Thus, Calhoun has established that he was subjected to adverse employment action on June 26, 2001.
(iii). Did the adverse action result from Calhoun's protected activity?
Calhoun has established a causal connection between his protected activities and the adverse employment action. During the June 26, 2001 meeting in which Calhoun was suspended, Allen advised him that he would have to follow UPS methods during his inspections (Tr. 121). Allen explained that Calhoun: (1) spent too much time doing his visual inspection; (2) looked at things more than once and for too long (Tr. 789); (3) touched things in the engine compartment unnecessarily, for example, grabbing the hoses and mashing or squeezing them; (4) grabbed the fan and the steering linkages on the tractor wheel and also turned the lug nuts (Tr. 788-9); (5) crawled under the trailer to check the spring gaps, which UPS does not require (Tr. 790); and (6) spent too much time during his in-cab routine doing personal things instead of productive activities while air pressure built (Tr. 788). Allen's report also stated that Calhoun completed an unapproved brake check because he backed up to the front trailer and pulled against it to check for free-rolling wheels (Tr. 100-1). Even though UPS cited this brake test as a reason for Calhoun's suspension, he was not suspended for the brake test alone. The record clearly indicates that Calhoun was suspended at least in part for his protected activities (Tr. 788-90). Thus, Calhoun has established a prima facie case of discrimination on June 26, 2001.
b. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on June 27, 2001?
(i). Did Calhoun engage in protected activity?
On June 27, 2001, Allen again accompanied Calhoun during his vehicle inspection (Tr. 128). Calhoun discovered an air leak at the rear valve of the trailer using UPS inspection methods. However, he was written up for improperly scanning equipment. The UPS method states that Calhoun is supposed to walk around the truck, and, if he does not hear an air leak or see anything during a quick inspection, he is not to touch anything (Tr. 130). Calhoun asked Allen to be left alone during his inspection because he wanted to check the air lines and because the truck is his responsibility from the moment he picks up the keys in the morning until he turns them in at night (Tr. 131).
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It took Calhoun 16 minutes to complete his tractor check. On the 27th, the pre-trip check took 22 minutes (Tr. 795-6). He did not alter his routine in any way and actually increased his time by exaggerating his inspections (Id .).
(ii). Did UPS take adverse action against Calhoun?
There is no evidence that Calhoun was subjected to any adverse employment action on June 27, 2001. Therefore, he has failed to make a prima facie showing of employment discrimination on that date.
c. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on June 28, 2001?
(i). Did Calhoun engage in protected activity?
On June 28, 2001, Calhoun began his pre-trip inspection the same way as before. He made no changes or alterations to his routine (Tr. 797-8). Allen stopped him half way through and took him to the feeder office to review where things stood. Randall Williams was also present (Tr. 798). Allen explained to Calhoun that, over the past two days, he had seen no effort on Calhoun's part to comply with suggestions made by his supervisor and, due to his defiance, Allen had no alternative but to take disciplinary action (Tr. 799).
After the meeting, Williams, Allen and Calhoun went back to the yard for Calhoun to continue his pre-trip inspection. He continued his inspection in the same manner as before, touching lug nuts, handling hoses and wiping down the interior of the cab after being told not to (Tr. 800). Allen stopped him again and asked him to step down from the cab. Calhoun was being rebellious at this point, and Allen and Williams accompanied him back upstairs to the office (Tr. 800-01).
(ii). Did UPS take adverse action against Calhoun?
On June 28, 2001, Calhoun was sent home with a one-day suspension without pay (Tr. 801). Suspension without pay constitutes adverse employment action. See Calhoun v. United Parcel Service , ARB No. 00-026 (ARB Nov. 27, 2002) (citing Von Gunten v. Maryland , 243 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 2001)).
(iii). Did the adverse action result from Calhoun's protected activity?
Williams' testimony establishes a causal connection between Calhoun's protected activities on June 28, 2001, and the ensuing one-day suspension issued by Allen. Williams participated in a meeting with Calhoun and Allen. Williams observed Calhoun begin his pre-trip report and heard Allen tell Calhoun not to touch items such as the lug nuts (Tr. 578-9). When Calhoun continued to touch items that Allen told him not to touch, Allen said that he would issue a warning letter for failure to follow instructions (Tr. 579). The pre-trip inspection was not completed because Calhoun began to clean the windshield. During the meeting in which Calhoun was issued a warning letter, he was also told that he was taking too long in the yard (Tr. 586). Calhoun was not complying with Allen's instructions because he was wiping down the cab instead of doing the required in-cab checks (Tr. 588).
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Allen's testimony confirms that Calhoun was suspended at least in part because of his protected activities. Allen testified that Calhoun made no changes from his previous vehicle inspections. Allen stopped Calhoun halfway through and took him to the feeder office to review where things stood. Allen explained to Calhoun that, over the past two days, he had seen no effort on Calhoun's part to comply with suggestions made by his supervisor and, due to his defiance, had no alternative but to take disciplinary action (Tr. 799).
After the meeting, Williams, Allen and Calhoun went back to the yard for Calhoun to continue his pre-trip inspection. He continued his inspection in the same manner as before, touching lug nuts, handling hoses and wiping down the interior of the cab after being told not to (Tr. 800). Allen stopped him again and asked him to step down from the cab. Allen opined that Calhoun was being rebellious, at which point Allen sent him home with a one-day suspension (Tr. 801).
I find that Calhoun has established a prima facie case that he was suspended because he engaged in protected activity on June 28, 2001.
d. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on June 29, 2001?
(i). Did Calhoun engage in protected activity?
On June 29, 2001, Allen completed yet another work audit of Calhoun. Allen opined that Calhoun seemed to improve slightly in his hand-checking of parts. However, as if to compensate for not touching things, he spent more time on his scan (Tr. 802). Calhoun also began separating the doubles, at which point Allen stopped him. Calhoun became belligerent and insisted that he needed to check the coupling devices (Tr. 802-3). At the end of his start-work routine, Allen, Calhoun, Williams and Byron Tucker met regarding his one-day suspension. It was decided that he would be taken out of work for his next scheduled work day (Tr. 804). Calhoun was told that he needed to make some changes in his start-work routine to avoid further disciplinary action (Id .).
(ii). Did UPS take adverse action against Calhoun?
On June 29, 2001, Calhoun was taken out of work for the next day. Taking an employee out of work and docking his pay is an adverse employment action. See Von Gunten , supra ; Calhoun , supra .
(iii). Did the adverse action result from Calhoun's protected activity?
Calhoun has established a causal connection between his protected activities on June 29, 2001 and his removal from work for the next day (Tr. 804). Thus, he has established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on June 29, 2001.
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e. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on July 5, 2001?
(i). Did Calhoun engage in protected activity?
On July 5, 2001, Allen once again accompanied Calhoun during his pre-trip inspection of his vehicle (Tr. 133). Calhoun noticed an oil deficiency in the glad hands (Tr. 137-9). On July 6, 2001, Tom Hope, a shop steward, also participated in the pre-trip inspection (Tr. 141). Calhoun noticed that there was a problem maintaining air pressure at 120 pounds. The pressure seemed to fluctuate between 75 and 95 pounds, which could indicate a number of problems such as a leak in the spitter valve or a seal problem in the glad rings (Tr. 142-3). The truck was taken to the shop and the leak fixed.
Calhoun did not think that he had completed a proper inspection and felt rushed through it by Allen and Hope (Tr. 145). Allen stayed right next to Calhoun the entire time and gave him no space in which to move. Allen seemed antagonistic and almost hateful when speaking to Calhoun and, despite the air pressure not reaching the correct number, told him to leave the yard anyway (Tr. 514-5). Allen pressured Calhoun to hurry through the pre-trip inspection (Tr. 532-6).
Calhoun refused to drive on this date, at least in part, because of a defect in the brake system. His refusal to drive until the brake system was repaired is protected activity.
However, Allen testified that Calhoun began adding additional things to his routine as if to compensate for not touching parts (Tr. 807). Calhoun's behavior in increasing his start-work times by exaggerating his inspections was not related to any reasonable safety concern, and, thus, is not protected activity.
(ii). Did UPS take adverse action against Calhoun?
Allen prepared a "start-work audit" concerning Calhoun's July 5, 2001 inspection (Tr. 134-5; JX-48, D-000563). The report indicated that Calhoun did not perform a proper inspection because he turned off the air on the trailer to check the seals on the brake lines (Tr. 805-06). Calhoun has not presented evidence that the start-work audit affected his pay or promotion potential within or outside of UPS. Therefore, I find that the start-work audit does not constitute adverse action. See Calhoun , supra . Thus, Calhoun has not established a prima facie case of discrimination on July 5, 2001.
f. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on July 10, 2001?
(i). Did Calhoun engage in protected activity?
On July 10, 2001, Allen noted in his report that Calhoun was "purposefully over exaggerating his inspections. He had no sense of urgency about running the schedule or his departure time" (Tr. 811). He did not believe in the UPS pre-trip inspection method and was going to check what he deemed necessary anyway (Tr. 821).
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Calhoun was supposed to move around the truck and not slow down to check anything unless he heard an air leak (Tr. 147). He stopped to look under the cab door area and again to look under the rear of the truck (Tr. 151). He also drained all the air off the dolly, which UPS deemed not to be necessary and rubbed his hands up and down the brake lines (Tr. 153-4). He tried to hurry through his inspection and later found that he had missed a bad knot on the short red line (Tr. 155).
Calhoun has not established that looking under the cab door area of his truck was based on a reasonable belief that there was any violation of a safety regulation. Nor has he established that he would have violated a safety regulation had he not drained the air off of the dolly. However, Calhoun did manually inspect brake hoses on this date, and I find that manual inspection of brake hoses is protected activity. Therefore, Calhoun has established that at least some of his pre-trip inspection activities on July 10, 2001 were protected activities.
(ii). Did UPS take adverse action against Calhoun?
On July 18, 2001, Calhoun was given a three-day suspension for not scanning properly during his July 10, 2001 vehicle inspection (Tr. 146-7, 674; JX-52). A suspension without pay is an adverse employment action. See Von Gunten , supra ; Calhoun , supra .
(iii). Did the adverse action result from Calhoun's protected activity?
Calhoun engaged in protected activity when he manually inspected brake lines. 49 CFR 392.7. He was subsequently suspended for three days. I find that there is a causal connection between Calhoun's protected activity and the adverse employment action. He has established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on July 10, 2001.
g. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on September 6, 2001?
(i). Did Calhoun engage in protected activity?
Allen accompanied Calhoun during his September 6, 2001 vehicle inspection (Tr. 818). Calhoun touched lug nuts during the inspection (Tr. 820). He told Allen that the fifth wheel needed grease, but Allen instructed him that it did not need grease (Tr. 820). During the inspection, Calhoun dropped to one knee at the rear of the dolly to inspect parts, including the brakes (Tr. 156-7). He observed that the dolly brakes were out of adjustment because the brake lining and drum did not match up (Tr. 157-8). Calhoun put the set together and performed the UPS brake test twice (Tr. 158). Calhoun told Allen that he wanted to have the dolly brake checked at the UPS shop because it did not look right. Allen told Calhoun that the brake test "felt okay" and that he needed to "move on" (Tr. 159, 883).
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When Calhoun arrived in Carnesville, Georgia, he performed his preferred brake test, which revealed that the brakes were not working properly (Tr. 162-3). That same day, the UPS vendor in Carnesville had to adjust a brake on the dolly with a two-foot long bar because the brakes were locked up due to rust. The vendor told Calhoun that the brake drum was completely rusted (Tr. 165).
Calhoun engaged in protected activity when he inspected the brakes on his trailer. 49 CFR 392.7. Allen's instructions to disregard his concerns about the brakes, which brakes turned out to be in non-working order, prevented Calhoun from taking reasonable steps to assure himself of the safety of his vehicle when he had reason to believe that the brakes were not in working order. That the brakes were later proved to be defective only reinforces the reasonableness of Calhoun's brake inspection on this particular day.
(ii). Did UPS take adverse action against Calhoun?
Despite finding a problem, Calhoun was terminated on September 7, 2001 for once again failing to comply with UPS inspection methods (Tr. 162-8). He was called to a meeting with Allen, Williams, and Wolfe. Allen told Calhoun that he was would be terminated for dropping to his knee and inspecting the dolly brakes (Tr. 167). Calhoun told Wolfe that he had brake problems with a dolly brake the previous day and that the vendor in Carnesville had had to adjust the brakes (Tr. 166). He also explained that the brake drum was rusted. Calhoun told Wolfe that he did not have any brakes on one dolly wheel during his trip to Carnesville (Tr. 167-8).
I find that Calhoun's termination on September 7, 2001 was adverse employment action. Assistant Sec'y & Brown v. Besco Steel Supply , 93-STA-30 (Sec'y Jan. 24, 1995); Calhoun , supra .
(iii). Did the adverse action result from Calhoun's protected activity?
Calhoun has established that his September 7, 2001 termination was as a result of his inspection of the dolly brakes (Tr. 162-8). Because I find that his inspection of the dolly brakes was reasonable, I find that Calhoun has established that his termination was because of protected activity. Thus, he has established a prima facie case of discrimination for September 7, 2001.
h. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on October 30, 2001?
When he arrived at work on October 30, 2001, he found his doubles that were to be attached, but the rear trailer doors were open and still being loaded (Tr. 171). He pulled the trailers apart to check the dolly and put them back together after finding nothing wrong with them. Allen came out of his office and asked Calhoun to come in for a meeting (Tr. 172-3). Allen asked Calhoun why he separated his doubles and reassembled them (Tr. 173, 822). Calhoun answered that that was the only way he could check everything (Tr. 174). Calhoun was told not to separate the doubles after they had been built and was discharged (Tr. 822-4).
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Calhoun has not established that he engaged in protected activity on October 30, 2001. Separating pre-assembled doubles without a specific indication that there was a safety-related problem has not been shown to be reasonable.
i. Has Calhoun established a prima facie case of discrimination on May 7, 2002?
Calhoun pulled apart a set of pre-assembled doubles on May 7, 2002 (Tr. 190-1, 684). Wolfe and Sherman observed Calhoun do so (Tr. 192-3). Calhoun did not complete any other components of the pre-trip inspection. As explained above, I find that separating pre-assembled doubles without a specific indication of a safety-related problem is not reasonable behavior under 49 CFR 392.7 and 396.13.
Calhoun testified that he pulled the trailers apart on May 7, 2002 even though he had no specific reason for doing so (Tr. 400-1). Pulling apart the pre-built doubles absent a specific indication that it is necessary is not reasonable. Because this is the only part of the pre-trip inspection which Calhoun carried out on May 7, 2002, I find that he did not engage in protected activity on this day.
B. Did Calhoun engage in protected activity under the "complaint" clause, 49 USC 31105(a)(1)(A)?
Under 49 USC 31105(a)(1)(A), Calhoun may establish that he engaged in protected activity if he proves that he complained about a violation of a safety regulation and that UPS took adverse action against him because of his complaint. 49 USC 31105(a)(1)(A); Clement v. Milwaukee Transp. Servs., Inc. , ARB No. 02-025, at 6 (Adm. Rev. Bd. 2003). Calhoun must establish that he conveyed a reasonable belief that UPS was engaging in a violation of a motor vehicle safety regulation. Leach v. Basin Western, Inc. , ARB No. 02-089, at 3 (Adm. Rev. Bd. 2003) ("Under the complaint clause, it is necessary that the complainant at least be acting on a reasonable belief regarding the existence of a violation."); Harrison v. Roadway Express, Inc. , ARB No. 00-048, at 5 (Adm. Rev. Bd. 2002).
Internal complaints to management officials are protected under the act. See Schulman v. Clean Harbors Environmental Servs., Inc. , 98-STA-24 (Adm. Rev. Bd. 1999). A complaint to any supervisor, no matter where that supervisor falls in the chain of command, can be protected activity. See , e.g. , Hufstetler v. Roadway Express , 85-STA-8 (1986), aff'd , Roadway Express, Inc. v. Brock , 830 F.2d 179 (11th Cir. 1987).
UPS does not dispute that Calhoun repeatedly expressed his belief that sections 392.7 and 396.13 permitted him to conduct the vehicle inspection routine of his choice and that UPS's efforts to curtail his inspections were a violation of these provisions (Employer's post-hearing brief at 65). However, UPS argues that Calhoun's complaints about his freedom to conduct pre-trip inspections were not based on a reasonable belief that the company was in violation of a motor vehicle safety regulation.
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I find that Calhoun's inspections in the face of instructions to adhere simply to the UPS inspection regimen and his well-documented displeasure with the UPS inspection regimen constitute protected complaints under the act. As discussed above, some aspects of Calhoun's pre-trip inspections were reasonable, and, thus, protected activity, even when he exceeded the standard UPS inspection regimen. Therefore, he has established that his complaints to management officials were based on a reasonable belief that UPS was in violation of motor vehicle safety regulations 49 CFR 392.7 and 49 CFR 396.13. Thus, I find that Calhoun's inspections on June 26, 2001, June 28, 2001, June 29, 2001, July 10, 2001, and September 6, 2001, which inspections I have found to be protected under the "refusal to drive" clause, are also protected under the "complaint" clause.
III. Can UPS offer a legitimate non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse employment action?
Calhoun has established a prima facie case that he engaged in protected activity and was subject to retaliatory action by UPS on June 26, 2001, June 28, 2001, June 29, 2001, July 10, 2001, and September 6, 2001. In order to avoid liability under the act, UPS must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action on those dates. Moon v. Transp. Drivers, Inc. , 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1987). If UPS can articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, Calhoun must then prove that UPS's reasons are a pretext for retaliation. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S 502, 507 (1993).
UPS has alleged that Calhoun was disciplined for insubordination. The alleged insubordination was Calhoun's insistence on performing certain inspections which exceeded the standard inspection (See generally , testimony of Don Allen at Tr. 724-801). Disciplinary action in response to employee insubordination can be a legitimate employment action. See e.g. , Logan v. United Parcel Service , 96-STA-2 (ARB Dec. 19, 1996). However, because I have found that Calhoun's pre-trip inspections on the dates in question were reasonable despite exceeding UPS's standard inspection routine, the allegation of insubordination falls flat. The insubordination alleged is the very activity which I have found to be protected under the act. Although Calhoun may have engaged in heated exchanges with his supervisors over the scope of his pre-trip inspections, those exchanges are indistinguishable from the underlying protected inspections. Furthermore, unlike the complainant in Logan , supra , Calhoun's insubordination was not beyond the pale. There is no evidence that he acted inappropriately toward or threatened any supervisors or fellow employees. Thus, I find that insubordination is not a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse employment actions taken on June 26, 2001, June 28, 2001, June 29, 2001, July 10, 2001, and September 6, 2001.
On three dates, June 26, June 28, and July 10, 2001, Calhoun engaged in some protected activity and some unprotected activity. Under a dual motive analysis, UPS can refute Calhoun's prima facie case of discrimination only by demonstrating that it would have taken the same adverse employment action in the absence of Calhoun's protected activities. However, UPS has not so demonstrated.
UPS has not shown that the one-day suspension issued to Calhoun on June 26, 2001 would have been issued if Calhoun had only wiped down the interior of his truck cab. In fact, Calhoun's supervisors specifically identified Calhoun's protected activity (touching the steering components and lug nuts, checking the brakes, grabbing hoses in the engine compartment) as the reason for the suspension (Tr. 118-20, 788-90).
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Calhoun's suspension on June 28, 2001 occurred after he engaged in protected and unprotected activities. Don Allen's testimony confirms that the warning letter was issued to Calhoun in part because Calhoun was touching lug nuts on the wheels of his trailer (Tr. 578-9). There is no evidence that Calhoun would have been suspended for only cleaning the cab of his truck.
Finally, UPS has not demonstrated that three-day suspension Calhoun received for "not scanning properly" on July 10, 2001 (JX 52) would have been issued in the absence of Calhoun's protected manual inspection of the brake air lines. Thus, while Calhoun engaged in some unprotected activities such as looking under the door of his truck cab, UPS has not met its burden in establishing that Calhoun would have been disciplined for those unprotected activities alone.
Because UPS has failed to establish that Calhoun was disciplined for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons, Calhoun has proved his claim of employment discrimination and is entitled to damages.
IV. Damages
Having found that UPS punished Calhoun for engaging in protected activity, I will now consider the remedy to which Calhoun is entitled. Under 49 USC 31105(b)(3)(A), administrative law judges may order an appropriate remedy, including abatement of the adverse action, reinstatement of the employee, or awarding compensatory damages, including back pay. Because of the circumstances of the case, including the fact that Calhoun has retired, I find that the appropriate remedy is an award of back pay and compensatory damages for emotional distress. I will also grant Calhoun's request that UPS be ordered to post a copy of my recommended decision and order and of the final decision and order in this case be posted in prominent places in all UPS terminals for sixty days.
A. Back Pay
I find that Calhoun is entitled to damages for pay lost as a result of the adverse employment actions taken by UPS. Calhoun is entitled to lost wages for his one-day suspension issued on June 26, 2001. He is also entitled to two days' lost wages for the one-day suspension issued on June 28, 2001 and for being placed on out-of-work status on June 29, 2001. He is further entitled to three days' lost wages for the three-day suspension issued on July 18, 2001 and for any wages lost as a result of his September 6, 2001 termination. However, he is not entitled to damages for the adverse employment actions on October 30, 2001, and May 7, 2002 because he failed to make a prima facie showing that his termination on those dates were related to any activities protected under the act.
B. Emotional Distress
In Michaud v. BSP Transport, Inc. , 95-STA-29 (ARB Oct. 9, 1997), the ARB held that the common meaning of compensatory damages includes back wages as well as damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. In Dutkiewicz v. Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc. , 95-STA-34 (ARB Aug. 8, 1997), the complainant was awarded compensatory damages where there was uncontradicted evidence that he experienced severe emotional distress proximately caused by his unlawful discharge. In seeking an award for compensatory damages, a complainant need not present medical or psychological evidence to prevail. Busche v. Burkee , 649 F.2d 509, 519 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981).
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Having observed and listened to Beverly Calhoun for seven days in 1999 and 2003, I have no doubt whatever that he suffered emotional distress as a result of retaliatory actions which I have found to be actionable (Tr. 289-92). He saw a psychologist for treatment of his emotional distress (Id .). Further, his emotional distress in undisputed. Based on a review of other cases in which emotional damages have been awarded to successful whistleblower complainants, I find that it is appropriate to award some emotional damages to Calhoun. See e.g. , Hillis v. Knochel Bros., Inc. , 2002-STA-50 (ALJ July 21, 2003); Roberts v. Marshall Durbin Co. , 2002-STA-35 (Mar. 6, 2003); Dutkiewicz v. Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc. , 95-STA-34 (ALJ Apr. 14, 1997); Assistant Sec'y & Bingham v. Guaranteed Overnight Delivery , ARB No. 96-108 (ARB Sept. 5, 1996) and cases cited therein. However, this case does not compel an award of a significant amount for emotional damages. The retaliatory actions by UPS were not as egregious as those taken by some employers. Neither was the evidence of emotional damage in this case as extensive as in other cases. Finally, I found that only a portion of UPS's actions alleged by Calhoun to be unlawful were retaliatory. Thus, I find that an award of $2000 for emotional damages is appropriate.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is hereby recommended that the Department order the following:
1. UPS shall pay Calhoun damages equal to the amount of wages and benefits he would have received for the six days for which he was suspended without pay following his suspensions on June 26, June 28, and July 6, 2001.
2. UPS shall pay Calhoun damages equal to the amount of wages and benefits he would have received for any days for which he was suspended without pay following his termination on September 6, 2001.
3. Employer shall pay interest at the applicable federal rate, computed from the date on which the wages and benefits would have been paid.
4. Employer shall pay directly to Complainant the sum of $2000 for emotional distress caused Complainant by Employer's unlawful retaliation.
5. Employer shall post copies of my recommended decision and order and of the final decision and order in this case in prominent places on the premises of all UPS terminals for sixty days and shall ensure that such copies are not removed or covered.
6. All of Complainant's other requests for remedies are DENIED.
FLETCHER E. CAMPBELL, JR.
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order and the administrative file in this matter will be forwarded for review by the Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-4309, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington D.C. 20210. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(a); 61 Fed. Reg. 19978 (1996)
[ENDNOTES]
1 The following are references to the record:
CX � Complainant's exhibits;
RX � Respondent's exhibits;
JX � Joint exhibits; and
Tr. � Transcript of the hearing.
2 Calhoun's generalized complaints of safety violations are, however, sufficient to invoke protection under the "complaint clause" of 49 USC 31105(a)(1). See discussion section II(B), infra .
3 Id. at 14. While the tire inspections in Monde were found not to be mandated by the general regulations, I cannot conclude that the general safety regulations have no force. The regulations must have some meaning, and there must be some mechanism for enforcing them. Thus, I conclude that a driver engages in protected activity if he refuses to violate the general safety provisions.
4 Calhoun has a commercial driver's license and principally drives his rig in North Carolina. Calhoun v. United Parcel Service , ARB No. 00-026, ALJ No. 1999 STA 7 (ARB Nov. 27, 2002). The North Carolina commercial drivers license (CDL) manual is published by the North Carolina Department of Transportation Division of Motor Vehicles (JX 38). The manual "describes the minimum requirements for obtaining a commercial driver's license in North Carolina and provides information to assist [drivers] in passing the required knowledge and skills tests" (Id. at 1-1). The introduction to the manual explains that "The North Carolina law was passed in 1989 to comply with the Federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 which set minimum standards for a CDL in order to reduce accidents involving commercial motor vehicles" (Id .). Thus, I find that the North Carolina CDL manual has been demonstrated to be authoritative as an expert treatise in this case. The CDL manual was drafted to provide "knowledge and safe driving information" to all North Carolina commercial truck drivers (JX 38 at 2-1), and those instructions to commercial truck drivers bear on the reasonableness of Calhoun's activities.
5 The instructions from UPS management to Calhoun regarding disassembling the pre-built doubles were explained in the following exchange at the hearing:
[Employer's counsel] Question: "if you observe a visual problem, it's okay to separate the doubles, it's just you're not supposed to do it as part of your normal pre-trip, isn't that right?
[Calhoun] Answer: If I...
Question: The instructions you have received from Allen and Wolfe and Sherman in this regard have been that you are not to separate your pre-assembled doubles as part of your normal pre-trip, but that if you observe a specific problem it's okay for you to do that, isn't that right?
Answer: I believe so.
Question: Well, a bent handle would be a specifically observable problem on a pre-assembled unit, wouldn't it?
Answer: I think so.
Tr. 425-6.
6 In Calhoun v. United Parcel Service , ARB No. 00-026, ALJ No. 1999 STA 7 (ARB Nov. 27, 2002), the Board explained that "adverse actions need not rise to the level of ultimate employment decisions." Calhoun v. United Parcel Service , ARB No. 00-026, ALJ No. 1999 STA 7 (ARB Nov. 27, 2002) (citing Von Gunten v. Maryland , 243 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 2001)(Title VII case)). In Von Gunten v. Maryland , a Title VII case, the Fourth Circuit found that "adverse action includes not only ultimate employment decisions such as firing or demotion, but also actions that result in 'adverse effect[s] on the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.' Von Gunten v. Maryland , 243 F.2d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of adverse action comports with the language of the act, which prohibits an employer from "discharg[ing] . . . disciplin[ing] or discriminat[ing] against an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of employment. . ." 49 USC 31105(a)(1).