The main Pathet Lao effort seems to be an attack from the north toward Luang Prabang. A town called Nam Bac fell on January 7 after an intensive four-hour mortar and recoilless rifle attack. The Pathet Lao numbered about 700. Government forces destroyed some ammunition and apparently saved their weapons in the withdrawal to Muong Sai, 30 miles west. This latter town possesses a 3000-foot sod runway. Possession of Nam Bac makes it possible for the Communists to go down the river toward Luang Prabang.

The government forces, meanwhile, reportedly possess the road junction where the Xieng Khouang road forks to Luang Prabang and Vientiane. Furthermore, the troops in Luang Prabang have been reinforced by a battalion (338 men). The King has returned to Luang Prabang after the formalities at Vientiane. The bulk of the Boun Oum forces in the Xieng Khouang area have withdrawn about 40 miles southeast of that town. Many of these are Meo tribesmen. Plans are for a counterattack north from Paksane to retake the Plaine des Jarres.

We have authorized use of counterpart funds to provide a bonus of one-month's pay for FAL personnel in the Vientiane combat./2/ A C-47 with a K-38 camera is now available. T-6s are now authorized for use within Laos for all operations except bombing, and CINCPAC may now use U.S. military aircraft to move supplies. The RLG has notified its embassy in London to warn the Soviets one day before the first T-6 mission is flown./3/ Despite this fact, the Soviets have not at this time ceased aerial re-supply of the Pathet Lao.

/2/As outlined in a memorandum from the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., to Goodpaster, January 13. (Ibid., International File, Laos)

/3/As instructed in telegram 733 to Vientiane, sent also to Bangkok and CINCPAC, January 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-661)

The Joint Chiefs have authorized the use of our military aircraft in the Thai festivities for the return of the King and Queen on January 20.

The big problem seems to be the question of the reactivation of the ICC. The Indians have approached the Soviets directly on this matter and the British, while annoyed, feel we should go along. Our own diplomatic position at this moment is that the ICC could be reactivated under some stringent conditions, which means primarily that its task would be to end Pathet Lao military operations and end Communist military assistance. The Thais are relieved to learn of the conditions put forth by the U.S., but afraid that these conditions would be whittled away if the ICC were reactivated.

Brown visualizes five ways of internationalizing this conflict: (1) Lao appeal to SEATO; (2) Lao appeal to the UN; (3) reconvocation of the Geneva Conference; (4) reactivation of the ICC; and (5) creation of a neutral mediation group./4/

/4/As stated in telegram 1285 from Vientiane, January 7. (Ibid., 751J.00/1-761)

Brown favors course of action 5 but CINCPAC, while recognizing that reactivation is a political decision, has pointed out the very severe military impact such a move would have. Primarily, he feels that it would hinder our operations while not hindering the Communists. In our operations, he refers to both resupply and direct involvement under SEATO. He summarizes by saying: "For the above reasons CINCPAC feels that reintroduction of the ICC might serve many interests but not the national interest of the U.S."/5/

/5/As stated in CINCPAC telegram 070359Z to JCS, January 7. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense's Cable Files, Laos 1961)

As of today, military operations in Laos seem to be a little better. At the very least, Phoumi is getting them to regroup and plan the counterattacks, and reinforcements are being sent to critical areas.

[Here follows a section on Cuba.]

John S. D. Eisenhower

5. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower/1/

Washington, January 13, 1961.

/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The conference took place at the White House.

OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter recalled that, regarding the international political activity in connection with Laos, we had received conflicting and inconsistent recommendations from the British, French, Canadians, Cambodians and others./2/ He recalled that the British had sent to us a text of a statement they would propose be sent jointly by the UK and USSR, in their capacity as co-Chairmen of the Geneva 1954 Conference, to India, in its capacity as Chairman of the ICC. Mr. Herter said he had amended this text to accommodate the suggestion of the Canadians that the first action should be to "explore" the situation. He showed the revised text, combining both the British and the Canadian thoughts, to the President, who approved./3/

/2/The British recommendation for a possible intervention by the ICC in Laos to end the fighting is in a letter from Home to Herter, January 11, which was transmitted by Ambassador Caccia on January 12. (Department of State, SEA/Laos Files: Lot 65 D 169, 1961 Laos) On January 3, French Charge d'Affaires Claude Lebel proposed to Parsons a tripartite U.S.-British-French approach to Moscow to see if the Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese were prepared to support an officially neutral Laos. (Memorandum of a meeting, January 3; ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/1-361) Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia wrote Eisenhower a letter on January 1 suggesting an enlarged 1954 Geneva Conference-type international meeting on Laos. (Telegram 782 from Phnom Penh, January 3; ibid.) Canadian Ambassador Heeney outlined to Merchant on January 11 a plan for an exploratory commission to Laos to discuss reactivating the ICC. (Memorandum of conversation, January 11; ibid., 751J.00/1-1161)

/3/The text, which was initialed by Eisenhower, is in the Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Laos.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

6. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, January 17, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-1761. Top Secret. Drafted by Christian Chapman and approved in Herter's office on January 25 and in Rusk's office on February 3.

SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State Designate
Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary
J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Director of Intelligence and Research
Christian G. Chapman, Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs
Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of Defense
James H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense
John N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense Designate
General L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director (Plans)

The Secretary opened the meeting by reading the agenda and asked General Lemnitzer to start with a military briefing.

Military Briefing

General Lemnitzer described on a map the movement south from Xieng Khouang Province of Communist forces estimated at 3300 which were opposed in the area by an estimated 2300 FAL and 1500 Meo [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The General stated that it appeared both sides were building up their forces. Eighteen Soviet aircraft are involved in an airlift of supplies from Hanoi to the Plaine de Jarres. Reports have been received that an increase in Soviet airlift capacity may be expected shortly. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The General went on to say that Vang Vieng had been taken by the Lao Army against minimum resistance. This is a most important development as it opens the road from Luang Prabang to Vientiane and should free the army for an attack against Kong Le's base area in Xieng Khouang.

The General cited a report that Prime Minister Boun Oum had asked for the return of Seno and the replacement of the French Military Mission. The Secretary remarked that if the French Mission were forced out, the position of US technicians would be rendered very difficult, legally and politically, since their presence was linked to an agreement with the French and would otherwise be prohibited by the Geneva Agreement.

General Lemnitzer described the difficulties of carrying out reconnaissance missions. However, several had been flown by the Thai Airforce between January 9 and 11.

Four T-6s had been brought to Laos January 10, the General continued, and first priority had been assigned to intercepting the airlift. Instead, however, the planes had been used for close support of the troops. General Lemnitzer planned to send out a new message reemphasizing the importance of the lift as a target. Mr. Dulles remarked that the T-6 had a maximum air speed of 140 knots as against 165 knots for the IL-14.

Mr. Rusk inquired regarding the quality of the FAL and General Lemnitzer answered that it was not as good as we would like it to be. This army had not had as much training as it should. The French had primary responsibility in this field and the US did not have a clear-cut training mission. Mr. Rusk remarked that one of the problems it seemed was that our prestige rested on a flimsy basis. The General answered that we could do a better job if we had a clear-cut responsibility for training. A year ago he had sent a directive to General Heintges not to be bashful in moving in tactical training. Mr. Rusk asked whether the army had any French officers assigned to its combat units. The General answered that we had no positive indication to that effect but that if the French were doing their job, they should be. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Cumming remarked that they had seen no intelligence indicating that French officers were with combat units. Mr. Parsons noted that one of the army's problems was the very poor quality of the leadership.

Intelligence Estimate

Mr. Dulles [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] summarized the National Intelligence Estimate of December 29. (SNIE 68-2-60)./2/

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XV/XVI, Microfiche Supplement, Part 2, Document 702.

The Secretary asked whether Defense was planning to recommend any drastic military steps at this time. Mr. Gates answered that they would make several recommendations but these were heavily linked to political questions. General Lemnitzer read a paper of January 14 from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense/3/ in which the JCS made the following recommendations: a) establishment of a MAAG, b) furnishing the RLG with the necessary equipment and materiel, c) assumption of training responsibility by the MAAG, d) expanded [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support of RLG to enable it to maintain control of main centers and means of communication, e) agreement within SEATO to support the Boun Oum Government, f) that an overt intervention by a third country will be less satisfactory than a SEATO action, g) that the US should not seek a UN intervention, h) that the US should not seek the reactivation of the ICC, i) that unilateral US action should only be undertaken after SEATO had failed and j) that US or SEATO intervention would provoke a bloc reaction. General Lemnitzer explained that the principal concern of the JCS was that we were not winning on the ground because we were not able to train and support the FAL fully. French responsibility for training was not good enough. We had no indication of lack of equipment.

/3/JCSM 13-61, derived from JCS 1992/890, January 14. (National Arhives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 9155.2/4060 (16 Dec. 60))

The Secretary then referred to the escalation theory and asked how the airlift might be stopped without United States involvement and, in that event, how a general war could be prevented. General Lemnitzer agreed that escalation presented a problem. The JCS, he said, would like to see concerted action by SEATO. The T-6s were not going to stop the lift and we should consider giving the Lao AD-6s from South Viet-Nam. He remarked that such a step would, however, add a new dimension to the situation. Thailand has a good Air Force that could deal quickly and effectively with the lift. The United States of course has the means but this again raised the problem of escalation. The question is how far the other side is willing to go. Mr. Irwin remarked that, since both the PL and the FAL are not effective forces, the addition of Viet-Minh technicians and cadres to the PL gives them a decided advantage which cannot be offset by the mat[riel and equipment the United States is supplying to Phoumi. The question is how to reinforce the Phoumi forces. SEATO appears impossible in view of the French and British opposition. There is the possibility, however, of bringing in volunteers not only in the air but also on the ground. He expressed the view that, until the FAL is strengthened on the ground by foreign cadres, the situation will not be promising.

Mr. Rusk asked whether by general war it was meant an all out Soviet-United States war or a large-scale war in SEA. Mr. Gates answered that it meant the latter. Mr. Rusk expressed the opinion that war in Laos would result in a larger affair than Korea. General Lemnitzer answered that large forces had been engaged in Korea.

Mr. Rusk inquired whether the situation in Korea was reasonably satisfactory from the military point of view. General Lemnitzer assured him that we were in good shape with 20 divisions--18 Korean and 2 American. We were ready to meet any diversionary move there.

Mr. Gates expressed deep concern that we were losing the propaganda war and felt that we should organize our resources in Washington. He cited all the stories that had come out on the T-6s and nothing on the Soviet airlift. He said that Defense had prepared a paper on the subject.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

[2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Cumming also mentioned that we should not overlook the possibility of the Communists introducing helicopters into Laos where the terrain is suitable for their use.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Soviet Intentions

The Secretary then asked Mr. Bohlen to give an estimate of Soviet intentions. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that the Soviets don't want to turn the Lao situation into a large operation. He agrees with Ambassador Thompson that the Soviets are not seeking a complete victory but, at the same time, that they would not accept a complete defeat./4/ They consider that they are acting on a pretty good basis of continuing to recognize the Souvanna Government. This is one reason that they have not troubled to disguise the airlift. Mr. Cumming noted, in this regard, that the PL and Quinim had announced a joint military commission to carry on the fight against the "rebels". Mr. Bohlen then went on to say that Menshikov had probably gone further in denying the Soviet airlift than he intended, while Kuznetzov had ducked the issue in his conversation with Ambassador Thompson./5/

/4/As suggested in telegram 1633 from Moscow, January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-1461) Mr. Bohlen suggested that there was a possibility of stopping the airlift by going to the Soviets and stating "either you admit this lift or we shall be quite entitled to go in and shoot down the planes". Soviet involvement in Laos, Mr. Bohlen continued, is also in part a function of the Soviet-Chicom row. Following the Communist meeting in Moscow last November, the Soviets probably have to demonstrate their Bolshevik revolutionary zeal. However, by operating the lift, they can at least control by Soviet presence in Laos. In support of this theory, Mr. Bohlen cited an intelligence report which reported the Polish Ambassador in London as stating that the Soviets are in Laos because they want to control the situation, and that they are prepared to go to the brink but not over it. Furthermore, they do not want to start off on a bad footing with the new Administration.

/5/The conversation between Herter and Soviet Ambassador Menshikov is reported in a memorandum of conversation, January 10. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Kuznetsov's discussion with Thompson is reported in telegram 1640 from Moscow, January 14. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/1-1461)

Mr. Bohlen then outlined two possible courses of action:

1. A clear plunge into the situation with overt assistance in men and mat[riel to Phoumi. If this course is decided upon, we must go through with it. It will probably end up with a Korean-Indo-Chinese type of war. However, Mr. Bohlen noted, since World War II, there is not a single recorded case of a colonial war, such as would develop in Laos, that has been brought off successfully by a Western power; he cited Indo-China and Indonesia as examples.

2. A diplomatic solution--Mr. Bohlen asked: If the Soviet airlift could be halted, would we be prepared to accept a status quo in which neither side would receive military assistance? Mr. Gates and General Lemnitzer answered that such a status quo would be to our disadvantage.

In answer to a question from Mr. Gates for an explanation of the Soviet airlift, Mr. Bohlen answered that the Soviets had an Ambassador in Vientiane under Souvanna who requested aid from them. After Souvanna had been kicked out by the rebels, the remnants of his Government were in position to request a continuation of the lift. This request gives the Soviets a good basis for their action.

Diplomatic Proposals

Mr. Herter then turned to Mr. Parsons for a review of the diplomatic proposals. Mr. Parsons first reminded the meeting that there was no diplomatic proposal which led to a safe haven. The major difficulty is that any form of international mechanism which the Communists might possibly accept would be one that would perforce have to recognize their present position of strength and thus lead to equating the two sides, eventually bringing the Communists into the government and thus leading to the probable loss of the country peacefully instead of militarily.

In this international jungle, Mr. Parsons continued, we had first a sizeable record of discussions with the Soviets which Mr. Bohlen had discussed. Then there was the question of the revival of the ICC. At the present time, we are discussing with the British and Canadians means of safeguarding an ICC approach. The Secretary noted that Mr. Nehru's proposal to the Co-Chairmen was sent on December 15 and that no reply had ever been given to the Indians. Mr. Parsons recalled that Khrushchev had expressed to Ambassador Thompson the Soviet preference for the 14-nation conference over the ICC. The Thais and all the anti-Communist Asians are distrustful of the ICC. They pointed out the record of the Indians and Poles on the Commission of which we too were very mindful. Sihanouk himself has expressed doubt regarding its effectiveness.

Mr. Parsons then described the proposal we are now discussing with the UK and Canada to have the Indians send a representative to the King of Laos to explore whether the ICC could usefully return to ascertain the facts of the situation and help reestablish peace./6/ If favorable terms of reference, including proper recognition of the Government of Laos, can be agreed upon, then the ICC would return. More recently Boun Oum and Phoumi had indicated their willingness to have the ICC return but with limitation of time and scope. One trouble with the proposal is that it places the onus on the Lao Government to accept or reject the return of the ICC rather than on the Russians.

/6/As reported in a memorandum of conversation, January 17. (Ibid., 751J.00/1-1761)

Mr. Parsons then briefly mentioned the French proposal for a tripartite approach to the Soviets to negotiate the Lao problem./7/ In our view, this proposal of the French equated the RLG and PL and, furthermore, we could not agree to try and settle SEA problems behind the backs of SEA countries. In this regard, Mr. Merchant expressed the view that the role of the French in this situation had been almost as damaging as that of the PL in refusing to acknowledge the Boun Oum Government and to approach Souvanna to resign.

/7/See footnote 2, Document 5.

Remarks by Mr. Rusk

Mr. Rusk then made certain comments about which he asked the conferees' views. Mr. Rusk also expressed considerable concern that the Boun Oum forces might be spread out too much and be in danger of being picked off. He asked whether they should not consolidate or whether the situation was too fluid to permit such a move. General Lemnitzer answered that the Boun Oum forces were not out where they could be picked off but that the PL controlled a very strategic central area.

Mr. Dulles recalled Khrushchev's statement [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the Soviets would continue to supply the PL and that the fighting would go on for 7 years.

Mr. Parsons inquired into the military evaluation of Communist intentions. He recalled that Nehru had stated that it was nonsense to talk to the Souvanna Government which "could not be found" and, if such was the Indian position, maybe the Soviets' legal situation was going to collapse. In this situation the Soviets might be seeking a military decision and collapse of the Boun Oum Government in very short order. General Lemnitzer stated that the Communists could cut the country in half at Paksane.

Mr. Bissell [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] supported General Lemnitzer's comment that the real weakness of the FAL was in its leadership and this could only be helped if our legal position permitted it. He thought it would not take a large MAAG to do the job with the United States military being thus placed along the whole Mekong River.

Mr. Rusk asked whether the Filipinos could come up with a good quality MAAG. General Lemnitzer answered that they would be better than the present arrangement, but Mr. Bohlen remarked that such a MAAG could only be a front for us, because the Philippines alone could not provide a good group. Mr. Bissell said that among the Asians, the Thais have a great advantage in having a common language with the Lao.

Mr. Gates expressed grave concern regarding SEATO which appears to be a paper tiger and regarding our permitting the French and British to run the organization.

Remarks by the Secretary

Mr. Herter then described in some detail our discussions with the British and Canadians on a draft note from the Co-Chairmen on which we could agree. The Secretary finished by stating to Mr. Rusk that "we do not want to take any action which would limit your freedom of action". Mr. Herter added that we will proceed with diplomatic moves presently underway. We will strengthen the Meo people, but the legal situation cannot be cleared up unless an approach to SEATO is made and he reiterated that he was not willing to take any such action now with only three days to go before the new Administration came in. Mr. Rusk said that it was very important if, in the next few days, the ICC were reactivated, it should not affect the factual situation and we should not agree with this reactivation unless we had at least guarantees that the ICC can function throughout Laos. Mr. Herter answered that it was doubtful that the ICC would be reactivated in that time since there would be delays in negotiating its return.

7. Notes of Conversation Between President-Elect Kennedy and President Eisenhower/1/

Washington, January 19, 1961./2/

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Special Correspondence, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Secret. Dictated by Kennedy to Evelyn Lincoln.

/2/According to President Eisenhower's appointment book, he met with Kennedy from 9 to 11:10 a.m. The President and the President-elect met alone from 9 to 9:45 a.m. and then joined members of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's cabinets including Secretary of State Christian Herter, Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense-designate Robert McNamara. Clark Clifford also attended, but he is not listed as a participant in Eisenhower's appointment book. (Ibid., President's Daily Appointments)

I visited E. [Eisenhower] this morning at 9:00 o'clock. This last visit had been suggested by Roscoe Drummond, who had informed me that as a result of a visit he had had with the President he thought the President would welcome a second visit from me./3/ This fit in with my own desire. I was anxious to see E. for two reasons:

/3/The first meeting was on December 6, 1960, and Laos was only briefly discussed. (Memorandum for the Record by Persons; ibid., Ann Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series, Memos--Staff Re Change of Administration (2))

First because it would serve a specific purpose in reassuring the public as to the harmony of the transition. Therefore strengthening our hands.

Secondly because I was anxious to get some commitment from the outgoing administration as to how they would deal with Laos which they were handing to us. I thought particularly it would be helpful to have some idea as to how prepared they were for military intervention.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

At 9:45 a.m. we went in where the six Cabinet members were seated and we continued to discuss the issues. Mr. Herter talked most of the time. He pointed out that as to the question of Laos that any proposal which would include communists in the government would end up with the communists in control of the government and therefore this solution should be regarded with great suspicion. He agreed that the local government forces were more vigorous in the struggle but he said this could be improved with the MAG [MAAG] group being sent there. This would not in any way be against the Geneva pact and the Germans were bitter about this matter anyhow. He stated that they were afraid that the British and French would not respond. I asked the Secretary as to whether in his opinion we should intervene if the SETO [SEATO] was invoked by the government. He said very directly that he felt we should. It was the cork in the bottle. If Laos fell, then Thailand, the Philippines, and of course Chiang Kai-shek would go. I turned to the President. He stated also that he felt we should intervene. When I asked him whether he felt that the communists could intervene with greater force he said it was a question as to whether they would be willing to see the war spread. I asked Mr. Gates whether he felt the United States would have sufficient military power and he said he felt they could; that they had conducted a survey and while we might not be able to handle two fronts, they could handle one. He also said that with the use of certain aircraft it would be possible to cut down the time from 17 days to 12 days to move 12,000 men and supplies for these men in the Pacific and the Marines from Okinawa.

I came away from that meeting feeling that the Eisenhower administration would support intervention--they felt it was preferable to a communist success in Laos./4/

/4/Evelyn Lincoln added a postscript to these notes indicating that Kennedy asked her to find out if Clifford and McNamara took notes, and if they did so, to get him copies.

8. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, January 19, 1961.

/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969, John F. Kennedy, 1960-1961 (2). No classification marking. Prepared by Persons, Assistant to the President.

The meeting in the Cabinet Room began at approximately 9:45 a.m., and Senator Kennedy indicated he wished to discuss at this meeting the topics on the enclosed list (Tab 1)./2/ The President opened the meeting stating that we have topics for discussion of such importance and complexity that we could talk for as long as a week on them, and asked Senator Kennedy if he would like to start off the discussions.

/2/Not printed.

1. Laos

Senator Kennedy stated that he would like to have discussed the basic unconcluded decisions with respect to Laos and get the advice of the outgoing Administration on them. The President stated that unilateral action on the part of the United States would be very bad for our relations in that part of the world and would cause us to be "tagged" as interventionists. He stated that the situation was complicated by the matter of recognition of the Phoumi government by some of our Allies and indicated that Great Britain preferred a unilateral approach rather than through SEATO. He then asked Secretary Herter to expand on this subject. Mr. Herter talked for about ten or fifteen minutes and I asked him to give me a memorandum covering his discussion which is attached at Tab 2./3/

/3/See Document 7.

In addition to Secretary Herter's memorandum, I would like to add the following points covered in the discussion of this subject:

Secretary Herter emphasized that neither the British nor the French wished to go to SEATO on the subject of Laos and that the French have a preferred position in Laos and will strive to keep it so. He indicated that a SEATO approach to the problem would probably result in the elimination of the British and the French from the SEATO organization. Senator Kennedy pointed out the advantage of the Soviets in the military situation due to their proximity and that if we got into the situation militarily we could find ourselves in an escalation situation. Secretary Herter indicated that this could be so, but it would come down to a question as to what extent the Soviets would wish to get publicly involved.

Senator Kennedy asked the President which he would prefer: coalition with the Communists to form a government in Laos or intervening through SEATO. The President replied that it would be far better to intervene through SEATO and referred to the example of the coalition with the Communists which was set up in China at the time General Marshall was sent there. The President pointed out that unilateral intervention on the part of the United States would be a last desperate effort to save Laos, stating that the loss of Laos would be the loss of the "cork in the bottle" and the beginning of the loss of most of the Far East.

Senator Kennedy asked what could be done to keep the Chinese Communists out of the situation in Laos. The President replied that he did not think that the Chinese Communists wished to provoke a major war and that it comes down to a question of who will take steps to do this. The President further stated that it is like playing poker with tough stakes and that there is no easy solution. He mentioned the Communist influence on Chinese troops, pointing out their ability to get much higher morale among the under-developed peoples than seemed to be the case of the Western Allies. Senator Kennedy mentioned the apparent weakness of the troops of the government of Laos.

The President pointed out the attitude of General de Gaulle as another complicating factor in getting coordination and agreement of the major Western powers. He mentioned that de Gaulle's thinking on every matter is dominated by an obsession that a triumvirate of the United States, France, and Great Britain should decide on all these matters--that this triumvirate should be organized on a joint staff concept. The President went on to state that any action of this type would break up NATO immediately.

Senator Kennedy asked Secretary Gates if we could intervene in Laos militarily with success. Secretary Gates replied that he was pessimistic about the political situation but that we could handle the military situation successfully if we did intervene. He indicated that the only optimistic plan would be to operate through SEATO, but that Laos must make the request and, to date, Laos has refused to do this. Secretary Herter indicated that this would preclude a political settlement of the problem, and Secretary Gates again emphasized that Laos is the "cork in the bottle" insofar as the Far East is concerned.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

9. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, January 19, 1961.

/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, Laos. Secret. Drafted by Herter. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 002513.

Senator Kennedy asked the President if the problem of Laos could be developed and the President asked me if I would outline the situation. I began by pointing out that there were two separate problems in Laos which were quite closely interlocked: the first was the military situation; the second was the political situation and the possibilities of achieving a political settlement of the problems besetting that country.

With respect to the military situation, I merely stated that it was one of very real uncertainty as of now, with the factor disturbing us most being the unwillingness of the armed forces of the recognized Government to fight despite the logistical support which we had been able to give them in the supplying of materiel of war. I also said that a political settlement might well be affected in large measure by the military situation as of any given time.

On the political front, I pointed out that a number of different suggestions had been made by various governments. I then outlined the provisions of the Geneva Accord/2/ which had three objectives in mind: the first being the cessation of fighting, the second the integration of Pathet Lao elements in the Government and Pathet Lao troops into the regular military forces, and, third, the cessation of outside interference in the internal affairs of Laos. I pointed out that in 1957 all parties, including the Pathet Lao, in Laos had agreed that the International Control Commission, which had been set up by the Geneva Accord in order to achieve these objectives, had successfully completed its mission, after which it had adjourned sine die and left the country. I also explained the terms of the SEATO Alliance/3/ in which the signatories had taken the solemn obligation to come to the aid of the Government of Laos in the event that it requested assistance as a result of aggression from the outside.

/2/The Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954; see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1521-1530.

/3/Under the terms of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol, signed at Manila on September 8, 1954. (6 UST 81)

I then pointed out that in December the Indian Government had requested the two co-chairmen set up under the Geneva Accord, namely, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, and the Foreign Minister of Soviet Russia, to give consideration to the reactivation of the ICC through a formal request to the three nations represented on that Commission, namely, the Indian chairman, the Pole and the Canadian. No formal reply had yet been sent to the Indians by the co-chairmen since the latter had not yet discussed what joint action they might take. I pointed out that in the last few days we have had a number of discussions with the British and Canadian Ambassadors here over the type of draft reply to the Indians which the British wished to submit to Gromyko for possible joint action. The sticking point in our opinion with respect to our approval of the drafts submitted by the British was that the British refused to refer to the existing Government of Laos, which we consider the legal government, because they were convinced that any such reference would lead to the rejection of any joint effort because the Soviets recognize only the Souvanna Phouma Government, which is non-existent except for himself living in Cambodia. I said, however, that we had come to a tentative agreement which might lead the British to go ahead anyway, and that we reserved our rights depending on further developments with respect to supporting this action with the Government of Laos in the event of agreement between Gromyko and Lord Home.

At this point, I laid particular stress on the fact that I felt it would be futile to send the ICC back into Laos unless its terms of reference were clear and unless it presented itself in the first instance to what is clearly the Constitutional Government of Laos. I then explained that this matter was still in a fluid state, although the Soviets had indicated quite clearly that they wished to have a meeting of all the nations who were signatories to the Geneva Accord in order to work out new terms of reference for the ICC, but that there had not been any great enthusiasm shown by any nation for such a move./4/

/4/Clark Clifford sent an account of this meeting to President Kennedy on January 24 which provides additional detail on Eisenhower's views. Clifford wrote that Eisenhower interjected that while there was "some merit" in submission of the issue to the ICC, he personally preferred that SEATO take charge of the controversy. Eisenhower recounted that U.S. efforts to engage SEATO had so far been unsuccessful, especially with the British and French who viewed the conflict as "internal internecine difficulties" and "not a clear case of aggression from the outside." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, White House Correspondence, 1961-63) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 414B.

Another alternative, from the point of view of an international settlement, was that offered by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, who wished to call a conference in Cambodia of all the signatories to the Geneva Accord, plus the neutral nations of Southeast Asia and the United States. To Prince Sihanouk's message with respect to this subject, we had replied saying that we were giving his suggestion serious consideration in conjunction with other suggested moves, and without encouraging any other steps in this direction, did not close the door completely on such a conference./5/

/5/See footnote 2, Document 5. The reply to Sihanouk from Eisenhower, January 16, is in telegram 615 to Phnom Penh, January 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-361)

Senator Kennedy then asked me a direct question: "What did the outgoing Administration recommend should be the next step that should be taken?" As this question was addressed to me, I pointed out that if a political settlement were possible without setting up a new Government in Laos which would include the Communists, I felt this was undoubtedly the most desirable solution. On the other hand, I indicated that the historic experience of the last fifteen years indicated clearly that governments which included Communist representatives had never succeeded and had always led either to the elimination of the Communists or to complete take-over by the Communists. I indicated that I thought the chances of working out a political solution depended in large measure on the status of the military situation. I then pointed out that the legal government of Laos had the right at any time to formally request the assistance of SEATO should external aggression in Laos be established. In our view, the Soviet airlift constituted such aggression, even though the Soviets denied its existence. In the event of such a request by Laos being made to SEATO, there was a solemn obligation of the signatories to go to the assistance of Laos and I felt that we had no choice but to honor that obligation even though we knew that the British and French hoped such a request would never be made and that, certainly in the case of the French, there was doubt whether they would feel they had to honor that obligation. I explained the anxiety already expressed to us by the Thais, Philippines and Pakistanis as to whether or not this alliance, on which they counted so heavily for their own self-defense against Communist aggression, was in fact only a paper tiger or was one in which the big nations would honor their pledge of assistance. I then added that I could see no alternative for us but to honor our obligation, to which the President added that he was confident the Thais, Pakistanis and Philippines would take the same position but that he had doubts with regard to the other SEATO members./6/

/6/Clifford's account provides more detail on Eisenhower's advice. Clifford wrote, "At this point, President Eisenhower stated that Laos is the present key to the entire area of South East Asia. If Laos were lost to the Communists, it would bring unbelievable pressure to bear on Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam. President Eisenhower stated that he considered Laos of such importance that if it reached the stage where we could not persuade others to act with us, then he would be willing, as a last desperate hope, to intervene unilaterally."

Senator Kennedy then inquired with regard to the military situation and Secretary Gates gave an outline of what the most recent deployment of ships and airlift consisted of and, in answer to a specific question from the Senator, gave the length of time which it would take to deploy in Laos itself the equivalent of 12,000 men and 12,000 tons of equipment.

C.A.H.

10. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

I-18062/61

Washington, January 23, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/3/61-1/31/61. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
White House Meeting on Laos, January 23, 1961

Mr. McGeorge Bundy will prepare and circulate minutes of the meeting./2/ The following is merely a preliminary memorandum.

/2/Not found.

The attached report of the State-Defense-CIA Task Force on Laos was discussed.

After a briefing on the military situation by General Lemnitzer, Secretary Rusk presented the main element of the Task Force/3/ paper.

/3/The interagency task force was headed by Parsons and included as principal representatives Walter Rostow for the White House; Paul Nitze for Defense; Richard Bissell for CIA; and William J. Sheppard, Director of the Office of Far East Operations, for ICA. (Memorandum from Parsons to Herter, February 8; Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, Task Force on Laos, 1961, Jan.-Aug.) The Task Force met over the inaugural weekend (January 21-22) and prepared the attached papers.

The principal discussion turned on the recommendations. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that the recommended actions to improve the military situation (a) to (i) inclusive would be helpful, but would not be expected to reverse the unfavorable longer term prospects. He pointed up the issue of the military desirability of interdicting the Soviet Air Lift through the additional measures in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) versus the State Department's concern that these measures would greatly impair the prospects of the political negotiations which they propose to initiate. The Secretary of State said that he would not reject (a), (b) and (c) but would want to talk with the U.S.S.R. before undertaking. Furthermore, he would want to have a strategic appreciation with the British and French of the more general problem of the security of Southeast Asia before talking with the U.S.S.R. He felt we may have let our allies off too lightly by permitting them to isolate the Laotian problem. He also thought we should increase our support to Thailand and Vietnam, and seek the creation of a composite SEATO force. In other words, he wishes to smoke out the real attitude of our allies.

The President expressed concern at the weakness of the local situation in Laos coupled with the weakness of allied support for our position. He proposed that, if the British and French aren't going to do anything about the security of Southeast Asia, we tell them we aren't going to do it alone. They have as much or more to lose in the area than we have. General Lemnitzer stressed the vital importance of Laos to the security of the entire area and to our relations with our Southeast Asian allies./4/

/4/Parsons also prepared a summary record of this meeting. He wrote that Kennedy "remarked on the unsatisfactory military situation, the geographic propinquity of Laos to the Communist bloc and the unsatisfactory internal and international situation." The President stated that he did not see how the United States could solve the problem alone and one or more of the factors he had mentioned would have to be improved. The President wondered specifically how the United States could save Laos. During the ensuing discussion, according to Parsons, Lemnitzer emphasized that he did not consider that "Laos was lost." In response to a question from Kennedy, Rusk noted that the Soviet Union might not seek a complete victory in Laos for fear of extending Chinese influence. Rusk ended the meeting, according to Parsons, with the observation that perhaps the situation could be kept in a state of flux, as opposed to deterioration, with the Royal Lao Government exercising "a fair degree of control of the country." (Summary record of meeting, January 23; ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/1-2361)

There then followed a more detailed discussion of some of the specific courses of action. It was my impression, confirmed by a call to McGeorge Bundy, that we were authorized, but not directed, to proceed with all the military measures (a) through (i) as may continue to appear to be wise after further detailed exploration. Proposal (c) was, however, subject to clarification by the State and Defense Departments as to the legal status of the PEO personnel engaged in this operation and clearance with the French in the field.

On (i) Mr. Rusk pointed out the great disparity between the risks we may run into in Southeast Asia and the amounts of money involved in these matters. He hoped the President would authorize State to work out more flexible arrangements for handling these matters. The President agreed.

Secretary Rusk summarized the phasing of the steps to be taken in the following manner. First there should be consultation with our principal allies in an attempt to develop a common strategic appreciation. In the meantime, the ICC maneuver entrained by the British should be permitted to run its course. In the meantime, also, preparations should be made for attempting the neutral commission approach which might perhaps be adopted to meet a move in the United Nations with respect to the Laotian question. Concurrently, we should be exploring measures for joint SEATO action and possibly a SEATO commission.

Paul H. Nitze/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Attachment]/6/

Report Prepared by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Laos

/6/Top Secret. In Parsons' summary record of the January 23 meeting with the President, Parsons noted that Rusk suggested that the President "might read parts of the 'Analysis Paper.'" (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-2361)

ANALYSIS

Efforts to achieve U.S. objectives in Laos are handicapped by the following factors:

(1) An adverse current military situation which is deteriorating progressively and which could result in the loss of Paksane and other areas. Time appears to be against us if we do not increase our support of RLG forces.

(2) An apparent determination on the part of the bloc countries to take maximum advantage of their present opportunity in Laos by introducing the necessary military measures and committing the necessary resources. They may see victory in sight.

(3) An internal situation in Laos which makes the general populace and even large segments of the army apathetic toward the course of events there. The only real determination appears to reside in the Pathet Lao.

(4) Uncertainty of SEATO members as to SEATO and U.S. intentions regarding Laos, caused by failure of SEATO up to this point to take action in a crisis which appears to have called for action. This is particularly acute in the case of Thailand, which would be immediately threatened by the loss of Laos.

(5) Unwillingness on the part of the British and the Australians, and even more on the part of the French and New Zealanders, to support effective SEATO action.

(6) Unwillingness of the French to use their position in Laos and their military personnel in wholehearted support of the RLG. Indeed, there is evidence of obstruction, at least on the part of certain French personnel, to the defense of Laos. Our own ally is working against us.

(7) Unwillingness on the part of many important free world countries, particularly South Asian countries, to accept and deal with the present Lao government, thus diminishing its general aura of legitimacy.

(8) A generally adverse world reaction to recent United States actions in Laos and criticism in important circles even in the United States. There is no important power which would contribute significant forces to a joint military intervention in Laos with the U.S., few who would openly support our intervention. Of those who would, only Thailand is in a position to provide significant number of troops quickly. There would be widespread opposition in the U.S. to committing U.S. troops to support of the RLG.

(9) The geography of Laos, particularly its isolation and lack of access to the sea, its mountainous-jungle terrain, absence of railroads, inadequate roads and airstrips. Laos would be a most undesirable place in which to commit U.S. forces to ground action.

Measures calculated to achieve U.S. objectives in Laos must reckon with all foregoing concurrently.

II. Military vs. Political Approach

Basic to any effective U.S. strategy in Laos is the necessity for proceeding simultaneously both on the political and military fronts. This is self-evident since it is unlikely, on the one hand, that there could ever be a decisive military victory for our side within the present military and political context, and since, on the other hand, the success of any attempts on our part for a political settlement is directly affected by the military situation. As long as the PL and bloc forces maintain their present advantage through control of the Plaine des Jarres and continued success elsewhere, it would be illogical for them to agree to a weakening of their position without a suitable quid pro quo. If they succeed militarily, there is no necessity for them to negotiate.

Indeed, there appears to be no reason, from their standpoint, why the bloc countries should not capitalize on the opportunities afforded them by their present situation in Laos to create a puppet state in at least the northern part of the country, which they could use as a further springboard against Thailand and Southern Viet-Nam.

III. Possibilities of a Political Solution

Following are the principal considerations which it is believed are likely to affect favorably the willingness of the bloc to negotiate a political settlement:

(1) Evidence of determination on the part of the United States not to permit a Communist takeover of Laos. This can be evidenced by the type and level of military support being given currently to the RLG, and by convincing proof that increased support will be given in the future. It can also be evidenced by the deployment of U.S. naval, air and ground units which would indicate the possibility, if not the threat, of direct U.S. intervention.

(2) Support of world public opinion, particularly that of the South Asian neutral countries, of a particularly proposed political solution for Laos to the point that it would have gathered such momentum that it would be difficult for the bloc countries to turn it down.

(3) It is also possible that the Soviet Union may have uncertainties as to the degree to which, and how, Communist China might exploit the capture of Laos by Communist forces. The Soviet Union may feel that this might lead China to an unpredictable and reckless course of action which would endanger world peace and upset the balance of power between them. The Soviet Union may be in a position now to influence China with respect to their joint policies in Laos because of the dependence of the Pathet Lao forces on Soviet supplies and airlift. China may in the future be able to achieve greater independence of action.

(4) The change in Administration in the United States, which brings a new President into office with whom Russia has indicated expectations of dealing with on a more cooperative basis than the past Administration. Bloc willingness to cooperate in a Laotian settlement might be highlighted as a proof of good intentions upon which the incoming Administration could assess the possibility of its being able to work with the Soviets. The Soviet Union might be unwilling to prejudice this possibility so early in the new Administration. There is risk, on the other hand, in the new Administration's committing its prestige and the future of its ability to work with the Soviet Union to the Laos issue, where the bloc countries have at the moment such a favorable situation to exploit.

There is also an advantage to the United States through the fact of the new Administration, in that there will appear to many critics of our past policies a potentiality for a new approach. The new Administration will have an initial momentum which might be an advantage in its relationship with other countries as well as the Soviet Union. Most countries should be inclined to give the new Administration every benefit of the doubt in its attempt to devise new lines of action to cope with the Laos situation.

IV. SEATO

One complicating factor on the present scene is the ambiguous position of SEATO. Since SEATO was created to act in circumstances such as that now existing in Laos and has not acted, it casts doubt not only on its own integrity but on the reliability of the United States as its originator. The obvious reluctance of the British and French and others to take SEATO action with respect to Laos creates general doubt as to the validity of our case in Laos. SEATO becomes a means whereby restraint is imposed on us by our allies against action which we might be willing and able to take unilaterally and which might be generally acceptable.

In view of the great emphasis which the U.S. has placed in the past on its worldwide treaty system, and the probable effect on other existing treaties, such as the Central Treaty Organization and even NATO, we cannot ignore, by-pass or seek to disband SEATO. If we conclude that it is best, in the light of all circumstances, for SEATO not to act directly on Laos, we must in the immediate future take action to clarify its position toward the Laotian crisis by requesting, approving, or at least acquiescing in whatever unilateral United States action is decided on. If SEATO is not to play an important role in the future, it should be progressively de-emphasized and United States unilateral action substituted for it, i.e., by a bilateral treaty with Thailand and whatever U.S. military dispositions are called for by the circumstances.

A basic problem facing the United States arising out of bloc military success in Laos, failure of SEATO to take effective action, and what has appeared to be a retrogressive series of possible United States actions, is how to inject a basic strengthening effect into the free world position in Southeast Asia. This is necessary both to assure the continued support of Thailand, which must play a role in many of the immediate additional military actions called for in Laos, and to show U.S. determination to prevent Southeast Asia from being captured by the Communists. One way of doing this would be to land United States contingency forces in Thailand, on Thai request, in such a way as to give a clear indication that this did not indicate any expectation or acceptance of the loss of Laos. A careful statement should be made by the U.S. Government explaining its action as related to its long range objectives in Laos and Southeast Asia.

V. Additional Military Measures in Laos

All additional military measures which might be taken now in Laos to counteract the adverse military situation, within the present level of escalation, should be pursued vigorously. The only important additional actions requiring high escalation which might be considered are

(a) Introduction of Thai and/or other non-U.S. SEATO troops.
(b) Introduction of United States fighters and/or bombers over Laos.
(c) Introduction of United States ground forces in Laos.

It is not believed that there is any important advantage to the bloc at the moment in the degree of their escalation. We both engage in military supply. We have introduced fighter aircraft to the RLG, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. They have introduced transports to the PL. They have introduced DRV personnel. We have introduced a few [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel. The principal advantage they hold is a quantitative one, i.e., their DRV personnel are much larger in numbers and more effective. Their DRV personnel are with advanced troops, ours are not. The military effect of our fighters has been negligible. In other words, we have not taken advantage of the escalation we have injected.

In considering the possible introduction of additional measures which could be considered a further escalation, it is not, of course, necessary to assume that each would be met by the bloc. It is, however, necessary to analyze whether the introduction of that particular measure by us would, if met, give the bloc an inherent advantage.

In considering the possible introduction of Thai troop units [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] consideration must be given to the fact that the DRV has a very large troop force available in North Viet-Nam, in the order of 13 divisions, which is greatly in excess of the number of available Thais, this being in the order of 3 divisions.

In considering the possible introduction of U.S. fighter aircraft, consideration must be given to their relative ineffectiveness in interdicting supply on the ground. Russian or Chinese fighter aircraft could probably interdict our air transport as readily as we can theirs. It must be remembered, too, that the RLG controls the large cities, road junctions, and supply centers which provide much better targets for bombing and strafing than are afforded by the Pathet Lao forces operating in mountainous and jungle terrain. Although an air war between U.S. and bloc forces over Laos might not lead to further escalation, the next stage of escalation in Laos itself, i.e., the introduction of U.S. troops, would be highly disadvantageous to us in view of the inaccessibility to Laos, difficulty of supply, greater familiarity with terrain and guerilla type of warfare on the part of the Pathet Lao and the DRV. The fact that a jungle guerilla type war is the most difficult type for organized units, combined with a generally adverse world and U.S. public opinion, would make this a most difficult step to take, consequently we do not have it available as a threat if a lower order escalation fails.

VI. Ultimate Political Objectives in Laos

In supporting any plan for Laos it must be made clear to all that the United States is willing to accept in Laos any truly neutral government, i.e., a government not aligned to either power bloc, if it is committed to protecting itself against subversion. This may make it necessary to go back to the conditions existing at the time of the Vientiane Agreements, including at least tacit acquiescence to Pathet Lao control of Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces.

The promise of free elections in Laos supervised by neutral observers, as part of a general plan, would be one of the best ways of proving to the world the sincerity of our intentions in Laos. We should in this eventuality be prepared for the election of a certain number of Pathet Lao representatives. Certainly, however, if there were a preparatory period during which the Laotian Government gives evidence to its people that it has something to offer them along civil lines, there would be no real danger of losing control to "real", i.e., Communist dominated, Pathet Lao.

Although it is a question which need not necessarily be faced at the present time, we might even consider the inclusion of "Laotian" Pathet Lao in unimportant positions in the government if this should prove to be a necessary condition. The Soviets are unlikely to agree to any situation in Laos which would permit the coming to power of a true pro-Western government. If we are to achieve our objective of creating Laos as an independent buffer state we must be willing to abandon this as a possibility, providing we have assurances that Laos will not fall under Communist domination.

VII. Diplomatic Action vis-�-vis the Soviet Government

The key point in our diplomatic action will be the approach to the Soviet Union in response to the two oral statements which have been made, one in Washington and one in Moscow, to the United States Government by the Soviet Government on Laos./7/ It would be highly desirable and conceivably essential that we should have more assets both military and political in regard to Laos than we have now before any approach was made to the Soviet Government. These would comprise (a) a stabilization of the military situation within Laos, particularly in the vital areas around Vientiane, (b) a SEATO basis for possible Thai-U.S. action and (c) on the political side a much wider acceptance among our allies and friends of the legitimacy of the present Lao Government.

/7/See footnote 5, Document 6.

To approach the Soviets under present circumstances would in all probability invite a sharp Soviet rebuff or at best becoming involved in a conference along the lines suggested by Prince Sihanouk and supported by the Soviet Government. It would therefore appear desirable before approaching the Soviet Government to put into effect military measures set forth in other parts of this document and endeavor to obtain SEATO permissive authorization for U.S.-Thai action. On the diplomatic side a further effort should be made with our allies and friends utilizing the prestige of the new Administration and endeavor to line up solid support for the legitimacy of the present Laos Government.

On the other hand, most careful analysis should be made of the degree to which these measures will indeed provide us with greater assets, political and military. If our considered judgment is that they will not be successful, then we should probably approach the Soviets without further delay. In other words, we should seek to estimate whether with the actions now in contemplation we will in effect at a later date be in a stronger position than we are now as against the possibility that despite these measures our position will have worsened.

GENERAL LINES OF RECOMMENDED ACTION

(2) An immediate effort should be made to influence world opinion favorably toward the RLG and its cause. We should go out to all friendly countries in the name of the new Administration strongly urging them to accept and deal with the present regime in Laos. We should give assurances as to our ultimate objectives in Laos and at least hint at our plan that would give prospects for a generally acceptable solution.

(3) Concurrently, strong pressure should be put on France in the name of the new Administration to cooperate in Laos and in SEATO toward the objectives we seek and, after obtaining French cooperation, at the same time we should approach Britain, Australia and New Zealand along similar lines. As soon as the cooperation or at least acquiescence of the other SEATO members has been assured, we should take the necessary SEATO action required to make the SEATO position toward Laos clear and to clear the road for U.S. bilateral action. The SEATO Council should call on or at least authorize each member to take such steps under the SEATO flag, short of direct national military involvement in hostilities, which in its judgment is necessary to deal with the current threat to Laos.

(4) Assuming the situation still justifies it, U.S. contingency forces should be landed in Thailand, on request of the Thais.

(5) The U.S. is committed to the British and Canadians to support the British proposal for return of ICC to Laos should exploratory mission of Indian representatives prove successful. Since we are convinced that the Soviets will not accept the text of the proposed reply, or in the event they do accept that either the Indians or Laotians will reject it, an alternative line of political action must be sought.

(6) While the foregoing is taking place, therefore, we should see that a plan is put forward by the King of Laos for the creation of a commission comprised of Cambodia, Burma and Malaya under the chairmanship of Prince Sihanouk, which will supervise the carrying out a plan of action that has promise of being acceptable to other allied and neutral nations, should satisfy any legitimate international concern of the bloc as to the future status of Laos, and gives evidence of achieving minimum U.S. objectives in Laos. This concept should be merged with the concept of the buffer zone proposed by the King of Cambodia to include Cambodia and Laos. This proposal should be put to our allies with request for their support in the most forceful possible way, making full use of the prestige and momentum of the new U.S. Administration.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Courses of Action to Improve Military Situation

It is recommended that the following military courses of action be approved and that the timing of their implementation be left to CINCPAC:

[paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. The training of additional FAL personnel and/or units in Thailand.

Action required:

(a) Securing approval of Phoumi and Marshal Sarit
(b) Guaranteeing all costs
(c) Inform CINCPAC

c. Use of PEO personnel (expanded members, if necessary) as tactical advisers to FAL units, ostensibly as training advisers.

Action required:

(a) Clearance with JCS
(b) Secure approval of Boun Oum/Phoumi
(c) Inform CINCPAC

d. Make use of "silver bullets" and bounty.

Action required:

Inform [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] CINCPAC.

e. Establish a small U.S. logistic support group in Thailand.

Action required:

Clear with JCS.

f. Augment U.S. airlift in SEA in support of RLG either with contract aircraft [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or USAF aircraft.

Action required:

(a) Clear with JCS
(b) Provide funds

g. Substantial augmentation of FAL airlift by contract (20 H-34s or 43s), improved observation (3 high altitude helicopters), employment non-Lao commercial pilots and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] technicians.

Action required:

(a) Clear with JCS
(b) Provide funds

h. Improve SEATO intelligence collection agency.

Action required:

(a) Clear with JCS
(b) Secure approval of SEATO Council representatives
(c) Provide funds

i. Make available to CINCPAC and CHPEO (1) necessary funds to cover existing deficit from past operations, (2) funds required urgently for current operations (3) a "drawing account" of ten million dollars from which to meet special requirements.

Action required:

Approval of a supplementary appropriation to the extent necessary to cover that portion of the above which cannot be met from current funds.

Phase 2--Possible additional military actions

[paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

[paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]

/8/c. Preparation for commitment of U.S. aircraft if ChiComs start fighter escort of airlift.

/8/Recommend for immediate action by Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, it is believed that military advantage, which would lie in the possibility of shooting down Soviet airlift, does not outweigh political disadvantages. It should be recognized that if this action is taken, it will meet with grave misgivings on the part of our British, French and other allies and will risk serious adverse political repercussions on our position in many Asian countries. [Footnote in the source text.]

[paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

e. Removal of restriction on use of bombs and napalm by AT6's.

[paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

RECOMMENDATIONS

B. Diplomatic Action Vis-�-vis the Soviet Government

Phase 2--Possible future diplomatic action.

(a) At such time as the following political and military objectives have been achieved in Laos (a) a stabilization of the military situation within Laos, particularly in the vital areas around Vientiane, (b) a SEATO basis for possible Thai-U.S. action and (c) on the political side a much wider acceptance among our allies and friends of the legitimacy of the present Lao Government, or it has been determined by appropriate authorities that these objectives are not likely to be attained, it is recommended that an approach be made to the Soviet Government pointing out that the continuance of active Soviet support for armed bands seeking to subvert and overthrow the armed forces of the legitimate Government of Laos cannot but render illusory the possibility of fruitful discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union on other international questions. This message would urge that Laos be made a test case of the ability of our two governments to work together toward peaceful objectives.

(b) If, however, it is determined to utilize [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] combat aircraft to interdict effectively the Soviet airlift, a formal personal communication should be sent Khrushchev by President Kennedy announcing (a) our determination not to permit overthrow of Lao Government by armed bands sustained and supported from without, and (b) a coherent plan for a political settlement; in other words, offering Moscow the olive branch or the sword.

(c) SEATO

Discuss bilaterally with SEATO members a SEATO program of action including the following elements:

(1) Visit by SEATO Secretary General to Laos, who would report findings to SEATO with copy to UN.

(2) Holding of a publicly announced SEATO Council meeting to examine the nature of Communist intervention in Laos.

(3) Stationing, subject to Thai's request, of U.S. military unit (probably a battle group and an air squadron) at Ehorat. This unit to fly SEATO flag, if members agree.

(d) Proposal for Neutral Commission

Explore first with Laos and Cambodia and then with U.K., France and other SEATO members creation of a neutral commission on following lines:

The King of Laos would invite Cambodia, Burma and Malaya to constitute a neutral commission.

The terms of reference of the commission might include some or all of the following elements: recommend a cease fire, a regrouping of contending forces to positions allocated in the Geneva accord, an amnesty, a cessation of outside military supplies, a broadened Laotian Government and possibly free elections.

(e) Direct Pressure on Our Allies for Solidarity

Messages to friendly countries emphasizing the importance the new Administration places on concerted action in face of growing general threat and specifically urging coordinated support of RLG.

POLICY TOWARD LAOS

To arrive at a sufficiently precise determination of broad policy toward the Laotian situation to give (a) guidelines for planning and action and (b) to leave necessary room for flexibility and initiative to those having specific subordinate responsibilities.

Background Considerations

a. Internal Political Situation

The King, the Boun Oum government, and the Phoumi forces appear to be the only Laotian leadership presently available to give cohesion to the forces resisting a pro-Communist take-over of Laos. A broadening of the political base of the government, however, appears desirable.

b. Internal Military--Political Situation

Continued control of the Plaine des Jarres would give the Pathet Lao--Kong Le forces a dominant strategic situation, threatening simultaneously Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Pak Sana. From this dominant strategic position, the symbolic centers of authority in Laos could be isolated and overrun and the country could be cut in half by a thrust to the Mekong River. Such a development of the military threat could mature in a matter of days.

Ambassador Brown reports a psychological weariness on the part of the Boun Oum-Phoumi elements which could result, if there are further military reverses, in a spreading collapse of the Laotian will to resist.

c. External Political Situation

The Soviet Union has recognized the Souvanna Phouma group as the legitimate government, has recognized a Pathet Lao group as constituting the legitimate provincial government in the Plaine des Jarres area, and is overtly supplying the Pathet Lao forces with an expanding airlift.

The French have supported Souvanna Phouma overtly, and Kong Le covertly, and have not recognized the Boun Oum government.

The British have separated themselves from our policy, are avoiding their SEATO commitments and are seeking the role of middleman between us and the Communists.

The other members of SEATO are prepared to give Laos varying measures of support.

d. The External Military--Political Situation

Communist Assets

The North Vietnamese can continue and increase the type of support they are giving the Pathet Lao. In addition to support of the Pathet Lao with cadres and supplies they could draw upon their 13 divisions and 16 regiments for "volunteer" intervention forces.

The Chinese Communists could give massive support, either through so-called volunteers, or overtly.

The Soviet Union's logistic lines are long, but her capabilities for varied forms of support obviously immense.

Western Assets

Thailand has assets which could be committed to Laos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Thailand has three divisions, one regimental combat team, one ranger battalion, and 128 aircraft in tactical units (33 jets) from which forces could be drawn for [3 lines of source text not declassified].

South Viet-Nam possesses seven divisions, one airborne group, and 88 aircraft in tactical units. They have no jets and only 15 fighters and 30 transport aircraft. Their Air Force Chief, however, has indicated a willingness to use his AD-6 aircraft on ground attack missions.

The Philippines have only one division with a low level of combat readiness, and 68 aircraft in tactical units (37 jet fighters).

Pakistan has seven divisions and 120 aircraft in tactical units (73 jet fighters). SEATO Plan 5-60/9/ calls for the commitment of one brigade group and one squadron of F86's by Pakistan and she has announced her readiness to make such a commitment.

/9/Dated August 31, 1960, "Plan To Assist the Royal Laotian Government to Counter Communist Insurgency in Laos" is Appendix B1 to "Report of the Military Advisers 13th Conference," November 1960. (Department of the Army, SEATO Subregistry (Microfilm) Files: Reel S-4-60)

The United States can provide air support from carriers or from bases in Thailand. A battalion of Marines currently afloat could be introduced in 3-6 days. An airborne Army battalion group in Okinawa could be introduced in approximately the same time. This would leave the remainder of the Marine Division on Okinawa and the remainder of the Army Division in Hawaii as possible commitments from CINCPAC's resources.

Factors Governing the Commitment of These Assets

It is possible that increased Western [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support would be met by increasing Vietminh and Communist Bloc support along present lines.

It is possible that overt commitment of Thai, South Vietnam and or Philippine and Pakistani forces would be met by overt support from the Vietnamese with backing from other members of the Communist Bloc.

It is likely that the overt introduction of U.S. forces would bring in Communist Chinese volunteers with backing from other members of the Communist Bloc.

BROAD POLICY ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE

The basic objectives of U.S. policy include the maintenance and strengthening of our alliances, the maintenance of a firm position versus the Soviet leadership coupled with a willingness to negotiate, and the maintenance of control over the risk of nuclear war either with Communist China or the USSR.

In Laos itself our immediate aim is to enable the RLG to reestablish firm political control over the population and communication centers. We have no aim to include Laos in any military system but on the contrary would accept and support its neutralization.

It does not appear that this aim can be obtained without increased external aid and support of the RLG from without Laos.

The broad policy alternatives facing the U.S. involve the manner in which we decide to carry out our basic policies in support of our local aim in Laos.

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Another range of alternatives is to mobilize a far higher degree of political support from our allies for the RLG. This would require a very specific commitment of the new Administration's initial potential with the French and the British.

A third range of alternatives involves those specific, but relatively minor actions, which can improve the prospects of the RLG of restoring political control in the essential areas, without raising risks of escalation or substantial changes in the present position of our major allies.

A concrete policy would be unlikely to fall clearly in any one of these ranges of alternatives but would combine elements of all three. Emphasis in one direction or the other will, however, be important to our over-all policy.

11. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, January 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381. Top Secret.

You asked that I put in writing my recollection of the subjects discussed at the meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House on Thursday, January 19. My notes taken at the meeting are not complete, but they indicate that the following statements were made:

A. With respect to Laos:

1. President Eisenhower advised against unilateral action by the United States in connection with Laos.

2. The President stated that the British and French were reluctant to fulfill their obligations under the SEATO Treaty.

3. Secretary Herter/2/ stated that if the Phoumi government requested aid from SEATO, he, Herter, believed we would be bound by our obligations under the SEATO Treaty to supply such aid. In this event, he stated he believed the British would probably fulfill their treaty obligations, but that the French would not.

/2/For Herter's account of this meeting, see Document 9.

4. Herter added that if a political settlement in Laos is not possible, we must support the Royal Laotian Government's request for SEATO intervention.

5. President-elect Kennedy inquired of President Eisenhower whether, in the event of intervention in the Laotian conflict by either the United States or SEATO, the Sino-Soviet bloc could be expected to counter with forces in excess of those provided by either the SEATO nations or the United States. President Eisenhower's answer was not completely clear, but he implied that the Sino-Soviet bloc could support the Pathet Lao with resources of men and mat[riel substantially larger than those which the SEATO nations could be expected to provide for the support of the Royal Laotian Government.

6. Secretary Herter stated that the introduction of communist members into the Laotian Government would undoubtedly lead to subversion of the government, and the ultimate replacement of a coalition government with a communist government. President Eisenhower replied he was not certain that this would be the result; he believed it might be possible to maintain indefinitely a coalition government including representatives of the communists.

7. President Eisenhower stated without qualification, "If Laos is lost to the Free World, in the long run we will lose all of Southeast Asia."

8. President-elect Kennedy asked, "What action can be taken to keep the Chinese Communists out of Laos?" There was no answer to this question from President Eisenhower.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Robert S. McNamara/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

12. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy/1/

Washington, January 25, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. I. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on January 27.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Lemnitzer
General Decker
Admiral Burke
General White
General Shoup
General Clifton
General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The President next read to the Chiefs a cable from Ambassador Thompson in Moscow pertaining to the Laos situation,/2/ and questioning the apparent thinking of the U.S. government involving considerable reliance on a military solution in the area. He said he hoped to have Thompson back here shortly for consultations. General Lemnitzer said he did not see how Thompson had reached the view that we regard a military solution as the primary element in handling the Laotian situation. The Joint Chiefs have certainly not advanced the idea of a military solution alone. The fact is, however, that if we do not assist a legitimate government of Laos when the Pathet Lao are pushing in, we will have a very great problem. What concerns him most is that somehow we are not able to win public opinion to our side in these matters. We have meticulously honored the Geneva accords, for example. Admiral Burke added that we, who are not a signatory to the Geneva accords, have honored them, while the Soviets, who are a signatory to the Geneva accords,/3/ have been violating them with impunity and with no worldwide protest. The President said he is all for doing what we can in Laos. He does not want to start any form of action where the other side can easily top us in anything we do, however.

/2/Telegram 1721 from Moscow, January 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1-2361)

/3/See footnote 2, Document 9.

Admiral Burke went on to say that the Communists are always trying to give our Ambassadors the impression that they will go all the way if we resist them in any degree. If we once start accepting this point of view, they will have disarmed us. The President said he thought the important thing is to try to get the British and French to go along with us. General Lemnitzer suggested that this be done in SEATO. The other countries are very much in accord with us--particularly the Asian members--and are deeply concerned over their own safety. The President said he regarded the step of committing American troops as the last step to be employed. However, he is determined to try by all means to sustain the government. He said he is not too optimistic in this regard. Admiral Burke said that he thinks we can save the government through a combination of military and political action. He said that other governments in the area know that their own safety is involved and will support us if we show that the U.S. supports freedom. The situation is not lost by any means.

General Lemnitzer commented that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been advocating the establishment of major U.S. forces in Laos, but rather the support of indigenous forces. He said that wherever the U.S. takes action to oppose Communist aggression, charges that the U.S. is "trigger happy" seem to dominate the press of the world, including the press or our allies, such as the British. General White advanced for consideration the possibility of making more use of Australia in this situation. General Lemnitzer said the Australians have been quite luke-warm, but are getting much more concerned. The President asked as to the possibility of using the Pakistanis, and inquired further whether we would have to move them. General Lemnitzer said the Pakistanis are willing to come in, and added that we would have to move them. We have the capacity, although it would take some time to assemble it. The President asked how many jet troop transports we now have, and General White said that we have none. In response to a question by the President, he said it is just a matter of program decisions not having included this aircraft. General Lemnitzer said that we have great capacity in C-124s, C-130s and DC-6s. He recalled that we had moved 18,000 troops and 20,000 tons of equipment to Puerto Rico and back in a space of two weeks recently. The President commented that the Secretary of Defense is considering the acquisition of some jet transports, and General White confirmed this.

General Lemnitzer then said that we have some Marine forces in the Far East entirely ready to go on a moment's notice. Admiral Burke said that if the President thinks the situation is tightening, there would be reason to move some ships forward to the Western Pacific.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The President said he would like to have a memorandum bringing out what, if we were to decide to commit American troops in Laos, we could do in the way of a buildup in 30 days. He asked that it cover how fast the Viet Minh could come into the situation. General Lemnitzer said they could come in fast, but we could cut their supply lines and limit what they could do.

General Lemnitzer said that if we took units out of our ready forces, we would want to replace them quickly with units from the reserves. General Decker said there are three divisions ready to go in STRAC. Also, the 25th Division, less one RCT, is in Hawaii, with the RCT in Okinawa. There are seven national guard divisions that have been designated to be called in to replace any units committed.

The President asked what efforts have been made to prevent the experience we had with our prisoners of war in Korea. General Decker reported that a code of conduct has been prepared and that there are programs of indoctrination. It is recognized that there would be brainwashing, but the men know much better what to do. General Lemnitzer confirmed that training has been intensive--on occasion involving the acting out of what can be done to maintain order and morale in a prison camp. Admiral Burke observed that those who believe in something can and will stand up in such a situation. General Lemnitzer said he thought the situation was infinitely better than in 1950, when the armed forces were at a very low ebb. The units committed in Korea from Japan were at a low state of training and readiness.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

13. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 3, 1961, 10:40-11:38 a.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Bangkok Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, 350 Political Affairs--Laos (C), 1961. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Brown, who was in Washington for consultations. The conversation took place at the White House. The time of the conversation is from Kennedy's appointment book. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown

The President opened the conversation by saying that he understood that we had been concerned about the morale of the Lao Army but that there had been some improvement in it recently and inquired whether this was correct. I replied that there had indeed been some improvement consequent upon the Army's success in retaking Vientiane and also because of some improvement in organization and command which had been introduced by General Phoumi. However, my basic concern about the staying power of the Royal Army troops and particularly the quality of their leadership remained. When the Army approached Vientiane they had an identifiable target, the capital city was a stimulus. Now they faced a long period of battle over a wide area of the country with no end in sight. There were differences and factionalism in their leadership and a severe shortage of first-class officers. Morale could break easily in the face of reverses. In any event it was not realistic to expect that a total victory or indeed any satisfactory solution of the problem in the country could be found by purely military means.

The President asked what should be done. I said that some very constructive thinking had been going on in the Department looking towards bringing in a neutral commission to try to arrange a cessation of hostilities and to prove to the world, including the Communists, that Laos really was neutral, was not a military base and was not a source of hostile acts or aggression against the Communists but rather simply an independent Kingdom anxious to lead its own life in its own way.

I said I thought this would go a long way to cure the unfortunate differences of opinion which had arisen between us and the British and the French. I was particularly concerned about the difficulties with the British because if Ambassador Addis was to be believed, it had gone beyond a mere difference of opinion between friends as to the proper course of action and had reached the stage where the British had become suspicious both of our motives and of our actions and felt that we were concealing things from them, both in the realm of what we had done and what our intentions were. This I felt was a most unhealthy situation.

I explained to the President that I had a certain bias in approach to these problems because all my background had been in Europe and in international organizations with a European flavor and, therefore, he must appraise any of my judgments accordingly.

The President asked what our real differences with the British and the French were. I replied that they centered about a difference in the concept of neutrality and more specifically in attitudes toward Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi. They were prepared to go much farther with a neutral Laos accepting aid from the Soviets and having Pathet Lao in the government and not taking an anti-communist posture than we would. They felt that the only hope of uniting the country was to support Souvanna Phouma, and the British at least were willing to accept Pathet Lao in the government. They agreed that this was a risk, but felt that with proper care and guidance, one or two communist members in the government could be kept from doing too much harm. The alternative would be civil war and, in their view, a greater risk.

I said I thought that their attitude might be colored to a certain degree by the fact that they are not Pacific powers and have no real responsibilities there whereas we have great responsibilities there. They tend to think of everything in terms of what its possible impact might be upon their position in Europe and elsewhere and therefore come out with a different emphasis than we.

The President indicated his concern about the military situation in view of our long lines of communication, the easy availability of supplies from Communist counties and the nature of the terrain. He also expressed concern about the differences between ourselves and our Western allies and indicated sympathy to the idea of a political approach through the neutral commission that we were considering. He expressed some skepticism, however, as to whether the Communists would accept this in view of their favorable military position.

I explained to him that in our program we were trying to implement the concept expressed in his inaugural that we should be ready to negotiate and yet at the same time be in a position of strength. Our program included proposals for certain actions by SEATO including a suggestion of stationing an American unit in Thailand thus indicating the determination of SEATO to be ready for action if peaceful measures failed. The President asked what my personal opinion of this was. I said that I had some reservations personally about the balance of advantage in stationing an American unit in Thailand. It was of course vitally important to stiffen the resolution of the Thais and to give them a sense of American support. Against this must be weighed an appraisal of the effect of such a move upon the Soviets or Chinese Communists and upon our Western allies and the neutrals whose support we were seeking to elicit by our package approach.

In the discussion of the military situation I mentioned my concern at certain moves which we had made and which had been proposed by our military such as the provision of T-6 aircraft and consideration of the use of napalm and other bombs. I said that it seemed to me unwise from our own interest to make moves which in themselves were not particularly effective but which could be seized upon by the other side as justification for increasing the tempo and level of their own activities and which would certainly be considered by neutrals and our Western allies as being unduly provocative. If there was to be an escalation in the level of military activity, I would hope that it would not be initiated by us and that the onus for it could clearly be placed on the other side. Therefore I felt it was very important that any moves in the military field should be thought through very carefully in terms not only of their immediate usefulness but in terms of consequences which they might set in motion and that they should be undertaken only if we were fully prepared to accept and meet those consequences. My own hope was that the fighting could be kept in the framework of Lao against Lao even if it took a lot longer to achieve our objectives.

The President asked me what kind of men Souvanna, Phoumi and Boun Oum were. I described Phoumi along the lines of Hasey's character sketch contained in Embtel 1412./2/ I described Souvanna as a highly cultivated man, conscious of his royal blood, a sincere patriot, basically anti-Communist, possessed of an infinite capacity for self-deception, convinced (wrongly) that he commanded the devout support of 90% of the Lao people, confident that if he could get the Communists in his government he could handle them and keep the country from their clutches, wholly incapable of organizing or running a government, too disposed to compromise, underestimating Communist persistence and ruthlessness, unwilling to believe that his half-brother Souphanouvong, or indeed most of the other Pathet Lao leaders, were really Communists.

/2/In telegram 1412 from Vientiane, January 25, Phoumi was described as a devoted family man, who suffered from insecurity about himself and was suspicious of others unless they were part of his loyal entourage. Phoumi was characterized as ambitious, unscrupulous, hard-driving, egotistical, moody, proud, a fast-talker, but a slow thinker who was nonetheless intelligent. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.521/1-2561)

I described Boun Oum as a Lao Falstaff, popular in the South and in other places among the simple people who were impressed by his royal blood, the fact that he was the second personage in the realm, and the fact that he mingled with the people many of whom felt that he had supernatural powers. At the same time he had a widespread reputation for venality and was not either very intelligent or very decisive. So far as the government was concerned, he was a figurehead.

14. Summary Record of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 8, 1961, 2:45-3:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-861. Secret. Drafted by Parsons. The meeting took place at the White House.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
General Lemnitzer
Mr. Allen Dulles
Asst. Secretary of Defense Mr. Nitze
Mr. Walter Rostow, White House
Mr. Bissell, CIA
Mr. Bohlen, State Department
Mr. Parsons, State Department

General Lemnitzer was requested to open the meeting with a brief exposition of the military situation. He discussed the fighting around the Phou Khoun road junction and the prospective offensive, launched February 6, to retake the Plaine des Jarres from the west and the southeast.

The Secretary then discussed our proposal for a political solution in Laos, including its relationship to the military effort and to discussion with other nations, especially the British. The Secretary mentioned that there were some subsidiary decisions required to assist military support of General Phoumi's offensive.

On one such decision relating to the use of C-130 aircraft to lift supplies needed for General Phoumi's offensive, General Lemnitzer stated that this airlift was essential to its success. Consideration was then given to possible Soviet responses to the use of C-130 planes into Vientiane. It was pointed out that the use of US planes would merely match the longstanding use of Soviet planes to airlift supplies to the Pathet Lao. Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Rostow were of the opinion that it would not matter much what was painted on the planes we used, and Mr. Bohlen thought the more critical moment in regard to a Soviet response would come if it appeared that General Phoumi was succeeding in his effort to recapture the Plaine des Jarres. Mr. Bohlen thought that this might be the moment for the President to address a message to Khrushchev on our proposal for a peaceful solution. In response to the President's question, General Lemnitzer agreed (contrary to the opinion held by his representatives on the Laos task force the preceding day) that it would be feasible for the C-130s to lift supplies only as far as Udon in northeast Thailand, [1 line of source text not declassified]. Authorization was then given for these planes to fly to Udon.

Another matter requiring decision was the proposal to send in an additional nine training teams (three teams per month). The nine teams would amount to 72 persons in all, and their presence would enable the US to have one team with each battalion of the Royal Lao Army. Mention was made of the severe reduction in French training personnel, which made this step all the more necessary, although on the other hand, it would have much less cover than before the French reduction. The introduction of these training teams was authorized.

[paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

In discussing the package of telegrams constituting our concept on Laos,/2/ the President expressed particular concern in regard to the possible stationing of a SEATO force in Thailand. He set forth arguments on both sides of this matter, but preferred that we not proceed with this part of our proposal at present. The Secretary pointed out that other actions were possible to bolster our military posture as a means of improving the negotiating position. He mentioned in this regard the dispatch of fleet units on visits to Bangkok, etc.

/2/See Document 15.

During the discussion Mr. Bohlen indicated that if Phoumi's offensive were succeeding, which was by no means to be taken for granted, then he could see a much better prospect for launching Neutral Nations Commission proposal, particularly in terms of Soviet acquiescence in it. It was pointed out that to wait that long would be likely to leave the initiative to others on the political front and that time was needed in any event to consult with other countries, persuade the Lao to adopt our proposal, and to get action. In the meantime, Ambassador Brown was already in Bangkok and needed instructions.

There was also discussion initiated by the President as to why we thought these neutral nations would accept membership in the Commission, as we proposed. Also discussed were the possibilities and timing of a broadening of the Boun Oum-Phoumi government. It was brought out that a government crisis now would make it impossible for the King and his government to launch the proposal for a Neutral Nations Commission, which, according to our plan, the US and others would publicly support after the King acted. There was indeed a possibility that the Lao themselves would wish the government to be broadened, but premature action and pressure might make it impossible to advance towards the peaceful settlement which we envisaged.

Turning to our concept telegram, the President read the text and, subject to a change in timing to defer SEATO action, approved it. The Secretary pointed out that this particular text might not be the one which we would wind up with after discussion with the British. We felt that we should talk to them right away, but the Secretary thought it likely that the British would not agree with anything which did not commence with a replacement of the Boun Oum-Phoumi government by one including at least Souvanna. It was the sense of the meeting that we should next talk to the British, and only later to the French, in view of the danger of leaks; at the same time the urgent need to dispatch our message to Vientiane was recognized.

The President inquired as to the status at Seno, where there had been a tense position between the Lao and the French. He was told that this seemed to have moderated and that we were pressing the Lao not to antagonize the French needlessly.

[1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

Before closing the meeting, the President reiterated that he wanted to be sure that the timing on SEATO action was changed before we sent our concept telegram./3/

/3/Rostow prepared a 1-page summary of this meeting which emphasized decisions taken. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2-861)