<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:82668.wais]
AIRPORT BAGGAGE SCREENING: MEETING GOALS AND ENSURING SAFETY--ARE WE ON
TARGET?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 7, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-134
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
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____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on August 7, 2002................................... 1
Statement of:
DeCosta, Ben, general manager, Hartsfield International
Airport, Atlanta, GA....................................... 8
Stefani, Alexis M., Assistant Inspector General for Auditing,
U.S. Department of Transportation; Stephen J. McHale,
Deputy UnderSecretary of Transportation for Management and
Policy; and Willie Williams, Federal Security Director,
Hartsfield International Airport........................... 36
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana, prepared statement of.......................... 4
DeCosta, Ben, general manager, Hartsfield International
Airport, Atlanta, GA, prepared statement of................ 13
McHale, Stephen J., Deputy UnderSecretary of Transportation
for Management and Policy, prepared statement of........... 61
Stefani, Alexis M., Assistant Inspector General for Auditing,
U.S. Department of Transportation, prepared statement of... 39
AIRPORT BAGGAGE SCREENING: MEETING GOALS AND ENSURING SAFETY--ARE WE ON
TARGET?
----------
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
College Park, GA.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:04 p.m., in
the Council Chambers Room, College Park City Hall, 3667 Main
Street, College Park, GA, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton and Barr.
Staff present: Kevin Long and Gil Macklin, professional
staff members; and Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk.
Mr. Burton. Good afternoon. A quorum being present, the
Committee on Government Reform will come to order.
I ask unanimous that all Members' and witnesses' written
and opening statements be included in the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and
tabular material referred to be included in the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
We have two panels today. Mr. DeCosta will be the first
witness on the first panel. We want to try to keep the opening
statements between 5 minutes--we will have a little latitude,
up to 10 minutes, but if you could stick close to that, we
would really appreciate it because we do have a lot of
questions we would like to ask.
First of all, I would like to thank my vice chairman, Bob
Barr, for suggesting this timely and important meeting. Airport
security is one of the most important issues that Congress is
facing and that we have had to deal with in the last year. I
cannot think of any place in America where airport security is
a more pressing issue than here at the Nation's busiest
airport, Atlanta Hartsfield International. And I want to tell
you, when I got off the plane today, I have no doubt that this
is the busiest airport in the country.
I want to welcome our witnesses here today. We look forward
to hearing your testimony. Today's hearing comes at a critical
juncture in our national effort to improve aviation security
and prevent future terrorist attacks. It is important to
reassure the flying public that our airports, our planes and
our aviation system are safe.
Like my colleague, Mr. Barr, I fly at least twice a week
almost every week. We know first hand the impact that September
11th has had on our airports and on the travelers in
particular. We know that some of the critical elements of
developing a seamless transportation security system have not
yet come together.
This hearing is being held to address the looming deadline
that we have before us for screening checked baggage. Before
September 11th, we did not have a system for screening checked
baggage for bombs. We had a vulnerability that we were not
addressing. For more than a decade, I have advocated increasing
our use of bomb sniffing dogs at airports and we had a
difficult time getting that accomplished. But because we did
not have a crisis, it was very hard to get people to pay
attention. After September 11th, everything changed.
Last fall, we passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act. It set a deadline of December 31st this year to
have explosive detecting machines up and running at every
airport. This is an extremely tough deadline, these machines
are very expensive. Construction will have to be done at the
airports, people have to be trained, and we are hearing from
more and more airports that this deadline simply cannot be met.
The House realized that there would be problems meeting
this deadline. I voted for that extension, not because airport
security is not a priority, but because the job has to be done
correctly. The Senate has not yet passed a similar extension.
What exactly will happen if the Senate does not act as we
did? It is my hope that our witnesses might be able to provide
some insight into that. One thing is certain, the flying public
should be reassured that aviation travel is still safe, even if
the deadline is extended.
I have been told that there are a number of screening
machines already produced, but there has been little thought
given to the challenge of installing the equipment, who is
going to pay for it and even which airports or where in those
airports we will be placing these SUV-sized machines.
Obviously, there is a lot of work yet to be done and not much
time left to do it.
During the intense debate we had in Congress last fall, I
supported having the Federal Government assume the passenger
screening function with Federal standards, Federal supervision
and Federal oversight. However, at the end of the day, we went
even further than that. We required that all airport screeners
become Federal employees. So we have given the administration
two herculean tasks to be done at the same time--hire tens of
thousands of Federal screeners and place thousands of bomb
detection machines in every airport in the country and all in
about 12 months. And I want to tell you, that is a big job.
As many of my colleagues predicted, the TSA has been
consumed with hiring an army of more than 30,000 Federal
workers. Right now, only nine airports are Federalized and only
about 4,500 persons have been hired at this date. I am told
that the TSA is working feverishly toward meeting Congress'
passenger screening mandate of November 19, 2002. But we must
ask ourselves honestly what happens if this bureaucracy is not
in place by then.
It is now being estimated that as many as 67,000 Federal
employees will be required and I understand 45,000 has been
approved by the Congress and approved by the Office of
Management and Budget. That includes 33,000 for passenger
screening and 21,000 to run the explosive detection machines.
I, for one, would like to know why those numbers have gone up
so much.
Finally, we must address these pending aviation security
issues. Airports want answers. Airlines need answers and we owe
the American traveling public answers. We cannot allow the
prospect of 3 and 4 hour passenger waits for security risks and
checks. We cannot further damage our aviation industry with the
number of major air carriers on the brink of bankruptcy. We
have a responsibility to deploy the most effective aviation and
transportation security system possible, and because of the
terrorist activity and the possibility of terrorist activity,
we do not have any other choice.
One thing is very important. We have got to have local
input. We need to know how our decisions are affecting the
people who are going to have to run our airports and that is
why hearings like that are very important.
That is why I am glad we have Mr. DeCosta, the manager of
the Hartsfield International Airport here today--we appreciate
you being here, sir. We need to know what we can do to help you
do your job better. Can you meet the December 31, 2002 deadline
or even December 31, 2003? That is the deadline that we passed
in the House that has not yet been approved by the Senate. What
happens if the Senate does not extend the deadline, as we have?
And more importantly, what steps are being done right now--
taken right now to screen baggage.
In closing, I would like to once again thank my committee
vice chairman, Bob Barr, for inviting me down to his State and
district to hold this important hearing.
Mr. Barr, I understand you have an opening statement, we
will recognize you right now.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82668.002
Mr. Barr. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Both
personally and as vice chairman of this subcommittee, I
appreciate very much your taking time during this district work
period, in which your time and expertise is demanded, not only
in your home district, but as chairman of this committee, in
various locations around the country. We appreciate very much
your taking some time from that very busy schedule to be with
us here in Atlanta. I would like to welcome you to the Atlanta
area, to Georgia, you are always welcome here to enjoy some
Southern hospitality, Mr. Chairman.
I would also like to extend a personal welcome to Ben
DeCosta, who manages not only the world's busiest airport, but
in many of our opinions, the best airport in the world. We know
that is a constant challenge to juggle the sometimes competing
demands of running the world's busiest airport, but in my
experience, as Mr. Burton has said, somebody who frequents
Hartsfield with far more frequency than a lot of our families
would like, I really do appreciate the manner in which
Hartsfield has been run and continues to be run, and the manner
in which you are attempting to meet the very, very difficult
challenges that have presented themselves by the aftermath of
September 11th.
Since the events of last September, the administration and
Congress have worked together to mobilize the necessary funds,
intelligence and personnel to track terrorists at home and
abroad, and to strengthen the Nation's security infrastructure
to meet and neutralize the threat that they pose.
Many of the post-September 11th airline security issues
were addressed in the Aviation Security legislation adopted
several months ago. This important legislation targeted
specific security concerns, including access to secure areas of
airports; cargo security; use of explosives detection
equipment; baggage screening; training to improve the
performance of security screeners; and background
investigations of airport and airline employees.
The House has approve spending over $1 billion for the
physical modification of commercial service airports, for the
purpose of installing checked baggage explosive detection
systems and other security upgrades.
The luggage screening plan for Hartsfield calls for an in-
line system, with built-in enhanced and expanded baggage
handling rooms throughout the airport. This design allows the
Transportation Security Administration [TSA], to install and
operate the explosive detection system without decreasing the
public space available to passengers in the airport terminals.
The project provides a permanent solution, integrated with
airline and airport operations, and avoids any temporary or
make-shift design or procedures, outstanding achieve 100
percent checked luggage screening.
This comprehensive security upgrade has proved to be a
massive undertaking for our country's airports, including the
Nation's busiest, Hartsfield International. Hartsfield, in
particular, as a major hub in our Nation's domestic aviation
system, will be greatly affected by the requirements of this
Federal legislation. The most recent statistics show this
airport served over 6.5 million passengers just through May of
this year. Hartsfield officials are responsible for redesigning
and constructing new security checkpoints, deploying
sophisticated new equipment, and hiring and training scores of
new employees--all while attempting to minimize the
inconvenience to passengers.
Today, we will hear from Hartsfield General Manager Ben
DeCosta, who has estimated the TSA will need to hire 1,500
people to screen baggage at the checkpoint and at the gates. He
has well-founded concerns with the balance between deadlines,
passenger delays and meeting the substantive requirements of
the law.
Mr. DeCosta is not the only aviation official who has
communicated such concerns. Given the bill's aggressive
timetable and deadlines, many airline officials have
communicated similar concerns. In July, officials from 39
airports across the country wrote Transportation Secretary
Mineta, asking him to work with them to achieve a more
reasonable deadline. The letter warned of ``harried
installations'' of explosive detection machines in airports
that have little space for new equipment.
Moreover, the results of a recent survey conducted among
airport executives by the American Association of Airport
Executives, showed an overwhelming majority, some 78 percent,
of the airport executives surveyed, believed the Congress
should move back the December 31, 2002 deadline mandating all
airports and airlines screen checked luggage for explosives;
not to avoid meeting the substantive need for full screening of
luggage, but to ensure a more realistic timetable within which
to meet the those substantive requirements.
Based on these concerns and the problems the Department of
Transportation is expected to encounter in meeting that second
deadline, the House approved an extension of the December 31,
2002 deadline. H.R. 5005, the bill to establish the Department
of Homeland Security, contains a provision to extend that
deadline for screening all checked airline baggage for
explosives.
It is critical to note, however, this does not mean there
will be gaps or threats to air travel safety. On the contrary,
if the deadline extension is ultimately signed into law,
airlines and airports will have a number of options to choose
from in the interim. These options include using explosive-
detection machines, using bomb-sniffing dogs, increasing hand
searches by security officers, and so-called bag matching, by
which every bag is matched to an actual passenger on the plane.
While airports work toward full deployment of explosive
detection machines, the TSA has assured the flying public that
other screening measures will serve during the interim, and
wherever the machines are available, they will be used as close
to full time as possible. This makes much more sense than
spending hundreds of millions of dollars right now, only to
discard such equipment in the near future, as the newer and
better equipment is made available, and then have to spend all
that money again a second time.
In short, the deadline extension implies no vulnerability.
We can and must work together to provide the means and
capability for airports such as Hartsfield to meet the new
security requirements. Deadline or no deadline, the safety of
the flying public is our ultimate goal.
I want to again thank Chairman Burton for calling this
important hearing and for coming to Atlanta to chair this
hearing personally. I also wish to thank General Manager Ben
DeCosta for his continued leadership in this area. I look
forward to hearing from all the witnesses on the progress made
here at Hartsfield, on the outstanding demands, and what the
Congress can do to assist airports in meeting aviation security
needs.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Before we go to Mr. DeCosta, I would like to thank the
mayor of College Park, GA, Mr. Longino, for being so hospitable
by letting us use this chamber today. And I would also like to
thank Gary Wade, who is the director of the Air Marshal Service
for being so hospitable to us, we really appreciate your help,
and your staff, Gary; thank you.
With that, would you rise, Mr. DeCosta, to be sworn?
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Do you have an opening statement, sir?
Mr. DeCosta. Yes, I do.
Mr. Burton. OK. Well, I told you before the meeting that we
would like to stay close to 5 minutes, but I understand that
you may take a little longer, so we will try to be
understanding.
Mr. DeCosta. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF BEN DECOSTA, GENERAL MANAGER, HARTSFIELD
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ATLANTA, GA
Mr. DeCosta. I would like to thank Chairman Burton and
Congressman Barr for hosting this hearing. This is an important
national issue and we really appreciate your leadership on the
issue.
As the world's busiest airport, more than 75 million
passengers annually pass through our gates. With economic
impacts of $16.8 billion annually, we are also the largest
single economic engine in the State of Georgia or the
southeast. In short, Hartsfield is very important to America.
We want to do everything we can to ensure the safety of our
passengers and visitors and protect the viability of Hartsfield
for the Nation.
Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today to
share our experience with enhanced security measures at
Hartsfield. We also would like to share our views regarding the
best approach for the Transportation Security Administration to
meet the 100 percent bag screening requirements mandated by
Congress.
In this post-September 11th environment, it is essential
that we do all we can to enhance security at our Nation's
airports and to restore and maintain the confidence of the
traveling public. Our economy depends on it.
We have fully implemented all necessary security measures
to further enhance our security program at Hartsfield. On
September 11th, we increased our law enforcement support by 300
percent, thanks to the tremendous support received from the
city of Atlanta Police Department, Federal law enforcement
agencies and other local municipalities. The Clayton County
Police Department, for example, actively patrolled the outer
perimeter of the airport during the initial stages of the
recovery. The mutual aid received from these agencies allowed
us to quickly resume operations. We also welcomed the
deployment of the Georgia Sky Guards to assist in the
monitoring of security screening operations. We were also
pleased when Guardsmen were given authority to support our law
enforcement officers in other areas of the airport such as the
concourses.
The airport community has responded also very positively to
our increased security awareness through its involvement in our
airport security consortium. Our consortium, under the
leadership and direction of our Aviation Security Manager, Mr.
Richard Duncan, who is here with me today, meets regularly to
review security directives and assess their impact on airport
operations. The consortium developed plans for revalidating
security badges, searching incoming vehicles and reducing the
number of access portals, while maintaining our ability to
provide quality customer service to our passengers and to our
employees. We have devoted a tremendous amount of resources to
ensure the full implementation of the additional security
requirements at Hartsfield.
We believe that the Transportation Security Administration
has also made tremendous strides toward improving security at
airports across the Nation. In short order, they stood up a
brand new agency, they moved out and made partners of airports
and established these partnerships at many airports and others
in the aviation industry to assess the status of security while
planning a course to fully implement the provisions of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The organizing of a
new Federal agency, the establishment of recommendations, early
appointments of Federal security directors, the establishment
of TSA go-teams and the passenger screening checkpoint redesign
approach are all noteworthy accomplishments done in record time
by the TSA. At Hartsfield, beginning in March of this year, we
provided TSA consultants with the full support and cooperation
of my employees and our consultants, to make sure that they
would be successful or as successful as they could be in
meeting the November deadline for passenger screening. They
worked jointly with the TSA consultant team, Accenture, during
the ongoing checkpoint redesign. That redesign is continuing
and part of our checkpoint is actually undergoing
reconstruction. So we have made some good progress.
We believe that under the able leadership of our Federal
Security Director Willie Williams, the Federalization of the
passenger screening operation will be both effective and
timely.
The design for the passenger screening checkpoint
reconfiguration is underway and we understand that the hiring
of more than 1,400 TSA staff and supervisors is progressing.
While we do not yet have a firm date for the implementation--
that is the Federalization of the security checkpoint--the TSA
should meet the November 19th date for passenger screening at
Hartsfield, we believe. We are still working out a few issues
on the physical configuration and who pays for what, but we
think we will be successful in working out those details on
passenger screening.
With the appointment of Admiral Loy, we hope to strengthen
our partnership with the TSA as we forge ahead with the full
implementation of the statute requirements.
The implementation of 100 percent baggage screening
requirement is, unfortunately, not going as well. We continue
to cooperate with the TSA consultants, but with mixed results.
The cooperation, the attitude, the partnership is right, but
the approach is wrong. Rather than consider, in dialog with
airport management and our consultants, the best approach to
accomplish the baggage screening and enhanced security at
Hartsfield, TSA consultants have come to town with a
predetermined approach--the use of explosive trace detection
systems placed in our ticketing lobbies, rather than the more
effective x-ray type explosive detection systems [EDS],
integrated into our airline baggage systems. We believe that
the more effective approach at the world's busiest airport is
to make the baggage screening part of the airline baggage
system. However, TSA has pushed placing this function in
constrained ticket lobbies, where they will undoubtedly lead to
long lines and congestion.
What is needed is a more flexible approach by TSA. That we
think can only occur if Congress will provide the TSA and the
U.S. Department of Transportation with the guidance and
appropriate funding resources to accomplish this important
goal--let us do it right the first time.
The TSA has accelerated the planned implementation at
Congress' direction, of course. For the most part,
congressional deadlines have been very, very positive indeed.
You have energized the government, the airports, the airlines
to do a much better job and I think the results are becoming
more and more apparent. Except for the baggage screening, the
deadline tends to force us on an allegations path that leads us
which, in our view, is the wrong direction.
Section 110(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the
President on November 19th of last year, directed the Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security to take all necessary
actions to ensure that explosive detection systems are deployed
as soon as possible to ensure that all U.S. airports have
sufficient EDS to screen all checked baggage no later than
December 31, 2002--a very short time indeed. All systems
deployed are fully utilized. If EDS at an airport is
unavailable, all checked baggage is screened by alternative
means.
So the Congress has given us a chance to use more than one
approach and there is some flexibility. The alternative means
include the bag match program, manual search, K9 units and
other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary,
which of course would include the trace detection.
The safety and security of the traveling public should be
the overriding factor during the implementation of this section
of the act. We would propose to the TSA and its baggage
screening consultants a solution that would enhance passenger
safety and security while meeting the intent of the act.
However, the TSA and its consultants will not discuss or
consider our recommendations. They do not have time, they say.
At Hartsfield, we have proposed that the TSA develop and
implement with us an integrated and automated in-line EDS
solution that would be transparent to the public. An integrated
and automated EDS approach is the only workable solution to
address our large baggage volumes at the busiest airport in the
world, in our opinion.
We are developing plans to implement an integrated
explosive detection system for screening the bags. This system
can be in place, we believe, our planners are telling us--we
are working out schedules as we speak--we think we can do it in
between 18 and 21 months at a cost of probably over $100
million, maybe somewhere between $100 and $120. The numbers
keep moving as we are refining the approach. While an in-line
system has a higher initial capital cost, the long-term
benefits are significant. An automated in-line system, for
example: Requires one-sixth the number of employees to operate
as compared to trace detection solution at Hartsfield. Does not
add congestion to already constrained ticketing lobbies.
Provides redundancy in the case of mechanical failure. Does not
force passengers to wait in additional lines for security
screening. And allows flexibility to easily incorporate new
security technologies in the baggage handling system as they
become available.
We support H.R. 5005 and the provisions recommended by
Congresswoman Granger in the Homeland Security Bill that
extended the deadline for the EDS deployment to December 31,
2003. Of course, from my testimony, you know that we would have
difficulty having 100 percent deployment under our solution by
that date, but certainly we could get a good head start on the
right path rather than spending and wasting time on an interim
solution which we think is not as effective.
This provision in the Homeland Security Bill would allow
the TSA to consider our recommended integrated EDS approach and
would create a cost savings of about $25 million, or actually
somewhat more if you consider the cost of the interim solution
to TSA. You would not have to spend money on an interim
facility, demolish part of the terminal, which you would have
to replace, and you would end up saving the throw away cost on
the interim solution which would probably be more than $30
million.
In addition, the interim solution requires heavy staffing.
We estimate that you would need between 1,000 and 1,200 people
in the interim approach, whereas less than 200 would be needed
for the in-line integrated EDS system approach. With a fully
loaded cost of between $45,000 and $50,000 per person, you can
see that this additional staffing would cost the Federal
Government a considerable sum.
The TSA's interim plan calls for a combination of EDS and
explosive trace detection equipment in our crowded lobbies to
meet the deadline. This concept would result in higher
screening personnel requirements. And I mentioned that if it is
somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200, maybe you could do it
perhaps with somewhat less, but the cost would exceed $40
million a year at Hartsfield. And some analysts have estimated
that it would be over $1 billion nationwide.
Significant alterations to current check-in facilities and
processes that have a direct impact on passenger
responsibilities and their resulting travel experience would
occur with this trace detection system.
There also may be an increased requirement for explosive
ordnance disposal response because of false positives that may
result in the ticketing office. That is an operational issue
that needs to be explored further with TSA.
Additional and high density lines of passengers in and
outside the terminal building, which could conceivably create a
new target for terrorists.
We believe TSA should explore alternative means such as bag
match and emerging technology, to screen baggage while actively
pursuing--let me repeat--actively pursuing an integrated system
at the busiest of America's airports. Currently the required
number of EDS machines is not available. The TSA has stated
that it can increase production, however, we have not seen an
increase in the deployment of these systems. Nationwide, TSA
has deployed only about 6 percent of the total devices that are
needed for airports and so you can press forward to meet the
deadline but there are some challenges and difficulty in
actually meeting it in terms of the availability of needed
machines.
In order for the TSA to meet its schedule, it must purchase
and install EDS and ETD machines every 38 minutes between now
and December 31st of this year.
Let me skip over some of this, I know I am coming to the
end of my 10 minutes.
The Airport Alliance, consisting of 39 of the Nation's
airports has gone on record to request an extension of the 2002
deadline. Our intention is not to relax security, but to
enhance security. We firmly believe that the interim measures
to deploy the EDS equipment in lobbies and other spaces just to
meet the deadline is not the right approach. In fact, this
approach will create bottlenecks and safety hazards for our
customers. Simply stated, we may be creating a more lucrative
target for terrorists and other criminals.
In closing, airports throughout the Nation are committed to
protecting the safety and security of our passengers and we
fully support the TSA in our goal of strengthening the security
of aviation. But in the case of the 100 percent baggage
screening approach, the TSA plans to implement a program at
Hartsfield that will not give us the best security or
acceptable levels of customer service. The TSA must revisit its
solution for the world's busiest airport. An integrated and
automated checked baggage screening system is the right
solution for Hartsfield.
We fear that harried efforts will compromise efforts to
enhance security, frustrate our aims to increase capacity and
slow the return of the industry to financial health. We should
do the bag screening right the first time. We may not be able
to afford to do it over again.
Again, thank you very much for this opportunity to share
our views with you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DeCosta follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. DeCosta. It's a little
disturbing to me that you are having this kind of disagreement
with the TSA people. Were they recalcitrant when they talked to
you about your suggestions?
Mr. DeCosta. I would not use the word recalcitrant, because
they are highly professional people who are very smart and seem
to know their business. But they have been given a clear and
definite mission and that is to do 100 percent explosive
detection screening by the end of this year and are not
permitted, either by budget or by timeframe, to consider
various other modes of getting the job done, like the in-line
system.
Mr. Burton. When you were talking about the in-line system,
I am not sure I understood you correctly, but you said it would
take one-sixth of the employees once it was on line; is that
correct?
Mr. DeCosta. If you have what we think would be roughly 26
or 20 EDS machines installed in line in the baggage systems,
not in the lobbies, but below the ticketing lobbies, you would
run that entire process with less than 200 people. But if you
use the current TSA approach of putting trace detection
machines, of which there are over 160, in the ticketing
lobbies, you would need a work force to cover the full
operating day at Hartsfield of between 900 and 1,200 people.
Mr. Burton. And----
Mr. DeCosta. Of course, if you hired all of those people
and then you got the preferred approach implemented in 2 years
or less, then those people would have to be let go.
Mr. Burton. So you would have duplicative costs and you
would be wasting, what did you say, $30 million or----
Mr. DeCosta. Yes.
Mr. Burton. About $30 million?
Mr. DeCosta. Or more, on the interim solution. Those would
be sunk costs that would be of no use to you in 3 years after
you got your other systems up and running.
Mr. Burton. Well, when you discussed this with the TSA
experts that came down, what did they say about that? Is it
just because of the timeframe within which they have to work
that they are very concerned about getting on with it or is
it----
Mr. DeCosta. I think they are very committed to meeting
Congress' mandate of the deadline. The word has come down from
Congress through Secretary Mineta to each and every person at
TSA, that this deadline must be met. And so they are following
the directions they are given.
Mr. Burton. But the deadline could not be met if your
approach was adopted by the end of this year.
Mr. DeCosta. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. So long-term, your approach is far superior,
but in the short run, if we are going to protect the public as
quickly as possible, we ought to take a look at what they are
suggesting.
Mr. DeCosta. Well, I think what we should do is have a
combination of methods. You know, security of airports is much
better than it was last September 11th, and so security across
airports around the Nation will increase month by month as we
go forward. There is nothing magical about the December 31,
2002 date. What you should do is plan to increase security to
its highest level and rather than take an interim, you know,
step that will actually cost you more money and not deliver
what is in our view the highest level of security.
Mr. Burton. But you say there could be an amalgamation of
the two approaches that would be effective within a relatively
short period of time?
Mr. DeCosta. I think so.
Mr. Burton. What timeframe are you talking about?
Mr. DeCosta. I think if you start immediately on trying to
take care of your interim solution as the statute permits--the
statute does permit some flexibility. You use your hand
searches, your K9s and trace detection, but at the same time
you work on the real solution, you do not wait.
Mr. Burton. What I would like to have is a list of your
recommendations and your recommendation on how these two could
be integrated to give maximum security as quickly as possible
and yet impose these cost savings you are talking about and
still protect the flying public. So if you could get those to
us, since our committee oversees the entire government, I will
be very happy to make sure that Mr. Mineta and the people at
TSA get those and we will ask questions as to why they do not
see eye to eye with you in the approach and maybe we will get
some compromise that might be more helpful to you. We have
people from TSA here today of course and we are going to be
asking them questions about your statement as well.
With that, I see my time has expired. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeCosta, when you use the term in-line automated and
integrated system, what exactly do you mean? And could you
basically just sort of walk us through how such a system would
work, just very briefly?
Mr. DeCosta. You would have every bag that comes into the
system go into the baggage system and go through a bank of
somewhere between 10 and 13 CTX-9000 machines. Those machines,
on an automated basis, can detect whether or not there is an
explosive in the bag. And if the bag fails, then the bag comes
off line and is searched.
Now there are some false positives, and so the system is
designed to take the bag and have it reviewed, the image
reviewed, by an operator. That operator would either clear the
bag based on their intelligence of how these machines work or
then it goes into a second series of machines in which the
machine would then review it by x-ray technology to determine
whether that bag has in truth a bomb in it or whether it is a
false positive.
If the bag clears, it then is shipped back into the baggage
system and ends up on an aircraft. If the bag fails, either
because there is a bomb in it or there is a false positive, the
bag is taken off line and searched.
And so in this system, you can get most of the bags through
the system in an automated system and some residue of bags
would actually end up being searched by TSA officials to
determine whether the bag is safe.
Mr. Barr. Compare that walk-through with what TSA is
proposing.
Mr. DeCosta. They are proposing that when the passenger
comes into the ticketing lobby carrying their bags, they will
go to ticketing and then after ticketing, they will get in a
second line and be shepherded to trace detection machines which
are about this big [indicating], they could sit on this table.
A TSA official would then swipe the bag on the outside or
perhaps on the inside and it will pick up a fine residue of an
explosive material, if there is one in the bag of the people
who have handled the bag have handled this material. This
cotton or paper swab would then be placed into this explosive
trace detection machine, which would accept the vapor from the
materials. It is warm, if it detects certain chemicals that you
find in explosives, then it will alarm and you will know that
you have a problem.
Once that is done--and this takes a great deal more time,
of course, than through an automated system, then the bag will
have to be taken from that desk and then placed into the
baggage system.
The difference is in the accuracy of the approach and in
the time it takes to handle large portions of bags. Our fear is
that the trace detection methodology, if used wholesale,
would--for 100 percent--would result in very long lines,
especially if you were not able to staff all of the machines
available at the ticketing counters. And one of our concerns is
that of hiring this 1,000 people and keeping them on the job is
not a foregone conclusion. If you do not have this part of the
system which is labor intensive fully staffed, the lines will
back up, fill up our ticketing lobbies and people will be in
line out on the street.
Mr. Barr. Is this the same technology that currently is
available when you take your hand baggage through and there is
a problem or they, for whatever reason--you do not have to go
into the details of it here publicly--it is the same technology
that is currently being used for suspicious hand bags.
Mr. DeCosta. Yes. We do a sampling of baggage, hand bags,
coming through and do the trace detection for explosives.
Mr. Barr. For a hand baggage, I have kind of a general
impression of how long it takes, but how long does it take on
average for that process?
Mr. DeCosta. Well, for carry-on bags, it is pretty quick,
but for checked baggage, it would take I think considerably
longer.
Mr. Barr. Is that because of the size of the bags?
Mr. DeCosta. Well, especially if you open the bag and you
go through the inside of the bag with it. There are several
approaches--a closed bag approach, an open bag approach. One
takes more time than the other.
Mr. Barr. And this would be done--orient us to Hartsfield
right now, where would this be done, as you enter terminal A
or--the north or south terminal?
Mr. DeCosta. The north or south terminal, you would
approach ticketing, handle your ticketing transaction and then
move behind the ticketing counters--of course in your travel
through Hartsfield, you know there is no space there now, there
are offices behind those ticket counters. Those offices would
have to be demolished and that space would then be used for----
Mr. Barr. It is my impression even if you do that, you are
still not going to have very much space.
Mr. DeCosta. Probably not, especially if the throughput is
slow, which we would expect.
Mr. Burton. Let me just followup on Mr. Barr's questions.
You indicated that they might have to open the bags to do that
hand check with the explosive detection device. Do I deduct
from that if the bag was closed, there could be a bomb inside
that might not be detected if you did not open it up?
Mr. DeCosta. I would rather not speculate on this technical
area.
Mr. Burton. OK, well, in a public forum, I can--OK, we will
talk about that later, but the point is that is very
disconcerting because if you have got thousands of bags going
through and there is some question about the detection
capability of that system without the bags being opened, my
gosh, that would be like the Israeli system where they go
through everybody's bag one at a time before an airline
departure. I mean it would almost come down to that. So that is
something that we really need to look into and I would like to
talk to you about that problem probably privately in a closed
session. But we would like to have you give us in writing some
of the concerns you have that will be transmitted through our
committee directly to Mr. Mineta and the Transportation people
as well as TSA. But that raises a real question as far as I am
concerned.
Mr. Barr, if you have more questions, go ahead.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What are the benefits in the approach that you have just
outlined, the TSA is proposing? Are there any?
Mr. DeCosta. Yes, there are. One of the benefits is that
you can meet the deadline with it. For those people who feel
that is a sufficient benefit.
You could do this--you might be able to meet the deadline,
let me put it that way, because there is a lot of work to be
done between today and the end of the year to even implement
that option.
Mr. Barr. You say on page 13 of your testimony that TSA has
deployed only 6 percent of the total devices they will need at
airports. Why is that figure so low?
Mr. DeCosta. The manufacturers are trying to build as many
machines as they can as fast as they can and it is far from
certain that the manufacturing capacity is there, and then once
you have the machine, you also have to find a place to put it.
As you know, these are very large machines and you have to try
to wedge them into existing facilities, if you do not build out
those facilities. Building them out will not be done by the end
of the year, and so if you use the current EDS machines in
combination with trace, you will have to wedge these machines
into the present terminal.
Mr. Barr. Is there a demonstrably high false positive rate
for the current machines?
Mr. DeCosta. The current EDS machines, we have heard by
some researchers and commentators, have a high false positive
rate of between 20 and 30 percent.
Mr. Barr. How much?
Mr. DeCosta. Between 20 and 30 percent. I think my
testimony has the 30 percent number. That is what has been
reported in recent studies by the Reason Foundation. But you
could ask the TSA what has been their experience on false
positives.
But the system that the TSA and the airports are putting
together will take into account the false positive
characteristic of the machine, to make sure that at the end of
the system, that we are sure that we can protect the public
against explosives getting on aircraft.
Mr. Burton. If I might followup with a couple of questions.
Mr. Barr. Sure.
Mr. Burton. The cost of buying the machines is going to be
borne by the Federal Government. The installation, as I
understand it, is going to be borne by the local airport
authority.
Mr. DeCosta. We hope not.
Mr. Burton. Well, I know, but----
Mr. DeCosta. That is still an open question. We believe
that----
Mr. Burton. Just give me a rough idea what it would cost to
install a machine or all the machines that you would require
here at Hartsfield.
Mr. DeCosta. For an in-line system, our estimate is between
$100 million and $120 million.
Mr. Burton. To install them.
Mr. DeCosta. Well, that's an all in cost that includes both
the cost of the machines and the installation.
Mr. Burton. Well, the machines themselves, as I understand
it--we are talking about cost of installation.
Mr. DeCosta. Just bear with me 1 second. And these numbers
are spongy because we are in the planning phase, considering
various----
Mr. Burton. While he is looking that up, let me ask you a
couple of other questions. You have a couple of machines here
at Hartsfield now?
Mr. DeCosta. Yes, we have an Envisions machine in the south
terminal in the baggage system and a CTX-5000 out on Concourse
E which is the international facility.
Mr. Burton. OK. Now it was brought to our attention that
those in the past have not been utilized fully, some up to 10
percent, 20 percent, maybe 30 percent. Can you tell us what
percentage of utilization is----
Mr. DeCosta. The best information I have for you right now
is that they are used on all selectee bags.
Mr. Burton. On all what?
Mr. DeCosta. There is a certain percentage of passengers
who the computers will select for a more in-depth survey.
Mr. Burton. It is random selection?
Mr. DeCosta. Well, it is not just random, it is also a
computer algorithm that tries to assess the risk of a person
being somewhat of a threat.
Mr. Burton. A profiling of some kind?
Mr. DeCosta. I hesitate to use the word, but yes, there is
a computer approach to determining what people are more likely
to be a risk rather than less likely and those people are
selected in conjunction with the random selections. So you have
both a random selection and those people who meet a certain
profile, like how you buy your ticket, for example, which would
spit you out and then your bag is searched in some parts of the
airport or goes through one of these computer operated x-ray
machines. And so this Envision machine is used for all
selectees.
And then out on Concourse E, the CTX-5000, that is also
used in a like manner.
Mr. Burton. But you don't know the percentage of
utilization at this time?
Mr. DeCosta. No, I do not know exactly what the utilization
is.
Mr. Burton. It would seem that you would probably be using
them almost 100 percent of the time, because you have so much
baggage and so many people coming through this airport.
Mr. DeCosta. Well, if we have some time later, we can go
down and take a look at it.
Mr. Burton. I think Congressman Barr and I would both like
to do that.
Do you have any more questions right now, Bob?
Mr. Barr. Just a couple here.
It is my understanding, Mr. DeCosta, that TSA's contractor,
which I believe is Boeing, is supposed to complete site
assessments at all major airports by the end of this month to
determine exactly how many machines are needed. Has the site
assessment for Hartsfield been completed?
Mr. DeCosta. We are in the final stages of the assessment.
The TSA used Ratheon to do the first series of assessments and
recommendations. Once the contract with Boeing was finalized,
then Boeing fielded a team and we have worked very
cooperatively with them so they understand how the airport
works, what the operations are like and we understand that they
have a recommendation to TSA and we are hopeful soon to know
more precisely what their recommendation is and then give us an
opportunity to respond to it. I believe that another site
survey team is due at Hartsfield this week--tomorrow.
Mr. Barr. And do you anticipate that it will be completed
by the end of the month?
Mr. DeCosta. Yes, certainly.
Mr. Barr. Is one of the benefits to the approach that TSA
seems to be taking that if there is a problem with the bag, you
are assured of having the person whose bag it is right there
with the bag at the time the problem is identified?
Mr. DeCosta. Yeah, I guess that would be a benefit of that,
although you can work out procedures to make sure that if there
is a problem, that a person is available even if you are not in
the ticketing lobbies.
In answer to your question on the cost, the terminal
modifications would cost over $80 million.
Mr. Burton. $80 million in installation?
Mr. DeCosta. Yes, we would have to modify the terminal and
the north parking deck.
Mr. Burton. Now you are talking--if the gentleman would
yield--you are talking about if they do the in lobby----
Mr. DeCosta. No, in-line system.
Mr. Burton. The in-line system itself that you are
advocating, would cost $80 million.
Mr. DeCosta. Would cost over $80 million. And the balance
of the 120 that I mentioned is the cost of the equipment, which
is clearly a TSA cost and the over $80 million that is
uncertain as to who bears that cost.
Mr. Burton. What is the cost of the equipment itself?
Mr. DeCosta. $38 million.
Mr. Burton. So you are saying that two thirds of the cost
is going to be borne by the local airport authority unless
something is worked out with the Transportation----
Mr. DeCosta. Well, our position is that this is a national
defense issue and it should not be borne by the airports.
Mr. Burton. I understand. We will talk to TSA about that a
little bit.
Let me just ask one more question and I will yield back to
Mr. Barr. It sounds like your relationship with the TSA and
their contractors has been kind of good and bad.
Mr. DeCosta. I would say it has been professional with a
good attitude for the most part, and I----
Mr. Burton. But you have disagreements.
Mr. DeCosta. Yeah, the major disagreement is on the
approach taken and the approach is being taken because of their
commitment to the deadline.
Mr. Burton. But you indicated in your statement earlier I
think that they--when you told them that you thought there was
a better way to skin the cat, they were very adamant that their
way was the way it was going to be done.
Mr. DeCosta. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. So there was no resiliency there.
Mr. DeCosta. There was no dialog on this other approach
because they are committed to a predetermined approach.
Mr. Burton. OK. Well, what I would like to have, and I
think Mr. Barr would like to have, is your recommendations that
we can present to them and find out the reasons why they feel
so strongly that their position should not be changed. So if
you could get that to us, we will ask questions of Mr. Mineta
and the TSA about that.
And also I have some other questions for the record that we
probably will not be able to get into today, we would like to
get those to you and if you would answer those, we would
appreciate it.
Mr. DeCosta. Certainly.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. I do also, Mr. Chairman, and we will certainly
coordinate those with you and have those submitted to Mr.
DeCosta.
I very much appreciate your testimony today and, of course,
your continued service at Hartsfield. And hope that we can work
this out, because I agree with you that we do not need to rush
into something here, we do need to get it right the first time.
If it takes a little bit more time in order to do that, so long
as, as you have assured us, there are measures that will
continue to be in place to protect the traveling public in the
meantime, that certainly does seem to make a lot of sense.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. DeCosta, we really appreciate
your hospitality and your candidness, and we appreciate your
staff as well, and we will look forward to taking a little tour
of the airport and seeing what you do after we conclude the
meeting.
Mr. DeCosta. OK, thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. We will now hear from our second panel, Mr.
Stephen J. McHale, the Deputy Undersecretary of Transportation
for Management and Policy and Alexis Stefani. And we also, I
understand, will add to that panel, Mr. Willie Williams, who I
guess was a former police chief in Los Angeles--I saw you on
television, good looking fellow--and you are now the Federal
Security Director, is that correct?
Mr. Williams. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Would you please stand to be sworn?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. I think we will start with Ms. Stefani.
We will start with you. Do you have an opening comment you
would like to make, or statement?
STATEMENTS OF ALEXIS M. STEFANI, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR AUDITING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; STEPHEN J.
MCHALE, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION FOR MANAGEMENT
AND POLICY; AND WILLIE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR,
HARTSFIELD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Ms. Stefani. Yes, I do.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Barr, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today concerning the progress
the Transportation Security Administration is making in
implementing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
We all recognize that ensuring our transportation systems
are secure is a tremendous task, one that has never been
undertaken before on a scale of this magnitude. TSA is making
progress--for example, it has awarded three major contracts for
hiring and training all the passenger screeners and for
deploying and installing the explosives detection equipment at
over 400 airports nationwide.
However, the heavy lifting lies ahead. Today, the deadline
to have a Federalized screener work force in place is just over
3 months away, while the deadline to begin screening 100
percent of all checked bags is less than 5 months away. While
there has been much debate as to whether these dates are
achievable, we can attest that TSA and the Department are
working diligently to meet these deadlines and could not be
working any harder. As we get closer to the deadlines with only
a fraction of the airports completed, the task ahead becomes
more formidable.
It will become clear, in our opinion, in the next 30 days
as to what exactly must be done, airport-by-airport, to meet
the deadlines. And this is based on two key factors. Site
assessments are really the driving force behind determining
what equipment mix of the explosives detection equipment must
be put in each airport, and as a result will also then
determine the number of staff you need for both the EDS and the
trace equipment. Once these assessments are done in August at
approximately 260 airports nationwide, we will have much better
data.
TSA is also moving ahead and hiring up for the passenger
screeners. Consequently, in our opinion, we will be in a much
better position by the end of August to judge what is or is not
feasible by the deadlines.
I would like to provide you with some specific information
on where TSA stands on meeting the two main deadlines. First,
on hiring and training the passenger screeners. As of July
31st, nine airports are currently operating with a full,
complete Federal screener work force. During July, the TSA
contractor was at over 200 airports with 100 teams to determine
if the passenger screener checkpoints needed to be reconfigured
and to determine the amount of staff that would be needed at
each of the checkpoints. Over the last month, we can say the
pace of hiring has increased and is accelerating. TSA has
almost tripled the number of screeners on the payroll, to about
4,400 with another 6,800 individuals who have accepted
employment with TSA. At the end of July, TSA was accepting
applications for 415 airports and had opened assessment centers
for 119 airports. This compares to only three airports under
the assessment process in mid-June.
However, TSA estimates that it will need, in total, up to
33,000 passenger screeners. With just over 3 months left before
the deadline, this means that TSA needs to hire and train
approximately 8,000 passenger screeners per month. While TSA
has made adjustments in its hiring process to respond to past
events, we are concerned about its difficulties in hiring
screeners in major metropolitan areas, your large cities. For
example, TSA estimates it will need about 2,300 passenger
screeners for the airports near New York City. Since June, 774
individuals have accepted offers for employment, or about 33
percent of the targeted amount.
These delays in hiring in the large cities have been
largely due to no shows. That is, individuals who have applied
for a position but do not show up at the assessment centers.
That accounts for about 25 to 35 percent. Of those that do
show, approximately 50 to 60 percent fail the aptitude test at
the centers.
I would like to move now to the screening of the checked
bags. This challenging deadline for TSA, to screen 100 percent
of the checked bags, is unprecedented. An effort of this
magnitude has never been done in any single country or group of
countries. In fact, the amount of explosives detection
equipment necessary to screen all checked bags, or
approximately 7,000 units, is estimated to be at least three
times the amount deployed at airports worldwide.
To be successful in this effort, TSA must effectively
manage three concurrent activities. First, it needs to place
the orders for the remaining equipment of 75 EDS and 4,500
trace units. Because of manufacturer long lead times, all
orders must be placed by the end of September if the equipment
is to be delivered and installed by the year's end. Then the
manufacturers must meet their delivery schedules.
Second, TSA must ensure it meets all the milestones on the
deployment. As Mr. DeCosta spoke, they are currently in the
first phase of a six phase process looking at what equipment
mix will have to be done at each airport. Site assessments have
been started at 202 airports. Of these, 45 were completed by
July 26.
The next 30 days, as I said before, will tell what can or
cannot be accomplished by the deadline.
After site assessments, stages of design, construction and
actual installation of the equipment must occur. For TSA, this
will stretch out over the remainder of the year with 43 of the
largest airports, including Atlanta, DFW and San Francisco,
scheduled to be completed by the last week in December.
Schedule creep in any one of these phases will, of course,
ultimately affect the December deadline and TSA's ability to
meet it.
Third, a checked baggage screener work force of 21,600 must
be hired and trained by December 31st. This is in addition to
the 33,000 passenger screeners. As of July 16th, TSA had only
200 of these baggage screeners hired and deployed.
Finally, I would like to discuss the usage of the EDS
equipment already in place. For many years, we have talked
about this and have requested that the use of these machines be
increased. Today, as of May of this year, the latest data we
have available, over 82 percent of the machines that are in
use, are, on average, screening 750 bags per day or less. In
our estimate, these machines can easily do 1,250 bags per day.
In our opinion, TSA needs to direct that the current rate of
machine usage pick up substantially or we are going to miss out
on a great opportunity to get more practice, to learn more
about how these machines operate in the airport environment,
and to provide increased security.
Mr. Chairman, my statement also had information on cost
controls. To save time, I will be glad to answer any questions,
but I will not talk about that right now.
That concludes my statement. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. You have created a lot of questions, Ms.
Stefani.
Secretary McHale.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefani follows:]
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Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon,
Chairman Burton and Vice Chairman Barr. I am pleased to
represent Admiral James Loy, the Acting Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security.
With me this afternoon is, as you have acknowledged, Willie
Williams, the Federal Security Director of the Hartsfield
Atlanta International Airport. He is our leading representative
at the airport and is in charge of all the Federal security
responsibilities at Hartsfield.
Mr. Williams has 30 plus years of service in law
enforcement, he was Police Commissioner of Philadelphia and
Police Chief of Los Angeles and he brings a wealth of
excellence, talent and commitment to this important position.
Also, as you have acknowledged, with me today is Mr. Gary
Wade of the Federal Air Marshal Service, who also has many,
many years of law enforcement experience and brings that talent
to our greatly expanded air marshal service.
I would also like to mention that TSA has selected Mr.
Quinton Johnson to be the FSD responsible for the Valdosta
Municipal Airport and the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport.
The TSA is currently in the process of selecting an FSD for
Savannah.
Since September 11th, the Department of Transportation and
TSA have worked intensely to tighten security throughout the
aviation system. These efforts include enhanced screening
measures, hardening of cockpit doors, greatly increased
deployment of Federal air marshals and more intelligent use of
technology. They have dramatically increased aviation security
for all passengers.
In addition to recognizing the hard work and perseverance
of hundreds of employees of the FAA and TSA, we owe a debt of
gratitude to the thousands of airport security workers, law
enforcement officers, National Guard personnel and hundreds of
thousands of aviation industry employees who have contributed
so much to our efforts to increase security. Perhaps most
importantly, we are especially grateful to the millions of
travelers who continue to exercise great patience with the
enhanced security measures.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that
all passengers be screened by Federal employees by November 19,
2002 and that checked baggage be screened by explosive
detection equipment by December 31, 2002. This is an immense
challenge for TSA and for the Nation's airports and airlines.
From the beginning, TSA has been committed to meeting these
deadlines and all of the other mandates of the act. We
developed plans for doing so and continue to move forward
aggressively.
I am going to give you a few of our accomplishments and you
will hear the numbers that will be slightly different, slightly
higher perhaps, than Ms. Stefani just mentioned, partly because
I think my numbers are a few days sooner, and given the
implementation at TSA, every day adds a bit more
accomplishments, we bring on a few more people, we do a few
more things.
We have met every deadline imposed by Congress in the ATSA
to date. The biggest one for us initially was taking over the
responsibility for civil aviation security from the airlines on
February 17. At that time, TSA as an agency was really only
about 40 days old, and yet we were able to enter into contracts
with all of the contract screening companies to replace the
airlines in that responsibility that they had been exercising
for many years.
In the southeast region and particularly here, that task
was accomplished by the FAA personnel and civil aviation
security, who have come over now to TSA, headed by Jackson
Smith, who is the regional director for aviation security here
and has been up until this point. Now, we are migrating over to
the full TSA structure.
We have appointed 118 Federal security directors who are
responsible for security at over 300 airports around the
country and should complete the appointment of all the
remaining Federal security directors by the end of this month.
We have implemented a rigorous training program for Federal
security directors--screeners that has more than tripled the
length of the one used before September 11th.
We have begun recruiting at all the Nation's airports and
we have held 37 job fairs and our staffing contractor, MCS
Pearson, is operating 55 regional assessment centers.
Over 600,000 people have applied for jobs as screeners and
we have hired a little over 10,000 of them, about one-third of
the number we need to reach the November 19th deadline.
Federal passenger screeners are now working at 19 airports
and they began working at Athens, GA just last week.
One hundred percent of all checked bags are being screened
with explosive detection equipment at four airports. We have
orders pending for over 1,000 EDS machines--that is the large
explosive detection system machines--and 119 of those have been
delivered so far.
We have also received about 200 trace detection machines
and have orders in place for in excess of 4,000.
Interim and final plans for the deployment of baggage
screening systems are being developed. Boeing, our explosive
detection contractor, is working at more than 220 airports,
including all of the major airports. We have received a number
of designs and should have the remainder in about 4 weeks.
And this is only a partial list of our accomplishments for
an agency that did not even exist at the beginning of this
year.
Here in Atlanta, we have recruited about half of the
approximately 1,200 passenger screeners that we believe we will
need. We expect to begin deployment of those passenger
screeners toward the end of this month, possibly into
September. Obviously we need to work around the Labor Day
weekend, we do not want to be doing a major turnover that
weekend, but we will work around that.
The assistance we have received from the airport,
especially from Mr. DeCosta, has been superb and we agree that
Atlanta poses unique problems for explosive detection
deployment. But we will continue to work with the airport over
the next weeks and months and years to get this system right.
No one expected it to be easy to implement the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act and it has not been easy. But
Secretary Mineta, Admiral Loy and all of us at TSA remain
strongly committed to the mission.
Unfortunately, the recently enacted emergency supplemental
appropriation is below the amount the President requested.
Accordingly, we are now undertaking a fundamental re-evaluation
of all our business plans to fit within the budget that
Congress has given us. Our preliminary evaluation suggests that
we will be able to meet the November deadline for passenger
screening. However, we are looking at whether we will have
enough money to meet the baggage screening mandate in the
timeframe set by Congress. As we complete that evaluation, as
we look at exactly how we will proceed, we will keep you, Mr.
Chairman, and the Committee informed, as well as the
Appropriations Committee and the T&I Committee.
In the 261 days since President Bush signed the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act into law, we have accomplished
a great deal. In the 146 days between now and December 31st, we
have a lot more to accomplish and TSA employees around the
country are dedicated to the task. With your support, we can
deliver on the promise made last year in the ATSA.
Mr. Williams and I look forward to answering any questions
that you or other Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Williams, do you
have any comments you would like to make?
Mr. Williams. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Very good.
It was a little disturbing to me, Mr. Secretary, that even
though he couched his concerns in diplomatic terms, that the
administrator of the airport here said that there was a
recalcitrance on the part of the TSA officials that came down
as far as working with him to solve the problem in not only the
most expeditious way, but also in the most cost effective way.
Can you explain that to me?
Mr. McHale. Well, I will let Mr. Williams in a moment just
talk about the relationship that we have had with Mr. DeCosta
and his staff, which I think has been excellent, as well as our
contractors.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me just 1 second. I know it has been
excellent and I know that you are gentlemen and you do not hit
each other and that sort of thing. But it sounds like to me
there is a real difference of opinion in how to protect
Hartsfield from the people who came down to Washington and made
recommendations. And I would like to know why and is there room
for compromise or is it, as he said, pretty much set in stone?
Mr. McHale. Talking and listening to Mr. DeCosta and also,
from what I know of our approach nationwide as well, I think
the issue here is not one of disagreement or unwillingness to
talk about a variety of solutions. What we are driving toward
and what our mandate is at this point is to come up with a
plan, a system, for 100 percent explosive detection using
explosive detection equipment by the end of this year. Mr.
DeCosta's proposal, as he outlined it here, is one that would
take well beyond that deadline to complete.
We are committed--this is a long-term commitment for us
obviously, this is a long-term program to ensure permanent
improved security at airports. December 31st is a deadline that
was in the act that we are trying to meet, we are committed to
try to meet it. We have proposals to meet it.
But the equipment that is out there today, the systems that
are in place today, are--will improve over the years to come as
we apply good American ingenuity. I think what we are going to
be looking to is how do we continually upgrade these systems
and move toward more automatic or integrated systems.
One of the places where we do disagree with a number of
people from the aviation industry is whether the technology
that is available today is at a state where it is really going
to be as effective and automatic within an in-line solution as
we would like it to be. The EDS equipment, these large machines
today, require us, when they alarm--and they alarm quite
frequently--to actually remove the bag from that machine and
then take it over and do a trace detection on the bag, take it
to the second type of technology and do that trace detection.
It is not really an automatic process, and given the type of
false alarm rate we are hitting today, we do not have a high
degree of confidence that the systems will work fully in line.
Mr. Burton. What percentage of false alarms do you have?
Mr. McHale. It is coming up in the range that Mr. DeCosta
said, it is over the 20 percent range, which we have to
resolve.
Mr. Burton. So 20 percent of the bags that would go through
the system, on the on-line system, would have to be taken off
and rechecked.
Mr. McHale. Right. So one of the things we look at then
inputting in an in-line system is how can we do that. If we are
going to take--there are some airports where we are looking at
in-line solutions today, but they are ones where the costs are
not as high as they might be at an airport like Hartsfield. We
are trying to work with airports that are already doing
construction work, such as Jacksonville, which is building a
whole new terminal and baggage handling system, to try to work
with them as they build that new terminal out to work to do the
in-line EDS systems and pave the way for maybe improvements in
the system that may be a year, 2 years, 3 years away. We do not
see a great improvement coming down the line any time soon, but
we need to be thinking ahead 2, 3, 4 years out, as the
technology improves.
Mr. Burton. Let me ask one more question. Ms. Stefani said
that--and this is my math, so I might be off just a little
bit--that about 60 percent of the machine time is being
utilized, which means that about 40 percent is not being
utilized. Why is that? You were talking about on-line machines,
were you not?
Ms. Stefani. I was talking about the ones currently in all
the lobbies.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. McHale. The machines are used today, they are operated
primarily by the contractor personnel. We are taking over these
machines, we have--as we are going to take them over, as we are
going to deploy the Federal screeners, we expect to be able to
use them close to 100 percent of the time. Ms. Stefani and I
have discussed the fact that we need to continue to try to
drive toward a greater utilization.
Mr. Burton. So it is because of the personnel changes that
are going to be required?
Mr. McHale. And the layouts of where the machines are. They
were not originally put in to really do the 100 percent baggage
checks, so they have to--we have to reconfigure things and
things like that. But we can use them more than we are using
them today and we will continue to work toward that.
Mr. Burton. One last comment that I will make and then I
will yield to Mr. Barr and then I might have some more
questions. It seems to me that in airports, especially like
Hartsfield here, where the manager, Mr. DeCosta, is conversant
with all the problems and he is talking about you are going to
have to tear out walls, you are going to have to spend $30,
$40, $50 million to reconfigure the airport, all that sort of
thing, it just seems to me that there ought to be--I understand
that you have a plan and you want to stick to your plan and you
have to not deviate, but it seems to me that there ought to be
at least some open-mindedness to the needs of the local airport
authority in dealing with the problem. And I do not like to use
the word recalcitrant because it sounds like you do have a
fairly good working relationship with the airport authority,
but it seems to me that there ought to be a little more
openness and a little more understanding of the problems they
face.
With that, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
About a week and a half ago, the House passed the
President's Department of Homeland Security Bill and while many
Members may have had some specific concerns about one thing or
another and certainly we exercised our prerogative and made
some fine-tuning to it, the general feeling in the Congress was
that the President, as essentially the CEO and the person
tasked with the responsibility of implementing the mandate of
the Congress reflecting the will of the people, ought to have
the type of framework that he, as the CEO, believes would best
accomplish the task before him. Do you think that's a good
approach to take, a good perspective?
Mr. McHale. Yes.
Mr. Barr. Why would that not apply then to Mr. DeCosta and
the heads of major airports, as the CEOs, if they come to you
and say we believe as the CEOs and the persons actually
responsible for carrying out and implementing in an appropriate
way the mandates of the Congress, why would you not grant them
the same deference that we believe is appropriate to grant the
President, at a higher level?
Mr. McHale. Congressman, we actually believe we granted a
lot of deference and try to work very closely in partnership
with the airports as we develop these plans. Again, the
disagreement between Hartsfield and TSA is over really the
timing of when we are going to be able to deploy explosive
detection equipment to check 100 percent of the bags. I think
Mr. DeCosta agreed that his plan does not come close to meeting
the deadline that we are currently operating under. And really
the only disagreement here is that we have a plan that we are
talking to him about, how to implement it, but our plan is
designed to meet the statutory deadline. There is not really a
disagreement, in my view, over the actual implementation of a
plan to meet the statutory deadline in that sense.
Mr. Barr. What is the goal? Is the goal to meet a deadline
or is the goal to implement the very best plan over the long-
term to protect the traveling public in a way that is the most
cost effective at the same time?
Mr. McHale. I think the goal is a bit of a combination of
both. On the one hand, we believe, as I think the Congress
does, that we should have explosive detection equipment out
there as soon as we can, because of the level of threat against
the United States, the kinds of threats that we face. We have
designed a plan that will meet that deadline, try to provide
that equipment by the end of the year, as the Congress
suggested, an appropriate deadline in light of the threat. But
that is only a marker on the way. I think we have to
continually----
Mr. Barr. So you are not saying that the very best system
will be the one that might get in place by December 31st.
Mr. McHale. That is correct. We should continue to study
it, continue to improve it, continue to replace it.
Mr. Barr. But if in fact substantial costs are incurred in
meeting that deadline, that then would have to be incurred all
over again, and as a matter of fact might over the long term
even be more expensive because then you would have to sort of
undo what you have already done in order to meet that deadline
in order to get in place the very best long-term integrated
automated system, would it not make at least some sense, would
you concede, to maybe take another look at that deadline and
make sure that we are doing the there thing, and that is a
realistic deadline for the long term?
Mr. McHale. I think we always have to look at how we
proceed on the security role, but we have to balance what is
the technology out there, what is available, how we can get it
installed, what may be over the horizon that might be better.
The technology out there today obviously can be improved, but
the time line for doing that is quite prolonged, unfortunately,
from our look at it. So we need to look at what we have today
and see how we can get it in place as soon as we can and then
continue to improve it.
Mr. Barr. When we talk about it, you are not talking about
a one size fits all system though, are you?
Mr. McHale. Absolutely not. People always tell me that when
you have seen one airport, you have seen one airport.
Mr. Barr. Has that been communicated to Mr. DeCosta, that
the whole process of determining what is the very best system
would include consideration of an automated integrated system,
such as he has proposed and I think other major airports have
proposed also?
Mr. McHale. We have had a lot of conversations with the
airport directors as a community. Let me just turn to Mr.
Williams for a moment and let him talk about the
conversations----
Mr. Barr. But as the policy director, I really would prefer
for you to answer that question first and then let Mr. Williams
expand on it.
Mr. McHale. I have not had that conversation with Mr.
DeCosta, I have had it with--I have had a number of
conversations with----
Mr. Barr. Are you communicating that to him today though at
this hearing?
Mr. McHale. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Barr. Is that good news, Mr. DeCosta?
Mr. DeCosta. Yes.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Williams.
Mr. Williams. I think you just about got your answer, but
the discussions have, to a great degree, as Mr. McHale just
said, centered on the issue of getting the best system that we
can in place with the technology that is available today and
meeting the congressionally mandated deadline, but also
recognizing at the same time that there have been discussions,
perhaps not at Mr. DeCosta and my level on a regular basis, but
certainly with staff, that this is really just the beginning,
that as technology improves, that as time and resources are
available, there are probably better and more economical, from
the standpoint of dollars and cents and personnel to increase
it in the future.
Mr. Burton. Let me followup. I guess you are like our
Defense Department where we have new weapons systems coming on
board that are going to make us less vulnerable to a military
attack from Saddam Hussein or somebody and because of that, we
appropriate money for new technologies and new weapons systems
almost every year, because there are new things coming on line.
Are you saying that in effect, we are going to have to be
looking at new technologies to detect terrorist threats at
airports and elsewhere ad infinitum, each year have to take
another look at it and if there is new technology coming on
that is superior, that Congress is going to have to look at
that like a national defense budget increase?
Mr. McHale. I think there is some truth in that. I think we
certainly all hope that we will win this war on terrorism and
decrease the threat, but I think we do need to look at--there
are obviously new threats that come about that we need to
respond to, but also I think what is important to realize is
that the security technology that is available today was never
really designed for the kind of threat that we face today. It
was designed for a very different kind of era when we did not
have to check every single bag.
But this is what we have, this is the technology we have.
We can look down the road, we have actually sought funding and
Congress has provided some funding for research and development
to continue to see how we can improve this. But we do have to
deal with what we have available to us today. And given the
nature of the threat, we have to deal with trying to get that
equipment installed and also meeting the congressional mandate.
Mr. Burton. Ms. Stefani, you raised a couple of questions--
more than a couple--that was kind of disturbing. You said that
50 to 60 percent of the people that apply as screeners fail the
aptitude test and you said that 20 to 25 percent after they
make application do not show up?
Ms. Stefani. Correct, that from the time the people do the
initial application, which will do basic screening say for
English, your proficiency, basic skills, basic information
about the person, that they will apply on line usually and then
when they get notified to come to an assessment center, they do
not show up for the further tests. Then once at the assessment
center, TSA is also again having people drop out that they fail
various parts of that assessment center process.
Mr. Burton. The percentage was what concerned me.
Ms. Stefani. Yes, 50 to 60 percent.
Mr. Burton. That fail the aptitude test.
Ms. Stefani. It's not just the--including the aptitude
test, it would be other things, such as the medical, drug
testing, all different kinds of things, but in total what
happens is--let me give you an example. If 10 people applied at
TSA on line and TSA will call six people in for their
assessment, and only four will show. And then during the
process, basically you whittle it down and you end up with one
person actually accepting the offer. And TSA has adapted its
processes to try to adjust for what was happening. This is
predominantly at your large cities that we are seeing this kind
of dropout rate as the process progresses.
Mr. Burton. So it is a combination of educational ability
and physical problems and possible drug use.
Ms. Stefani. Or criminal record, those kinds of things that
would just, you know, automatically drop the person out.
Mr. Burton. Is a large part of it the educational----
Ms. Stefani. I would prefer--we can analyze the data and I
can give you a lot more information.
Mr. Burton. I would like to have that, because you know,
that could be a real indictment of our education system if we
are trying to hire all these screeners and that people do not
have the educational skills to do that job. That kind of
bothers me a little bit and we would also like to know about
how the people who have criminal backgrounds who are applying
break down and those that--do they give them a drug test? Is
that right?
Ms. Stefani. Correct, yes.
Mr. Burton. So you give them a drug test, those that are
failing the drug test.
Ms. Stefani. Let me get a record up of what the history has
been to date for TSA and provide it to you.
Mr. Burton. OK, and then the question you raised about the
equipment that we have on line right now only being utilized to
the tune of about 60 percent. I think the Secretary indicated
that was probably because the personnel they have doing it
right now is not as well equipped to do the job as the ones
that are being hired. Is that your assessment as well?
Ms. Stefani. It is in part. What we have is a requirement
that the airlines use it if their individual is a selectee and
there is other factors--there are other factors that go into
that, but that is going to be compared to 100 percent. We have
said and testified numerous times--previously it was FAA and
now it is TSA--they need to increase this random factor, they
need to get more bags into the system and use those machines
that we have out there.
Mr. Burton. And Mr. McHale, is TSA planning to do that?
Mr. McHale. We are, Mr. Chairman, particularly as we get in
there to reconfigure these airports so that the machines are in
the right places and we get our trained people in there, but I
think there are certainly machines out there we can be using a
lot more.
Mr. Burton. When you talk about reconfiguring airports, you
are talking about putting these machines in the lobbies in
close proximity to the ticket counter?
Mr. McHale. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. How do you deal with the problem that Mr.
DeCosta brought up awhile ago about long lines outside? This
airport, I came in here today and I could not hardly get on the
subway. I mean the amount of people is just phenomenal and I
can imagine if you get to a holiday season, that you are going
to have people standing in the parking lot trying to get in.
Mr. McHale. It is a challenge, but we have been working a
number of different pilot programs around the country where we
have been doing 100 percent of the explosive detection system,
running the bags through EDS systems, 100 percent of the bags
through trace systems. And actually what we have found is that,
particularly if those machines are located after the passenger
checks in at the ticket counter, that typically the wait is
metered, measured by the ticket counter wait. In other words,
people tend to be waiting at the ticket counter to actually
check in and then they proceed to the machine to check their
bag. There usually is not--there is virtually no wait time at
the actual machines once they have been through the checkpoint.
For example, at Norfolk airport, we had an average of about
between 16 and 18 minutes that the passenger was waiting to
check in their bag. The wait time at the ETD machines, the
trace machines, that the passengers then went to, was about 30
seconds and the average processing time for a suitcase was a
little over--about a minute and a quarter. It was very short,
again we did the outside of the bag.
Mr. Burton. Well, I hope you are correct, but I hope you
will work with Mr. DeCosta because I am not sure he would agree
with your time sequence there.
Mr. McHale. Right.
Mr. Burton. And the last thing I would like to ask, and I
do not want you to answer this in public, and I probably should
not have asked the question in public, but I asked Mr. DeCosta
about the detection equipment now where they put that--when I
go into Dulles or I go into Reagan National or here and you put
your bags in the machine and they run that cloth over it to put
it in the machine, when I asked him--from his testimony it
sounded like there might be something in that that would not be
detected. I would like for you to give us some information on
that because that would be a problem if all those bags had to
be opened in order to use that equipment for that purpose.
Mr. McHale. We will be happy to arrange an appropriate
briefing.
Mr. Burton. OK, we would like that.
Mr. Barr, do you have any other questions?
Mr. Barr. Just a couple, Mr. Chairman.
With regard to the deadlines, I am not quite sure how you
come up with any degree of optimism that these could be met.
You know, I look at the figures here from Ms. Stefani's
testimony, with just over 3 months left, TSA needs to hire and
train more than 8,000 passenger screeners a month, that would
be just to meet the November 19th deadline. That is basically
about 400 a day over the course of a 20-day work month and the
number of machines to meet the--you know, to be tested and
installed and up and workable to meet the December deadline is
several dozen per day.
I mean other than just sort of a rote commitment to saying
we have to meet a deadline, we will meet a deadline, by golly
we will meet a deadline, we have to meet a deadline, I mean
how--I just do not see any realistic way that those deadlines
can be met unless something gives in that process. And I am not
quite sure what can give if you insist on saying you can meet
the numeric deadlines other than quality.
Mr. McHale. We have built a system--as Ms. Stefani said, we
have actually tripled the rate at which we are hiring in the
last month. We are ramping up to do this.
Lockheed Martin is providing the training for the
screeners, they are committed to being able to train up to
7,500 per week if we have to reach that point. We expect
actually to be at about between 300 and 4,000 per week within
the next couple of weeks. We slowed this process down a little
bit as we waited for the supplemental appropriation to come
through. And Congress enacted it last week, the President
signed it and that is now available to us. We are ramping up
full speed now and we have tremendous confidence actually that
we will meet the November 19th deadline.
The end of the year deadline is--we actually have worked
with the various manufacturers, we spent a lot of time going
over their production lines. One of Boeing's jobs is to
actually work on the processes that those manufacturers have in
place and to ensure their capability of meeting the deadline
and to look at additional production capabilities. And through
orders that we have placed, we have caused the supply pipeline,
all the various parts for these machines, to be fully flowing,
it actually has been fully flowing now for several months, so
the parts are actually--the long term lead parts have actually
been on order and are coming in now to the manufacturing
facilities.
So we have been working on this program with a lot of
detail at the plants, trying to address all these issues. We
have known this was going to be tough from day one and through
the work of the Deputy Secretary and a number of other people,
we have worked very, very hard to put ourselves in a position
to do it.
The concern that we have, as I mentioned in my testimony,
is that we did get a lower amount of funding than we requested.
And we are now examining exactly how that is going to play out
toward the end of the year deadline. We will meet the November
19th deadline. We have to see whether the--exactly how the
money plays out toward the end of the year deadline, how that
will work out also with the 2003 appropriation, which of course
will be coming before the Congress.
Mr. Barr. The November 19th deadline is 104 days away. How
many passenger screeners still need to be hired?
Mr. McHale. We have about--the November 19th deadline? We
have about 20,000 to hire, 22,000. We have hired about 10,000.
Mr. Barr. So the figures, Ms. Stefani, of 33,000, that's
13,000 less?
Ms. Stefani. As Mr. McHale had spoken earlier, we are using
slightly different days, so we were looking at the end of July
that they had about 11,000 either on board or that they had
accepted our offer. So I will agree with his 22,000 figure.
Mr. Barr. So as of the end of July, there were 33,000 and
as of now, 6 days later, there are 20,000?
Ms. Stefani. No, excuse me, I must have confused that.
The 33,000 is their goal that they must have on board by
November 19th, and given that they have hired about 11,000 at
this point, either hired on board or they have accepted offers,
we are looking at approximately 22,000 more that must be hired
in the remaining 3 months.
Mr. Barr. I do not think my confusion is misplaced. I am
not being critical but I am just trying to figure this out.
Your testimony is that it is pretty clear that with just over 3
months left, TSA needs to hire and train more than 8,000
passenger screeners a month.
Ms. Stefani. Right.
Mr. Barr. This is to hire the estimated 33,000 passenger
screeners needed. I read that to mean that that testimony
indicates we need to hire 33,000 people before the November
19th deadline.
Mr. McHale. But we have already recruited 10,000. That is I
think where the difference is. We have to bring on--we have
recruited 10,000, we have to recruit 8,000 more a month over
the next 3 months and that will bring us to--actually if we did
that, it would bring us to 34,000.
Mr. Barr. So are you saying there have already been how
many thousand already hired?
Mr. McHale. About 10,000. We have recruited 10,300. Not all
of those are in training yet. We have about close to 6,000 of
them are actually either trained or in training, the others are
scheduled to start training. And we have to recruit another
23,000 to meet the 33,000 goal, so it is about 8,000 a month,
about 2,000 a week and that is what we are--we are actually
spooling to do more than that because we want to achieve this
goal a little ahead of the statutory deadline of November 19th.
Mr. Barr. Now these are those that have actually passed
through and passed the first phase of the assessment.
Mr. McHale. The assessment, that is correct, they have
either--they are either on our rolls being trained, or trained
and deployed at airports, they have received job offers that
they have accepted and they are being scheduled for training.
So they are at a variety of different stages.
Mr. Barr. And you have every confidence that without making
any sacrifices in the quality of the standards that you will be
able to meet that November 19th deadline?
Mr. McHale. We are confident. The biggest problem, as Ms.
Stefani has said, is in some of the bigger cities. We had
originally hoped to be able to complete the recruitment process
in about 3 weeks. We learned in our experience in Baltimore
that we had to stretch that out and we stretched it out quite a
bit. We started recruiting in all of the cities actually sooner
than we had intended to, so that we are now trying to recruit
everywhere in the country, even though some of the big city
airports and some of the airports will not in fact roll out
until the October-November timeframe, so we really want to give
ourselves the maximum amount to accommodate that.
Mr. Barr. With regard to hiring also, is there a concerted
effort being made to recruit former military personnel?
Mr. McHale. Yes, we--there is a veterans preference that is
applied. Actually, as a practical matter, within the
application process, we are actually trying to fill so many
vacancies that we are able to offer positions to veterans who
pass the assessment with no----
Mr. Barr. I am sorry, to what?
Mr. McHale. To offer positions to veterans who pass the
assessment process. Even though they are veterans, they still
have to go through the testing and the assessment process and
pass through that process. If they pass that process, we are
recruiting so many screeners that is not a problem in the sense
of getting positions for them, there are more than enough
positions.
Mr. Barr. But is there an active effort being made, a
conscious active effort made to recruit military, former
military personnel? It would seem to me a tremendous pool of
folks that already have some familiarity and training in the
sorts of skills that you would be interested in.
Mr. McHale. I believe there is a program that we have in
place that works with the Armed Forces dealing with members who
are leaving the services. I am just not certain what our
outreach is to the veterans groups. I will look into that and
get back to you.
Mr. Barr. Could we get some additional information on that?
I would be very curious to that.
Are there European airports that have already instituted
the type of in-line integrated and automated system that Mr.
DeCosta believes is the appropriate one for an airport such as
Hartsfield?
Mr. McHale. No, not using the whole CTX--the EDS kind of
equipment we are using. There are European airports that do
integrated systems using what is called vivid x-ray technology
and then following up with CAT scan technology. The vivid
technology is not certified in the United States as meeting the
standards for explosive detection.
Mr. Barr. But is--I am sorry, what is not certified, the
system that some of the European airports are using?
Mr. McHale. That is correct. It does not meet our explosive
detections standards. And again, there are issues about that I
would be happy to brief you in a closed session.
Mr. Barr. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, did you have any additional questions?
Mr. Burton. I think we have covered it pretty well. Let me
suggest that we have some other questions that we--I do not
want to be redundant, but we would like to submit them to you
in writing.
Mr. McHale. Absolutely.
Mr. Burton. And if you could respond to us, we would really
appreciate it.
Do any of you have any final comments you would like to
make before we conclude the hearing?
Ms. Stefani. No, sir.
Mr. McHale. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr, any further questions?
Mr. Barr. Just one. If in fact the Senate adopts the same
provisions that the House did and that is what emerges out of
the conference committee with regard to the action the House
took on the Homeland Security legislation, with regard to the
deadlines, you will certainly make every effort to meet those
deadlines and comply fully with the law as passed by the
Congress and if that is signed by the President.
Mr. McHale. Absolutely.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. If there are no further questions, I want to
thank you very, very much for being here. It has been very
illuminating. There are still questions that need to be
answered, but hopefully you will give us in writing some of the
problems and solutions and I know that Mr. DeCosta is going to
give us some suggestions which we will pass on to you and ask
some questions about it in written form.
If you would not mind sticking around just for a minute
after we conclude, because I would like to talk to you and Mr.
DeCosta before we go on our tour.
Mr. McHale. Certainly.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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