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International Health Services, Inc. ads Administrator, 93-ARN-1 (ALJ May 20, 1994)



Date:  May 20, 1994

Case No. 93-ARN-1

In the Matter of:

International Health Services, Inc./
Naval Hospital,
     Respondent

Ads

Administrator, Employment Standards
Administration, Wage and Hour Division,
     Complainant

Before:   JAMES GUILL
          Associate Chief Judge

POSTHEARING ORDER NUMBER SEVEN
DE                       NIAL OF STAY

     On February 8, 1994, Respondent filed a motion for stay of
this proceeding pending resolution of its complaint filed January
19, 1994 under the Job Service Complaint System (JSCS), 29 C.F.R.
Part 658, Subpart E.  On March 4, 1994, the undersigned issued
Posthearing Order Number Six in which Respondent was ordered to
provide documentation sufficient to establish why, even if
Respondent could obtain a favorable ruling under the JSCS, the
evidentiary record should be permitted to be reopened in view of
the timing of the filing of the JSCS complaint and the motion for
a stay.  Respondent was directed to address what relevant new
evidence was discovered, and why that evidence could not have
been discovered and submitted prior to the conclusion of the
hearing.  Respondent submitted its response on March 16, 1994. 
Complainant submitted its reply to the response on April 1, 1994.

     The positions of Respondent and Complainant stated in the
initial submissions on Respondent's motion for a stay were
detailed in Posthearing Order Number Six, and are not restated
here.  In its response, Respondent submits that the new evidence
consists of recent wage determinations made by the state agency
after the close of the record herein.  It contends that the new 

[PAGE 2] wage determinations are relevant because they address the issue of "entry level" versus "experienced" rates provided for the attestations at issue in this proceeding, and they show that the state agency has now recognized that its earlier prevailing wage determinations and earlier interpretation of survey data was erroneous. Respondent contends that this matter is crucial to fair implementation of the INRA program, and that this forum should have all relevant evidence on the prevailing wage rate issue before rendering a decision. Respondent does not seek a reopening of the record in the instant case, per se, but apparently would seek to submit into the record any favorable ruling it might obtain through the JSCS. Complainant's reply is that the new wage determinations are not relevant to the wage determinations at issue in this matter. Complainant notes that Respondent's submission does not make it clear how, if at all, the state agency modified its method for determining the prevailing wage, and contends that even if it did, that is not an admission of prior error. Discussion In Posthearing Order Number Six, the standard to be applied in determining whether to grant a stay was set out, and that standard bears repeating: In the absence of statutory mandate, whether to stay an action for completion of another action is within the sound discretion of the tribunal, and in exercising that discretion, the tribunal should consider all factors, such as possible delay, the relative difficulty of estimating what the other tribunal will decide, the importance to the case of the other tribunal's determination, the relative burden on the parties, which action was commenced first, and any other relevant factors. See, e.g., Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 199x); Lummun Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 280 F2d 915 (1st Cir. 199x). See also generally 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions §§ 92. Posthearing Order Number Six at 2. Considering the motion under this standard, I am not persuaded that a stay is appropriate. Belatedness of filing of JSCS complaint The foremost consideration militating against Respondent's request for a stay is its belatedness. The purpose underlying
[PAGE 3] the imposition of time constraints upon parties to a case is pragmatic: it ensures the expeditious resolution of claims and spares the administrative-judicial system from litigation of stale claims. As noted in Posthearing Order Number Six, the record evidences that Complainant asserted its position that a challenge to a SESA wage determination must be made under the JSCS in its prehearing brief, which was received by this Office on July 2, 1993, and is shown as having been served on counsel for Respondent. (Complainant's prehearing brief at 13) This position was again asserted by Complainant during the hearing, (see, e.g., Hearing Transcript, July 21, 1993 at 474, 507, 520- 21; Oct. 12, 1993 at 129-30), and in its post-hearing brief. (Complainant's posthearing brief at 33-34) The hearing in this matter was completed on October 14, 1993. Hence, more than seven months passed from the time Respondent was formally made aware of Complainant's position and the time it filed the motion for a stay, more than three months passed from the completion of the hearing before the JSCS complaint was filed, and nearly four months passed following the hearing before a motion for a stay was filed. The fact that recent wage determination rendered by the state employment agency may indicate that prior determinations were incorrect does not explain why Respondent waited until the eleventh hour to file its JSCS complaint when it knew for many months that Complainant's position is that the JSCS is the only forum for contesting the correctness of a prevailing wage rate. I consider the fact that Respondent had many months in which it could have pursued the JSCS remedy, but chose to wait until several months after the hearing in this matter to act, to strongly weigh against the granting of a stay. Possible delay A granting of Respondent's motion would ensure further delay -- which could be quite substantial. One can only speculate, but a JSCS proceeding could take many months to complete. The INRA and the implementing regulations mandate that enforcement actions relating to attestations proceed expeditiously. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 504.405(d),504.435, 504.440. Although both Complainant and Respondent have waived the statutory deadlines for hearing and decision, INRA's clear intention of quick decisions on enforcement actions militates against a stay. Though Complainant cannot now revoke that waiver, its contention that it never
[PAGE 4] contemplated a delay of this magnitude when it agreed to the waiver of the time limitation on hearing of this matter is well- taken. Difficulty of predicting what JSCS would decide While it is beyond the purview of this proceeding to determine whether Respondent's JSCS complaint was timely filed, the delay in filing was of such magnitude as to surely raise it as an issue to be resolved in the JSCS proceeding. Though Respondent makes out a colorable argument regarding a change in the method of calculating the prevailing wage rate, I cannot be certain that Respondent would be successful before the JSCS in obtaining a favorable finding on the merits. Accordingly, I conclude that this factor does not support the motion for a stay. Importance of JSCS determination to Respondent's case If Respondent is able to obtain a favorable ruling before the JSCS, it could substantially undermine the Administrator's position on the alleged prevailing wage rate violations -- either by completely exonerating Respondent or by substantially reducing back wage liability. This factor weighs in favor of the motion for a stay. On the other hand, the prevailing wage determinations at issue in this matter are not the only alleged violation. A finding in favor of Complainant in only one of the various violations exposes Respondent to a 12 month "debarment" from INRA attestation petitions. Congress undoubtedly intended that violators of INRA attestation requirements be exposed to this penalty relatively quickly. Thus, this factor militates against granting the stay. In addition, it has not been determined yet in this proceeding whether Respondent's only recourse for addressing the propriety of the prevailing wage rate was the JSCS: that was only Complainant's position and I do not interpret Respondent's filing of a JSCS complaint as relinquishing its apparent position that the prevailing wage rate may be attacked in this INRA proceeding. Since this is still an open question, the edge in favor of staying the INRA proceeding for completion of a JSCS proceeding because of its importance to Respondent's case is less clear. Relative burden on the parties A stay would not appear to burden Respondent in regard to
[PAGE 5] the instant INRA proceeding. A stay would burden Complainant insofar as it delays the rendering of a final decision on Respondent's potential violation of the INRA attestations at issue here. In addition, a stay would substantially impair the alien nurses who stand to benefit from any back pay award. Both parties will be burdened by participation in the JSCS proceeding -- they, in effect, will be relitigating much of what has been presented into evidence in this INRA proceeding. Accordingly, the overall burden on the parties involved militates against a stay. Summary This proceeding has already well exceeded the statutory and regulatory time limitations in order to provide Respondent with a full and fair opportunity to present its defense. At this late date in the proceeding I am not convinced that a stay would significantly contribute to proper resolution of the alleged INRA violations. ORDER IT IS ORDERED that (1) Respondent's motion for a stay is DENIED. (2) the parties comply with the following schedule for submission of post-hearing briefs:[1] (a) Respondent's post-hearing brief must be postmarked (or time-stamped by this Office if hand-delivered) on or before June 8, 1994 to be considered timely. (b) Complainant's reply brief must be postmarked (or time-stamped by this Office if hand-delivered), on or before June 22, 1994 to be considered timely. (3) additional enlargement of the briefing period will be granted only for compelling reasons. At Washington, D.C. Entered: by:___________________________ JAMES GUILL Associate Chief Judge JG/trs [ENDNOTES] [1] It is not necessary to submit posthearing briefs by fax.



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