Date Issued: January 4, 1992

Case No.: 92-TSC-2

In the Matter of

Robert Scott
&bsp;   Complainant

    v.

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
    Respondent

    1. Respondent Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has moved for an order requiring the complainant not to disclose or make available to any person for purposes unconnected with this litigation any documents or other information produced by respondent in response to complainant's discovery in this case. Respondent's proposed protective order runs 10 single-spaced typed pages. For the following reasons, this motion is denied.

    First, it is the burden of the party seeking a protective order to establish good cause for the issuance of that order. Under F.R.C.P. 26 (c), as well as 29 C.F.R. § 18.15 of this Office's Rules of Practice and Procedure, a protective order is appropriate "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . ." However, respondent has failed to indicate in anything other than the most general way how the discovery served so far or likely to be served is in any way inappropriate, impermissible, or likely to cause annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Moreover, even if respondent had made such a showing, the protective order it seeks is so all-encompassing and draconian that I would not be likely to impose it in any event.

    Further, the cases cited by respondent in support of the protective order do not, in fact, provide a basis for it. In re Alexander Grant and Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352 (11th Cir. 1987), and In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 597 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1984), both involved attempts by the news media to obtain discovery information covered by protective orders entered at the request of all the parties. Thus, the entry of the protective orders in those cases was uncontested. Moreover, the protective order in Alexander Grant was limited to "material containing tax returns, trade secrets, or other sensitive material ..." (In re Alexander Grant, supra, at 354), and the protective order in Korean Air Lines was two short paragraphs (In re Korean Air Lines, supra, at 622). Finally, the ruling in Chambers Development Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 104 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1985), does not state the basis for the Judge's finding that there was good cause to issue the protective order. But it is noteworthy that the protective order in that case specifically provided for the showing of the information obtained through discovery with counsel in two related cases (id. at 135). One of the reasons respondent gives for needing a protective order in this case is its fear that information obtained by the complainant will be shared with other attorneys involved in related lawsuits against Alyeska.

    In its motion for the insurance of the protective order, respondent states:

    Alyeska's primary impetus in seeking a protective order is to ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, discovery efforts by the complainant in this matter are limited to the discovery of information necessary to the disposition of this matter through the hearing scheduled to take place before the Administrative Law Judge in may 1992.

    There is nothing in respondent's motion indicating that this aim cannot be achieved without the proposed protective order. The usual limitations on discovery -- that it is limited to material designed to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, and that privileged documents, trade secrets and confidential commerical information are not generally discoverable -- should serve to adequately protect respondent's interests.

    2. Complainant has moved for an order compelling respondent's officials to testify at depositions. Since it appears that the only reason these witnesses' testimony was withheld was the resolution of the issue of the protective order, IT IS ORDERED that respondent produce its employers, including Mr. Wellington and Pepper Smith, to testify at depositions. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no more than five days notice need be given for these depositions.

    3. Complainant moved to amend my pre-hearing order to extend discovery one month, through April 16, 1992. However, extending discovery to that late a date would require a lengthy extension of the deadline for the parties to file pre-hearing statements, rendering those statements virtually useless. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the pre-hearing order issued on December 10, 1991 is amended as follows:

    a. Discovery shall be completed no later than March 30, 1992; and

    b. The parties, pre-hearing statements shall be filed no later than April 23, 1992.

       JEFFREY TURECK       
Administrative Law Judge