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October 4, 2008         DOL Home > OALJ Home > Whistleblower Collection
USDOL/OALJ Reporter
Thomas v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 81-TSC-1 (ALJ Dec. 17, 1980)


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
Suite 700-1111 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Case No. 81-TSCA-1

In the Matter of

LOVICK P. THOMAS
    Complainant

    v.

E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY
    Respondent

APPEARANCES:
    Lovick P. Thomas
    27 Golfview Drive
    Apt. A-2
    Newark, Delaware 19702
       pro se

    E. I. Dupont De Nemours and Co.
    By: Pamela Meitner, Esq.
    Legal Department
    1007 Market Street
    Wilmington, Delaware 19899

BEFORE: JOHN W. EARMAN
    Administrative Law Judge

RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

Statement of the Case

    This is a complaint brought under Section 23 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622,1 wherein the Complainant, Lovick P. Thomas, alleges that the Respondent, E. I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, took retaliatory action against him because he reported or threatened to report, a violation of the Act. Specifically Mr. Thomas charges that he received reduced performance ratings in April 1979 and March 1980 and a reassignment in August 1980 as a result of his activities.2


[Page 2]

    Mr. Thomas asks for (1) reinstatement to his former position; (2) correction of his performance ratings; (3) protection from future retaliation; (4) reimbursement for expenses and restitution of vacation time used in connection with the proceedings; (5) reparations for loss resulting from the low performance ratings; and (6) exemplary damages provided by the Act. Dupont denies any retaliation took place and contends that the September 9, 1980 order of the Department of Labor is unconstitutional, that the Department has no subject matter jurisdiction in the case and that most of the allegations are barred by the statute of limitations.

Findings and Conclusions

I

    Dupont's Chemical, Dyes and Pigments Technical Service Laboratory at Chestnut Run employed 124 persons of which half were professional and the other half support personnel. The Director was Edward W. Stewart and Complainant's immediate supervisor was Carl H. Muendel, Technical Service Supervisor, who was head of one of the six groups in the laboratory.

    Mr. Thomas, who was sixty years of age and had a degree in chemistry, worked for Dupont for over 35 years. In 1977 he was transferred to the Chestnut Run Laboratory where he was assigned duties that included answering customer correspondence and preparing material safety data sheets, the latter project taking most of his time after sometime in 1979.

    On September 12, 1978 Mr. Thomas advised Dupont of his opinion that its zircon mineral sands products were a radioactivity hazard. Meetings and discussions were held. On January 11, 1979 Mr. Thomas asked whether the alleged hazard should be reported on the Material Safety Data Sheet. His supervisor, Mr. Muendel, advised by memo that after consultations and reviews it was determined that the situation was adequately covered and, since agreement could not be reached with him; the preparation of that data sheet had been reassigned.

    On April 27, 1979 Mr. Muendel discussed Complainant's performance rating with him. Among other things the form notes that Complainant "Requires excessive supervision because of judgement lapses, as in


[Page 3]

poor choice of words & because of inattention to detail in sensitive work. Tends to be overly defensive vs. criticism & argues opposing views excessively -- should concentrate on major priorities of job. Should take a more active role in moving his program." The form notes that Complainant liked his current assignment and, while he would prefer field sales, would consider a pigment assignment. His rating was "S" for satisfactory.

    Mr. Thomas next wrote letters concerning his interpretation of new Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations which he thought required the hazard be reported. J. C. Watts, a technical Service Consultant in the same group, replied on November 15, 1979 detailing the basis for the warning used. By memo on November 20, 1979, Mr. Thomas took issue with the Watts' memo. On February 25, 1980 Complainant questioned a request that he prepare a data sheet on ferric chloride except for the heath hazard section which was to be done by another person.

    On March 13, 1980 Mr. Muendel discussed Complainant's next performance rating with him. The rating was again satisfactory for basically the same reasons given a year earlier, including being defensive about criticism and arguing his own views excessively. Complainant asked for a written reply as to what actions would enhance his chances for a reassignment to field marketing. He also submitted a lengthy written comment on the review.

    Mr. Thomas, in a memo to Mr. Muendel on March 19, 1980, commented on a discussion they had on Dupont's decision not to disclose a radioactive hazard of Zircon Sands. Mr. Thomas told Muendel that, unless Dupont reconsidered its decision, he felt compelled to report the matter to the Department of Labor (OSHA).

    As a result of the memo of March 19, a study was made of the problem and, on April 24, 1980, a report was made on the health hazard assessment of radioactivity of zircon sand. The report reached the conclusion that there was no health hazard. Complainant took issue with the report in a lengthy memo on May 1, 1980. Also on May 1, he received a salary increase in the nature of a cost of living increase and later that month attended a one week training course on hazardous materials. Mr. Thomas had discussions with Dupont's legal department and maintained that he was obligated to report the matter. He wrote Mr. Muendel on June 30, 1980 that he thought he had no


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alternative but to report the hazard to OSHA.

    In late June a position in pigment group became available and Mr. Stewart, the laboratory director, selected Complainant to fill the opening. Mr. Stewart said this was because (1) the job was at an appropriate level, (2) complainant was not happy with his performance ratings, and (3) complainant's position was to be filled by a demoted employee who needed to be in a position where his work product could be measured.

    On July 7 a complaint was filed with the Department of Labor, occupational Safety and Health Administrator. No copy was sent to Dupont. On July 21 Mr. Thomas was advised that he would be transferred and he voiced no objection. On July 29 he wrote to the Secretary of Labor complaining of discrimination by Dupont because he reported hazards.

    Complainant's transfer was effective on August 1, 1980. Eight other professionals were reassigned at the same time, including three who also went to the Color Coatings Group. On that same day Complainant wrote to the Environmental Protection Agency concerning the possible hazard of ferric chloride sold by Respondent.

    The Department of Labor advised Dupont cf the complaint on August 22, 1980. After investigation the Department of Labor on September 9, 1980 found Dupont had violated the Act and directed that certain actions must be taken to abate the violation and afford relief. Dupont was advised of its appeal rights. It did timely appeal, but the telegram went astray. The matter was clarified at the hearing and it was found that the delay was not the fault of Dupont.

    In the meanwhile the EPA complaint concerning the ferric chloride was forwarded to the Department of Labor, being received on August 20. On October 9 it was forwarded to the Office of Administrative Law Judges.

II

    Dupont first argues that the finding of the Area Director on September 9, 1980 is an order in violation of Section 23(b)(2)(A) of the Act and therefore Dupont has been denied its right to a hearing. As we understand the situation, the Area Director's letter was the notification in writing of the result of the investigation conducted pursuant to the above section. His finding would become final unless appealed. Still, Dupont had an


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opportunity for a hearing, which it has taken advantage of by a timely appeal. Therefore, Dupont's argument of a decision being made without the due process of a hearing, is not well founded.

    Dupont's next argument, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Act because the complaint was filed with the wrong agency of the Federal Government, is also rejected. it is expected that, if an individual files a complaint with the wrong agency of the Federal Government, the complaint will be forwarded to the proper office or the complainant will be advised where to file.3 When more than one agency has jurisdiction over the subject matter or they have jurisdiction over various aspects of the subject matter the confusion is compounded. To restrict the instant complaint because it was sent to OSHA instead of EPA, is unreasonable. Then too, a later complaint was made to EPA. True the hazard complained of was different, but the question here is not whether Mr. Thomas is right or wrong, but rather whether he was discriminated against because he threatened to, or did, report a hazardous material made by Dupont.

    Dupont next argues that the statute of limitations apply because Section 23(b)(1) provides that the complaint be made within 30 days of the acts of discrimination. This would, it urges, put the low performance ratings beyond consideration. There is little merit in this position because the performance ratings were background for and considered in the reassignment. Also, if the ratings effected Mr. Thomas' job level or salary they would be continuing discriminations commencing on the dates they were given and still effecting his employment. Therefore, Dupont's argument of limitations is dismissed.

    Turning to the merits of the case we find that proof of a violation of the Act involves a two-step process. The employee must first prove a discriminatory act the employer. The essence of discrimination is treating like individuals differently. Once discrimination is proven, the employee must show discriminatory animus or intent. Because proof of discriminatory animus is seldom neat or obvious, circumstances surrounding the discrimination must be carefully examined to determine whether the employer's reason for taking the action is the actual motive of a mere pretext. However, since the prohibited reasons for discrimination are set forth in the act, only those reasons can be considered in this proceeding, it being noted that Complainant also has age discrimination complaints pending.


[Page 6]

    Considering first the performance ratings, Mr. Thomas has failed to show that they were discriminatory in that he was treated differently from other individuals. There is no information as to how other individuals were treated when they maintained a running dispute with management, as was the case here. Under such circumstances management's ratings seem reasonable. But, assuming arguendo that Mr. Thomas was discriminated against for his conflict with management, that reason is not one of the reasons set forth in the law. The first threat to report the alleged violations was made on March 19, 1980, almost a year after the first rating and six days after the second one. Thus, even though the ratings involved to some degree Mr. Thomas' position on hazardous materials, they could not be said to be based upon the yet to be made threat to report the situation.

    Next we look at the reassignment of Mr. Thomas and again find that he has failed to show discrimination. It should be remembered that he suffered no loss of salary or level of employment and the new assignment was in the same building. Also, on the same day eight other professional employees were reassigned, including three to the same group and in the last two years 83 laboratory employees were reassigned. These figures do not indicate that Mr. Thomas was treated differently from other employees. It must be also noted that while Mr. Thomas requested consideration for field marketing, he had indicated to Mr. Muendel that he would consider a pigment assignment in discussions on his performance rating on April 27, 1979.

    Mr. Stewart, in uncontroverted testimony, said that he decided in late June to reassign Mr. Thomas for three reasons, one of which was because Complainant was not happy with his performance ratings. Mr. Thomas did not protest his reassignment to Dupont when he was advised on July 21, 1980 that it would take place. He contends that he does not know his present job as well as did his predecessor but this is true of all reassignments and was true of Complainant's assignment to the Engineering and Product Safety Group.

    In view of the above the Complainant has failed to establish that he was discriminated against.

RECOMMENDED DECISION

    It Is Ordered that the complaint that E. I. Dupont De Nemours and Company violated the Toxic Substances Control Act in its rating in 1979 and 1980 of Mr. Lovick P. Thomas and his reassignment on August 1, 1980 be dismissed with prejudice.


[Page 7]

       JOHN W. EARMAN

       Administrative Law Judge

Dated: December 17, 1980
Washington, D.C.

JWE:kat

[ENDNOTES]

1 Regulations, 29 C.F.R. Part 24, provides for a final order within 90 days after receipt of the complaint. The time requirements were not followed in this case because of some filing problems, because Complainant appeared pro se and because Complainant would not be prejudiced by delay. Under these circumstances the parties were allowed to submit post-hearing briefs.

2 15 U.S.C. 2622 (a) provides: No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) has (1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this chapter; (2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding; or (3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

3 For coordination between agencies see 15 U.S.C. 2608(d).



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