<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:27759.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-877
THE FUTURE OF PORT SECURITY: THE GREENLANE MARITIME CARGO
SECURITY ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 5, 2006
__________
Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Kathleen L. Kraninger, Professional Staff Member
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Jason M. Yanussi, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Collins.............................................. 1
Senator Lieberman............................................ 3
Senator Warner............................................... 5
Senator Carper............................................... 6
Senator Coleman.............................................. 7
Senator Lautenberg........................................... 31
WITNESSES
Wednesday, April 5, 2006
Hon. Patty Murray, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington... 9
Hon. Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California............................................ 12
Hon. Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California..................................................... 16
Hon. Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 18
Captain Jeffrey W. Monroe, MM, Director, Ports and Transportation
Facilities, City of Portland, Maine............................ 36
M.R. ``Mic'' Dinsmore, Chief Executive Officer, Port of Seattle,
Washington..................................................... 39
Andrew Howell, Vice President for Homeland Security Policy, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce............................................ 41
James P. Hoffa, General President, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters...................................................... 43
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Dinsmore, M.R. ``Mic'':
Testimony.................................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Harman, Hon. Jane:
Testimony.................................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Hoffa, James P.:
Testimony.................................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 94
Howell, Andrew:
Testimony.................................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Jackson, Hon. Michael P.:
Testimony.................................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Lungren, Hon. Daniel E.:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Monroe, Captain Jeffrey W., MM:
Testimony.................................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 75
Murray, Hon. Patty:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement with attached photos...................... 51
APPENDIX
Letter from John J. Castellani, President, dated April 5, 2006,
with a statement on behalf of Business Roundtable.............. 103
Questions and responses for the Record from:
Mr. Dinsmore................................................. 106
Mr. Howell................................................... 108
Mr. Hoffa.................................................... 113
Mr. Monroe................................................... 115
THE FUTURE OF PORT SECURITY:
THE GREENLANE MARITIME CARGO
SECURITY ACT
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan
Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Coleman, Warner, Lieberman,
Carper, and Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS
Senator Collins. The Committee will come to order. Today
the Committee considers the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security
Act, which Senator Patty Murray and I introduced last November
with our colleagues Senator Lieberman and Senator Coleman. I am
very pleased that we will shortly be joined by two of our House
colleagues who have joined with us in this bipartisan,
bicameral effort. Representative Dan Lungren and Congresswoman
Jane Harman, who has arrived right on cue, are both outstanding
leaders on this important issue. This hearing builds on the
extensive efforts begun by this Committee 3 years ago to
enhance the security of our Nation's maritime transportation
system and the international supply chain.
Seaports are more than just waterfront facilities. They are
crucial links in a supply chain that includes all modes of
transportation and that reaches across the country and around
the world. They are also profoundly and unacceptably at risk.
The urgency cannot be overstated. Approximately 95 percent of
our Nation's overseas trade, worth nearly $1 trillion, enters
or leaves through our seaports. Our ports receive some 8,500
foreign vessels, which make more than 55,000 calls per year.
These ships carry the bulk of approximately 800 million tons of
goods that come into our country, including more than 175
billion gallons of oil and other fuels.
In fiscal year 2005, these vessels also brought more than
11 million containers. I remember 3 years ago when we held the
first hearing on this issue the number of containers was
approaching 9 million, and now it is more than 11 million. The
number of containers entering this country by sea continues to
grow by more than 10 percent per year. While this figure
represents robust trade, it also signals a considerable risk in
our national security.
Al Qaeda has the stated goal of causing maximum harm to the
American people and maximum damage to the American economy.
Clearly, our cargo ports provide a tempting target. One has
only to visit a major port like Seattle, which I did in
February at the invitation of Senator Murray, with its large
urban population, two stadiums nearby, and ferries bringing
thousands of passengers every day, to realize the enormous loss
of life that could occur if a dirty bomb were detonated. I have
also had the honor of visiting the Long Beach and Los Angeles
ports at the invitation of our colleague Representative Harman,
and, again, the magnitude of the potential damage is evident
when one tours those enormous ports.
We have already had a glimpse of the staggering economic
damage that a terrorist attack on a cargo port could produce,
damage that would extend far beyond the waterfront. The West
Coast dock strike in the fall of 2002 cost our economy an
estimated $1 billion a day for each of the 10 days that it
lasted. It not only brought those ports to a halt, but harmed
businesses throughout the country and along the entire length
of the supply chain. That astonishing amount of harm was the
result of an event that was both peaceful and anticipated. A
terrorist attack, obviously, would be neither.
We cannot eliminate the risk of a terrorist attack, but
better supply chain security can build a stronger shield
against terrorism without hampering trade. Indeed, greater
security can promote trade and strengthen the global economy by
building confidence and trust.
That is why Senator Murray and I joined together last year
to introduce comprehensive legislation. Our bill was developed
in close consultation with key stakeholders, including port
authorities, major retailers and importers, carriers, labor
organizations, supply chain managers, security and
transportation experts, and Federal and State agencies. Let me
highlight just some of the important features of this bill.
First, it directs the Department of Homeland Security to
develop a strategic plan to strengthen security for all modes
of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from,
or move through seaports. Despite the myriad of programs aimed
at enhancing supply chain security, the Administration has not
yet brought those programs together in a coherent and seamless
strategy. The plan we require in the bill would clarify the
roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government agencies
at all levels and of the private sector stakeholders. It would
establish mandatory baseline security standards and provide
incentives for additional voluntary measures.
Most important, the Secretary would be required to develop
protocols for the resumption of trade in the wake of an attack.
Just as the attacks of September 11 grounded all commercial
flights, an attack on one port would likely result in the
closure of all ports for a time. More than 4 years later, the
Federal Government has yet to establish protocols for resuming
port operations and for deciding which cargo would be released
first after an attack.
The impact on factories and retailers using just-in-time
inventory, as many businesses do, would be devastating. Much of
our agricultural sector would also be harmed as farmers would
be unable to export their crops. These protocols are essential
to enhancing our economic security.
Second, the legislation would require the Department to
make faster progress in strengthening port security and
outlines priorities for action. I am deeply concerned by the
slow pace of many of the security initiatives. For example, the
Department has been working on a regulation setting a minimum
standard for mechanical seals on containers for more than 2
years. In addition, though the Department has recently
announced a timeline toward implementation of the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, the TWIC card
has also languished despite the obvious importance of a secure
ID to facilitate access to our ports. Such delays are simply
unacceptable in this era. This legislation would set and
require clear timelines for action.
The bill also provides guidance and deadlines for essential
improvements in several well-conceived security programs,
including the Automated Targeting System, the Radiation Portal
Monitor Program, the Container Security Initiative, and the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). All of
these programs are well conceived, but their implementation has
been spotty and flawed in some cases.
Third, this legislation would provide for the creation of
the GreenLane, a third tier of C-TPAT, which would offer
additional benefits to participants that voluntarily meet the
highest level of security standards. This part of our bill,
which was conceived by Senator Murray, is going to be part of
her testimony, so I will not go into detail. Finally, this
comprehension legislation would authorize a competitive Port
Security Grant Program, with $400 million of stable, consistent
funding each year.
America's cargo ports, large and small, are on the front
lines of the war against terrorism. Strong accountability
provisions are included in this bill to prevent wasteful
spending, but we need to give the ports consistent, multiyear
funding. These port security dollars would originate from
duties collected by Customs and Border Protection. This is a
major commitment of resources. Overall, the bill would
authorize $835 million a year, but it is fully proportional to
what is at stake.
The controversy over the Dubai Ports issue has focused
much-needed attention on the overall issue of port security. It
is my hope that we can pass significant port security
legislation this year. I am very proud to have worked with our
colleagues on this issue, and I look forward to hearing their
views. Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Thanks for holding this hearing on a gap in our homeland
security that just should not be as wide as it is, 4\1/2\ years
after September 11, 2001.
As you have said, on a daily basis, 800 million tons of
goods cross our borders whether by ship, train, or truck.
Ninety-five percent of it arrives in the 21,000 containers that
enter U.S. ports each day. This is a number that probably
startles most people because most people live away from all of
the activity at our ports in this country and do not see how
much is coming in. But these ports really are our lifeline to
the global economy.
The Administration has told us in testimony before this
Committee recently that somewhere between 5 and 6 percent of
those 21,000 containers that come in every day are physically
inspected. That's up from 2 or 3 percent a few years ago, and
of course I am grateful for that progress, but it obviously is
not enough. The fact is that, at any given moment, our
government still has too little knowledge of the contents of
thousands of multi-ton containers that are loaded from the
ports onto trucks, trains, and other barges for shipment into
and across the heart of this Nation every day. The nightmare
scenario that we all have within us and together want to stop,
of course, is the smuggling of a nuclear bomb or a dirty bomb
within a shipping container. We know that criminals have for a
long time used cargo containers to smuggle drugs, firearms, and
even people into this country. We know containers have been a
means for transporting terrorists and their weapons, as well.
And we know that a terrorist attack at any one of our major
ports could cause billions of dollars of damage to the economy
just in the short-term. Given the irreparable damage that would
result from the smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction
across our borders in a shipping container, we have to act
urgently to protect ourselves before it is too late, and that
means directing people, technology, and resources toward the
goal of greater port and cargo security.
That is exactly what the legislation before the Committee
today does. I am privileged to have joined you, Senator
Collins, Senator Murray, and Senator Coleman, on this. We are
of like mind and singular purpose. We understand that we need a
comprehensive, coordinated, and multilayered strategy to
protect not just cargo and containers, but ships, piers, ports,
and maritime workers, as well. We need to do this to protect
our national and economic security before terrorists strike.
That is the purpose of the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security
Act, which we introduced, again, last month.
The Chairman has outlined the bill and many important
things it does. I just want to focus on one part that I believe
is very important, and that is the Port Security Grant Program.
Unfortunately, the Administration has tried to eliminate a
dedicated Port Security Grant Program from the budget for the
last 3 years in a row, despite evidence that it is crucial to
our ability to improve the physical security of our ports.
Congress has, fortunately, and across party lines, rejected
the Administration's proposal as many times as it has been
proposed.
The legislation before us today, our legislation, would
ensure that every port is eligible to apply for a port security
grant. We require them to persuade the Department that they are
at risk, but once they do, they are eligible for the grant.
The bill also would reauthorize Operation Safe Commerce to
test innovative technologies in real-world cargo environments,
another program, which unfortunately, the Administration has
seemed determined to eliminate.
Madam Chairman, the legislation that we have introduced
together and that has been introduced on the House side by
Congresswoman Harman and Congressman Lungren and others would
greatly increase the security of American ports and, therefore,
greatly raise our defenses against terrorists who would use our
ports to attack us.
Here again, we have a choice. The warnings are clear. We
can await disaster, or we can act proactively to prevent it.
Ultimately, there is no choice. Our legislation acts wisely to
establish the structure proactively and preventively and to
provide the resources necessary to protect the American people.
I join you, Madam Chairman, in welcoming Senator Murray,
Congresswoman Harman, Congressman Lungren, and I look forward
to their testimony and that of the other witnesses that we
have. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Warner.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. In
deference to our distinguished colleagues about to testify, I
will ask to put my statement in the record with one or two
observations quickly.
Quite interesting, the Nation's 361 ports form the heart of
the U.S. maritime transportation system and function as the
Nation's lifeline. I did not realize it. They handle 95 percent
of all overseas-U.S. trade, extraordinary. And they serve as
the conduit for 90 percent of the war material destined for
major theater operations. So you can realize the full
importance of what we are about to do, as this Committee moves
ahead with potential legislation. I would like to say that I am
privileged to represent a State that has the second largest
port on the East Coast, and our port was recently recognized by
the London-based Containerisation International as the top port
authority in the world for 2004 and 2005.
I yield the floor.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER
Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding today's hearing. It is a
topic with which I share your interest both from a security and
economic perspective.
I am privileged to represent a State that has the second largest
container port on the east coast and is the fastest growing in the
country. In fact, with the expansion of our existing port and opening
of the Nation's first privately owned and operated terminal next year,
the combined ports in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia will double in
size. We are proud of the fact that Virginia Port Authority was
recently chosen by Containerisation International, a London-based
publication, as the top port authority in the world for 2004 and 2005.
As I stated before, the issue of enhanced port security is
something I have focused on for the past several years:
<bullet> The 2002 Defense Appropriations Bill (P.L. 107-117)
created four new Coast Guard marine safety and security team teams--two
teams ``to exclusively serve those port areas presenting the greatest
security challenges, especially those ports with a substantial
concentration of critical Department of Defense facilities. . . .'' and
two with area-wide responsibilities (one for the Atlantic Ocean, one
for the Pacific).
<bullet> I have also worked with my colleague from New York,
Senator Schumer, introducing our own bill in the 107th Congress. The
``Port Terrorism Prevention Act'' required strict cargo reporting
standards, provided funds for mobile X-ray machines, and authorized
grants for research and development. The passage of the Port Security
Bill in November 2002 included several of our provisions, including $15
million per year in research and development grants.
Since that time the maritime industry, our Port Authorities, and
the Department of Homeland Security have all worked together to improve
security at our Nation's seaports. I am proud of the progress made to
date and look forward to the opportunity to continue on that path.
The Nation's 361 major ports form the heart of the U.S. Maritime
Transportation System (MIS), and function as the Nation's lifeline.
They handle 95 percent of all U.S. overseas trade, and they serve as
the conduit for 90 percent of war material destined for major theater
operations. While only 2-5 percent of the 6 million cargo containers
that pass through these ports each year are physically inspected, it is
important to note the progress made in establishing a strong worldwide
network under the Department of Homeland Security's Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) programs that coordinate pre-screening in ports and businesses
around the world.
Once again, thank you Madam Chairman for holding this hearing. I
look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and to working with the
Committee and the rest of the Senate to advance the security of our
Nation.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. I appreciate your reminding us
of the military implications of our ports too. That is an
important point.
Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is always
good to see our colleague Senator Murray, and I have not seen
Dan Lungren for a while. Your career has taken an interesting
set of turns, so welcome, Daniel, nice to see you. And
Congresswoman Harman, great to be with you last week and again
to be with you today, and thank you for your leadership in the
House of Representatives on some real important issues. A brief
statement I want to make, and then to have a chance to hear
your testimonies.
In the wake of September 11, we all recall Congress passing
legislation to transform aviation security and to allocate the
billions of dollars to make our airports safer, and I am
reminded, as I travel around the country and around the world,
I think we have made some real progress. We all know that we
have some way to go.
Around the same time, we recall that we passed the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. It is a bill that requires Federal
agencies, ports, and vessel owners to take a number of steps to
upgrade security, and 4 years later, I am sorry to say, we have
not really followed through.
While it is not physically possible to open up every piece
of cargo brought onshore on our ports, we are still inspecting,
as we know, only a very small portion of that. In addition,
initiatives to inspect high-risk cargo overseas before it comes
to us in the United States and reward shippers that secure
their supply chains have proven ineffective to date, largely
due to inadequate staffing and an inability to conduct
necessary inspections.
In my State we do not have a port like you do in
Washington. I was out visiting part of your port operation not
long ago, however. We are small potatoes in comparison. We are
a big banana port but small potatoes compared to what you have
in Washington. In Delaware, the Port of Wilmington has been the
site of a test conducted by the Department of Homeland Security
of an identification system for screening port workers and
blocking individuals with criminal or terrorist backgrounds
from accessing sensitive areas around our port. The test under
way at the port and at three other locations has been, we
believe, quite successful. However, Homeland Security, for
reasons that are not all together clear to me, is ending this
test, even though a national screening and identification
system is still more than a year away.
I just do not think this makes a lot of sense, Madam
Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from Deputy Secretary
Michael Jackson, who is out here somewhere in this audience,
about what the Department of Homeland Security plans to do to
get this program adopted and implemented nationally and whether
it makes sense to discontinue a program that is working at our
port and a number of other ports. We are already using it
successfully in the interim.
Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Again, to our witnesses, welcome, it is great to see you
all.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We may be a big
potato port since we grow them in Western Minnesota, and we
have a small banana port over on Lake----
Senator Carper. Keep away from our bananas.
Senator Coleman. First, Madam Chairman and the Ranking
Member, thanks for your leadership on this critical issue. And
I applaud Senator Murray for her leadership, and I see my
friends from the House who have done an outstanding job.
This is important. I will reflect on Senator Warner's words
and request that my full statement is entered into the record.
I have just a couple observations.
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
Thank you, Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman for
holding this important hearing and championing the legislative solution
to the challenge of port security. I also applaud and thank Senator
Murray for her leadership on this important issue. As you know, I held
two hearings last week in my Subcommittee examining these issues. Our
oversight investigation culminated with an extensive staff report that
makes several recommendations that I believe are reflected in the
GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. And I am happy to be an original
co-sponsor of this important legislation.
Many experts in the industry believe it is just a matter of time
before terrorists compromise the security of supply chain, most likely
with a dirty bomb. This legislation will help prevent that from
happening by adding standards to supply chain security as well as
insisting that the Department of Homeland Security expedite the
deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors to our Nation's seaports. It is
4\1/2\ years after September 11, and we have a massive blindspot at our
seaports. More than half of the containers that enter through this
Nation's seaports are not screened for radiation.
When enacted, this legislation will significantly enhance our
supply chain security and codify many existing programs. I also intend
to amend this legislation and order the Secretary of DHS to report back
to us within 90 days with a plan on how to improve our screening
processes. As I have previously mentioned, the Hong Kong system is a
promising concept that demonstrates the potential to enhance our supply
chain security by screening more containers with both an X-ray and a
radiation scan. We--as elected officials--have a difficult time
explaining to our constituents that the Department of Homeland Security
believes screening 5.4 percent of containers is adequate when
technology may exist to screen close to 100 percent.
Improving supply chain security demands a public-private
partnership. Not only is the task too great for government, but we do
not possess the in-depth knowledge of the global supply chain.
However, we do know that the supply chain is riddled with
vulnerabilities. That is what we in the government must fix. Industry
and government need to work collaboratively and move forward on
programs and technologies to secure trade. Instead of security being a
cost of doing business, it must become a way of doing business.
The bottom line is this: We are safer now than we were yesterday,
but we are not safe enough. Enacting the GreenLane Maritime Cargo
Security Act will make us safer and solve many of the challenges that
confront our supply chain security programs.
Senator Coleman. It has been 4\1/2\ years since September
11, and we still have massive blind spots in our container
security. We simply have to do better. There is no question
about that.
I am proud to be an original co-sponsor of this
legislation. It is important, and it will improve our supply-
chain security.
One of the things that we discussed at our hearing was we
looked at a system in Hong Kong. I am not here to say that this
system works, but rather demonstrates the potential to screen
100 percent of the containers as they come through the port.
One of the difficulties that I have is explaining to my
constituents how we are safe when we screen about 5.4 percent
of the containers coming in. I believe it is important to
screen more, and I intend to push the Department very hard to
come back within 90 days and tell us how we are going to screen
at least 100 percent of the high-risk containers, those in
which we have some reason to believe, based on a process that
we use, there is some risk. And I think it is also important
that we have that screening done before it reaches our shores,
that we have kind of a multi-layered system here. But the best
place to do that screening first is before it ever gets on a
cargo ship coming here. Then, when it gets here, we have to put
in place many of the mechanisms that are already in place and
are strengthened by this legislation.
Two other quick observations. One, I was pleased to hear,
and we will hear from Secretary Jackson, that the TWIC program,
the worker ID, is finally moving forward. It was indicated to
us that by last Friday there would be notice published about
this process. So I do hope the efforts of this Committee and
others to accelerate the process by which we improve the level
of securities is having a difference, and I look forward to
seeing those results.
Then the last observation is this, and that is that this is
something that government cannot do alone. We really do need to
work with the private sector. I heard that. I saw that. They
have an interest. Security, instead of being a cost of
business, it needs to be a way of doing business. We have to
work in partnership and, perhaps, work in partnership with some
foreign companies since they control about 80 percent of the
terminals.
So the bottom line is this: We are safer today than we were
yesterday, but we are not safe enough. Enacting the GreenLane
Maritime Cargo Security Act will make us safer and solve many
of the challenges that confront our supply chain security
programs today.
So thank you again for your leadership, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. I want to commend the Senator from
Minnesota for his leadership on this. You have held many
hearings in the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to
look at the effectiveness of our port security programs, and
that has been extremely helpful in educating this Committee as
we go forward.
I am very pleased now to welcome our first panel of
distinguished witnesses, each of whom has been a true leader on
port security. We will start with Senator Murray.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. PATTY MURRAY,\1\ A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Chairman Collins and
Ranking Member Lieberman, for calling this hearing and for your
leadership on cargo security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Murray with attached photos
appears on page 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am here today because our country is vulnerable to a
terrorist attack, and time is not on our side. By using cargo
containers, terrorists can deliver a deadly one-two punch to
our country. The first punch would create an untold number of
American casualties. The second punch would bring our economy
to a halt.
Cargo containers carry the building blocks of our economy,
but they can also carry the deadly tools of a terrorist attack.
Today we are not doing enough to keep America safe. Sitting
here in this Senate room, it can feel like the dangers at our
ports are a million miles away. In recent years, some in our
government have said they could never have imagined the
devastation caused by recent disasters.
So let me make this crystal clear. On March 21, just 2
weeks ago, a container ship called the Hyundai Fortune was
traveling off the coast of Yemen when an explosion occurred in
the rear of the ship. Here is a photo of what happened next.\2\
About 90 containers were blown off the side of the ship,
creating a debris field of five miles long. There were few
fatalities, and the crew was rescued. They are still
investigating the cause, but it does not at this time appear to
be terrorist related. Here is another picture. Now I want you
to imagine this same burning ship just a few feet from our
shores in New York Harbor, or Puget Sound, or off the coast of
Los Angeles, or Charleston, Miami, Portland, Hampton Roads,
Delaware Bay, or the Gulf of Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The photos mentioned by Senator Murray appear in the Appendix
on page 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now imagine that we are not just dealing with a
conventional explosion, we are dealing with a dirty bomb that
has exploded on American shores. Let me walk you through what
would happen next. First, of course, there would be an
immediate loss of life. Many of our ports are located near
major cities. If this was a nuclear device that exploded at a
major port, up to 1 million people could be killed. If this was
a chemical weapon exploding in Seattle, the chemical plume
would contaminate our rail system, Interstate 5, and SeaTac
Airport, not to mention the entire downtown business and
residential district. At the port, there would be tremendous
confusion. People would try to contain the fire, but it is
unclear who, if anyone, would be in charge. Then, when word
spread that it is a dirty bomb, panic would likely set in.
There would be chaos as first responders tried to react and
residents tried to flee.
Next, our government would shut down every port in America
to make sure there were not other bombs in other containers in
other cities. That shutdown would be the equivalent of driving
our economy into a brick wall. It could even spark a global
recession. Day by day, we would feel the painful economic
impact of such an attack. American factories would not be able
to get the supplies they needed. They would shut their doors,
lay off workers. Stores around the country would not be able to
get the products they needed to stock their shelves.
Now, in 2002, as the Chairman said, we saw what a closure
of a few ports on the West Coast would do. It cost our economy
$1 billion a day. Imagine if we shut down all our ports. One
study concluded that if U.S. ports were shut down for just 12
days, it would cost our economy $58 billion. Next, we would
realize we have no plan today for resuming trade after an
attack. No protocol for what would be searched, what would be
allowed in, and even who would be in charge. There would be a
mad scramble to create a new system in a crisis atmosphere.
Eventually, we would begin the slow process of manually
inspecting all the cargo that is waiting to enter the United
States. One report found that it could take as long as 4 months
to get them all inspected and moving again. Finally, we would
have to set up a new regime for port security, and you can bet
that any new rushed plan would not balance strong security with
efficient trade.
The scenario that I just outlined could happen tomorrow,
and frankly, we are not prepared. Nearly 5 years after
September 11, we still have not closed a major loophole that
threatens our lives and our economy. Time is not on our side.
We must act.
Madam Chairman, I approach this as someone who understands
the importance of both improving security and maintaining the
flow of commerce. My home State of Washington is the most
trade-dependent State in the Nation. We know what is at stake
if there were any incident at any of our ports. That is why I
wrote and funded Operation Safe Commerce to help us find where
we are vulnerable and to evaluate the best security practices.
It is why I have worked to boost funding for the Coast Guard
and have fought to keep the Port Security Grant Program from
being eliminated year after year. Right after September 11, I
started talking with security and trade experts to find out
what we need to be doing to both improve security and keep
commerce flowing.
Ten months ago, I sought out Chairman Collins, and she has
been a partner in this effort. I approached her because I knew
she cared about the issue, I knew she had done a lot of work on
it already, and I knew she was someone who could get things
done. Since that day, we have worked hand-in-hand to develop
this bill and move it forward, and I am very grateful as well
to Senators Lieberman and Coleman for their tremendous work as
well.
The GreenLane Act recognizes two facts: we must protect our
country, and we must keep trade flowing. We know we are
vulnerable. Terrorists have many opportunities to introduce
deadly cargo into a container. It could be tampered with any
time from when it leaves a foreign factory overseas to when it
arrives at a consolidation warehouse and moves to a foreign
port. It could be tampered with while it is en route to the
United States. And there are several dangers. I outlined what
would happen if terrorists exploded a container, but they could
just as easily use cargo containers to transport weapons or
personnel into the United States to launch an attack anywhere
on American soil.
Madam Chairman, while I have been sitting here I have just
received notice that there were 21 Chinese nationals just found
this morning in a cargo container in the Port of Seattle, and I
want to commend our Customs agents for being very efficient in
finding them, but it shows us once again how vulnerable we are.
The programs that we have in place today are totally
inadequate. Last May, thanks to the insistence of Senators
Collins and Coleman, the Government Accountability Office found
that C-TPAT was not checking to see if companies were doing
what they promised in their security plans, and even when U.S.
Customs inspectors do find something suspicious at a foreign
port, they cannot force a container to be inspected. So we have
a clear and deadly threat, and we know that current programs
are inadequate. So what are we going to do about it? We could
manually inspect every container, but, frankly, that would
cripple our economy.
The real challenge here is to make trade more secure
without slowing it to a crawl, and that is why Senators
Collins, Coleman, Lieberman, and I have been working with all
of our stakeholders and experts to strike the right balance,
and the result is the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. It
provides a comprehensive blueprint for how we can improve
security while keeping our trade efficient. At its heart, this
challenge is about keeping the good things about trade, speed
and efficiency, without being vulnerable to the bad things
about trade, the potential for terrorists to use our engines of
commerce.
Our bill does five things. First, it creates tough new
standards for all cargo. Today we do not even have any
standards for cargo security.
Second, it creates the GreenLane option, which provides an
even higher level of security. Companies have the option to
follow the higher standards of the GreenLane, and their cargo
will be tracked and monitored from the moment it leaves a
factory floor overseas until it reaches the United States. We
will know everywhere that cargo has been. We will know every
person who has touched it, and we will know if it has been
tampered with. The GreenLane will push out our borders by
conducting inspections overseas before cargo is ever loaded on
a ship bound for the United States, and we will provide
incentives for the companies to use the highest standards of
the GreenLane.
Third, our bill sets up a plan to resume trade quickly and
safely to minimize the impact on our economy.
Fourth, our bill will secure our ports here at home by
funding port security grants at $400 million.
Finally, our bill will hold DHS accountable for improving
cargo security. DHS is long overdue in establishing cargo
security standards and transportation worker credentials. We
need to hold DHS accountable, and our bill provides the
infrastructure to ensure accountability and coordination.
I want to thank all of our cosponsors and partners,
especially Chairman Collins for her tremendous leadership, and
I want to thank Senator Coleman for his leadership and work as
Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
Senator Coleman has helped expose our vulnerabilities and has
worked to help develop solutions. I also want to thank the
Ranking Member, Senator Lieberman, for his leadership and his
support, and I want to commend our cosponsors, Senators
Feinstein, Snowe, DeWine, and Warner. We are also seeing
tremendous progress on the House side with SAFE Port Act, and I
want to thank Representatives Dan Lungren and Jane Harman for
their leadership.
You are going to hear today also from Mic Dinsmore. He is
the CEO of the Port of Seattle. He has been a real leader on
cargo and port security issues, and I have been proud to work
with him.
Madam Chairman, today we have a choice in how we deal with
cargo security challenges facing us, but if we wait for a
disaster, our choices are going to be much starker. Let's make
the changes now, on our terms, before there is a deadly
incident. Let's not wait until a terror incident strikes again
to protect our people and our economy.
Two months ago, the American people woke up and spoke out
when they heard that a foreign-government-owned company could
be running our ports. That sparked a critical debate. Now we
need to set up a security regime that will actually make us
safer. Until we do so, none of us should sleep well at night. A
terrible image like this one, a burning container ship, with a
dirty bomb, in one of America's harbors could be on our TV
screens tomorrow, so this Committee and this Congress must act
today.
Thank you, Chairman Collins.
Chairman Collins. Thank you so much for your very eloquent
testimony and your hard work on this issue.
Representative Lungren, welcome.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DANIEL E. LUNGREN,\1\ A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman
Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman, for inviting me to
testify today. Although I now represent a district that is
centered in Sacramento County and goes up into the mountains of
the Sierras, in my previous term of service I represented a
district 400 miles away on the coast in Long Beach. I had both
Long Beach and Los Angeles Harbors in my district. When I was
in college, I actually worked in the Port of Los Angeles at one
of the shipbuilding facilities, so I have seen many changes.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Lungren appears on page 60.
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After 16 years away from Congress, it is refreshing to
return to an environment in which important issues such as port
security can be approached in a bipartisan and bicameral
fashion. The cooperative manner in which the House and the
Senate are moving companion legislation on this issue is a
testament not only to your leadership here in the Senate, and
that of Chairman King in the House, but also evidence of the
urgent need, the urgent nature of our task.
On October 18, 2001, Italian port authorities noticed
unusual movement coming from a container waiting for the next
leg of its transshipment to Canada. Inside the container, a man
was attempting to widen ventilation holes for what had become
his temporary residence. The container boasted superior
amenities to those found in many homes around the globe. It had
a bed, a heater, toilet facilities, water, laptop computer, and
a satellite phone; all accompanied the man for his trip. Also
inside the container were airport security passes, an airline
mechanic's certificate valid for New York's JFK Airport, Newark
Airport, LA International Airport, and O'Hare Airport in
Chicago. After the man was temporarily apprehended, he
disappeared. His intent and his whereabouts are unknown to this
day.
This event, occurring only one month after the tragic
events of September 11, is in part the product of an
increasingly liberal global trade system. Those of us who
remember the great film ``On the Waterfront'' know that only 50
years ago things were quite different. Before the advent of
cargo containers, cargo had to be individually loaded,
offloaded, transported to a warehouse, inspected by Customs
officers, and then reloaded on to their respective vessels.
Although this system ensured transparency, it was, obviously, a
barrier to trade. Cargo containers are able to accommodate the
transport of huge volumes of goods without manual intervention
by dock workers, making global trade more efficient and more
profitable, and that is the world that we live in today.
Today we must ensure that the efficiency of our intermodal
transportation system does not, however, compromise American
security. The various aspects that make it so unique, the
various aspects that make it possible for a different world to
exist today, compared to 50 years ago, where we do not have
things warehoused, where our warehouses are really moving on
ships and trucks around this world, and we depend on that. We
depend on these things to come to us just in time. That is, as
I say, the world we live in. At the same time it creates the
vulnerability. The very efficiency, the very timeliness of this
kind of trade provides opportunities for those who would do us
harm.
I believe that the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act,
which we are here today to discuss, does help create an
environment in which we can maintain that efficiency without
compromising American security, and it does it primarily by
enhancing supply-chain visibility and accountability. By
involving everyone in the supply chain, including importers,
freight forwarders, shippers, terminal operators, longshoremen,
truck drivers, and port employees, this Act ensures
accountability from the factory floor overseas to seaports here
in the United States.
Let us pause here and take a moment to recognize the nature
of this endeavor by Senators Collins and Murray. I think it is
important to note that neither this effort in the Senate nor
the companion effort in the House with the SAFE Ports Act is an
afterthought to the recent Dubai Ports World controversy.
Senators Collins, Murray, Lieberman, Coleman, and others began
work on this bill months before the now-defunct acquisition of
U.S. port operations by the United Arab Emirates-owned company
made headlines around the country. That is important because
this is not a reaction to headlines. It is not a reaction to
the emotion of the moment. It is, in fact, a well-considered
response to a continuing problem that affects all of us. The
facts that were illustrated in the remarks by the senior
Senator from Virginia are extremely important. We take for
granted this trade. We take for granted that it is going to be
there. We do not realize, as was pointed out by Senator Murray,
the tremendous impact an attack on a single major port would
have on all of us. It would not just close down that one port.
When we had September 11, we did not just close down the
airport from which the airplanes originated--we closed down our
entire system. Does anyone think we would not do the same thing
with respect to ports, at least for a short period of time?
When I recently was at the Los Angeles Port and met with
some of the port operators there, they talked about the 11-day
slowdown we had because of a little labor dispute in LA-Long
Beach Harbors. They told us it took 100 days for them to
recover from that 11 days. One hundred days, and this is one of
the most efficient operators in the entire world. They did not
want to have delay. They worked as hard as they could to get
back to everyday operations, but an 11-day slowdown caused a
100-day shortfall in terms of getting back to day-to-day
operations.
Nonetheless, the hullabaloo around the Dubai Ports World
deal injected a sense of urgency to the need for important port
security reform, and for that at least we can be thankful.
The GreenLane Act authorizes important programs such as the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, creates a third
tier of C-TPAT known as GreenLane, directs the Secretary of
Homeland Security to create baseline container security
standards and procedures, and importantly, creates a dedicated
port security grant program.
The C-TPAT program, which is authorized for the first time
in this Act, incentivizes the private sector to share
responsibility in the protection of our homeland from terrorist
attack with government. Entities participating in the
international supply chain, from importers to land carriers,
are encouraged to enter into a partnership with the Department
of Homeland Security. By allowing companies to volunteer to
submit additional information regarding their business
operating procedures, manifest data, and container contents,
they will become eligible for expedited processing once their
shipment reaches the United States.
This program, I believe, lies at the heart of future
homeland security business approaches. It serves a dual purpose
of protecting Americans from those that would do us harm, while
also creating more efficient and profitable business operations
for companies that choose to participate.
One company, for instance, toy manufacturer Hasbro, has
seen a five-to-one return rate since becoming a C-TPAT member
in 2002. What do I mean by that? The company spent
approximately $200,000 in up-front costs becoming compliant
with C-TPAT and about $112,500 each year thereafter maintaining
compliance. After becoming a member, its inspection rates
dropped significantly. Given that it imported 8,000 containers
into the United States in 2003 and that port authorities charge
$1,000 per inspection, they are saving about a half a million
dollars a year in inspection costs alone. There is a carrot and
a stick involved in this program that is in this bill.
The GreenLane Act allows the Department of Homeland
Security to focus a greater percentage of its resources on
those threats that pose the greatest risk. It makes little
sense to spend 99 percent of our resources hardening 99 percent
of what will never become a target. Risk-based analysis is
appropriate.
That is why I am here today to commend your efforts. Your
legislation is reflective of a common-sense approach to port
security. As you know, Congresswoman Jane Harman, ranking
member of the House Intelligence Committee, and I have
developed House companion legislation. Our bill, called the
SAFE Port Act, Security and Accountability for Every Port Act,
is somewhat different from the Senate legislation before us,
but is based upon the common principle of pushing our shores
out as far as possible through layered defenses. The SAFE Port
Act is a comprehensive proposal to strengthen the maritime
transportation system through the multi-layered security
strategy that everyone agrees with, which builds on existing
initiatives to secure the supply chain from the point of origin
to delivery in the United States.
It focuses on improved security, both at home and abroad,
by expanding capabilities, maximizing available resources, and
pushing our borders forward. I would just mention three key
areas.
First, enhancing security at our U.S. ports by establishing
a risk-based port security grant program with dedicated funding
from Customs duties. I think a dedicated revenue stream is
extremely important. It also requires implementation of the
TWIC program. We are happy to hear, as others are, that it
looks like we are finally going to get a TWIC program.
Nonetheless, we should keep it in our legislation to make sure
that we do get it.
Second, preventing threats from reaching the United States
by authorizing and improving two Customs and Border Protection
cornerstone security programs, CSI, the Container Security
Initiative, and C-TPAT, similar to the Senate bill.
And third, tracking and protecting containers en route to
the United States by improving our ability to detect high-risk
containers through strengthening the existing Automated
Targeting System by requiring entry data, establishing
container security standards, supporting additional cargo
security research and development, and reviving Operation Safe
Commerce.
We held legislative hearings on our bill on March 16,
followed by a markup in subcommittee on March 30. We added two
key provisions to the base bill. First, we established the
Directorate for Policy, Planning, and International Affairs in
the Department. Within this directorate, we created a position
of Director of Cargo Security.
I worked with Congressman John Linder of the Subcommittee
on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack to establish the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which will work to establish
relationships across departments and levels of government in
order to develop a global nuclear detection architecture.
The full House committee met yesterday to hold a
legislative hearing on this piece of legislation, and a full
committee markup is scheduled before the end of April. We have
a commitment from our leadership to have this on the floor in
May. We are working expeditiously because we want to make sure
that we keep up with you, and hopefully, we will meet you in
conference.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much, and let me commend
you for the rapid action in the House of Representatives. You
really have leap-frogged us by getting it out of subcommittee
already. I do hope that we will schedule a markup within the
next few weeks on this bill, and I look forward to meeting you
in conference. Thank you for your good work.
Representative Harman, it is a great pleasure to welcome
you to the Committee today. We have worked together on so many
different homeland security bills, and it is great to have you
here.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HARMAN,\1\ A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. I am last, but I hope I am
not least. I am very excited about the progress we are making
on this legislation.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Harman appears on page 65.
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Chairman Collins, my Senate Security Sister, has been to
the Los Angeles-Long Beach port complex twice in the last year
at my invitation to assess best practices and observe how
various agencies and levels of government cooperate and
coordinate. She even buckled up in a Coast Guard helicopter in
Maine-like weather to see the huge complex from the air. Now,
if I could only get her to go for a run on the beach, as
Secretary Chertoff has.
It was during our work on the Intelligence Reform Bill in
2004 that Senator Collins, Senator Lieberman, and I really
bonded. Our collaboration yielded great results then, and I am
confident that it will again.
If there is a silver lining to the recent Dubai Ports World
debacle, it is that it roused Congress from a deep security
slumber, at least as far as port security was concerned.
Congress and the American people are now focused on the huge
vulnerability of our seaports.
I applaud your leadership and initiative on this issue. You
and your partners, Senator Murray and Senator Coleman, have a
terrific bill in the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. My
California colleague, Dan Lungren, and I used many of the same
ideas in crafting our SAFE Port Act. It differs in some
respects, of course. In those ways it is better. [Laughter.]
But it is similar, and in that regard, I want to also
commend contributions from a number of House members, including
Bennie Thompson, the ranking member of the full House
committee, Loretta Sanchez, ranking member on Representative
Lungren's subcommittee, and former Representative Doug Ose,
whose idea it was to use dedicated Customs revenues to fund
long-term multi-year port security improvements.
I will not share my worst nightmare with you. It is just as
bad as Senator Murray's. I am not going to embellish it with
some of her information. But I also will not share with you how
many times focused dock operators have found human beings in
containers at the Port of Los Angeles. That is truly scary.
Let's understand that instead of Chinese stowaways, we really
could have terrorists in those containers, and they could be
fully armed. A lot of the things they might be armed with would
escape our detection techniques, and they could attack us, both
in those ports, or if they continued to be in those containers,
in the interior of the United States.
Let's remember that 50 percent of our cargo, our container
cargo, goes through the LA-Long Beach complex, and some of it
directly goes on rail into the center of our country, and it
may even end up in Maine or Connecticut. So this is a very bad
nightmare.
Why did these incidents happen despite steps taken by the
Homeland Security Department to improve supply chain security?
Well, first, as others have said, we still do not really
know what is in the box, evidence, human beings might be in a
box labeled ``clothing.''
Second, the system used to determine whether or not a
container poses a threat remains flawed. There have been good
efforts at DHS. I applaud them, and I am sure you are going to
hear about them from Secretary Jackson in a moment, but
nonetheless, the system is not even close to what it needs to
be.
Third, many ports, as we know, do not have the technology
in place to screen containers for contraband or weapons of mass
destruction.
Fourth, CBP and the Coast Guard do not have adequate
personnel to examine containers and conduct inspections
throughout the worldwide supply chain or at U.S. ports.
The legislation we are discussing in both chambers is
strategic, comprehensive, and badly needed. I am very proud to
be part of this bipartisan, bicameral effort. Port security, as
you have heard, must be layered and strategically structured to
enhance safety without disrupting the flow of trade. These are
two competing goods, and we will either have both or we will
have neither, unless we get it right.
The terrorists, as we know, attack us asymmetrically, and
they will look for holes in our security network and look to
strike where we are weakest. It is impossible to hand search
every container entering the country. As Congressman Lungren
has just said, that was the old port security. The new port
security has to have better strategies and the use of
technology.
Our bill would do that. It would push out our borders and
help prevent bad actors and hazardous materials from reaching
American soil at all. I think we failed if those materials get
in. Let's understand that the residents around the Port of Los
Angeles, who live in my congressional district, are at risk if
we find a container there that includes some sort of
radiological bomb.
Central to success on port security and the war on
terrorism in general is better intelligence and better
technology. These two coordinates apply as much to immigration
and border points-of-entry as they do to port security. Let me
make that point again because I do worry that when we pass this
excellent legislation--and we will--we may push the terrorists
to find other ways to get bad people and bad material into
America. So it is important that we think strategically about
the whole issue of entry into America.
We have to make our ports safe, but we also have to make
our other borders safe, and in that connection, I would just
observe that building bigger walls is not an adequate answer.
Finding ways to get better intelligence on who is trying to
come here,or what they are trying to bring here and stopping
those people and those things is a much better strategy for
true border security.
Good maritime security measures have been introduced in the
past, I know, many of them in the House, and they have
languished. But now, finally, Congress seems appropriately
focused, and as you heard from Congressman Lungren, in the
House we have already had subcommittee markup, and we are
poised for full committee markup in a few weeks. To my Senate
friends, you should know that this is nothing short of a
legislative miracle.
Time is of the essence. I am glad you are going to try to
catch up with us. [Laughter.]
Good luck. The terrorists are not waiting on the
legislative schedule, and nor should we.
Thank you very much for inviting me to testify.
Chairman Collins. Thank you so much for your testimony and
your extraordinary leadership.
I want to thank this entire panel for being here today.
This is evidence that when confronted with a serious threat to
our homeland security, we can work together across the aisle,
and even more remarkably, across the Hill--with the House and
the Senate working together. I am very pleased that we have
such a strong team leading the way, and I am convinced that we
will see success this year. Thank you very much for being here.
I am now going to ask our second panel to come forward. Our
second panel is really just one witness. It is Deputy Secretary
Michael Jackson. He was confirmed by this Committee last year
to serve at the Department of Homeland Security, and we look
forward to hearing his comments today.
Senator Murray, I understand that you are going to stay for
part of the hearing. If you would like to join us up here, we
would be happy to have you do so. We would even let you sit on
the Republican side if you wanted to. [Laughter.]
I guess that would be too traumatic. [Laughter.]
Secretary Jackson, welcome, and you may proceed with your
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL P. JACKSON,\1\ DEPUTY SECRETARY,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Chairman Collins, and thank you,
Ranking Member Lieberman. I am grateful to be included in this
testimony, and I am very grateful for the work that you are
doing in this Committee.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson appears on page 69.
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You have talked about the intersection of interest and of
will and of commitment to make a bill that the House and the
Senate share. I just want to tell you today, and to reiterate
throughout my appearance here, that the Administration shares
your commitment to improved maritime security, to make a
difference with this legislation. We have been working closely
with your staff for months on it, and we are committed to
continue to help you craft as strong a bill as possible for
passage and to improve our transportation security in the
maritime world.
I will not reiterate the importance of making increased
security here. I would like to say that we are very grateful in
particular for this legislation, as well as the legislation in
the House, because it has helped us focus the interest and the
commitment of our Department and of the Congress on a common
set of goals and objectives, and for that, I think we have made
good progress.
We have made, however, and I want to say for the record,
transformational improvements since September 11. I agree with
Senator Coleman, we have done a lot, we have not done enough,
there is more to do. I will just say it simply and stop. There
is more to do. We are prepared to roll up our sleeves with you
and get this done.
I would like to talk particularly today then about the path
ahead and to start with a discussion of some of the principles,
which the Administration and the Congress, I believe, share in
common as we approach this, so that we can find a template, an
approach, a basic set of principles in agreement, and then
flesh out those principles to make programs that are stronger
and to accomplish the objectives that you have laid out for us
today.
First, I want to talk about risk. The first principle--and
it is one that has been stated here in this Committee today--is
that we have to talk about risk and some sense of starting
where the highest risks are. As an Administration, our programs
have been designed to start with the question of the nuclear
and weapons of mass destruction risk. That is the starting
point.
Second, a layered system of security, a strong layered set
of interlocking tools. I think this is the most important part
in a way for us to understand, to get our brains around, how to
pull these pieces together in the legislation and in our
programs. No one single thing will be sufficient in and of
itself to give us the security that we need in this maritime
domain. We have a system of interlocking tools, and single-
point failure is reduced if we have multiple layers of security
working in concert with each other. The security is seldom
adequately delivered via a single silver bullet.
Next. It begs the obvious, but this is a global supply
chain. It serves multiple different economies and governments,
and it is a series of interdependent private sector driven
businesses, so a second doctrinal component of our cargo
strategy has been, where possible, to push security out, to
push the borders out. So I think that is something that is very
much embedded in this legislation. We are fundamentally in
alignment with you there.
Close partnerships with the private sector are a third
component, indispensable to make this work.
A fourth component, we have to strengthen government-to-
government partnerships. When we talk about the Container
Security Initiative, as an example of our government-to-
government partnerships, we have to understand that we cannot
control everything they do. We have to work cooperatively with
them, and it is the same thing with the private sector when we
work on a program like C-TPAT, which is voluntary. We have made
tremendous strides with the private sector. I believe they have
a strong commitment to improve security, so we have to leverage
both the public, foreign, and the private relationships as
well.
Let me try to just divide where the working product has to
hit. There are four basic areas that we have to work on in this
enterprise: First, vessel security; second, personnel security;
third, we have port facility security; and fourth, we have
cargo security. So these four areas, cargo, people, facilities,
and the vessels themselves, we have to work on those four sets
of issues domestically and abroad, so you basically have a grid
with 8 cells in it, and we have to fill in programs, processes,
and tools to help us at home and abroad to strengthen this.
I would say again, this legislation, I believe, generally
tries to look across that range and find appropriate tools to
create this system of systems.
So let me just say a couple of words about where the
Administration thinks we can get the highest return in the
short term and where we would like to focus. Again, I think
these are things that the Committee has found also to be high-
priority items.
The first of these is in an area that we have aggregated
under the rubric ``secure freight.'' It has two essential
parts, first, better targeting, and second, enhanced inspection
tools.
On better targeting, we believe, as an important tool, that
the Department's Automated Targeting Systems run at the Customs
and Border Protection is an indispensable tool. We have made
tremendous and strong growth in using this tool to screen all
inbound cargo. We use this tool to screen and then do a
profiling of risk for 100 percent of all inbound containers
into this country. We assign scores for containers of high
risk, and we then inspect 100 percent of all the high-risk
containers. The next generation tool that we would use here
would give us, and the ATS system, a more rich and deeper
profile of the prehistory of a container move. Where has the
cargo been? Who has touched it? What information do we have
about it from order to order fulfillment, to the intermodal
supply chains that touches that container as it moves across
the globe. Today there are resident, and multiple different and
non-connected businesses, information about this prehistory.
I believe it is possible, working in the right way, to
aggregate that data, fuse it, share it globally, not only for
containers that are bound for the United States, but to create
a true global switch so that we can try to begin to get our
arms around a close-loop system in which governments who have
containers inbound have the opportunity to evaluate a richer
and deeper prehistory of this to score that risk as they deem
fit and to take measures as appropriate to inspect it. This is
a natural extension of what we have done. It is a big idea
here, but it is not an idea that cannot be delivered in, I
think, a reasonable timeframe.
I would say, particularly to Senator Murray, that it builds
very much on the initiative that you helped launch after
September 11 to begin to probe supply chain weaknesses and to
work with that data to help us build the next generation of
tools, so for that I am very grateful.
I will tell you that before I took this job at the
Department, I was invited by the Department to come talk about
cargo security, and this was the area in a speech, which I was
grateful to be asked to give to the people who are now my DHS
colleagues, that I identified as the primary point and the
focal point for us for next-generation tools.
Next, as part of secure freight, we need enhanced
inspection tools. At home, again, inspection tools at home,
inspection tools abroad. At home, our target is to have 100
percent inspection of all containers that are transported by
truck or rail from a U.S. port into the interior of our
country. Abroad, our goal is to increase materially the number
of containers inspected by radiation detection tools and by
non-intrusive detection tools such as large X-ray devices. The
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which we have created at the
Department and which this bill authorizes formally, has a vital
role in making that process work.
I would tell you that Secretary Chertoff was in Asia last
week on a trip and was able to look at the Integrated Container
Inspection System pilot in Hong Kong. He comes back with
enthusiasm about the opportunities for this. I would just say
after extensive discussion with the industry about the so-
called ICIS pilot, we believe that its underlying technology
and business concerns are very valuable and possible as a way
to take, again, a next-generation and substantial leap so that
we can use those tools, multiplexing the images into the United
States and look at that inspection data, along with our
targeting data, and have a much richer and deeper profile of
what's headed our way.
And, Senator Coleman, your Subcommittee has done very good
work. I was grateful for the chance to talk about this
particular topic with you last week.
Finally, on the high-priority list, in addition to secure
freight, is TWIC. Let me just say we have last week published a
request for qualifications. There are three moving parts to go
from where we are today, which is, we have completed a pilot
phase of this work. We are now moving straight into deployment
nationwide with the TWIC program. It has three moving parts.
One, it requires regulations from the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). Two, it requires cognate rules by the
Coast Guard. And three, it will require some procurement work
so that we can bring in the tools for card production and
distribution, for intake management, and for the back-room
processing tools that we are going to need to make this a
nationwide program.
I think we have a good architecture. We have a path ahead.
It's going to be a balance, but it is a very aggressive
commitment. Secretary Chertoff has made it very clear to his
team, do it, get it done, get it in the street, get it going.
And I promise you, that is where we are headed. We are moving
all three of those components at warp speed through the
process, through the regulatory process and through the
procurement process, and I am going to be very pleased to come
back to this Committee and show you the results of that in the
weeks ahead.
Finally, I'll just say a quick word about the GreenLane
Maritime Cargo Security Act. We believe that this proposed
legislation reflects a great deal of solid agreement, as I've
already tried to indicate, and we are committed to trying to
work with you to close any gaps we have, to refine any places
where we find disagreement, and to work with you as you move
this through your Committee and to the floor.
We have already talked about a core component part of your
legislation, which is next-generation Automated Targeting
Systems. We believe that the vision that I have just briefly
outlined is in alignment with you and will help do just that.
On the movement of radiological material, which is a key
part of this legislation, we are in alignment in the core with
you. We believe that the deployment strategy, both at home for
getting to 98 percent inspection with some random inspection of
the remainder on a short path by the end of next year, will get
us where we need to be. We can accelerate this a bit. We are
trying very much to push that as much as we possibly can to get
that penetration there and at our land borders.
We think the GreenLane concept in principle is very
important. I would just say a few words about it. I think that
it is important to retain some flexibility for a voluntary
program to define the terms and conditions of this GreenLane
third-tier type approach. We believe that giving carrots and
sticks, as has been spoken about already today, is important.
The industry has to find sufficient motive to participate with
us, and having the benefits of voluntarily submitting to a more
rigorous security profile. We will need the chance to be
nimble, and we will need the chance to be responsive to
particular attacks or incidents in a post-response manner. If
it is an explosion offshore, the response would be different
than if it is an attack at the fences, at the gates of a
terminal facility.
So we need to have the flexibility, as you think through
the GreenLane privileges, to be able to work at that in an
effective way.
We are grateful for your formalization of the Under
Secretary for Policy. We are also very much in agreement on the
need to create in the Department in our policy shop a cargo
security position, a Director of Cargo Security. I will tell
you that shortly after I came on board, I started trying to
recruit a couple of stars from the industry. We are committed
to doing this, and we are grateful for the legislation that
makes it formal.
On the port security grants, we have a difference of
opinion on the structure of port security grants. We are, as an
Administration, committed to a $600 million transportation
infrastructure program, and the targeted infrastructure program
that we have proposed.
Let me just explain briefly why we think that flexible
program is a better alternative to simply earmarking in the
modes of transportation for transit grants, port security
grants.
Last summer, after the attack in London, we were together
worrying over how best to focus our funds and our resources,
our limited resources, in the best possible way, and after the
Dubai Ports World discussions that we have had here in public,
we are now showing a lot of attention on the maritime world,
rightfully so, appropriately so, absolutely necessarily so. But
what we think is the principle of being able to allow State and
local leaders and terminal owners in multiple different types
of facilities to have some flexibility to be able to align
those resources with the highest risk is a valuable tool. We
have talked about the importance of having risk-based
investment. This gives our colleagues at the State and local
level the flexibility to say, ``I'm concerned more about ports
this year. We're going to put some more focus on that.'' They
can also use UASI, State grants, and local grant money in this
area. They have not historically used as much as we think they
might and could and should, perhaps, in some cases.
But we are looking overall for a principle of targeting on
highest risk and giving flexibility to be nimble as the threat
evolves over time. When we lock these massive programs years in
advance and then drive to an agenda, it sometimes reduces the
flexibility that we have to be nimble and responsive to the
threats that we face in the world ahead.
So I would stop there simply and say thank you very much
for the opportunity to continue our work with this Committee,
and I am happy to answer questions that the Committee might
have on our programs and your program.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much for your testimony. I
am going to interpret your testimony as an endorsement of the
GreenLane bill with a few qualifications, and I think my
colleagues here would all agree with that interpretation. If
you would like to disabuse me of that, I will give you an
opportunity to do so.
Mr. Jackson. Madam Chairman, I want to be as close to this
Committee and our work together as we possibly can, and what I
would tell you is we are very close around very many
particulars and very much of the philosophic approach that this
bill brings to the table. We have some changes, some edits,
some suggestions, some differences. I will try to be clear
about that here today and also to have our staff line-by-line,
word-by-word, go over your latest draft to make sure that you
have the benefit of our counsel as best as we can give it to
you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Jackson. But substantial alignment, and I think that is
a very good thing.
Chairman Collins. I think it is as well. I want to pick up
on an area of disagreement, and that has to do with having a
line item for port security grants. The Administration has long
recognized the importance of enhancing our port security, and
yet, the Administration's budget continues to lump port
security grants into an overall infrastructure grant program.
That is an approach that Congress has rejected in years past,
and I am quite confident will do so again this year.
It seems inconsistent to me for the Administration to say:
Yes, port security is a priority. It is a major vulnerability.
We need to do more. We have developed all these programs such
as CSI, C-TPAT, but, no, there should not be targeted funding
for port security grants.
We have made the $400 million that we proposed a
competitive program to address some issues that the
Administration has. We know that the American Association of
Port Authorities says that is needed each year to just meet the
goals of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. If you lump
port security in with other infrastructure needs, you risk not
allocating any funding to port security grants or insufficient
funding. I do not understand why the Administration is so
resistant to a targeted program, given the overwhelming
evidence and advice that we receive from terrorism experts. We
do need to put more resources into this area.
Mr. Jackson. Let me try to summarize it this way. We share
the conviction that infrastructure investment in ports is a
vital priority for the country, and in fact, what we have
done--and where I think the difference is--is how best to make
those investments. The principle that we are trying to press
very hard is the principle of flexibility and nimbleness. We
authorized these programs in a siloed fashion years in advance
and spend a year trying to get the money out the door, the
applications reviewed in a systematic way. And what we are
saying is we think that by giving States and locals more
flexibility about how they take core infrastructure programs
and their grant money associated with it that we can be more
responsive to the threat itself, that we will have a more
threat nimble system of grants.
In fact, the Administration has proposed more money, almost
double the amount of money for the individual programs this
year. We did the same thing last year. We proposed, aggregate
them, give us some flexibility, and we are supporting more
money. That will allow for the particular needs to be served,
we think, and it will give us a stronger tool that is
responsive to the terrorist threat. The terrorist threat is
driven by our intelligence assessments, as Representative
Harman spoke. We have to have tools in our tool kit that do not
take 2 years to change course when we see that threat change,
and that is the core reason for our program.
I will tell you, if the Congress should decide--we did
propose it last year, the Congress decided not to support it.
If the Congress decides not to support it, we will make a
targeted marine port security program that is as strong and as
good as we can make it, and we will do so with the funds we
have available.
Chairman Collins. As you mentioned, Congress did reject
that approach last year and instead provided $175 million for
port security grants for this fiscal year. We are deep into
this fiscal year, and yet the Administration still has not
provided guidance, and as a result, not a dime of that grant
money has been awarded. Why has that been held up? Does that
reflect opposition to the concept? What is the problem?
Mr. Jackson. No. It does not reflect opposition to the
concept, and I believe that the release of the grant guidance
is imminent. I get my first briefing on the details of it this
week, and the next step out the door is a very short step out
the door when the Secretary and I have had a chance to review
it. We are trying to make sure that it is philosophically
aligned with the risk-based concerns that you have articulated
and that are animating the core programs of the Department. It
will be very soon.
Chairman Collins. I am pleased to hear that, and I hope you
will keep us informed----
Mr. Jackson. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Collins [continuing]. Because I do think that is
an inordinate delay.
When I was in Seattle, I saw the radiation portal monitors
that were used to detect radiation, and they worked pretty
well. There were some false positives, but they did not delay
the trucks that were rolling through them, and I thought it was
an effective system. Our legislation would require that there
be screening for radiation of all containers entering our
seaports within a year of enactment. But I have to tell you, as
I was looking at the system, I was struck by the fact that it
is really too late by the time radiation is detected in
Seattle. If in fact one of those containers includes a nuclear
weapon or the makings of a dirty bomb, by the time it is
detected in Seattle, the risk, the explosion may already have
occurred. What are we doing to push out our borders to install
these radiation portal monitors overseas so that before the
containers come to our shores, they have already been screened
for radiation?
Mr. Jackson. That is an excellent question. Let me try to
do a couple of layers of that. First, the first important layer
of defense is the screening process, the container profiling
that we do in our Virginia targeting center at CBP. That is a
two-part process. It involves all of the electronic data we
have about the given container. It involves a massive history
file that allows us to detect patterns, look at trends, find
areas to probe to understand rules that will allow us to use
algorithms. There are many of these rules that drive a score
for us to profile the container. That is Level 1. If you have
not had an opportunity to see this, I volunteered to Chairman
King yesterday to take him out and show him because it is an
impressive set of tools, but we can also show you what the next
generation looks like. That is Level 1.
Level 2, the ICIS program that I mentioned is an example of
the industry, I think, that has very responsibly volunteered to
tax themselves, to assess a fee on themselves to put the
radiation portal monitors in the inbound part of this equation
overseas. We are talking with that industry. As I said, my boss
just got back last week from an actual look-see at it and
discussion, and we have some significant hope that we can work
with the industry in a way that might see this work across the
globe in many ports.
Will it be 100 percent overnight? No, it can never be
turned on like a switch, but we see this as a very promising
tool. I do not think the tool that is currently working in Hong
Kong is the panacea. The technology is not as complete as it
can be. That is what DNDO's research is producing for us, a
next generation spectroscopic tool that allows us to target
which particular type of radiation is there so that we can,
with a more fine comb, understand whether we have a problem or
not. But we have current generation, next generation, with
afterburners blowing to move into the ports and to our land
ports. We have the concept of multiplexing those images, in
other words, taking those images and sending them to the United
States so we can align our targeting work with the ATS, with
the visual image, the inspection that is overseas, and together
making a much stronger connection there. So that is a business
concept that secure freight proposes for this next generation
of pushing the border out.
It is, I think, a powerful idea, especially if we can take
the enthusiasm of terminal operators and port owners and ocean
carriers around the globe, shippers, to help us assess the fees
that they would make to do this. We, obviously, would have to
have an investment and make a system that would work in a more
global way.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Madam Chairman. I mean I know
there is general rumoring around here that you and I spend too
much time together, having worked together, as was shown in
your first two questions, and I thank you for them.
They are the first two I was going to ask. I am not going
to repeat them, but I agree totally with the Chairman on the
port security grant program. This is a real priority. You
understand that and have stated it very clearly today, this
bipartisan feeling of Congress.
You know, people ask me at home, ``What's the thing you
think we haven't done enough of yet to protect our security?''
And I always start with port security. If we just lump the
money together, there is a danger that we all worry about, that
there is not going to be the money there for meeting this
priority. So I was glad to hear you say at the end that if this
is our will in Congress, you will do your best to carry it out.
The second line of questioning, we both shared the same
reaction. I was waiting to hear you say the Administration
endorses the GreenLane proposal. I did not quite hear that. I
heard about substantial alignment, which is good because we do
not have to go to one of the auto places to get aligned.
But now, let me ask you this: Where are we out of
alignment, just either generally or specifically? What are the
areas where the Administration is not happy with the bill,
where we have to work together?
Mr. Jackson. Well, I will take on the GreenLane itself,
that particular part of it. I think that we need a little
flexibility to discern what the incentives should be and how
they align with the C-TPAT program. That is something, I
believe, that is a bridge that we can cross with some good and
short-term work here to design a way to give us the flexibility
to figure out in a post-incident fashion what would constitute
the privileges that we would want to award to a carrier to
bring containers in on a more expedited basis. That is an
example of something that I think deserves a little bit of
further work.
On the funding issue about the dedicated funding, I have
some work to do with my OMB brethren to opine about that in a
formal and final fashion, and I tell you that I will make the
commitment to work with my colleagues in the Administration on
that issue. But I think the principle of spending money on
reducing port risk and port vulnerability is one that you would
see DHS in agreement with you on.
So there are examples of that. There is another example
about some of the legislation in the House and the Senate, I
think, points to performance indicators. I am a vigorous
advocate that we measure and report to you what our goals and
objectives are and how we run our programs and we do so
routinely and make it quite transparent, our performance. When
we fail, we fail. When we succeed, we succeed.
But, for example, putting a deadline of one year on getting
radiation portal monitors installed is unrealistic based upon
the production capabilities and also trying to balance the idea
that we are moving to a new generation. I really urge you, if
you have not had the opportunity, to be briefed in more detail
about this next-generation leap that DNDO is doing. And with
the support of Congress, with a half a billion investment in
this office, to move to a much more strong tool.
And so this is the constant tradeoff about risk and speed
of technology and innovation. We are trying to balance the
current generation of tools and the next-generation deployment
and to bring these two into harmony in a way that gets us a
stronger set of tools out there for the work we have to do. It
is a refinement. We can get to, for example, 98 percent
coverage on exit from our ports in the United States into the
country of trucks carrying these containers out by December of
next year. That is the plan. And we would say to get that last
2 percent is a massive investment which should not probably be
spent. We can tackle that 2 percent with portable radiation
detecting programs that come into a small port that has very
low volumes on a given day and, with a random basis, make such
a presence in that port that we would have a deterrent effect.
So there are details like this, Senator, that I think we
should work through with you.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate the answer. Those are
differences, but they are bridgeable. Those are not chasms that
cannot be bridged, and I think the sooner we do that, the
better everybody will be.
I want to pick up on, in the time I have remaining, your
last point. Under the DHS Secure Freight Initiative, you have
stated the Department goal, which is to inspect 100 percent of
all containers coming into a U.S. port for radiation and
overseas to materially increase the number of containers
inspected by radiation detection tools and non-intrusive
inspections, including large-scale X-ray devices. And today,
you again stated the goal of 98 percent inspection.
But as we have been educated on the Committee and as the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) last week heard
from Steve Flynn again, a very strong argument was made that
unless we have both the portal monitors and the non-intrusive
X-ray equipment, we are not really inspecting. Am I right that
the 98 percent goal you talked about is for portal monitor
inspecting?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. So as I understand it--you correct me if
I am wrong--the portal monitors inspect a container, and they
can detect radiation. But they cannot detect the nightmare
package of a dirty bomb or a nuclear weapon that is shielded
because the shielding is there to stop the radiation from
coming out. And that is why the non-intrusive X-ray equipment
is necessary because it can see the shielding, and once it
does, presumably, the container gets pulled off and gets
physically inspected in some way.
So my concern is that the budget that DHS has given us for
the coming fiscal year includes $178 million for additional
radiation portal monitors, which does move along at a good
pace, and I appreciate that, but just $33 million for
additional non-intrusive inspection equipment. So I wanted to
ask you, do you agree that we need both types of technologies
to ensure that neither nuclear or dirty bombs are able to be
smuggled into the country, and if so, why are we not
appropriating up to that level to achieve that level of
protection as soon as possible?
Mr. Jackson. Both tools are valuable tools. They are not
the only tools that help us address the risk that you are
presenting.
The first point, again, is the layered security idea.
Better targeting and a better profiling of the container is the
starting point for making this assessment.
Senator Lieberman. And that is the kind of computer work--
--
Mr. Jackson. That is the ATS--exactly, yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. And that is great.
Mr. Jackson. So that is part one.
Senator Lieberman. The beginning.
Mr. Jackson. Part two is then we would inspect all of those
containers with both tools for the high-risk ones that we have
identified as high risk. We would randomly inspect other
containers both for radiation and using the large-scale X-ray
machines so that we have some check and randomness about the
process of looking with both tools. And then the idea of the
radiation portal monitors on exit is, again, aiming to the goal
of 100 percent of those containers leaving having this
additional check. In other words, it was not--we cannot inspect
literally through these two tools everything coming off of a
ship without fundamentally changing the business design of port
operations, as I think Senator Murray mentioned. But as we get
these tools and test them in configurations where we can make
them intersect in ways that balance security and mobility, we
are eager to deploy them in that fashion. That is why the idea
of the ICIS program overseas inbound of trying to find a way to
align in the inbound lane the two things would be another layer
of security.
Senator Lieberman. Let me interrupt, with thanks, because
my time is up. But as I understand the Administration request,
it will bring us to a point where, by the end of 2007, every
port in the United States will have a portal monitor.
Mr. Jackson. It will be by that point 98 percent of all the
containers leaving a port would be done.
Senator Lieberman. OK. Pretty good.
Mr. Jackson. And then, sir, in those ports that do not have
the lane equipment, there will be handheld devices; there will
be random inspections using portable tools. So there will be a
concept of operations that we can move through in those ports
as well.
Senator Lieberman. But the $33 million requested for non-
intrusive inspection equipment, which can detect the shielding
on a potential radiation-containing container, will only cover
five prototype systems. So that is leaving--in other words, on
this schedule, when do we get to a point where we have enough
equipment to see the shielding that may be covering a dirty
bomb or a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Jackson. Well, again, we are doing that for every one
of the high-threat containers that we identify. I would like to
be able to get you a schedule, if permitted.
Senator Lieberman. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Jackson. That will give you a deployment schedule for
future years, commitment of large gamma ray, X-ray type
machines.
Senator Lieberman. Bottom line, I think we are not spending
enough fast enough in this area, although you are making
progress, and I thank you for it. Thanks.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Secretary Jackson, the core foundation for our inspection
program really starts with container profiling. We put a lot of
stake in the targeting system, the computer program.
Just a couple questions. On the panel at my hearing last
week, we had somebody from the World Shipping Council. They
raised a concern about data, about entry data, and apparently
before you can pick up a cargo container, once it is in the
country, there are certain entry data that you need. They are
concerned--and apparently they indicated that they have raised
this with DHS--that this is the kind of data that needs to be
looked at before the container comes into this country. And
there was still concern that it was not. So, yes, you get it,
but the comment by the Chairman was basically saying that it is
already in, the container is already here. Obviously, we are
safe when we push it back.
So my first question really has to do with the data that we
have and your sense of confidence that it is sufficient to make
the critical and profound judgment about whether there is any
risk in this container.
Mr. Jackson. I am going to say exactly what you said in
your opening remarks. We have made tremendous progress here.
There is a lot more to do so. So there are two parts of the
data filing equation. One is the 24-hour notice, 24 hours
before lading, before we put a container on a ship, they have
to give us a core number of variables--I believe it is 22, but
I may be wrong by a small amount--variables that come in that
help us score risk. That again is pinged against a large
database and a big history that helps us understand where these
variables tease out risk. So the combination of those two
things help us profile.
In addition, before arrival into the port but after the
ship has left overseas, we get further data relating to the
customs transaction. That data is gone back again and fused
with the Coast Guard data, which was receiving information
before arrival, both about the ship and the mariners on the
ship.
So we take the ship, the mariners, and the cargo, and we
profile, screen, and assess when it is farther out, before it
has left, and also shortly before arrival.
Your core question goes to, I think, the importance of
Secure Freight. We need more data elements to get a richer stew
of data about the pre-history of that container. There is such
data in the supply chain out there. We are just not getting it,
and we are not fusing it as part of this risk analysis. By
getting additional data, we can move from this level to this
level, and we should do exactly that.
Senator Coleman. And my concern is that the whole system
really, which is a targeted system, essentially rests on that.
So the concern that I have raised before is the validation of
ATS. Do we know that it is working? We look at high-risk cargo,
but a lot of cargo that goes by is not high-risk. Are we
confident that we are getting the high-risk stuff, that we are
not missing something?
And so I continue to have this concern about the amount of
data, the type of data, when we get the data, since so much
rests on the fundamental early determination: Are we looking at
something with risk?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, I think we are doing a very good job. I
do not think we are doing a perfect job. I will tell you, we
will never do a perfect job. There is no risk assessment engine
tool or model known to man that is perfect. We are all about
reducing risk, and you understand that very well. I think we
can do more here, and I think we have to take a fundamental
business model leap. Scraping the waybill electronically and
assessing what is there is not where we need to be. So what we
are going to have to do is something that is more complex, more
time-consuming, but I think more effective, which is to take
the various different supply chain partners, the people who
order goods to be imported, the people who fulfill those
orders, the subcontractors that are associated with the
fulfillment, the drayage firms that move it out of a point of
manufacture and into a port; if it is an intermodal move, the
rail touch, the customs brokers, the 3PL people who manage all
this. All of these entities have data. We have to find a way,
without causing the economy to grind to a halt, to be able to
fuse that data in some intermediary organization between the
supply chain actors and the governments. And if we can fuse it
appropriately and then spread it to the government, we will tap
into our A system. We will get a more rich analytical tool to
evaluate that data. We will also, if we create this right as an
intermediary between us and the private sector with some
investment from the government sector to help make it work,
prove its concept, audit and monitor its activity, we can then
create an international tool.
Right now we have been, in the first generation after
September 11, talking almost exclusively about what the United
States can do to protect ourselves. We need to take this to a
more global basis so we can help our colleagues around the
globe understand they need to be doing risk profiling and that
they will contribute to the store of data that is being used to
manage this.
So I think there is a new business model. I am very excited
that it has an opportunity to be transformationally helpful in
improving our capability.
Senator Coleman. My time is running short. I am not going
to get to the follow-up, but just----
Mr. Jackson. I know your question. I would be happy to
answer it.
Senator Coleman. First, I hope it is our goal that we are
inspecting, that we are having some kind of review of all high-
risk cargo before it gets to our ports. That needs to be the
goal. And, second, we need the cooperation of foreign
governments, and we have to push them to do this or else tell
them we are not bringing the stuff into our country. There are
still too many high-risk containers out there that we have
identified as high-risk and that we have asked to be inspected.
We do not have that cooperation today, and I think we have to
demand it. And if we are not getting it, just say it is not
going to come here until that takes place.
Mr. Jackson. Madam Chairman, can I give just a little bit
of a gloss on Senator Coleman's concern? I was not adequately
capable of answering your question when I spoke to you last
week. I will try another shot at it, and then I would be happy
to go further at another time.
The data that Senator Coleman has pointed to shows a
question about what amount of cargo that we flag for a foreign
country is actually being inspected in a CSI port. And here
there is a distinction which my CBP colleagues have helped to
educate me about.
There is a referral and a request. When we work in the
targeting center, we first begin to aggregate data, and we
begin to look at a container that may be in a CSI port and has
not yet been loaded and sent. And we frequently have a
referral, as it is called in CBP, in which we probe our
colleagues in the Customs Service of another country and say,
for example, there was an inadequate amount of data about the
shipper itself. We have not seen him shipping things into the
United States. We do not have that component of the risk--which
is just one component of the risk work--fleshed out in any
meaningful way. So it may turn out that the customs people in
another country say, ``We have a lot of data about that, and
here is that data.'' Our CSI colleagues find it, and that
lowers our concern about that particular container.
When we complete that assessment, we identify containers
and have what is called a request to look at that container.
The requests are averaging in the area of about 89 percent
fulfillment prior to a container coming our way. So when we
perfect an investigation from referral to request--and I
believe that this data that you had showed referral data rather
than request data--we are getting a much higher compliance
level. Is it 100 percent? No. Should we look for 100 percent? I
believe we should aim as a goal for that. But you see here we
are doing very much more, and when it gets to the United
States, 100 percent of all these containers that have not been
reconciled abroad are immediately put into the system for
reconciliation.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I apologize
for coming in so late. We had another committee hearing, and it
took more time than we expected, so I missed an opportunity to
hear the Secretary's statement and some of the questions. I
hope none of this is redundant.
I am going to use part of my time to make this statement.
The proposed Dubai Ports World deal stirred up a lot of
controversy, particularly because the Administration handled it
so poorly. It should have been investigated more closely before
it was rubber-stamped. The Dubai Ports World fiasco woke up the
American people to the fact that a good job has not been done
protecting our ports since September 11.
I was Commissioner of the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, and I have been sounding an alarm on port security
for many years. Now, I understand our colleague and friend,
Senator Murray, knows how vulnerable our ports are, and I
commend her for addressing the issue. Unfortunately, I do
believe there are some major problems with the bill before us
today.
Instead of meeting the 9/11 Commission demand that security
grants be based on risk, it would return us to the days of the
less responsive distribution of funds. Now, I worked hard to
change the system for port security so grants would go to
threatened areas where the impact would be the greatest. And I
cannot support any measure that takes a step backward in this
regard.
The measure also would continue to outsource many important
links in the security of our ports by relying on voluntary
actions by private companies. Additionally, I am disappointed
that the bill once again extends the deadline for DHS to
develop critical standards for container security.
So when something is this important, you have got to meet a
deadline, and the job should already have been completed. By
failing to meet its deadlines, DHS gives the impression that
port security is not quite the high priority that many of us
see it, and I certainly hope that is not the case.
Mr. Jackson, what is the Department's view about port
security grant programs being entirely risk-based in their
distribution?
Mr. Jackson. Senator, we believe that risk-based is the
core of what we should be thinking about when we make these
port security grants. As in the entire world of security, we
can never address fully every single thing that might be a good
idea. We have to triage in some significant way how to invest
those monies.
We have had an exchange about the idea of how to structure
grants to try to drive it to a more risk-based model by giving
States some flexibility, and that is the Administration's
position. We will, however, in whatever form of grant program
we have, as we did last year, put risk at the core of the
equation.
We had a program last year of port security grants, which I
think did just that and made a very strong focus and
improvement on analytical, measurable results that were derived
from the people in our ports.
Senator Lautenberg. I am not sure where you are going, Mr.
Jackson. Does the Department view risk as the critical factor
in distributing port security grants? Now, I heard the
Secretary, Mr. Chertoff, say that he believed that is the way
it ought to be done. He said it publicly several times.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, and that is how we did it last year.
Senator Lautenberg. OK. And with the pending bill, do you
see that same requirement to be in there?
Mr. Jackson. I think the bill reflects an intent--which I
cannot validate, and I would defer to the authors of the bill--
that would spread more money across a larger spectrum of ports
and that is not in full alignment with where the Administration
was, for example, in last year's port security grant program.
Senator Lautenberg. In the bill it says the Secretary,
acting through the Office for Domestic Preparedness, shall
establish a grant program to ``fairly and equitably'' allocate
Federal financial assistance. So that ducks the question, very
frankly. It certainly does not emphasize it. And that is
something--I lost in this Committee 15 to 1, so you can see
where----
Chairman Collins. If the Senator would yield on this point,
and I will yield him additional time, the bill that Senator
Murray and I have drafted establishes a competitive grant
program. It is not an automatic entitlement for each port, so
it is consistent with the 9/11 Commission and with what you
said, so I think you have misread the bill.
Senator Lautenberg. With all due respect, Madam Chairman,
when I read this language--and I do not know what the criteria
is for competitive opportunity. Does that mean competition will
include the risk factors exclusively, or will it allow for
other things as well?
Chairman Collins. All entities that are subject to area
maritime security plans under the Coast Guard are eligible to
apply. But it is the Department's decision on who gets funded,
and that is a risk-based decision. It is a competitive process
that looks at the quality of the grant applications.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, I regret to continue this
discussion because I do not see it firmly coming down on risk-
based. And when I have 2 miles within my State declared to be
the riskiest 2-mile target for terrorists in this country,
abutting the port, less than 2 miles from the airport, Newark
Airport, a giant airport, and we devote any of these funds to
anything other than risk I think is less than a good
perspective on how to protect ourselves. So we have this
difference.
I understand, Mr. Secretary, that you have been more and
more involved in the Hong Kong pilot project, and hopefully,
the target is to be able to scan all the containers that come
in. Why haven't we at this point worked to develop more of a
likelihood that we will have 100 percent screening as a result?
Have these tests proved to be effective? Now, I know that you
were discussing it, and I am sorry if it is redundant.
Mr. Jackson. No, sir, Senator. I am happy to address this.
I believe that the pilot in Hong Kong is a very promising
business model and technology. It is not perfect right now. For
example, the data in the pilot phase is simply retained and
stored. We would need the data to be able to be networked and
used on a real-time basis. There is not a technology impediment
to that. We can make that happen, I think. And we need to
strengthen the technology tools themselves and the business of
how those are operated. We need a business operations plan that
tells us how to inspect containers in a more aggressive fashion
if they have been flagged for radiation. Again, I believe that
can be worked through operationally to do it.
So the sum is I consider this a very promising tool. The
most important part that I omitted from that list was that the
industry has in Hong Kong decided to assess a fee upon
themselves to pay for this, and we again find that a very
public-spirited and valuable way of helping us to accelerate
this type of scrutiny overseas. And so we are in close
conversations with the industry about that.
My boss just got back last night from his trip overseas to
look at this. We have talked about it this morning already and
will be working it hard.
Senator Lautenberg. Has DHS spent some significant funding
on maritime container security, would you say?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I think we are spending quite a lot
of money. This year it is roughly $2.5 billion in the
Department for maritime security all up. If you take the period
of time from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2007, if the
President's fiscal year 2007 bill were to be implemented, we
would all up have spent $9.6 billion in that period fiscal year
2004 to fiscal year 2007. That is the whole layer of security
using all the tools that we are applying at DHS.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Madam Chairman, thank you so much for
allowing me to join your Committee and for holding this hearing
and for the excellent questions so far.
I did want to just join with the Chairman's and Ranking
Member's comments regarding the port security grants because,
as an appropriator, I think we are very frustrated that when we
do not delineate where this money is going to go, it gets lost,
and we have seen that with the lack of funding for fire grants,
for law enforcement training grants, for emergency management
performance grants that all get lost if we do not specifically
say that. In fact, Operation Safe Commerce, which we are using
much of what we learned from that experience to write the
legislation that is before us, when we funded that I actually
had to hold up a nominee from the Department in order to get
that funded, even though we had said the funds were going
there.
So I think many of us feel very frustrated that ports and
cargo security has been sort of the forgotten stepchild of an
agency that does have a tremendous amount on its plate, but
which many of us see the port and cargo security as an item
that we cannot any longer continue to ignore. And that is why I
think we feel strongly that funding those and delineating that
is extremely important as part of this bill.
And, in fact, Operation Safe Commerce, I believe the report
has been sitting on your desk for some time, and I would like
to know when we are going to see that because that is essential
for us to be able to have the knowledge to move forward.
Mr. Jackson. I am not aware of the timing of the release of
the report. I was told that we are close to a conclusion of the
sum-up of the status of what we have learned so far in
Operation Safe Commerce. I would be happy to let you know
directly what the timetable of that is.
Senator Murray. If you could give us that quickly, I think
that is really essential for us to have that knowledge and move
forward.
Mr. Jackson. There has been, as you know, as a sponsor of
this program, a fair bit publicly released. The last phase of
it, I believe, is what has not yet been formally presented
publicly.
Senator Murray. We are waiting for that.
Mr. Jackson. Good.
Senator Murray. In your response to one of the questions
from Senator Lieberman on what you may disagree with, you
talked about the incentives for GreenLane post-incident. I
would just ask you: If an incident occurred today in the Port
of Seattle, for example, as I talked about earlier, how would
you resume--I assume everything would be shut down. What would
you do? How would you resume any kind of activity today?
Mr. Jackson. Well, I am not going to dodge your question,
but I will caveat it at one point by saying that a recovery
plan discussed in full complexity ought to be something that we
do in a classified environment so that we can preserve some of
the core assumptions about what happens and not unduly expose
our operational plan to those who might choose to do harm to
the country.
I would say in the structure of this is part of the
maritime domain awareness work that we have done. We have
drafted a plan on response and recovery. We did this in close
coordination with a wide array of external parties that
actually operate these businesses--our port security people,
captains of the port, port operators, terminal operators, and
others in the ocean carrier business and the shipping industry.
So there is a concept of operations which has been drafted
for this, and I would say that one of the keys is to decide
what the particular incident was and what is a measured
response to that type of incident. So let's say we have a Cole-
type of attack, which I believe is, in the hierarchy of
maritime threats, not an inconsequential concern. We would have
a different type of response to that, which would not, in my
view, shut down commerce automatically in order to be able to
respond to that type of incident.
If we had another type of attack, a nuclear explosion in a
container, that would be a higher level--and that is the
scenario that you discussed this morning already earlier. That
would be a higher level of response. Again, I am not certain
that we would automatically shut down the entire global system.
That is a step that I think we should take with some
substantial consideration before we leapt to that conclusion
that an attack is an automatic response there. But that would
certainly be at the high end or the far end of the equation of
risk and would require our most aggressive set of tools,
lockdown and other tools to be evaluated for that response.
Senator Murray. I think one of the holes that I know
Senator Collins and I have talked about is the resumption of
trade.
Mr. Jackson. Yes.
Senator Murray. Senator Coleman has mentioned it as well,
and I think it is very clear that we need a very strong regime
in place that we are all confident, whether it is an incident
small or large, that we know who is in charge, who is going to
be called on, and how that is going to be resumed. So that is
why it is part of it.
Mr. Jackson. In our substantial alignment comment, let me
just say I think we are aligned on your concerns in the bill on
that score, producing a plan and having the right type of
opportunity to share both the public and a classified version
with our authorizers and appropriators and other important
committees on the Hill.
Senator Murray. All right. In my few seconds left, you also
responded about delineating timelines because technology might
change as well, and I think all of us totally understand that
there is a lot of great technology out there. But as someone
who grew up without a color television because my Dad was
always waiting for the better one to come along, I just think
it is really important that at some point we make a decision
and we move forward. And if new technology comes along, great,
but do not let that be the enemy of the good. So I think that
is important.
I thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you for your comments.
I, too, grew up without color television, but it is because
my father was colorblind and it did not matter to him.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here today. We
do look forward to working very closely with you and turning
substantial alignment into wholehearted support. So that is our
goal, and I do hope that you will devote significant time to
working with us because we do want to move this bill rapidly.
Mr. Jackson. Good. You have my personal commitment to work
closely with you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much.
I am now pleased to call forward our final panel of
witnesses. These witnesses bring great expertise in maritime
security and the security of the international supply chain.
Captain Jeffrey Monroe is the Director of the Department of
Ports and Transportation for the City of Portland, Maine. He is
a valuable advisor to me on all issues involving our ports, and
we consulted closely with him in drafting this legislation. In
addition to his responsibilities at home in Maine, Captain
Monroe also serves as the Chairman of the National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee.
M.R. ``Mic'' Dinsmore is the Chief Executive Officer of the
Port of Seattle. I had the opportunity of meeting Mr. Dinsmore
when I toured the port. He oversees the fastest-growing
container port in the United States--that was an important fact
that I learned during my trip--and he deserves much credit for
its growth. I know that Senator Murray and her staff have
worked very closely with him.
Andrew Howell is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Vice
President responsible for the Homeland Security Policy
Division. Mr. Howell has been the Chamber's principal spokesman
and strategist on issues including transportation security,
critical infrastructure protection, and cyber security, and we
are pleased to welcome you here today.
And, finally, last, but certainly not least, James Hoffa is
the General President of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters. He has led this organization since 1998, and he
represents a very important perspective on the issue of port
security from the perspective of truck drivers and others in
the transportation industry. And we look forward to hearing his
testimony, particularly on the long delayed TWIC program.
I thank you all for being here today, and I am going to
exercise the home State prerogative and start with Captain
Monroe.
TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JEFFREY W. MONROE,\1\ DIRECTOR, PORTS AND
TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE
Captain Monroe. Good morning, Chairman Collins and Members
of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security. It is a real
honor to be here, and my personal thank you to Senator Collins
for all the good work that you have done in supporting us in
the public sector in regard to homeland security.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Captain Monroe appears on page 75.
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Since my graduation from Maine Maritime Academy 30 years
ago, I have been involved in the supply chain, in the
international supply chain and domestic supply chain of this
Nation. Today, I am the Director of Ports and Transportation
for the City of Portland. We operate the Portland International
Jetport, also coordinate all the surface transportation system
around Portland, and obviously look after the Port of Portland,
Maine, and their municipal marine facilities.
The Port of Portland is the largest foreign inbound tonnage
transit port in the United States and ranks 25th among the top
100 ports in this country. I currently serve as Chairman of the
U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Safety Advisory Committee, a member
of the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, and I am
President of the North Atlantic Ports Association.
I appreciate the opportunity to come and talk about the
GreenLane Security Act. This bill is coming at a very critical
moment in port security and transportation logistics planning.
It is time to take a really serious look at international
cargo.
The GreenLane Maritime Security Act and its companion
legislation, the SAFE Port Act, we believe will greatly improve
international trade and certainly will enhance homeland
security. We do support the concept of joint operation centers
that are contained in the bill; however, as often as possible,
we think it is very critical that we do not need to duplicate
facilities. We know that there are many facilities already in
place. We have one in Portland, Maine, already that works very
well. And rather than creating a large set of duplications
where you have miscommunications and different organizations
working in different areas, we think they should all be
combined, and if they exist, to be enhanced. One size can fit
all no matter who it belongs to. Also, sharing allows us to do
something that is very definitive in emergency management, and
that is using resources for critical back-up locations.
We support the expansion of the Port Security Grant Program
and commend Senators Collins and Murray on the $400 million
level that is proposed in here. We would like to see funding
for some regular operations and training included, as well as
an expansion of authorized uses for those who need it. Not
every port is as wealthy as many of the major port authorities,
and many times municipal ports like ours or state-owned ports
have minimal resources, and it is a real struggle.
In a regional center, such as Portland, we would be unable
to comply with the Maritime Transportation Security Act without
grant support. We have been very fortunate that we have
received about $3.5 million, which otherwise would have had to
have been borne by the taxpayers of the city of Portland,
Maine, and that in competition with our schools and social
services.
I absolutely agree that these funds need to be designated.
There is no question that putting them all in the same pot will
create a real problem, and we have seen that time and time
again, and certainly in the realm of transportation where
commingled monies never get to where they are supposed to be.
Our port security grants have provided us with surveillance
and screening equipment, interoperable communications, back-up
power, and systems integration capabilities that allow us to
share resources and provide for layered facilities right at our
own docks and within our city. It involves all the
stakeholders, all the Federal, State, and local agencies. None
of this could have been funded locally.
We also believe that an Office of Cargo Security Policy
will be of great value. It lays the groundwork for the merging
of the many separate cargo security responsibilities that have
evolved since September 11.
We also believe that the best chance of finding problem
cargo is when it is loaded and not when it is on the dock. We
support the third tier of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism that offers additional benefits to validated
participants. And we also support the Container Security
Initiative.
But we believe that we are not concentrating all of our
efforts in the right place. Weapons of mass destruction do not
necessarily come in containers. Sometimes they come in other
locations. For example, we very rarely look at the millions of
automobiles that are imported into the United States. We
believe that these units can be brought into the United States
in component form, and a lot of new research is necessary, and
I am glad that the bill focuses on that.
We also believe that the almost 4-year delay in
implementing the TWIC is absolutely unnecessary and puts this
Nation's security at risk. To continue to operate without this
TWIC standard is an area of America's greatest vulnerability
and can no longer be tolerated. I cannot personally understand
why we could do this in aviation in a short amount of time and
haven't been able to do it in other areas of transportation.
We also believe that dynamic leadership by the Coast Guard
is required in each Area Maritime Security Committee that
brings stakeholders together in frequent and robust discussion
and exercises. That leadership in most cases is there. But we
noticed that a lot of the Federal agencies get a chance to
interact with each other but do not often get a chance to
interact with State, county, or city municipal officials, and
those folks have to be included in all of these mixes.
We continue to see the development of advisory committees
on any number of transportation and security issues, and these
are essential. The reality here, though, is that most of the
committees meet too seldom to be effective and are often
ignored by the agencies they advise.
Homeland Security is not about collecting all agencies
under one roof. It is about creating a system. And I often tell
people about my own experience being in aviation, being a
merchant mariner, having to go through four separate security
checks under Department of Homeland Security. I was very happy
that every time they found me clean, but the reality is it
should have never been necessary.
Ports are just one link in our transportation network. No
part of the system can be neglected or overemphasized,
particularly in restoring that system, if we do have an
incident. We talk about ports. We need to think in the concept
of total systematic restoration. Moving cargo or people by air,
water, rail, or road must be looked at collectively. Every part
of our total border system, including all of our land, air, and
sea ports of entry, must be monitored and managed completely
cohesively through a comprehensive partnership. That
partnership has to involve everyone who is in any way involved
in transportation security or law enforcement. The standard for
that partnership has to begin here in Washington, DC. Agencies
in Washington, DC, must work together, and that is very
important because that sets the standard and the tone for how
they will work locally.
I am often asked if we are better off than we were on
September 11. Yes, we are much better off and much better
prepared than we were. And, no, because most of what we have
created to address our security needs has become overly
bureaucratic and sometimes non-responsive.
If we really want to make homeland security effective, it
is time to trim our agencies to their fighting weights and set
them up with clear, very definitive goals and absolute
deadlines that help them to meet their responsibilities
quickly. For guys like me who are on the dock, or on the bus or
the train platform, or at the airport, we need a level of
efficiency that I had hoped would come a lot further than it
has today. Nearly all of the legislation you have proposed here
today and that has been mentioned in the past is good
legislation. But that legislation without dynamic
implementation is ineffective. If the lessons of the last 5
years have taught us anything at all, it is that we can be far
more effective and efficient in the protection of our Nation
than we already are. And I hope that all of this gets us to the
point where we can finally solve these problems and get to
where we need to be.
Thank you for your time today.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Dinsmore.
TESTIMONY OF M.R. ``MIC'' DINSMORE,\1\ CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
PORT OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Mr. Dinsmore. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and let me start
by saying to you and Senator Murray, Wow, tremendous leadership
in bringing this GreenLane legislation forward today. I have
sat here for 2 hours listening to many presentations, many
questions, and let me start by saying I am in awe. I have been
here many times for almost 40 years, long before my hair got
this color, and I cannot remember a time being more encouraged,
more proud of what you are doing in the U.S. Senate.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Dinsmore appears on page 79.
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Now, I have had the good fortune--a little bit of
background--of leading the Port of Seattle for almost 15 years,
and that is my daytime job. I also have other roles. I am in my
fifth year as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the
Pacific Northwest. I am in my second year as Chairman of this
Nation's Center for Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
and I share that with you only to say I get it. I have more
than a neophyte understanding of the economic alignment of what
you are talking about today, and it has been said so many ways
and so many times, our economic vitality of this Nation is at
risk unless we move forward with the creative leadership that I
have witnessed here today with you and your Committee and many
others.
So, almost 5 years ago, I think about what we did within 2
weeks, we, the Port of Seattle, with the open, active
endorsement of the five elected officials I work for, we were
back visiting with Senator Murray and said the following--we
have an airport and a seaport, a very unique institution. We
are public, yes, but at the end of the day we look more like a
Boeing and Weyerhaeuser than City Hall. We want to make a
difference. We have worked so closely with Senator Murray and
her leadership for almost 5 years. Are we better today than we
were 5 years ago, Jeffrey? Absolutely yes. Senator Coleman, we
are a long way from where we need to be, and thanks for your
comment.
We have been an active participant, hopefully an energetic,
supportive one of Senator Murray and this Nation, trying to
make our movement of people and commerce more safe and secure,
our Nation more safe and secure. We have been actively involved
in endorsing the tremendous amount of programs. Secretary
Jackson talked about CSI, C-TPAT, Operation Safe Commerce, so
we know it well. But here we are, the fact remains, almost 5
years later and finally, Madam Chairman, doing the right thing.
Now, I don't mean to pretend for a minute that this piece
of legislation is going to solve this tremendous challenge, but
it absolutely is the right thing to do. It is a means to an
end, helping this Nation be more safe and secure.
When I listened to the presenters before me, almost every
issue has been covered, but a couple I want to recall again.
Please continue your leadership, bring this issue to the U.S.
Senate for a positive vote so we can move forward because we
have to move forward. When I think about what we have not done
yet, we do not yet have an integrated system that ties together
with technology what needs to be done. And, yes, fortunately,
we are looking at, at the national level, local level, in
excess of 4.5 or 5 percent of containers. That is not the only
solution. We cannot slow down the movement of commerce, nor
should we. And I encourage you to move forward with your piece
of legislation that enhances the movement of cargo. But we need
the technology, and technology is clearly part of the solution.
Four and a half years ago, Senator Murray, we talked about
what do we need to do. Then and now there are three absolute
underpinnings of this legislation that I am so pleased with
your actions. One, it is about making this Nation more safe and
secure in the movement of commerce. Two, it is about
expediting, moving more effectively and efficiently the
movement of commerce. And, lastly, it is about doing something
that is indeed a public-private partnership, and it is
affordable. Everything I have heard you say today, Madam
Chairman, is directly supportive of those three comments. So I
applaud what you are doing again.
But I ask you to consider a couple more things as you move
this forward, both of which have been talked about.
Five years later, we still do not have protocols to get
this Nation up and running when and if there is an incident.
And I am both surprised, pleased, and delighted we have not had
an incident, but I think the clock is clearly ticking.
So I listened to Secretary Jackson, and I am a fan of what
he is doing in Homeland Security. But when and if there is an
incident, we are not going to be shut down for a day. We do not
have protocols, and it is not going to be just, well, let's
start again as we did our Nation's airports in 4 days. We are
going to be down a while. And if, in fact, we do not have
protocols, we are not going to get up and running in a manner
that we would all support. So we are talking weeks, perhaps
longer. So please push that forward. Let the industry be part
of the solution as you have in the past.
When I hear us talk about funding--and I applaud your
efforts. Is it $400 million, $500 million, $600 million? Please
make sure that whatever the number is it is adequate to
implement in a way in which we can all be proud of this piece
of legislation. And I must tell you, I am somewhat taken with
here we are today with tremendous support of the Federal
Government and leaders in front of me. We are spending order of
magnitude at the Federal level $8, $9, $10 billion a year in
our Nation's airports. So when I hear us talk about $400 or
$500 or $600 million, I suggest where we are vulnerable today
is not at our Nation's airports. It is clearly at our Nation's
seaports.
So let me end where I began. Your leadership has been
extraordinary. I applaud you, and please keep doing the heavy
lifting that we so desperately need. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Howell.
TESTIMONY OF ANDREW HOWELL,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY POLICY, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Mr. Howell. I would like to thank Chairman Collins and
Senator Lieberman for the opportunity to testify here today.
Before I continue, I would ask that my full statement be
submitted for the record.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Howell appears on page 85.
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Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Mr. Howell. By way of background, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce is the world's largest business federation,
representing more than 3 million companies around the world.
Our membership encompasses direct corporate members of all
types and sizes, trade and professional associations, State and
local Chambers of Commerce, and 104 American Chambers of
Commerce abroad in 91 countries.
The Chamber appreciates the Committee's continued efforts
to bring attention to the important issue of supply chain
security. Clearly, the Chamber believes that ensuring the
security of our citizens should be America's first priority.
And in the maritime security arena, while we have certainly
made progress, there is obviously more work to be done.
We commend Chairman Collins and Senator Murray for
introducing the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act. Although
we have some very real concerns with aspects of the bill, the
legislation by and large represents a reasoned approach to the
issue. We especially appreciate the attempt to provide
incentives for businesses to adopt even more robust security
practices.
This approach is consistent with the multi-layered, risk-
based approach that the Department of Homeland Security uses to
address supply chain and maritime security. The legislation
builds on the strength of successful programs established by
Customs and Border Protection, including the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, commonly referred to as C-TPAT.
Moreover, the United States has worked cooperatively with
other countries through the Container Security Initiative and
the World Customs Organization's Security Framework.
Through such partnerships and on their own, U.S. companies
have spent a great deal of time, effort, and money on improving
supply chain security. Congress should recognize that companies
have taken and continue to take voluntary measures to address
key security concerns at their own expense.
Although the programs mentioned above do have room for
improvement, we believe that they have individually helped
improve supply chain security. And when taken in aggregate,
they form effective layers of improved supply chain security.
One of the reasons our members tell us these programs have
been so successful is that they are not one-size-fits-all
solutions. Unlike regulatory regimes, these voluntary programs
recognize differences among and between industries and modes of
transportation and affirm that what works in one sector or
company may not work in others. Flexibility is key to their
success.
This bill would eliminate this flexibility, which leads me
to our chief concern: The proposal to regulate the now
voluntary C-TPAT program. We strongly oppose the idea of
regulating a program that has been successful precisely because
of its voluntary nature. Provisions that would require the
Secretary to promulgate regulations that describe minimum
requirements, program tiers, and program benefits of C-TPAT and
GreenLane, respectively, run counter to how our member
companies have built their security programs. This would
actually damage the cooperative nature of the program and limit
the ability of both government and those who move goods
globally to evolve in an ever-changing security, economic, and
technology environment.
Our second concern with the legislation relates to the
confidentiality of information collected from businesses. While
provisions in this bill would authorize the government to
collect information about business operations and security
procedures, there are insufficient safeguards against the
unwarranted distribution of the information or data.
Third, we believe this legislation would impose
significantly new compliance burdens on small and medium-sized
firms. As written, the legislation does not adequately address
the regulatory compliance costs that would be imposed upon such
firms.
Finally, we question the wisdom of permitting new third-
party validations of supply chain security practices of C-TPAT
participants. The use of third-party validators raises issues
of cost, confidentiality, and practicality. Instead, we believe
Congress should give CBP the necessary resources to conduct the
needed validations.
In addition to needing additional validations, realizing
the benefits of the GreenLane concept requires new technology.
As some of you may recall, last year former Customs and Border
Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner laid out his vision of
some basic requirements for C-TPAT in order to achieve true
GreenLane status. In his words, ``No inspection upon arrival--
immediate release.'' Most critical among these requirements was
the use of some form of smart box technology to detect and
record whether tampering has occurred with a container seal
after being affixed at the point of origin.
This technology, referenced in Section 10 of the
legislation as ``Container Security Devices,'' is a critical
element in making the GreenLane concept a reality.
Over the past year, DHS has conducted tests on technologies
designed to track, monitor, and secure containers against
compromise. The Department has been very clear that before
incorporating these devices into any government-sponsored
programs, they must meet a strict 1-percent or lower false
positive threshold. We agree wholeheartedly with this
requirement.
At the same time, we hope that policymakers avoid mandating
any one technology solution, allowing the private sector to
choose particular solutions that best fit the needs of their
business operations. Technology neutrality is central to
fostering competition, innovation, and effective solutions.
Also, DHS must conduct a cost/benefit analysis to ensure
that buyers will see an acceptable return on investment.
Finally, policy and operational requirements for container
security devices must be established in order to gain the
confidence of the trade community. To the extent that this
legislation focuses DHS to finally make decisions in this
critical area, we applaud the Committee's efforts.
In conclusion, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and our member
companies fully support the goal of continually improving the
security of maritime supply chains. In fact, American companies
spend billions of dollars toward this end every year. To the
extent that this legislation reinvigorates the policy debate
and helps DHS make long overdue decisions, we thank and
congratulate you. However, we remain concerned with a number of
provisions in this legislation, especially the regulation of C-
TPAT. We hope that any bill that emerges from this Committee
would address the points that we have raised here today.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our views. We stand
ready to assist you as you move forward, and we would be
pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Hoffa.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. HOFFA,\1\ GENERAL PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Mr. Hoffa. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman, Members of the
Committee, thank you for having me here today. My name is James
P. Hoffa. I represent 1.4 million members who are very
concerned about the issues of cargo and port security. I
commend you and Senator Murray for your efforts to introduce
the GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act and for holding these
hearings because I think they are very important at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffa appears on page 94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My written statement includes specific comments about
sections of the bill. It is extremely important that these
issues receive the public airing that they really deserve.
Let me start by saying what the Teamsters believe. We
believe that American ports should be run by Americans. We
believe that port security should be managed by Americans. We
believe, as it stands now, that American ports are extremely
vulnerable. And we believe that something should and can be
done. The GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act will address
many of the current vulnerabilities.
These additional security protocols will improve cargo and
port security in the future, but steps must be taken now to
improve port security. Our union has been sounding the alarm on
these issues for decades. Because of the Dubai debacle, our
Nation is now focused on port security. And I am here to say
let's not lose that focus.
I would like to talk about something I know something
about: The labor force that works in our ports.
When a container comes off a ship, a longshoreman moves the
container within the port to the container yard. From there, a
port driver, a truck driver, picks up the container and leaves
the port for final delivery. Longshoremen are regular employees
that report every day to a hiring hall. They are the same
people every day. But it is not clear who manages the port
truck drivers. There are over 100,000 port truck drivers that
outnumber all the other people that work at the ports, but
there is no employer, no chain of control, and no
accountability. And the faces of these drivers change daily.
That would be unacceptable at any airport. We are really
playing Russian roulette with our Nation's security.
There has been an intense congressional and media focus on
funding infrastructure and improvements to protect our maritime
ports, and that is as it should be. But no matter how high we
build fences or how many Coast Guard cutters patrol the
harbors, our ports remain vulnerable when the gates are left
wide open. And that is the situation at most of our U.S. ports
today.
Former Coast Guard officer Stephen Flynn, in his recent
report to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that our
Nation's ports are the weak link of port security. They are our
Achilles heel.
A recent unpublished report by the Department of Homeland
Security found that over half of the 9,000 truck drivers at the
Port of New York and New Jersey have criminal records,
including smuggling, and over 500 were driving without valid
commercial licenses. And it gets worse.
In an effort to ratchet down the rates that truck drivers
are paid, the industry uses container-hauling companies who
contract with drivers who are exploited by making only $5 to $7
an hour; driving unsafe, polluting vehicles; hauling
dangerously overweight containers; operating without driver's
licenses; many of them have no insurance, no hazmat
certificates, and who are regularly forced to violate wage and
hour laws.
This is the dirty little secret of the maritime import/
export business. You may not have known this, and the public
and press may not have known this. But the port authorities and
the terminal operators all know it.
They know that the annual turnover rates for these truck
drivers is close to 140 percent, compared to 2 or 3 percent
with unionized truck drivers. The steamship lines have posted
incredible profits, increasing 100 to 200 to 400 percent, while
most of the drivers struggle just to survive.
And the industry also knew that something was critically
wrong in Los Angeles and Long Beach when dozens of trucks were
abandoned, effectively shutting down the terminals, when the
INS showed up at the gates.
The industry also knew that something was terribly wrong at
the Port of Miami when drivers boycotted the ports in the year
2000 and 2004 to protest trucking companies engaged in
insurance fraud.
And the industry knows that the reason one-third of the
drivers in the Port of Savannah get daily passes is the fact
that they cannot pass the background checks that you need to
get a permanent pass.
There can really be no port security when the industry
promotes a system where motor carriers operate with pirate
companies, when they employ drivers who cannot find work in the
regular trucking industry, all in the name of providing low-
cost trucking services.
The industry uses the excuse that these drivers are not
their employees. They claim the drivers are contractors or
independent contractors for container-hauling companies and
subcontractors with foreign-owned steamship lines. Like our
airports, every one of these ports is controlled by a public
authority. They must take responsibility. They must operate as
stewards for the public good and place national security first.
Reasonable people can debate the issue of independent
contractors, but we also know one other thing: That we really
have to have security at our ports. The current system is a
security nightmare. It allows port drivers to be treated like
sharecroppers on wheels. Most importantly, the independent
contractor system means that no one in the industry takes
responsibility for these drivers and the cargo that they
deliver.
Contrast this with the movement of cargo within the port
itself. The U.S. Customs ruled a long time ago. In 1993, they
said we are not going to use independent contractors because it
is too dangerous to have them move cargo within the U.S.
Customs facilities. Customs rejected the use of independent
contractors because of the lack of control, and it meant that
no one was responsible in the supply chain. And that is exactly
my point. Someone must be responsible for these drivers.
So why are these issues of concern for national security?
Because these drivers are ruled by fear. Drivers operating
illegally in our ports or operating at or near bankruptcy are
vulnerable to blackmail and bribery. They are susceptible,
knowingly or not, to people who would harm our country. They
are in a position to smuggle contraband or, God forbid, weapons
of mass destruction. As many port drivers operate under the
radar, they are in no position to report to the police a
violation if they did see one. This is the nightmare scenario
that none of us really want to see.
You know, there is a movie out that I have seen, and I hope
you all see it. It is called ``The Sum of All Fears,'' where a
nuclear device is smuggled into the port of Baltimore. And I
think it is instructive today with the environment we live in.
What is fiction today could be fact tomorrow. Could anyone have
imagined September 11, four airplanes hijacked simultaneously?
You would have said it couldn't happen, but it did.
Most experts agree that a terrorist attack at a major U.S.
port would cripple the entire Western economy, and,
unfortunately, many experts also say that it is not a matter of
if, it is a matter of when the next terrorist attack happens.
So since September 11, the shipping industry has avoided
dealing with these security issues. They think that close
scrutiny of the ports will increase the shortage of drivers. I
am here to say that there is something more important than the
companies' bottom line. You get what you pay for. Our Nation's
security should not be dependent on the highest bidder or the
lowest payer, especially if the highest bidder is the one who
wants to cut corners when it comes to safety and security.
Congress must authorize the ports to set guidelines that
will eliminate the pirate motor carriers who operate in an
underground economy. As General President of the Teamsters, I
know our country can do better than allow critical
infrastructure to be at the mercy of companies who supply
unqualified and uninsured drivers, companies who pay no FICA,
no unemployment taxes, no workmen's compensation. These
companies are undercutting the possibility of legitimate
carriers competing for this important business. As soon as
legitimate carriers enter the process, thousands of drivers who
can pass security tests will line up for good jobs and deliver
good services in a secure environment. Legitimate
transportation companies have these obligations to their
workers.
The system we have now is bad for our ports and bad for
America. If Congress forces the industry to clean up its act,
you will have a workforce that can pass security checks, a
workforce that will be trained, efficient, and productive, a
workforce that will be the eyes and ears of our ports and
report any violations to the authorities.
The solution to improving port security is to stabilize the
workforce, the 100,000 port drivers. Give them employee status.
Give them decent pay. Make them legitimate. Give them a stake
in the American dream.
On behalf of the Teamsters, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today. I think it is very important what you are doing,
and sitting here today listening to all the comments has been
very instructive, and I think we all share the common goals of
a safe America. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I am going to call on Senator Coleman for his questions. I
am going to have to leave shortly to go to the floor to offer
an amendment to the immigration bill. But I will be submitting
questions for the record to each of you, and I want to thank
each of you for your helpful testimony.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First, Mr. Hoffa, in your written testimony you talked
about--you didn't talk about it in the oral testimony, but I
want to thank you for raising the issue of checking empties. It
is something we do not talk about, and I am sure the folks
operating ports understand this. So much of our focus has been
what is coming in, but then containers come back, and I would
be interested in the percentage, somewhere along the way there
is a very significant number of percentages going back as
empties. Does anybody have any information on what that number
is?
Mr. Dinsmore. Out of the Northwest, I would say order of
magnitude 30 to 40 percent. And let me assure you, Senator, we
are checking every one.
Captain Monroe. The same thing on the Northeast. It is
about 40 percent, and you can be sure that every one of those
empties are checked.
Senator Coleman. One of the concerns that we had in the
Subcommittee is the ability to smuggle materials to create a
dirty bomb into this country, and the concern is if you want to
shut down a port, it may be easier on the way back. So I just
think it is something that we have to take a closer look at. I
have not looked at that as extensively, but, clearly, when you
have 30 or 40 percent going back as empties, we have to be
focused on every step along the way.
Mr. Howell, just one comment about C-TPAT. I do not read
this bill as regulating C-TPAT, as simply ensuring that there
is some legislative specificity to say we are going to do C-
TPAT. It is still a voluntary program. Where I may disagree--
and I am not sure we are disagreeing. Perhaps that is my
question. C-TPAT, in effect, gives you a free ride, pretty
close to a free ride. You are part of C-TPAT, the chance of
your cargo being inspected significantly drops. And so we have
an interest in there being specific standards. It is voluntary,
but if you participate, you are going to get certain benefits.
Is there any question that we need to ensure that those who are
involved, voluntarily work in C-TPAT, live up to the highest
level of security? And today the problem is we just are not
checking that. We have not been verifying it. Do you disagree
with the need to verify the process, procedures that folks are
using for C-TPAT?
Mr. Howell. Senator, I would argue those are two separate
issues, the first issue being baseline criteria for C-TPAT and
for the different tiers of C-TPAT. CBP has, in fact, published
that and made it available on their website, and those baseline
criteria are the criteria that C-TPAT participants must hit.
On the validations piece, separate issue, but we do believe
emphatically that CBP should be conducting validations of C-
TPAT participants, and maybe an appropriate next step is to
more robustly fund CBP to perform more of those validations.
And if the risk management model supports doing more of that,
we are all for it because we believe this voluntary program is,
again, one layer in a multi-layered security strategy, but an
important one to make sure that it is, in fact, validated going
forward against those baseline criteria as set by CBP.
We do not view there being a compelling need to go through
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking process to lay out those
criteria.
Senator Coleman. So I am still trying to understand what
would you find as overly burdensome or regulatory in what is in
this bill? I am just not seeing that this bill is doing that
kind of regulating. It is simply saying, we want to make sure
that C-TPAT is there regardless of whether there are changes in
Administration or changes with the head of DHS. We want to make
sure this program is part of that layered security system that
we have.
Mr. Howell. We see it being, again, a voluntary program
where the criteria are published on the CBP website now, and
going through the Administrative Procedures Act in order to
regulate those benefits in our view eliminates flexibility and
does not allow us to, on a dime, shift and change security
strategies as may be appropriate as threats and technology
evolve. We view the flexibility of the criteria as set on the
website and as continually evolving over time as being the
appropriate step to take.
Senator Coleman. I would submit the legislation does not
create the problems that you are reflecting. I think we agree
with where we want to go on this. We just want to make sure
that there is a C-TPAT that is there, regardless of who is in
charge, and that, in fact, there are the highest levels, that
we are going to push the Department to make sure that this is
validated, that it works.
Let me just switch gears and perhaps across the board. One
of the benefits in the Hong Kong ICIS program is that you have
a system that demonstrates the potential to screen 100 percent
of the containers that come through. They are all checked with
radiation portal monitors as well. There are questions about
how that is used and not used. But one of the key factors here
is that the private sector--this was done without Homeland
Security grants. The private sector did that.
Do you think that there is the appetite in this country for
the private sector to be a full paying partner in the creation
of programs like ICIS in any of our ports?
Mr. Dinsmore. Senator, I would suggest to you that what you
saw and I have seen many times in Hong Kong is a partial
solution, including perhaps ICIS. But to your question, is
there an interest in the generic maritime industry to know
there has to be a financial partnership? Yes. To what degree
and how do we make sure that it is really about value-added?
Quite candidly--and we have said it. We have listened to it
many times. Putting the emphasis back on the offshore port both
with the X-ray and with the radiation portal because, quite
candidly, the incident you know about last night in Seattle,
where 21 people came into our harbor, a tragedy and an irony,
Customs Border Patrol had flagged that container, which is the
good news. The bad news, they are here. So it could have very
easily been a very different set of circumstances.
Captain Monroe. I have to agree with Mr. Dinsmore. I think
the reality here is that there is a blatant economic self-
interest on the part of the carriers to make sure that their
cargo gets from Point A to Point B with no issues. And, while
the industry is always looking for ways to cut its costs, I
think they recognize that this is a critical part of their
business and that they need to look at this. And I think they
would be willing to participate in it.
Mr. Howell. And if I could just add, companies have every
incentive in the world to protect their people, their property,
and their assets. And finding the best ways to do that is what
we really need to engage in a public-private partnership to
make sure we do going forward.
Mr. Hoffa. I disagree. I think that what we have is a
record here of people trying to cut costs, and when it comes to
the most important part, these 100,000 truck drivers that are
on the docks, what have we seen? We have seen people shirk
their responsibility, want to pay them the lowest wages, get
people that are unqualified, and basically to save money to
make--to fatten their bottom line. So I do not think that this
is working. That is why we have to have legislation or help
that basically says we have to make these concessions where
they have to hire people who are responsible. Take this TWIC
program, move that out where more and more people have to have
their backgrounds checked, that is going to get you a higher
quality of people. And I do not think the voluntary system is
working because we have a record of years and years and years
of cost-cutting and these sharecroppers on wheels. It is not
working for the truck drivers.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you very much, and thank you for
all the work you have done on this really important issue.
I want to thank all of our witnesses today. I think this
has been an extremely valuable hearing that establishes a very
good record for us to proceed forward in marking up the
legislation, and I appreciate your sharing your expertise with
us.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 days for the
submission of additional statements, materials, and questions.
Again, my thanks to all of you.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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