duplication, as there were times when two or three attorneys billed time for tasks that could have been accomplished by one attorney. Respondent first objects to more than one attorney billing time for various depositions taken in this matter.

   On September 13, 1996, attorneys Renner and Muchnicki each billed 9.7 hours for attendance at the depositions of Michael Thomas, David Thomas, James Tekely, and Dr. Lavapies. Respondent objects that Muchnicki's time is duplicative as Renner questioned three out of the four witnesses. More than one attorney attending a deposition is excessive. As Renner questioned three out of the four witnesses, his time shall be reduced by one-fourth to 7.3 hours and Muchnicki's time shall be reduced to 2.4 hours.

   On January 7, 1997, Renner billed 6.2 hours for attendance at the depositions of Paul Pollock and James Tekely. Muchnicki billed 7.1 hours for attendance at the deposition of Paul Pollock and 1.1 hours for attendance at the deposition of James Tekely. Respondent objects as Muchnicki questioned Pollock and Renner questioned Tekely. Respondent also objects to the two hour discrepancy between the number of hours each attorney billed for the depositions. Muchnicki responded that he stayed an additional two hours to complete the deposition of Pollock. Therefore, 1.1 hours of Muchnicki's time is stricken for attending Tekely's deposition and 5.1 hours of Renner's time is stricken for attending the deposition of Pollock.

   On July 2, 1997, Renner and Muchnicki each billed time for attendance at the depositions of two witnesses, Tom and Rebecca Morgan. Respondent objects as only Muchnicki questioned both witnesses. As Renner was merely an observer, the 6.6 hours he billed for attending the depositions and the 2.8 hours he billed in travel time is stricken.

   On June 23, 1997, Respondent objects because Kohn billed .7 hours for attendance by telephone at a deposition. As Kohn stated in his affidavit that he did not charge for telephone attendance at depositions to avoid the appearance of duplication, Respondent's objection is well taken. On June 24, 1997, Renner billed 1.6 hours for the deposition of Mike Burns and 2.6 hours for the deposition of Chuck Probst. Muchnicki billed a total of 4.2 hours for attendance at the depositions of Mike Burns and Chuck Probst. Muchnicki questioned Burns and Renner questioned Probst. Thus, Renner's time will be reduced by 1.6 hours for attending the deposition of Mike Burns and Muchnicki's time will be reduced 2.6 hours for attending the deposition of Chuck Probst.

   Respondent next cites several instances where each attorney billed time for attending the hearing but was not examining witnesses. I am reluctant to disallow these charges as the attorneys performed as a team at the hearing, frequently consulting with one another over the examination of witnesses and the introduction of evidence.

Unreasonable Hours

   Respondent argues that the number of hours Complainant's attorneys spent on this case is unreasonable and should be reduced by at least fifty percent as they did not succeed on all of the issues, in particular the amount of various damage awards that were sought. However, counsel did succeed on the merits and thus an overall reduction is not justified.

   Respondent objects that the time Complainant's attorneys spent on particular tasks was unreasonable. Respondent first objects to the amount of time billed in preparing Complainant for his testimony. Between August 16-21, 1997, Kohn billed a total of 50.4 hours in preparing Complainant for his direct testimony. Renner billed a total of 6.1 hours between August 19-22, 1997. Muchnicki billed a total of 4.5 hours between August 21-22, 1997. Complainant's direct testimony took place August 21-22, 1997 and lasted 11 hours. Kohn billed 19 hours between September 6-8, 1997 in preparing Complainant for cross-examination. Muchnicki billed a total of 10.3 hours between September 6-7, 1997. Renner billed a total of 7.7 hours between September 6-8, 1997. Complainant's cross-examination and re-direct took place on September 8, 1997 and lasted 6.9 hours. Complainant's attorneys billed 98 hours in preparing him for 17.9 hours of testimony. Although Kohn conducted the questioning of Complainant, his time in particular appears excessive, particularly of an attorney of his level of expertise in whistleblower litigation, and his time shall be reduced by half.

   Respondent objects to the amount of time it took for Complainant's counsel to prepare the brief as excessive. Kohn billed a total of 36.5 hours between December 17, 1997 and March 17, 1998 for preparing the brief; Muchnicki billed a total of 43.2 hours between December 17, 1997 and March 17, 1998; and Renner billed a total of 52.3 hours between December 17, 1997 and March 17, 1998 plus an additional 7 hours of paralegal time. Complainant's attorneys billed for a total of 132 hours of time in preparing a 45 page brief. This amount of time is excessive given the number of years each attorney has been practicing, their levels of expertise, and their familiarity with the case. Each attorney's time shall be reduced by a third.

   Respondent objects to the amount of time it took for Complainant's counsel to prepare the reply brief as excessive. Kohn billed a total of 14.7 hours between March 20 and April 21, 1998 for preparing the reply brief; Muchnicki billed a total of 10.6 hours between March 18 and April 20, 1998; and Renner billed a total of 29.6 hours between March 18 and April 21, 1998. Complainant's attorneys billed a total of 54.9 hours for preparing a 25 page reply brief. Again, this amount of time is excessive based on their years of practice, the level of their expertise and their familiarity with this case. Each attorney's time shall be reduced by a third.

   Respondent objects to time billed in preparing the fee petition, stating that it is not compensable. However, counsel is entitled to compensation for time reasonably spent in preparing a fee petition. See Larry v. The Detroit Edison Co., 86-ERA-32 (Sec'y May 19, 1992). Respondent also objects that the amount of time Complainant's counsel spent in

preparing the fee petition is excessive. Kohn billed a total of 44.65 hours for preparing the fee petition between July 30 and August 31, 1998; Muchnicki billed a total of 42.25 hours between July 27 and August 31, 1998; and Renner billed a total of 30.6 hours between June 19 and August 30, 1998. Renner also billed an additional 93.85 hours for work his office manager performed on the fee petition. Complainant's attorneys billed a total of 119.5 hours for preparing the fee petition and an additional 93.85 hours for work performed by an office manager in compiling the fee petition. This amount of time is excessive if the attorneys were keeping contemporaneous time records and contemporaneous records of their costs. Each attorney's time shall be reduced by half. The office manager's time shall be addressed in the costs section.

   Respondent asserts that time Complainant's counsel spent preparing a cross-appeal to the Administrative Review Board is not compensable at this level as Complainant has not yet succeeded at that level. If counsel is successful at the Administrative Review Board, they can submit a petition to the Board for all of their time spent performing work before the Board, thus the hours spent on Complainant's cross-appeal are stricken. Kohn billed 3.6 hours for preparing and filing Complainant's cross-appeal, Muchnicki billed 5.15 hours and Renner billed 13.95 hours.

Lack of Specificity in Entries

   Respondent maintains that several of Complainant's attorneys' entries in their fee petition lack sufficient information to determine what work was performed and whether that work was necessary to the litigation. Specifically, each of complainant's attorneys has several entries for telephone calls to and from Complainant, one another, and others that contain no description of what the telephone call was about or how it pertained to this case; several entries for reviewing, analyzing, reading and writing faxes, letters, memos, and e-mails from Complainant, one another and others that contain no description of how the communication pertained to this case; several entries for legal research that does not state what the research was or how it pertained to this case; and document review that does not state what the documents were or how they pertained to this case.

   Complainant's counsel argues that the entries are sufficient and that it would violate attorney-client privilege to provide more information. However, the Administrative Review Board has stated that it requires an itemized list that includes the date on which an attorney's time was expended, the amount of time expended, and a specific description of the tasks undertaken by the attorney at that time. Pillow v. Bechtel Construction, Inc. 87-ERA-35 (ARB Sept. 11, 1997) (Emphasis added) The Secretary has disallowed time where the hours expended where reasonably documented but a number of descriptions were unduly abbreviated which precluded a determination of whether or not they were justified. See Jenkins v. Environmental Protection Agency, 92-CAA-6 (Sec'y Dec. 7, 1994).

   Review of the attorneys' entries is further complicated because they have represented Complainant in actions before other tribunals arising out of his termination and Complainant's trio of attorneys are representing two of Complainant's co-workers against Respondent in actions pending before this agency. The Administrative Review Board has stated that in addition to attorney time records that indicate the date, time and duration of a specific activity, each activity must be identifiable as pertaining to the case. Van Der Meer, supra (slip. op. at pg. 9).

   Complainant's argument is undermined by the fact that several entries did contain enough of a description to determine whether the work performed was connected to and necessary to this action without violating attorney-client privilege. It is noted that there appears to be no rhyme or reason for what received a specific description and what did not. Therefore, I am disallowing 73.25 hours billed by Kohn, 57.9 hours billed by Muchnicki, and 217.7 hours billed by Renner for various telephone calls, tele-conferences, faxes, letters, e-mails, memos, legal research, and document review entries that did not contain a description specific enough to determine whether the work was justified or connected with this action.

Time Spent on Other Matters

   Respondent objects that attorneys Muchnicki and Renner have included time in their fee petitions that was spent representing Complainant in actions before other tribunals that were not necessary to further his claim before this agency. The Administrative Review Board held, in a case where complainant's attorneys represented complainant in several causes of action, that attorney's fees are to be awarded for expenses reasonably incurred 'for or in connection with the bringing of the complaint on which the order was issued'. McCafferty v. Centerior Energy 96-ERA-6 (ARB Sept. 24, 1997). Therefore, 32 hours Muchnicki billed for time spent on other matters shall be disallowed and 13.15 hours Renner included in his fee petition for time spent on other matters shall be disallowed.

   Respondent also objects to time billed by Renner before Complainant was terminated. In Renner's affidavit it stated that he was not retained to represent Complainant in challenging his termination until September 26, 1995. As it is Complainant's termination that gave rise to his cause of action, 4.1 hours that Renner charged before September 26, 1995 are disallowed.

Clerical Services

   Respondent objects to 42.9 hours of time Renner billed performing clerical services. Complainant concedes that Renner should not be compensated at his full hourly rate for performing these services and suggests Renner be compensated at half of his hourly rate. The Supreme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) stated:

"Of course, purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them. What the court in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir 1974), said in regard to the work of attorneys is applicable by analogy to paralegals: 'It is appropriate to distinguish between legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics and other work which can often be accomplished by non-lawyers but which a lawyer may do because he has no other help available. Such non-legal work may command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it.'"

However, there is no evidence that Renner did not have other help available to perform these tasks. As matter of fact, there is evidence to the contrary as he has submitted time for three paralegals and an office manger to be compensated for work they performed in connection with this case. There was no need for Renner to perform these tasks as they could have been performed by a member of his staff. Accordingly, the 42.9 hours Renner billed for performing clerical work is disallowed. See also Doyle v. Hydro Nuclear Services, 89-ERA-22 (ALJ July 16, 1996) (clerical work performed by an attorney is not recoverable).

Lodestar

   As stated above, the lodestar is a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by a number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation. For Kohn, 554.65 hours at $250 an hour equals $138,662.50, which is a reasonable fee and shall be awarded. For Muchnicki, 723.35 hours at $200 an hour equals $144,670.00, which is a reasonable fee and shall be awarded. For Renner, 839.8 hours at $150 an hour equals $125,970.00, which is a reasonable fee and shall be awarded.

REASONABLE COSTS

   Complainant is seeking reimbursement for a total of $111,608.90 in costs arising out of this litigation. Specifically, Complainant is seeking $70,252.45 in related costs; Kohn is seeking $20,036.42 in related costs; Muchnicki is seeking $3,621.90 in related costs; and Renner is seeking $17,671.29 in related costs. Respondent has several objections. Complainant has withdrawn his requests for reimbursement of computer equipment, tape recorder and a legal handbook, as well as $118.00 requested in connection with documents sought after the Recommended Decision and Order was issued in this case. This equals $2,984.41 worth of costs withdrawn by Complainant and leaves $67,268.04 in contention.

   The Administrative Review Board has stated that all claimed costs must be specifically identifiable as pertaining to the litigation. See Van Der Meer, supra. The Secretary of Labor has disallowed costs for which an estimation has been given. Johnson v. Bechtel Construction, 95-ERA-11 (Sec'y February 26, 1996.)

Costs of Complainant

   Respondent objects to $9,032.10 Complainant is seeking for the services of the law firm of Bricker & Eckler. Complainant retained this firm before he was terminated and his cause of action arose. Bricker & Eckler never performed work before this agency. Further, Complainant pursued several causes of action in different jurisdictions arising out of his employment with Respondent. Therefore, $9,032.10 for payment to Bricker & Eckler is disallowed.

duration necessary to accomplish the specific task, and a description sufficient to identify the task as pertaining to the case. As it is unclear what task was performed and whether or not it was in connection with this case, the $50 fee shall be eliminated.

   Respondent objects to $3,197.18 of costs for office supplies. Complainant states that these items were necessary to assemble exhibits and organize case files. However, Complainant had three attorneys from three different firms representing him in this case. These costs are part of an attorney's overhead and there is no reason that these costs should have been assumed by Complainant. If Complainant were pro se, these costs might be compensable. Therefore, $3,197.18 for office supplies is stricken.

   Respondent objects to $2,570.61 of costs for photocopying. Complaint responds that these items were necessary to assemble exhibits and organize case files. Again, this should have been a cost assumed by one of Complainant's attorneys as part of overheard. Also, some of the descriptions indicate that some of these photocopying expenses may have been incurred in one of the other litigations arising out of Complainant's employment with Respondent and not pertaining to the case before this agency. Therefore, the $2,570.61 worth of photocopying charges is eliminated.

   Respondent objects that the $3,585.40 for travel expenses by Complainant is inflated. Complainant seeks compensation for travel to various locations at $.325 dollars a mile. Complainant included 216 miles for $70.20 for travel to and from OBES hearings. These hearings were unrelated to the case and these costs are not compensable. Complainant included 3,192 miles for 12 meetings with Muchnicki which amounts to ,037.40 and 2,660 miles for 19 meetings with Renner which amounts to $864.50. Both Renner and Muchnicki represented Complainant in other matters not pertaining to this case. Therefore, I am reducing these amount by half. I am giving Complainant the benefit of the doubt and allowing him to be compensated for the four trips he made to Washington, D.C. to meet with Kohn. Complainant is requesting compensation for 12 trips to Bellaire for a total of 432 miles for a total of $140.40 to do document searches or go to BOT meetings. From the description, it is impossible to ascertain whether these trips were for this case or another one of Complainant's cases. Additionally, with three attorneys from three different firms representing him, it is unclear why Complainant had to conduct document searches. This mileage is eliminated from Complainant's costs. Complainant seeks compensation for 192 miles for 12 trips to St. Clairsville for 18 depositions, and document searches at county court and Duff's office. Without a more specific description, it is impossible to ascertain which of these trips is related to this litigation. Therefore, the 192 miles is eliminated. Complainant requests reimbursement for 750 miles for 3 trips to the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency for document searches. Complainant had a separate state whistleblower case with OEPA and it is impossible to ascertain from his description whether those trips were related to this litigation. The 750 miles which amounts to $243.75 for those trips are not compensable. I find that Complainant's compensable travel charges equal $2,117.95.

   Complainant requests reimbursement for $2,666.18 worth of telephone calls, teleconferences and faxes to his attorneys. Even for the extended duration of this case, there appears to have been an incredible amount of communication between Complainant and his attorneys. Since there are no details provided about these various telephone calls and faxes, it is impossible to decide what was reasonable and what was not. Even more troublesome is that Complainant had Renner and Muchnicki represent him in several cases in other courts against Respondent and there is no way to discern what costs were accrued in other matters and what costs were accrued in this matter. Therefore, I am cutting this cost in half. Given the length of this litigation, I find that ,333.09 is a reasonable reimbursement for telephone calls and faxes to his attorneys.

   Complainant shall be reimbursed for $49,323.91 of costs reasonably incurred in this litigation.

Costs of Michael Kohn

   Respondent objects to the ,707 Kohn is requesting for sending faxes and $80.80 he is requesting for photocopies. In particular, Respondent objects to the lack of documentation for the fax and copy charges. Complainant responds that these fees are in line with what is charged for these services at Washington, D.C. law firms. Again, absent further detail, it is impossible to determine what was reasonable for this litigation and whether or not these fees should have been considered part of counsel's overheard. Hence, ,787.80 is stricken from Complainant's requested costs. Respondent objects to an entry for $115 for "Misc. Taxis, porters, tips and cash payments (no receipts available)". As there are no more details about these various charges, this appears to be an estimate. It is also impossible to determine if they are reasonable. Therefore, $115 is eliminated from Complainant's costs.

   Respondent objects to a $10.00 estimate for postage from 1996 to 1998. This is an estimated cost and it is disallowed. Respondent objects to $29.32 Kohn is requesting for black binders as it should be part of counsel's overhead. As the binders are office supplies, this cost is stricken.

   Respondent objects to $8,190 for 126 hours of work at $65 an hour for the paralegal services of Mary Russell. Respondent avers that Mary Russell is not a paralegal, she is the wife of Paul Russell, a witness in this case, and she did not provide a description of the services she performed. Complainant responds by agreeing to reduce Mrs. Russell's rate to $40 an hour. However, there is no evidence Mary Russell was trained as a paralegal or is a certified paralegal. Her time records include the date she performed work and the number of hours she worked, but do not include a description of the services she performed. This makes it impossible to determine if these services were reasonable, pertaining to this case as this trio of lawyers is also representing Paul Russell against Respondent in a matter pending before this agency, or clerical in nature, which is not compensable as it is a part of counsel's overhead. Therefore, the $8,190 request is eliminated from Complainant's costs.

   Kohn requests $515.85 for telephone costs. However, as the majority of hours he billed for telephone calls were stricken because they lacked a description specific enough to ascertain whether the phone calls were reasonable to this litigation or pertained to this case, and there is no further description provided in his costs, I am reducing this amount by half. I find a cost of $257.93 reasonable for telephone calls.

   Kohn shall be reimbursed for $9,673.33 of costs he reasonably incurred for this litigation.

Costs of Richard Renner

   Respondent has several objections to paralegal time billed by Renner as the work was either clerical in nature, or the description of the work performed was too vague to make a determination as to whether the work was reasonable, not duplicative or pertaining to this case. Sally Bernhart billed 6.8 hours at $20 an hour for transcribing Complainant's unemployment hearing tapes. This service was clerical and related to another matter, therefore, $136 is disallowed. Further, 22.15 hours billed at an hourly rate of $45 is eliminated for copying transcripts, exhibits, and traveling to Staples to purchase binders. These services were clerical in nature and are a part of counsel's overhead.

   Renner requests reimbursement for his office manager for 93.85 hours of work at $45 an hour in preparing the fee petition. Although Complainant's fee petition is voluminous, billing for an two and a half weeks' worth of work in addition to the attorney time billed for compiling the fee petition is excessive. This time shall be cut in half and I find that 46.93 hours is reasonable for compiling the fee petition.

   Respondent objects to 14.45 hours of paralegal time for Chad Ascar. He billed 5.7 hours for attending the deposition of Sharon Arakawa and 8.75 hours for analyzing depositions and drafting a memorandum. There is no description of the work performed by Ascar at the deposition, therefore it cannot be determined whether it was necessary for a paralegal to attend this deposition and the 5.7 hours is disallowed. Additionally, as there is no further description of what depositions were reviewed or what issues the memorandum was concerning, 8.75 hours is also stricken.

   Renner requests 2.20 hours of paralegal time for Amanda Rasbach for interrogatories and requests for Production of Documents and law library research. These charges were incurred well after the Recommended Decision and Order had been issued and they lack a sufficient description to determine whether or not they were reasonable or pertained to this case.

   An additional ,441.27 is being eliminated from Renner's expenses as these charges were for copying, parking, office supplies, payment to other courts, tele-

conferences, and a fax fee as well as $400 for an independent paralegal. Based upon their description, it is not possible to determine whether these charges were reasonable or connected to this case. There were no dates, length of time worked, or description of the activity for the paralegal charges. The office supplies are part of counsel's overhead.

   Renner requests reimbursement for $487.35 in fax charges and $707.43 for telephone charges. As several of the hours Renner billed for telephone calls and faxes were stricken because the entries lacked a description sufficient to make a determination whether those calls or faxes were reasonable or pertained to this case, both of these requests shall be reduced by half.

   Renner shall be reimbursed for $10,698.27 of costs he reasonably incurred in this litigation.

Conclusion

   I find that $250 an hour for 554.65 hours plus $9,673.22 in related expenses equals a total fee of $148,335.72 for Michael D. Kohn; $200 an hour for 723.35 hours plus $3,621.90 in related expenses equals a total fee of $148,291.20 for E. Dennis Muchnicki; and $150 an hour for 839.8 hours plus $10,698.27 in related expenses for a total fee of $136,668.27 for Richard R. Renner. Complainant, David Charvat, shall also be paid $49,323.91 for expenses he incurred in this case.

   IT IS ORDERED THAT the Eastern Ohio Regional Wastewater Authority:

   (1) pay the sum of $148,335.72 to Michael D. Kohn for services rendered to Complainant in this matter;

   (2) pay the sum of $148,291.20 to E. Dennis Muchnicki for services rendered to Complainant in this matter;

   (3) pay the sum of $136,668.27 to Richard R. Renner for services rendered to Complainant in this matter; and

   (4) pay the sum of $49,323.91 to David Charvat for expenses he reasonably incurred in this case.

       DANIEL L. LELAND
       Administrative Law Judge

DLL/lab

NOTICE: This Recommended Decision and Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees will automatically become the final order of the Secretary unless, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 24.8, a petition for review is timely filed with the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, Room S-4309, Frances Perkins Building, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20210. Such a petition for review must be reviewed by the Administrative Review Board within ten business days of the date of this Recommended Decision and Order, and shall be served on all parties and on the Chief Administrative Law Judge. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.8 and 24.9, as amended, by 63 Fed. Reg. 6614 (1998).