U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board
200 Constitution Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20210
ARB CASE NO. 97-144
ALJ CASE NO. 97-CAA-14
DATE: February 9, 1999
In the Matter of:
THEODORUS J. FABRICIUS,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
TOWN OF BRAINTREE/PARK DEPARTMENT,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
Appearances:
For the Complainant: William T. Salisbury, Salisbury & Neelon, Quincy,
Massachusetts
For the Respondent: Arthur A. Smith, Jr., Office of the Town Counsel, Braintree,
Massachusetts
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
WITH LIMITED REMAND CONCERNING ATTORNEY FEES
This case arises under the employee protection provision of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §7622 (1994) (CAA). Complainant, Theodorus J. Fabricius (Fabricius), alleged that
Respondent, the Town of Braintree Park Department (the Town) violated the CAA when it
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disciplined him for two different infractions. In a Recommended Decision and Order (RD), the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Town's disciplinary actions violated the CAA. The
ALJ recommended, among other things, that the Town expunge the two disciplinary notices from
Fabricius' personnel file, pay Fabricius one day's pay and compensatory damages, and pay attorney
fees and costs.
The ALJ's Recommended Decision is now before the Board for review and
final decision. We affirm the ALJ's RD with the principal exception of the issue of attorney fees,
which is remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this Final Decision.1
1 We also decline to award other,
minor elements of relief that the ALJ recommended. Seeinfra n.15.
2 Testing confirmed that the
ceiling contained asbestos. T. 167; Administrative Law Judge's Exhibit (ALJX) 8, Tab D.
3 The first notice, labeled a
"warning," did not contain a penalty. The second, called a "discipline
notice," carried with it a one day suspension without pay. Both notices are disciplinary
because they were issued pursuant to a progressive discipline system under which an employee
could be discharged after receiving four written warnings for the same infraction. T. 82; RD at 8
n.11.
4 This was Fabricius' fifth written
notice about tardiness. T. 227.
5 Graziano initially believed that
it was Gray who had gone into the Building Inspector's office on March 25. T. 60, 218; RD at 9.
6 Fabricius also filed two union
grievances with the Town concerning the asbestos incident. In the first, he grieved the issue of
assignment to work with toxic materials. ALJX 9C. In the second, he grieved the warning notice
for his visits to the town offices, ALJX 9H. Both grievances were denied at the first step and, at the
time of the hearing, they were scheduled to proceed to the second step. RD at 9.
7 Asbestos and asbestos containing
materials are regulated under both the CAA and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§2622 (1994). The Environmental Protection Agency has issued regulations pursuant to the
CAA that regulate work practices and training standards for workers who handle asbestos and
asbestos containing materials. 40 C.F.R., Part 61, Subpart M, at §61-140 to §61-157
(1998).
8 The CAA provides in relevant
part, 42 U.S.C. §7622(a):
No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any
employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because the employee . . .
(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or
is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under
this chapter or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of
any requirement imposed under this chapter or under any applicable
implementation plan,
  (2) testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding, or
(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist
or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or
in any other action to carry out the purposes of this
chapter.
9 The only evidence of a written
policy about leaving the work site concerned leave taken for personal reasons or for union business,
which clearly was not the motivation for Fabricius' visits to the town offices.
10 A shifting explanation
for the adverse action often is an indication that the asserted legitimate reasons are pretext. See
Hoffman v. Bossert, Case No. 94-CAA-0004, Sec'y Dec. and Rem. Ord., Sept. 19, 1995, slip
op. at 9 (finding shift in respondent's theory of the case a strong indication of pretext); Priest
v. Baldwin Assoc., Case No. 84-ERA-30, Sec'y Fin. Dec. and Ord., June 11, 1986, slip op. at
12 (holding that the reasons not relied upon at the time of the adverse action, but later presented,
were pretextual).
11 Were we to consider the
documents, we note that they tend to support Fabricius' case, rather than the Town's. The Town
contends that the similar dates on which warnings about tardiness were issued to a number of
employees "reinforce the Respondent's assertion that it regularly reviewed attendance records
of all departmental employees and issued warnings to chronic offenders." Reply Br. at 5.
However, the tardiness notices submitted with the Town's Brief (a total of 9 notices concerning 4
employees), do not appear to be issued in any regular, periodic fashion, as the Town contended.
More importantly, the only employees who received notices on March 31, 1997 (shortly after
Fabricius raised asbestos concerns), were the two employees involved in the issue, Fabricius and
Gray. The fact that Fabricius and Gray were singled out on March 31, 1997, only five to six days
after visiting the town offices to raise concerns about asbestos, lends support to the conclusion that
the tardiness disciplinary notice was retaliatory.
12 Even if we determined
that there was a legitimate reason for issuing the tardiness notice, we have found that there also was
an impermissible reason, Fabricius' protected activities concerning asbestos.
Where "dual motive" is found to exist, i.e., where the trier
of fact finds that there was both a permissible and an impermissible motive for the challenged
employment action, "the burden then shifts to the respondent to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the illegitimate
factor." Carroll, 78 F.2d at 357, citing Mt.Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). We conclude that, under the dual motive analysis,
the Town did not sustain its burden of establishing that it would have issued the tardiness notice even
if Fabricius had not engaged in any protected activity.
13 We do not mean to state
that an employer may not legitimately discipline an employee for tardiness, but rather that an
employer may not do so when the motivation for the discipline is retaliation for engaging in
protected activities.
14 Fabricius appears to have
taken up the ALJ's suggestion. Attachment A to his brief is a written complaint to an OSHA
investigator about the alleged additional retaliatory acts.
15 We do not order payment
of the medical costs related to Fabricius' exposure to asbestos, because these costs are not a
consequence of the Town's discrimination. Similarly, we do not adopt the ALJ's recommendation
that the Town reimburse Fabricius for the cost of his contaminated clothing. RD at 25. The clothing
contamination was caused by Fabricius's exposure to asbestos, not by the Town's retaliation for
raising concerns about asbestos in the bath house.
16 Because this decision
resolves all issues with the exception of the collateral issue of attorney fees, it is final and appealable.
See Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Reich, 111 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 1997) (under analogous
employee protection provision of the ERA, a decision that resolves all issues except attorney fees
is final).