, British and Indians. However, it is probably unlikely that Souvanna can quickly or readily be brought to support the foregoing positions or that the Communist bloc countries will accept these positions as a basis for ultimate solution of the Lao problem.

5. Probable Course of Events

(a) We can expect that the negotiations will stall. An inconclusive cease-fire will continue for a while. As the firmness of our position becomes more evident two results are possible: (1) The Communists, convinced of our firmness of intent and purpose, will agree to a negotiated settlement acceptable to us; (2) More likely, no acceptable settlement will be reached at Geneva or in Laos and the Conference could drag on indefinitely. While the inconclusive cease-fire could also continue, it is probable that after a time, the Communists would initiate new violations of the cease-fire, with the purpose of exerting military pressure, further improving the PL military position, and lowering Phoumi's resolve.

6. Ensuing U.S. Actions

(a) At Geneva the U.S. Delegation would move to suspend Conference sessions if cease-fire violations occur; (b) If this tactic failed to stimulate progress toward our political objective, such violations would form the basis for the implementation of some agreed version of SEATO Plan 5, which would be preceded by an appropriate request from the RLG.

The military intervention would be undertaken to achieve the following objectives: (1) To secure key points along the Mekong River with airfields and river crossings in their vicinity, and the lines of communication between them. (2) To assist the Lao Army in regaining areas lost to the insurgents by furnishing additional materiel and logistic support, by denying other vital areas to the insurgents and by participating in offensive operations such as the provision of air support, communications, psychological warfare and other special operations. (3) To achieve the necessary position to permit successful political negotiation for a unified, independent and neutral Laos.

7. Additional Measures

Long term inconclusive negotiations under the present military conditions in Laos will afford the Communists additional time to mount increasing offensive pressures on South Vietnam. The subversive war in South Vietnam can be expected to increase in intensity. To counter it, coordinated moves by picked South Vietnamese, Thai and Lao troops could be made to push salients westward from Vietnam and eastward from Thailand along Route 9. The Thais would use elements of the Thai PARU units [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The selected FAL elements would have U.S. advisors.

We would continue to supply by air the Meos in northern Laos, as an anti-Communist force behind the enemy lines.

It might be possible to characterize such actions as a military response to Communist cease-fire violations. They might be regarded as counter-actions, undertaken at places of our own choosing, to offset the gains made by the PL in their violations of the cease-fire since 3 May.

126. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, June 29, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/27/61-6/30/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
NSC Discussion on Laos

The State Department was unable to get a firm and precise statement from Phoumi of the type of coalition he would be prepared to accept. All that Phoumi and Sisouk would say was they thought the coalition should include all seven Laotian political parties, not just three, and thus get away from the Troika principle./2/

/2/General Phoumi, accompanied by General Ouane and Sisouk Na Champassak and the Lao Charg[ ad interim in Washington, met with U.S. officials at the Department of State in a meeting which lasted from 10 to 11:30 a.m. U. Alexis Johnson and Harriman headed the Department of State contingent which also included officials from FE and SEA. Nitze, along with other ISA officials, attended for Defense. Rostow represented the White House. An extensive account of the meeting is in a memorandum of conversation, June 29. (Ibid., Phoumi Visit, 6/29/61-6/30/61)

I believe Phoumi is unwilling to be more precise because he first wants to know how much of a military commitment he can get from us. Phoumi has not been precise in stating what it is he wants in the way of a military commitment./3/

/3/During the afternoon of June 29, Phoumi had a 2-hour meeting with Chief of the Joint Staff Lieutenant General Wheeler and about a dozen other U.S. military officers. Anderson also attended the meeting and wrote a memorandum to McConaughy on June 29, highlighting the points of interest and providing notes paraphrasing the conversation. Anderson stated that Phoumi was aware of SEATO planning, continued to exaggerate the size of Viet Minh forces in Laos, was prepared to hold southern Laos with Nam Ca Dinh as the dividing line, and requested more rapid handling of his requests for U.S. logistical support. (Ibid.)

As you remember, Phoumi said to you that his forces should be in much better shape by the end of July than they are now.

The main point to be decided this afternoon/4/ is what position the President take with Phoumi tomorrow.

/4/At the NSC meeting; see Document 127.

State (see memo attached, particularly para 3 of Tab A/5/) will recommend that he tell Phoumi to stand firm and that if there is renewed military pressure we will take appropriate action.

/5/Document 125.

If, as you indicated this morning, this is a stronger commitment than you wish to recommend, you may wish to suggest the following to the President:

He tell Phoumi:

(1) We all seem to be agreed that the present Western line at the Geneva Conference should continue to be firmly pursued;

(2) The key to the political problem is, however, the formation of a coalition government which can have a reasonable prospect of maintaining an independent Laos;

(3) We recognize the dangers in Souvanna Phouma's present orientation. We want, however, to have one more try directly, and through the French, to get him to see the necessity of his following a non-Communist line if the independence of Laos is to be preserved;

(4) We understand that Phoumi believes his military forces will be considerably stronger by the end of July than they are now;

(5) We propose to follow a firm line in support of Laotian independence. We believe, however, that the time has not yet come to decide whether direct U.S. military support is wise or is required;

(6) We urge the closest continuing consultation to find an independent future for Laos without the necessity for direct U.S. military intervention.

Paul H. Nitze/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

127. Editorial Note

On June 29, from 4:30 to 7:15 p.m., the National Security Council held its 486th meeting at the White House. According to an account by Vice President Johnson's Military Aide, Colonel Howard L. Burris, the discussion of Laos went as follows:

"With regard to Laos, Mr. Rusk gave a summary of the Zurich meetings during which Phoumi was treated with contempt. It was clear from the meetings that a neutralist government in Laos would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Mr. Rusk said that he had come to the conclusion that within 7 to 10 days certain difficult decisions must be made: If all cease-fire efforts fail and no further progress is made the United States must decide whether or not to intervene in Laos and to invoke, initially, Plan Five. He expressed the belief that the British would support intervention as would certain SEATO members. He observed that the issue in Laos was of such international concern that the United States of necessity had to be firm. He cited the relationship to the Berlin issue.

"The President inquired as to the status and condition of the government forces in Laos and added he was suspicious of relying on airstrips in Laos any longer. General Lemnitzer replied that training had continued during the cease-fire (reported by Phoumi to Lemnitzer this date). Also, two battalions have recently completed training in Thailand, and government forces now total about 32,000. The President asked for additional details and suggested to General Lemnitzer that a more complete military appraisal be made. The President suggested that Ambassador Brown maintain close relationships with the British and French to determine their reactions and their willingness to respond with the United States.

"Mr. Harriman reported on deliberations of the ICC and inferred pessimism of the outcome. He expressed the belief that Souvanna will probably become Prime Minister of Laos and the President agreed. The President felt that it would be good under these circumstances for Souvanna to visit the United States and directed Rusk to have Gavin attempt to arrange such a visit." (Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, National Security Council (III))

Another unattributed summary account of the Laos portion of the meeting reads:

"Laos--The Secretary of State presented an outline of the current situation in Laos, closely following a memorandum sent over from the Department of State. [Document 125.] It was agreed that appropriate encouragement should be given to Phoumi and that he should be given to understand that there are points at which the United States will intervene to prevent a Communist Laos this summer. On the other hand, these points must be measured and decided by the United States and not by Phoumi, and accordingly, careful instructions will need to be sent to Ambassador Brown, and Phoumi must be encouraged to stay in close touch with the Ambassador. There was also agreement that efforts should be made to improve our communication and understanding with Souvanna, and in particular General Gavin is to be instructed to press him again in this direction." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memorandum Series, NSC Meetings 1961, No. 486, 6/29/61)

128. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 29, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 5/1/61-6/30/61. Secret. There is no indication on the source text of the hour or location of the conversation. The Department of State copy indicates it was drafted by Glenn. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-2961)

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)

Laos
General Phoumi Nosavan

The Secretary said that the General would certainly like to know what kinds of attitudes and what kinds of action might be expected from the United States during the weeks and the months to come. The Secretary expressed his intention to speak with frankness to which friendship authorizes him. The substance of what he was going to say, after his earlier conversation with the President,/2/ will be communicated to Ambassador Brown and repeated by the latter to the General and the King of Laos./3/ After apologizing for the apparent discourtesy of such a reminder, the Secretary cautioned the General to be most careful to preserve the secrecy of the meeting, since common enemies of the two countries would be most happy to learn what was said in these conversations.

/2/Rusk is apparently referring to the NSC meeting earlier that day; see Document 129.

/3/In telegram 1 to Vientiane, July 1, the Department summarized for the Embassy the discussions during the Phoumi visit and instructed Brown to seek an audience with King Savang to convey the U.S. position as presented in Washington to Phoumi. Before seeing the King, Brown should consult with Phoumi to ensure that Phoumi's own report of his Washington visit to Savang was based on an accurate presentation of the U.S. position. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-161) The record of Brown's conversation with King Savang, July 3, is in telegram 5 from Vientiane, July 3. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-361)

The Secretary said that he would begin by outlining two main reasons which make it difficult for the United States to take direct military action in Laos.

The first of these is that when President Kennedy took office in January, he found that the United States had been committed by the previous Administration to seek a solution of the Laotian problem through negotiations. Such a commitment is extremely important, not because a new President could not change a position taken by the earlier Administration, but because it had created a climate of opinion in the world at large and in the public opinion of the United States in respect to Laos. Moreover, it involved the question of solidarity among the allies and it had repercussions in all those areas of ambiguity which accompany all negotiations.

The second difficulty is even more serious. This is that the United States is in a confrontation throughout the world with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Thus the question of Laos is not only the question of Laos as such but also that of this world-wide confrontation. When the United States thinks of a military action, it must do so after taking into consideration the responsibilities which it and it alone has in respect to itself and to the entire world. In consequence, a decision in regard to Laos might well mean a decision in regard to World War III. The Secretary said this not to show a fear or a particular concern on the part of the United States in regard to World War III, but simply to show that a decision taken in Washington is by its very nature different from a decision which might be taken in Vientiane, and this because a decision taken in Washington or in Moscow might be such as to reduce all of Laos to ashes. This is for the United States a question of conscience and of moral principle, and of what the United States feels it owes to the two million Laotians. It is possible that a decision might involve only the lives of a few thousand or of a few tens of thousands of soldiers. It is possible also that such a decision might involve the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

It is the tragedy of the peaceful Laotian people that they are involved in the confrontation between the great powers, in which they should not be involved at all. The U.S. is, nevertheless, fully conscious of having undertaken to do its utmost in order to prevent a Communist takeover of Laos. This undertaking has three reasons. The first one is the Laotian people themselves. The second one is Southeast Asia; and the third one is the position and the prestige of the U.S. in the world. Actions of the past have proved that the U.S. is in earnest in regard to Laos. For example, if only the efforts of the foreign nations were considered, it would be clear that the actions in the defense of Laotian independence of countries other than the U.S. were very puny indeed.

There are circumstances under which the U.S. would find it necessary to send its own armed forces to defend Laotian independence. The Secretary expressed his feeling that under such circumstances the principal allies of the U.S. would also find it necessary to participate in the struggle. If, however, the Secretary is to speak frankly and as a friend, he finds it impossible for the U.S. to state precisely and in advance what might be the circumstances under which the U.S. would find it necessary to intervene militarily. This is because to state such circumstances in advance would amount to delegating to the Government of Laos the responsibility for the decisions and the policy of the U.S. The Secretary therefore cannot state what set of circumstances would automatically bring about military action as a response of the U.S. A better way, however, is to call for mutual trust and openness between the Laotian Government and ourselves.

To give an example, the Secretary then recalled the events of these recent weeks. At the beginning of the Geneva Conference the Secretary sent a message to the General,/4/ in which he called upon the Royal Laotian Government to avoid making premature concessions to Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao. At that time his colleagues, the Foreign Ministers of France and of the U.K., transmitted similar messages to the Laotian Government. Although the Secretary did not see the texts of those messages, he was assured that they were indeed transmitted by the two Governments mentioned.

/4/In Secto 104 from Geneva, also sent to Vientiane as telegram 11, May 13, Rusk suggested that Phoumi and the King use the "greatest care" in political negotiations with Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong and that it would be a mistake to enter into an "improvident political agreement under sense of pressure Geneva Conference." (Ibid., 751J.00/1361)

The Secretary indicated he wished to renew at this moment the same advice and the same appeal against premature concessions to the enemy. He said he gave this advice with the full realization of the responsibility of his office and of the responsibility of the U.S. as a great power. The Secretary reiterated that he did not believe that the General, the King of Laos, and Prince Boun Oum should consider the situation as calling for surrender. This is the advice which the Secretary felt he had to give as a friend. The Secretary furthermore said that the General should not advise the King to enter on the path of premature concessions leading to the formation of a coalition Government which would be in fact dominated by the Communists. The question arises how this advice can be followed, when it is accompanied by a feeling of uncertainty. The only answer which can be given to this question is to suggest that--should the Government and the King be willing--daily contacts be maintained between the Laotian and the U.S. Governments, so as to transmit from one to the other a full and frank expression of its thoughts and intentions. The Secretary assured the General that the President of the U.S. will not deceive the latter, and that if the two Governments remain in close liaison and act in a concerted manner in the future, at the very least each will know the thoughts of the other. The U.S. is committed to the defense of freedom in the entire world, which means also in Laos. Looking at the situation from Vientiane, it is possible to think that there is a certain indifference in American attitude. This, however, is not the case.

The Secretary stated that he had to add a highly important comment. He is doing so not to be critical but only to be frank. If the U.S. is to call on its young men to go and fight to defend the freedom of another country, it must be quite certain of the desire of that country for freedom. This is a question of moral principle and also a question of practical necessity. Therefore, it is of the highest importance to make certain that the will to defend freedom not only exists in Laos but also is made obvious to the entire world, and complete solidarity and readiness to accept sacrifice on the part of the Laotian people becomes more apparent. American soldiers are not mercenaries who can be used to defend the causes of other people. The Secretary can say this with the utmost frankness because he knows of the great gallantry with which the General has defended the cause of freedom.

The Secretary appealed for close contacts between the General, the King and the Laotian Government on the one hand, and Ambassador Brown and the U.S. Government on the other, in order to obtain concerted efforts on both sides to determine the manner in which the defense of Laos can be best assured. The Secretary repeated that it is not possible to bring more precision to the description of the American position, as any attempt at such a clarification would amount to deception. The Secretary said that he had spoken with a frankness which went beyond traditional diplomatic practice. His concern in doing so was to clarify the situation. It is not necessary to think of an intervention in Laos in terms of risk to the lives of a few thousands or a few tens of thousands of soldiers, but rather in the terms of the danger of a direct clash between the two greatest powers. If a certain caution could be felt in the actions of the U.S. Government, it was not so much due to the undertaking entered into by the previous administration to seek a solution through negotiations, or to the concern about possible consequences, as due primarily to a deep sense of responsibility on the part of the U.S. The responsibility of the U.S. is, among other things, that of preserving Laotian independence and not making Laos into a cemetery. The question is a very complex one, and the only answer is close liaison between the two Governments and concerted action by them. The simplest answers may sometimes be also the worst answers. What is sought is the independence of Laos and not the crushing of Laos between the millstones of the two great powers.

If the United States has taken a position for the neutrality of Laos, it is certainly not because of a lack of appreciation for what the General and men like him have done. The Secretary asked the General to believe that one of the motivations of the United States is a reluctance to involve the Laotian people in a tragedy. The United States has no national ambitions in Laos. It does not seek any military bases in Laos and neither does it seek a military ally in Laos. The extent of its ambitions in regard to Laos is to safeguard the latter's freedom and independence, and this is also the ambition of the Laotians themselves. The Secretary repeated his apologies for having been more frank than is traditional in diplomacy; he was frank in order to show the necessity for a close and complete liaison between the two Governments.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that the Laotians should not feel that they must surrender; neither should they feel that they must accept Communist domination nor, again should they feel that they lack support. The Secretary added, after apologizing for an indiscretion of such remark, that the United States Government feels that the historical moment has come for His Majesty the King to exercise a greater degree of direct influence. The Secretary understands the King's reluctance at playing an active part in politics. However, if his understanding of the situation is correct, the Laotian people have a great respect for the institution of monarchy. There are times when such respect can be safeguarded only by taking appropriate decisions. It is clear that in a Communist Laos there would be no place for a King, and that the moment has come for the King to assert his leadership. It is possible that the King may be reluctant to take actions which might create a risk for the institution of the monarchy. However, if the Secretary is to consider risking the life of his son in the defense of Laos, the King should also consider taking risks for the crown.

General Phoumi Nosavan thanked the Secretary for the latter's frankness and for the expression of his opinion. The General shares many of those opinions; in particular in regard to actions which would be desirable on the part of the King.

There is, however, something which makes difficult action on the part of the King and also on the part of the General. This is a lack of clarity as to the United States position. Such a lack of clarity makes it difficult to take decisions. Therefore, one of the things which the General would greatly like to understand better is what actions the United States contemplates in the near future from the political, diplomatic and military points of view.

The Geneva conference was convened, in fact, against the wishes of the Royal Laotian Government. The General believes that the United States has already committed itself in Geneva to a certain objective. He would appreciate it if more precision could be given to him as to the nature of that objective. This is of the highest importance to determine the future actions of the Laotian Government.

The Secretary said that the United States seeks the neutrality and the independence of Laos. In Geneva, the United States delegation has supported all the proposals which could lead to a maximum of international assistance to genuine independence and neutrality of Laos. The United States is in favor of an effective international machinery, without a Soviet veto, which would prevent infiltration into Laos of arms or men, and the development of any situation which would endanger Laotian independence. In consequence, the United States is for a strong international commission without a Soviet veto.

The question of the Geneva conference, however, is secondary at the present moment as compared to that of the establishment of a coalition government in Laos. Should there be established a coalition government which would in fact be dominated by the Communists, the United States would lose all interest in Laos. The United States does not intend to subscribe to a fiction. Not one dollar would be spent on either military or economic aid for a Laos which would not be genuinely independent. The United States will have no part in any decision or any action which would make Laos Communist.

From the American point of view, the so-called neutralists in Laos are in fact the allies of the Communists. If a possibility existed for those neutralists to be drawn away from the Communists, so as to become allied with the Royal Laotian Government, that would greatly improve the prospects for the future. At the present moment, however, the United States Government is skeptical as to the possibility of a coalition government based on the idea of the three forces and of an apportionment of portfolios, which would, in fact, be dominated by the Communists. If the neutralists can be drawn away from the Pathet Lao and toward the Government, the situation might be different.

The General said that if he understood correctly, the United States has decided to approve the objectives of the Geneva conference.

The Secretary said that this was not exactly the case, although the United States would view with favor such objectives if the situation permitted that they be genuinely reached. The Geneva conference, however, is of a secondary importance at the present moment, as he noted earlier. The Secretary mentioned as an example the early days of the Geneva conference when he was isolated in Geneva. He was insisting at the time that it was absurd to seat the Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao delegations on a footing of equality with the delegation of the Royal Laotian Government. Yet at that very moment at Van Namone, the three delegations were gathering on a footing of equality and amidst a great display of friendly relations, including champagne luncheons. To be fair, it must be said that the United States Government suggested to the Royal Laotian Government that the latter participate in the Van Namone talks; the question is, however, of the spirit and the atmosphere which surrounded these talks. If the United States Government is to take a firm position at major international conferences, it must be sure that its friends will not pull the rug from under it. In consequence, the Secretary renewed his appeal for close contacts between the two Governments, so as to avoid any situation in which any one of them would be in the dark concerning the thoughts of the other one, in order both to avoid any actions other than those agreed upon jointly, and to avoid any premature concessions to the enemy. The Secretary expressed the hope that the King might assert his influence, for example by making the three Princes come to him in Luang Prabang.

The Secretary said that the General might wish to continue this conversation the next day at the reception to be offered by the Charge d'Affaires in honor of the General./5/

/5/Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, and Harriman went to the reception at the Lao Embassy in Washington at 6:30 p.m. on June 30 and had a final word with Phoumi before he returned to Laos. Rusk expressed the hope that when presenting the report of his Washington trip to King Savang, Phoumi would stress that "premature despondency is not called for." (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)

The General said that he did not wish to take advantage of the Secretary's kindness and take up too much of his time. He recognized that there was not enough liaison between the two Governments and in fact such actions as those leading to the Geneva conference, the Van Namone meetings and the meetings of the three Princes in Zurich were taken without much consultation.

The Secretary remarked that direct consultation and close contacts are much better than any formal definition of positions, especially in regard to hypothetical situations concerning a future which no one can foresee. The Secretary indicated that the United States is interested not only in Laos but in all of Southeast Asia and that events in Laos cannot fail to have an influence on Thailand, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. In turn, events in Southeast Asia cannot fail to influence the world situation. Thus the involvement of the United States in world affairs does not mean that the United States may have appeared negligent in regard to Laos, rather on the contrary. The Secretary said that if he had spoken to the General with a somewhat brutal frankness, it is because he had not always been a diplomat. He also used to be a soldier and had fought in Southeast Asia and in particular in the North part of Burma where he had seen action alongside with the Karins and the Kachins who remind him very much of the Khas and the Meos of Laos.

129. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 30, 1961, 9:50-10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, Phoumi Visit, 6/29/61-6/30/61. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was probably drafted by Glenn. The conversation took place at the White House.

SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPANTS

Major General Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Prime Minister of Laos and Minister of National Security and Veterans' Affairs
Brigadier General Ouane Ratrikoun, Chief of Staff of the Lao Armed Forces
Sisouk Na Champassak, Minister attached to the Prime Minister's Office
Tianethone Chantharasy, Charge d'Affaires a.i., of the Embassy of Laos

The President
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Christian G. Chapman, Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs
Edmund S. Glenn, Chief of Interpreting Branch of Language Services

After being welcomed by the President, General Phoumi gave him an oral message from the King who was very worried about his health. The King hoped the President would recover promptly. The King also wanted to express his high gratitude for the President's efforts since assuming office. The King was very touched by the President's good will in saving Laos from Communist domination. He hoped this collaboration would continue until Laos emerged from its difficult situation. Phoumi then thanked the President in the name of his party and himself for granting them this visit.

The President said he knew Phoumi had been through a difficult time and had acted courageously. The problem now was to find the means of working out a solution for a neutral and fully independent Laos; part of our effort is being carried on in Geneva and part in Laos. The President hoped that Phoumi had good talks with the Secretaries of State and Defense/2/ and that we could continue to maintain very close contacts, particularly on Phoumi's coming talks with Souvanna and Souphanouvong.

/2/For the talk with Rusk, see Document 128. No record has been found of Phoumi's discussion with McNamara.

The President then asked whether Phoumi was continuing to train the FAL in case efforts to find an agreement failed.

Phoumi answered that he had discussed this matter with the Secretaries of State and Defense and American military leaders./3/ He had given them his own personal ideas regarding the solution in Laos and now he wanted to inform the President of the serious concern he felt over the very near future. He considered that a government of national union was only one more possibility for Communist penetration of Laos. If such a government is formed, Phoumi said, they will take measures to continue this penetration. If a government is not formed the RLG will be confronted by a difficult situation. Therefore he requested the President to give exactly his point of view so that on his return to Vientiane he could give a full report to the King.

/3/ Regarding Phoumi's discussion with U.S. military leaders, see footnote 2, Document 126.

The President understood that the Secretary of State had discussed these matters in detail and added that our ideas would be the subject of a message which we would send to Ambassador Brown. Given the difficult balance of forces, the President said, we were anxious to have a government that would maintain Lao neutrality and independence. He wanted, therefore, to maintain close contact with the General through Ambassador Brown. The President then asked Phoumi what the military result would be if the cease-fire broke down.

Phoumi answered that he had fruitful conversations with the Chiefs of Staff/4/ and had given them details on the FAL potential and on that of the enemy. He said that he could maintain the situation if the Viet Minh did not reinforce the other side. However, the RLG could not hold out without supplementary assistance if the enemy received additional aid from the Viet Minh. As far as resolving the Lao problem by peaceful means was concerned, Phoumi said, the Lao foresee a very difficult situation and do not believe in the success of such an approach. At Zurich the other side maintained their position. The RLG, on the other hand, offered a compromise which would be the subject of future discussions. If the President wanted success by peaceful means, Phoumi stated, the RLG would have to try to find a solution.

/4/No other record of Phoumi's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been found.

Then Phoumi bluntly asked what would be the President's attitude if they accepted a government presided over by Souvanna Phouma.

The President answered that before making a judgment we would have to know the details of the distribution of portfolios. Close contact should be maintained on the subject between the United States and the RLG. Phoumi was better informed and could discuss this matter with Ambassador Brown. He himself, the President said, was not sufficiently aware of the different personalities to make a judgment at this distance. The kind of government we would like to see emerge was one strong enough to insure the independence and neutrality of Laos; that is the objective of our policy, the President said. We want to make every effort to search every avenue of approach. If negotiations break down, we shall then have to re-examine what measures need be taken. The President then asked Phoumi whether any government headed by Souvanna Phouma would remain neutral.

Phoumi said he thought it would be quite difficult. Souvanna is not the true leader of neutralism. He used the Communists to fight the RLG and used Communist arguments to prevent the national reconciliation that could otherwise easily have taken place. That is the reason, Phoumi continued, that the RLG had put forward a proposal for a royal government. Phoumi then inquired whether, if the President could not give them a precise opinion on a Souvanna government, the RLG could count on United States aid to insure the success of the King's government.

The President reiterated that we would maintain contact with Phoumi in order to be able to evaluate developments. He remarked that the British and French look more hopefully on Souvanna to maintain neutrality than do others. The President then summarized our position: The United States will be influenced by Phoumi's judgment; the objective is an independent and neutral Laos; the United States wants to maintain intimate contact with the General through Ambassador Brown; Ambassador Harriman will return to Geneva to seek to obtain an effective ICC; the makeup of a future government will depend on the General's firmness and judgment; we cannot get everything we want in Laos; in view of the military situation, we do not want to resolve the situation by purely military means; we must therefore seek the best arrangement we can obtain; the evolution of the situation will depend on the General, on the FAL, and on the King. One of the difficulties in answering General Phoumi on the question of whether Souvanna might be Prime Minister, the President added, depended in part on whether Phoumi, for instance, obtained the Ministry of Defense. In sum, in judging a new government one had to consider the whole package.

General Phoumi assured the President that he would try to remain as Minister of Defense.

The President continued his summation by saying that we could not give the General precise answers to the questions he raised. We are faced with problems of our own such as relations with our allies the British and French and American public opinion. It is therefore important that we make every effort to find a peaceful solution. The President hoped the General would leave Washington realizing that Laos is a matter of greatest importance to us. Laos and Berlin are two priority problems confronting the President. We cannot make a judgment today and we shall see how things develop at Geneva and in the future conversations among the three Princes.

General Phoumi thanked the President for his very clear explanation and assured him of maintaining close collaboration. He said that he considered Ambassador Brown an "excellent comrade." He thought the President's attitude reinforced their position and that they could therefore tackle the problem.

The President again expressed satisfaction in seeing the General. The President knew that the General had a very difficult twelve months, that he was involved right at the site while he, the President, was 8,000 miles away. He therefore recognized the General's difficult position. Therefore, while Phoumi may not agree and we cannot always do as he wishes, we are conscious of the fact that the General is carrying a very heavy burden and that much hangs on his judgment and vigor. The President realized how difficult the negotiations would be and reminded Phoumi what Talleyrand faced at Vienna when he represented a France which had no power and was in complete collapse after losing a war. Yet Talleyrand succeeded in obtaining a stronger France out of these negotiations. The President added, of course, that France was in a much worse state then Laos is today. Therefore Phoumi, the President said, should conduct his negotiations with perseverance. He hoped that Phoumi might achieve a favorable solution.

130. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, July 3, 1961, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-361. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Vientiane and repeated to Geneva for Fecon, Bangkok, London, Ottawa, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.

22. From Harriman. In hour's talk with Souvanna this afternoon I went over points contained Deptel 14/2/ but followed Brown's admonitions in manner of approach. Souvanna said he suffering from ear infection in addition to continuing abscess.

/2/In telegram 14, July 2, Harriman received instructions for his discussion with Souvanna Phouma. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-261) In addition, U. Alexis Johnson sent Harriman a memorandum on June 30, providing guidelines for the discussion and expressing concern that Souvanna's actions belied his claim to neutrality. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-3061) In telegram 2 from Vientiane, repeated to Paris for Harriman, July 1, Brown suggested that, from his personal knowledge of Souvanna, Harriman should not confront him with open criticism. The approach should instead be in terms of U.S. willingness to cooperate if Souvanna was prepared to do certain things to show he was a genuine neutral. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-261)

I took occasion warn him about trusting Soviets and cited my personal experiences with Khrushchev perfidy in connection with pledges to other smaller countries which had tried cooperate with them. Souvanna explained he believed situation different in Laos where there no landed aristocracy and no proletariat. Moreover, he thought Communist aware West would not tolerate pro-Communist Laos any more than Soviet bloc prepared accept too pro-Western orientation. Therefore, they were willing for country to be neutral. He aware of problem of placing confidence in Communists and would not trust them or, for that matter, anyone else until he saw what happened. I expressed concern about PL dominance in future Lao Armed Forces, and Souvanna said he recognized problem which would be taken care of when armed forces reduced and excess arms locked up.

Turning to ICC, I told him we believed strong commission could be useful in Laos and could aid it to maintain independence and neutrality. Commission, however, would have be able carry out its mission effectively. Souvanna said he agreed completely with this point of view. He believed best way improving commission's effectiveness would be for it to increase size of respective contingents in Laos and give them their own means of traveling about country--helicopters, light aircraft, et cetera. He did not believe commission teams should be stationed at given points in country, as had been case before, since country so big control points could be avoided. ICC should be located in Vientiane where it would be informed by Lao Government of foreign incursions. If it had proper transportation it could quickly investigate. Or, if it heard separately of incidents, it could inform government and obtain its permission to investigate them. Commission could not act independently lest this infringe on Lao sovereignty. This why French proposal unacceptable. He agreed, however, to oppose supervision of ICC by co-chairmen and thought co-chairmen's role should be limited to convening new Geneva conference in event serious situation developed. He repeated ICC should supervise elections.

Souvanna asked whether US prepared support his candidacy for premiership. I told him I unable reply directly but could give him perhaps an impression of the things that would affect USG attitude. While we recognized importance his position and sympathized with his objectives, we were concerned at role of PL and of orientation of people he might have around him. Much would depend on type of men he would propose for government. In reply to my question, Souvanna said he had good men such as Quinim Pholsena, Sissamang Sisalemqak, Khamsouk Keoula and Pheng Phongsavan. He said Phoumi "very ambitious" and without popular support while his (Souvanna's) nephew Somsanith "too young and inexperienced." He said there no difficulties between him and Phoumi and latter had always had high opinion of Souvanna, his former chief, and Souvanna had esteem for Phoumi. He asked what Phoumi had said about him during talks in US, and I replied that he had said nothing derogatory about Souvanna but had not concealed his distrust of PL. When I asked about Souphannouvong, Souvanna said quite possible he would not be in government. Souvanna continued believe that key Ministries such as Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior could not be given to PL but shall be held by strong non-Communists.

When I told him US would be prepared continue aid a Laos which neutral, he said this aid would be welcome on condition people benefited directly and not [omission in text].

I told him there was one thing in particular which we would like to see and that was closer ties with Western friends, particularly UK and France, and less intimacy with northern neighbors. Prince laughed and said only way he could leave Laos was through Hanoi. When I remarked we concerned about DRV designs on Laos, Souvanna said he distrusted it completely but would probably accept certain technicians from it in public works field. When I expressed opinion that PL was a front for Viet Minh he replied they were not completely Communist but he didn't fully trust them. That was why he kept them at a distance.

It was to combat PL in election that he had recently formed new political party and had asked UK and French to provide party with "certain means." This help had been promised and similar aid from US would be welcome.

I told Souvanna Couve told me this morning agreement had been reached on continued French military presence and training role in Laos. Souvanna indicated this not quite true. Seno would have to have status changed. However, general provisions of 1954 Accords could be maintained with some modifications.

We talked some about his past contacts with US representatives in area, and he spoke favorably about Brown. I urged him see Brown, if occasion presented itself, or Trimble, and he said would be pleased see either one.

Question of food shortages in China and DRV arose, and I inquired whether areas under his control had similar problems. He replied affirmatively, and I suggested that he might wish to ask for help in this field. He indicated that he might consider doing so.

On the whole he was considerably more forthcoming than in earlier talks and made somewhat more sense in explaining his views. A disquieting feature was the four names he mentioned which I understand have been considered pretty close to PL.

Gavin

131. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, July 6, 1961, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-661. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Hong Kong and Warsaw.

Confe 339. From Steeves. During translation break in conference yesterday Ambassador Wang Peng Nan approached me with obvious show of cordiality saying he now back from Warsaw and would like to talk to me about "Chinese-American relations." I passed the remark off by saying that the one comment which I would make on the subject of our relations was the one that had to do with this conference saying that we were not progressing very rapidly.

He said he agreed and then said "What do you Americans want out of this conference?" I told him that should be rather obvious from what I had said in my statement at the conference yesterday. I gave him a very brief resume again of our insistence on impartial machinery with adequate terms of reference in order to insure that people like the Viet Minh would be restrained from interfering in Laos as they had done for so many years.

He obviously wanted to be affable and not engage in an argument and halfway agreed with me that adequate controls were probably necessary and that we should discuss the matter further.

Ambassador Harriman and I feel that some continuing cautious contact with Wang on the subject of the conference would not be out of place. Would appreciate Department's comments promptly./2/

/2/In Fecon 231, July 6, the Department agreed that "cautious contact" with Wang Ping-nan was not out of place, but there should be no impression given of negotiations. Contacts should be guarded, casual, and limited to conference issues. (Ibid.) In Confe 357, July 10, Steeves reported he had another brief talk with Wang Ping-nan in which the Chinese delegate suggested in an almost affable approach that all the Chinese wanted out of the conference was a show of progress. Wang suggested that the easy question, i.e., neutrality, should be discussed first and the progress made would help to resolve the more difficult issues. Steeves countered by emphasizing the issues of equipment and instructions to the ICC and Wang "mildly agreed" that an effective commission was desirable. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-1061)

132. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, July 7, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 7/61. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Capabilities of the Lao Army

1. This brief estimate of the current capabilities of the Lao Army is furnished in response to your query during the NSC Meeting on 29 June 1961./2/ It is based upon information received from Chief, MAAG, Laos this morning.

/2/See Document 127.

2. At the time of the cease-fire on 3 May, it was estimated that the enemy could advance on any front without encountering effective Lao Army resistance. This evaluation was based on considerations of leadership, training, status of equipment, and the will to fight. Since the cease-fire, progress has been made in training and the correction of combat losses in personnel and some equipment. The increase in the effectiveness accruing from this progress to date is insufficient, however, to justify too much optimism in view of the leadership and supply deficiencies which still exist, the lack of noticeable improvement in the Lao will to fight, and the continuing unimpeded movement of troops and supplies from North Vietnam into areas of Laos under enemy control. The Lao Army without outside military assistance is not at the present time capable of more than delaying action on any front on which the enemy chooses to make an organized attack.

3. An intensive training program has been initiated since the cease-fire and Lao forces are undergoing training in Laos and Thailand. One infantry battalion has completed a six-week period of unit training in Thailand and two additional battalions are now in training under this program. Artillery training has been initiated to convert all batteries from French to U.S. techniques. Two 105-mm howitzer and one 75-mm howitzer batteries have already been trained; an additional 75-mm battery is presently in training. Thirteen pilots are now undergoing training in Thailand; an additional fifteen are scheduled to commence training about 1 September. Tactical training of deployed battalions is being conducted wherever feasible and has resulted in increased individual proficiency in basic soldiering and some progress in noncommissioned officer leadership. The principal result of this tactical training has been position improvement, increased small unit tactical proficiency and improved maintenance of individual equipment. Officer and noncommissioned officer schools have not been approved by the Lao Ministry of Security on the basis of the pressure of other commitments. Specialist training has been generally neglected for the same reason. In the area of intelligence training, a Royal Lao Military Intelligence School has been established to train additional intelligence officers. Regional intelligence schools are now being organized at regional headquarters.

4. With regard to logistics, the status of supplies has improved during the past two months except for certain critical items which have been requisitioned on an emergency basis. Equipment is in from poor to fair condition. The maintenance capability of the Lao Army is improving slowly but is hampered by insufficient trainees, low technical ability, language difficulties and an excessive backlog of equipment needing maintenance.

5. In the area of organization, the most notable improvement has been made in intelligence organization. Officers trained at the U.S. Army Intelligence School on Okinawa have been placed in key command and intelligence positions. New tables of organization make provision for adequate intelligence staffs.

6. Leadership remains weak despite strong efforts by the Chief, MAAG, for improvement. Leadership and proficiency training of officers is generally neglected although one such school is planned in one military region.

7. In summary, although progress is being made, the Lao Army is not yet an effective fighting force. The correction of the basic deficiencies in leadership and motivation are prerequisite to reaching an acceptable level of effectiveness and will take time and the full cooperation of the Royal Lao Government and Lao Army. Present deployments necessary to confront opposing forces on the avenues of approach to critical terrain decrease the Lao Army capability for internal security against irregular opposing forces and hamper training and rehabilitation. Improvement of the overall combat capability of the Lao Army in the face of the present missions for internal security and for defending the cease-fire line can be expected to be an uphill battle for some time to come.

L.L. Lemnitzer/3/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

133. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)/1/

Washington, July 10, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Laos: General, 7/61. No classification marking.

Many thanks for your message of the 7th of July in regard to the capabilities of the Lao Army./2/

/2/Document 132.

(1) I think the officer training is particularly important and I note that the Lao Ministry of Security is opposed "on the basis of the pressure of other commitments. I would think the non-commissioned officers are the key to the resistance there. Can't we push this harder? Can't we put pressure on the Ministry of Security? We may not have much time left, but at least if we could get a month of training for the officers it would be most helpful.

(2) I notice that they have requisitioned on an emergency basis for certain critical items. Would you let me know what is happening on those?

(3) I also note that "equipment is in from poor to fair condition." Is there anything we can do about this?

134. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-460-61

Washington, July 12, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Laos 381 (Sensitive), Jan.-Dec. `61. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it.

SUBJECT
US Actions in Respect to Laos (C)

1. The United States agreed to participate in the Geneva Conference on Laos subject to the proviso that an effective cease fire, verified by the ICC or other conditions satisfactory to the United States would prevail before the Conference on May 12.

2. No effective cease fire has been achieved and yet the United States has participated in the Conference from the start. Furthermore, the USSR has never agreed to providing adequate instructions to the ICC for supervision of the cease fire. The Communist assault on Pa Dong commenced on 22 April. When Pa Dong fell on 7 June, the United States restated its firm view to the USSR that the Conference should not continue until adequate provisions for the maintenance of a cease fire were assured. The US delegation temporarily boycotted the conference, but returned without altering the situation or obtaining an effective cease fire. On 12 June, following three days of mortar attack against FAL positions near the village of Hat Bo, Kong Le/PL infantry forced the retreat of the FAL units toward Paksane. On 14 June the rebel forces captured two villages in the Paksane area. The Communists continue to violate the cease fire in order to expand their control over new areas while the FAL is restricted to defensive action only.

3. Thailand is extremely critical inter alia of US actions with respect to the Geneva Conference, and on 13 June directed her delegation not to attend further conference sessions until and unless there is a satisfactory solution to the Lao delegation seating problem. On 27 June 1961, the Thai delegation resumed its place at the Conference, as a result of US urging and an RLG decision to fill the third Lao chair with representatives of the five Lao political parties supporting the RLG. Vietnam's Foreign Minister Mau--who is under instructions from President Diem not to participate in discussions of substantive issues until an effective cease fire exists--has been advised to the effect that the US Government considers that we now have as good a cease fire as we will get until parties reached detailed agreement re a cease fire. It would appear that the US determination not to walk out of the Conference is dominating all other considerations.

4. Since the start of the Geneva Conference, the US negotiating position has been weakened by compromises made in drafting agreed tripartite position papers (US, UK and France)--positions which are subject to further dilution in the 14-Nation forum. The United States also acquiesced in the Lao delegation seating procedure, i.e., giving both the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna Phouma groups equal recognition with the RLG. After being goaded by the Communists for stalling on substantive discussions at Geneva, the US delegation, on 15 June, announced readiness to get down to work and stated that the West no longer insisted there first must be an effective cease fire. If present trends at Geneva and in Laos continue, the outcome will be a Laos more Communist than neutral. If this eventuality materializes, US prestige will have suffered another serious blow.

5. Some of our Southeast Asian allies are realistic enough to recognize the pressures brought to bear on the United States by the British and French. The situation we now face was not created in 1961. Its origins go all the way back to 1954 and before. Nevertheless, US failure to exercise active leadership of SEATO, particularly since August 1960, is not understood and is considered by many in Asia as a sign of weakness. Continued political retreat by the United States in the face of Communist challenges will surely immobilize the national will of those nations who have allied themselves with us, and it may induce many to seek an accommodation with Communism. There are some indications that Thailand is already considering plans for moving toward neutralism. Similar thinking is emanating from the Philippines.

6. Credibility in the US deterrent is waning. The challenge has been made in Southeast Asia. Khrushchev has indicated Berlin may be next. If we take a stand on Laos, we can not, of course, avert the potential dangers of escalation. Nevertheless, the probability of escalation into a war of nuclear exchange with the USSR over Laos is less than would be the case with a more direct confrontation with the Soviets over Berlin. Taking a firm political and military position on Laos could serve to enhance credibility in US determination to use its military force wherever needed to protect its interests. Such a course of action need not unhinge our general war posture to a significant degree.

7. A plan exists for intervention in Laos in the event of a breakdown of the cease fire. This plan has been approved at high levels in State and Defense, and involves forces of some SEATO nations as well as the United States. The Ban Pa Dong incident on 7 June provided an occasion of short duration wherein the United States would have been justified in sending military forces into Laos. The Communists' operational pattern in Laos over the past several months makes it highly probable that such a situation will present itself again. The United States should be ready to respond immediately with political and military actions.

8. In view of the reasons set forth above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense seek a high-level governmental decision that, upon the next occurrence of a proven Communist violation of the cease fire, the United States will:

a. Withdraw its delegation from the Geneva Conference on Laos.

b. Undertake military operations in Laos through SEATO, or with those SEATO members prepared to participate, or, if necessary, unilaterally. The objective of military action would be to achieve the necessary military position to permit successful political negotiation for a unified independent and neutral Laos.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

135. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/

Geneva, July 12, 1961, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1261. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Paris, Vientiane, and Moscow.

Confe 365. From Harriman. In an informal meeting today which we agreed would be considered unofficial and personal I discussed with Pushkin conference procedure. Pushkin remained adamantly opposed to MacDonald compromise proposal/2/ but offered in answer to my arguments following proposal: First, that Declaration on Neutrality and Protocol on Controls, taken together, should be considered a "single entity." Second, they would be considered in order in which they appeared in both currently tabled drafts, i.e., neutrality first, on understanding that if there is disagreement on any provision after one day debate, this provision will be set aside and discussion will proceed to next provision. After discussion of neutrality on this basis, and without attempting further to resolve points of disagreement, conference would proceed with discussion of protocol on controls on same basis. Thereafter, we would then consider how the unresolved provisions of both declaration and protocol could be dealt with by the conference. Pushkin said he had not obtained approval this proposal other bloc countries. He hoped we would give the matter serious consideration and felt that this compromise proposal met all our objections. I told him I would study this proposal, consult my government and let him know. I request urgently the Department's reaction. I recommend its acceptance in principle, and that I be authorized reach detailed agreement with him and with non-Communist delegations along these lines. There are a number of details which would have to be satisfactorily resolved. For example, the idea of a single day's debate on provisions in dispute should probably be interpreted as applicable only after we have reached an acknowledged deadlock on a particular provision. It is patent that many provisions would require more than a single day to negotiate. Pushkin agrees, of course, that discussions on general subjects, such as equipment for ICC, access or cease-fire can be taken up in conference any day at the instance of the US or any other delegation.

/2/The MacDonald compromise was described in Confe 353 from Geneva, July 8. With the concurrence of the U.S., French, Canadian, and British Delegations, MacDonald suggested to Puskin either simultaneous discussion of "neutrality" and "controls" on every other day or as the basis of separate committees of the whole. Puskin refused to accept any departure from the Soviet-Chinese procedure of discussing only neutrality. (Ibid., 751.J.00/7-861)

I feel this compromise gives us the main points for which we were pressing and in some ways is better than the British alternate day proposal as all unresolved matters of both declaration and protocol would be held for consideration at one time.

Martin

136. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to President Kennedy/1/

CM-277-61

Washington, July 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 7/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Capabilities of the Lao Army

In response to your memorandum of July 10, 1961,/2/ the following additional information is provided on measures being taken to improve the capabilities of the Lao Army:

/2/Document 133.

(1) Officer and noncommissioned officer training is being pushed hard. Continuing pressure has resulted in some progress, although the over-all problem remains a very difficult one in the absence of a clear appreciation by the Laotians of the problems they face. A unit level, on-site training program was established a month ago. It includes officer and NCO instruction stressing leadership, aggressive patrolling, and general offensive and defensive tactics. An NCO school, presenting a six months' course of instruction, is currently in session at Pakse. A military intelligence course, approved by General Phoumi, began early this month for sixty selected company grade officers. This course covers combat intelligence, counterintelligence, psychological warfare, and aerial and ground reconnaissance. We are further examining ways and means to cause the Laotians to expand and expedite their officer and NCO training programs, fully recognizing the importance of such training and the length of time it takes to achieve meaningful results.

(2) With regard to the emergence requisition of certain critical items, Admiral Felt is personally acting on such requests, and has reiterated his assurance to me that actions taken by the Service Departments in response to his requests are invariably cooperative and expeditious. For example, six floating bridge raft sections and ferry conversion sets are being airlifted direct to Vientiane in response to just such an emergency request. To expedite delivery of the more common items, a thirty-day stock has been established in Thailand subject to the control of Chief MAAG, Laos.

(3) The "poor to fair condition" of equipment in Laos relates directly to the training situation. The French made no effort to provide technical training in maintenance. The U.S. technical training effort to fill that void has not yet had time to make its impact felt. Initially, U.S. and Filipino technicians had to be used to perform maintenance instead of carrying out their training mission, which is their primary responsibility. A concerted effort is now being made to carry out a vigorous maintenance training program, and the condition of equipment is expected to improve. We have informed CINCPAC and Chief MAAG, Laos that we are prepared to augment the number of maintenance training personnel now in Laos to the extent they can be usefully utilized there.

L.L. Lemnitzer