

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE**CURRENT ISSUES BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT****Weapons of Mass Destruction:
What's There, What's Not, and What Does it All Mean?****TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2004****PRESENTERS:**

Speaker

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Former Special Advisor to the Iraq Survey Group,
and Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector in Iraq

Moderator

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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 MS. KING: Good morning, and welcome to the
3 U.S. Institute of Peace's Current Issues Briefing on WMD
4 in Iraq, with our guest speaker, David Kay, the former
5 Special Advisor to the Iraq Survey Group and former
6 Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector in Iraq.

7 Dan Serwer heads the Institute's Iraq
8 Working Group, and is Director of our Peace and
9 Stability Operations Program will moderate this
10 morning's program. I'm Kay King, and I am Director of
11 Congressional and Public Affairs here at the Institute.

12 Before I turn over the program to the Institute's
13 President, Richard Solomon, I have just a few brief
14 announcements and housekeeping details to take care of.

15 First, I'd like to let you know that the
16 Institute will be webcasting this session for later
17 posting on our website, so during the question and
18 answer period we really ask that you come to the
19 microphone right up here in the front of the room.
20 Please identify yourself and ask your question so that
21 we can be sure to capture it on the video tape.

22 Second, and as a courtesy to our speakers

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1 and to all of you in the audience, we ask that you
2 please turn off your cell phones and your beepers. And
3 last but certainly not least, I have a little bit of a
4 plug. I want to let you know that the Institute is
5 getting a major Iraq initiative underway. One of our
6 senior staff is over in Iraq right now, and we will be
7 offering a press briefing when he returns, so we will
8 let you know about that event when it gets underway.

9 In the meantime, I want to let you know
10 that we have a lot of Institute materials in the ante
11 room, on the table in the ante room, so feel free to
12 take those materials. And again, it's a pleasure to
13 have you here, and I will now turn over the program to
14 our president, the President of the Institute, Richard
15 Solomon. Thank you.

16 DR. SOLOMON: Thank you, Kay. Good morning
17 and we're obviously delighted to have a full house this
18 morning for an extremely important, and I suspect a very
19 informative session. We are very pleased to welcome
20 David Kay back.

21 He gave a very interesting precursor
22 briefing up on the Hill in November of last year, along

1 with Jonathan Tucker, one of our senior fellows, and Jim
2 Sutterlin. I think it's worth just quoting very briefly
3 two of the comments that were made at that session
4 which, of course, was before the military operations in
5 Iraq.

6 Jim Sutterlin noted that Saddam Hussein's
7 image is vital to himself and to the region, partly
8 because he's the only one with weapons of mass
9 destruction. His image and his power in the region both
10 diminish if the United Nations and he, himself, make
11 public a decrease or lack of weapons capability. And
12 that, I think, fits in with some of the things that
13 David Kay has indicated about the pretense that lay
14 behind much of the deception.

15 All of the panelists in that session raised
16 the possibility that Saddam might choose to cooperate
17 with the inspectors, but with the intention to
18 reconstitute key WMD capabilities at a later date. So
19 again, some great insights were raised at that session,
20 and I have no doubt that they will also emerge in
21 today's discussion.

22 What have we really learned? We're here to

1 try to give David an opportunity to indicate lessons
2 learned so that hopefully we can deal more effectively
3 with inspection challenges in the future. Now I hardly
4 need to say that this is a radioactive issue
5 politically, and it's worth remembering that in our
6 election high season, things do tend to get pulled in
7 one direction or another. I see some gray hair in the
8 room. Some of you may remember the 1960 Presidential
9 Campaign, when candidate Jack Kennedy expressed the
10 so-called Missile Gap, only to find when he became
11 President that there really wasn't a missile gap. So
12 we're in a situation where as we look at a number of
13 proliferation issues of which Iraq is only one, there
14 are instances where we've over-estimated, and there are
15 also in contemporary history many instances where we, in
16 fact, have under-estimated: what Iraq had in the early
17 1990s, under-estimated North Korean, Libyan, and Iranian
18 capabilities.

19 We are only now seeing this remarkable
20 expose coming out of Pakistan of a very substantial
21 network of proliferation activities, and we're dealing
22 with issues that as we try to get a hold on them, we're

1 finding that our intelligence capabilities are sorely
2 tested.

3 Where did the anthrax come from or the
4 Ricin? Who did it? We still have no idea, so that
5 again our intelligence services are being challenged in
6 a way with this new weaponry that we have not faced
7 before. Today's weapons are not only more lethal, but
8 they circulate in contexts that are much harder to
9 identify. We're not dealing with just nation-state
10 systems, but also sub-national groups, private business
11 operations, and so again the challenges that we face are
12 very substantial. And, of course, the risks of these
13 more lethal weapons make the policymakers dilemmas all
14 that more profound.

15 So with that David, let me say how pleased
16 we are to have you, and the podium is yours. Thank you.

17 DR. KAY: Just let me thank you again for
18 the opportunity to appear here. When Daniel called me
19 and asked if I would, I jumped at the opportunity. My
20 experience with the Institute has been -- it's one of
21 those rare Washington forums in which you really come
22 out knowing much better what you think afterwards

1 because of the quality of the questioning and the people
2 who participate. So I must say, I found over the years
3 my participation, both as a listener and occasionally as
4 a speaker participant at the Institute is one of those
5 things that I value the most, because they helped me
6 understand better whatever is at issue.

7 What I'd like to do today is set a
8 framework that I'm thinking through the process, and
9 certainly allow adequate time for discussion and
10 questioning of that. It still is unfolding.

11 Let me just skate over what I think at this
12 point after the two weeks of whirlwind opportunities
13 I've had to state my view. The situation that I believe
14 existed in Iraq, and then move on to why and some of the
15 broader implications, which I think are more
16 interesting, at least to me at this point.

17 My personal conclusion is that there were
18 no large stockpiles of chemical and biological
19 weaponized material at the time Operation Iraqi Freedom
20 began. And that's not just because we haven't found
21 them. Indeed, I think finding them is probably the
22 wrong approach and wrong strategy. As I was reminded on

1 the Hill yet again, Iraq is as large as California,
2 Baghdad as large as L.A., have you looked every possible
3 place? Well, the answer to that question is always
4 going to be no. It's no today, and it will be no 10
5 years from now.

6 In fact, my confident prediction is that 20
7 years from now, maybe 50 years from now, people will
8 still be digging things up in Iraq that were as items
9 not found earlier. I mean, a country that takes its
10 most advanced aircraft really pulls them behind a
11 tractor out into the desert and bulldozes sand over them
12 with the cockpits open, is a country that's probably in
13 Iraq. In fact, if I indeed become unemployable in
14 Washington, I'm thinking about going back and asking the
15 Coalition Provisional Authority if I could have a
16 license to import metal detectors. I actually think
17 relic hunting in Iraq probably has a long-term prospect
18 there.

19 There is so much the regime hid. You take
20 just the stockpile of conventional armament that Saddam
21 acquired from the time in the early 80s when he started
22 a major buildup right to the present, you've got

1 somewhere around 60 to 75 percent as much conventional
2 ordinance as the total conventional ordinance that the
3 United States has, a global superpower. It's just
4 mind-boggling as you fly over the country and look at
5 it.

6 Now I'm confident in my own view that there
7 were no large stockpiles, not because we haven't found
8 them, although we certainly made a lot of attempts to
9 find them, and had a lot of reward money available if
10 they turned up, but because as you take the smart
11 hunting strategy and you look and say, look, maybe
12 they're so well-hidden we can't find them with the
13 resources we have. Work the chain back, you look for
14 the production processes, where they would have been
15 produced, you look for the people that would have been
16 involved in that production, you look for the records,
17 both records internal, as well as records external of
18 imports into the country that would have supported such
19 a process, and pretty soon you've done that about as
20 thoroughly as you can, and you reach the conclusion they
21 really didn't exist.

22 The Nuke Program, it is true there was some

1 money that was being poured into the process in
2 2000-2001, but it was a faint, faint shadow of what had
3 existed in 1991. It wasn't resurgent. It was at the
4 earliest stages of what might have eventually been a
5 rebuilt nuclear program, but it was far from a resurgent
6 nuclear program, and pales in capacity to the program
7 next door in Iran, for example.

8 The most advanced program, and the one that
9 I think has largely been underplayed and misunderstood
10 in the U.S. Press was, in fact, the Missile Program.
11 The Missile Program relates to decisions made in late
12 '99, 2000, 2001 by Saddam to achieve a range of over
13 1,000 kilometers, 650 miles in a series of different
14 missile programs.

15 Now the reason and there are multiple ones,
16 but the primary reason I think that was so serious is
17 because of the amount of foreign assistance that went
18 into it. It is perfectly true that if you go to Iraq
19 and you talk to one or two of the missile scientists and
20 you look around, you do not see the infrastructure that
21 would have supported reaching that goal in a very short
22 period of time.

1 On the other hand, if you do as we did and
2 you probe not only what was in Iraq, but where they were
3 reaching out for assistance, and where and how that
4 assistance was flowing into the program, you really come
5 away realizing that they may well have achieved some of
6 those goals in a much quicker time frame than has
7 generally been estimated.

8 This is a general theme, and something I
9 think we've done poorly in the past, is looking at and
10 understanding foreign assistance. What we generally
11 looked at is for large imports of equipment, precursors,
12 chemical supplies. The real heart of a weapons program
13 is intellectual capital. It's the ability of people who
14 know how to do things, have done it themselves, to
15 transfer that knowledge. And in today's age, that can
16 be by physical presence, and certainly the Iraqis had
17 foreign assistance that was physically present in Iraq
18 for periods of time after 2000 that made a difference.
19 But it also can be transferred very easily and very
20 difficult to detect by a variety of other means,
21 including the Internet.

22 Many of us collaborate with colleagues

1 across the United States and across the world without
2 physically coming into contact. I think back to when I
3 started my academic career in the late 60s, the great
4 days of boondoggles for academic collaboration, a trip
5 to Bellagio as 12 authors would collaborate under
6 Rockefeller Foundation funding on a book. Today no
7 trips to Bellagio, by and large log on to the web with a
8 web-sharing program, and occasionally you might get
9 together.

10 We haven't taken that on board in terms of
11 how that impacts proliferation. Iraq is an interesting
12 case because as it's fully revealed, you're going to
13 discover bits of the old world, that is actual physical
14 presence, and collaboration with large bits of the new
15 world of web-sharing and Internet connectivity. So the
16 Missile Program, I think is fair to say, that was an
17 aggressive program that was building.

18 It's also fair to say in the missile area
19 that it was Iraq. And a lot that affected scientific
20 collaboration in Iraq affected the missile program, as
21 well. And I'd like to get into a bit of this later, but
22 just to foreshadow it. Iraq had, by the time it came to

1 the late 1990s, it had lost its ability to concentrate
2 and to make systematic program decisions, so if you look
3 across the number of missile programs that were
4 underway, everything from taking old Chinese Sokor
5 missiles, and putting Russian helicopter turbine engines
6 into them to extend their range as a land attack
7 missile, to taking surface-to-air missiles and extending
8 their range as a 250 kilometer land attack missile, to
9 multiple solid propulsion programs and liquid propulsion
10 programs, we just want to, if you want anything to
11 succeed, which I really didn't and don't - you would
12 like to walk in and take the missile team, shake them up
13 and say we're going to make a choice, one program, and
14 you're all going to work on it. It didn't happen that
15 way, so there were real impediments to even the missile
16 program being successful. And those were ones that were
17 characteristic, and I think by and large missed, of Iraq
18 in the post-1990 period.

19 There certainly is, and I don't want to be
20 misunderstood, there is a need to press ahead with the
21 activities of the Iraq Survey Group and inspections. I
22 think those reasons relate not to this faint hope of

1 well, maybe we'll get lucky, and maybe we'll discover
2 the stockpile. I think that's actually the worst reason
3 for pressing ahead. But there is a lot more to learn
4 about procurement. There is a lot more to learn about
5 how we missed the signs of a deterioration and
6 disintegration of Iraq's arms program, and actually its
7 whole society.

8 There are, as well, certainly technologies
9 and documentation of technologies and people that are
10 still resident in Iraq they probably have not found,
11 that we want to be sure they don't get transferred to
12 other countries. So cleaning up the record, finding as
13 much as you can, getting as close to 100 percent
14 understanding of that is, I think, a valuable effort.

15 Let me say again, I think with regard to
16 the discovery of large stockpiles of weapons of mass
17 destruction, chemical and biological agents that were
18 weaponized, they were produced after 1991, I think we
19 know they didn't exist.

20 Let me ask and try to share with you my
21 thoughts as I work myself through this, as to why did we
22 get so seriously misled about what Iraq was, and what

1 Iraq was about. Well, first of all, and you know, as
2 Americans, we're almost Iranian in our desire, Shiia in
3 our desire of self-flagellation. We forget we were
4 dealing with Iraq, and Iraq behavior in at least two
5 distinct ways made a huge difference in the way, the
6 misassessment of what Iraq was about.

7 First of all, at the beginning, Iraq in
8 1991 started its relations with the U.N. Inspectors
9 based on lying, cheating and deception. They tried to
10 hide the Nuke Program initially. When caught, they lied
11 about what it was. They continued to lie, and when
12 caught without any embarrassment said oh, yeah,
13 everything else we're now telling you is true. U.N.
14 Inspectors built into the mindset, as did the rest of
15 the world, that Iraq never told the truth.

16 One of the most articulate and educated
17 Iraqi officials, as we led up to Operation Iraqi
18 Freedom, said to a colleague of mine look, we got off on
19 the wrong foot in 1991. We started lying. We continued
20 that up to 1995. I told my colleagues that if we
21 continue this behavior of lying, no one will ever
22 believe us when we tell the truth. This is one occasion

1 on which I think he was telling the truth; that is, no
2 one would believe them if they didn't tell the truth.

3 And that became very fundamental to the
4 misinterpretation following.

5 There is a second aspect of Iraqi behavior,
6 however, that in many ways as you get through down to
7 `98, was also almost equally important; that is, Iraq
8 continued to cheat on its international obligations. It
9 continued to engage in the clandestine procurement of
10 military hardware, and it was caught, not in every case,
11 in fact, not even in most cases, I think. But just
12 enough so it perpetuated this image of a state that was,
13 in fact, still determined to maintain weapons of mass
14 destruction, and certainly the capability to produce
15 those weapons.

16 I guess there is a final aspect which is a
17 shoot-off of really that second one; is Iraq's general
18 relations with the international community was not one
19 that built confidence that it had ever turned the page.

20 And if you doubt that, I invite you to go back and to
21 read Hans Blix' first report to the Security Council
22 after UNMOVIC began its inspection. He said, "Iraq has

1 not shown a genuine commitment to disarmament". So even
2 Dr. Blix in dealing with the Iraqis detected this
3 continued behavior to try to preserve and try to hide -
4 not knowing, and don't misunderstand me - Dr. Blix never
5 said that he knew they were trying to hide weapons of
6 mass destruction. But it was illustrative of a behavior
7 that is trying to shield something, and so it became up
8 to everyone to try to understand to guess their own
9 interpretation of what was behind it.

10 Secondly, responsibility is borne by all of
11 us who engage in inspection, and the institutions that
12 engaged in the inspections in Iraq. Quite frankly, we
13 became so used to being abused, to being lied to, to
14 being cheated, that it became the stereo -- well, in
15 many ways it wasn't a stereotype, it was a reality.
16 That reality became the only reality we could imagine.
17 It became very hard to imagine that there might be some
18 other reality behind there. So as each new piece of
19 evidence up until 1998 when the inspectors left, and
20 certainly in the period after '98 and before UNMOVIC
21 began, as additional evidence came, it was fit into a
22 pattern that says this is a country that is continuing

1 to lie, cheat, and deceive on its obligations not to
2 have weapons of mass destruction.

3 So evidence that didn't really fit into
4 that pattern just was sort of decaying because the basic
5 argument was based on really good proof and good
6 evidence and behavior, that this country had, in fact,
7 not changed its ways. So we really do as we go ahead,
8 have to think about inspection procedures that allow us
9 to understand countries that really may make a
10 fundamental change.

11 We're currently engaged in that with regard
12 to Libya. And some would argue, and some would argue
13 the other side too, with regard to Iran and its nuclear
14 program. You get so used to how a country has behaved
15 in the past, how it's cheated, how it's deceived, how
16 it's lied and continues to try to push programs ahead,
17 even in spite of having said that, that it's hard to
18 take on additional evidence.

19 This isn't new to us, by the way. If you
20 were to fit this and put another name in front of it,
21 you'd have the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, and the
22 argument was the Soviet Union complying with its

1 obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention?
2 Was the Soviet Union complying with its other
3 obligations with regard to missiles, chemical weapons,
4 all of this. We continued to have that argument as long
5 as the Soviets existed. And, in fact, in some, although
6 a much lesser extent today, you will still find that
7 echo in the community with regard to what is current
8 Russian behavior, because the burden of past Russian
9 behavior is so great, that it's hard to imagine how it
10 would have changed.

11 Another fact that I think bedeviled us and
12 led to this, is in the collection area. When the first
13 Gulf War ended, I can speak from having been directly
14 involved in the first inspections there, the amount of
15 collection that had gone on inside of Iraq by the
16 intelligence services of the world, and particularly the
17 United States, was minuscule.

18 Iraq was a hard place to operate. It also,
19 before 1991, had been a place that had largely not been
20 at the center of collection. The Soviet Union still
21 existed. That was the dominant strategic motif. China
22 was emerging. That was an important area. Iraq was

1 relatively unimportant.

2 Technical collection had taken place, but
3 even technical collection had in many ways been limited
4 in the 1980s. In the 1980s, most technical collections
5 focused on the contact zone between Iran and Iraq during
6 the Iran-Iraq Gulf War. People who have never spent any
7 time in the world of collection and technical
8 collection, unfortunately believe that the movies which
9 show omnipotent powers knowing everything you do at all
10 times, whether you speak, whisper, cell phones, or
11 conduct your conduct inside buildings, it's a great
12 image from the point of view of U.S. power to have
13 people believe that. It's just not really true, so
14 there were huge gaps.

15 Immediately what took place is inspectors
16 started, quite to their surprise I will say, at least in
17 my personal contact, quite to the surprise of those
18 people inside the intelligence community. It was an
19 interesting stereotype about U.N. inspections that were
20 shared both by the Iraqis and National Intelligence
21 Service. They both believed we were wusses, that we
22 were ineffectual.

1 I had a senior Iraqi official tell me one
2 day that I wasn't behaving like a traditional U.N.
3 Inspector because I was demanding to get inside places
4 he didn't want me to get, insisting and making a fuss,
5 and ultimately getting in. And he explained to me that
6 that's not how U.N. Inspectors work.

7 I also had friends in the intelligence
8 community tell me U.N. Inspectors could never accomplish
9 anything. They weren't forceful, they weren't used to
10 being intrusive, et cetera. They would be fooled.

11 The fact of the matter is that beginning in
12 the spring of 1991, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq
13 started doing a magnificent job of penetrating Iraq's
14 deception program, and collecting real information.
15 There were surprises on both sides, both the National
16 Intelligence Services were surprised, the Iraqis were
17 surprised.

18 What has largely been unexamined is how
19 each side handled that surprise. And I think this, in
20 many ways, is a subject that needs far more rigorous
21 scholarship. In the case of Iraq, I'm convinced that
22 what happened is they tried to improve their deception.

1 They tried to hide better, but they also decided that
2 there were certain capabilities that they could not
3 maintain because the inspectors would find them, large
4 weapon stockpiles.

5 On the side of National Intelligence
6 Services, what they decided is it was almost a Eureka
7 moment, or if you like my favorite television commercial
8 right now, the yellow Chevy that retracts its roof and
9 the kid says something that I will not repeat because of
10 television cameras and starts to say - you never know he
11 actually says it, and he gets a bar of soap in his
12 mouth. It was one of those moments when you said
13 Eureka!

14 You suddenly have hundreds of U.N.
15 Inspectors on the ground willing to follow-up leads in
16 Iraq. This fills a huge gap in the collection system.
17 You can tie your technical collection, which may show
18 buildings that look unusual, with people on the ground
19 who can open the doors and go into the buildings and see
20 if they're unusual. That was as addictive as Crack
21 Cocaine, the National Intelligence Services.

22 Suddenly you had ground assets that you

1 didn't have to worry about recruiting it. You didn't
2 have to worry about them being killed. You didn't have
3 to worry about the moral shortcomings showing up on the
4 pages of the "Washington Post" and "New York Times", and
5 being embarrassed that you had ever recruited someone
6 like this. You had good, upright U.N. Inspectors doing
7 the job. And the result is that there was essentially
8 no effort after 1991 by National Intelligence Services
9 to build an on-the-ground collection capability apart
10 from the U.N. They became used to the U.N.

11 Now that was fine, as long as the U.N. was
12 around. The limitation of that became only apparent in
13 1998, when the U.N. Inspectors withdrew in the face of
14 increased Iraq intransigence, and you suddenly had a
15 gap, and had to rely on technical intelligence or to
16 resort to any place you could find someone who would
17 talk about what was going on in Iraq. And that led to
18 two different but related behaviors.

19 Certainly, Iraqis who would leave the
20 country and would talk were valuable individuals, and
21 you wanted to talk. And it's not true that I think the
22 National Intelligence Services did not recognize that

1 these might have their own agendas. It was in a
2 desperate need for collection, you simply tried to vet
3 out those whose agenda and lying was so apparent that it
4 failed the taste test, and you were left with others.

5 The second resort was to resort to what
6 technically is usually called liaison services; that is,
7 other intelligence services who would have assets in the
8 country, and would come tell you what they were saying,
9 but usually never give you direct access to those
10 assets.

11 The result is very much like trying to do
12 an oil painting with blinders on and thick gloves, with
13 someone telling you how you're drawing your lines. It
14 may be roughly accurate, and rough is being the
15 operative word. It may be grossly inaccurate, without
16 that real touch. And that became a huge gap.

17 It shows up in other ways too. I continue
18 to be amazed to this day. The Middle East is not new to
19 the U.S. We know how vital it is. It goes back at
20 least to the Carter Administration when those of us who
21 were living in Washington or any place in the states and
22 are old enough - I have to add that, because as I look

1 around I realize a number of you aren't - to remember
2 real gas lines, and an embargo.

3 Look, the Middle East was important, but as
4 a nation, our training of scholars, our training of
5 intelligence analysts who speak Arabic, who know the
6 cultures, is a tragedy that I still don't understand.
7 And it's even more of a tragedy I think for people of my
8 own generation, because we trained for several
9 generations some of the brightest of American students,
10 analysts, scholars in Russian studies.

11 Look, I started out at Columbia in the
12 Russian Institute. I was just one of many that flooded
13 after Sputnik into Russian studies. We've never done
14 the same thing for other areas of the world. And in a
15 real way, we showed that limitation yet again in the
16 case of Iraq.

17 There is another lesson that I think we
18 need to draw, and that relates to analysis, and to
19 understand. It's become, after 9/11, almost everyone
20 says the feeling of 9/11 is analysts didn't connect the
21 dots. You should have just connected the dots and you
22 would have understood the plot against you.

1 That's an extraordinarily dangerous thing
2 to urge on analysts. That presumes there are enough
3 dots to make sense of, as you connect them. Only if
4 you're collecting do you have dots. If you misconnect
5 dots, you get a very wrong picture of the world.

6 The fact of the matter is, I'm convinced
7 there just were not enough dots to connect. And it was
8 not the procedure in the analytical intelligence world
9 to stand up and say no can do, can't tell you, customer
10 - can't tell you, Mr. Policymaker, what's going on. We
11 need more collection. After 1998, I think as that
12 history is rewritten and restudied, a new commission and
13 historians finally get into it, we're going to be
14 appalled at how little information led to conclusions.

15 Now the reason was, and to get back to
16 something I started with, we had a long body of
17 experience with Iraq. Every new piece of information
18 was added on to this old animal, which said Iraq had
19 built weapons of mass destruction, had used weapons of
20 mass destruction against its own population and
21 neighbors, had lied and cheated to the U.N., so really
22 each dot you can connect back to that larger dot. If

1 there were two different animals, you were in real
2 trouble. I think we were in real trouble.

3 The second part of the analytical frame
4 work I think we're all going to have to learn from,
5 you're always in your greatest danger, whether you're
6 talking about your 401(k) plan two and a half years ago,
7 three and a half years ago, but all of us were convinced
8 I'm going to be able to retire early. I'm going to be
9 able to travel. I'm going to play as much golf and
10 fishing as I want. This thing is going to just go up,
11 up, and up.

12 We had a dominant model of what the world
13 looked like, and we just didn't examine its foundations.

14 The bubble burst, and all of us are facing working
15 longer than we wanted to, maybe forever. Not only that,
16 we have kids bounce back and live with us, that assumes
17 you'll work forever and ever, so that's what makes some
18 people rich.

19 You know, contrarian analysis, which is
20 hard to do, very, very hard to do, because you look like
21 an idiot by standing -- or you look like Scott Ritter,
22 you know, by standing up and saying this isn't true.

1 There is another view. Let's examine the foundations of
2 it. It is really something that we need to build into
3 our systems. And in some ways this is commonplace. Do
4 any of you not realize after the bursting of the
5 economic bubble that your 401(k) analysis really needs
6 safety measures, and constant contrarian analysis? But
7 we repeat these bubbles and these cycles, and we get
8 caught up into it.

9 And let me again emphasize the Iraqis did a
10 lot to make this easy to do. They started lying,
11 cheating, deceiving. They continued to lie, cheat, and
12 deceive us about a number of issues, and their behavior
13 with regard to the U.N. inspectors and the rest of the
14 world.

15 Let me say a few things about political
16 abuse, and what goes by political abuse. I have no
17 problem by saying I think the new commission certainly
18 ought to examine how policymakers use intelligence, and
19 whether they, in fact, cherry picked and abused
20 intelligence. I think that's a natural question that
21 needs an answer.

22 I will say in my personal contacts, I've

1 seen absolutely no evidence of that, both in the
2 intelligence and in the policy world that I came in
3 contact with, I never had anyone say you've got to go
4 out and find the weapons. That's your job. Don't worry
5 about these other things.

6 The constant refrain is to find the truth,
7 the mission was to find the truth. And with regard to
8 cherry picking, which is this artful description of
9 well, maybe what the policymakers just did is they
10 picked those interpretations that most favor them. The
11 fact of the matter is almost everyone believed Iraq had
12 weapons of mass destruction, whether you were in the
13 U.S., whether you were in France, the U.K., Germany; and
14 yes, even the Russian Intelligence Service.

15 Now there were great differences at the
16 nuance level, and certainly even greater differences at
17 the political strategy level of how you coped with that,
18 but there was remarkable consistent belief that Iraq,
19 indeed, had weapons of mass destruction, and was
20 continuing to try to enhance and acquire those, and was
21 there.

22 I think that is -- it makes it very, very

1 unlikely in my view that cherry picking occurred. And
2 let me pick another -- one other charge that's often
3 labeled and express my own personal amazement at it.
4 The Vice President of the United States on a Saturday
5 goes over and talks to the lead analyst or some of the
6 lead analysts involved in the Iraq Weapons Program, and
7 that is an example, so it is said, of political twisting
8 and distortion.

9 I think that is just an unfounded
10 conclusion that I'm personally appalled at. We exist in
11 a world in which not all wisdom, not all experience
12 exists in the corps of analysts wherever they are. A
13 lot of policymakers have had more contact with the world
14 that the analysts are analyzing, have spent more time
15 with the leaders, more time there than any analysts
16 have. And after all, if something goes wrong, it's the
17 policymakers generally, not the analysts that are going
18 to be hung up to dry.

19 And I'll give you an example where I think
20 we all should have wished that policymakers had spent
21 more time questioning analysts about their view. I
22 think as the 9/11 Commission will show, the dominant

1 view of Al-Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden (UBL) prior to 9/11
2 in large parts of the intelligence community was that we
3 were building him up to be a 12 foot threat, and we were
4 only enhancing him, that Al-Qaeda and UBL were not the
5 threats that were generally being portrayed, that there
6 were other threats that couldn't hurt the United States,
7 et cetera, et cetera. There was real questioning about
8 whether that was the problem.

9 I quite frankly wish Secretary of Defense
10 Perry, Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense
11 later Cohen, all of these people who had tremendous
12 experience, spent more time prior to 9/11, as I would
13 say with the same people in the current administration,
14 with the analysts, asking them how did you come to this
15 conclusion? What do you believe? Checking and
16 dialoguing.

17 Quite frankly, that's the type of stuff
18 that makes for better analysis, and probably makes for
19 better policy. And from the point of view of an analyst
20 or someone who has done analysis, let me tell you - good
21 analysts don't mind people who have important positions
22 coming over and spending time with them. If you're a

1 good analyst and you've gone through a good process,
2 you're used to people challenging you and disagreeing
3 with you. That's what analysis is about.

4 The idea of the Vice President taking part
5 of his Saturday and coming over and talking to you, in
6 general, is a chance to get face time. It's a chance to
7 have someone who has a very important position, talk to
8 you. And I can only speak going very far back in my own
9 personal experience as a mid-level relatively young
10 member of Arthur Goldberg's staff when he was U.S.
11 Ambassador of the U.N. I got invited one weekend as it
12 turned out to go over and brief for all of five minutes
13 Vice President Humphrey on an issue and have Humphrey
14 ask me questions.

15 Did I feel abused? Did I feel challenged?
16 Hell, no. I told all my friends about it. I was happy
17 about it. It was a real joy. I managed on one occasion
18 to get one-half of a sentence in, in Lyndon Johnson's
19 State of the Union Address. Did I feel abused that he
20 had cut out three paragraphs and left one-half of a
21 sentence? No, I was happy to have half a sentence. You
22 know, it just completely misunderstands the way people

1 who are in foxholes feel about when people who are
2 sitting on high take the trouble to come and ask. And
3 my real fear is that in the future people like Vice
4 President Cheney and others will be fearful of direct
5 contact with analysts to challenge and to talk to them,
6 to ask them about their views.

7 If that indeed happens, we as a country are
8 going to be worse off. So I think it's very appropriate
9 the Commission examine all these issues. I can just say
10 there are some things that are out there that really go
11 counter to that.

12 Let me end on one final note. I've gone on
13 for longer than I intended to - that I think is going to
14 be the most interesting thing discovered out of Iraq;
15 and that is, the extent to which Iraqi society had
16 become corrupted and was in the process of
17 disintegration. And it's what led me to the conclusion
18 to say last week, in many ways I think the Iraq that
19 we're finding is more dangerous than we anticipated.

20 I know this seems counter to a number of
21 people's views, at least as I read the editorial pages
22 today in the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times"

1 last week, I know editorial writers have a hard time
2 with this. You know, Saddam ran a state of absolute
3 terror with security forces all around. How could
4 anyone have cheated and lied on such an individual?
5 Well, we don't study history very well. If you go back
6 and you look at Stalin in the last days of Stalin's
7 rule, you go back and look at almost any terrorist
8 totalitarian state, you discover that the problem with
9 terrorism on high and totalitarian state is everyone
10 becomes, first of all, afraid to speak the truth in
11 front of the leader, and so you get used to lying and
12 cheating. And your risk cycle, and your risk scale is
13 far different than that of people like you and I.

14 And secondly, that most of the societies
15 fail and fall into corruption, denigration in a way that
16 destroy all sense of moral values, and makes it so
17 almost everyone else can justify their cheating, their
18 behavior, not in the terms that they were educated, not
19 even in the culture they believe they're a part of, but
20 in terms of look what Saddam is doing, look what Uday is
21 doing, look what Qusay is doing, et cetera, and so it
22 sort of falls down that scale.

1 Iraq is going to be a terribly interesting
2 case to examine. It cries out not for an American, it
3 cries out for an Iraqi Joseph Conrad to right the heart
4 of Iraqi darkness. Tariq Aziz, in talking to him, went
5 on at great length about what the last years of the rule
6 was in terms of Saddam getting into this fantasy land.
7 I'll never forget Tariq telling me, you know, I got this
8 500 page manuscript of a novel with a letter from Saddam
9 asking me to read it and give him his comments. Tariq
10 said I took this seriously. I started going through,
11 working my way through it, and then a week later I got
12 another 300 pages. And he said they just kept coming,
13 so I just put it aside and I ignored it. It was a
14 fantasy land. We could not get any serious discussion
15 of the issues. And there's always a certain amount of
16 self-serving over the ultimate opportunist, Tariq Aziz,
17 but there is a large amount of truth, I think, in that
18 too.

19 Also, as you talk to Iraqi scientists and
20 engineers, and ask how the behavior - you come across a
21 series of milestones that made a difference. After
22 1998, Saddam opened up the pot of wealth and said for

1 scientists, bring your proposals to me personally. I
2 will review them and decide whether they get funded.

3 Here again, those of you who are historians
4 will remember your history. If we had known that, it
5 should have set off lightbulbs. The most fateful
6 decision in the last days of the German military in the
7 Second World War, they could have not changed the course
8 of the outcome, but certainly could have raised the cost
9 of that outcome - was Hitler's decision that the jet
10 engine and jet aircraft that they had produced should
11 not be a fighter aircraft, an interceptor, but should be
12 a bomber. And so the German Air Force went over its own
13 protest, but because that's what Hitler said, trying to
14 produce a bomber jet engine and jet aircraft is totally
15 unsuitable, and German cities were set alight.

16 When finally at the end that aircraft and
17 the production as a fighter, it was a scatter of U.S.
18 fighter aircraft and U.S. bombers. Fortunately, the
19 decision to produce it as a fighter has been so delayed
20 it would have made absolutely no difference unless you
21 happened to be an allied fighter facing a German jet
22 aircraft.

1 It happens in totalitarian regimes, this
2 belief of infallibility, this belief that only you can
3 make decisions. And of course, what it leads to is
4 corruption. Teams would come up with the most fanciful
5 ideas trying to guess what Saddam was really interested
6 in, and ideas that would solve that particular itch, and
7 then walk away and come back with progress reports.

8 Saddam didn't have an establishment. There
9 was no peer review. It was that sort of corruption.
10 Another sort of corruption that I think in many ways was
11 more corrosive of total society was the corruption that
12 surrounded the Oil for Food Program, and how he used it.

13 The Iraqi estimate of those who were inside
14 is that roughly six and a half billion dollars of Oil
15 for Food Money was skimmed off. And of that, 60 percent
16 went into new palace construction. Now those of you who
17 grew up - let me not make any more enemies than I have
18 in Washington by naming states - but there are a number
19 of states where highway construction funds and big digs
20 - I didn't really say that - have, in fact, become
21 subjects of criminal prosecutions because construction
22 is an easy way to skim off money. And believe me, Quday

1 and Usay, the family, Saddam did exactly that. Everyone
2 saw that. So the physical fear was worn away by having
3 lived under that physical fear for so long. This is
4 Iraqi testimony, it's not my guessing.

5 They tell you -- you ask a direct question
6 - how could you do that? Didn't you fear that if Saddam
7 found out, he would kill you? The answer is, we always
8 fear Saddam would kill us even if he didn't find out
9 something. I mean, that was sort of the normal - that
10 was the high level of fear. High level of fear of
11 random violence is not conducive to efficiency, believe
12 it or not. Try to remember that in dealing with your
13 kids. It just leads to lying, cheating and dishonesty,
14 where it's not even in their interest. It destroyed the
15 moral fabric of that society.

16 Now why do I think that was dangerous?
17 Iraq was a place that had produced, everyone agrees, had
18 at one time produced large stockpiles of weapons of mass
19 destruction, of chemical biological agents, had an
20 advanced Nuclear program, had a missile program, a place
21 of tremendous technical capability, and probably some
22 hardware and other capability that goes beyond that in a

1 world in which we know both states and groups were
2 seeking weapons of mass destructions and mass error
3 capability. The marketplace, if the war had not
4 intervened, would have inevitably led to a willing buyer
5 and a willing seller. And we probably wouldn't have had
6 the capability of detecting that.

7 Now I'm at a disadvantage, as we all are.
8 I can't pull out of my pocket and declassify that we've
9 known certain things forever. But even if you accept at
10 face value that we've known A.Q. Kahn was running the
11 Sam's Club for nuclear weapons technology. He certainly
12 ran it longer than we knew it, and ran it in places that
13 we didn't know at the time he was running it.

14 Those sorts of acts, and A.Q. casts a
15 fairly large shadow and footprint, should have cast a
16 larger one. Individuals selling that in Iraq for their
17 own gain, I think was well within the realm of
18 possibility there, and well beyond the resolution of our
19 capability to discover it. So, I mean, I think those
20 are the issues that in the end make Iraq an
21 extraordinarily dangerous place. And I'm running out of
22 time, and this is probably not the forum - let me just

1 assert that I think as the history of Saddam's rule
2 becomes more apparent and more available, we all - and I
3 don't mean just Americans, but I mean all as a people
4 around the world are going to be not just embarrassed
5 but shown at our very moral core that we stood aside and
6 allowed a regime like that to destroy a culture and
7 destroy a people.

8 One reason we are having such a great
9 trouble putting Iraq back together today is not only
10 that Saddam destroyed as he did the physical
11 infrastructure and let it run down in Iraq, but much
12 more importantly, he destroyed the societal
13 infrastructure that holds a people and a nation
14 together. The degradation, a million people or so
15 killed in unmarked graves, the random nature of the
16 violence going over a 25 year period, when in fact the
17 Joseph Conrad of Iraq comes out and that "Heart of
18 Darkness" book is written, all of us are going to be
19 ashamed by the extent to which we stood aside and said
20 it's not our problem, it's not our country, it's not our
21 region. Someone else will deal with it. It's
22 economically not attractive to deal with, whatever the

1 argument each individual and each country came with is
2 going to be shamed by the depth of terror and
3 degradation that Saddam hurled Iraq into. It's truly a
4 cesspool of degradation, and it makes it very, very hard
5 when that social glue is destroyed to recreate a society
6 that runs on the rules of democracy.

7 I mean, America and any democracy is held
8 together by a series of social expectations, of bounded
9 behavior, of a common past and a common future. But
10 regardless of not liking and disagreeing, and finding
11 bits of our history, and in some cases maybe large
12 portions, disagreeable and shameful, the overall image
13 is one that we believe we're better off together than we
14 are apart, and that there is a future to this work
15 achieving together.

16 There is not in Iraq today anything like
17 that, and that's why it's a very, very hard job, if not
18 almost impossible to easily and quickly put that back
19 together again. We're asking a lot of the Iraqis, and
20 more than we've ever asked of our own selves.

21 DR. SERWER (USIP): Thank you very much,
22 David. I think you've probably roused a good number of

1 questions.

2 DR. KAY: I hope so.

3 DR SERWER: I'm going to turn to
4 questioners, reminding you that you must go to the
5 microphone because we are webcasting this. And please
6 introduce yourself before you ask your question. Thank
7 you.

8 MR. LEVENTHAL: I'm Paul Leventhal with the
9 Nuclear Control Institute. I'd like to ask a question
10 of David Kay related to his testimony at the Senate.
11 You said two things which appear to be internally
12 inconsistent. One is, you described a situation where I
13 think you said after Saddam's brother-in-law spilled the
14 beans to General Gamal in 1995, Saddam must have at that
15 point ordered the destruction of whatever existing
16 stockpiles were there. And you also said that in
17 interviewing field generals, each one pointed to another
18 with certainty saying I'm sure another general must have
19 that.

20 My question is, aren't those two scenarios
21 internally inconsistent. Surely if the stockpiles were
22 destroyed, the general would have known it. And what

1 evidence do you have that might be forensically
2 validated to demonstrate that in fact the stockpiles
3 were destroyed? And do you have anything other than the
4 word of the people you were speaking to? And if that is
5 the limit of what you had, then aren't you potentially
6 subject to the same orchestrated deception by Iraqi
7 officials and scientists that you, as a U.N. Inspector,
8 know full well how well they have done over the years.

9 DR. KAY: Interesting questions, Paul. I
10 wondered why you were standing near the microphone
11 throughout. And I want to say it was the son-in-law,
12 not brother-in-law of Saddam Hussein. I don't think
13 they're internally inconsistent at all.

14 When the exact date of the destruction took
15 place, my personal view is that most of it took place -
16 some took place as early as '92, some took place at
17 least as late as '95 after Hussein Gamal and his brother
18 left, and some may have taken place even later. Is that
19 inconsistent with the reported interviews of senior
20 generals that believed it? This was Iraq. It's not
21 inconsistent.

22 If we destroy chemical stockpiles, we go to

1 Alabama. We have lawsuits. We have the press covering
2 the incinerator working. Congress has hearings on it.
3 Everyone knows about it, and so you can't do it. In
4 Iraq, if you decide to destroy something, it's not the
5 generals who will do it. It's by and large the
6 intelligence service, the IIS of Iraq that are involved,
7 a very small group. It's not covered in the press.
8 It's not debated in the parliament. U.N. Inspectors
9 weren't invited to witness it, and at the same -- and
10 this gets to a question that's related to what you ask
11 but you didn't ask, why would Saddam want to maintain
12 the belief even among his hardcore military commanders
13 that somewhere in this vast system there was chemical
14 weapons?

15 And also remember, too few of us I think
16 studied the order of battle of the Iraqi military.
17 Iraqi military had a regular army, republican guard, and
18 special republic guard in roughly that there are always
19 special units around, but the republic guard -- the
20 regular army and the republic guard were never allowed
21 to enter Baghdad. Why? He was afraid of a coup. Large
22 multi-unit divisional, combined divisional at core level

1 and multi-core maneuvers never took place. Why? Coup,
2 worried about it.

3 The danger and division leaders were
4 rotated, and in general did not come from the same
5 ethnic group that the dominant troops, or region that
6 the dominant troops under the command came. Core, fear
7 coup.

8 The military itself often having questions
9 about others that it couldn't confirm, and could not
10 even ask questions about because of the fear of terror
11 if you were asking questions about it.

12 I think Saddam quite clearly, it's probably
13 one of the worst gambles ever made by a political
14 leader, thought that the impression of retaining the
15 capacity with WMD was useful internally. These had been
16 effective weapons against the Shiia and the Kurds. He
17 certainly wanted the Shiia and the Kurds to believe he
18 still had those weapons. Believe me, after Halabja is
19 had a chilling impact on the limits which you were
20 willing to push the regime.

21 I think also Saddam had a problem with
22 regard to others in the region believing he caved in

1 either to the U.N. or the U.S. He was willing to pay
2 the cost of being believed to be an effective cheater,
3 so I don't find those inconsistent.

4 Now with regard, Paul, to the level of
5 forensic evidence, I'm going to have to brief and skate
6 on this one because it gets into an area I can't talk
7 about. Let me say I think everyone who was involved in
8 the survey work over there understands the importance of
9 not relying on just what people tell you. The
10 importance of forensic evidence and documents - there
11 are real limits to how much of that you can get. But
12 everyone understands that's a gold standard, and is --

13 MR. LEVENTHAL: Did you find evidence
14 beyond what you were told?

15 DR. KAY: I'm not going to play that game.
16 That's a game that gets very dangerous. I understand,
17 and I think everyone understands the importance of that.
18 How far along you get to it is going to -- some is
19 going to face really some technical limits. But
20 everyone understands that's exactly the standard you
21 need.

22 MR. LEVENTHAL: Just to follow-up, if I

1 could. The question of corruption, maybe you could
2 corroborate on the basis of a bank account --

3 DR. KAY: Yes.

4 MR. LEVENTHAL: -- to Saddam that these
5 things did happen --

6 DR. KAY: Oh, no, they're not simply told.

7 Believe me, the bank records are some of the more
8 interesting records in Iraq - interesting to
9 accountants. I mean, I despair of "Washington Post", or
10 "New York Times", or other report - and particularly
11 television journalists trying to explain that. Eyes
12 glazed over generally when that happens, but they're
13 fascinating records.

14 MS. SNIPE: My name is Michelle Snipe with
15 Executive Intelligence. Dr. Kay, I recently interviewed
16 Scott Ritter about his latest two books --

17 DR. KAY: My sympathy.

18 MS. SNIPE: My sympathies to you also for
19 the position that you're fielding all these wonderful
20 questions, but he's only one of many when you made your
21 remarks before Congress you may have been quoted out of
22 context that we were all wrong. That's the most popular

1 quote. As one Middle East Intelligence retired man said
2 to me, what you need (inaudible) And Members of Congress
3 have brought this up quoting a number of people who
4 expressed doubt about the rush to judgment. And let me
5 say a couple of things that Mr. Ritter brought up that I
6 think are important.

7 Like you, he said the U.N. Inspectors were
8 not wusses in `91 to `98, you stormed into place and
9 held your ground, et cetera. It led to a brief war, et
10 cetera. And then he put a particular highlight on the
11 debriefing of Kamal Hussein who as recently as last
12 week, I believe it was Secretary Powell said that he was
13 one of the most important defectors because he led us to
14 a program about which the Iraqis had lied tremendously.
15 Yet he said that these were destroyed.

16 Now if I could ask the audience to think
17 about a year ago around this time something that I never
18 expected to see at that moment was going on, the Une
19 Movic Group (ph) was destroying the ballistic missiles
20 which had slightly exceeded the U.N. limits. I believe
21 people did not think that they were going to do that.

22 And my question to you as a former inspector and a

1 distinguished person in the United States government is
2 --

3 DR. KAY: Former.

4 MS. SNIPE: Right. The body count at this
5 point, 520 plus, thousands injured, the United Nations'
6 opponents to the United States didn't seem to be asking
7 too much, especially after the missiles were destroyed.

8 They were asking at one point for another 120 days, and
9 what was wrong with UNMOVIC. Could they have secured
10 the United States against WMD attacks if they had been
11 allowed to continue? You mentioned Dr. Blix' first
12 testimony--

13 DR. KAY: Can I get a chance to answer
14 these questions?

15 MS. SNIPE: Yes. This is my last comment,
16 you mentioned his first comment. They visited hundreds
17 of sites. He gave a lot more testimony which indicated
18 that with persistence they were getting through the
19 blockades. Could they have done the job?

20 DR. KAY: Let me answer the two questions.
21 One is, the first being we were all wrong. Literally,
22 did I mean everyone in the world was wrong? No.

1 Although it's interesting, as with all events, you
2 discover people who had alternative views usually after
3 the reality has been determined.

4 What I really meant by that is that if you
5 look at - and there were people in the U.S. government
6 who had alternative explanations on particular points.
7 The vast weight, including myself, including a lot of
8 people who were outside the government as I was at that
9 time, was that Saddam had continued his weapons program.

10 Now there were great differences with
11 regard to what was the appropriate response to that,
12 whether it was continued inspections, whether sanctions
13 should be increased, Smart Sanctions as they were called
14 then, or whether, in fact, unilateral military action
15 was appropriate. And there were differences with regard
16 to where particular programs were. These were most
17 serious in the nuclear area, and very few analysts
18 outside the government believed that the nuclear program
19 was resurging. But on the simple point of had he
20 continued his WMD program, I think we do not do
21 ourselves a great service in terms of future
22 proliferation and understanding what went wrong here,

1 and how we correct it. If we suddenly start saying well,
2 that's not really true. It was only a small band of
3 brothers either in DOD or somewhere, in CIA or someplace
4 else that believed this. Most of the rest of us didn't
5 believe it. The fact of the matter is, you've even got
6 statements by Jaques Chirac in which he said yes,
7 obviously Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. The
8 dominant view was that they existed and that this was a
9 regime that was continuing to attempt to acquire them.

10 On the issue of inspections, let me give
11 you a two-part answer on that. If the goal of
12 inspections was to eliminate entirely Iraq's clandestine
13 program, and everything that had been hidden and
14 activities that continued in defiance of both the
15 earlier U.N. Security Resolutions and 1441, there is no
16 better testimony I think than the number of Iraqi
17 scientists, including the scientists who took us to the
18 undiscovered missile programs, who said he'd been
19 interviewed by UNMOVIC. He did not tell them about this.

20 He would not have told them regardless of how many
21 times or where they had asked him, simply because he
22 feared for his life and his family's life because Saddam

1 was still in power.

2 The second part though is a much more
3 interesting question and an answer. In the small amount
4 of down time we had in Iraq, and I had a number of
5 former U.N., both UNMOVIC inspectors, not as many as I'd
6 like but I had some working for me. You know, we would
7 sit around and essentially look at what we've done as
8 inspectors and question in terms of what we were
9 discovering and what Iraqis were saying about it. And
10 it was a unanimous conclusion - we all said, we were
11 better than we gave ourselves credit for. And the
12 Iraqis thought we were better even than that; that is,
13 Iraq adjusted its behavior to a view of the
14 effectiveness and efficiency of inspectors that I think
15 both exceeded the reality, but also exceeded even an
16 enhanced reality of how good we were. And we did not
17 fully understand the limits that had been put on the
18 program.

19 It's not unusual, working inside a program
20 you usually see the things that bother you every day.
21 You know how you would get around behavior. You were
22 bothered by that. And there were a series of these that

1 ran literally from '91 all the way up through '98. I
2 think one thing we have to do, and it should be on the
3 top of the non-proliferation agenda, is to divide and
4 not fall into the trap. In some ways, I think the
5 questioner did - those people who support treaty
6 inspection and treaty activities, and those who believe
7 that they'll always be inadequate and you have to have
8 this resort to unilateral action as a possibility.
9 Quite frankly, the lesson I think we're going to get out
10 of Iraq is there are ways to combine both that will make
11 both better. And to the extent that you can make
12 treaty-based approaches better, unilateral action
13 doesn't become necessary and the high human cost that is
14 involved do not become necessary.

15 We're faced with real limits. Look, the
16 Iranians said that they cheated on their obligations for
17 17 years, and it had gone undetected by the
18 International Atomic Energy Agency and by National
19 Intelligence Services, by and large. Now whether that's
20 right on the ladder I have no idea, but that was the
21 Iranian assertion to the IAEA.

22 We need to find ways, and I think there is

1 a wealth of data that will come out of Iraq as to how,
2 in fact, you can make those treaty-based approaches
3 better. I don't think anyone has ever said, at least no
4 one I've talked to, has ever said, you know, it's damn
5 the torpedoes, full ahead, and from now it's going to be
6 just unilateral action. This ought to be a last resort,
7 and generally, I think there are ways to make it even
8 more of a last resort than it was at the time of
9 Operation Iraqi Freedom. We've learned hard lessons,
10 and we've learned them on the ground.

11 MR. ROTHSTEIN: Hi. My name is Michael
12 Rothstein. I work with the Russian American Nuclear
13 Security Advisory Council. I want to thank you for
14 spending so much time during many of these opportunities
15 you've had to speak publicly to sort of highlight the
16 dangers that are inherent in the proliferation of WMD
17 expertise. I think when we're looking at this whole
18 situation that's emerged in Iraq, this is really an
19 issue that hasn't been paid close enough attention to by
20 anyone.

21 And having been someone who has been in
22 contact with a lot of the Iraqi weapons scientists, in

1 particular, the State Department has given notice that
2 they will be initiating efforts to re-employ many of
3 these weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits. I'm
4 wondering what do you think about these efforts that the
5 State Department is planning on pursuing? What are the
6 challenges you think they're going to experience, and
7 what do you think are some situations that might give us
8 encouragement with regard to these efforts?

9 DR. KAY: Well, I won't pick on the State
10 Department, because as a matter of fact in terms of
11 history, this started originally as a DOD proposal. It
12 got caught up in some of the worst inter- agency
13 wrangling, most pointless inter-agency wrangling I've
14 ever seen. It struck, I think a lot of us who were in
15 Iraq in the summer, last summer that the best thing we
16 could do immediately is start giving out cash to Iraqis
17 and require that they come every two weeks to get the
18 cash, the Iraqi scientists and engineers, because what
19 we were up against is we were discovering Iraqi
20 scientists who we could no longer find. They had either
21 left the country, or moved some place in the country.
22 You didn't know, and you didn't have a picture.

1 Look, this is a country that you don't get
2 a passport when you want to go across the border. You
3 hire a fixer who will take you across the border. WE
4 don't know about that brain drain, but we do know
5 there's no productive enterprise right now that will
6 capture them. I think we need to quickly infuse cash.
7 I would even argue - and this will no doubt get me in
8 trouble with GAO or GAO-types - I will say it probably
9 will not be as effectively used as we would like. It
10 will be somewhere on the order of federal programs.

11 Look, Iraq is a chaotic society. The
12 important thing is to give those individuals some hope
13 of a better productive life. That's going to take a
14 long while. I think actually the restart of their
15 economy and their society is going to be far more
16 difficult than most Americans understand and anticipate,
17 and that includes Americans inside the government.

18 I think it's important that we deal with
19 that expertise, and start helping those who want to make
20 a transition to another life inside Iraq that is
21 profitable and not weapons-related. These are the most
22 talented and trained.

1 The real tragedy as you talk to Iraqi
2 scientists, and I see Jonathan who I know has talked to
3 a lot, and other people in this room who have, is these
4 were the people, the senior scientists were the people
5 who were mostly educated in the West, who were very,
6 very well-trained and very good.

7 The fact of the matter is that their
8 children are nowhere near as well educated, have nowhere
9 near the same future that they had. A lot of their
10 desire to move is not because they want, and I never met
11 one who really admitted he wanted to work in another
12 weapons program. They just want a life. They want to
13 either finish their own life with some dignity and
14 employment, or have a better life for their kids. We
15 need to do it in the interest of stopping that flow.

16 It's not the only answer. You know, we
17 need to take a hard look at A.Q. Kahn. A.Q. did not
18 have a bad life in Pakistan. And unfortunately, he's
19 not going to have a bad life in Pakistan. But there are
20 some people who will cross boundaries and go ahead and
21 cheat, deceive, lie and do acts that are truly horrible.

22 There are other ways for dealing with those, but for

1 the bulk - and this is the bulk of the Iraqi scientists
2 and engineers - we need immediate injections of cash and
3 employment, of giving them opportunities to work. We
4 haven't done a very good job at that.

5 MR. SOMALIS: Albert Somalis. I'm a fellow
6 here at the Institute. Last summer I spent, actually
7 towards the tail-end of the war I was in Iraq for a few
8 weeks, actually for a few months into the summer after
9 that, and obviously, at that point most Iraqi that we
10 talked to, every Iraqi that we talked to was concerned
11 about security. But later on as the conversation
12 progressed, I would find myself engaged with the Iraqis
13 talking about the weapons. So my question is, what are
14 the implications of the credibility gap that's kind of
15 developed towards the reconstruction, both the pace and
16 the depth of the reconstruction in Iraq?

17 And then also beyond that, I guess it's a
18 two-part question. What are the implications of this
19 credibility gap for other places? You've done a good
20 job of talking about hey, that's how intelligence
21 sometimes is, but the credibility gap exists, and the
22 perception exists out there, nevertheless. So when it

1 comes time to dealing with other places out there beyond
2 Iraq, what does that mean?

3 DR. KAY: Again, let me take the first one
4 quickly, and go to the second. Look, if you talk to
5 Iraqis at least -- and I haven't for a month - as I've
6 talked to them, there are sort of three themes you get.

7 (A) You're after our oil - that's probably the dominant
8 one you get. The second one, which actually I was
9 always amazed - how little attention they paid to WMD.
10 You know, it was an excuse, et cetera. But the dominant
11 one is, you know, they don't resent us as occupiers.
12 They resent us as ineffective occupiers. That is, you
13 can't get the electricity working. You can't provide
14 security. You can't get schools and all that.

15 I think in terms of the ultimate test for
16 the average Iraqi, it's how their personal life -- and
17 here, quite frankly, reality is more complicated than we
18 often portray it. For an urban Iraqi in Baghdad, there
19 are new freedoms that you never dreamed you'd have. Now
20 they're freedoms that we laugh at, the right to watch Al
21 Jazeera, you know, all the general junk that is on
22 television - boy, that'll play well. You know, is one

1 that if you've been denied that right, is really
2 important. Going out to eat, being free of that fear.
3 But the fact of the matter is, it is the security issue
4 that dominates their life and employment as they restart
5 their economy.

6 The credibility gap is the one that I think
7 is the more serious part in the longer run of your
8 question that has really broader implications. We
9 probably have shot ourselves in the foot for a
10 generation of people who when you go to them and whisper
11 in their ear, X is doing this, they're automatically
12 believing that because you're the United States and
13 you're so good, you must know, and it must be true.
14 We're just going to have to live with that. You saw a
15 bit of that, and you're still seeing a bit of that on
16 the idea of putting air marshals on foreign flights,
17 them rejecting it, cancelling flights.

18 It's just a fact of life. Some of it will
19 be erased quicker than I think we think. I think as a
20 general view and understanding of how dangerous and what
21 real moral shame I think all of us deservedly face for
22 letting that regime continue. There's going to be a

1 little bit of a washout, but there's no doubt - and
2 that's one reason I think an independent commission is
3 an important step to try to restore systemic failures
4 and show that you've restored them so you can regain
5 that confidence, both abroad and with the American
6 public. I think that's a terribly important question
7 that needs a lot more thought.

8 Dr. TUCKER: -- Jonathan Tucker, Monterey
9 Institute. It's good to see you back in the U.S.A.
10 Regardless of what type of government is finally
11 installed in Baghdad, do you believe it was be necessary
12 to have ongoing monitoring and verification of dual-use
13 facilities in Iraq? And if so, what agency should
14 conduct the OMB activity?

15 DR. KAY: Sure. I think Iraq poses a case,
16 just like North Korea hopefully will, and Libya does now
17 - countries that have had WMD programs, and had
18 tremendous successes in them. Even when a government
19 changes to give confidence to their neighbors and the
20 rest of the world, there has to be something more than
21 this belief that that government wouldn't do it. You've
22 got a real case that we paid no attention to in the

1 States, and that's Brazil.

2 Brazil had an active nuclear program. A
3 democratic government was elected. It abandoned it.
4 And as we sometimes forget, democratic governments mean
5 you can change governments, and not all governments are
6 going to have the same policy. You currently have in
7 Brazil a Master of Science and Technology who quite
8 frankly has spoken about the need to acquire nuclear
9 weapons, and that's causing angst, if anyone ever took
10 them seriously, probably more angst in B.A., in Buenos
11 Aires and other places on the continent.

12 I think in the case of Iraq what you want
13 is two - you do not want the U.S. running that ongoing
14 monitoring. You know, it's just a formula for disaster.

15 What you want is two-fold. You want the Iraqi
16 government to have its own internal procedures. Let the
17 lesson of Pakistan and A.Q. Kahn, if I believe what
18 President Musharraf has said, is that they didn't know
19 A.Q. was doing that. That tells me boy, they should
20 have had some monitoring systems that they didn't have.

21 But in any case, probably the appropriate
22 one is some international. Now it could be the

1 traditional international organizations. The problem
2 is, you know even better than I do as the biological
3 area, whoever you want to turn to, it may be that you do
4 it regionally as part of some regional security pact
5 with the Iranians to give mutual confidence as well as
6 confidence in the region. But it's clear got to be
7 beyond the U.S., and we ought to be moving towards that.

8 In talking with Iraqis, and there are
9 Iraqis in the Ministry of Science and Technology already
10 thinking about this - they recognize that as an issue,
11 and they want to take back that responsibility
12 themselves. I think we need to encourage that.

13 MR. SOMALIS: This is a quick follow-up.
14 Do you think there is an ongoing role for UNMOVIC or
15 should it be allowed to die a natural death?

16 DR. KAY: Or unnatural. No, I haven't
17 really thought of it. You know, the problem is going to
18 be how do you continue a role for UNMOVIC without
19 denigrating the IAEA and the chemical weapons area. On
20 the other hand, maybe there are ways. A lot is going to
21 depend on how Libya, Iran, and whatever happens in North
22 Korea plays out. I'm a little leery of creating a

1 bureaucratic model and stamping it up and saying this
2 will be it, when we don't know the reality to apply to.

3 MR. CONSOLTUR: Dan Consoltur, I'm a
4 graduate student. You spoke a fair amount at the end
5 about the ethical and moral obligation of the United
6 States. And I'm sure it's -- it can come off as
7 self-serving if the members of the administration,
8 particularly Secretary Rumsfeld, were part of the effort
9 to propose human rights groups' efforts to, for example,
10 to bring the object to light in 1983, well, in '87 when
11 that happened but in earlier efforts - for example,
12 Secretary Rumsfeld's visits to Saddam Hussein. This has
13 not been discussed enough, and I think it would behoove
14 us all as Americans to recognize how we supported the
15 regime earlier on when it was deemed to be in our
16 interest to do so. If it's truly an ethical question,
17 it's not enough to simply assert that it was the right
18 thing to do because the Iranian regime was the worst at
19 the time. That's my question.

20 In terms of credibility of the
21 administration, this speaks to the politics and it can't
22 be avoided. CBS News did an interview, "60 Minutes 2"

1 last week, with officials from the State Department, a
2 man named Greg Fieldman, a scientist at Oakridge
3 National Lab, who made it clear that there was a good
4 deal of evidence in advance that the aluminum tubes
5 thought to be for centrifuge were clearly not, and known
6 not to be well ahead of the war, known not to be
7 intended for that use. And yet, the administration used
8 them to make its case - even Secretary Powell at the
9 U.N.

10 Now you haven't spoken much about the
11 nuclear side specifically; yet, if the administration's
12 decision on that point clearly contradicted when they
13 said there was no doubt, that was factually, I think,
14 untrue. There was doubt, it was known that there was
15 doubt. If their credibility is questionable on the
16 nuclear issue, how can you be so sure of your confidence
17 that (a) there wasn't cherry picking; and that (b) the
18 interpretation of the rest of WMD programs, of the
19 evidence that was available was, in fact, correct?

20 DR. KAY: Well, let me take the last one
21 which was a comment and then get to the ethic picture.
22 I said, and let me say again, I clearly believe the

1 issue of cherry picking and the issue of whether there
2 was political distortion of the intelligence deserves to
3 be on the agenda by the Independent Commission. I think
4 it essential that it be there. All I was saying is that
5 in my personal contacts, I saw no example of that taking
6 place, and I can only speak about what I personally
7 observed. It clearly needs to be examined.

8 On the ethics issue, I must have been more
9 unclear than I intended to be certainly. I do not
10 believe it's just the U.S. When I say I think we are
11 going to be embarrassed, profoundly disturbed by what
12 will turn out to be the reality of the horror of that
13 regime, I think everyone in the world - I think our
14 European allies and others in the region are. It's not
15 just us, are going to be there.

16 I think it needs to be examined. I think
17 really -- I hope what comes out of this is that issue.
18 Quite frankly, one of the problems is we don't really
19 have a good way to focus on it. I've met no one,
20 including Iraqis really, who when they look at the
21 extent of the killing, the mass graves and all, they
22 themselves are utterly shocked at how much occurred.

1 This regime, it probably is as hard to
2 express in words as to how bad it is. So the end of it,
3 for me, is -- I have absolutely no sympathy for however
4 Saddam and his sons meet their end on that.

5 Now on the issue of the use of chemicals
6 against the Iranians and their own people, well here
7 again, the moral outrage is not just at the U.S. If you
8 look at when the Iranians started shipping Iranians to
9 Europe for treatment saying that they had been
10 chemically attacked, and look at how the world reacted,
11 you're not going to find very much difference between
12 Americans and Europeans at that time. It was two evils,
13 look the other way, and not -- moral outrage was absent
14 from real politics. I think that's a shame, and it's a
15 responsibility we all bear for that. And maybe it's
16 just a sign of age - as you get older you recognize that
17 the ethical and moral issues of foreign policy start to
18 loom larger as your own -- your own end comes nearer.
19 But I quite frankly think Iraq, and I hope there is an
20 Iraqi Conrad to write the "Heart of Iraqi Darkness." I
21 also hope that places like the Institute lead the
22 examination. It is complex, of the responsive of the

1 international community to sovereign governments who
2 descend into this vortex of destruction of their own
3 people.

4 Kosovo and Bosnia were earlier examples,
5 but we've got earlier examples going well back in
6 history. We don't really have a global consensus or
7 global procedures for it. It needs more work.

8 MR. KOROLOGOS: Tom Korologos, recently
9 retired from the Coalition Provisional Authority. I
10 wasn't going to get to speak but I'm going to. To
11 buttress what you just answered here about the shame. I
12 used to take members of Congress, as one of my
13 assignments, that were skeptics when they got there,
14 down to the mass grave. And they would sit there on the
15 edge of that hill, and you never saw any quieter member
16 of Congress in your life when they'd start looking down
17 there. There's an oxymoron; A quiet member of Congress.

18 DR. KAY: Note that Tom said that, I
19 didn't. I've still got to testify.

20 MR. KOROLOGOS: My question is, he
21 destroyed the WMD's, whatever they had, Anthrax, or
22 nukes or whatever. How much slipped out? How much

1 ended up in Syria? How much ended up in Yemen? How
2 much ended up in rogue states? How much Sam's Club
3 operation was going on? Do you have any idea?

4 DR. KAY: I've got ideas, but not
5 definitive answers, Tom. The one most often asked is,
6 couldn't it have all gone to Syria? And you've got
7 satellite photography that shows a lot of sub crossing
8 the Iraqi-Syrian border. After all, this was the most
9 widely advertised war. If you had anything and you
10 wanted to get it out, you had ample time to get it
11 across the border. But unfortunately, as with satellite
12 photography you see trucks, trains, people occasionally
13 moving. What you don't know is what they're carrying.
14 And the Syrian government has not exactly been
15 cooperative on this issue.

16 So from the point of view of what you're
17 doing in Iraq, you step back, and how do I answer the
18 question - did WMD move? Well, first of all, can I
19 answer the question, was it large amounts of weaponized
20 WMD? If it were to be, it had to be produced some place
21 by some people leaving some trail. And so it's very
22 much how you come to the conclusion was there at the

1 time of the war or prior to it those large stockpiles?

2 Simply because you can't find the evidence
3 that it ever existed, it's unlikely large stockpiles of
4 post 1998 WMD, or post 1991 produced WMD moved. I don't
5 think it existed. Now could the technology have moved?

6 Yes. Could small amounts of pre-1991 WMD that had not
7 been destroyed, but had been secreted away been moved by
8 people? Absolutely, and you won't know it.

9 This is - and I didn't do it today and I
10 should - one of the things we're all going to have to
11 become used to is the unresolvable uncertainty that is
12 going to surround Iraq's WMD. The end of the war was
13 messy. The loss of control, of physical security in
14 Iraq, as you know as well, if not better than I do -
15 from April 9th to when it was finally reasserted in late
16 May, led to phenomenal destruction and looting, some of
17 it purposeful to cover tracks, some of it just for the
18 hell of it, Ali Baba looting, rip off stuff.

19 I remember going out to the research site,
20 and I actually have a picture of this, of this old man
21 and his grandson carting away pieces of metal. I asked
22 him what he was going to do with it. He didn't know

1 what he was going to do with it, and when I kept
2 pressing he said oh, I'm going to incorporate it into my
3 house. It was utter useless scrap that he was doing to
4 do it, so we're going -- and I think the Syrian question
5 is going to be a bit like that, unless the young Bashar,
6 the petit fils, suddenly decides to become honest and
7 talk about what he's doing, and presuming he actually
8 had control of Syria. I don't know that we'll ever
9 know, and we'll have to get used to it. And I don't
10 think you'll ever have the resolving power to say some
11 weapons that may have been produced before 1991,
12 technology that could relate to the very most recent
13 move across that border and is some place else, you'll
14 probably only know it when you detect it showing up in
15 some place else. That really is a disturbing answer.
16 But look, that's after all how you got A.Q. Kahn.

17 It was not from an existing in Iraq, it was
18 the movement of it some place else, and you finally pick
19 up the trail. It's really one of the most unhappy and
20 I'm convinced, largely unresolvable issues there. And
21 it gets partly to what you said, and partly to what
22 Jonathan said earlier, asked about what goes from here.

1 All of us should be clear. We have a
2 limited window to continue the types of inspections that
3 were started in June. We're in the process of giving
4 the Iraqi government back to the Iraqis. As that
5 government assumes its role, they're not going to allow
6 a group of Americans to barge around, demand the right
7 to collar anyone, to talk to anyone, go anywhere, to
8 take their documents. We've already had resistance.
9 We've had Iraqi ministries who say WMD doesn't exist.
10 We're not interested in it. You can't talk to our
11 people. We've got more serious work to do.

12 This is not because they're trying to hide
13 WMD. This is the natural pride to the unnatural act of
14 occupying another country and behaving the way we have
15 to to unmask that program, so we have a limited amount
16 of time. I'm sure when that time is over, whether it's
17 June 30th or somewhere later than that, we're not going
18 to have answers to all those questions. It's just a
19 regrettable fact.

20 Tom had a far tougher job, I should say,
21 than I ever had in Iraq. He had large numbers of
22 delegations that came through not every week but every

1 few days that he had to get around and let them
2 understand that Iraq was not Times Square. It was very
3 hard, very dangerous to go places to see things, and to
4 keep them happy and well-informed, and he did an
5 outstanding job, and convinced me there's one job in
6 this life I will never accept, and that's it.

7 MR. GUSTAFFSON: I thank you so much, David
8 Kay. Thank you for your thoughts. I'm the Director for
9 the Education for Peace in Iraq Center, Eric Gustaffson
10 and I have two quick questions. The first question
11 relates to I think a concern that by defining what has
12 happened as only an intelligence failure, that we might
13 be limiting what we've learned, what the lessons learned
14 are, that there may have also been a misrepresentation
15 of intelligence success rates based on what I saw that
16 is publicly available. I often found it questionable
17 the unequivocal statements being made by senior
18 officials. But also, simply errors in judgment, not
19 just related to the question of whether or not to go to
20 war, but also on a lot of the decisions that were made
21 in dealing with post war Iraq that I think has led to a
22 lot of the challenges that we're facing now. So do you

1 feel that it's important to be able to have the
2 commission look at more than just whether or not there
3 was an intelligence failure, recognizing that obviously
4 there's challenges politically, but still the need to
5 really get to the bottom of it and learn it - some hard
6 lessons.

7 And the second question is, as an
8 organization that did have a contrary view or contrary
9 analysis based on humanitarian concerns, and our effort
10 to press for sanctions reform often ran up against those
11 who believe that Iraq posed an imminent threat, had
12 stockpiles. It became very difficult to argue for
13 reform. And what we were arguing is that there was a
14 degradation of Iraqi society, that this was posing a
15 danger, and that there was a need to handle the
16 situation differently.

17 Do you think that the arms control
18 community, the intelligence community would have
19 benefitted from more of a dialogue with those of us that
20 did have contrary views?

21 DR. KAY: Well, let me take the second one
22 because it's certainly easy. Look, I think we all

1 benefit from dialogue. We benefit from talking to
2 people who have opposite views. One of the dangers -- I
3 mean, I think one of the things we're going to learn as
4 we come out of Iraq is that the dominant view of Saddam
5 and his weapons program became so dominant that it was
6 hard to have alternative views about that weapons issue,
7 and that's it.

8 I think where I guess I would still differ,
9 but I'd welcome the opportunity at some other time to
10 talk about - I think the evidence is that the
11 degradation and destruction of Iraqi society did not
12 come from sanctions. It came from the regime, and the
13 regime's misuse of the resources of the country, and its
14 dissent into what was both a personal and a societal
15 evil, and the way it treated. And I don't think anyone
16 should wash away, and I'm sure you don't intend to, wash
17 away the depravity of Saddam and his sons by saying
18 well, sanctions caused it. Sanctions didn't cause it.
19 That was a regime that was at its heart evil. And evil
20 is a word that we ought to get used to using in terms of
21 some of these, and not be embarrassed by it.

22 Secondly, on your initial question, let me

1 say yet again - I think I've said it three times, but I
2 really do mean it - I even said it I think in front of
3 the Senate - the commission ought to have -- you appoint
4 people of stature, give them the resources and the time,
5 and they ought to examine everything they think is
6 important to examine. And I certainly include, since
7 the charges are out there and need to be examined, as
8 opposed to fester in an unexamined corner to maintain in
9 the light that they're not true, and if they're true,
10 they need to be brought out; that is, if there was
11 cherry picking, if there was misuse, if there was
12 distortion, we need to know it.

13 And I'll repeat, I wish that I really
14 believed it was simply what a military person would call
15 undue command influence, misuse and destruction because
16 we know how to handle that. In a perverse sort of way,
17 that's easier than dealing with the fundamental issues.

18 If that was it, you know - Texas justice where I came
19 from, Judge Roy Bean and Miss Lily -- I mean, all you do
20 is Miss Lily entertains the crowd while Judge Roy Bean
21 puts the hangman's rope over the tree and you hang the
22 S.O.B., and that both improves the gene pool, which is

1 Texans because -- we come from a cattle country. We
2 believe in gene pool improvement, and for at least maybe
3 two to four years politicians see the religion and
4 behave properly. I don't think that's the issue.

5 I think when it gets down, it's going to
6 turn out to be a lot more complex than that solution.
7 Should it be examined? Absolutely, it should be
8 examined.

9 SPEAKER: I guess it's not the first time
10 that you've had lynching proposed.

11 DR. KAY: Probably at the Institute of
12 Peace it's the first time.

13 MS. GUDIAN: Hi. My name is Alberta
14 Gudian, and I was wondering if -- I know it's getting
15 kind of long, but if you could speak briefly about the
16 challenges and lessons you've learned with regard to
17 having the Army working with ISG, in terms of how you
18 were able to, I don't know, pass along what you learned
19 from being an inspector, how you -- or maybe you didn't
20 turn the army into inspectors themselves, how they
21 carried out the different sites and maybe implications
22 of future operations.

1 DR. KAY: I hope you're writing a thesis on
2 this, because it is a subject worthy of a thesis, which
3 I'm not going to try to quickly deal. Look, for those
4 of who don't know the internal laydown on this, what
5 really happened - as the nation was prepared to go to
6 war, the DOD suddenly realized that it had - realized is
7 probably the wrong word - it was suddenly forced to
8 realize that it had a mission, and that mission dealt
9 with WMD elimination. And so it threw together a small
10 unit, the 75th Exploitation Task Force. It was
11 primarily a group of artillerymen who really had no
12 training for this, had no organic means of movement or
13 self-protection. It was a huge disaster, and I can't --
14 and there's no need for me to go into great detail.
15 Just read Judith Miller in the "New York Times" who did
16 some very good stories, as did a couple of other
17 journalists. She was embedded and so hers is more first
18 contact. They did a horrible job.

19 The 75th became such an embarrassment, and
20 it was planned to phase it out anyway. A new group
21 called the Iraq Survey Group was planned to be stood up
22 under military command, as a military organic unit, as

1 part of the military structure in Iraq. It was slow off
2 the mark. The WMD issue was becoming one that was
3 getting some political salience, people were commenting
4 about the search and how it hadn't turned up anything.
5 The President in early June decided to transition the
6 task from DOD to the Director of Central Intelligence,
7 but the ISG still existed, and the ISG was to have the
8 bulk of the resources there, but it was to work under
9 the direction of Central Intelligence.

10 For any of you who ever been in the
11 military or close to the military realized you have a
12 train wreck about to happen. You have a military
13 organization that is chopped -- in this case it was op
14 con initially to the task force, the Core Level Task
15 Force in Iraq, but eventually to General Abizaid, the
16 Cen Com commander, combat commander for the theater.
17 And that's a military chain, and suddenly over here you
18 have a civilian chain that is directing how it does.
19 That's an unnatural act.

20 It worked much better than any of us had
21 any right to expect. It was never tension-free. It
22 should never be repeated. It's not the way to do

1 things. This was a mission that we should have seen
2 coming. We should have planned for it. We should have
3 trained for it. We should have figured out our
4 relationships and how we were going to do it, instead of
5 having to wing it. But as winging it goes, it worked
6 amazingly well. It's a long answer. As you get into
7 your thesis, I'd be happy to talk to you.

8 SPEAKER: One last question.

9 MS. MOLLEN: Yes. My name is Mary Mollen.

10 I was going to ask you if you could think back before
11 the war when there were so much demonstrations against
12 the war, when so many people spoke out against it. And
13 yet they always said we know this is a terrible regime,
14 we know there's tremendous abuse here. And the
15 inspectors wanted to go in again and they wanted some
16 more time.

17 I wanted to know if when you were going to
18 go in again, if you did not find any weapons of mass
19 destruction, what is it that all these people that knew
20 how terrible this regime was. What is it that you would
21 have done if it weren't for war? What could have been
22 done, we could go to the ICC Court. Is that what the

1 ICC Court is for today? Do they indict someone like
2 Saddam Hussein who commits crimes against humans. I
3 always wondered what these people really were going to
4 do if they were against the war, and yet they knew it
5 was the regime, the type of regime that we found out it
6 was.

7 DR. KAY: I think that's a very good
8 question which we're all going to have to wrestle with.

9 If we're unhappy with the exercise of unilateral
10 military - leaving WMD aside - unilateral military force
11 against a regime like this, what effective action is
12 there to change the regime? They asked one of these
13 questions that in Kosovo finally led us to decide that
14 military action was the only action to effectively
15 remove Milosevic. We have, and I hope the Institute of
16 Peace, I'm sure the Institute of Peace is working on a
17 broader pallet of tools available to do it.

18 I have a strong belief that even in
19 totalitarian societies, shining the light of public
20 opinion on abuses can have a salutary effect even in the
21 short run, but here again if you -- you know, none of us
22 knew -- I mean, I've seen Hiravi as well as Hiller,

1 those images weren't available. I mean, you had no way
2 of getting the press in to show those, to demonstrate
3 the mass graves, and to find them, and the Iraq families
4 go out and just for a bit of cloth that they can believe
5 is their son's, father, or husband's. They spent days
6 out at this desert this summer trying to dig these up
7 with their hands.

8 We, as an international society, and as a
9 country - we lack those tools for doing it. I don't
10 have the answers. I think that ought to be on the
11 research agenda. But the problem is going to be, you're
12 up against regimes that really don't care. They can
13 tell you to pound sand, and in the case of Iraq, even a
14 regime that more importantly had vast oil resources, so
15 some people were willing to hold their nose in return
16 for the prospect of sharing in that oil well, and some
17 of our allies I would put in that boat, as well. So
18 you've got tremendous problems coming up with easy
19 solutions. If the burden of that question is, what
20 would we have done if we had -- say we had known there
21 were no weapons, and we made the case on human rights
22 grounds, on ethical grounds, what would we have done

1 that would have been effective in changing the regime
2 other than going to war, military action? Quite
3 frankly, I don't know what it was. You know, you just
4 didn't have -- you take the case where South Africa
5 where sanctions work, well what you had there is a small
6 minority that decided it couldn't stand against this
7 larger majority, and it had to negotiate the best way
8 out for itself. You didn't have that same situation
9 with the Saddam family. It's the nature of -- and it
10 really was very much a family-type of enterprise of
11 destroying this society, and so it's a tough question,
12 which I don't have a good answer for, but I recognize it
13 as probably the most important question to come out of
14 this.

15 DR. SOLOMON: This is a perfect place to
16 stop because it describes well the mission of the
17 Institute, and we would like to thank you very much,
18 David, for maintaining your reputation and --

19 (Applause.)

20 (Off the record.)

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END TRANSCRIPT

This transcript was produced by Neal Gross Court Reporters and proofed by Institute staff from tapes provided by the United States Institute of Peace.

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