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USDOL/OALJ Reporter

Rowe v. Newport News Shipbuilding, Case No. 96-2572 (4th Cir. Oct. 7, 1999)

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH ROWE, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND

No. 96-2572

DRY DOCK COMPANY; DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Benefits Review Board.

(94-2264)

Argued: March 2, 1998

Decided: October 7, 1999

Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and

HILTON, Chief United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Petition for review denied by published per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: John Harlow Klein, RUTTER & MONTAGNA, L.L.P.,

Norfolk, Virginia, for Petitioner. Benjamin McMullan Mason,

MASON & MASON, P.C., Newport News, Virginia, for Respon-

dents. ON BRIEF: Matthew H. Kraft, RUTTER & MONTAGNA,

L.L.P., Norfolk, Virginia, for Petitioner. Melissa R. Link, MASON &

MASON, P.C., Newport News, Virginia, for Respondent Newport

News Shipbuilding.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Claimant Joseph W. Rowe appeals from a denial of his claim for

an increase in his compensation for permanent partial disability under

the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.

901-50. We affirm.

On February 20, 1991, the parties stipulated, in relevant part, to the

following facts:

1) That on March 19, 1985, Rowe injured his right knee

arising out of or in the course of his employment with New-

port News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company.

2) That at the time of the injury, Rowe's average weekly

wage was $536.76, yielding a compensation rate of $357.84

per week.

3) That Rowe was temporarily totally disabled from March

24, 1985 through April 7, 1985; March 5, 1986 through May

11, 1986; May 31, 1989 through August 21, 1989; and May

14, 1990 through September 8, 1990.

4) That in 1991 Rowe was compensated for a forty percent

permanent partial disability for loss of use of the right leg,

a compromise between a rating of fifty percent disability by

Dr. Helmuth W. Trieshmann Jr., Rowe's doctor, a rating of

thirty percent disability by Dr. Robert S. Neff, the compa-

ny's doctor.

Since the parties entered the agreement that resulted in compensa-

tion for forty percent permanent partial disability, Rowe claims that

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the economic impact of his injury has worsened. After surgery to his

knee in May 1989 and May 1990, Rowe was given light duty assign-

ments as a production planner at the shipyard, but was laid off in

March 1992. Subsequently, he worked as a superintendent for the

Bradford Corporation. He left that job in April 1993, after six months,

due to a heart disorder. Rowe then was a maintenance worker at the

Vickie Villa motel, but was laid off in October 1993. Thus, he filed

a claim for additional benefits under LHWCA based on the economic

effects of his injury.

A full hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge on

October 19, 1993. On March 21, 1994, the ALJ issued a Decision and

Order in which he denied Rowe's claim for additional disability bene-

fits based on economic factors. In addition, the ALJ found that there

was no medical evidence from which to conclude that the extent of

Rowe's permanent partial disability had increased.* Rowe filed a

timely appeal to the Benefits Review Board. The decision of the ALJ

was affirmed by operation of Public Law 104-134. A petition for

review was timely filed in this court, and we have jurisdiction pursu-

ant to 33 U.S.C. 921(c).

The issue in this case is whether an injured claimant under

LHWCA may base his claim on economic factors when awarded

compensation for a scheduled disability as set forth in the Act under

33 U.S.C. 908(c)(1-20). This court addressed this same question in

Gilchrest v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 135 F.3d

915 (4th Cir. 1998). In that case, the claimant injured his hands, and

an order was entered by the Director of 10% permanent partial dis-

ability in each hand, a scheduled injury. Thereafter he claimed loss of

wage earning capacity and sought increased benefits for that under

LHWCA for the scheduled injury. Similar to the present case, the

ALJ, affirmed by the Board, determined that under Potomac Electric

Power Co v. Director, OWCP (PEPCO), 449 U.S. 268 (1980), he

could not account for economic factors in calculating disability bene-

_________________________________________________________________

*Dr. Trieshmann sent a letter to Rowe's counsel in June 1992 stating,

in pertinent part, that: "it is my opinion that his condition has not deterio-

rated since the rating in October 1990." Then, in June 1993, Dr. Triesh-

mann similarly found that there had been no further deterioration in

Rowe's condition. This second issue has not been appealed.

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fits when the medical impairment falls within the schedule provided

in the statute at 908(c)(1-20).

On review, the claimant asserted that the ALJ erred by not consid-

ering loss of economic wage earning capacity in denying his claim for

increased benefits. We denied the petition for review in that case. In

PEPCO, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between sched-

uled injuries, for which the claimant is limited to the compensation

provided in the statutory schedule, and injuries outside the schedule,

for which 908(c)(21) provides a potentially higher recovery by

incorporating economic factors. PEPCO, 449 U.S. at 274. Thus, we

held that the PEPCO decision precluded an increase in compensation,

based on economic factors, beyond that provided in the permanent

partial disability schedule of Section 908(c).

We can find no meaningful distinction between the facts of the

case presently before the court and those in Gilchrest.

The petition for review is accordingly

DENIED.

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