Estes
contends that it would be unduly prejudicial and wasteful to
permit Complainant to use the filing of his instant [second]
complaint as a vehicle for re-trying the issues presented and
litigated in the hearing of the First Complaint before Judge Avery
(herein Hasan I).
Estes further contends that
a prima facie case in a failure to hire or rehire
context requires a showing that Complainant actually applied for a
specific job opening or vacancy and that Complainant has failed to
show such an opening. It is further asserted that Complainant has
merely transmitted his resume to Estes and no employment ever
materialized which fails to meet the requirements of a prima
facie case.
[Page 3] On December 13, 1999,
Commonwealth Edison Company (herein ComEd) filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for
failure to set forth any specifics regarding an alleged failure to
hire. ComEd also contends that the Complaint constitutes a
"rehashing of allegations . . . litigated in the Section 211
case filed in April 1999 . . . (Case No. 1999-ERA-17) . . . ."
(Hasan I). ComEd asserts that for Complainant to pursue a failure
to hire claim he should be required to "plead that he actually
applied for but was denied an identifiable and identified job for
which he was qualified. Because he has not done so, his Complaint
should be dismissed." Furthermore, to the extent
Complainant's Complaint alleges a "blacklisting claim,"
ComEd argues that Complainant failed to set forth any factual
evidence of a violation and offers merely conjecture.
On December 14, 1999, an
Order issued requiring Complainant to show cause by December 29,
1999, why the motions of Respondents Estes and ComEd should not be
granted.
On December 15, 1999,
Complainant filed a "Motion To Disqualify Respondent Estes
Group Inc.'s Attorney, Burr E. Anderson and his law firm (Anderson
& Thomas), for Default Judgment and for Sanctions" and a
"Motion for Default Judgment and for Sanctions against
Respondent Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd)." Complainant
seeks to disqualify Counsel for Estes and requests default judgment
and sanctions against Estes for their failure to respond to his
requested discovery in the form of Requests for Production of
Documents and Interrogatories. Complainant also seeks a default
judgment and sanctions against ComEd for failure to respond to his
discovery requests notwithstanding ComEd's assertion of objections
and privileges.
On December 23, 1999, Estes
filed a Motion to Strike Complainant's Motion for Sanctions as
specious since his discovery requests were prematurely served on
November 6, 1999, one month before his "complaint" was
due pursuant to the pre-hearing order.
On December 27, 1999, ComEd
filed a response to Complainant's motions. ComEd supplements its
Motion to Dismiss in support of its argument that Complainant could
presumably file complaints against any nuclear employer contending
they had "failed to hire him" by advising that
Complainant has filed two additional complaints against ComEd. In
response to Complainant's motion for sanctions it is represented
that the discovery requests which form the basis of such motions
"were little more than a rehashing of the vastly overbroad
requests he served in prior litigation (in Case No. 1999-ERA-17),
were not tailored to this new case in any meaningful way and were
objectionable on numerous grounds."
[Page 4]
On December 27, 1999,
Complainant filed a response to the Show Cause Order as well as
responses to Respondent's motions to dismiss. Complainant has
requested that he be allowed to amend his complaint of October 6,
1999, "so that it covers the period from May 18, 1999 to
January 19, 2000." However, he provides no specifics to his
motion or amendments. Despite an opportunity to enlighten and
clarify his Complaint, Complainant presented redundant arguments
related to the form of motions, the purported sanctionable
misconduct of Respondents' attorneys in failing to provide
discovery and the alleged discriminatory conduct of Respondents
litigated in the complaint before Judge Avery in Hasan I. He re-
urges his Motions for Default Judgment and Sanctions. Although
Complainant seemingly acknowledges that the instant case involves
alleged discrimination commencing on May 18, 1999, no specifics of
any such alleged violations have been forthcoming. Rather,
Complainant maintains that Respondents have engaged in a continuing
course of conduct which constitutes violations of the ERA. Yet,
not one specific act of discriminatory conduct has been described
in his response or amendments, except that in August 1999,
"others were still working on the safety issues DISCOVERED BY
ME . . . ." Notwithstanding his overly general complaint,
Complainant insists that Respondents have failed to respond to his
discovery, which is also overly broad and general, or provide
meaningful discovery and that dismissal would be improper in the
absence of discovery. He did not deny that his discovery
represents a redundant request for information. He contends,
without any factual evidence or specificity, that Respondents are
"systematically excluding" him from consideration for
employment.
On December 29, 1999,
Complainant filed a response to Respondents' reply to the Motion
for Sanctions. Complainant seeks disqualification of Counsel for
ComEd from further participation in this matter because he filed a
"totally illegal" Motion to Dismiss, which Respondent
argued should be a sanction for Complainant's abuse of this
process. Complainant thereafter proceeds to accuse Counsel of
lying and engaging in "gross professional misconduct" as
purportedly supported by alleged actions in a 1986 whistleblower
case.
Finally, on January 5,
2000, Estes and ComEd filed replies to Complainant's Response to
the Show Cause Order averring that no valid argument was presented
against dismissal. They argue that discovery is irrelevant because
their motions for dismissal are based on his failure to state a
viable claim. Moreover, Estes and ComEd oppose Complainant's
"Motion To Amend" to include a period of time after the
filing of his October 6, 1999 Complaint.
[Page 5]
On January 7, 2000, ComEd
filed, inter alia , a Motion In Limine seeking to
"exclude any evidence outside the time frame of May 18 to
October 6, 1999, and to exclude any evidence on matters already
litigated" in Hasan I. ComEd argues that it did not receive
any discovery from Complainant to support his alleged failure to be
rehired from May 18 to October 6, 1999, let alone any alleged
incidents beyond October 6, 1999. Moreover, ComEd asserts that
Complainant has filed three additional complaints against ComEd
after October 6, 1999, alleging a failure to rehire and any
evidence or testimony of events subsequent to October 6, 1999,
would be beyond the scope of the instant case. ComEd also filed a
Motion to change the hearing location from Decatur, Alabama to
Chicago, Illinois.
For reasons discussed
hereinafter, I find and conclude that Complainant has failed to
state a viable claim of Respondents' failure to rehire. In sum, he
has failed to plead or present any indicia of proof that he applied
for a specific job position/vacancy for which he possessed the
requisite qualifications and was rejected despite the existence of
Respondents' continued search for applicants.
DISCUSSION
A. The Motions to Dismiss
An analysis of the pending
motions and responses must begin with the employee protective
provision of the ERA. 42 U.S.C. § 5851. The complaint filing
provision envisioned by the Act requires the employee to make a
prima facie showing that proscribed behavior by an
employer was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel
action alleged. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5851(b)(3)(A).
General rules of pleadings
prescribe such construction to identify and particularize issues to
be litigated, determine and establish defenses and narrow and
clarify the differences between the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The
main object of a pleading is to give the opposing party notice of
the claim. Although pleadings filed by a pro se
litigant are held to a less stringent standard, they must
nonetheless meet minimal pleading requirements. See
Salahuddin v. Jones , 992 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied 510 U.S. 902, 114 S.Ct. 278 (1993);
Beaudett v. Hampton , 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert . denied 475 U.S. 1088, 106 S.Ct. 1475 (1985).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply in any situation
not provided for or controlled by the Rules of Practice and
Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the Office of
Administrative Law Judges. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.1(b).
[Page 6]
Procedures for the handling
of discrimination complaints under federal employee protection
statutes provide that an administrative law judge may, at the
request of any party, or on his own motion, issue a recommended
decision and order dismissing a claim:
Upon the failure of the Complainant to comply
with a lawful order of the administrative law
judge.
29 C.F.R. § 24.6(e)(4)(i)(B).
The procedures for handling
discrimination complaints under federal employee protection
statutes also require that the form of a complaint be in writing
and "include a full statement of
the acts and omissions , with pertinent dates ,
which are believed to constitute the violation ." 29
C.F.R. § 24.3(c).
The pre-hearing order issued in this matter by the undersigned required Complainant to
file a complaint stating "in detail the nature of each and every violation as well as the relief sought."
Based on this specificity, Respondents were mandated to file a responsive pleading, an answer, to the complaint allegations. A
review of the Complaint filed in this case on December 6, 1999, reveals that all specific factual allegations relate to a time
period before and immediately after Complainant's March 26, 1999, termination. (See Complaint, pages 2-21). Complainant alleges that he has
"applied for a job (number of times), after my discriminatory/retaliatory lay-off/termination (by ComEd/Estes), to Respondent Estes. I, also applied
for a job to Respondent ComEd." It is clear that Complainant's alleged efforts at
employment with Respondents after March 26, 1999, through May 17, 1999, was the subject of litigation in Hasan I. Complainant has
not alleged, with any specificity, his application for any job vacancies after May 17, 1999. It is undisputed that he sent his
resume to Estes on two occasions after May 17, 1999; on August 24, 1999 and September 21, 1999. (Attachment 1 to Complaint, pp. 1, 3)
and to ComEd on November 17, 1999 (Attachment 1 of Complaint, pp. 9-10). His complaint however does not identify any specific job
opening on any specific date for which he sought employment, or that he was rejected for such employment.
It is well-settled that in a case involving an alleged discriminatory refusal or failure to
hire/re-hire, to establish a prima facie case Complainant must show that (1) he applied for and (2) was qualified
for a job (3) for which Respondents were seeking applicants and, (4) despite his qualifications, he was rejected and (5) that after
his rejection, the position vacancy remained open and (6) the Respondents continued to seek applicants from persons of
Complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The foregoing McDonnell
Douglas framework applies as well to determining whether a Complainant in an ERA case has established adverse action in
Respondent's failure to hire/re-hire him. See Samodurov v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. and General Physics Corporation ,
Case No. 89-ERA-20 (Sec'y, Decision and Order, Nov. 16, 1993).
In the present matter, Complainant has failed to allege or show that he
"applied" for a job vacancy through Estes or ComEd for which he was qualified; that he was not hired for the job; that
either another candidate was hired or Respondents continued their search for applicants. Moreover, implicit within any
discriminatory allegations is the requirement to also allege or show that Complainant's "protected activity" was known to
Respondents and that he was denied a job position or treated differently because of his protected activity. The identical
failings exist in Complainant's alleged "blacklisting" rhetoric. In essence, he claims ComEd "shall never permit me
to work" or will see that he is "never employed, at least in the nuclear industry." A blacklisting claim should set
forth specific allegations of a "blacklist" document containing a list
of persons marked out for special avoidance or any other source of communication distributed throughout the nuclear industry intended
to preclude employment of complainant. Howard v. Tennessee Valley Authority , Case No. 90-ERA-24 (Sec'y July 3, 1991);
Hasan v. Sargent & Lundy , Case No. 96-ERA-27 (ALJ Recommended Dec. and Order, Nov. 4, 1996)(Slip Op., p. 10).
Complainant failed to allege any of the foregoing critical elements of his case in his complaint. In his response to the show
cause order, he again failed to provide any specificity regarding the alleged discrimination visited upon him by Respondents between
May 18, 1999 to October 6, 1999. Instead, he re-pled his case before Judge Avery in Hasan I.
Complainant has failed to allege any discriminatory violations worthy of a formal hearing.
He has failed to allege the existence of any jobs or their availability or that he applied or sought any specific job with
Respondents. He has failed to allege how and when Respondents allegedly discriminated against him. See Holtzclaw v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency , Case No. 95-CAA-7 (ARB, Final Dec. and Order, Feb. 13, 1997)(Slip. Op., p. 4);
Acord v. Alyseska Pipeline Service Co. , Case No. 95-TSC-4 (ARB, Final Dec. and Order, June 30, 1997)(Slip. Op., p. 6).
Although Complainant repeatedly refers to himself as a "pro se litigant," I am not persuaded that
he is a novice in these matters. Complainant has filed numerous Section 211 complaints under the ERA in which he has appeared
pro se .2 As argued by Respondents, Complainant has only alleged that he
submitted his resume to Respondents and he remains unemployed. Even if true, the foregoing does not sufficiently state a claim or
"case or controversy" warranting a formal hearing. In the absence of the details/specificity necessary to frame a failure
to hire/re-hire case, Complainant's complaint has failed to (1) set forth a prima facie case of proscribed behavior; (2)
particularize the issues; (3) provide a full statement of the acts and omissions, with pertinent dates, which are believed to
constitute the violations, and (4) state in detail the nature of each and every violation as well as the relief
sought. Complainant has not advanced any cogent reason for failing to comply with the necessary requisites in his complaint or
response to the show cause order. Consequently, I find and conclude that Complainant has also failed to comply with the
undersigned's pre-hearing order. See Billings v. Tennessee Valley Authority ,
Case No. 91-ERA-12 (ARB, Final Dec. and Order, June 26, 1996); See generally Laratta v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Company , Case No. 86-ERA-3 (Sec'y, Final Order of Dismissal, Apr. 12, 1986). In view of his failure to comply and utter failure
to allege a viable claim, Respondents' Motion to Dismiss are hereby GRANTED for all of the foregoing reasons.
[Page 7]
B. Complainant's Motion To Amend
As noted above, notwithstanding his failure to allege specific facts supporting any
violation of a failure to rehire or blacklist by Respondents, Complainant failed to present any cogent reasons in his response to
the show cause order why his claim should not be dismissed. He, instead, requested that he be allowed to amend his original
complaint to cover the period from May 18, 1999 to January 19, 2000, the date of the presently scheduled formal hearing. Yet, he
fails once again to allege any specific facts or violations by Respondents which constitute a viable claim. Without specific
events or acts of discrimination alleged, Complainant's motion to amend to add an additional time period after the filing of
his Section 211 complaint on October 6, 1999, is meritless and is hereby DENIED .
C. Continuous Violations
In his response to the show
cause order, Complainant argues that "systematically excluding
[Complainant] from consideration for employment . . . by its very
nature, is a continuing course of conduct and does constitute a
continuing violation." However, his contention is not
supported by any evidence or specificity. Even continuing
violations must be alleged in detail and cannot be based on mere
conjecture or speculation. There is no direct, circumstantial or
inferential evidence to corroborate Complainant's continuing
violation theory or defeat Respondents' motions to dismiss.
Accordingly, Complainant's continuous violations contention is
REJECTED.
D. Motions To Disqualify Counsel/Respondents and Motions for
Default Judgment and Sanctions
Unfortunately, Complainant's motions are replete with unnecessary, baseless,
reckless, irrelevant, abusive, offensive, slanderous and frivolous claims, language and accusations against Counsel and Respondents.
He refers to Counsel as liars, "so-called officers of the court," who have engaged in "gross professional
misconduct" [otherwise not specifically supported]. The only conclusion that can be drawn from such personal attacks is that
Complainant, who is pro se and arguably not subject to Rule 11 sanctions, seeks to malign the character of Counsel for
Respondents in an attempt to persuade the undersigned to discredit anything filed by counsel, without any legal or rational basis
therefor.
Complainant's accusations are directed at Counsel because they have not provided redundant
requests for discovery information arguably received by Complainant in Hasan I.
Complainant has exhibited no grounds for disqualification of Counsel, their respective law
firms or either Respondent. Counsel have sought to respond to Complainant's overly broad and general discovery by asserting
objections and privileges. I find Complainant's contentions to be specious and his motions are hereby DENIED .
E. Discovery
Complainant argues that
because Respondents have not provided information pursuant to his
discovery requests, it would be improper to dismiss his case.
Respondents responded arguing that discovery in the instant case is
irrelevant because Complainant has failed to state a viable claim.
I find, in the absence of complaint specificity, Complainant's
entire case would be based on a "fishing expedition" in
search of specifics through discovery.
[Page 8]
Notwithstanding the overly
broad, misdirected, unbridled and general discovery requests,
Complainant never sought the specific information required to
establish a prima facie case of failure or refusal to
hire/rehire or blacklisting. A perusal of Complainant's discovery
requests discloses that he has not sought any information relating
to the existence of any job openings or new hires after May 17,
1999, nor the skills or qualifications required to fulfill such job
vacancies.
Since Complainant's
complaint pleadings contain no allegations of specific facts that
could establish a prima facie case of discrimination
after May 17, 1999, through October 6, 1999, there is no viable
claim. In the absence of a viable claim, discovery requests are
merely a fishing expedition in a search for information which
should not be available to Complainant. See generally
Naartex Consulting Corporation v. Watt , 722 F.2d 779, 788
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v.
Birenbaum , 527 F.2d 87, 93-95 (2d Cir. 1975)(no abuse of
discretion in the denial of discovery in face of bland assertions
of violations); McLaughlin v. McPhail , 707 F.2d 800, 807 (4th
Cir. 1983)(finding no prima facie showing . . . the
district court properly exercised its discretion in denying
discovery). Accordingly, Complainant's argument that it would be
improper to dismiss his case in the absence of discovery is without
merit under the extant circumstances and is hereby
REJECTED .3
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
In view of the foregoing
rulings, I conclude that Respondents' Motions for Change of Venue
or Hearing Location as well as ComEd's Motion In Limine are moot.
Respondents' Motions to Dismiss are hereby GRANTED for
reasons discussed hereinabove. Complainant's Motions To Disqualify
Counsel/Respondents, and For Default Judgment and Sanctions are
hereby DENIED .
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the formal hearing presently scheduled for January 19, 2000,
be and it is hereby CANCELLED .
ORDERED this 10th day
of January, 2000, at Metairie, Louisiana.
LEE J. ROMERO, JR.
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order will
automatically become the final order of the Secretary unless,
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 24.8, a petition for review is timely
filed with the Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department of
Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20210. Such a petition for review
is timely filed with the Administrative Review Board within ten
(10) business days of the date of this Recommended Decision and/or
Order, and shall be served on all parties and on the Chief
Administrative Law Judge. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.8
and 24.9, as amended by 63 Fed. Reg. 6614 (1998).
[ENDNOTES]
1 Complainant's
April 1999 complaint was the subject of a formal hearing in Case
No. 1999-ERA-17 before Administrative Law Judge Richard Avery on
November 8-10, 1999, wherein evidence was adduced relating to
alleged discriminatory acts through May 17, 1999, including alleged
failures to rehire after Complainant's alleged discriminatory
termination on March 26, 1999. (Hasan I). (See Transcript
of Record, page 25).
2 See
Hasan v. Nuclear Power Services, Inc. , Case No. 36-ERA-24
(Sec'y, Final Dec. and Order, June 26, 1991)(alleging a failure to
hire based on a negative recommendation from a former employer);
Hasan v. System Energy Resources, Inc. , Case No. 89-ERA-36
(Sec'y Final Dec. and Order, Sept. 23, 1992)(alleging
discrimination by his employer because he made safety complaints);
Hasan v. Bechtel Power Corporation , Case No. 93-ERA-22 (ALJ
Decision Recommending Dismissal based on settlement agreement, Dec.
8, 1994); Hasan v. Bechtel Corporation , Case No. 93-ERA-40
(ALJ Decision and Order Approving Settlement, Dec. 9, 1994);
Hasan v. Bechtel Corporation , Case No. 94-ERA-21 (Sec'y
Final Order Approving Settlement, Mar. 16, 1995); Hasan v.
Intergraph Corp. , Case No. 96-ERA-17 (ARB, Final Dec. and
Order, Aug. 6, 1977)(rejecting Complainant's failure to hire
claim); and Hasan v. Sargent & Lundy , Case No. 96-ERA-27
(ALJ Recommended Dec. and Order, Nov. 4, 1996)(alleging
blacklisting within the nuclear power industry.)
3 I am cognizant
that a denial of a Motion for Summary Decision may not be
appropriate whenever a moving party denies access to information by
means of discovery to a party opposing the motion. 29 C.F.R.
§ 18.40(d). However, in the present case, which does not
involve the existence of material issues of fact but rather the
presence of a prima facie case, Complainant's
discovery requests are clearly not germaine to the issues raised by
the general complaint allegations which fail to state a viable
claim. Therefore, I find Section 18.40(d) inapplicable to the
instant case.