Good
morning. My name is Debbie Doran and since 1996 I have been
a Special Agent of the FBI assigned to the New York Division's
Counterterrorism Division, where I have focused on USAMA
BIN LADIN and AL QAIDA investigations. As a "street
agent," I am removed from the policy and administrative
decision-making processes that have defined the scope and
conduct of the FBI's investigation into AL QAIDA, both historically
and currently and therefore cannot speak to those issues.
What I can speak to is how we, at the "street-agent"
level, pursued AL QAIDA and some of what we have learned.
Let
me begin by telling you that I am proud to be a Special
Agent of the FBI and that I am particularly proud of the
work done by the Counterterrorism Divison in New York. I
have been privileged and honored to work with and learn
from my colleagues in the FBI, as well as those in other
government agencies. Prior to 9/11/2001, it was primarily
the New York office, together with AUSAs from the United
States Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New
York, supported by a handful of dedicated analysts at FBIHQ,
in conjunction with our colleagues at CTC, that constituted
the majority of the United States government's institutional
knowledge about AL QAIDA and the threat it posed to the
United States. The dedication and sacrifices made in this
cause by these people is incalculable. I hope today that
we who sit before you can do justice to their efforts which
since 9/11/01 have been supplemented with literally thousands
of additional people in both civilian and military capacities.
Clearly this is indicative of the responsibility with which
we were charged prior to 9/11/01.
The
FBI is, and has been, an integral part of the United States
Intelligence Community working to prevent acts of terrorism.
The FBI is not new to countering terrorism against United
States' interests, whether here or abroad. Included in the
FBI's mission has always been the proactive identification
and disruption of potential terrorism threats. The FBI's
first Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) was formed in New
York over 20 years ago. We have long understood that a successful
prosecution after a terrorist attack is only second-best.
The
FBI is extremely effective in putting together both criminal
and intelligence cases, all built upon information obtained
through detailed and thorough investigations that are factually
substantiated and corroborated. The fundamental objective
of our investigations, both criminal and intelligence, is
to reach the highest level of proof -- truth -- about that
which we investigate.
It
is the FBI agents' training, under the rule of law, that
has led to the FBI's successes in such cases. FBI investigators
seek to pursue all leads to their logical end, and follow
those leads wherever they may take us. While leads can undoubtedly
be developed in the wake of terrorist attacks, the real
goal is to develop them through proactive investigation
so as to be able to disrupt the potential terrorist act
before it occurs. In numerous instances FBI investigations
have disrupted planned attacks against the United States
and have contributed to the disruption of planned attacks
abroad. Beyond merely disrupting specific plots, FBI generated
intelligence has significantly contributed to the identification
of AL QAIDA's leadership, its organizational structure,
methods, training, finances, geographical reach and intent.
The
early development of operational sources and cooperators,
dogged pursuit of leads and the factual substantiation of
information all exemplify the ways that the FBI was proactive
in the fight against terrorism, long before 9/11/2001. Through
good operational sources, the FBI identified the first seeds
of Islamically-justified terrorism in the United States
in approximately 1989. The FBI utilized all the intelligence
and investigative techniques available to identify potential
terrorist subjects and to attempt to determine their goals
and objectives. These FBI investigations bore fruit and
photographs taken later gained significance as some of those
surveilled and photographed were subsequently identified
as subjects in early terrorism cases. For example, individuals
photographed at a shooting range in the United States in
the late 1980s were later identified as subjects in the
1990 murder of MEIR KAHANE, head of the JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE,
a proscribed terrorist group, and as subjects in the first
World Trade Center bombing case in 1993, and as subjects
in the investigation into plans to bomb various New York
City landmarks disrupted in 1995.
It
was through these early investigations that the name USAMA
BIN LADIN ("UBL") first surfaced. Initially he
was identified as an organizer and financier of military
training camps in Afghanistan. The fact that UBL's name
first surfaced through FBI New York investigations connected
to the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and the 1995 New
York City landmarks case was the reason why the UBL investigation
was assigned to the FBI's New York office. This early era
yielded yet another important name, KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMED.
KSM first surfaced as evidence was developed that indicated
that he had wired money to Ramzi Youssef and another coconspirator
in 1992.
Pursuit
of fugitives indicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
namely RAMZI YOUSSEF, led to the identification of another
terrorist plot against United States interests, namely MANILA
AIR. New sources were developed out of that investigation,
without whom YOUSSEF might still be at large. Investigation
in Manila revealed that the plot to blow up twelve American
airliners, while in the air, over a two-day period was planned
by RAMZI YOUSEF and KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED (KSM). The arrest
of YOUSSEF in Pakistan contributed greatly to the FBI's
then-new, but growing, institutional knowledge of UBL and
his network.
The FBI's intelligence investigation into USAMA BIN LADIN
(UBL) was opened in February 1996, and the criminal investigation
was opened in September 1996. Perhaps the most significant
factor in the progress of the UBL investigations, from the
FBI perspective, came with the arrival of an AL QAIDA defector,
JAMAL AL FADL, nicknamed "JUNIOR."
JUNIOR
had offered his information to a number of different countries
before being brought in by the CIA in 1996. Subsequently
the CIA allowed him to meet with the FBI. In December, 1996
JUNIOR was established as a FBI cooperating witness against
AL QAIDA. Information provided by JUNIOR spurred a continuing
effort to target and apprehend AL QAIDA associates, wherever
they might be found, including those willing to act as informants.
JUNIOR was only one of a series of cooperators developed
by the FBI. Like JUNIOR, they continue to be debriefed and
to this day continue to provide the FBI with new and relevant
information. Through them, the FBI gained valuable insights
into AL QAIDA's leadership, organization, methods, training,
finances, geographical reach, and intent.
Utilizing
sources like Junior and others, UBL was identified as the
head of AL QAIDA. Information these sources provided also
allowed for identification of his top lieutenants and the
structure of the AL QAIDA organization. The AL QAIDA organization
can be likened to that of a corporation, headed by a CEO,
with a number of subsidiaries, the directors of which all
sit on the corporate board. In AL QAIDA's case, UBL is the
CEO, and his board of directors is called a majlis al shura,
or consultative council, which forms the core of the group's
command and control structure. The majlis al shura discusses
and approves major undertakings, including the terrorist
operations of AL QAIDA. Each member of the majlis al shura
heads a committee: these committees include those for the
military operations, information and propaganda, sharia
(Islamic law), finance and security of AL QAIDA; each has
its own specific purpose and responsibilities.
Through
its sources, the FBI has also gained a more comprehensive
picture of the training camps, methods, tradecraft and intent
of AL QAIDA. Throughout the 1990s, thousands of men were
recruited to come and fight on behalf of the Taliban against
the Northern Alliance in order to establish an Islamic state
in Afghanistan. Those who came were sent into basic training
camps; those who excelled were approached about the possibility
of joining the larger jihad targeting the United States
and its allies. Those who accepted that offer were sent
on for advanced training, and sometimes for specialized
training, such as in explosives. We learned that AL QAIDA
studies American military manuals and has set up its own
internal security system, and that its operatives are selected,
in part, on their ability to assimilate into other societies
and cultures, including our own. AL QAIDA operatives travel
to other countries to marry into local society and to set
up front companies. This is done for the dual purpose of
trying to earn money to sustain themselves and to use those
front companies to further their jihad efforts. The FBI
has learned that UBL does not trust banks and that money
is often hand-couriered by trusted associates as required
to support operations. The FBI has also seen AL QAIDA's
evolutionary abuse of non-governmental organizations for
its own ends. It also became clear that UBL was more than
simply a financier; rather, he was the spiritual leader
of virulently anti-Western interpretation of Islam who was
adored by those who followed him.
By
early 1996 and continuing until today, the FBI and CIA were
working together in the targeting of UBL and AL QAIDA, first
via ALEC Station, which was founded for this purpose, and
now through the CIA's Counter Terrorist Center and the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division The FBI contributed significantly
to this joint effort to fight terrorism. The FBI continued
to examine AL QAIDA's presence across the United States
and around the globe. Long before 9/11/2001, FBI agents
briefed countless foreign law enforcement and intelligence
agencies about UBL and AL QAIDA.
Eventually,
the amount of factually substantiated and corroborated information
developed by the FBI was such that in June 1998, UBL was
indicted in the SDNY (under seal). This was a significant
legal tool to have in hand in the event an opportunity to
capture Bin Laden arose. This indictment was unsealed and
superceded after the attacks on the U.S. embassies in East
Africa in August 1998.
This
Commission has been provided unprecedented access to FBI
personnel, FBI information, and FBI records in order to
inform yourselves about the FBI's counterterrorism efforts,
past and present. The fact this Commission was able to draft
the statement it has for this panel is and of itself a small
testament to the work done by this dedicated band of public
servants, including those in the FBI, in the years prior
to 9/11/2001.
On
behalf of the United States Attorney for the Northern District
of Illinois, Pat Fitzgerald, and Executive Assistant Director
of the FBI, John Pistole, we thank the Commission for inviting
us to these proceedings, and providing the opportunity,
in some small way, to contribute to history. We understand
the responsibility with which you have been charged and
will do our best to answer your questions.