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USDOL/OALJ Reporter

Gonzalez v. Langone Pipeline & Utility Contracting Division, 2001-STA-18 (ALJ Sept. 21, 2001)


U.S. Department of LaborOffice of Administrative Law Judges
Seven Parkway Center - Room 290
Pittsburgh, PA 15220

(412) 644-5754
(412) 644-5005 (FAX)

DOL Seal
Issue date: 21Sep2001

CASE NO.: 2001-STA-00018

In the Matter of

EDWIN GONZALEZ
    Complainant

    v.

LANGONE PIPELINE & UTILITY
CONTRACTING DIVISION
    Respondent

Appearances:

Edwin Gonzalez, Springfield, Massachusetts, pro se

Nicholas Langone, Russell, Massachusetts and
Ellis Langone, Agawam, Massachusetts, for the Respondent

Before: Daniel F. Sutton
    Administrative Law Judge

RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

I. Statement of the Case

   This case arises from a complaint filed by Edwin Gonzalez (the Complainant) against Langone Pipeline & Utility Contracting Division (the Respondent) under the employee protection provisions of section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (the STAA), 49 U.S.C. §31105, and the implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 1978. Section 405 of the STAA protects a covered employee from discharge, discipline or discrimination because the employee has engaged in protected activity pertaining to commercial motor vehicle safety and health matters. The matter is before me on the Complainant's request for hearing and objection to findings issued on behalf of the Secretary of Labor by the Regional Administrator of the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) after investigation of the complaint. 49 U.S.C. §31105(b)(2)(A), 29 C.F.R. §1978.105.


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   The Complainant filed his complaint on December 7, 1999, alleging that the Respondent terminated his employment on that date in violation of the STAA. ALJX 1.1 After an investigation, the Regional Administrator for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") issued a Secretary's Findings on December 8, 2000 that the evidence showed that the Complainant was not meeting the standards of his position and that his termination was for non-discriminatory reasons. ALJX 1. The Complainant appealed the Secretary's Findings and requested a hearing before an administrative law judge in a letter which was received by the Office of Administrative Law Judges on December 28, 2000. ALJX 3.2

   Thereafter, the Complainant submitted a letter dated March 7, 2001 in which he stated that he had been unable to obtain legal representation and that he wished to have the case decided without an oral hearing based on written submissions. In support of his request, the Complainant submitted a seven page statement which sets forth his version of the relevant facts and his position that the Respondent terminated his employment in violation of section 405 of the STAA. ALJX 14. In an order issued on March 14, 2001, I notified the parties that the Complainant's request would be treated as a motion for summary decision, and I allowed the Respondent until March 26, 2001 to file an answer to the Complainant's request. ALJX 16. This date was subsequently extended at the Respondent's request; ALJX 18; and the Respondent timely filed an answer in which it disputed several of the Complainant's factual allegations as well as his ultimate allegation that the Respondent violated the STAA. ALJX 19. By order issued on April 20, 2001, I found that summary decision was inappropriate because there were issues between the parties as to material facts, and the parties were notified that the matter would be rescheduled for hearing. ALJX 20.

   Pursuant to notice, a hearing was conducted before me in Northampton, Massachusetts on May 16, 2001, at which time the parties were afforded an opportunity to present evidence and argument. Both parties appeared without counsel, and the Respondent was represented by its owner, Ellis Langone, and Nicholas Langone, job superintendent. Testimony was elicited at the hearing from the Complainant and from Nicholas Langone, Michael Duquette and Douglas Richards for the Respondent. Documentary evidence was admitted as ALJX 1-24A, CX 1-10 and EX 1-3. The parties submitted closing argument on the record, and the record was then closed.

   Upon careful consideration of the entire record, I conclude that the Complainant has established that he engaged in activity protected by the STAA and that his protected activity was a factor in the Respondent's decision to terminate his employment. However, I further conclude that the Respondent has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated the Complainant's employment even if he had not engaged in protected activity. Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed. My findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.


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II. Summary of the Evidence

   A. The Complainant's Testimony and Supporting Documentary Evidence

   At the hearing, the Complainant relied on his March 7, 2001 correspondence as the evidence supporting his complaint. TR 19-20. In that statement, the Complainant alleges that he was unlawfully discharged because he told the Respondent that he would not drive the Respondent's trucks unless they were repaired and inspected because he felt that the vehicles were in a state of disrepair so that continued operation would present a hazard to both himself and the public at large. The Complainant further stated that he was a member of Local 98 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (the Union) and that the Respondent repeatedly assigned him to perform manual labor in violation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The Complainant also alleges that the Respondent retaliated against him after he expressed safety concerns by giving him a grade of "fair" on his November 1999 performance report. ALJX 14.

   Upon cross-examination by the Respondent, the Complainant testified that he had worked for the Respondent from October 7, 1999 to December 7, 1999. He acknowledged that prior to starting work, he had discussed what the job would entail and that he became aware that his job duties would include manual labor. TR 26-27. He further testified that within a few weeks of starting his employment with the Respondent and becoming aware that he would be required to perform manual labor, he asked his Union business agent to reassign him to another job. TR 28-29. The Claimant testified that he was an apprentice operating engineer during the period of his employment with the Respondent, and he did not obtain a license to operate hoisting equipment until December 14, 1999, after his employment was terminated. TR 31; CX 7. As an apprentice, the Complainant testified that he could only operate some of the machinery on the Respondent's job sites. TR 44-48.

   The Complainant also testified that he repeatedly informed the Respondent of the unsafe condition of vehicles, particularly Truck 5 (TR5), a Chevrolet C-series, one ton flatbed truck, which, according to the Complainant, had an expired inspection sticker, a flat rear inner tire on the left side, an engine that would continue running after it was shut off, and a faulty emergency break. TR 29-35, 68, 70.

   The Claimant testified that on December 6, 1999, when Nicholas Langone asked him to back up TR5 so that it could be loaded, he told Langone that he would not operate the truck until it was repaired and officially inspected. TR 69, 71-72. This was the first time that the Complainant refused to operate one of the Respondent's trucks. TR 70-71. The Complainant testified that he was fired the following day, December 7, 1999, at which time Langone informed him that the Respondent would not allow an employee decide "what they're going to drive and what they're not." TR 81.


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   B. Testimony of Nicholas Langone

   At the hearing, Mr. Langone read from a statement that he had submitted during the OSHA investigation of the Complainant's allegations. TR 95-99; EX 3. Mr. Langone testified that during the last week in September 1999 he contacted Douglas Richards, a Union business agent, because he wanted to hire a few operators to work on horizontal directional drilling projects. TR 95. Horizontal directional drilling is a "trenchless" method of installing pipe or cable. The process involves drilling a pilot bore by means of a remote control device which guides the drill head. After the pilot bore is drilled, a cutter device is used to simultaneously enlarge the diameter of the bore and pull the pipe or cable through the bore. TR 103-104. Due to the scarcity of operators experienced with horizontal directional drilling equipment, Mr. Langone agreed to hire two apprentice operators, the Complainant and Michael Duquette, to train under his own crew until they were sufficiently experienced to operate independently. TR 95-96. Mr. Langone testified that prior to hiring the apprentice operators, he called Complainant and Mr. Duquette on the telephone and explained that the positions for which they had been hired are very labor-intensive, that they would not just be operating machinery and that they would be expected to do their own shoveling and jack-hammering work as there would not be a laborer on the job. According to Mr. Langone, the Complainant and Mr. Duquette both agreed and were enthusiastic about starting work. TR 96.

   Mr. Langone further testified that he supervised the training of the crew during the first few days of the Complainant's employment. Mr. Langone stated that after the Complainant's initial training was completed, he made spot checks of the job sites and had daily progress meetings with his foreman, Todd Chamberlain, who informed him that the Complainant "had a tendency to disappear when any physical labor was going on." TR 96-97. Mr. Langone testified that although he had reiterated to both apprentices that they were expected to perform manual labor, he continued to receive reports from the foreman regarding the Complainant's lack of effort. He stated that he again contacted Mr. Richards, the Union's business agent, and asked if the Union he had any other operators available because he felt that the Complainant was not working out. Mr. Richards told him that he would look into it, and Mr. Langone decided to keep the Complainant on the job in the interim. After not hearing back from the Union, Mr. Langone testified that called Mr. Richards a second time to inform him that he wanted to make a move as quickly as possible because the overall morale of the crew was dropping, and production was lagging. Mr. Langone stated that he was informed by Mr. Richards during this second conversation that the Complainant had also contacted the Union, asking to be placed elsewhere. TR 97.

   Mr. Langone continued that shortly after this second conversation with Mr. Richards, he directly supervised the Complainant on a new project in Ridgefield, Connecticut and "reached wits end with Mr. Gonzalez and his lack of teamwork" which led him


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to decide to terminate the Complainant's performance on December 6, 1999. TR 97. Mr. Langone described his decision and the communication of that decision to the Complainant as follows:

I planned on finishing up the job with Mr. Gonzales, and terminating him on the 7th of December when he returned. This did not happen due to how late he and the other apprentice finished up on that Monday.

When he came into work on Tuesday the 7th, I asked to have a word with him. We took a walk away from the rest of the crews who were preparing their trucks. Before I could get a word in he explained to me that TR5 had a problem with the clutch slipping on the way home from the job that Friday. He then told me that he deemed all of my trucks unsafe and that he would not drive them. Out of curiosity I asked "aside from the clutch, why is this truck unsafe?" He stated that there was no flares, triangles, or a first aid kit. I then proceeded to lift forward the seat to show him that all of these things were present, and that if there is a problem with the clutch, the normal procedure is to notify my mechanic. I also stated that if it was so bad then why did he not take the truck out of service, instead of making it back to the shop. Obviously I was insulted even more by this than the lack of work that I received from him. It was then that I carried out what I originally intended to do by stepping aside with him. So at approximately 7:30 a.m., Edwin Gonzales was terminated as an employee with Langone.

TR 98. On cross-examination by the Complainant, Mr. Langone testified that he and Mr. Duquette were forced to perform a majority of the manual work on this last project which caused him to decide to terminate the employment the Complainant. He also testified that after Mr. Chamberlain was moved to another job, the production of the Complainant and Mr. Duquette "lagged", though he did not have a problem with Mr. Duquette's performance. TR 124-125. Mr. Langone acknowledged that he had never approached the Complainant directly about his performance, but he explained that he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Complainant's performance to Mr. Richards on at least four or five occasions and was told that the Union did not have anybody to replace the Complainant. TR 126-128. After the Claimant was terminated, the Union sent the Respondent another apprentice, George Romano, who replaced the Complainant on the horizontal directional drilling crew on December 8 or 9, 1999. TR 119-120.

   Finally Mr. Langone did not dispute the Complainant's report that there were various mechanical defects in TR5 involving the clutch, a broken tailpipe and the engine tending to "diesel" or continue to run after the ignition was shut off. TR 129, 139-141.3 Mr. Langone testified that TR5 was not used after December 7, 1999 and has since been junked and used for spare parts. TR 133-135.


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   C. Testimony of Michael Duquette

   Mr. Duquette testified that the Complainant excelled at running the locator on the drilling rig but had difficulty with the more physical aspects of the job such as operating a jackhammer and shoveling. TR 146. He also testified that he had spoken to Mr. Langone about a possible replacement for the Complainant prior to the Complainant's termination, and he agreed that he is more productive with George Romano on the crew than he was when he worked with the Complainant. TR 147-148. Although he testified on cross-examination by the Complainant that he felt that the Complainant made an honest effort, he considered the Complainant's performance to be "fair" and less than the job required:

A. I would say it was fair. I would also say maybe I don't know if the proper word is more physical conditioning

Q. Okay.

A. where you could do a little shoveling or something like that, it could have got better and probably fit the job a little bit more. I don't know if you had any kind of physical training. I don't know your background or what, you know, how much you could lift before your back is sore or whatnot, but the job definitely required more than you could do, and probably could have done more if the condition was better, I would say. But for what I've seen, you know, you seem to be an honest guy. You seem to do what you could do, you know, which made me do a little bit more in some aspects, but that was fine for me. I didn't mind. I could use the workout. I could use a few pounds knocked off.

TR 160-161. Mr. Duquette also corroborated the Complainant's testimony concerning some of the reported defects with TR5. He testified that the inspection sticker had expired at one point, that the exhaust pipe "blew off" and that clutch occasionally slipped on hills. TR 156-157. Mr. Duquette worked for the Respondent until January 2000 when he and Mr. Romano were laid off due to the weather. In March 2000, he went to work for another contractor where he is currently employed. TR 151-152, 162-163.

   D. Testimony of Douglas Richards

   Mr. Richards testified that he is employed as a business agent by Local 98 of the International Union of Operating Engineers which has approximately 1,200 members and covers all of Vermont, western Massachusetts and five counties in New Hampshire. TR 169-171. He testified that he was the Complainant's business agent while he was employed at the Respondent, and he stated that the Complainant contacted him almost immediately after beginning work at the Respondent to express his unhappiness with the working conditions and equipment and to request a reassignment. TR 170-171. Mr. Richards also testified that he had


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been asked by Mr. Langone on more than one occasion to find a replacement for the Complainant. He stated that he initially told Mr. Langone that he did not have another apprentice available at that time and that Mr. Langone made it clear to him that he wanted to replace the Complainant as soon as possible. TR 165-166. Mr. Richards recalled that Mr. Langone complained to him about the Complainant's performance and, specifically, that the Complainant was unwilling to get dirty and help out by doing what is necessary to get the job done. TR 178. He also stated that he was told that although the Complainant did part of the job well, there were other parts where he could have helped out more and that "maybe he wasn't cut out for that type of work." TR 180. Mr. Richards testified that he spoke to Mr. Langone after the Complainant was terminated by the Respondent and that Mr. Langone stated that the Complainant "wasn't working out with the job and he refused to run the equipment, the trucks." TR 181.

III. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

   A. Analytical Framework

   The STAA prohibits the discharge of, or discipline or discrimination against, an employee in the commercial motor transportation industry because the employee either files a complaint or initiates or testifies in a proceeding related to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety regulation, standard, or order, or because the employee refuses to operate a vehicle in certain circumstances:


(1) A person may not discharge an employee or discipline or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of employment because
(A) the employee, or another person at the employee's request, has filed a complaint or begun a proceeding related to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety regulation, standard, or order, or has testified or will testify in such a proceeding; or
(B) the employee refuses to operate a vehicle because
(i) the operation violates a regulation, standard, or order of the United States related to commercial motor vehicle safety or health; or
(ii) the employee has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to the employee or the public because of the vehicle's unsafe condition.

49 U.S.C. §31105(a). The elements of a violation of the STAA's employee protection provisions are that the employee engaged in protected activity, that the employee was subjected to adverse employment action, and that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. BSP Trans., Inc. v. United States Dep't Labor, 160 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1998); Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (Clean Harbors). A complainant initially may show that protected activity likely motivated the adverse action by proving: (1) that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that the respondent was aware of the activity; (3) that he suffered adverse employment action;


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and (4) the existence of a causal link or nexus, e.g., that the adverse action followed the protected activity so closely in time as to justify an inference of retaliatory motive. Shannon v. Consolidated Freightways, USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), ARB No. 98-051, OALJ No. 1996-STA-15 at 5-6 (ARB April 15, 1998); Kahn v. United States Secretary of Labor, 64 F.3d 261, 277 (7th Cir. 1995). An employer may rebut this prima facie showing by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse action, and the complainant must then prove that the employer's proffered reason was not the true reason for the adverse action and that protected activity was the real reason for the action. Shute v. Silver Eagle Co., USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), ARB No. 97-060, OALJ No. 1996-STA-19 at 1-2 (ARB June 11, 1997); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-508 (1993).

   B. Protected Activity

   The Complainant's activities which are asserted to be protected under the STAA fall into two basic categories (1) his internal complaints to the Respondent about defective and unsafe conditions on TR5 and (2) his refusal to drive TR5 on December 7, 1999. Regarding the former, it is well-established that an employee's internal safety complaints to management are protected by 49 U.S.C. §31105(a)(1)(A). Clean Harbors, 146 F.3d at 19-21; Zurenda v. J&K Plumbing and Heating Co., USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), ARB No. 98-088, OALJ No. 1997-STA-16 at 5 (ARB June 12, 1998); Doyle v. Rich Transport, Inc., USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), OALJ No. 1993-STA-17 at 2 (Sec'y April 1, 1994); Davis v. H.R. Hill, Inc., USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), OALJ No. 1986-STA-18 at 3-4 (Sec'y March 19, 1987). Here, there is uncontradicted evidence in the record that the Complainant made internal complaints to the Respondent concerning what he perceived to be defects or unsafe conditions on his assigned vehicle. As the Respondent has not disputed that these complaints fall within the ambit of section 31105(a)(1)(A), I find that the Complainant engaged in protected complaint activity. See Castle Coal & Oil Co., Inc. v. Reich, 55 F.3d 41, 45-46 (2nd Cir. 1995) (allegation of a violation sufficient to invoke the protection of subsection (a)(1)(A) without proof of a violation of any motor vehicle safety rule).4

   In order to receive protection under this subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii), an employee's apprehension of a serious injury due to an unsafe condition must be objectively reasonable based on the information available to him at the time of the work refusal and, despite seeking a correction of the condition, the employee must have been unable to obtain correction. 49 U.S.C. §31105(a)(2); Brinks, Inc. v. Herman, 148 F.3d 175, 180-81 (2nd Cir. 1998). The existence of an actual safety defect need not be proven, and the fact that a subsequent inspection affirmatively shows that there was no mechanical defect does not remove the STAA's protection so long as the analysis of the situation encountered by a driver at the time


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of the refusal to drive compels the conclusion that the driver's perception of an unsafe condition was reasonable. Yellow Freight System v. Reich, 38 F.3d 76, 82-83 (2nd Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Protein Express, USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), ARB No. 98-104, 1995-STA-38 at 2-3 (ARB January 9, 1997). In view of Mr. Langone's candid admission that the clutch on TR5 was "blown" on December 7, 1999 and that the vehicle was taken out of service as of that date, I find that the Complainant's refusal to drive on December 7, 1999 was reasonable and, therefore, protected by subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii).

   C. Awareness of the Protected Activity, Adverse Action and Causal Connection

   There is no dispute that the Respondent was aware of the Complainant's protected activity and that the Complainant was subjected to an adverse employment action when he was terminated on December 7, 1999. The fact that the Complainant's protected activity was followed immediately by the Respondent's announcement of its decision to terminate his employment alone would be enough to support an inference of a causal connection between the two. Bergeron v. Aulenback Transportation, Inc., USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), OALJ No. 1991-STA-38 at 2 (Sec'y June 4, 1992); Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1989). The inference of a causal connection is further supported by the uncontradicted testimony from the Claimant that Mr. Langone referred to the Complainant's refusal to drive when he told the Complainant that he was being terminated and by the uncontradicted testimony from Mr. Richards, the Union business agent, that Mr. Langone told him that the Claimant was terminated because he wasn't working out and because he refused to drive the Respondent's trucks. Based on the close proximity of the Complainant's protected activity to the date of his termination, and Mr. Langone's statements connecting the Complainant's termination to his protected refusal to drive TR5, I find that the Complainant has met his burden of establishing that the Respondent's termination decision was, at least in part, motivated by retaliatory considerations.

   D. Respondent's Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons for Termination

   Because the Complainant has met his burden of proving that his termination was, at least in part, motivated by his protected activity under the STAA, the burden of persuasion shifts to the Respondent to demonstrate that it would have terminated the Complainant even if he had not engaged in the protected activity. Pogue v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 (9th Cir. 1991) (dual motive test set forth in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), applies where it was "undisputed" that complainant engaged in protected activity and "that this was a motive for disciplinary action"); Passaic Valley Sewerage v. United States Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 481 (3 rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 964 (1993); Mackowiak v. Univ. Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163-1164 (9th Cir. 1984). Mr. Langone, the Respondent's job superintendent, testified that after the Complainant began working on the horizontal directional drilling crew, he determined that the Complainant was not cut out


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the amount of physical labor required, and he made repeated attempts to have the Union provide a replacement. His testimony in this regard is credible, and it is corroborated by the testimony elicited from Mr. Duquette and Mr. Richards. Indeed, the record shows that the Complainant had also contacted the Union to seek reassignment to another job. Mr. Langone further credibly testified that he made a final decision to terminate the Complainant on December 6, 1999 after he had personally supervised the Complainant on the Ridgefield, Connecticut job and reached his "wit's end" with the Complainant's lack of teamwork and effort, and that he had taken the Complainant aside on the morning of December 7, 1999 to inform him of the termination when the Complainant announced that he would no longer operate the Respondent's vehicles due to his safety concerns. While the Complainant has argued that the Respondent's requirement that apprentice operators do physical labor violated the collective bargaining agreement and testified that he made a sincere effort to accomplish the physically demanding tasks despite his physical limitations, he has not shown that the Respondent's articulated dissatisfaction with his performance is false and a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Based on Mr. Langone's credited testimony, I find that the Respondent has met its burden of demonstrating that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory performance reasons for terminating the Complainant's employment and that it would have terminated the Complainant even if he had not engaged in activity protected by the STAA.5

IV. Conclusion

   The Complainant has met his burden of proving that his termination was, at least in part, motivated by his protected activity under the STAA. Under these circumstances, it is clear that he filed and pursued his complaint in the good faith belief that the Respondent had violated the STAA. However, as the Respondent had met its burden of demonstrating that it would have terminated the Complainant for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason even if he had not engaged in protected activity, I conclude that the complaint must be dismissed. Shannon v. Consolidated Freightways, USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), ARB No. 98-051, OALJ No. 1996-STA-15 at 8-9 (ARB April 15, 1998).

V. Recommended Order

   The complaint filed in this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice.

      Daniel F. Sutton
      Administrative Law Judge

Boston, Massachusetts
DFS:dmd

NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order and the administrative file will be forwarded for review to the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Ave., Washington D.C. 20210. 29 C.F.R. §1978.109(a); 61 Fed. Reg. 19978, 19982 (1996).

[ENDNOTES]

1 The documentary evidence admitted to the record will be referred to as "ALJX" for jurisdictional and procedural documents admitted by the Administrative Law Judge, "CX" for documents offered by the Complainant, and "EX" for documents offered by the Respondent. References to the hearing transcript will be designated as "TR".

2 This matter was originally scheduled before Chief District Administrative Law Judge David W. Di Nardi, but was reassigned to me due to a scheduling conflict. ALJX 11.

3 Mr. Langone testified that he was not aware of any problem with TR5's brakes, and he denied that the vehicle had a flat tire on December 6, 1999 when the Complainant drove back from the Ridgefield job though he did admit that there previously had been a flat on TR5 which the Complainant and Mr. Duquette drove for about five days before it was repaired. TR 129-130.

4 In view of the fact that the Respondent has not argued that the Complainant's safety complaints are unprotected, I find the ARB's recent decision in Assistant Secretary and Bates v. West Bank Containers, USDOL/OALJ Reporter (HTML), ARB No. 99-055, OALJ No. 1998-STA-30 at (April 28, 2000) (discussing the analysis required where a respondent challenged OSHA's interpretation that section 31105(a)(1)(A) protects safety complaints as long as the employee has a reasonable belief that the condition violates a motor vehicle safety regulation) to be inapplicable.

5 I do note that there is a discrepancy between the Complainant's testimony that he told Mr. Langone on December 6, 1999 that he would not drive TR5 and Mr. Langone's account that this conversation took place on December 7, 1999. However, I do not find this discrepancy to be significant in light of the substantial and credible evidence that the Respondent had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the Complainant and would have terminated him in the absence of any protected activity. That is, I find that it makes no material difference whether the Complainant's refusal to drive was communicated to Mr. Langone on December 6 or 7, 1999.



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