<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:30869.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-723
AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP (GNEP), INCLUDING
PROPOSED ADVANCED REACTOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR RECYCLING NUCLEAR WASTE
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HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
SEPTEMBER 14, 2006--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri TOM HARKIN, Iowa
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HARRY REID, Nevada
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
Bruce Evans, Staff Director
Clayton Heil, Deputy Staff Director
Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Energy and Water, and Related Agencies
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi HARRY REID, Nevada
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
CONRAD BURNS, Montana BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
Professional Staff
Scott O'Malia
Roger Cockrell
Emily Brunini
Drew Willison (Minority)
Nancy Olkewicz (Minority)<greek-l>
Administrative Support
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici.................... 1
Statement of Senator Wayne Allard................................ 2
Statement of Dennis Spurgeon, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy......... 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
GNEP Overview.................................................... 6
Future of Nuclear Energy in the United States.................... 7
Spent Fuel Recycling............................................. 9
Statement of Dr. Alan Hanson, Executive Vice President,
Technology and Used-Fuel Management, AREVA NC, Inc............. 11
Prepared Statement........................................... 14
The Comparable Costs of Recycling................................ 14
The National Benefits of Recycling............................... 15
GNEP Can Be a Successful Public-Private Enterprise............... 16
Industry Can Begin Meeting the Objectives of GNEP................ 16
Letter From Dr. Alan Hanson...................................... 17
Statement of Matthew Bunn, Harvard University, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts........................... 23
Prepared Statement........................................... 26
Assessing the Benefits, Costs, and Risks of Near-Term
Reprocessing and Alternatives.................................. 26
Recycling in Context............................................. 27
Costs and Financing.............................................. 27
Proliferation Risks.............................................. 28
Safety and Security.............................................. 31
Environmental Impact............................................. 31
Sustainability................................................... 31
Uranium Supply................................................... 32
Repository Space Supply.......................................... 32
Commercial-scale Demonstrations and the GNEP R&D Program......... 34
Recommendations.................................................. 36
Statement of Kelly Fletcher, GE Global Research, Sustainable
Energy Advanced Technology Leader.............................. 40
Prepared Statement........................................... 42
Historical Overview.............................................. 43
PRISM Technology................................................. 44
PRISM Technology for the Future.................................. 48
Advanced Reactors Program........................................ 51
Schedule and Cost Impacts to GNEP................................ 52
Industry Involvement............................................. 54
Support of Nuclear Power......................................... 55
GNEP Change in Scope............................................. 56
Technical Capability............................................. 57
Estimated Time for Start of Program.............................. 58
AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP (GNEP), INCLUDING
PROPOSED ADVANCED REACTOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR RECYCLING NUCLEAR WASTE
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Energy and Water,
and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V. Domenici (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Domenici and Allard.
opening statement of senator pete v. domenici
Senator Domenici. This hearing I want to follow up on the
Department's evolving strategy to address spent nuclear fuel
and determine the level of coordination between GNEP and the
Yucca Mountain program. I think you all know that's very
important.
One month ago the Department undertook several
solicitations to begin the site selection process and to
determine the level of interest in the development--or the
developing--the consolidation at fuel treatment facility and an
advanced burner reactor.
This move to a commercial facility is a major departure
from the Department's original R&D roadmap in February of this
year, and has the potential to significantly accelerate the
development of recycling technology and bring it more in line
with the plan for Yucca Mountain. Accelerating the process,
this process, will certainly change the selection of
technologies and I need to be assured that the Department is
making a sound decision regarding non-proliferation.
We also need to be assured that the department has the
technical capability to fully realize the GNEP goals of closing
the fuel cycle and significantly reducing the amount of spent
fuel. I think we need to know more about the integration--
integrating advanced reactors into the process and having a
frank discussion about the Department's technology capability
to develop high quality actinide fuel.
Secretary Spurgeon, I understand the Department received
over a dozen responses to your recent site selection RFP. That
is a very encouraging sign and I look forward to learning more
about this.
Ladies and gentlemen we are at a crossroads in our national
energy policy. Building on the success on the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 we can choose to make the investment and developing
diversified energy resources or we can choose to maintain the
status quo. With regard to nuclear power the provisions in the
EPACT which encourage development of new nuclear plants are
having a positive effect. Already 12 utilities or consortia are
preparing at least 19 applications for as many as 30 new
reactors. In addition, 50 percent of the existing reactor fleet
will receive 20-year license renewals.
The existing nuclear fleet provides the cheapest source of
power--other than hydroelectric--and like hydro does not
contribute to greenhouse emissions. Therefore it is clear to me
that one nuclear strategy must not only address new plants, but
must solve the waste problem as well.
Let me be clear that I believe it was a mistake to abandon
the nuclear fuel recycling in 1978 and that clearly our so-
called leadership did not make a bit of difference had others
decided to develop the process without us. I support GNEP as a
responsible solution to addressing our spent fuel needs. I also
believe this strategy must be closely aligned with the
development of Yucca Mountain in the near term. I would hope
the Federal Government lives up to its commitment under the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act and begins to take responsibility for
waste stored at reactor sites nationwide.
Today, we hear from four witnesses with vast experience in
the world of nuclear power to determine if the Department is on
the right path with GNEP. Witness Dennis Spurgeon, Assistant
Secretary Office of Nuclear Energy, will update the committee
on the evolving GNEP strategy and provide feedback on the
recent site solicitations.
Dr. Alan Hanson, Executive Vice President for Technology
and Used Fuel Management, AREVA, will provide perspective on
the most recent economic analysis of recycling technology and
the opportunities to deploy commercial spent fuel recycling
technology.
And Mr. Matt Bunn of Harvard University will provide
testimony on the economics of nuclear reprocessing and address
proliferation concerns.
Mr. Kelly Fletcher, Global Research and Advanced Technology
Leader, General Electric will provide testimony on investments
the Department of Energy has made in advanced reactors and the
viability of the DOE strategy.
I appreciate the participation of the witnesses and request
that you keep your testimony to 5 minutes--perhaps slightly
more--as your full statement will be included in the record and
we can spend more time talking together for a more complete
record.
Unless one of my colleagues would like to make an opening
statement, I am going to proceed to the first witnesses.
statement of senator wayne allard
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make just
some very brief comments.
Senator Domenici. Please do.
Senator Allard. First of all, I want to congratulate you on
a very fine opening statement this morning. I think you and I
agree on the importance of having a sound energy plan for this
Nation. I want to applaud you for the leadership in that
regard. Obviously nuclear energy has to be a vital part of
that--in my view--and I think you agree with that. And, if we
are going to have nuclear energy, we have to have a sound
process where we take the waste and deal with the waste
problem. So, I want to thank you for holding this important
hearing.
As I stated during the hearing earlier this year on the
global nuclear energy plan, I believe that nuclear energy is
one of the most promising and under-utilized energy sources
available to us and I am pleased we are taking another look at
the administration's GNEP plan and pleased to see that we are
looking particularly at the waste recycling portion of the
plan.
When the United States stopped nuclear reprocessing in the
1970's, England, France, and Japan, as we all know, kept moving
forward. They are now operating several successful reprocessing
facilities. I visited some of these sites in France and England
where I was able to discuss much of the reprocessing technology
and to see it in action. It is my understanding that newer
processes, ones that we would be using are even more advanced,
and it's my understanding that potentially these processes are
safe and efficient and ultimately result in a much smaller
waste stream than the nuclear energy production process. This
results in lessened storage requirements down the road and
because much of the spent fuel is recycled, less new fuel must
be acquired.
Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for your holding this
hearing. I look forward to continuing our work on this
important issue. To the panel I going to have a vote here in
another committee, so I'm not going to be able to be here for
your whole testimony, but I'm going to read it and I'm very
interested in this issue and I look forward to what you have to
say. I appreciate your being willing to show up here and share
your thoughts with us this morning. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Senator. Let us proceed.
Assistant Secretary Spurgeon.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS SPURGEON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
NUCLEAR ENERGY, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Spurgeon. Chairman Domenici, Senator Allard, it is a
pleasure to be here today to discuss the future of nuclear
energy in the United States and the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership, or GNEP, through which the Department proposes to
develop and deploy an integrated recycling capability.
Mr. Chairman, you have been a strong and appreciated voice
in calling for a nuclear renaissance in the United States and
for expanded use of nuclear power across the world. I
appreciate this committee's long-standing leadership and
support for the Department's nuclear energy program.
With 130 nuclear powerplants under construction or planned
around the world, clearly many countries--including China,
India, Russia, and others--see the benefits of nuclear energy
and are moving forward with ambitious nuclear power programs.
The same can be said for the United States. For the first time
in decades, U.S. utilities are developing the detailed plans to
build a new generation of nuclear power plants. At current
count almost 30 new nuclear powerplants are in the planning
process for construction beginning over the next decade.
What is prompting this growth? First, in the United States,
industry has done the hard work of establishing a solid
foundation for a new generation of plants. Demand and rising
costs of energy, particularly volatility of natural gas, along
with concerns about carbon dioxide emissions has made nuclear
energy attractive. Partnerships between government and industry
have successfully worked to address the final financial and
regulatory impediments that the first purchasers of new nuclear
plants face.
During the 5 months that I have been Assistant Secretary, I
have worked to focus the priorities of my office on what I
believe to be our most important responsibility--first, serving
as a catalyst for a new generation of nuclear power plants in
the United States. That is what we are doing with Nuclear Power
2010 and implementing the provisions of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005. Second, we are paving the way for safe and secure
expansion of nuclear power in other parts of the world. I
believe this is the compelling challenge of our time and I want
to work closely with you and the committee as we move forward.
We are making progress on both fronts. I am confident that
we will see the first announcement of new United States nuclear
power plants before President Bush leaves office. But it is
important for our future that nuclear energy expand in the
world in a way that is safe and secure, in a way that will
result in nuclear materials or technologies being used only for
peaceful purposes--energy and security go hand in hand.
GNEP addresses two major issues that have limited the use
of nuclear power in the later half of the 20th century: how to
responsibly use sensitive nuclear technologies in a way that
does not threaten global security and how to safely manage high
level waste. GNEP is complementary to the Department's efforts
to license and open Yucca Mountain. For the long-term viability
of our nuclear generating capacity we must proceed with a
geologic repository. The Department is pursuing initial
operation of Yucca Mountain as early as 2017 so that we can
begin to fulfill our obligation to dispose of spent fuel and
other nuclear wastes from our defense program. Whether we
recycle or not, we must have Yucca Mountain open as soon as
possible.
This is one of the reasons I believe we must develop and
deploy advanced recycling technologies as soon as possible--
technologies that will enable us to recover the usable material
contained in spent fuel, and reduce the volume, heat load, and
toxicity of waste requiring emplacement in the geologic
repository. In so doing we can extend the capacity of Yucca
Mountain such that additional repositories may not be needed
this century.
We are pursuing development and deployment of integrated
spent fuel recycling facilities in the United States. These are
technologies that do not result in separated plutonium stream.
Specifically, the Department proposes to develop and deploy the
uranium extraction plus or UREX+ technology or comparable
variants to separate the useable materials contained in spent
fuel from the waste products. Based on considerable domestic
and international experience, we also propose to deploy a fast
reactor capable of consuming or destroying those usable
products from the spent fuel while producing electricity.
Based on the positive international and private sector
response to GNEP, we believe there are advanced technologies
available to recycle used nuclear fuel that may be ready for
deployment in conjunction with those currently under
development by DOE. For example, portions of the UREX+
technology are well understood today, while other portions,
such as group separation of transuranics from lanthanides,
require additional research and development. Also, industry may
have similar advanced technologies that are closer to full-
scale deployment. As such, we want to examine the feasibility
of proceeding with those portions of the technology that are
well understood while completing the R&D for the others. These
two parallel tracks would provide technology development and
R&D efforts necessary to support full-scale deployment and
advanced recycling concepts.
Last month, DOE issued two requests for Expressions of
Interest from domestic and international industry, seeking to
investigate the feasibility, interest and capacity of industry
to deploy an integrated spent fuel recycling capability
consisting of a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center and an
Advanced Burner Reactor. The integrated recycling facilities
would include process storage of spent fuel prior to its
recycling. This process storage would be on a scale
proportionate to the scale of recycling operations.
We are now in the process of reviewing industry's response
to last month's request for expressions of interest (EOI). We
received 18 such responses, representing both U.S. and
international companies, including several nuclear suppliers.
Based on our limited review thus far, I can tell you that we
are very encouraged by the response from industry and we look
forward to establishing a working relationship with industry in
fiscal year 2007.
Pursuant to the report language contained in the fiscal
year 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations
conference report, we issued a funding opportunities
announcement seeking grant applications from private and/or
public entities interested in hosting integrated spent fuel
recycling facilities. Last week, we received 14 grant
applications from public and private entities proposing eight
DOE and six non-DOE sites, representing essentially each
geographic region of the country. We are very pleased with this
response. Several of these applications included indications of
support by State elected officials. We anticipate awarding
grants later this fall that will provide funds to entities for
site evaluation studies. The studies will be completed over the
90 days following the award and will provide input to the
National Environmental Policy Act documentation to be prepared
for the integrated spent fuel recycling facilities.
Senator Domenici. Did that many surprise you?
Mr. Spurgeon. We were very pleased with that response
because we made it very clear, Mr. Domenici, that we wanted
sites proposed by public/private entities that had support for
their submissions. This represents somewhat of a change from
how we solicited Expressions of Interest in the past, but we
were very pleased with that response, sir.
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Spurgeon. Finally, I would note that the technical
underpinnings of GNEP are found in the work of the Advanced
Fuel Cycle Initiative Program (AFCI) over the past several
years. To further advance and guide the GNEP effort, we have
developed an initial technology development program plan that
establishes the work to be accomplished, the applied research
priorities, and the milestones, drawing upon the expertise of
our national laboratories. This plan will be finalized over the
next 3 months and execution will extend from the Department
down to the multi-laboratory teams. This technology plan will
evolve as industry is integrated into the GNEP program.
Mr. Chairman, we are making progress and we respectfully
request support and which we know we have received to date,
sir, for full funding for GNEP in fiscal year 2007 to continue
the progress forward. I look forward to answering your
questions, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dennis Spurgeon
Chairman Domenici, Senator Reid, and members of the subcommittee,
it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the future of nuclear
energy in the United States. I will discuss the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership or GNEP, through which the Department proposes to
accelerate development and deployment of an integrated recycling
capability in the United States.
First, I will provide a brief overview of our GNEP efforts.
Second, I will discuss the expansion of nuclear power reactors in
the United States.
Third, I will discuss the status of our efforts to plan for
advanced recycling of spent fuel to accommodate the safe expansion of
nuclear power.
GNEP OVERVIEW
As you know, I have been in the position of Assistant Secretary
since April. During this time, I have worked to focus the priority of
Office of Nuclear Energy on what I believe is our most important
responsibility--serving as a catalyst for a new generation of nuclear
plants in the United States. We are making progress on this front and
in the longer term global expansion of nuclear energy through GNEP.
I am working with industry and the national laboratories to restore
the United States to a position of international leadership in nuclear
power to meet the goals of GNEP. Dr. Paul Lisowski is now on-board as
my Deputy Program Manager of GNEP. Paul assumes this position after 20
years at Los Alamos National Laboratory, including 10 years as a senior
manager responsible for the Accelerator Production of Tritium Project
and operation of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center. Paul comes to
this position with significant experience in fuel cycle technologies,
in particular transmutation. He has a proven track record managing
highly complex scientific and national security projects and programs
and I am pleased to have him on our team.
GNEP is both a major research and technology development
initiative, and a major international policy partnership initiative. It
addresses two major issues that have suppressed the use of nuclear
power in the latter half of the 20th century: how to responsibly use
sensitive technologies in a way that does not threaten global security,
and how to safely dispose of nuclear waste. The technology R&D
addresses primarily the waste issue. International collaboration and
diplomacy harnesses new technologies and policies to ensure nuclear
power is used responsibly.
That is why we have proposed to establish an international
framework to bring the benefits of nuclear energy to the world safely
and securely without all countries having to invest in the complete
fuel cycle--that is, enrichment and reprocessing. We propose to create
an approach, which provides fuel and reactors that are appropriately
sized for the grid and the industry needs of the country. Next week, I
will attend the 50th anniversary of the International Atomic Energy
Agency General Conference. For the first time in many years, a key
focus is on how to facilitate the safe and secure expansion of nuclear
energy. The IAEA has planned a special event to recognize the 50th
anniversary. The special event will focus on developing an assured fuel
cycle.
We also seek to develop international fuel leasing arrangements to
assure the availability of fuel and international partnerships to
develop advanced recycling on productive approaches, incentives and
safeguards. To encourage countries to forgo fuel cycle activities, they
must be assured of credible international fuel supplies backed by
designated supplies and governmental entities. These efforts backstop
the proven performance of a well-functioning international commercial
fuel sector. In addition, in bringing the benefits of nuclear energy to
the world, we want to work with other countries to facilitate export of
reactors sized to the grids and utility needs of those countries. These
reactors would have adequate safety and safeguards integrated into the
design.
As you know, the Department is pursuing development and deployment
of integrated spent fuel recycling facilities in the United States.
These are technologies that do not result in a separated plutonium
stream. Specifically, the Department proposes to develop and deploy the
uranium extraction plus (UREX+) technology to separate the usable
materials contained in spent fuel from the waste products. We also
propose to deploy a fast reactor capable of consuming those usable
products from the spent fuel while producing electricity.
Based on international and private sector response to GNEP, we
believe there may be advanced technologies available to recycle used
nuclear fuel ready for deployment in conjunction with those currently
under development by DOE. In light of this information, DOE is
investigating the feasibility of these advanced recycling technologies
by proceeding with commercial demonstrations of these technologies. The
technology, the scale and the pace of the technology demonstrations
will depend in part on industry's response, including the business
aspects of how to bring technology to full scale implementation.
DOE will draw upon the considered review of these technologies in
the Advanced Fuel Cycle Program (AFCI) program over the past several
years. Consistent with the fiscal year 2006 Energy and Water
Development Conference Report H.R. 109-275, we are also exploring
potential locations in the United States where the integrated spent
fuel recycle capability and related process storage could be
successfully sited and demonstrated.
We have the opportunity now to invest in an advanced fuel cycle
that can impact waste management in truly significant ways. Limited
recycle with mixed oxide fuel in thermal reactors or existing light
water reactors, in our view, does not offer the long-term benefits for
the geological repository or support the same forward-looking
advantages for the revival of U.S. nuclear leadership for the 21st
century.
The Department respectfully requests Congress' support for full
funding for GNEP in order to continue the forward progress needed to
inform a decision by the Secretary of Energy in mid-2008 on whether or
not to proceed with design, construction and operation of prototype
spent fuel recycling facilities. If successful, the Department will
have set a course to re-establish commercial-scale spent fuel recycling
capability in the United States. This effort will greatly expand the
supply of affordable, safe, clean nuclear power around the world, while
enhancing safeguards to prevent misuse of nuclear material and assuring
the availability of Yucca Mountain for generations to come.
FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
The resurgence of nuclear power is a key component of President
Bush's Advanced Energy Initiative and a key objective contained in the
President's National Energy Policy. The reasons for this are clear. As
we enter a new era in energy supply, our need for energy--even with
ambitious energy efficiency and conservation measures--will continue to
grow as our economy grows. Electricity demand is expected to double
over the next 20 years globally (EIA International Energy Outlook 2006,
p. 63) and grown by 50 percent in the United States (EIA Annual Energy
Outlook 2006, Table A-8). While nuclear power is not the only answer,
there is no plausible solution that doesn't include it.
Our country benefits greatly from nuclear energy. One hundred and
three nuclear plants operate today providing one-fifth of the Nation's
electricity. These plants are emissions-free, operate year-round in all
weather conditions, and are among the most affordable, reliable, and
efficient sources of electricity available to Americans. Nuclear, like
coal, is an important source of baseload power and is the only
currently available technology capable of delivering large amounts of
power without producing air emissions. U.S. nuclear power plants
displace millions of metric tons of carbon emissions each year.
Over the last 15 years, industry has done an exceptional job
improving the management and operation of U.S. plants, adding the
equivalent of 26 \1\ 1,000 megawatt units during this timeframe without
building a single new plant (EIA Annual Energy Review, 2004). U.S.
nuclear plants have a solid record of safety, reliability,
availability, and efficiency. Longer periods between outages, reduction
in the number of outages needed, power up-rates, use of higher burn-up
fuels, improved maintenance, and a highly successful re-licensing
effort extending the operation of these plants another 20 years, have
collectively improved the economics of nuclear energy. Today, nuclear
energy is among the cheapest electricity available on the grid, at 1.72
cents per kilowatt-hour (www.nei.org).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Increase in nuclear generation between 1990 and 2005 with a 90
percent capacity factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these successes and growing recognition of the benefits and
need for more nuclear energy, industry has not ordered a new nuclear
plant since 1973 (an additional plant ordered in 1978 was subsequently
cancelled). In fact, not much baseload capacity--whether nuclear,
hydro-electric, or coal--has been ordered since the 1970's, other than
some coal-fired plants located close to the mouth of the coal mine in
the western United States. In the 1980's, a large number of commercial
orders for nuclear plants were cancelled and no new orders were placed.
This was because of financial and regulatory challenges that
significantly drove up the capital cost of nuclear plants and delayed
their startup. In addition, investment premiums were so high that
capital markets could no longer support nuclear power plant projects.
Today the conditions are significantly different, with volatile
natural gas prices, increasing demand for electricity, and concerns
about clean air, utilities and investors are planning for a new
generation of nuclear plants in the United States.
To address regulatory uncertainties that first purchasers of new
plants face, in 2002, the Department launched the Nuclear Power 2010
program as a public-private partnership aimed at demonstrating the
streamlined regulatory processes associated with licensing new plants.
Under Nuclear Power 2010, the Department is cost-sharing the
preparation of early site permits, expected to be completed in 2007 and
early 2008. The Department is also cost-sharing the preparation of a
total of two combined Construction and Operating Licenses (COLs) for
two consortia: Dominion Energy, which is examining the North Anna site
in Virginia and NuStart--a consortium of ten utilities and two
vendors--which will use DOE funding to move a COL forward on either the
Bellefonte site in Alabama or the Grand Gulf site in Mississippi.
Collectively, these two teams represent the operators of two-thirds of
nuclear plants operating today in the United States.
Under this program, we are also jointly funding the design
certification and completion of detailed designs for Westinghouse's
Advanced Passive Pressurized Water Reactor (AP 1000), General
Electric's Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR), and site-
specific analysis and engineering required to obtain COLs from the NRC.
The two COL applications are planned for submission to the NRC in late
2007 and industry is planning for issuance of the NRC licenses by the
end of 2010.
With dozens of new nuclear plants under construction, planned or
under consideration world-wide, many countries around the world are
clearly moving forward with new nuclear plants (www.world-nuclear.org/
info/reactors.htm). And it is no different here in the United States.
We are nearing completion of the initial phase of preparations for a
new generation of nuclear plants. Through the Nuclear Power 2010
program and incentives contained in the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
government and industry are working together to effectively address
regulatory and financial impediments that the first purchasers of new
plants face.
As a result, I am confident that we will see the first
announcements of new U.S. plants before President Bush leaves office. I
am also confident that we will see construction begin by 2010. Already
we are seeing indications that new orders are in the planning stages,
with utilities announcing procurements of long-lead components. Earlier
last month, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission indicated that it has
received letters of intent from potential applicants for a total of 19
site-specific COLS for up to 27 reactors. This progress would not have
been possible without NP 2010 and incentives like risk insurance, which
respectively mitigate the financial and regulatory risks facing the
first few new nuclear power facilities.
However, for the long-term viability of our nuclear generating
capacity, we must proceed with a geologic repository. We are pursuing
initial operation of Yucca Mountain as early as 2017 so that we can
begin to fulfill our obligation to dispose of the approximate 55,000
metric tons of spent fuel already generated and approximately 2,000
metric tons generated annually. Whether we recycle or not, we must have
Yucca Mountain open as soon as possible. But as you know, the statutory
capacity of Yucca Mountain will be oversubscribed by 2010 and without
the prospect of spent fuel recycling, simply maintaining the existing
generating capacity in the United States will require additional
repositories.
This is one of the key reasons why I believe we must accelerate the
development and deployment of advanced recycling technologies--
technologies that will enable us to reuse our valuable energy resources
and that extend the capacity of Yucca Mountain for generations to come.
But it also important for our own future that nuclear energy expands in
the world in a way that is safe and secure, in a way that will not
result in nuclear materials or technologies used for non-peaceful
purposes.
SPENT FUEL RECYCLING
The United States operates a once-through fuel cycle, meaning that
the fuel is used once and then disposed of without further processing.
In the 1970's, the United States stopped the old form of reprocessing
and then committed to not separate plutonium, a nuclear proliferation
concern. But the rest of the nuclear economies--France, Japan, Great
Britain, Russia and others engage in recycling, a process in which
spent fuel is processed and the plutonium and uranium are recovered
from the spent fuel to be recycled back through reactors. As a result,
the world today has a buildup of nearly 250 metric tons of separated
civilian plutonium. The world also has vast amounts of spent fuel and
we risk the continued spread of separated plutonium via fuel cycle
separation technologies. Furthermore, recent years have seen the
unchecked spread of enrichment technology around the world.
Having ceased reprocessing of spent fuel for several decades, with
anticipated growth of nuclear energy in the United States and abroad,
the United States is now considering a new approach that includes
recycling of spent nuclear fuel using advanced technologies to increase
proliferation resistance, recovering and reusing portions of spent
fuel, and reducing the amount of wastes requiring permanent geological
disposal. Since 2000, Congress has appropriated funds for the AFCI for
research and development on a number of different recycle concepts.
Within the AFCI program, we have had considerable success with the
UREX+ technology, demonstrating the ability at the bench and laboratory
scales to separate uranium from the spent fuel, at a very high level of
purification that would allow it to be recycled for re-enrichment,
stored in an unshielded facility, or simply buried as a low-level
waste. With UREX+, the long-lived fission products, technetium and
iodine, could be separated and immobilized for disposal in Yucca
Mountain. Next, the short-lived fission products cesium and strontium
are extracted and prepared for decay storage, where they are allowed to
decay until they meet the requirements for disposal as low-level waste.
Finally, transuranic elements (plutonium, neptunium, americium and
curium) are separated from the remaining fission products, fabricated
into fast reactor transmutation fuel, and consumed or destroyed in a
fast reactor. After these elements are consumed, only small amounts
would require emplacement in a geologic repository. This approach is
anticipated to increase the effective capacity of the geologic
repository by a factor of 50 to 100.
Last month, DOE issued two requests for Expressions of Interest
from domestic and international industry, seeking to investigate the
interest and capacity of industry to deploy an integrated spent fuel
recycling capability consisting of two facilities:
--A Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center, capable of separating the
usable components contained in light water spent fuel from the
waste products;
--An Advanced Burner Reactor, capable of consuming those usable
products from the spent fuel while generating electricity.
The Department asked industry to provide input on the scale at
which the technologies should be proven. Ultimately, as in the initial
plan reported to the Congress in May, the Department ultimately seeks
the full commercial-scale operations of these advanced technologies. It
is premature, however, to say exactly what form or size the recycling
facility will take until we analyze important feedback recently
received from industry.
The integrated recycling facilities would include process storage
of spent fuel prior to its recycling, on a scale proportionate to the
scale of recycling operations. A third facility, the Advanced Fuel
Cycle Facility--would be designed and directed through the Department's
national laboratories and would be a modern state-of-the-art fuels
laboratory designed to serve the fuels research needs to support GNEP.
We have solicited industry expressions of interest in order to
leverage the experience of existing, proven capabilities of industry
and fuel cycle nations to develop advanced recycling technologies for
GNEP. These entities will be critical in helping bring these facilities
to operation in the United States, while meeting GNEP goals. We are
also examining the feasibility of incorporating advanced technologies
that are closer to deployment, in conjunction with those currently
under development by DOE, to reduce the time and costs for commercial
deployment.
We are now in the process of reviewing industry's response to last
month's request for Expressions of Interest. Based on our limited
review thus far, I can tell you that industry has responded with
positively and we look forward to working with industry.
In addition, last month the Department issued a Financial
Assistance Funding Opportunities Announcement, seeking applications by
September 7, 2006, from private and/or public entities interested in
hosting GNEP facilities. Specifically, the Department will award grants
later this fall for site evaluation studies. As this committee knows,
Congress made $20 million available (H.R. 109-474, fiscal year 2006
Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill), with a maximum of $5
million available per site. Because we will need process storage for
fuel to be treated, part of the purpose of this Financial Assistance
Funding Opportunity Announcement is to understand the ability of and
interest in proposed sites receiving fuel for process storage. The
information generated from these site evaluation studies may be used in
the preparation of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
documentation that will evaluate potential environmental impacts from
each proposed GNEP facility.
The Department is continuing to plan and prepare for the
development of appropriate NEPA documentation to support activities
under GNEP. The Department issued an Advance Notice of Intent to
prepare an environmental impact statement in March 2006 and is
preparing to issue a Notice of Intent in the fall 2006. The current
plan is to complete the NEPA process in 2008, assisting in Departmental
decisions about whether to move forward with integrated recycling
facilities, and if so, where to locate them.
The overall GNEP effort involves several program secretarial
offices, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
For example, NNSA will provide key assistance in assuring that
safeguards approaches and technologies are incorporated into the
facilities early in the planning process. In addition, while DOE
currently sponsors university research grants through its R&D programs
via the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, universities will be
engaged in GNEP-funded research. Industry will also be engaged as the
program progresses through the design process.
Designing, developing and deploying the separations, fuels, and
reactor technologies requires that DOE carry out a variety of research,
ranging from technology development for those processes initially
identified to longer-term research and development on alternatives for
risk reduction. In addition, the Office of Science held three technical
workshops in July 2006 on basic science in support of nuclear
technology. Although not limited solely to GNEP, the results of this
activity will help guide the long-term R&D agenda for closing the fuel
cycle. Furthermore, advanced simulation is expected to play an
important role in the development of this program, as it does today in
many leading commercial industries. DOE organized a workshop on
simulation for the nuclear industry at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory which was chaired by Dr. Robert Rosner, Director of Argonne
National Laboratory and Dr. William Martin from the University of
Michigan. We also participated in a nuclear physics workshop sponsored
by the Office of Science.
Systems analysis also forms an important part of the ongoing GNEP
effort and will have an increased role during the next 2 years. Through
systems analysis, we will investigate several key issues, including
life cycle costs, rate of introduction of fast reactors and separations
facilities, a detailed study of the technical requirements for GNEP
facilities and the complete fuel cycle, and how to ensure that they
relate to the top level goals of the program. The results of these
analyses are essential to establishing the basis for each key decision
in the AFCI program and will have a profound effect on GNEP program
planning.
In short, there has been considerable progress on the Department's
fiscal year 2006 efforts on GNEP. The Department has continued applied
research and technology development efforts in concert with the
Department's national laboratories. The Department has engaged the
international community to identify areas of potential cooperation,
cost-sharing, and support.
In fiscal year 2007, the Department seeks to continue the research
and development activities necessary to support GNEP, including issues
associated with developing transmutation fuel. The Department will also
continue work on conceptual designs for the Advanced Fuel Cycle
Facility.
CONCLUSION
In closing, the United States can continue down the same path that
we have been on for the last 30 years or we can lead to a new, safer,
and more secure approach to nuclear energy, an approach that brings the
benefits of nuclear energy to the world while reducing vulnerabilities
from proliferation and nuclear waste. We are in a much stronger
position to shape the nuclear future if we are part of it. This is an
ambitious plan and we are just at the initial stages of planning. I
look forward to coming before the committee in the future as the GNEP
program plans take shape.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. Dr. Hanson.
STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN HANSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
TECHNOLOGY AND USED-FUEL MANAGEMENT, AREVA
NC, INC.
Dr. Hanson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Bennett, my
name is Alan Hanson, I'm Executive Vice President for
Technology and Used Fuel Management at AREVA, Inc. I appreciate
this opportunity to testify before you today. I am very pleased
to join Assistant Secretary of Energy, Dennis Spurgeon on this
panel, we look forward to working with him to achieve the
objectives of GNEP.
AREVA, Inc. is an American Corporation, headquartered in
Maryland. We are part of a global family of AREVA companies,
and we are the only company in the world to operate in all
aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Relevant to today's
testimony is the fact that AREVA operates today, the largest
and most successful used fuel treatment and recycling plants in
the world. AREVA has proven expertise in the areas GNEP is
designed to address. We have today commercially available
technology that can be implemented in the very near future and
AREVA is ready to commit its substantial resources to support
the objectives of GNEP.
We believe that no time should be wasted since developing a
comprehensive used fuel management will have the most important
effect of increasing confidence in nuclear energy, thereby
paving the way to the nuclear renaissance that Congress enabled
with passage of Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Now one of the major obstacles to implementing a used fuel
management strategy that includes recycling in the United
States has been the perceived high cost of recycling compared
to a once-through approach. However, several factors recently
have led to questions about the appropriateness of the once-
through fuel cycle. In particular, cost estimates in national
repository to support the once-through policy have
significantly increased. Additionally, more repository capacity
is likely to be needed for fuel discharged after 2015. And
finally, with the long-term increase in new U.S. nuclear power
generation, now foreseen, even greater volumes of used nuclear
fuel will need to be disposed.
These developments have made it increasingly important that
the United States further investigate recycling as part of a
comprehensive used fuel management strategy, which must also
include geologic repositories. In this context, The Boston
Consulting Group recently completed an independent study for
AREVA to review the economics of a fuel cycle which includes
developing a recycling component in the United States, using a
technology consistent with America's nonproliferation
objectives. The study addressed the costs of a portfolio waste
management strategy. A new recycling facility was assumed to be
operational by 2020. The facility would integrate used fuel
treatment together with fuel fabrication on a single location
and would function in combination with the development of the
geologic repository.
The facility would utilize an AREVA recycling process
called COEX, which unlike conventional technologies, never
separates out pure plutonium. BCG's analysis conclusions found
that the costs derived from an integrated plant, can be
significantly lower than previously published findings suggest.
Previous estimates of the cost of treatment and recycling have
been based on very sparse publicly available industry data.
They did not consider the effects of building only specific
facilities needed or the economies of scale, higher rates of
utilization, and they also used different assumptions with
regard to financial calculations. They did not account for the
full repository optimization potential that recycling strategy
offers and this is a very important advantage of doing
recycling.
Initial repository with today's statutory capacity, for
instance, can ultimately handle the equivalent of four times
more used fuel when operated as part of the portfolio strategy
because efficient modes of recycling significantly compact the
final waste volumes and minimize the heat and toxicity of
disposed materials. These are, in fact, some of the goals and
objectives just outlined by Assistant Secretary Spurgeon.
The Boston Consulting Group study, which assumed very
conservative variables, concluded that the total cost of
recycling in combination with an optimized repository can be
comparable to the cost of a once-through program. By
comparable, they meant within perhaps plus or minus 10 percent.
Additionally, recycling is part of a portfolio strategy,
presents a number of other significant benefits. For example,
foregoing the need for additional civilian repository capacity
until at least 2070. Eliminating earlier the need for
additional investments in interim storage capacity at our
operating reactor sites. And by relying on existing strategy
providing a systematic progressive operational transition to
the more advanced technology developments that are the ultimate
objective of the GNEP initiative.
We believe the GNEP can be a successful public/private
enterprise. DOE has recently engaged industry in the future
development of the GNEP initiative, formulating the two-track
approach and requesting from industry expressions of interest
as just described. Based on AREVA's own experience, we believe
that such an industrial and evolutionary approach offers the
highest probability of success for introducing used fuel
recycling in the United States.
AREVA responded positively and with great enthusiasm to
both DOE requests for expressions of interest. With adequate
public/private coordination, we forecast that a workable
business framework can be achieved that will draw less heavily
from the American taxpayer than is widely predicted while
simultaneously leveraging significant investment interest from
interested companies, such as AREVA. Industry can begin meeting
the objectives of GNEP today. AREVA looks forward to the
accelerated execution of a GNEP two-track approach.
We believe there are three compelling policy reasons for
immediate action. We want a strategy that provides full
confidence that the by-products resulting from the generation
of nuclear power can be adequately dealt with for generations
to come. This will help to ensure that new nuclear power plants
can begin being built immediately. Beginning implementation of
recycling in the near term will postpone or eliminate the need
for siting, funding, and constructing additional geologic
repositories. And finally, used fuel can be moved away from
today's power plants early to the process storage part of the
recycling facility perhaps as early as 2015, thus minimizing
further Federal liabilities that, approved, would compensate
utilities for interim storage.
As an industrial and commercial company, AREVA believes in
an evolutionary approach to technology development. We have
used this approach successfully on several occasions during the
deployment of our treatment plants at La Hague. Making such
provisions in the initial facility designs provides a high
degree of flexibility for addition of advanced technologies
when they become available. AREVA is also working on innovative
business models that would require very limited direct
government financial support over the next decade, thus
allowing resources to be spent on the development of a final
waste repository and on the R&D needed for advanced
transmutation fuels. Our proposed evolutionary approach meets
the fundamental objectives of GNEP to reduce proliferation
risks through the combination of advanced safeguards techniques
and technology developments.
First of all, avoid any separation of pure plutonium at any
location within the treatment facility. This is one of the
advantages of the COEX process which we are developing. We can
limit the concentration of plutonium solution throughout the
facility to keep the physical protection requirements of that
facility to a minimum. And there are other features that we
would design into the plan for advanced measurement techniques
and defense in depth which are part of the ongoing nuclear
industry.
Advanced burner development is also an important component
of the GNEP initiative. As currently envisioned by DOE, this
development would keep pace with the operational start of an
integrated evolutionary recycling plant. However, focusing any
national recycling strategy solely in conjunction with the ABR
deployment carries a serious programmatic risk, because a full
fleet of ABR reactors will likely not be available on the same
time schedule that the recycling plant can be up and
operational. Even if the technology program for ABR development
is accelerated, and we hope that it will be, utilities will
still require as many as 10 years of proven operational
experience before considering serious private financing and
commercial deployment.
Thus, a more successful recycling strategy should allow for
the fabrication of both ABR fuel and fuel for today's fleet of
light water reactors. The latter could be used in the interim
as the ABRs come online improving the overall economics of the
GNEP initiative. AREVA has recommended a DOE approach here that
can demonstrate economic viability in the shortest frame work.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, AREVA believes that recycling
as a complementary strategy to development of a geologic
repository can be done economically and that is the best
comprehensive waste management strategy for dealing with used
nuclear fuel. AREVA is interested in being a partner with the
Department of Energy and thereby helping to put the partnership
into GNEP. We stand ready to support the Department of Energy
and this subcommittee and the nuclear energy in general in this
historic initiative.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you, I
appreciate the opportunity to make this statement and I will be
pleased to answer questions later this morning. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Alan Hanson
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Alan
Hanson, and I am Executive Vice President, Technology and Used Fuel
Management, of AREVA NC Inc.
I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today on the
U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).
I am very pleased to join Assistant Secretary of Energy Dennis
Spurgeon on this panel. Assistant Secretary Spurgeon comes to DOE with
a distinguished industry background, which will help him to take on
many challenges implementing our Nation's nuclear energy policy. I look
forward to working with him to achieve the objectives of GNEP.
AREVA, Inc. is an American corporation headquartered in Maryland
with 5,000 employees in 40 locations across 20 U.S. States. Last year,
our U.S. operations generated revenues of $1.8 billion--9 percent of
which was derived from U.S. exports. We are part of a global family of
AREVA companies with 59,000 employees worldwide offering proven energy
solutions for emissions-free power generation and electricity
transmission and distribution. We are proud to be the leading supplier
of products and services to the worldwide nuclear industry, and we are
the only company in the world to operate in all aspects of the nuclear
fuel cycle.
AREVA designs, engineers and builds the newest generation of
commercial nuclear plants and provides reactor services, replacement
components and fuel to the world's nuclear utilities. We offer our
expertise to help meet America's environmental management needs and
have been a longtime partner with DOE on numerous important projects.
Relevant to today's testimony is the fact that AREVA operates the
largest and most successful used fuel treatment and recycling plants in
the world.
What I hope to accomplish today is to provide a commercial,
industrial perspective on how we as a Nation might realistically
achieve the bold objectives of the GNEP program. AREVA applauds the
GNEP vision for expanding clean nuclear power to meet the ever-
increasing global demand for energy while providing the framework to
safeguard nuclear technologies and materials. We strongly believe that
nuclear energy has a critical role to play in the future of our Nation,
just as we believe that GNEP puts the United States on the right track
for leadership in the global nuclear industry.
AREVA has proven expertise in the areas GNEP is designed to
address. Our accumulated experience makes us uniquely qualified in all
of the industrial aspects of this initiative. We have today
commercially-available technology that can be implemented in the very
near future, and AREVA is ready to commit its substantial resources to
technically support the objectives of GNEP.
We believe that no time should be wasted since developing a
comprehensive used fuel management strategy, one that is complementary
and beneficial to our Nation's repository program, will have the most
important effect of increasing confidence in nuclear energy, thereby
paving the way to the nuclear renaissance that Congress enabled with
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
THE COMPARABLE COSTS OF RECYCLING
One of the major obstacles to implementing a used fuel management
strategy that includes recycling in the United States has been the
perceived high cost of recycling compared to a once-through approach in
which used fuel is stored for a period of time and then disposed in a
geologic repository.
Over the last decade, however, several factors have led to
questions about the appropriateness of the once-through fuel cycle as
an exclusive used fuel management strategy. In particular, cost
estimates of the national repository to support the once-through policy
have significantly increased from initial estimates. Additionally, at
the current rate of used fuel generation, additional repository
capacity is likely to be needed for fuel discharged after 2015. And
finally, with a long-term increase in new U.S. nuclear power generation
now foreseen, even greater volumes of used nuclear fuel will need to be
disposed.
The underlying economics of a used fuel management approach that
includes recycling have thereby shifted, driven also in part by higher
uranium prices and by a deeper understanding of the long-term behavior
of recycling byproducts that allows for significant optimization of
valuable repository space.
Recycling as a key component of a comprehensive used fuel policy
has gained recognition through the demonstrated, long-term operational
effectiveness of treatment and fabrication technologies for more than
40 years of accumulated industrial experience combined with a higher
level of confidence based upon economic data from actual operations
such as AREVA's. These developments have made it increasingly important
that the United States further investigate recycling as part of a
comprehensive used fuel management strategy.
In this context, The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) recently
completed an independent study commissioned by AREVA to review the
economics of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle and, in particular,
a fuel cycle which includes developing a recycling component in the
United States using a technology consistent with America's
nonproliferation objectives.
The study addressed the cost of a ``portfolio'' waste management
strategy. A new recycling facility treating 2,500 metric tons of used
fuel per year was assumed to be operational by 2020. The facility would
integrate used fuel treatment together with fuel fabrication on a
single location and would function in combination with the development
of a deep geologic repository for high-level waste from recycling and
untreated legacy used fuel. The facility would utilize an AREVA
recycling process called COEX<SUP>TM</SUP>, which unlike conventional
technologies never separates out pure plutonium.
Data from AREVA's global operations, supplemented by site visits
and additional analyses, were used by The Boston Consulting Group as a
starting point for an independent, third-party assessment of this
assumed recycling model. BCG's analysis and conclusions found that the
unit costs derived from an integrated plant are significantly lower
than previously published findings suggest.
While the capital investments and operational expenses of a U.S.
treatment plant may have been expected to be close to those of AREVA
reference facilities, a much higher-used fuel throughput can be
reasonably projected in an American context because of the U.S.
facility's larger size and a higher rate of utilization, which in turn
results in economical unit costs. Utilization was assumed to be at
about 80 percent of nameplate capacity, a technical assumption that can
be backed by AREVA's own operational experience. Higher utilization in
the United States is not only possible but desirable because of a
larger volume of newly discharged fuel and existing inventory.
Previous estimates of the cost of treatment and recycling have been
based upon sparse publicly-available industry data. These estimates did
not consider the effects of building only the specific facilities
needed or the economies of scale and higher rates of utilization, and
they also used different assumptions for financial calculations.
Additionally, previous studies did not account for the full repository
optimization potential a recycling strategy offers. A national
repository with today's statutory capacity, for instance, can
ultimately handle four times more used fuel when operated as part of a
portfolio program because efficient modes of recycling can
significantly compact final waste volumes and minimize the heat and
toxicity of disposed materials.
The Boston Consulting Group study, which assumed very conservative
variables such as the price of uranium at $31 per pound and the sum
cost of a national repository at 2001 DOE estimates, concluded that the
total cost of recycling used fuel in combination with an optimized
repository can be comparable to the cost of a once-through program.
THE NATIONAL BENEFITS OF RECYCLING
Additionally, recycling as part of a portfolio strategy was found
in the BCG study to present a number of significant national benefits.
Some of those discussed in the report include:
--Forgoing the need for additional civilian repository capacity,
beyond the initial 63,000-metric-ton capacity of the first
repository, until at least 2070.
--Contributing to early reduction of used fuel inventories at reactor
sites; in particular, removing newer, hotter fuel for recycling
within 4 years of discharge, thus eliminating earlier the need
for additional investments in interim storage capacity.
--Relying on existing technology with appropriate modifications that
can in turn provide a systematic, progressive operational
transition to more advanced technology developments as they
become available.
GNEP CAN BE A SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
DOE has recently engaged industry in the future development of the
GNEP initiative, formulating a two-track approach under the direction
of Assistant Secretary Spurgeon and requesting from industry
Expressions of Interest in a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC)
and an Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR). In so doing, ``DOE seeks to
determine the feasibility of accelerating the development and
deployment of advanced recycling technologies that would enable
commercial scale demonstrations that meet GNEP objectives.''
Based on AREVA's own experience, we believe such an industrial and
evolutionary approach, while factoring for the application of
incremental innovations, offers the highest probability of success for
introducing used fuel recycling in the United States.
In parallel, an extensive R&D program utilizing the wonderful
capabilities of our national laboratories should continue to be funded
to further develop advanced separations and reactor technologies.
Together with a team of other U.S. industry leaders, AREVA
responded positively and with great enthusiasm to both DOE requests for
Expressions of Interest. I have no doubt that other capable nuclear
companies have also made known to DOE their desire to participate in
the GNEP initiative. With adequate public-private coordination, we
forecast that a workable business framework can be achieved that will
draw less heavily from the American taxpayer than is widely predicted
while simultaneously leveraging significant investment interest from
interested companies such as AREVA.
INDUSTRY CAN BEGIN MEETING THE OBJECTIVES OF GNEP
AREVA looks forward to the accelerated execution of a GNEP two-
track approach. We believe there are three compelling policy reasons
for immediate action:
--Need for a comprehensive and effective waste management strategy.--
We want a strategy that provides full confidence that the
byproducts resulting from the generation of nuclear power can
be adequately dealt with for generations to come. This will
help to ensure that the nuclear renaissance can move forward
and that new U.S. power plants can begin being built
immediately.
--Optimization of a national repository.--Today, the first national
repository is limited by statute to a maximum capacity of
63,000 metric tons of civilian used nuclear fuel. The total
volume of used fuel to be generated in the United States by the
year 2100 is expected to exceed the statutory capacity
significantly, especially under the scenario where there is a
nuclear renaissance and new U.S. plants. Beginning
implementation of recycling in the near-term, however, will
postpone or eliminate the need for siting, funding and
constructing additional geologic repositories.
--Ending of interim storage charges.--Used fuel should be moved away
from the reactors as soon as possible. Acting on the two-track
framework described above, used fuel could be moved away from
today's power plants to a recycling facility perhaps as early
as 2015, thus forgoing Federal liabilities that would otherwise
be accrued to compensate utilities for interim storage.
As an industrial and commercial company, AREVA believes in an
evolutionary approach to technology development. It begins by first
applying a solid baseline of state-of-the-art, proven technologies, and
then, but only then, integrating improvements and upgrades of more
advanced, innovative technologies within a disciplined, continuous
improvement process. Using this approach, we wish to continue to apply
industry advancements to the GNEP program as it advances in the years
ahead.
AREVA has successfully adopted and used this strategy on several
occasions during the deployment of its treatment facilities at La
Hague. The inclusion of additional hot cells in the initial footprint
of the CFTC, which are intended to be used at a later date to receive
new technology, is an example of this approach. Making such provisions
in the initial design provides a high degree of flexibility.
AREVA is also working on innovative business models that would
stimulate and effectively leverage private investments. We are
exploring business model options that require very limited direct
government financial support over the next decade, thus allowing
resources to be spent on the development of a final waste repository
and on R&D for advanced transmutation fuel technologies, which are
crucial to the overall long-term success of the GNEP initiative. We are
looking forward to entering into discussions with DOE in the weeks to
come.
Our proposed evolutionary approach meets the fundamental objective
of GNEP to reduce proliferation risk through the combination of
advanced safeguard techniques and technology improvements. Our phased
approach will carefully ensure from Day One that the attractiveness
levels of process materials are kept as low as possible by:
--Avoiding any separation of pure plutonium at any location within
the treatment and recycling facility (which is ensured with the
AREVA COEX<SUP>TM</SUP> process).
--Limiting the concentration of plutonium in solution anywhere in the
process facility consistent with attractiveness level D or
below, thus making the recycling plant a Category II facility
with respect to materials control and accountability
classification.
--Implementing advanced nuclear material measurement to enhance the
accuracy of material accountability and reporting time; a
development program will be undertaken with the relevant DOE
national laboratories most specialized in this area, and
advanced safeguards will be integrated into the facility design
from the start.
--Implementing the defense-in-depth principle, which involves
multiple levels of physical barriers between nuclear materials
and the exposed environment.
Advanced burner reactor development, also an important component of
the GNEP initiative, is currently envisioned by DOE to keep apace with
the operational start of an integrated recycling facility so it can
address the actinide byproducts of evolutionary recycling.
However, an emerging industry consensus cautions that focusing any
national recycling strategy solely in conjunction with ABR deployment
carries a serious programmatic risk because a full ABR fleet likely
will not be available until some years after a recycling plant is fully
operational. Even if the technology program for ABR development is
accelerated, utilities will require as many as 10 years of proven
operational experience before considering private financing and
commercial deployment.
Thus, a more successful recycling strategy should allow for the
fabrication of both ABR fuel and fuel for today's fleet of light water
reactors. The latter could be used in the interim as ABRs come on-line,
improving the overall economies of the GNEP initiative.
AREVA, with more than 4 decades of sodium-cooled fast reactor
expertise, is uniquely positioned to support the commercialization of
ABRs in the United States under the framework of the GNEP initiative.
AREVA has recommended to DOE an approach that can demonstrate economic
viability in the shortest practicable timeframe.
AREVA believes that GNEP has the potential to vault the United
States into a position of leadership in the global nuclear industry. We
welcome the two-track approach recently announced by DOE and are eager
to move forward with it.
AREVA believes that recycling, as a complementary strategy to the
development of a geologic repository, can be done economically and that
this is the best comprehensive waste management strategy for dealing
with used nuclear fuel.
AREVA is interested in being a partner with DOE and thereby helping
to put the ``Partnership'' into GNEP. We stand ready to support DOE and
the nuclear energy industry in this historic initiative.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate having
this opportunity to join you today. I would be pleased to answer any
questions you may have at this time.
______
Letter From Dr. Alan Hanson
Mr. Matthew Bunn,
Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge,
MA.
Dear Mr. Bunn: I wish to follow up on conversations we had over the
past few months and, in particular, on the testimony you provided at
the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, U.S. Senate, on
September 14, 2006. I would like to take this opportunity to provide an
initial response to some of the points you raised regarding the BCG
study, which was commissioned by AREVA.
In the enclosure to this letter, I made an attempt to respond to
the key points you raised, with the purpose and the expectation that
these responses not be a final answer to your concerns, but a point of
departure for future constructive discussions.
We, at AREVA, certainly share your point of view that using
different assumptions could lead to different recycling costs. At the
same time, you will probably agree that, in the context of a comparison
between recycling and once-through strategies, adjustments to those
assumptions can often result in similar cost increases for both
strategies. The unfortunate truth is that the cost of a used fuel
repository is speculative at best since one has yet to be built
anywhere in the world.
I appreciate your interest and continued willingness to engage in a
dialogue, and I am looking forward to the opportunity of discussing
this further.
Sincerely,
Alan Hanson, Ph.D.,
Executive Vice President, Technology and Used Fuel Management.
Enclosure.--Responses to Comments Made With Regards to the BCG Study
Note that the responses provided in this document have been
developed by AREVA and have not been reviewed by BCG personnel.
1. PROJECTED COSTS LOWER THAN HISTORICAL COSTS
BCG assumes a unit cost of BOTH reprocessing and MOX fabrication of
$630/kgHM (undiscounted), far lower than current plants have managed to
achieve for either process. (BCG provides, for example, an interesting
chart showing that their estimate for reprocessing cost per kilogram is
roughly one-third the cost actually achieved in France). As they put it
themselves, one of the ``key differentiating elements'' between their
study and other studies is ``integrated plant costs significantly lower
than previously published data.''
BCG does not ``assume'' a unit cost. The cost for reprocessing and
MOX fabrication was built up from data provided by AREVA. Figure 17 of
the report is a graphical representation of the difference between
their projections and historical information.
The figure on page 17 does not represent what AREVA has ``managed
to achieve''--it is rather an overall unit cost analysis based on
historical costs of construction and operations and current throughput.
Even with the current plant at La Hague, if AREVA could increase the
throughput of the plant with new contracted work, the cost of
reprocessing would already be significantly lower than historical
numbers shown in this figure.
2. MOX PLANT AT SAVANNAH RIVER EXPERIENCING COST OVERRUNS
The current effort to use AREVA technology and plant designs in the
United States--the construction of a MOX plant at Savannah River--is
leading to unit costs several times HIGHER than those achieved in
France. This experience is not mentioned in the BCG report, and no
argument is offered to why the proposed facility will have a cost
result that is the opposite of the real experience.
The MFFF plant at Savannah River was conceived as a non-
proliferation governmental project, the economics of which cannot be
compared with a commercial fuel recycling project. It is designed for
limited throughput of excess weapons-grade plutonium, as part of
weapons disposal. The MFFF plant will process in its projected lifetime
about as much Plutonium as the plant described in the BCG study will
process over the course of just 1 year. Nevertheless, the MFFF plant
will have to incur significant construction costs, not to mention the
costs for more complex material handling requirements.
In addition, recent increases in the cost estimates for the MFFF
plant at Savannah River, were, as much as possible, already factored
into the design evaluated in the BCG study. At a high level, three
drivers of higher cost can be identified and addressed:
--Change in program and scope of work.--The potential for cost
overruns due to program and scope of work changes has been
considerably reduced in the BCG study by accounting as
thoroughly as possible for all aspects linked with the U.S.
recycling plant.
--Schedule slippage.--The ``political'' schedule slippage cost
overrun (caused by parallelism requirements with the Russian
program) is not applicable to a U.S. recycling plant.
--Unforeseen contingencies.--These have been accounted for as much as
possible in the BCG study by:
--Using as a basis the real costs incurred for the construction of
the reference AREVA facilities (La Hague and Melox),
including therefore all the historical contingencies.
--Adding $2 billion for costs of adaptation to the U.S. context
(e.g., regulatory, more stringent design requirements,
etc.) and another $2 billion for additional contingencies,
representing approximately 25 percent U.S. recycling plant
capital costs.
In general, we recognize that, even considering all contingencies
and reasons for cost overruns, a large and long project, such as the
construction of a recycling plant, is not immune to additional cost
escalation, and we cannot claim that, without any shadow of doubt, the
cost of the recycling plant will be under $16.2 billion. However, it
has to be kept in mind that similar conclusions must be drawn for any
alternative scenario.
3. LARGE PLANT IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIES OF SCALE
BCG envisions a reprocessing and MOX fabrication plant far larger
than any other such plant that exists in the world, processing 2,500
tons of spent fuel every year (compared to 800 tons per year in the
largest single plants that have been built to date).
The very large quantities of used fuel in the United States warrant
the construction of a large plant. Neither BCG nor AREVA identified any
major technical issue with a plant of this size.
BCG assumes that plant capacity can be scaled up dramatically with
only a minor increase in capital or operating cost. They note that the
capital cost of the existing French facilities was $17.8 billion (in
2005 dollars), but they assume that the capacity can be increased by
more than 50 percent (assuming, generously, that the two La Hague
plants should be considered to have a combined capacity of 1,600 tons
of heavy metal per year) with an additional capital cost of only $1.5
billion, less than 10 percent of the original capital cost.
First, it is important to point out that the cost estimates were
developed in a bottom-up fashion, i.e. a new U.S. plant was priced from
the ground up. The chart you refer to is an attempt to reconcile costs
incurred in the European plant with costs of a new plant, with obvious
approximation and adjustments. For example, while we can estimate the
cost of a new optimized vitrification process with a large capacity, it
is difficult to pin down exactly how much of the new estimate is due to
a larger capacity vs. an improved process.
Secondly, 2,500 tons/year represents a treatment throughput that
actually is not far from the throughput of the plant at La Hague. The
treatment capacity at La Hague is the combination of two operating
treatment plants (UP3 and UP2-800), both with a ``nominal'' throughput
of 800 tons/year, and which were combined in 2001 to perform as one
single operating entity. Each of these units has a technical throughput
capacity closer to 1,000 tons/year. Indeed, the licensing permits of La
Hague reference a maximum throughput of 1,000 tons/year per unit, and a
combined maximum throughput of 1,700 tons/year. Note that La Hague
sustained throughput close to 1,700 tons/years during several years in
the late 1990's, when contracted work allowed it.
Therefore, with the real capacity of La Hague close to 2,000 tHM/
yr, the projected U.S. plant is only 25 percent larger. Also, consider
that the increase in cost is $1.5 billion, but on a $12.6 billion basis
(see figure 8 on page 16 in the BCG study), this is a 12 percent
increase. Therefore, we are talking about a 12 percent increase in cost
for a 25 percent increase in capacity (or, in BCG terms, a 70 percent
BCG scale factor), which is in line with typical values one would
expect from projects like this,\1\ considering that a large percentage
of the costs during the construction phase of a project like this are
independent of the capacity of the plant (e.g. licensing costs, siting,
design and technology development, etc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From BCG's ``Perspectives on Strategy'', 1998. There is a
formula which is known to approximate scale effect in the process
industries. ``Capital cost increases by the six-tenths power of the
increase in capacity.'' This exponential change is equivalent to an
increase of 52 percent in capital cost to provide a 100 percent
increase in capacity. The total capital cost became 152 percent instead
of 100. The total output became 200 instead of 100. The average became
152/200=76 percent of 100 percent. That is a very common and typical
experience curve cost decline rate. Average production unit size
normally increases in proportion to rate of total output or even
faster. If it does, then capital cost should go down as fast or even
faster than in proportion to a 76 percent experience curve. Since
capital tends to displace labor over time, then this scale effect
becomes increasingly important with growth in volume and experience.
There are limits on scale due to load factors and logistics provided
there is a finite total market. But if the total market grows, then
scale can be expected to grow too. Scale effect applies to all
operations, not just process plants. Marketing, accounting and all the
overhead functions have scale effects also. Scale effect alone is
sufficient to approximate the experience curve effect where growth is
constant and scale grows with volume. For most products, a 70-80
percent slope is normal, with the steeper slope for those where the
maximum value is added and where shared experience with slower growth
areas is least. However, it is probable that few products decline in
cost as fast as they could if optimized. It is a known fact that costs
are more certain to decline if it is generally expected that they
should and will.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. NO TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, JUST-IN-TIME USE OF RECYCLED FUEL
BCG assumes that the plant will always operate at full capacity
with no technical problems, no contract delays, etc. No reprocessing
plant or MOX plant in the world has ever done so.
The throughput of 2,500 tHM is based on 300 days of operations,
thus allowing for 60 days of annual plant shut-down, which is
consistent with operating experience at both La Hague and MELOX.
In addition, in the United States, the large backlog of fuel, in
conjunction with significant quantities of used fuel generated each
year (>2,000 tons) will contribute to guaranteeing an adequate feed to
the plant.
Once again, we recognize that, even considering previous experience
and the specific U.S. situation, we cannot claim that, without any
shadow of doubt, the plant will be operated at 2,500 tHM/yr for 50
years. However, similar issues will be encountered by any alternative
scenario.
BCG assumes that there will never be a lag in fuel fabrication,
since, to save money, they cut out all funding for having a plutonium
storage area. In France, by contrast, tens of tons of plutonium have
built up in storage as a result of lags in the use of this plutonium as
fuel.
Having contracts in place for recycled fuel with utilities and
being able to implement a just-in-time system is important for the
economic viability of the plant and for non-proliferation and/or
physical protection issues. Even though just-in-time recycling is
envisioned as part of the strategy, the cost for a small buffer storage
facility where Pu/U in liquid form can be stored for a limited amount
of time was included in the plant. The plutonium storage area was not
cut out to save money but rather because it was believed to be
unnecessary and, therefore, undesirable.
5. DENSIFICATION FACTOR TRANSLATING INTO COST SAVINGS
BCG also makes dubious assumptions about the disposal and
management costs of different types of nuclear waste. They argue that
because of the lower long-term heat generation from reprocessing waste,
compared to spent fuel, four times as much reprocessing waste could be
placed in each unit area of the repository, and therefore they assume
that total per-kilogram disposal costs would be only one-quarter as
large. As we noted in our 2003 study, however, only a portion of total
disposal costs are likely to be driven by heat and repository capacity;
with a four-fold repository expansion, a two-fold reduction in cost per
kilogram is more appropriate.
Based on initial analyses, we believe that a repository built for
high-level waste from recycling (HLW-R) is likely to cost less than a
repository for used fuel; thus the unit cost of the repository
decreases at least proportionally to the densification factor (same
cost divided by larger quantity).
In your 2003 study, you mention how repository emplacement
operations and monitoring, waste package fabrication, and
transportation costs are related to volume, mass, or number of items.
That implies that, since, in the case of HLW-R, a larger volume of
waste and a higher number of waste items are emplaced in the same
repository area, a four-fold repository capacity expansion does not
translate into a full four-fold unit cost reduction.
However, we believe that several of those costs are to a large
extent fixed, i.e. those costs would not change whether the repository
is built for used fuel or high-level waste from recycling (HLW-R): for
example, in the case of transportation costs, the construction of the
Nevada railroad will cost the same whether it is built for HLW-R or
used fuel, thus shipping four times as much fuel to the repository will
result in a fourfold reduction in railroad construction ``unit'' costs.
Similar considerations can be made for large portion of the emplacement
operations costs, which can be considered fixed.
We agree that some costs are indeed variable (for example, waste
package material costs, or, in the same case of the Nevada railroad,
some of the operations costs) and will decrease less than four-fold in
unit cost terms in the case of a HLW-R repository. However, those costs
are not very large and are more than off-set by other additional
reductions that would occur in the case of a HLW-R repository (e.g. no
need to build wet lines in the surface facility, no need to use
dripshields for glass logs, etc.).
Finally, the additional cost for disposal of ILW and LLW, which you
refer to in your 2003 study and which amounts to an additional 20
percent of the repository costs for HLW-R, was taken into account in
the BCG study as part of the recycling costs. Also, in the BCG study,
it was conservatively assumed that compacted waste from hulls and end-
fittings would be disposed of in the repository--releasing this
constraint would result in higher densification factors and additional
economic benefits that would lower the HLW-R repository costs further.
In summary, to effectively conclude whether the cost of a HLW-R
repository is the same or less than one for a used fuel repository, it
would be necessary to perform some significant re-design, which goes
beyond the scope of the BCG study. Yet, based on initial analyses, we
believe that a HLW-R repository is likely to cost the same, or less,
than a used fuel repository; thus the unit cost of the repository
decreases proportionally to the densification factor (same cost divided
by larger quantity).
6. COST OF DEALING WITH USED MOX SAME AS LEU FUEL
At the same time as they take a four-fold cost reduction for the
lower heat generation from reprocessing wastes, they assume that the
management cost for spent MOX fuel would be the same as for spent LEU
fuel, despite the far higher heat generation of spent MOX fuel, the
greater difficulty in reprocessing it, and the much more radioactive
nature of the fuel that would be manufactured from it. They acknowledge
that disposing of the MOX spent fuel in the repository would
effectively eliminate the repository benefit of the entire effort,
because of the very high heat generation of the MOX; managing the spent
MOX would require fast reactors and other technologies not included in
their study.
This issue is addressed in the BCG study. In particular, Appendix
A10, pages 75-78, offers a detailed discussion of this issue.
Moreover, based on operational experience at La Hague, we do not
believe that reprocessing spent MOX fuel is technically any more
difficult than reprocessing spent UOX fuel. At AREVA, we have already
successfully treated several tons of used MOX.
7. HIGH FINANCING COSTS UNDER PRIVATE MODEL
BCG also assumes that the plants they envision will be financed
entirely by the Government, at a 3 percent real rate of return. This
assumption is crucial to their conclusions, as the costs of such a
capital-intensive facility would increase dramatically if a higher (and
more realistic) rate were chosen. As we noted in our 2003 study, if a
reprocessing plant were built that had the same capital and operating
costs and nameplate capacity as Britain's Thermal Oxide Reprocessing
Plant (THORP), whose costs are generally similar to those of the French
plants at La Hague, which are the basis for the BCG estimates, and the
plant were financed at such a government rate, it would have a
reprocessing cost in the range of $1,350 per kilogram of heavy metal in
spent fuel (kgHM), if it successfully operated at its full nameplate
capacity throughout its life with no interruptions (a far cry from the
real experience, but the same assumption used in the BCG study). (By
contrast, as already noted, BCG assumes $630/kgHM for both reprocessing
and MOX fabrication combined.) But if the exact same plant were
financed privately, at the rates EPRI recommends assuming for power
plants owned by regulated utilities with a guaranteed rate of return
(and therefore very low risk), the unit cost would be over $2,000/kgHM.
If financed by a fully private entity with no guaranteed rate of
return, the cost for the same facility would be over $3,100/kgHM. (That
is without taking into account the large risk premium the capital
markets would surely demand for a facility whose fate was so dependent
on political decisions; all three of the commercial reprocessing plants
built to date in the United States failed for such reasons.)
Not having any information on what financing scheme would be used
to build a recycling plant in the United States, BCG assumed a 3
percent Government rate to be consistent with the estimates on Yucca
Mountain. This is also in line with the fact that today transport and
disposal of used fuel is a government liability.
Business models were not discussed in the BCG study, which is
purely an economic assessment. The real effect of a different cost of
capital would depend very heavily on the specific of the business
model: what kind of risks can be assumed? What level of private
involvement do you have: 100 percent or less? What about
transportation? etc. Without having resolved those issues, no
assumptions can be made for the cost of a ``private'' plant.
The entire approach, in short, is only financially feasible if it
is fully Government-financed. But for the Government to own and operate
a facility that would not only reprocess spent fuel but manufacture new
MOX fuel on the scale they envision--providing a significant fraction
of all fuel for U.S. light-water reactors--would represent an immense
Government intrusion on the private nuclear fuel industry. The
implications of such an approach have not been examined. The coal
industry and the gas industry would surely ask, ``if nuclear can get
facilities to handle its waste financed at a 3 percent Government rate,
why can't we get the same thing for our environmental controls or
carbon sequestration?''
We acknowledge that there will need to be further studies to
develop a business model that can address competition issues on the use
of recycled fuel, although we would like to point out that MOX would
constitute only about 12 percent of the total U.S. fuel needs and,
therefore, would not represent ``an immense Government intrusion''.
The full answer to this question goes beyond the scope of the BCG
study, since taking the liability of the used nuclear fuel from the
utilities, regardless of whether the used fuel is directly disposed of,
or recycled, was a policy decision made by the Government many years
ago. We are also not qualified to comment on the merits of U.S.
Government policy decisions on waste treatment in other industries;
however, we would note that your argument regarding Government
financing of used fuel disposal is already relevant for the repository
and obtaining Government rates for a treatment facility would not be
new.
8. LEGAL DISCLAIMER
The BCG study itself appears to agree that it should not be used as
the basis for policy-making. After acknowledging that the study was
initiated and paid for by AREVA, and that BCG made no attempt to verify
any of the data provided by AREVA, the study warns: ``Any other party
[than AREVA] using this report for any purpose, or relying on this
report in any way, does so at their own risk. No representation of
warranty, expressed or implied, is made in relation to the accuracy or
completeness of the information presented herein or its suitability for
any particular purpose''.
AREVA asked BCG to provide an independent view of the economics of
used fuel management in the United States, using data from AREVA
operations as a starting point. It is understandable that BCG wanted to
clarify that they are not in the business of influencing policy-making
(BCG will not gain any benefit if the U.S. changes its policy on
recycling) and they have not audited the data they were provided. In
that respect, it is very common practice that a management consulting
firm such as BCG does not take any liability over future uses of the
report or for information provided by AREVA.
Most major institutions and corporations adopt a similar legal
strategy to shield themselves from potential liabilities, including
Harvard University. Such legal disclaimers should not be interpreted by
the reader as a lack of faith in the material discussed or presented,
or the veracity of statements made.
See for example: http://neurosurgery.mgh.harvard.edu/disclaim.htm;
http://www.seo.harvard.edu/students/disclaimer.html; http://
www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/statistics/survey-soft/disclaimer.html; http://
www.health.harvard.edu/fhg/diswarr.shtml.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. You certainly
provide us with bold testimony. Hope we will be as bold as you
are in your projections and enthusiasm. Assistant Secretary
Spurgeon, it's kind of contagious. I don't know which rubbed
off which way, but you both have come to my office and you
bring more enthusiasm about the possibility of United States
Government considering a comprehensive solution to our spent
fuel needs. Your enthusiasm about being able to achieve it is
rather startling compared to what we have been hearing for so
long. We might just get it right, let's hope.
Mr. Bunn, in all of your vast experience in this area,
you've seen us proceed through and stumble and fail and start
up again, but I think we are quite serious about moving ahead
and we need good thinking and good recommendations and we are
pleased that you are going to share some facts, some concerns
with us. We welcome you.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BUNN, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Bunn. Good. Mr. Chairman, it's an honor to be here
today to talk to you about the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership. I would consider myself a friend of nuclear energy
and I believe that we need to be working hard to fix the
problems that have limited nuclear energy's growth because we
may need it to cope with the problem of climate change and I
support a strong nuclear research and development program and I
support several of the key elements of GNEP. But I do have a
little bit different view on recycling.
I think that gaining the public utility and government
acceptance needed for a large scale expansion of nuclear energy
around the world is going to require making nuclear power as
cheap, as safe, as secure, and as proliferation-resistant as
possible. And the current GNEP focus of moving rapidly toward
near-term large-scale reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is
likely to take us in the wrong direction on each of those
counts, and hence, is more likely to undermine the nuclear
renaissance than to promote it. Moreover I believe that even
without reprocessing we will be able to provide sufficient
uranium supplies and sufficient repository space for many
decades. Let me elaborate on these points and make several
recommendations.
First, cost, reprocessing is going to be more expensive
than direct disposal. In a recent Harvard study we concluded
that reprocessing would increase the back end costs by roughly
80 percent, and a wide range of other studies--including
government studies in both France and Japan--have reached
similar conclusions. A National Academy of Sciences review of
separations and transmutation concluded that the excess cost of
recycling 62,000 tons of commercial spent fuel, ``Is likely to
be no less than $50 billion and could easily be over a $100
billion.''
Now, that is a small amount in per kilowatt hour terms, but
it's a large absolute number and there's only a few ways it
could be financed. You could drastically increase the nuclear
waste fee. You could provide billions of dollars in government
subsidies over decades, or you could pass numerous regulations
that would effectively force private industry to pay, to build
and operate otherwise uneconomic facilities. All of those
options would make investors, potential investors in new
nuclear power plants more uncertain about making such
investments rather than less.
The recent Boston Consulting Group study, is an interesting
document, but it makes a number of overoptimistic assumptions.
It estimates a cost of $630 per kilogram of heavy metal for
both reprocessing and MOX fabrication combined, which is far
less than the real French have ever achieved for either
process. A more detailed critique of the BCG study is provided
as an appendix to my testimony.
With respect to proliferation risks, those are also higher
on the recycling path. The new U.S. message to developing
countries is essentially: Reprocessing is essential to the
future of nuclear energy, but we're going to keep that
technology away from you. I don't think that it's going to help
achieve President Bush's goal of limiting the spread of
reprocessing technology. If we move forward with UREX+, rather
than PUREX, and that technology is spread around the world,
that would be only modestly better, as a developing country
with a UREX+ facility and the skilled personnel to operate it
could readily adapt those things to producing pure plutonium.
It is very important to move forward with another GNEP
element and that is giving states around the world reliable
guarantees of fuel supply and spent fuel management services to
convince them not to build their own enrichment and
reprocessing plants. But U.S. reprocessing is not central to
that vision, particularly, since I believe it is going to
politically unrealistic to import large quantities of foreign
power reactor fuel into the United States in any case.
The Bush administration has recognized that the large
quantities of separated plutonium building up as a result of
traditional PUREX process posed, ``A growing proliferation risk
that simply must be dealt with.'' We should be almost as
worried about the stocks of mixed plutonium and uranium that
would result from the COEX process that Dr. Hanson referred to.
Nuclear weapons could be made directly from the roughly 50/50
plutonium uranium mix that COEX advocates refer to.
Alternatively the plutonium could be separated in simple
gloveboxes and commercially available equipment and chemicals.
Any state or group able to accomplish the difficult job of
making an implosion-type bomb from pure plutonium, would likely
be able to accomplish this simpler job of separating this
plutonium from uranium. The repeated references to no pure
plutonium are a talking point, not a serious nonproliferation
analysis.
Keeping the minor actinides and possibly some of the
lanthanides with the plutonium as proposed in UREX+ and its
variants would make the product more radioactive, but the
radioactivity would still be far less than international
standards for self protection. And the process still takes away
the great mass of the uranium and the majority of the radiation
from the fission products, making it far less proliferation-
resistant than simply leaving the plutonium in the spent fuel.
With respect to safety and security, life cycle comparisons
have not yet been done, but it seems clear that extensive
chemical processing of intensely radioactive spent fuel
presents more opportunities for release of radionuclide, either
by accident or by sabotage than does leaving spent fuel
untouched in thick metal or concrete casks.
With respect to environmental impacts, GNEP might reduce
the long term doses from the repository if all its technical
goals are achieved, but those doses are already low and the
benefit of reducing them is therefore modest. With respect to
the sustainability of nuclear energy, neither uranium nor
repository space are likely to be in a short supply, as is
often asserted. As we described in detail in our 2003 study,
world resources of uranium likely to be recoverable at a cost
far less than the cost of breeding are sufficient to fuel a
growing nuclear economy for decades.
Indeed, in the last decade the Red Book estimates of world
uranium resources have been increasing far faster than uranium
has been consumed. Probably the most important argument in
favor of recycling is repository space issue and the need to
find a way to get the waste from a growing nuclear energy
enterprise into Yucca Mountain. But the latest estimates from
the Electric Power Research Institute indicate that Yucca
Mountain repository can almost certainly hold over 260,000 tons
of spent fuel, an amount that would not exist until well into
the latter half of this century even with rapid nuclear growth.
Then they will be able to hold 570,000 tons or more.
Moreover, it seems likely that gaining the public
acceptance and licensing for huge reprocessing plants and
scores of fast neutron reactors will be at least as difficult
as licensing another repository, which might well just be the
next ridge over at Yucca Mountain.
We do need a substantial nuclear R&D program, in fact we
need to substantially increase R&D on a wide range of energy
technologies. Unfortunately, I am concerned that DOE is
distorting that program by rushing to build commercial scale
facilities without having completed either the R&D on relevant
technologies or the detailed system analysis needed to make
wise choices. The CFTC envisioned in the request for
expressions of interest would process as much as 2,000 to 3,000
tons of spent fuel per year, far larger than any comparable
facility in the world, and they would also envision a
commercial scale fast neutron reactor. I think the subcommittee
should ask several questions about this approach.
First, wouldn't even the optimistic assumptions of the BCG
report lead to an estimated cost for just these two facilities
in the range of $20 billion? Second, wouldn't it be likely that
the cost of these facilities would grow as the project
proceeded, mirroring the experience with Hanford vitrification
project or the Savannah River MOX plant? How does DOE propose
to finance these costs? From the appropriations, from the
nuclear waste fund? Is there any previous example in DOE's
history in which the department has managed to build and
operate a commercial scale facility of this complexity
successfully? I believe they have a record unblemished by
success in this area. What is DOE's past record of success and
failure in picking winners among the possible technologies for
commercial deployment? What life cycle analysis of costs,
safety, security, proliferation resistance, led them to this
conclusion?
Senator Domenici. Sir, your time is running out.
Mr. Bunn. Ok, let me jump ahead to some recommendations. I
believe we should focus first on interim storage. Whatever
option we pursue, we are going to need additional storage
capacity and we're going to need at least some centralized
interim storage capacity. I believe we need to take a
deliberate voluntary approach to siting storage facilities. We
laid out such an approach in a 2001 report.
Second, we should pursue a broad R&D program on spent fuel
management that includes both improved approaches to direct
disposal and improved approaches to recycling and let the best
process win.
Third, we need to focus more on building broad political
sustainability. These processes are going to take decades to
implement and unless we have bipartisan support the chances of
failure are high.
Fourth, we need to move forward expeditiously with the
Yucca Mountain repository, but taking the time to get the
analysis right and build as much support as we practically can.
Fifth, we need to develop and analyze first and build
later. Today key separations and transmutation technologies are
in their infancy and key system analyses of costs, safety,
security, proliferation resistance have not yet been done. We
should not be building large facilities before those efforts
have been completed. Large scale reprocessing and transmutation
facilities should not be built until detailed analysis indicate
that they offer a combination of cost, safety, security,
proliferation resistance, and sustainability superior to
potential alternatives.
PREPARED STATEMENT
As a first step, I recommend that the committee accept the
House idea calling for an in-depth peer review of the entire
fuel recycling plan by the National Academies before moving
forward to build expensive facilities.
Thanks for your attention. I apologize for going on so
long, and I look forward to questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matthew Bunn
ASSESSING THE BENEFITS, COSTS, AND RISKS OF NEAR-TERM REPROCESSING AND
ALTERNATIVES
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be
here today to discuss the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).
I believe that we should be working hard to fix the past problems
that have limited the growth of nuclear energy, as the world may need a
greatly expanded global contribution from nuclear energy to cope with
the problem of climate change. I support a strong nuclear research and
development program--along with greatly expanded R&D on other energy
sources and efficiency.
But gaining the public, utility, and government acceptance needed
for a large-scale expansion of nuclear energy will not be easy. Such an
expansion will require making nuclear power as cheap, safe, secure, and
proliferation-resistant as possible. I believe that while several
elements of GNEP deserve strong support, the current GNEP focus on
moving rapidly toward large-scale reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel
will take us in the wrong direction on each of these counts, and hence
is likely to do more to undermine the future of nuclear energy than to
promote it.\1\ Moreover, I believe that reprocessing will not be
required to provide either sufficient uranium supplies or sufficient
repository space for many decades to come, if then. I fear that the new
focus on rushing to construction of commercial-scale facilities is
precisely the wrong direction, and will distort the R&D effort. I will
elaborate on each of these points in this testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a similar argument that the GNEP approach ``threatens to
set back the nuclear revival,'' see, for example, Richard Lester, ``New
Nukes,'' Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 2006, pp. 39-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But first, let me emphasize the two key take-away points:
--(1) We should focus first on safe, secure, and politically
sustainable approaches to interim storage of spent fuel. These
will be needed no matter what long-term options we choose for
spent fuel management; if properly implemented, they will
address the immediate needs of the nuclear industry and provide
the confidence needed for construction of new reactors.
--(2) We should take the time needed to make sound and politically
sustainable decisions about spent fuel management. There is no
need to rush to judgment. Spent fuel can be stored safely and
cheaply for decades in dry casks, leaving all options open for
the future, and allowing time for the economic, technical, and
political issues on all paths to be more fully explored. From
Clinch River to Wackersdorf, from Chernobyl to the Hanford
tanks, the nuclear age is littered with the costly results of
the rushed decisions of the past. Rushing to make decisions
before the needed analyses and R&D are completed will leave us
with programs that are more costly and less effective than they
could otherwise be.
RECYCLING IN CONTEXT
Recycling is not an end in itself, whether for newspapers or for
spent fuel. Rather, it is a way to conserve scarce resources and reduce
disposal costs. If all the real costs and externalities are
appropriately reflected in prices, and recycling costs more than direct
disposal, that means that recycling is wasting more precious resources
than it is conserving: the capital and labor invested in recycling, in
that case, are more precious than the resources conserved by doing so.
When old computers are discarded, the precious metals in them are often
recycled, but the silicon in their chips is generally not: silicon is
plentiful, recovering and recycling it would be expensive, and disposal
of it is not a major problem. It is worth at least considering whether
or not the same is true in the case of recycling spent nuclear fuel.
For spent fuel, neither recycling nor direct disposal should be
supported as an article of faith. Rather, the choice should be made
based on careful analyses of which options offer the best combination
low cost, low proliferation risks, low environmental impact, high
safety and security, and high sustainability for a growing long-term
nuclear enterprise. Reprocessing using either traditional PUREX
technology or the UREX+ co-extraction technologies being considered for
GNEP is inferior to once-through approaches in most of these respects.
COSTS AND FINANCING
Reprocessing and recycling using either current commercial
technologies or those proposed for GNEP would substantially increase
the cost of spent fuel management. In a recent Harvard study, we
concluded that reprocessing would increase spent fuel management costs
by roughly 80 percent, compared to once-through approaches, even making
a number of assumptions that were quite favorable to reprocessing.\2\ A
wide range of other studies, including government studies in both
France and Japan, have reached similar conclusions.\3\ The UREX+
technology now being pursued adds a number of complex separation steps
to the traditional PUREX process, and would likely be even more
expensive.\4\ The capital cost of fast-neutron reactors such as those
proposed for GNEP has traditionally been significantly higher than that
of light-water reactors. A National Academy of Sciences review of
separations and transmutation technologies such as those proposed for
GNEP concluded that the additional cost of recycling compared to once
through for 62,000 tons of commercial spent fuel ``is likely to be no
less than $50 billion and easily could be over $100 billion.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Matthew Bunn, Steve Fetter, John P. Holdren, and Bob van
der Zwaan, ``The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent
Nuclear Fuel'' (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, December 2003, available as of 16 July
2006 at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/repro-
report.pdf).
\3\ For quite similar conclusions, see John Deutch and Ernest J.
Moniz, co-chairs, ``The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary
MIT Study'' (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
2003, available as of 16 July 2006 at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/
). For a study for the French government, see Jean-Michel Charpin,
Benjamin Dessus, and Rene Pellat, ``Economic Forecast Study of the
Nuclear Power Option'' (Paris, France: Office of the Prime Minister,
July 2000, available as of 10 September 2006 at http://fire.pppl.gov/
eu_fr_fission_plan.pdf), Appendix 1. In Japan, the official estimate is
that reprocessing and recycling will cost more than $100 billion over
the next several decades, and the utilities have successfully demanded
that the government impose an additional charge on all electricity
users to pay the extra costs.
\4\ Other processes might someday reduce the costs, but this
remains to be demonstrated, and a number of recent official studies
have estimated costs for reprocessing and transmutation that are far
higher than the costs of traditional reprocessing and recycling, not
lower. See, for example, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, ``Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS)
and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles: A Comparative
Study'' (Paris, France: NEA, 2002, available as of 16 July 2006 at
http://www.nea.fr/html/ndd/reports/2002/nea3109-ads.pdf), p. 211 and p.
216, and U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy,
``Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group''
(Washington, DC: DOE, 18 March 2001, available as of 16 July 2006 at
http://www.ne.doe.gov/reports/GenIVRoadmapFCCG.pdf.), p. A2-6 and p.
A2-8.
\5\ U.S. National Research Council, Committee on Separations
Technology and Transmutation Systems, ``Nuclear Wastes: Technologies
For Separation and Transmutation'' (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1996), p. 7. Note that these figures are expressed in 1992
dollars; in 2006 dollars, the range would be $66-$133 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While such a cost would be a modest addition to total per-kilowatt-
hour costs of nuclear electricity generation, the absolute magnitude of
the amount is large, and there are only a few ways it could be
financed: either (1) the current 1 mill/kilowatt-hour nuclear waste fee
would have to be substantially increased; (2) the Federal Government
would have to provide tens of billions of dollars of subsidies over
many decades (which might not be sustained), or (3) onerous regulations
would have to be imposed that would effectively require private
industry to build and operate uneconomic facilities. All of these
options would make investors more uncertain, not less, about putting
their money into new nuclear plants in the United States. Most
approaches would represent dramatic government intrusions into the
private nuclear fuel industry, whose implications have not been fully
examined.
The recent study by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), arguing that
reprocessing would be no more expensive than once-through approaches,
is grossly overoptimistic and should not be relied on as a basis for
policy.\6\ The BCG study uses a wide range of unjustified assumptions
to reach an estimated price for both reprocessing and mixed oxide (MOX)
fuel fabrication of $630 per kilogram of heavy metal, far less than
real commercial plants have achieved for either process. Yet the real
experience of adapting French plutonium technology in the United
States, the project to build a MOX plant at Savannah River, is leading
to costs several times higher than those achieved in France, not
several times lower. A more detailed critique of the BCG study is
provided as an appendix to this testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Boston Consulting Group, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear
Fuel Management in the United States'' (Boston, Mass: BCG, July 2006,
available as of 11 September 2006 at http://www.bcg.com/publications/
files/2116202EconomicAssessmentReport24Jul0SR.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROLIFERATION RISKS
In addition to being more costly, the reprocessing proposed as a
central part of GNEP would raise more proliferation risks than would
reliance on once-through approaches.
President Bush, like every President for decades before him, has
been seeking to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies.\7\ Since 1976, the U.S. message has been, in effect,
``reprocessing is unnecessary; we, the country with the world's largest
nuclear fleet, are not doing it, and you do not need to either.'' While
it is often said that the rest of the world did not listen to us, no
countries have built civilian reprocessing plants that were not already
reprocessing or building such facilities as of 1976, three decades
ago.\8\ Now, with GNEP, the message is ``reprocessing is essential to
the future of nuclear energy, but we will keep the technology away from
all but a few states.'' \9\ This is not likely to be an acceptable and
sustainable approach for the long haul. In particular, this message is
likely to make it more difficult, not less, to convince states such as
Taiwan and South Korea--both of which have had secret nuclear weapons
programs based on reprocessing in the past, terminated under U.S.
pressure--not to pursue reprocessing of their own. Having other
countries pursue UREX+ rather than PUREX would be only a modest
improvement, as once a country had a team of people with experience in
chemically processing intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel and a
facility for doing so, this expertise and infrastructure could be
adapted very rapidly to separate pure plutonium for weapons--much as
countries with enrichment could readily switch from producing low-
enriched uranium to producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) should they
choose to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ President George W. Bush, ``President Announces New Measures to
Counter the Threat of WMD: Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. Mcnair--National Defense
University'' (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, 2004; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/02/20040211_094.
html as of 12 April 2005).
\8\ The major commercial reprocessing facilities in the world are
in France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Japan. The first three
already had reprocessing well underway in 1976, and the Japanese Tokai
plant was well advanced at that time. China and India both have some
reprocessing activities, but both had reprocessing technology already
in 1976. North Korea has established a reprocessing plant since 1976,
but it is entirely for military purposes, not a commercial plant that
might be influenced by U.S. policy on commercial reprocessing. Since
1976, a number of countries that were previously pursuing reprocessing
(such as Germany and Sweden, among others) have joined the United
States in abandoning reprocessing in favor of direct disposal. In
general, the poor economics of reprocessing have driven decisions more
than U.S. policy.
\9\ This formulation is adapted from Frank von Hippel, ``GNEP and
the U.S. Spent Fuel Problem,'' congressional staff briefing, 10 March
2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GNEP advocates argue, to the contrary, that another central element
of GNEP--the idea of a consortium of fuel cycle states that would
provide guaranteed fuel supply and spent fuel management to other
states, perhaps in a ``fuel leasing'' arrangement--would reduce the
incentives for states to acquire reprocessing facilities (as well as
enrichment facilities) of their own. This is an important and
potentially powerful idea, which should be pursued.\10\ Unfortunately,
the way it has been presented, dividing the world forever into ``fuel
cycle states'' that would be allowed to have these technologies and
``recipient states'' that would not, may be raising a danger of causing
what we are trying to prevent. As I understand it, Argentina and South
Africa, among others, have already suggested that they may restart
their enrichment programs in part in order to be considered in the
favored class of ``fuel cycle states.'' The subcommittee may wish to
inquire of DOE whether this is correct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See, for example, John Deutch et al., ``Making the World Safe
for Nuclear Energy,'' Survival 46, no. 4 (Winter 2004; available at
http://www.world-nuclear.org/opinion/survival.pdf as of 7 July 2006);
Ashton B. Carter and Stephen A. LaMontagne, ``Toolbox: Containing the
Nuclear Red Zone Threat,'' The American Interest (Spring 2006).
Unfortunately, the way a few GNEP advocates have presented the idea,
focusing on a new regime of discrimination and denial in which all but
a few states would be denied access to enrichment and reprocessing
technology, is unlikely to make the concept popular among the potential
recipients of such fuel leases. A substantively similar but more
appealing approach is to say that, in effect, countries will be offered
more than they have ever been offered before under Article IV of the
Nonproliferation Treaty: a guarantee of life-cycle fuel supply and
spent fuel management for as many reactors as they choose to build, if
they agree that, at least for an agreed period, they will not pursue
enrichment and reprocessing facilities of their own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In any case, U.S. reprocessing is not an essential part of making
such an offer. A U.S. offer to take in unlimited quantities of foreign
spent nuclear fuel is simply not politically realistic--even if the
spent fuel was to be reprocessed after it arrived. (Indeed, few steps
would be more likely to destroy renewed public support for nuclear
energy in the United States than proposing to make the United States
``the world's nuclear dumping ground,'' as anti-nuclear activists have
put it in the case of Russia.) Realistically, if major states are to
make such a back-end offer, it will be others who do so--starting,
perhaps, with Russia, which has already put in place legislation to
make that possible. Russia currently plans to offer such fuel leases
and to put imported spent fuel in secure dry storage for decades,
though at present it does plan to reprocess it eventually.
A second set of proliferation issues focuses on possible theft or
diversion of plutonium. While reactor-grade plutonium would not be the
preferred material for making nuclear bombs, it does not require
advanced technology to make a bomb from reactor-grade plutonium: any
state or group that could make a bomb from weapon-grade plutonium could
make a bomb from reactor-grade plutonium.\11\ Despite the remarkable
progress of safeguards and security technology over the last few
decades, processing, fabricating, and transporting tons of weapons-
usable separated plutonium every year--when even a few kilograms is
enough for a bomb--inevitably raises greater risks than not doing so.
Indeed, while many of the stocks of civil plutonium that have built up
are well-guarded, critics have argued that some operations in the
civilian plutonium industry are potentially vulnerable to nuclear
theft.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ For an authoritative unclassified discussion, see
``Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable
Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition
Alternatives'', DOE/NN-0007 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy,
January 1997), pp. 38-39.
\12\ Ronald E. Timm, ``Security Assessment Report for Plutonium
Transport in France'' (Paris: Greenpeace International, 2005; available
at http://greenpeace.datapps.com/stop-plutonium/en/TimmReportV5.pdf as
of 6 December 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration has acknowledged that the huge stockpiles of
weapons-usable separated civil plutonium built up as a result of
traditional PUREX reprocessing (now roughly equal to all world military
plutonium stockpiles combined, remarkably) ``pose a growing
proliferation risk'' that ``simply must be dealt with.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Samuel Bodman, ``Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Moscow Center: Remarks as Prepared for Secretary Bodman'' (Moscow: U.S.
Department of Energy, 2006; available at http://energy.gov/news/
3348.htm as of 17 March 2006). This characterization seems oddly out of
tune with the schedule of the administration's proposed solution,
advanced burner reactors that will not be available in significant
numbers to address this ``growing'' risk for decades. In a similar
vein, the British Royal Society, in a 1998 report, warned that even in
an advanced industrial state like the United Kingdom, the possibility
that plutonium stocks might be ``accessed for illicit weapons
production is of extreme concern.'' The Royal Society, ``Management of
Separated Plutonium'' (London: Royal Society, 1998, available at http:/
/www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=18551 as of 16 July 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the administration is worried about these stockpiles of
separated plutonium, they should also worry about the plutonium-uranium
mixes that would be separated in the COEX process now being considered.
As U.S. Government examinations of the question have concluded, nuclear
explosives could still be made directly from the roughly 50/50
plutonium-uranium mixes that COEX advocates refer to, though the
quantity of material required for a bomb would be significantly larger.
Moreover, any state or group with the capability to do the difficult
job of designing and building an implosion-type bomb from pure
plutonium would have a good chance of being able to accomplish the
simpler job of separating pure plutonium from such a plutonium-uranium
mix. The job could be done in a simple glove-box with commercially
available equipment and chemicals, using any one of a number of
straightforward, published processes. For these reasons, under either
U.S. or international guidelines, such a mixture would still be
considered Category I material, posing the highest levels of security
risk and requiring the highest levels of security. When such approaches
were last seriously considered in the United States three decades ago,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concluded that ``lowering the
concentration of plutonium through blending [with uranium] should not
be used as a basis for reducing the level of safeguards protection,''
and that the concentration of plutonium in the blend would have to be
reduced to 10 percent or less--far less than being considered for
COEX--for the safeguards advantages to be ``significant.'' \14\ The
repeated statement that these processes will result in ``no pure
plutonium'' is a talking point, not a serious analysis of proliferation
and security impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ``Safeguarding a Domestic Mixed Oxide Industry
against a Hypothetical Subnational Threat'', NUREG-0414 (Washington,
DC: NRC, 1978), pp. 6.8-6.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GNEP advocates argue that approaches such as UREX+ would be more
proliferation-resistant, because the minor actinides (and perhaps a few
of the lanthanide fission products) would remain with the plutonium,
making the separated product more radioactive and more problematic to
steal and process into a bomb.\15\ But the processing proposed in UREX+
still takes away the great mass of the uranium and the vast majority of
the radiation from the fission products, making the process far less
proliferation-resistant than simply leaving the plutonium in the spent
fuel. Indeed, the plutonium-bearing materials that would be separated
in either the UREX+ process or by pyroprocessing would not be remotely
radioactive enough to meet international standards for being ``self-
protecting'' against possible theft.\16\ Thus, the approach may be
considered modestly more proliferation-resistant than traditional PUREX
reprocessing, but it is far less proliferation-resistant than not
reprocessing at all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Of all the various impacts of civilian nuclear energy on
proliferation, this would only help with respect to the difficulty of
theft of the separated material and processing it into a bomb: while
that is not unimportant, many other issues should be considered in
assessing proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system,
particularly as there has never yet been an historical case in which
the radiation level of the material involved was the key in determining
the civilian nuclear system's impact on proliferation outcomes. For a
discussion of broader issues that should be considered in assessing
proliferation-resistance, and rough measures for assessing them, see
Matthew Bunn, ``Proliferation-Resistance (and Terror-Resistance) of
Nuclear Energy Systems'' lecture, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1 May 2006, available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/
BCSIA_content/documents/proliferation_resist_lecture06.pdf as of 12
September 2006.
\16\ See Jungmin Kang and Frank von Hippel, ``Limited
Proliferation-Resistance Benefits From Recycling Unseparated
Transuranics and Lanthanides From Light-Water Reactor Spent Fuel,''
Science and Global Security, Vol. 13, pp. 169-181, 2005, available as
of 16 July 2006 at http://www.princeton.edu/globsec/publications/pdf/
13_3%20Kang%20vonhippel.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proponents of reprocessing and recycling often argue that this
approach will provide a nonproliferation benefit by consuming the
plutonium in spent fuel, which would otherwise turn geologic
repositories into potential plutonium mines many hundreds or thousands
of years in the future. But the proliferation risk posed by spent fuel
buried in a safeguarded repository is already modest; if the world
could be brought to a state in which such repositories were the most
significant remaining proliferation risk, that would be cause for great
celebration. Moreover, this risk will be occurring a century or more
from now, and if there is one thing we know about the nuclear world a
century hence, it is that we know almost nothing about it. We should
not increase significant proliferation risks in the near term in order
to reduce already small and highly uncertain proliferation risks in the
distant future.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ For a discussion, see John P. Holdren, ``Nonproliferation
Aspects of Geologic Repositories,'' presented at the ``International
Conference on Geologic Repositories,'' October 31-November 3, 1999,
Denver, Colorado; available as of 16 July 2006 at http://
bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=presentation&item_id=1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With crises brewing over the nuclear programs of North Korea and
Iran, and a variety of targets for nuclear theft that are more
vulnerable than most of the proposed recycling operations in GNEP would
be likely to be (such as HEU-fueled research reactors in many
countries, for example), the issues raised by GNEP are not among the
world's highest proliferation risks. But they are real risks
nonetheless, and running them is entirely unnecessary, given the
availability of dry cask storage as a secure alternative.
SAFETY AND SECURITY
No complete life-cycle study of the safety and terrorism risks of
reprocessing and recycling compared to those of direct disposal has yet
been done by disinterested parties. But it seems clear that extensive
processing of intensely radioactive spent fuel using volatile chemicals
presents more opportunities for release of radionuclides--either by
accident or by sabotage--than does leaving spent fuel untouched in
thick metal or concrete casks. While the safety record of the best
reprocessing plants is good, it is worth remembering that until
Chernobyl, the world's worst nuclear accident had been the explosion at
the reprocessing plant at Khyshtym (site of what is now the Mayak
Production Association) in 1957, and significant accidents occurred at
both Russian and Japanese reprocessing plants as recently as the
1990's. The British THORP plant is returning to operation after the
2005 discovery of a massive leak of radioactive acid solution
containing tens of tons of uranium and some 160 kilograms of plutonium,
which had gone unnoticed for months (though none of this material ever
left the plant, and there was no known radioactive release).
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
The question, then, is whether the benefits reprocessing and
recycling would bring are large enough to justify accepting this
daunting list of costs and risks.
One potential benefit of recycling is to reduce the expected doses
to humans and the environment from a geologic repository. Reprocessing
and recycling as currently practiced (with only one round of recycling
the plutonium as uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel) would not
reduce such doses substantially.
Some of the approaches envisioned for the long-term track of GNEP
call instead for separating all the actinides and irradiating them
repeatedly in advanced burner reactors, so that all but a small
percentage of the actinides would be fissioned. Some of the more
troublesome long-lived fission products might be transmuted as well. If
developed and implemented successfully, these approaches might provide
a substantial reduction in projected long-term radiological doses from
a geologic repository. But the projected long-term radioactive doses
from a geologic repository are already low; hence the benefit of
reducing them further is small. While the relevant studies have not yet
been done, it seems very likely that if reducing environmental risks
from the repository were the principal goal of recycling, the cost per
life saved would be in the billions of dollars--and those possibly
saved lives would be tens of thousands of years in the future. (Most of
the discussions of these issues focus only on the high-level wastes,
but the substantial volumes of transuranic and low-level wastes
generated in the course of reprocessing and of decommissioning the
relevant facilities must also be considered.)
Moreover, the near-term environmental impacts of reprocessing and
recycling (including fabrication, transport, and use of the proposed
highly radioactive fuels), even when balanced in part by the reduction
in the amount of uranium mining that would be required, are likely to
overwhelm the possible long-term environmental benefit of reduced
exposures from a geologic repository--though no credible study has yet
been done comparing these risks for the proposed GNEP fuel cycle and
once-through fuel cycles.
SUSTAINABILITY
Advocates argue that the recycling proposed in GNEP justifies its
costs and risks because, with a growing nuclear energy enterprise in
the future, a once-through approach would soon run short of either
uranium or repository space. But neither uranium nor repository space
is in as short supply as advocates claim.
URANIUM SUPPLY
As with environmental impact, traditional reprocessing with one
round of MOX recycling has only very modest benefit in extending
uranium resources. The amount of energy generated from each ton of
uranium mined is increased by less than 20 percent.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz, co-chairs, ``The Future of
Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study'' (Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, available as of June 9,
2005 at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/), p. 123. They present this
result as uranium consumption per kilowatt-hour being 15 percent less
for the recycling case; equivalently, if uranium consumption is fixed,
then electricity generation is 18 percent higher for the recycling
case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recycling and breeding in fast neutron reactors, by contrast, could
potentially extend uranium resources dramatically. But world resources
of uranium likely to be economically recoverable at prices far below
the price at which reprocessing and breeding would be economic are
sufficient to fuel a growing global nuclear enterprise for many
decades, relying on direct disposal without recycling.\19\ Indeed, in
the last decade, the ``Red Book'' estimates of world uranium resources
have been increasing far faster than uranium has been consumed \20\--
and that trend is likely to accelerate substantially now that high
prices are leading to far larger investments in uranium exploration.
The more we look, the more uranium we are likely to find.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ For discussion, see ``Appendix B: World Uranium Resources,''
in Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, and van der Zwaan, The Economics of
Reprocessing.
\20\ In 1997, the estimate for the sum of reasonably assured
resources (RAR) and inferred resources available at $80/kgU or less was
3.085 million tons, while in 2005 it was 3.804 million tons, an
increase of 23 percent in 8 years, despite the very low level of
investment in uranium exploration until the end of that period. See
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy
Agency, ``Uranium 1997: Resources, Production, and Demand'' (Paris:
OECD-NEA, 1998), and ``Uranium 2005: Resources, Production, and
Demand'' (Paris: OECD-NEA, 2006). Indeed, the press release for the
2005 edition was entitled: ``Uranium: plenty to sustain growth of
nuclear power.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current run-up in uranium prices has nothing to do with a lack
of resources in the ground, but only with constraints on bringing on
new production to exploit those resources to meet market demand. At a
current price of over $100/kgU, producers able to provide supply at
costs of less than $40/kgU are making immense profits; market players,
seeing those profits, will attempt to bring additional supply on-line,
ultimately bringing demand and supply into better balance and driving
prices down. This will be difficult to do quickly, because of
regulatory and political constraints in uranium-producing countries.
But it would be surprising indeed if the price remained far above the
cost of production for decades.
Nor does reprocessing serve the goal of energy security, even for
countries such as Japan, which have very limited domestic energy
resources. If energy security means anything, it means that a country's
energy supplies will not be disrupted by events beyond that country's
control. Yet events completely out of the control of any individual
country--such as a theft of poorly guarded plutonium on the other side
of the world--could transform the politics of plutonium overnight and
make major planned programs virtually impossible to carry out. Japan's
experience following the scandal over BNFL's falsification of safety
data on MOX fuel, and following the accidents at Monju and Tokai, all
of which have delayed Japan's plutonium programs by many years, makes
this point clear. If anything, plutonium recycling is much more
vulnerable to external events than reliance on once-through use of
uranium.
REPOSITORY SPACE SUPPLY
Perhaps the most important single argument for GNEP's focus on
recycling is the belief that there will never be a second nuclear waste
repository in the United States, so we need to figure out a way to pack
all the nuclear waste from decades of a growing nuclear energy
enterprise into the Yucca Mountain repository.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ For a cogent version of this argument for recycling, see Per
F. Peterson, ``Will the United States Need a Second Repository?'' The
Bridge, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 26-32, Fall 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The size of a repository needed for a given amount of waste is
determined not by the volume of the waste but by its heat output. If
the proposed long-term GNEP approach met all of its technical goals for
removing and transmuting the actinides that generate much of the long-
term heat it could indeed make it possible to dramatically expand the
capacity of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.\22\ Few of the
technical goals required to achieve this objective have yet been
demonstrated, however.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Roald A. Wigeland, Theodore H. Bauer, Thomas H. Fanning, and
Edgar E. Morris, ``Separations and Transmutation Criteria to Improve
Utilization of a Geologic Repository,'' Nuclear Technology, Vol. 154,
April 2006, pp. 95-106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to understand that traditional approaches to
reprocessing, with one round of MOX recycling, would not have this
benefit. Because of the build-up of heat-emitting higher actinides when
plutonium is recycled, the total heat output of the waste per kilowatt-
hour generated may actually be somewhat higher--and therefore the
needed repositories larger and more expensive--when disposing of HLW
from reprocessing and spent MOX fuel after one round of recycling than
it is for direct disposal of LEU spent fuel.\23\ The spent MOX could in
principle be reprocessed for transmutation in fast reactors, but that
would require success in developing appropriate transmutation fuels and
reactors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See, for example, Brian G. Chow and Gregory S. Jones,
``Managing Wastes With and Without Plutonium Separation'', Report P-
8035 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999). Some other studies
suggest a modest benefit (perhaps 10 percent) from one round of
reprocessing and recycling: the differences depend on detailed
assumptions about such matters as how long the spent fuel or
reprocessing wastes would be stored before being emplaced in a
repository, how long active cooling in the repository is assumed to
continue, and the like.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In any case, repository space, like uranium, is a more plentiful
resource than GNEP advocates have argued. Means to increase the
quantity of spent fuel that can be emplaced in Yucca Mountain while
remaining within thermal limits are only now being examined seriously,
and the latest estimates indicate that the Yucca Mountain repository
can almost certainly hold over 260,000 tons of spent fuel (an amount
that would not exist until well into the latter half of the century
even with rapid nuclear growth); it may well be able to hold 570,000
tons or more.\24\ As researchers at the Electric Power Research
Institute put it: ``Thus, it is possible for Yucca Mountain to hold not
only all the waste from the existing U.S. nuclear power plants, but
also waste produced from a significantly expanded U.S. nuclear power
plant fleet for at least several decades.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ``Program on Technology Innovation: Room at the Mountain--
Analysis of the Maximum Disposal Capacity for Commercial Spent Nuclear
Fuel in a Yucca Mountain Repository'' (Palo Alto, Calif: Electric Power
Research Institute, May 2006, available as of 12 September 2006 at
http://www.epriweb.com/public/000000000001013523.pdf)
\25\ ``Program on Technology Innovation: Room at the Mountain''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, whatever the merits of the repository-space argument, it
applies primarily--or possibly only--to the United States. Only the
United States has chosen a repository site inside a mountain with fixed
boundaries, whose capacity therefore cannot be increased indefinitely
by simply digging more tunnels. Most other countries are examining
sites in huge areas of rock, where the amount of waste from centuries
of nuclear waste generation could be emplaced at a single site, if
desired.\26\ For this reason, measuring quantities of spent fuel in
``Yucca Mountain equivalents'' is highly misleading; if, in fact, a
second repository is ever needed, it is unlikely that the Nation will
again make the mistake of choosing one that is not readily expandable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Granite formations do often have faulting in some areas that
could limit the total area that could be used at a particular
repository site--but sites will presumably be chosen to be far from
nearby faults, and very large amounts of total material can be emplaced
at typical sites of this type. Even at Yucca Mountain, there are other
mountain ridges in the same area that have similar geology, and could
potentially be defined as part of the ``same'' repository. Ultimately
the issue is less the technical limits on repository capacity than the
political limits on how much material can be emplaced at a particular
location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This argument for recycling and transmutation is based on the
questionable assumption that while it would be very difficult to gain
public acceptance and licensing approval for a second repository, it
would not be very difficult to gain public and regulatory approval for
the complex and expensive spent fuel processing and transmutation
facilities needed to implement this approach--including scores of
advanced burner reactors. This assumption appears very likely to be
wrong. Reprocessing of spent fuel has been fiercely opposed by a
substantial section of the interested public in the United States for
decades--and the real risks to neighbors from a large above-ground
reprocessing plant performing daily processing of spent fuel are
inevitably larger than those from nuclear wastes sitting quietly deep
underground. Similarly, there seems little doubt that licensing and
building the new reactor types required would be an enormous
institutional and political challenge.
The proposed GNEP approaches are an extremely expensive way to
solve the problem, if there is one. The recent Harvard study concluded
that if, as recent international reviews suggest, the more complex
separations involved in a transmutation approach would be somewhat more
expensive than traditional reprocessing, and fabrication of the
intensely radioactive transmutation fuels would be somewhat more
expensive than traditional MOX fabrication, and if the needed
transmutation reactors or accelerators would have a capital cost
roughly $200/kWe higher than that of comparably advanced one-through
systems (a quite optimistic assumption, given past experience), then
separations and transmutation for this purpose would not be economic
until the cost of disposal of spent fuel reached some $3,000 per
kilogram of heavy metal, many times its current level.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, and van der Zwaan, ``The Economics of
Reprocessing'', pp. 64-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The repository-space argument for recycling is also based on a
further questionable assumption--that even decades in the future, when
repository space has become scarce and reactor operators become willing
to pay a substantial price for it, it will still not be possible to
ship spent fuel from one country to another for disposal. (This is an
odd assumption given GNEP's simultaneous emphasis on fuel leasing,
involving countries shipping back spent fuel to the state that provided
it.) If, in fact, repository capacity does become scarce in the future,
reactor operators will likely be willing to pay a price for spent fuel
disposal well above the cost of providing the service, and it seems
quite likely that if the potential price gets high enough, the
opportunity for enormous profit will motivate some country with an
indefinitely-expandable repository to overcome the political obstacles
that have blocked international storage and disposal of spent fuel in
the past, and offer to accept spent fuel from other countries on a
commercial basis. (It is worth noting that Russia has already passed
legislation approving such imports of foreign spent fuel, though the
prospects for implementation of that project remain uncertain.) \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ For an extensive discussion of the political history and
prospects for such concepts, see Chapter 4 of Matthew Bunn et al.,
``Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Safe, Flexible, and Cost-
Effective Near-Term Approach to Spent Fuel Management'' (Cambridge,
Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Project on
Sociotechnics of Nuclear Energy, Tokyo University, 2001; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/spentfuel.pdf as
of 18 May 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, once-through approaches will likely be able to provide
sustainable uranium supply and repository space supply for a growing
nuclear energy enterprise around the world for many decades or more,
with costs and environmental impacts lower than or comparable to those
of the proposed GNEP approaches.
COMMERCIAL-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE GNEP R&D PROGRAM
A substantial R&D program to develop improved approaches to nuclear
energy is justified. Such a program should include R&D on optimized
approaches to spent fuel management, including both improved once-
through approaches and recycling approaches. These efforts should be
based on in-depth life-cycle systems analysis of different potential
options, both to choose which approaches may be best and to identify
the most important technical objectives for the R&D effort.
Unfortunately, however, DOE appears to be shifting its GNEP efforts
to focus on building commercial-scale facilities, without having
completed either the R&D on relevant technologies or the detailed
systems analyses needed to make wise choices. In the request for
expressions of interest issued in August, DOE envisions building a
reprocessing and fuel fabrication plant known as the Consolidated Fuel
Treatment Center (CFTC) with a capacity to process 2,000-3,000 tons of
spent fuel per year--roughly three times the capacity of the largest
single plants that currently exist--and an advanced burner reactor
(ABR) that might have a capacity of 200-800 MWe.\29\ In response to
questions from industry, DOE indicated that it hoped to begin
construction of such facilities in 2010, only 4 years from now.\30\ The
subcommittee, in considering what direction to give DOE on this
proposed approach and whether to appropriate the many billions of
dollars that would be required to build these facilities, should ask a
number of questions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ U.S. Department of Energy, ``Notice of Request for Expressions
of Interest in a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center to Support the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,'' Federal Register, 7 August 2006,
Vol. 71, No. 151, pp. 44676-44679, and U.S. Department of Energy,
``Notice of Request for Expressions of Interest in an Advanced Burner
Reactor to Support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,'' Federal
Register, 7 August 2006, Vol. 71, No. 151, pp. 44673-44676.
\30\ U.S. Department of Energy, ``Q&As From August 14, 2006 GNEP
Industry Briefing,'' available as of 12 September 2006 at
www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepCFTCABREOIBriefingQAs.
html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Even under the very optimistic assumptions of the BCG report, would
it not be reasonable to estimate that the cost of building the
CFTC and the ABR would be in the range of $20 billion? \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ The BCG report estimates that a facility of the same scale
proposed for the CFTC would have an overnight capital cost of over $16
billion, not counting interest during construction or decommissioning.
BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in the
United States'', p. 16. As described in the appendix to this testimony,
the BCG figures are unrealistically optimistic. The cost to develop and
build the ABR would certainly be in the billion-dollar range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Is it not likely that cost estimates will grow substantially as the
project proceeds, if it does? Can DOE provide any recent
example of a DOE project of comparable scale and complexity
that did not suffer the kind of cost growth that has afflicted
the Hanford vitrification project and the Savannah River MOX
plant?
--How does DOE expect to finance these costs? From appropriations?
From the Nuclear Waste Fund? If the latter, would sufficient
funds remain for Yucca Mountain?
--Is there any previous example in DOE's history in which the
department successfully built and operated--or financed the
construction and operation of--a commercial-scale facility of
this complexity?
--What is DOE's past record of success and failure in picking winners
among a range of possible technologies for commercial
deployment? Why should we believe that this approach will be
suitable in this case?
--What life-cycle systems analyses of cost, safety, security,
sustainability, and proliferation-resistance led DOE to
conclude that this proposed approach is preferable to other
options? What independent review has there been of these
analyses? Can DOE provide those analyses?
--What life-cycle analyses has DOE performed of management of the
low-level and transuranic wastes that will be generated by
these facilities, including from their eventual
decommissioning? Would any of these wastes have to be disposed
of in Yucca Mountain or WIPP? If so, how does this affect
estimates of the increase in repository capacity that could be
achieved?
--Does a decision to move immediately toward deployment of
commercial-scale facilities mean that promising technologies
still requiring significant development cannot be seriously
considered for use in these major facilities? What factors led
DOE to conclude it was time to choose available technologies
and begin building facilities rather than continuing to pursue
R&D on a range of potential separations, fabrication, and
reactor technologies?
--What impact will building huge facilities using existing
technologies have on R&D on long-term technologies? Is it
likely that DOE will receive sufficient funding both to proceed
directly to construction of these large facilities and to
continue a robust research program on a wide range of
technologies? Is it likely that building these large facilities
would take money, personnel, and leadership focus away from
long-term R&D?
--What does DOE believe this investment would buy us? How can the
technologies to be pursued simultaneously be so mature that we
can go straight to construction of commercial-scale facilities
and so immature that they require demonstration? Does this
proposal amount to spending billions of dollars to build these
facilities before completing the R&D that would make it
possible to know whether they would ever have the hoped-for
repository benefits? If the CFTC is not expected to produce
transmutation fuels, and R&D on appropriate separations,
fabrication, and reactor technologies for transmutation is
still under way, how confident can we be that once built, these
facilities will prove to be what is needed for the
transmutation mission? What does DOE plan to do if further
analysis and R&D leads to the conclusion that these facilities
are poorly suited to that mission?
--What would the proliferation impacts be of building these
facilities? What independent review has been done of those
impacts?
--Since processing 2,000-3,000 tons of spent fuel each year would
provide some 20-30 tons of plutonium, while the ABR would
likely require less than 1 ton per year, what does DOE plan to
do with the rest of the product of the CFTC? Given that DOE is
planning to spend billions of dollars on disposition of some 50
tons of excess plutonium, is there a danger of adding that
amount to DOE's stockpile every 2 years?
--Is it really likely that the complex separations involved in UREX+,
which have only been demonstrated on a kilogram scale, could be
scaled to processing thousands of tons of spent fuel per year
without any intermediate steps? If not, would a facility be
built that uses PUREX or COEX? If so, what then happens to the
objectives of separating and transmuting all of the actinides,
or providing a process with improved proliferation resistance
(which the subcommittee has rightly emphasized must be
maintained in the development of recycling technologies)?
As these questions suggest, I believe that what is needed now is
patient R&D and in-depth systems analysis, rather than a rush to build
big facilities. As Richard Garwin has put it, by picking winners
prematurely, the proposed GNEP approach ``would launch us into a costly
program that would surely cost more to do the job less well than would
a program at a more measured pace guided by a more open process.''\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Richard L. Garwin, ``R&D Priorities for GNEP,'' testimony to
the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Subcommittee
on Energy, 6 April 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RECOMMENDATIONS
What, then, should we do? I recommend the following steps:
--(1) Focus First on Interim Storage.--Whatever option we pursue,
additional interim storage capacity will be needed. Storing
spent fuel in dry casks leaves all options open for the future,
as technology develops and political and economic circumstances
change. (Indeed, since the Yucca Mountain repository will
remain open for a century or more, even direct disposal will
leave all options open for a long time to come.) At least some
centralized storage capacity is needed to address particular
needs; whether nearly all of the spent fuel should be moved to
a centralized away-from-reactor site or site depends on a
number of factors that require further analysis. Here, too, we
should not let frustration with the current state of affairs
prevent us from taking the time to get it right: a rushed
process for siting and licensing such facilities is a recipe
for public opposition and ultimate failure, adding to the long
history of failed attempts to site centralized interim storage
facilities in the United States. In a 2001 study, we provided a
detailed outline of a democratic and voluntary process for
siting such facilities, based on approaches that had been
applied successfully in siting other hazardous and unwanted
facilities, and I would urge that such an approach be followed
here.\33\ I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you have encouraged
the American Physical Society to examine these issues in depth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Bunn et al., ``Interim Storage'', pp. 95-116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--(2) Pursue a broad R&D program to improve spent fuel management.--
Someday, recycling technologies may be developed which are
substantially cheaper and more proliferation-resistant than
those now available. R&D should be pursued to explore such
possibilities. In parallel, there should also be R&D on
improved approaches to direct disposal.\34\ As the technologies
develop, we should regularly re-examine which of them appear to
offer the best combination of cost, safety, security,
proliferation-resistance, and sustainability. At the same time,
we should not allow an expansion of nuclear R&D to overwhelm
R&D on other promising energy technologies: the United States
urgently needs to undertake expanded investments in a wide
range of energy R&D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ For a discussion, see Garwin, ``R&D Priorities for GNEP.'' For
a discussion of R&D that should be pursued on improved once-through
options, see Deutch, Moniz, et al., ``The Future of Nuclear Power''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--(3) Build political sustainability.--As it takes decades to develop
and fully implement nuclear technologies, stable government
policies are crucial to success. Stable policies require some
degree of bipartisan consensus. The current GNEP effort has
devoted virtually no noticeable effort to developing such
bipartisan support. Without it, the probability of failure is
high. In my judgment, approaches based on interim storage,
continued R&D on a wide range of options, and continued forward
movement toward a permanent repository have far better chances
of being politically sustainable than approaches focused on
near-term construction of reprocessing plants and fast neutron
reactors.
--(4) Move forward deliberately with the Yucca Mountain repository.--
Whether we ultimately pursue once-through or recycling options,
we will ultimately need a repository. We should move forward
with that effort, again taking the time to get the analysis
right and to build as much support as we practicably can.
--(5) Develop and analyze first, build later.--Today, technologies
that might someday be able to meet the technical objective of
transmuting nearly all of actinides remain in their infancy;
some, like UREX+, have been demonstrated only on a kilogram
scale, while others, like fabrication of transmutation fuels or
construction of fast reactors with very low conversion ratios,
we do not yet know are feasible. At the same time, detailed
life-cycle systems analyses of the cost, safety, security,
proliferation-resistance, and sustainability of the proposed
technologies, compared to those of similarly advanced once-
through systems, have not yet been done. To construct major
facilities without first doing these system analyses is like
choosing which car to buy without knowing the cost, gas
mileage, reliability, or safety performance of any of the
models available. GNEP should focus intensely on the kind of
systems analysis that can reveal which options have critical
flaws and where the greatest opportunities for R&D lie,
including accelerating the development of improved systems
analysis tools. Large-scale reprocessing and transmutation
facilities should not be built until detailed analysis has
indicated that they offer a combination of cost, safety,
security, proliferation-resistance, and sustainability superior
to potential alternatives, including direct disposal.
Independent review is an important part of such analyses, and
of building bipartisan support. As a first step, I recommend
that in conference, the subcommittee accept the House language
calling for an in-depth peer review of the entire fuel
recycling plan by the National Academies before any expensive
facilities are built.
--(6) Increase the focus on other key elements of GNEP.--As noted
earlier, the proposal to offer reliable guarantees of fuel
supply and spent fuel management, in order to help convince
countries to forego building their own reprocessing and
enrichment facilities, is extremely important and should
receive even more attention and effort than it has to date.
Similarly, the GNEP elements related to developing advanced
safeguards technologies and small, rapidly deployable reactors
for deployment in developing countries should be pursued more
vigorously. Neither received funding in the President's budget
request, and I commend the subcommittee for seeking to correct
that omission.
--(7) Redouble key efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons
materials and technologies. The U.S. Government should
significantly increase its efforts to: (a) limit the spread of
reprocessing and enrichment technologies, as a critical element
of a strengthened nonproliferation effort; (b) ensure that
every nuclear warhead and every kilogram of separated plutonium
and highly enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide are secure and
accounted for, as the most critical step to prevent nuclear
terrorism; \35\ (c) work with other countries to put in place
strengthened export controls and greatly strengthened
intelligence and law enforcement cooperation focused on illicit
nuclear trafficking, to smash what remains of the A.Q. Khan
network and prevent a recurrence; (d) convince other countries
to end the accumulation of plutonium stockpiles, and work to
reduce stockpiles of both plutonium and HEU around the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ For detailed recommendations, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony
Wier, ``Securing the Bomb 2006'' (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, DC:
Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat
Initiative, July 2006, available as of 16 July 2006 at http://
www.nti.org/securingthebomb).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, I recommend that we follow the advice of the bipartisan
National Commission on Energy Policy, which reflected a broad spectrum
of opinion on energy matters generally and on nuclear energy in
particular, and recommended that the United States should:
--(1) ``continue indefinitely the U.S. moratoria on commercial
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and construction of
commercial breeder reactors'';
--(2) establish expanded interim spent fuel storage capacities ``as a
complement and interim back-up'' to Yucca Mountain;
--(3) proceed ``with all deliberate speed'' toward licensing and
operating a permanent geologic waste repository; and
--(4) continue research and development on advanced fuel cycle
approaches that might improve nuclear waste management and
uranium utilization, without the huge disadvantages of
traditional approaches to reprocessing.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ National Commission on Energy Policy, ``Ending the Energy
Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America's Energy Challenges''
(Washington, DC: National Commission on Energy Policy, December 2004,
available as of June 9, 2005, at http://www.energycommission.org/
ewebeditpro/items/O82F4682.pdf), pp. 60-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar recommendations have been made in the MIT study on the
future of nuclear energy,\37\ and in the American Physical Society
study of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons proliferation.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Deutch, Moniz, et al., ``The Future of Nuclear Power''.
\38\ Nuclear Energy Study Group, American Physical Society Panel on
Public Affairs, ``Nuclear Power and Proliferation Resistance: Securing
Benefits, Limiting Risk'' (Washington, DC: American Physical Society,
May 2005, available as of 16 July 2006 at http://www.aps.org/
public_affairs/proliferation-resistance).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The global nuclear energy system would have to grow substantially
if nuclear energy was to make a substantial contribution to meeting the
world's 21st century needs for carbon-free energy. Building the support
from governments, utilities, and publics needed to achieve that kind of
growth will require making nuclear energy as cheap, as simple, as safe,
as proliferation-resistant, and as terrorism-proof as possible.
Reprocessing using any of the technologies likely to be available in
the near term points in the wrong direction on every count.\39\ Those
who hope for a bright future for nuclear energy, therefore, should
oppose near-term reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ For earlier discussions of this point, see, for example, John
P. Holdren, ``Improving U.S. Energy Security and Reducing Greenhouse-
Gas Emissions: The Role of Nuclear Energy,'' testimony to the
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, U.S.
House of Representatives, 25 July 2000, available as of 16 July 2006 at
bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=testimony&item_id=9; and Matthew
Bunn, ``Enabling A Significant Future For Nuclear Power: Avoiding
Catastrophes, Developing New Technologies, Democratizing Decisions--And
Staying Away From Separated Plutonium,'' in ``Proceedings of Global
'99: Nuclear Technology--Bridging the Millennia'', Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, August 30-September 2, 1999 (La Grange Park, Ill.: American
Nuclear Society, 1999, available as of 16 July 2006 at
bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=book&item_id=2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX: BRIEF CRITIQUE OF THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP STUDY,
``ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES''
In July 2006, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) published a report
which concluded that the costs of reprocessing and recycling spent
nuclear fuel in the United States would be ``comparable'' to the costs
of direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel.\40\ This conclusion was in
stark contrast to those of most other recent studies, which concluded
that reprocessing and recycling would significantly increase the costs
of spent fuel management.\41\ The BCG study, however, makes a wide
range of unjustified assumptions, and its cost estimates should not be
used as the basis for policy-making. The real cost of reprocessing and
recycling in the United States would almost certainly turn out to be
far higher than the costs estimated in the BCG report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. vi.
\41\ See sources cited in the main text, and other sources cited
therein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, the BCG study itself appears to agree that it should not be
used as the basis for policy-making. After acknowledging that the study
was initiated and paid for by Areva, the firm that operates France's
reprocessing plants, and that BCG made no attempt to verify any of the
data provided by Areva, the study warns: ``Any other party [than Areva]
using this report for any purpose, or relying on this report in any
way, does so at their own risk. No representation or warranty, express
or implied, is made in relation to the accuracy or completeness of the
information presented herein or its suitability for any particular
purpose.'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BCG conclusions float on a sea of optimistic assumptions:
--BCG assumes a unit cost for both reprocessing and MOX fabrication
of $630/kgHM (undiscounted), far lower than current plants have
managed to achieve for either process.\43\ (BCG provides, for
example, an interesting chart showing that their estimate for
reprocessing cost per kilogram is roughly one-third the cost
actually achieved in France.\44\) As they put it themselves,
one of the ``key differentiating elements'' between their study
and other studies is ``integrated plant costs significantly
lower than previously published data.'' \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 15.
\44\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 17.
\45\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--By contrast, the current effort to use Areva technology and plant
designs in the United States--the construction of a MOX plant
at Savannah River--is leading to unit costs several times
higher than those achieved in France.\46\ This experience is
not mentioned in the BCG report, and no argument is offered as
to why the projected facility will have a cost result that is
the opposite of the real experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ For a discussion of the remarkable cost growth of the Savannah
River MOX plant, see, for example, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, ``Plutonium Disposition and the U.S. Mixed
Oxide Fuel Facility'', U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress,
2nd Session (26 July 2006; available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/
schedules/as of 10 August 2006). See also U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of the Inspector General, ``Audit Report: Status of the Mixed
Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility'', DOE/IG-0713 (Washington, DC: 2005;
available at http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0713.pdf as of 26 May 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--They reach these extremely low-unit cost estimates for their
projected plant by using a large number of dubious assumptions:
--They envision a reprocessing and MOX fabrication plant far larger
than any other such plant that exists in the world,
processing 2,500 tons of spent fuel every year (compared to
800 tons per year in the largest single plants that have
been built to date).
--They assume that plant capacity can be scaled up dramatically
with only a minor increase in capital or operating cost.
They note that the capital cost of the existing French
facilities was $17.8 billion (in 2005 dollars), but they
assume that the capacity can be increased by more than 50
percent (assuming, generously, that the two La Hague plants
should be considered to have a combined capacity of 1,600
tons of heavy metal per year) with an additional capital
cost of only $1.5 billion, less than 10 percent of the
original capital cost.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 16.
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--They assume that the plant will always operate at nearly full
capacity with no technical problems and no contract delays.
No reprocessing plant or MOX plant in the world has ever
done so.
--Indeed, they apparently assume that there will never be a lag in
fuel fabrication, since, to save money, they cut out all
funding for having a plutonium storage area.\48\ In France,
by contrast, tens of tons of plutonium have built up in
storage as a result of lags in the use of this plutonium as
fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--With a hugely increased plant capacity compared to existing
plants, far higher plant utilization than existing plants,
and very small increases in capital and operating costs to
achieve these vast increases in throughput, it is not
surprising that they find that the cost per kilogram of
spent fuel processed would be much lower than the cost in
existing plants. This is simply not a realistic estimate,
however, of what the real costs would be likely to be if
such a plant were built and operated in the United States.
--Interestingly, the capital cost they acknowledge for the existing
French plants is higher than the estimates used in our 2003
study;\49\ had they taken this actual experience as the
basis for estimating future costs, they would have found
reprocessing and MOX prices higher than those used in our
study, not lower.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Based on published data, we envisioned a reprocessing plant
that cost some $6 billion and a MOX plant with a capital cost of
roughly $540 million; for two such reprocessing plants and a MOX plant,
the total capital cost would then be in the range of $12.5 billion. The
BCG study reports that the real capital cost of the two reprocessing
plants in France (with official capacities identical to the one we
considered) and the MOX plant in France (with an official capacity only
modestly higher than the plant we considered) was in fact $17.8
billion, a substantially higher figure than those we used. BCG,
``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in the United
States'', p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--BCG also makes dubious assumptions about the disposal and
management costs of different types of nuclear waste. They
argue that because of the lower long-term heat generation
from reprocessing waste, compared to spent fuel, four times
as much reprocessing waste could be placed in each unit
area of the repository, and therefore they assume that
total per-kilogram disposal costs would be only one-quarter
as large.\50\ As we noted in our 2003 study, however, only
a portion of total disposal costs are likely to be driven
by heat and repository capacity; with a four-fold
repository expansion, a two-fold reduction in cost per
kilogram is more appropriate.\51\ At the same time as they
take a four-fold cost reduction for the lower heat
generation from reprocessing wastes, they assume that the
management cost for spent MOX fuel would be the same as for
spent LEU fuel, despite the far higher heat generation of
spent MOX fuel, the greater difficulty in reprocessing it,
and the much more radioactive nature of the fuel that would
be manufactured from it.\52\ They acknowledge that
disposing of the MOX spent fuel in the repository would
effectively eliminate the repository benefit of the entire
effort, because of the very high heat generation of the
MOX; managing the spent MOX would require fast reactors and
other technologies not included in their study.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 18.
\51\ Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, and van der Zwaan, ``The Economics of
Reprocessing'', pp. 34-45.
\52\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 20.
\53\ BCG, ``Economic Assessment of Used Nuclear Fuel Management in
the United States'', p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--In 1996, in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) review of
recycling and transmutation technologies, the NAS committee
criticized paper estimates that predicted similarly low costs
per kilogram for reprocessing, and concluded that the actual
costs of real plants ``provide the most reliable basis for
estimating the costs of future plants.'' \54\ BCG appears to
have ignored this advice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Committee on Separations Technology and Transmutation Systems,
``Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation'', p.
421.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE FUEL INDUSTRY
BCG also assumes that the plants they envision will be financed
entirely by the government, at a 3 percent real rate of return. This
assumption is crucial to their conclusions, as the costs of such a
capital-intensive facility would increase dramatically if a higher (and
more realistic) rate were chosen. As we noted in our 2003 study, if a
reprocessing plant were built that had the same capital and operating
costs and nameplate capacity as Britain's Thermal Oxide Reprocessing
Plant (THORP), whose costs are generally similar to those of the French
plants at La Hague, which are the basis for the BCG estimates, and the
plant were financed at such a government rate, it would have a
reprocessing cost in the range of $1,350 per kilogram of heavy metal in
spent fuel (kgHM), if it successfully operated at its full capacity
throughout its life with no interruptions (a far cry from the real
experience, but the same assumption used in the BCG study). (By
contrast, as already noted, BCG assumes $630/kgHM for both reprocessing
and MOX fabrication combined.) But if the exact same plant were
financed privately, at the rates the Electric Power Research Institute
recommends assuming for power plants owned by regulated utilities with
a guaranteed rate of return (and therefore very low-risk), the unit
cost would be over $2,000/kgHM. If financed by a fully private entity
with no guaranteed rate of return, the cost for the same facility would
be over $3,100/kgHM.\55\ (That is without taking into account the
large-risk premium the capital markets would surely demand for a
facility whose fate was so dependent on political decisions; all three
of the commercial reprocessing plants built to date in the United
States failed for such reasons.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, and van der Zwaan, ``The Economics of
Reprocessing'', pp. 26-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The entire approach, in short, is only financially feasible if it
is fully government-financed. But for the government to own and operate
a facility that would not only reprocess spent fuel but manufacture new
MOX fuel on the scale they envision--providing a significant fraction
of all the fuel for U.S. light-water reactors--would represent an
immense government intrusion on the private nuclear fuel industry. The
implications of such an approach have not been examined. The coal
industry and the gas industry would surely ask, ``if nuclear can get
facilities to handle its waste financed at a 3 percent government rate,
why can't we get the same thing for our environmental controls or
carbon sequestration?''
CONCLUSION
The real costs achieved at real facilities provide the best guide
to likely future costs of reprocessing and recycling in the United
States. These costs are far higher than those assumed in the BCG study
for an integrated U.S. plant. Policies should not be based on assuming
that costs comparable to those in the BCG study are likely to be
achieved in the real world.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. I know that there
are those at the table who would like to take some time
disagreeing with you.
Mr. Bunn. I'm sure that's correct.
Senator Domenici. I'm hopeful that everybody would
recognize that there's not been an editing with his views and
others at the table or in my current years as the chairman, to
the extent that I've been able to arrive at some conclusions. I
don't see eye-to-eye with the imminent Dr. Bunn. I think we
will be right back where we've been and mainly we'll get
nothing done in this area. Having said that we're going to move
to Mr. Fletcher and then we're going to go to questions. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF KELLY FLETCHER, GE GLOBAL RESEARCH,
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
LEADER
Mr. Fletcher. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief in my
remarks so we can continue that discussion with Mr. Bunn.
Chairman Domenici, Mr. Bennett, it is a pleasure to be here
to discuss General Electric Company's potential contribution to
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, with the Power Reactor
Innovative Small Module, or PRISM Reactor Technology. In my
previous role as GE's General Manager of Nuclear Technology, I
had the opportunity to establish the foundation for utilizing
this fast reactor technology. My testimony will provide a
detailed summary of this technology and its potential role in
meeting the objectives of GNEP.
GE is especially interested in GNEP because it provides the
policy framework for solving two of the more serious challenges
impacting the nuclear industry today: Waste and proliferation.
The advanced recycling center concept, put forth in our
response to Department of Energy's requests, proposes our
integrated solution-based approach.
Today, I've been asked to focus my remarks on the advanced
reactor GE has developed, PRISM. In 1984, DOE began the
Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor Program. GE led seven industry
partners to refine the conceptual design of the PRISM Reactor.
The program was funded through 1994. Two products emerged from
the expenditure of approximately $100 million in funding. The
PRISM Reactor design, and the proliferation resistant PYRO
process for spent fuel recycle.
Following the discontinuation of the program, GE continued
to develop a more advanced modular fast reactor design called
SuperPRISM or SPRISM. The SPRISM design improved the commercial
potential of PRISM through increased power output and reduced
costs. These improvements enabled an estimated capital cost of
a SuperPRISM to be $1,335 per kilowatt electric in 1998
dollars. PRISM is an advanced fast neutron spectrum, reactor
plant design with passive reactor shut down, passive shut down
heat removal, and passive reactor cavity cooling. PRISM
supports a sustainable and flexible fuel cycle to consume
transuranic elements within the fuel as it generates
electricity. The essence of the reactor technology is a reactor
core, housed within a stainless steel vessel. Liquid sodium is
circulated within the reactor vessel and through the reactor
core by four electromagnetic pumps suspended from the reactor
closure. Two intermediate heat exchangers inside the reactor
vessel remove heat for electrical generation.
Reports delivered to the government during the advanced
metal reactor program, by the National Laboratories and the GE-
led team, document this technology. The nuclear regulatory
commission issued a report, NR-1368, titled, ``A Preapplication
Safety Evaluation Report for the PRISM Liquid Metal Reactor'',
dated February 1994, that stated, and I quote, ``The staff with
the advisory committee on reactor safeguards in agreement
concludes that no obvious impediments to licensing the PRISM
design have been identified.''
GE has the infrastructure and the processes to build the
PRISM reactor with a ``Made in America'' stamp. PRISM can be
deployed now on a commercial scale, generating a return on its
investment by putting electricity on the grid, using GE's
state-of-the-art management tools. We have proven this in our
deployment of the advanced boiling water reactor abroad and GE
hopes to continue this tradition with the deployment of both
ABWR and ESBWR in the United States in the near term.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Our Nation has already made much of the necessary
investment in facilities, analysis, research, and
experimentation on the design and development of fast reactors,
now called the Advanced Burner Reactor. The National
Laboratories has amassed extensive documentation and proof of
the PRISM concept, its safety, and its viability. We should
take advantage of this wealth of knowledge and expertise and
move ahead with this available technology to deploy a
commercial scale advanced burner reactor. If we do so, we
reduce the need for additional geologic storage capacity. GNEP
provides a unique opportunity to regain the historical U.S.
leadership position in nuclear science and technology.
Thank you for the time before this committee; this
concludes my formal statement.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kelly Fletcher
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reid, and members of the committee, it is a
pleasure to be here today to discuss General Electric Company's
potential contribution to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
program with the Power Reactor Innovative Small Module or ``PRISM''
reactor technology. In my previous role as GE's General Manager of
Nuclear Technology, I had the opportunity to establish the foundation
for utilizing this fast reactor technology. My testimony will provide a
detailed summary of this technology and its potential role in meeting
the objectives of the GNEP program.
This is a significant period for our country as we advance into a
possible nuclear energy renaissance. GE supports the GNEP concept and
is very interested in working with this committee and the Department of
Energy to realize the goals of GNEP. In so doing, we can make real and
significant contributions to U.S. and international energy security
needs. GE is especially interested in GNEP because it provides the
policy framework for solving two of the more serious challenges
impacting the nuclear industry today: waste and proliferation. The
Advanced Recycling Center concept put forth in our response to the
Department of Energy's request for Expressions of Interest for the
Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment
Center (CFTC) proposes our solution-based approach.
The Department of Energy has developed a broad implementation
strategy for GNEP comprised of seven key elements. GE sees these
elements grouped into two broad categories: technical and programmatic.
GNEP Technical Elements:
--Demonstrate proliferation-resistant recycling;
--Develop advanced burner reactors;
--Demonstrate small-scale reactors;
--Minimize nuclear waste.
GNEP Programmatic Elements:
--Expand the use of nuclear power;
--Develop enhanced nuclear safeguards;
--Establish reliable fuel services.
While demonstration of proliferation-resistant fuel recycling is
the crux of GNEP, we believe the first three technical elements can be
best accomplished through a partnership between private industry and
the government. The fourth follows with success in advancing the fuel
cycle and ABR deployment. Accomplishment of the GNEP technical elements
will ``pull'' the programmatic elements to success.
I have been asked to focus my remarks on the advanced reactor GE
has developed--PRISM. That PRISM technology directly supports two key
technical elements critical to GNEP success:
--Demonstrate an advanced burner reactor, and
--Demonstrate a small-scale reactor.
The PRISM can provide the energy to generate electricity while
``burning'' spent fuel from our Nation's 103 operating light water
reactors (LWR) as well as future LWRs. Because of its relative small
size and its inherently safe encapsulated design, PRISM can be factory
built and transported to the site.
To assist the committee in fully understanding this technology, my
testimony will cover three areas:
--A historical overview of the origins of PRISM;
--The PRISM technology itself, developed with the support of funding
provided by the committee; and,
--A PRISM (or SuperPRISM) deployment roadmap for the committee's
consideration.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A preliminary safety information document referencing the PRISM
design was released by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in
February 1994. NUREG-1368 noted that ``. . . the staff, with the
[Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards] in agreement, concludes that
no obvious impediments to licensing the PRISM ([Advanced Liquid Metal
Reactor]) design have been identified.''
In the early 1980's, the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program
focused on deployment of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) in
Tennessee. The program encountered difficulties because of cost
escalations and schedule delays. The LMR program faced challenges
because uranium was not becoming scarce and prohibitively expensive as
earlier had been predicted.
While the CRBR project was being debated, a small group at GE's
Advanced Reactors program pursued a technology other than large loop
sodium reactors. At the time, the 1,000 MWt CRBR was envisioned as the
stepping-stone to 3,000 MWt ``commercial'' plants--the scale thought
necessary to be economically competitive with the large light water
reactors. GE questioned the economics of large fast reactors, and
conducted internal work based on alternative small modular reactor.
This small reactor, with rated power in the range of 400 to 1,000 MWt
could provide stair step plant power levels by adding reactor modules
at a site to reach economic and power generation goals. This was the
genesis of GE's Power Reactor Innovative Small Module--PRISM.
In August 1981, representatives from the Argonne National
Laboratory's Special Project Office visited the Advanced Reactor team.
We explained the idea that our relatively small PRISM reactor vessel
could be transported to a refueling center about every 18 months. ANL
explained their in-core refueling machine process for the Experimental
Breeder Reactor II. It became apparent that rather than moving an
entire reactor, technology was available to move just the fuel. From
this synergistic meeting with the national laboratory, the concept of
PRISM matured.
When Congress terminated the CRBR project in 1983, DOE began the
Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor program. The goal of the ALMR program was
to increase the efficiency of uranium usage by breeding plutonium and
create the condition wherein transuranic isotopes would never leave the
site. The ALMR was designed to allow any transuranic isotope to be
consumed as fuel, and is the forerunner to the GNEP framework we have
today.
GE competed for leadership of the ALMR program against another fast
reactor technology. GE won the competition and joined the ALMR program
with its two key elements: reactor design and fuel cycle development.
GE led seven industry partners to refine the conceptual design of the
PRISM reactor. The national laboratories, led principally by ANL,
tackled the fuel cycle development and waste characterization with 80
percent of the ALMR funding.
The ALMR program was funded from 1984 to 1994. Two products emerged
from the expenditure of approximately $100 million in government funds:
the advanced conceptual PRISM reactor design and the highly
proliferation resistant pyroprocess for spent fuel recycle. At the
point at which the ALMR program was terminated, the PRISM design was
less than 5 years from construction contracting. Figure 1 shows the
typical power plant site design developed as a part of the ALMR
program.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
A major outcome from this early work on PRISM, focused on safety
and economics, was the possibility of deploying a small reactor
competitive with large light water reactors. The PRISM designers
evaluated light water reactor systems such as defense in depth, active
intervention system, and active emergency backups, and developed a
passive, inherently safe design that did not depend upon control rods
to SCRAM (immediate shut down of the reactor), back up emergency
systems, etc.
The passive safety philosophy developed with PRISM has been
transferred to advanced light water reactor designs. DOE designates
these reactor designs as GENERATION III+. At GE, we call ours the
ESBWR. For example GE's ESBWR relies on gravity for both core and
containment cooling, therefore providing passive safety.
Following the discontinuation of DOE's ALMR program, GE continued
to develop a more advanced modular fast reactor design called
SuperPRISM, or SPRISM. The thermal rating of each reactor module was
increased to 1,000 MWt from the PRISM's original 840 MWt. The
SuperPRISM design sought to further improve upon the commercial
potential of PRISM with:
--increased power output;
--compact reactor building on single seismically isolated base pad;
--multi-cell containment system; and
--improved steam cycle efficiency.
These improvements enabled an estimated capital cost of $1,335/kWe,
with a busbar cost of 29.0 mills/KWh for the two-power-block plant with
a net plant output of 1520 MWe (capital cost and busbar cost in 1998
dollars).
This history demonstrates that the national laboratories and
private industry learned a great deal from the Clinch River Breeder
Reactor project and the follow-on Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor
project. GE was privileged to lead a very talented industrial team.
PRISM is an important technology that America has already largely
developed. I will now describe the details of the technology.
PRISM TECHNOLOGY
PRISM is an advanced fast neutron spectrum reactor plant design
with passive reactor shutdown, passive shutdown heat removal, and
passive reactor cavity cooling. PRISM supports a sustainable and
flexible fuel cycle to consume transuranic elements within the fuel as
it generates electricity. The essence of the reactor technology is a
reactor core housed within a 316 stainless steel reactor vessel. Liquid
sodium is circulated within the reactor vessel and through the reactor
core by four electromagnetic pumps suspended from the reactor closure
head. Two intermediate heat exchangers (IHX) inside the reactor vessel
remove heat for electrical generation.
The PRISM technology is deployed as a power block with two reactors
side by side supporting a single steam turbine generator set. The plant
is divided into two areas: the nuclear island (reactors through steam
generators) and balance of plant (steam turbine to generate
electricity). The nuclear island is two reactors in separate
containments, plus steam generators, and shared services, in a single,
seismically isolated, partially buried building as depicted in the
cutaway view of a PRISM nuclear island shown in Figure 2. Each reactor
heats an intermediate coolant loop, sending heat to a steam generator.
Steam from the steam generators is combined and sent to the balance of
plant, where a single turbine generator produces electricity. Figure 3
shows the overall PRISM power train that converts transuranics into
electricity.
I will now provide some additional details of the components that
make up the power block.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Reactor Core
GE's extensive fuel cycle evaluations indicate a preference for
metal fuel. This fuel type best consumes transuranics, recycles spent
nuclear fuel and destroys weapons grade material. The reactor core,
however, can use either a metal fuel or an oxide-based fuel without
changes to the reactor structure or refueling system.
As noted in the history described above, PRISM core power can range
from 800 to 1,000 MWt. Metal fuel bundles allow a higher heavy metal
fraction in the fuel resulting in a lower fissile enrichment and better
internal transmutation compared to oxide fuel. Thus, the metal fuel
core could satisfy nuclear goals with fewer fuel assemblies and a more
compact core. The fission gas plenum is located above the fuel column.
Upper axial shielding is provided by the long fission gas plenum region
and the sodium pool above the core. Lower axial shielding is provided
by long pin end plugs. Reflector assemblies contain pin bundles of
solid HT9 rods.
Intermediate Heat Transport System (IHTS)
The IHTS is located within the reactor vessel. The internal
electromagnetic pumps (EMP)--pumps with no moving parts that move
conductive fluids by way of a magnetic field--circulate the molten
sodium through the reactor core and then to the IHTS. Another sodium
loop, a closed loop system, transports the reactor generated heat to
the steam generator (SG) system by circulating non-radioactive sodium
between the Intermediate Heat Exchangers (IHX) and the SG. The hot leg
sodium is transported in pipes from the two IHXs to a single SG. Two
high temperature EMPs in the cold legs return the sodium to the IHX
units at 350 C. The high temperature secondary EMPs are similar to
the ones used inside the reactor core.
Steam Generator (SG) System
The steam generator (SG) system is comprised of the startup
recirculation tank/pump, leak detection subsystem, steam generator
isolation valves, sodium dump tank, and the steam generator. The SG
provides a high integrity pressure boundary to assure separation
between the sodium and water/steam. The SG is a vertically-oriented,
helical coil, sodium-to-water counter flow shell-and-tube heat
exchanger. This basic design was developed over 15 years in the ALMR
program. Further, a 76 MWt prototype SG was fabricated and tested at
the DOE Energy Technology Engineering Center for 4 years. Based on this
development work, testing, and GE trade studies, this design was
selected as the reference design for SPRISM. This SG design also
provides passive protection from the effects of a significant sodium/
water reaction.
Functionally the steam generator operates as follows. Water enters
the steam generator through four non-radial inlet nozzles at the
bottom. Water is heated as it flows upward through the inlet tubes,
helical coil tube bundle, and the outlet tubes connecting the tube
bundle to four outlet nozzles sending steam to the turbine. The helical
coil design features a longer tube length resulting in fewer tubes. Hot
sodium enters the steam generator through a single inlet nozzle at the
top. The sodium is distributed uniformly and flows downward around the
helical coil bundle at low velocity, which provides a large design
margin against flow-induced vibrations.
The system detects any water-to-sodium leaks in the SG and can
identify the approximate size of the leak. The steam side isolation
valves and the sodium blowdown tank rapidly separate water/steam and
sodium--stopping the reaction. Gas backfilling prevents backflow of
sodium. If this system fails, an innovative design feature using the
gas space inside the SG and rupture disks provide increased steam
venting capability to prevent steam from being forced backward into the
sodium flow.
This helical coil steam generator design provides high reliability,
availability, and safety.
Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS)
The Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) provides
ultimate passive cooling for the reactor if all other methods are
unavailable. It is always ``on'' since it utilizes natural circulation
of sodium and air, constantly removing a small amount of heat (<0.5
MWt) from the reactor modules. Radiant heat transfer is employed to
transfer heat from the reactor vessel, through the containment vessel,
and then to the naturally circulating air.
When RVACS is required for decay heat removal, natural circulation
of primary sodium carries heat from the core to the reactor vessel. As
the temperature of the reactor sodium and reactor vessel automatically
rise, the radiant heat transfer across the argon gap to the containment
vessel increases to accommodate the heat load. With the increase in
containment vessel temperature, the heat transfer from the containment
vessel to the atmospheric air surrounding the containment vessel
increases.
The inherent safety features are the circulation patterns, which
follow the basic laws of physics. They are constant, and the natural
airflow can be easily confirmed, which gives us transparent safety.
Containment
The containment system envisioned for PRISM would use three
successive barriers--fuel cladding, primary coolant boundary (reactor
vessel cutaway view shown in Figure 4), and a containment boundary that
surrounds the reactor vessel--to provide defense-in-depth from
postulated releases from the reactor vessel. The containment boundary
is a steel lined concrete upper structure that encloses the reactor
module as shown in Figure 2. Controlled venting from the containment
region above one of the reactors in the power block into a service cell
(between each reactor of the power block) would relieve the containment
boundary system pressure. If necessary the service cell can vent into
the reactor containment boundary of the other unit(s) in the power
block. This multi-cell approach reduces containment system expense
while improving safety.
What is unique about the PRISM reactor is that the reactor vessel
is positioned below grade in a concrete silo--a fourth containment
boundary (Figure 2). In the beyond credible event of containment
breach, the sodium complies with the natural law of gravity and is
contained in the silo. Its relatively simple construction process also
reduces cost.
The PRISM reactor design benefits from testing of prototype steam
generators and electromagnetic pump at DOE's Energy Technology and
Engineering Center. The reactor vessel design and material selection
benefit from the standards and testing conducted during the Clinch
River Breeder Reactor Program. A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
was completed as part of the design evaluation to ensure its
reliability and public safety. The PRA meets the NRC safety goals for
core damage frequency, includes potential design improvements, and
developed baseline fault models for future use by the NRC.
This body of component testing, advanced design, and safety
philosophy mitigates technical risk if PRISM is deployed for GNEP's
ABR.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
PRISM TECHNOLOGY FOR THE FUTURE
We stand today at a major energy policy juncture. As Deputy
Secretary of Energy Clay Sell stated before the committee in March,
``[GNEP] is a comprehensive strategy that would lay the foundation for
expanded use of nuclear energy in the United States and the world by
demonstrating and deploying new technologies that recycle nuclear fuel,
significantly reduce waste, and address proliferation concerns.''
GNEP's underlying principal is that LWR spent nuclear fuel is an
asset to be managed using fast reactor technology. PRISM technology is
synergistic in this respect because it consumes transuranics produced
by our current fleet of LWRs. During that consumption, electricity is
produced. GE believes PRISM is the fast reactor technology to best
manage this spent nuclear fuel asset.
GNEP is about deployment of a nuclear reactor with a different
coolant. This coolant, sodium, allows different reactor performance
characteristics, beneficial for the intended mission. At this point,
the key issues in deployment of this new technology are related to
design, codes, and standards. If the government chooses to deploy a
PRISM reactor to achieve the goals of GNEP, the work that remains is
really about nuts and bolts project engineering and management--the
technology is ready to be deployed. GE is ready to leverage our
commercial expertise in reactor plant design and construction to
support deployment of a PRISM reactor as part of GNEP.
GE has experience in taking government research results from the
Nuclear Reactor Testing Station, Idaho--the BORAX reactors--and
developing and commercializing the Boiling Water Reactor from initial
reactor tests. This technology commercialization was accomplished with
public-private partnerships. Today's PRISM technology deployment
requires the same working partnership. With expanding demand for
domestically produced non-carbon emitting energy, and the fuel supply--
spent nuclear fuel--tied to government ownership, only a public-private
partnership can make GNEP happen.
In 1965 GE started the SEFOR (Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide
Reactor) project in Arkansas to develop first-hand design,
construction, and operational experience for a commercial-scale liquid
metal reactor. A remarkable aspect of SEFOR was that the total 8-year
program was described in detail in the initial contract and, except for
minor variations, was carried out exactly as planned. Contrast the
successful SEFOR project to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project.
The success of SEFOR provides an important lesson. At GE we are
proud of our past contributions to fast reactor development in this
country. PRISM technology has been extensively researched using both
Federal and private industry funding. A wealth of documentation and
expertise is available from the national laboratories and industry. GE
has the infrastructure and the processes to build the PRISM with a
``Made in America'' stamp. PRISM can be deployed now on a commercial
scale--generating revenue by putting electricity on the grid--using
GE's state-of-the-art management tools. We have proven this in our
deployment of ABWR abroad, and GE hopes to continue this tradition with
the deployment of both ABWR and ESBWR in the United States in the near
term.
Records and Documentation
``Prototype Plan'' (GEFR-0933) December 1993--one of many documents
delivered to the government in the early 1990's--presented what looks
very similar to the current GNEP ``plan.'' It proposed a system with
three subsystems--reactor power plant, fuel recycle facilities, and the
LWR actinide recycle facilities. The estimated cost for the reactor
subsystem and safety testing was estimated then at $1.6 billion. This
estimate accounted for the difference between the standard plant and
the prototype, which must support running the safety tests and fuel
testing until NRC certification is granted.
The NRC licensing approach defined in ``Licensing Approach'' (GEFR-
00842, UC-87Ta) presents a process and schedule for achieving standard
design certification. The ``Certification Test Plan'' (GEFR-0808[DR],
UC-87Ta) identifies all testing needed for the design certification.
``1993 Capital and Bus Bar Cost Estimates'' (GEFR-0915, UC-87Ta)
provides a bottom-up capital cost and bus bar estimate. As part of
these earlier efforts, GE delivered documents on exactly how to
fabricate the reactor vessel, test fuel, build steam generators, etc.
As I stated before, NUREG-1368, Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report
for the Power Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM) Liquid Metal
Reactor, Final Report, February 1994, stated that, ``. . . the staff,
with the ACRS in agreement, concludes that no obvious impediments to
licensing the PRISM (ALMR) design have been identified.''
The confluence of GE processes and project management with this
wealth of ALMR documentation (requiring relatively little updating)
provides significant input for a systematic path forward for GNEP.
Reactor Fuel Qualification
We recognize the need to perform rigorous qualification of the new
fuel forms available for PRISM. We recommend establishing a ``Fuel
Team'' to provide integration between GE and DOE's national
laboratories to develop technologies to separate and fabricate fast
reactor transmutation fuel. This team approach will insure qualifying
transuranic fuel that meets the project schedule, and is both cost-
effective and reliable. In order make a cost-effective and reliable
driver fuel, GE believes it should be based on the U-Zr or the U-Pu-Zr
fuel used at EBR-II, because of the considerable operational
experience.
The prototype PRISM reactor would incorporate more instrumentation
than would be employed in subsequent commercial units in order to
measure fuel temperature and flux in support of the fuel qualification
program. Both DOE's national laboratories and GE could conduct the fuel
examinations.
The PRISM reactor is the best vehicle for fuel qualification since
it has more in-core positions for fuel testing and operates that fuel
at prototypical conditions.
Resources Required for Public-Private Partnership
Two areas deserve consideration by this committee to assure success
of GNEP:
--A multi-year funding commitment for reactor construction to
mitigate cost risk, consistent with other DOE energy programs.
--Access by the GNEP prime contractor to information developed by the
national laboratories applicable to PRISM. Some examples are:
--Heat transfer correlations for Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Heat
Removal System water simulations tests for confirming the
in-reactor sodium flow paths to expedite validation
simulations using new CFD codes.
--Electromagnetic pump electrical insulation material testing data
to finalize pump design.
--Post-test evaluations of the seismic isolation bearings to
support the detailed design process for the seismic
isolation system.
--Support to recover the EM pump at the Energy Technology
Engineering Center.
--The total R&D cost for the PRISM development was estimated to be
$300 million in 1998. Some examples of this R&D identified in
NUREG-1368 are:
--Seismic Isolation.--The PRISM design uses seismic isolation
bearings. The response of buildings with these installed
bearings is needed to support ABR seismic code validation.
International cooperation with France and Japan, which also
have used this seismic isolation design, can provide
additional empirical data.
--Fuel System.--TRU metal-fuel development, supported by in-reactor
and ex-reactor experiments.
--Thermal Hydraulics.--New analytical tools will be developed for
core thermal hydraulics.
--Heat Exchanger.--Evaluation of the Intermediate Heat Exchanger
System gimbaled joints.
SUMMARY
Our Nation has already made much of the necessary investment in
facilities, analysis, study, research and experimentation on the design
and deployment of fast reactors (now called the Advanced Burner
Reactor). The national laboratories have amassed extensive
documentation and proof of the PRISM concept, its safety, and its
viability. We should take advantage of that wealth of knowledge and
expertise, and move ahead with this available technology to deploy a
commercial scale advanced burner reactor, the PRISM. Importantly, in
contrast to current reactors that require outsourcing of components
because of their size, the key elements of PRISM small module reactor
technology--including the reactor vessel, the steam generator and the
steam turbine--are capable of being fabricated domestically. As the
last U.S. publicly owned reactor vendor, GE is ready, if tasked by our
government, to move forward.
In his testimony before the committee this spring, Deputy Secretary
Sell succinctly defined our Nation's status on nuclear energy and the
potential for PRISM technology:
``. . . nuclear energy by itself is not a silver bullet for energy
supply, in the world or for the U.S. and we need all technologies to
address the anticipated growth in demand for energy. Regardless of the
steps the U.S. takes, nuclear energy is expected to continue to expand
around the globe.
``We can continue down the same path that we have been on for the
last thirty years or we can lead a transformation to a new, safer, and
more secure approach to nuclear energy, an approach that brings the
benefits of nuclear energy to the world while reducing vulnerabilities
from proliferation and nuclear waste. We are in a much stronger
position to shape the nuclear future if we are part of it and hence,
GNEP. GNEP is a program that looks at the energy challenges of today
and tomorrow and envisions a safer and more secure future, encouraging
cooperation between nations to permit peaceful expansion of nuclear
technology while helping to address the challenges of energy supply,
proliferation, and global climate change.''
PRISM is a technology that can close the nuclear fuel cycle using
the energy contained in our Nation's spent nuclear fuel. PRISM can
generate stable base load electricity to help meet our growing
electricity needs and enhance our energy security. As we do so, we
reduce the need for additional geologic storage capacity. GNEP provides
a unique opportunity to regain the historical U.S. leadership position
in nuclear science and technology.
Thank you. This concludes my formal statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions you may have at this time.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Well, I have a series of questions and I'll get them
started, and where they'll lead, I don't know. I know Assistant
Secretary Spurgeon and Dr. Hanson would probably like to
comment on the record; there's some areas where you disagree
with Mr. Bunn's testimony. Is that a fair estimate of where we
are? I don't quite know how to get that done in an hour and a
half and be fair with it, but I'm going to start with a couple.
ADVANCED REACTORS PROGRAM
Advanced reactors--can we talk about that for just a
minute? In his paper, ``Assessing the Benefits, Costs and Risks
of Near Term Reprocessing and Alternatives,'' Mr. Bunn states
that the Department's schedule for design, construction and
licensing of a prototype advance reactor is, he uses a nice
word, absurd. Do you agree with Mr. Bunn's characterization of
the Advanced Reactor Program, and if you do, why? And if you
don't, why not? Assistant Secretary Spurgeon and then Dr.
Hanson.
Mr. Spurgeon. Well, I certainly hope that we have not--nor
would we at any point in time--propose something that would be
``absurd'', sir. However, the precise schedule is not laid out
for the operation of an advanced reactor. We do recognize that
there is research and development that needs to be done, and
that is being proposed, especially when it comes to the ability
of an advanced reactor to burn fuel containing minor actinides.
That kind of fuel has not been qualified yet, that is the
subject of our major R&D program that we are proposing to carry
out.
However, I think on the worldwide scale, we must look at
what other countries are doing, and what they have
accomplished. India is scheduled to put a fairly substantial
fast reactor online in 2010. France has announced a next
generation, or a next fast reactor to go online in 2020. We're
looking at Japan that has one in operation, and another that is
now shut down, but is planned to go back in operation quite
shortly, and the United States put a great deal of effort,
including what was just described here by General Electric, in
research and development into fast reactor programs. We did--we
have operated fast reactors in this country--going back to the
first electricity ever generated in this country, it was 1950
or 1951 with a fast reactor. EBR-II following that, FFTF
following that. Clinch River--although it was cancelled--was a
fairly major program in this country, so we're not starting
from scratch, nor is this some pipe dream that we're pulling
out of the air. We recognize there's much work to do to recycle
actinides. But we do not accept that this is something that
cannot be done in cooperation with industry and the
international community.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Hanson?
Dr. Hanson. I would certainly concur with Assistant
Secretary Spurgeon's comment that the development of fast
reactors and deployment of such a fast reactor or burner is not
absurd. However, I would note that in his comments, we are
talking about singular cases, and not a large fleet of such
reactors. I believe that we can develop a prototype semi-
commercial reactor and deploy it in a reasonable time frame,
and use that as a test bed to see how well it will work both at
burning actinides, and at generating electricity, which may
turn out to be conflicting goals for a single reactor. It
remains to be seen how well it will do on both functions.
But if we talk about a commercial group of ABRs in the
quantities necessary to deal with the output of spent fuel,
this is going to take decades because our utility community
does not move overnight to produce dozens of reactors. If we
look at the nuclear renaissance right now, 2015 is the earliest
date that we are projecting for the addition of the first new
reactor and it is a minor variation on our existing light water
reactor technology.
So, where I would agree with Mr. Bunn, a fleet of such
reactors will not be available, I certainly would disagree that
we should not move forward on it--we certainly should move
forward to develop that prototype as early as possible, because
that will lead to the fleet soon, maybe decades later.
Mr. Bunn. Just to defend myself briefly, I never said that
building a fast neutron reactor in this country was absurd,
what I said was the kinds of schedules that DOE laid out, for
example, in the Q&As at the industry briefing, where they
envisioned beginning construction in 2010, simply couldn't be
plausibly achieved. This is a major change in the kind of
reactor that we're building in this country. There's no one at
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that yet has experienced
licensing a fast reactor, the notion that we're going to have a
license to begin construction in 2010, I think is not very
likely, let's put it that way.
Mr. Spurgeon. I'm not aware that we have said we're going
to begin construction of a fast reactor in 2010, so----
Mr. Bunn. Look on your website.
Senator Domenici. All that comment is about what you can't
do is built on the premise that you did not make. I assume
that's what you were saying.
SCHEDULE AND COST IMPACTS TO GNEP
We move ahead now to a couple of subjects--GNEP changes
impact on schedule and budget--can I talk about that with you
for a minute?
Since the introduction of the President's budget which
unveiled GNEP, the Department's schedule and vision has evolved
from an R&D-intensive program that included developing and
engineering a design scale demonstration before moving to a
commercial scale facility. The Department unveiled its two-
track strategy for GNEP; the first track would be to develop a
commercial scale spent fuel recycled facility and advanced
burner reactor.
The second path would focus on longer-term R&D to support
transmutation fuel, development for the use in the burner
reaction. Can you please tell the committee what factors led to
change in DOE's position to move forward with the immediate
commercial deployment and was it a change in technology? Go
ahead.
Mr. Spurgeon. Mr. Chairman, first, the basic strategy that
was first implemented is still in place. It was a very R&D-
oriented strategy, we do still need that same R&D. We don't
have today, nor can we, nor are we in a position to
commercialize the actinide-bearing fuel recycle that is
envisioned as part of GNEP.
And in the original strategy it was always envisioned that
industry would be involved for the commercialization of this
technology. What we are really looking at is what is needed
between the research and development, and the commercial step,
and can we use--in some cases--existing facilities that exist
in our national laboratories to do some of the test work,
leading to the point where we can get to a commercial-scale
facility.
What we are asking industry for, and what they are
beginning to provide by the expressions of interest, is where
do they think they can help pick us up in that program to get
us to that commercial stage? So, I don't view this as a change,
I view this as looking at the relative roles in developing any
nuclear technology. The government role being the research and
development on new technology; the industrial role being the
implementation of that technology, and we're trying to see if
we can do that in a more cost-effective and schedule-effective
way.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Hanson, in his testimony Dr. Bunn
criticized the economic assumptions of the Boston Consulting
Group in estimating the cost to build and operate the recycling
facility.
He says the cost of the two smaller facilities in France,
which have 50 percent less capacity, will cost the same as the
proposed U.S. facility. How do you respond to the criticism
that he is thus lodging regarding the economic assumptions? And
Mr. Bunn, do you have anything further to add? First, Dr.
Hanson.
Dr. Hanson. Thank you. Let me start by saying that I have a
good deal of respect for the study that was produced by Harvard
in 2003, which Matt Bunn was one of the authors. And I suspect
that if the Boston Consulting Group had been given the exact
information that was used to produce that report in 2003, they
might very well have come up with a similar conclusion.
However, a lot has changed since 2003. More importantly,
the Boston Consulting Group is the only group which has ever
been given complete access to the commercial, technical,
financial and operational data that has been acquired by
operating the La Hague and Melox facilities. Based on that
data, they produce a grounds-up estimate of what it would cost,
in their view, to produce a large recycling plant in the United
States. They stand by their number, they are perfectly willing
to defend it, and I must say that this is their study, not
AREVA's, although we did commission the study, and we
facilitated it by providing information.
Now, with the specific criticism with regard to the size of
the facility, one of the--it is first of all a misconception--
the capacity of the existing La Hague facility is not 1,500. In
fact, I can't give you a precise number, because a process
facility like this can be pushed well beyond its design
capability, what we do know is that the ultimate capacity of
those two plants together is in the vicinity of 1,500 to 2,000
metric tons, not 1,500. So this is not a doubling of the
capacity in the study.
But very significant is that we are talking in the Boston
Consulting Group study about building one facility, instead of
two facilities of half the size. And I can tell you that the
economies of scale associated from going from two smaller
plants to a single one far outweigh the cost disadvantages or
additional costs associated with building a larger facility.
This is why we built large refineries, why we build large
chemical plants, why the next generation of light water
reactors are, in turn, going to be very large. So, that
criticism is, I think, a little bit misstated.
Furthermore, there are parts of the facility at La Hague
which do not need to be scaled at all. A good example is the
receipt and acceptance pools of the plant, which are so large--
they are larger than is needed to put maybe 4,000 or 5,000 tons
of fuel through the plant. So, there's a significant fraction
of the existing facility which does not need to be scaled at
all, and therefore there are no additional costs associated
with it.
Again, I do not want to be in a situation of dueling
studies, I think the study produced--given the data that they
had to work with and the time in which it was done--is still a
credible study. However, I believe that the BCG study, given
the data that they used and today's environment, is just as
credible, and probably more so.
Senator Domenici. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bunn. I think both studies are using essentially the
same kinds of mathematics, and actually the data we are looking
at is not that different. I think that the key differences have
to do with the degree of optimism about the ability to scale up
very drastically and the scale of the facility for relatively
modest costs, and the likelihood that you will have the huge
through put rates and sort of the complete utilization of the
facility that they assume. They assume, basically, that the
facility will always be operating at close to capacity
throughout its life, for birth and MOX fabrication and the
reprocessing--they're so confident of that they actually take
out having any plutonium storage area, whereas in France, for
example, many tens of tons of plutonium have built up in
storage as a result of lags in fabrication.
We are left, we believe--as the National Academy of
Sciences review concluded--that the most reliable predictors of
the cost of future facilities is, in fact, the experience of
past facilities, and that's more what we relied on. And, so, I
think those assumptions about sort of being able to
continuously operate, never having a contract delay and so on
and being able to scale up dramatically with relatively modest
increases in cost are the key differences between the two
studies, fundamentally.
INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, can I
get back----
Mr. Spurgeon. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. I'll make this point.
You changed course here in August--can you once again,
discuss with me and for this record here--what's that all
about?
Mr. Spurgeon. I prefer not to say ``change course'', sir.
Senator Domenici. What do you want to call it?
Mr. Spurgeon. I prefer to say that we are involving
industry and their capabilities perhaps earlier than might have
been the case prior to that point in time, because we believe
that there are portions of this technology that are ready for
industry to pursue. And what I was saying before is, there's
definite role here between what should be done by the
government and our associated national laboratories and what
can then be done by industry. But along the way, perhaps some
of that can go in parallel, where the parts that industry can
do to get started now, rather than waiting for all of the R&D
to be complete before they're involved in a major way. And
that's what we're really trying to do, is to work in parallel--
that's the focus on, if you recall, two tracks. It's getting
industry started with what they can do now, while we're going
ahead on the research and development on those areas that we
don't have ready for----
Senator Domenici. How will this have an impact on the
overall schedule--will it?
Mr. Spurgeon. We hope that it will allow the schedule to be
done in a more timely--and also, ultimately--a more cost-
effective way. Especially, perhaps in limiting the amount of
Federal dollars that could be involved.
SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR POWER
Senator Domenici. I'm going to stay with you just for a
minute longer--I sense in some of that testimony here by Dr.
Bunn that he isn't living in the same age I am in reference to
support for nuclear power. He's still talking about things like
we need support for certain things. Well, I already think the
Nation is far ahead of that, there is more support for nuclear
power now than we ever thought. The signal in terms of public
support is, get on with it. And it's pretty high both for the
things we're doing, and everything that we can find out from
the public is that they would prefer that we go with nuclear,
rather than sit where we have for the last 25 to 30 years.
In your requests for bids, for what you would put out for
areas, tell us what kind of responses, generally, and what the
feeling appears to be of the areas that are submitting
applications to you?
Mr. Spurgeon. Well, I think what we're finding is that
there is a willingness on the part--and this is in several
regions of the country--to support the idea of locating these
fuel cycle facilities in their region. And that's very
positive, because as you know for many technologies, and not
just nuclear, the idea of ``not in my backyard'' can be very
strong. But we have found a willingness on the part of people
to not just say, ``Well, if you force us to, we'll take it. But
on the contrary, or to the contrary, we would like to have
it.'' And that, I think, is a positive. And understand, the
kind of facilities we're talking about--whether it be interim
process storage, whether it be the recycling facility, whether
it be the burner reactor--are very clean, very non-emitting
kind of facilities that can be very good neighbors for these
communities.
Senator Domenici. Yes, that's true, but in the past the
procession of skeptics that proceeded that factual presentation
to the areas had already poisoned the mind against these
activities, even if they are clean.
Mr. Spurgeon. And I think, as you know, in your State we
have just licensed and now construction has started on a fuel
cycle facility on the national enrichment facility.
Senator Domenici. Yes, it occurred in 30 months.
Mr. Spurgeon. It occurred on time from a licensing
standpoint, which I think is a good harbinger for our ability
to effectively license new nuclear facilities in a timely way.
Senator Domenici. And on the expressions of interest that
went out, you got many responses saying, ``Come to our area.''
Mr. Spurgeon. Yes, we did.
Senator Domenici. And some of those had politicians
joining, didn't they?
Mr. Spurgeon. That's correct. That's correct, and I think
that's very important because where these facilities go, should
be to areas that want to have them.
Senator Domenici. Now, I've been sitting here all this time
and thinking that you would ask me if you wanted to ask
questions but I didn't do that, and I'm very apologetic.
Senator Allard. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. I've been
fascinated by the discussion that you've triggered here. But I
would like to ask a few questions.
Senator Domenici. Please do.
Senator Allard. Good, thank you. And I'll stay out of this
fight. I'll let the chairman handle that.
Senator Domenici. There is no fight. We have a majority and
a minority and this fellow over here whose name begins with a
B----
GNEP CHANGE IN SCOPE
Senator Bennett. Okay, well my name begins with a B.
Senator Allard. Secretary, I'm interested in your response
to Chairman Domenici's comment about a change in direction and
you say no, you're just trying to get more commercial activity
involved in this.
Are there commercial alternatives to the laboratory-based
recycled processes promoted by the Argonne National, the UREX+
and if so, are they as proliferation resistant as the Argonne
process?
Mr. Spurgeon. Well, I think that's something that will be
part of the evaluation--yes, there are other technologies,
other variants, if you will that have been proposed, but
obviously a criteria in the end is that it does offer a degree
of proliferation resistance.
But if I may say the whole--I don't want to interrupt you,
sir--non-proliferation is a major reason for GNEP. What we are
really doing in GNEP is trying to look over the horizon to the
day when we do have not just 1 or 2 or 10 or 20 new nuclear
plants, but literally hundreds of new nuclear plants operating
around the world. And so, how are we going to handle that, what
kind of a regime do we need in order for that to be done safely
and effectively? And the base of GNEP is to say what you need
for new developing countries coming online, and to enable them
the benefits of nuclear energy, which they have a right to
have--is that there needs to be a regime where they can have a
guaranteed fuel supply. This is the fuel leasing idea.
But what fuel leasing requires is that there be an ability
to handle that fuel cycle from cradle to grave. You can't just
say, ``Here's your fresh fuel, and oh, by the way, when the
spent fuel comes out, we don't know where you're going to send
it.'' And if the response was simply, ``Well, wait a minute,
somebody else may take your spent fuel,'' well, that's somewhat
of a problematic situation, however, maybe there are countries
that would do that, by that way.
But, if you have a way of recycling that fuel, removing
what you would call the long-lived products, long-lived high
actinide products that caused the problem for ultimate
emplacement and thereby being able to take that fuel, process
it and only give them back something that is not so difficult
to deal with from an ultimate waste disposal standpoint you
have a way, and that would be in their best interest.
So, you're not, in effect, forcing something on them,
you're giving these countries a way to enjoy the benefits of
nuclear energy without needing, and without requiring countries
to build a complete fuel cycle. They should not even want the
kind of fuel cycle facilities that could cause concern from a
proliferation standpoint.
May I just say one other thing, we've never had to the best
of my knowledge, a light water reactor, a commercial reactor--
or a fast reactor, for that matter, a breeder reactor used
where the fuel from that plant has been used to proliferate
another country's nuclear weapons capability. It's been done in
other ways. You don't need a reactor, you don't need a
commercial reprocessing facility to get a nuclear weapons
capability. So, let's not throw the baby out with the bath
water, let's consider what are really proliferation risks, and
what are not.
Senator Allard. Thank you, that's a helpful explanation.
Now, do you prefer government or non-government sites for the
GNEP missions? Which would you prefer?
Mr. Spurgeon. We don't have a preference, we're not coming
into this with a prejudice for one site versus another, sir.
TECHNICAL CAPABILITY
Senator Allard. Okay, now, do you think the technological
and intellectual capacity exists in the United States to carry
out the cycle initiatives that you've described here? Or do you
think we're relying on foreign sources?
Mr. Spurgeon. I wouldn't say foreign sources, it's kind of
an international business these days, if you look at the
ownership of some of our major nuclear companies today. I mean,
General Electric is really the only one now in the reactor
business that is totally United States owned. But the gentleman
to my left is part of a U.S. subsidiary of AREVA that probably
employs more U.S. citizens than perhaps any other nuclear
company.
Senator Allard. The cycle you've described is far more than
just a reactor, from cradle to grave--to use your phrase--
you're going to have to have a lot of technologies in there,
and do we have the capacity in the United States to provide all
of the pieces of that chain?
Mr. Spurgeon. Sir, I think we have all of the bases, but as
you know, the nuclear industry in this country over this past--
even for conventional reactors--has atrophied. We have lost
capability that we need to rebuild. We need to rebuild our
infrastructure in the United States for nuclear energy and
that's all part of the process. We need to rebuild our human
capital to do some of these things because we just haven't
ordered a new plant in quite some time--the last nuclear plant
that was ordered that was actually built was 1973. So, it's
been a long time.
ESTIMATED TIME FOR START OF PROGRAM
Senator Allard. Give me a horse bet guess as to how quickly
the United States might be able to start recycling fuel, how
quickly could this program you've described come to pass?
Mr. Spurgeon. Schedules are always something that, you
know, when you throw them out and horse bet guesses come back
to haunt you as you made a firm commitment----
Senator Allard. That's why I described it as that up front,
to give you as much out as possible.
Mr. Spurgeon. Well, we've always said--and this is
dependent on so many things--but we're looking at the 2020-type
time frame. That's what we've said maybe is feasible. It can
certainly be done, depending on the technology you use, et
cetera--things can be started, perhaps, earlier than that, but
then when you get to the full-scale actinide recycle, you're
looking to perhaps a later time.
When we talk R&D, when you talk the nuclear business, you
hear people say ``We can afford to wait, you know, we don't
need it for 20 years, we don't need it for 30 years.'' And
nuclear R&D and especially when you get to implementation--20
to 30 years from now is today. You start today for things that
you want to have online in 2020 and 2030 when they involve
basic research.
Senator Allard. Mr. Bunn, do you think he's being too
optimistic?
Mr. Bunn. Our main concern is that, although Assistant
Secretary Spurgeon doesn't see it as a major change that the
announcements of August suggest that we're moving to building
potentially very large facilities, the expressions of
interest--for example, to a 2,000- or 3,000-ton heavy-metal
per-year reprocessing plant and fuel fabrication plant and that
that inevitably means, if we're going to be focusing on the
technologies that are readily available. I don't think there's
any way that we could build a 2,000-or 3,000-ton heavy-metal
plant today using your UREX+ technology, it's only been
demonstrated on a kilogram scale, you would need to have
intermediate steps. And so you may have to go, if that's the
direction you want to go, to something like what Dr. Hanson is
proposing with the COEX process, which is a much more modest
variant on what has already been deployed at AREVA's
facilities.
But I, myself, am quite concerned about the proliferation
impacts of using the COEX process or the PUREX process, and my
concern is that the level of effort that's going to be required
to build these huge facilities will inevitably take money,
personnel and leadership attention away from the long-term R&D.
We don't even know yet as Assistant Secretary Sturgeon
mentioned, whether we can successfully fabricate the
transmutation fuels to transmute the actinides. If we can't do
that we're not going to get the kinds of repository benefits
that we're looking for. So, it seems to me that we ought to
wait until we know what things are most attractive and that we
can do those things before we build a big facility and they
turn out to be not designed the way we would have liked to have
had them designed if we had done a little bit more R&D before
we went ahead and worked on building them.
Senator Allard. Just one last question, do you all agree
that there is a significant role for commercial enterprise in
this program, we should no longer depend entirely on the labs
as the primary source of information?
Dr. Hanson. If I could start with that, Mr. Bunn, I want to
say that absolutely, we agree with Assistant Secretary
Spurgeon's refinement of a strategy in terms of earlier
incorporation of commercial enterprise. We have a lot of
experience in these industries, and we know how to get things
done on budget and on time and so the earlier we believe the
commercial enterprise can be brought into what would otherwise
be a long-term research and development program, we think that
will lead to greater success.
Relative to the previous conversation around moving forward
with large-scale untested or unproven processes, I would agree
with Mr. Bunn that a step-wise approach is much more
appropriate than picking a technology that may offer some of
the benefits that we're looking for, but frankly is just an
interim solution. The COEX process is not the solution that's
going to get us to the long-term proliferation resistance that
the country and the globe needs, and embarking on a multi-
billion dollar program to deploy that only to have to deploy
something that really does meet the requirements of GNEP in the
future is not the appropriate approach. So in our expressions
of interest, we talked about a way to roll out a prototype
process where we can build as we go. We can spend smaller
amounts of money, learn as we go, utilize all of the experience
that we've gained in the last 15 years and build out in a
modular fashion rather than in a large monolithic fashion these
technologies so that we can gain the experience that we need,
we can qualify the fuel that needs to be done, but do so with
equipment and processes which are prototypical of commercial-
scale reactors. We need to get this out of the laboratory, but
we don't need to build huge monolithic processes.
Senator Allard. All right, thank you very much, thank you
Mr. Chairman. I want to be on the record with you as being
strongly in favor of moving forward in this area, and I want to
acknowledge your leadership here, because we've had a log-jam
in the Congress for a long time on this issue and your focus on
nuclear power and pushing it forward, I think, has broken that
log-jam, and it's good to get these experts talking about these
kinds of issues instead of being tied up in a basic ``yes/no''
position which we were in for so long. So, I commend you for
that.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. And let me say, I
thank you for coming down here when others see no reason to
come down here and spend some time on what I think is going to
dawn on everyone around here that it's one of the most
important things we've got going. When we present it on the
floor, they're going to ask ``Where did this come from?'' and
of course it's just like it's been in the past, it's going to
come out of this committee, because this committee's going to
spend time on it and then we're going to take it to the floor,
and we're going to get it done. So, it's very important people
pay attention to what's going on in here and then spend some
time. I'm sorry we can't have any more participation from
Senators, but I think they're getting some of it through their
staffs----
Mr. Allard. I thank you for that comment, but I'm now going
to have to leave.
Senator Domenici. We're almost finished. I do want to say
that I have been assuming you were a Ph.D. and that's a
mistake, and to the extent that I might have abused you by
calling you ``doctor''----
Mr. Bunn. Don't worry, I'm not offended. You may have made
the mistake because you and I have been working together on
non-proliferation issues for so long, I well remember working
with you and your staff on Nunn-Lugar-Domenici back in 1996,
and various initiatives since then.
Senator Domenici. It seems like forever, doesn't it?
But we did get some things done.
Let me say, I appreciate everybody here and I know we have
a problem and it's what do we do about GNEP, and how do we
solve nuclear waste storage? And they happen to go together
now, more than they ever did before and that's pretty obvious
to me, and I'm going to put them as closely together as I can
as we move ahead, because we wanted to spend money on GNEP and
we don't want to spend money on a single purpose when it can
spent for more purposes, just like a businessman from GE saying
that's dumb that we focus all of our attention on R&D on one
thing when it relates to others and we don't bring the others
along with it in some way or another, that we are wasting a lot
of time.
But I also don't think we're going to return--I say this
openly today--to the era of the 1970's on these issues. That's
finished. We messed up by waiting around and not doing
something, and now we're behind. We thought we were doing the
moral thing and that everybody would follow and not do
anything, and they did do--they didn't follow our great
example, they went ahead and developed, and we didn't. And
we've got to have a solution to waste disposal, we can't sit
around and say, ``It's just too big.'' It's not too big for
this country to solve this problem. To say it can't be solved
is crazy. We have the engineering, the technical, the
scientific knowledge and we're just going to have to decide
that we're going to take business and put them in, put them in
and use them. Before we didn't, but before they weren't in it
as much either. They want to be in it because they're in it and
the rest of the world, which is the most interesting. It isn't
as if they want to get in it to learn, they want to bring their
knowledge to us--they're bringing their knowledge to us, which
is the strange thing. It's what you just told using your
testimony--we didn't come up here with a whole bunch of new
inventions. And Dr. Hanson, you already know the answers,
because you did them, right? You came here and told us that we
already did these things. And, Mr. Secretary, I think I heard
you say, ``We're going to take and use these things, no matter
where they came from'', right?
Mr. Spurgeon. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. And you get on with it.
Now, I don't have the answer to how we're going to get
this, get this waste disposal site selected and how we're going
to get on with finding one and using it, I just know we're
going to do it. And I know that standing in the way, in a
sense, is Yucca--it's a solution and then it's also a problem.
If it weren't there and we started from scratch it might be
that we'd be ahead of the game. But it's there and so we're
going to have to figure out a way to use it but it's not going
to be used as quickly and early as people thought. As a
repository--it might be used for more research, but we're not
going to jump on our white horses and put on some radiation
shields and go down there and put the fuel rods in Yucca--that
isn't going to happen. It's going to be something else going in
there. And we've got to get ready to change those, do the
recycling or whatever, so what we're ready to put in there is
different. And we are delighted that we've got you, Mr.
Secretary, committed for short term, new life--it's what you
took--a short term, new life to get this done, right?
Mr. Spurgeon. Yes, sir.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Domenici. And we want to get it done. Thank you. If
you have anything to say that you think would indicate to
Senator Domenici is wacky, you're going to have to say it to a
closed record.
Because you're not going to have a record open to say it.
We're in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., Thursday, September 14, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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