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October 3, 2008         DOL Home > OALJ Home > Whistleblower Collection
USDOL/OALJ Reporter
Chase v. Buncombe County, North Carolina, 85-SWD-4 (Sec'y Nov. 3, 1986)


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

SECRETARY OF LABOR
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Case No. 85-SWD-4

In the Matter of

Donald W. Chase

    v.

Buncombe County, N.C.
Department of Community
Improvement

DECISION AND ORDER OF REMAND

   This is a proceeding arising under the employee protection (whistleblower) provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (a) (1982).

   Complainant Chase initially filed a complaint against Buncombe County, N.C., Department of Community Improvement (County), alleging that he was terminated from his employment in violation of the SWDA. Subsequently, on December 20, 1984, the parties executed a settlement agreement, and, on the basis of that agreement, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John C. Bradley dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Order Approving Settlement Agreement, December 28, 1984. Later, when his former position became vacant, Complainant applied for it but was not rehired. As a result, Complainant filed a second complaint in which he alleged that the failure to rehire him was the result of discrimination due to his previous safety complaints and constituted a violation of the settlement agreement.

   Prior to a hearing on the merits of the second complaint, ALJ Bradley issued an order to show cause as to why the complaint should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. After receiving Complainant's response to this order, the ALJ dismissed the second complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Specifically, the ALJ found that: (1) Complainant had conceded a lack of jurisdiction by admitting that he was not an employee at the time he applied for rehire; (2) the


[Page 2]

settlement agreement did not provide for Complainant's reinstatement and, therefore, the failure to rehire was not a violation of that agreement; and; (3) other alleged violations of the settlement agreement could not be addressed since they had not been included in the second complaint. Order of Dismissal, August 30, 1985.

   This matter is now before me for decision. After review of the record, I have concluded that I cannot accept the ALJ's recommendation that the second complaint be dismissed.

   The ALJ erred in ruling that section 6971(a) of the SWDA only protects current employees of a covered employer. I recently held that the term "employee" in a similar whistleblower provision of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1981), includes former employees. Flanagan v. Bechtel Power Corporation, 81-ERA-7, issued June 27, 1986. The SWDA, like the ERA, does not define "employee". I find nothing in the wording of either statute nor in their legislative histories which suggests any basis for interpreting "employee" differently in the SWD than in the ERA.

   The ALJ based his conclusion on a narrow interpretion of the term "employee". As noted in Flanagan, slip op. at 6-7, such a narrow interpretation does not comport with 29 C.F.R. Part 24 (1985), the regulation implementing the SWDA, the ERA and other whistleblower statutes. That regulation, specifically section 24.2(b), identifies "blacklisting' as an activity prohibited under the whistleblower statutes; and "blacklisting" in the labor context is not a term applied to action taken by an employer against his current employees. The inclusion of "blacklisting" in the regulation when originally drafted, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,836 (1980), indicates that the term "employee" has not been read so literally as to be limited to current employees. It has been recognized that regulations promulgated by the Federal agency authorized to enforce the statute are "persuasive authority as to the proper interpretation" of that statute. Butler v. McDonnell - Douglas Saudi Arabia Corp., 93 F.R.D. 384 (S.D. Ohio 1981).

   Applying a broad interpretation of "employee" to include former employees is consistent with the interpretation by the United States Courts of Appeals of this term as used in similar provisions of other statutes. See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Company, 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); N.L.R.B. v. Whitfield Pickle Company, 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir.


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1967) (National Labor Relations Act). These cases hold that a broad interpretation of "employee" is necessary in order to carry out the statutory purpose.

   Here, too, a broad interpretation of "employee" is necessary in order to give full effect to the purpose of section 6791(a), which is to encourage the reporting of violations of solid waste disposal requirements by prohibiting discrimination arising out of the employment relationship. Protecting the reporting employee against retaliation only while that employee is in the employ of the violator has a "chilling effect" and discourages, rather than encourages, the reporting of safety violations. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that section 6971(a) of the SWDA may apply to former employees as well as to current employees of covered employers. I find that section 6971(a) applies to the facts alleged in complaint in this case.

   Since jurisdiction under the SWDA exists, I remand this case to the ALJ for the purpose of holding a hearing and permitting Complainant the opportunity to prove that the County's refusal to rehire him was violative of section 6971(a) of the Act.

   I am well aware that Complainant adopted the position that he was alleging only a violation of the terms of the settlement agreement and was not filing a new complaint of discrimination in violation of section 6971(a).1 However, once a complaint of discrimination is filed, I am not bound by the legal theories of any party in determining whether a violation of the SWDA has occurred. Moreover, where as here, a complainant appears pro se, the power to dismiss is limited. It is well settled that a pro se complaint should not be held to the strict standards of pleadings that otherwise apply to formal pleadings drafted by attorneys and that it cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is "beyond doubt that the [complainant] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951 (4th Cir. 1979); Waller v. Butkovich, 605 F. Supp 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1985). On the basis of the information in the record before me, I am unable to find "beyond doubt" that Complainant will be unable to prove that the County's failure to rehire him was violative of the SWDA.

   Regarding Complainant's contention that the County violated the settlement agreement by refusing to rehire him, I find, as


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did the ALJ, that the settlement agreement does not require the County to reinstate or rehire Complainant. This finding, however, does not dispose of Complainant's contention. Complainant's position is that the County violated paragraph 2 of the settlement agreement, which requires that Complainant's personnel file be purged of all "mention of the alleged cause of his termination and the events leading up to said termination ..." and also requires that the County give, if requested, a "neutral reference as to [Complainant's] performance as a County employee." Complainant argues that this paragraph must have been violated because he was not rehired although he was the best qualified applicant for the position and because the decision not to rehire him was made by the County's Director of Community Improvement, who originally fired him and who allegedly stated in front of witnesses that Complainant would never be rehired by the County.

   The purpose of requirements for the purging of records and the providing of "neutral" references is to ensure that information in the hands of the employer does not adversely affect the employee in seeking future employment. Thus, where such information is the basis for the refusal to hire the employee, it cannot be said that the employer has purged its records and has given a "neutral" reference. The fact that the information is used to reject the employee in seeking re-employment by his former employer, rather than in applying for a position with a different employer, does not alter this conclusion. Unless the settlement agreement bars the former employee from seeking re-employment with his former employer, the requirement to purge the record and give a "neutral" reference applies equally when the employee is seeking re-employment with the same employer or with a different employer.

   The settlement agreement in this case did not prohibit Complainant from seeking re-employment with the County. Moreover, Complainant states that both the County's attorney and his attorney assured him that he "would have a 'clean slate'" and "could apply for County employment in the future." Complainant's pleading of August 14, 1985. If this occurred, then clearly the intent of the parties was that the information relating to Complainant's termination was not to be considered in determining whether Complainant would be rehired; and, if such information were the basis for the failure to rehire Complainant, the settlement agreement was violated. Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ is to take evidence to determine whether paragraph 2 of the settlement agreement was violated.


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   Complainant alleges that the County also violated paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement. This paragraph requires that the County conduct and report on certain investigations relating to the handling of asbestos and the collection of fees at the County landfill. Complainant requests that I enforce this requirement.2 As I indicated in Orr v. Brown & Root, Case No. 85-ERA-6, issued October 2, 1985, I have the authority to enforce agreements entered into in settlement of litigation pending before me. The parameter of this authority, however, is defined by the scope of the authority granted by the applicable statute. My jurisdiction under the SWDA reaches only to discrimination arising out of employment relationships, and my authority to grant relief is limited to such relief as is designed to abate the discrimination and to make the employee whole. It follows that my power to enforce provisions of settlement agreements must similarly be limited. Paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement entered into between Complainant and the County concerns matters which do not arise from any alleged violation of section 6971(a) of the SWDA and imposes requirements which are outside the scope of the authority granted me under the SWD. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to enforce paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement.

   Therefore, this case is REMANDED to the ALJ for the purposes of holding a hearing and making, a recommended decision in accordance with the rulings above.

   SO ORDERED.

       WILLIAM E. BROCK
       Secretary of Labor

Dated: NOV 3 1986
Washington, D.C.

[ENDNOTES]

1 Complainant obviously believed that he did not have a valid claim of discrimination under the statute because he was no longer an employee of the County. After conceding that he was no longer an employee of the County, Complainant states that, "I never intended that my request for relief be treated as a fresh discrimination complaint, because I don't believe that even my most creative and wishful reading of SWDA would give me a case." Complainant's pleading of August 14, 1985, at 1.

2 The ALJ's entire discussion of this issue is as follows: "Complainant's response also refers to other alleged violations of the settlement agreement by Respondent unrelated to the violation were not a part of his second complaint, and, therefore, cannot be addressed in this Order." Order of Dismissal, August 30, 1985, at 2. I do not adopt this finding.



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