U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Room 507
(617) 223-9355
(617) 223-4254 (FAX)
Date: AUG 19 1997
Case No. 96-ERA-34
RONALD THOMPSON,
Complainant
v.
HOUSTON LIGHT & POWER
COMPANY,
Respondent
Case No. 96-ERA-38
RONALD THOMPSON,
Complainant
v.
HOUSTON LIGHT & POWER
COMPANY and
HOUSTON INDUSTRIES, INC.
Respondents
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY DECISION
This Judge again revisits the effect of a Settlement Agreement and Full and
Final Release, executed by the parties on October 25, 1995, on the present claim. In this Settlement
Agreement, which was approved by the Secretary by Final Order issued December 4, 1995, the
Respondents agreed to "warrant that Complainant's access to the South Texas Project has not
been suspended, revoked or denied." Settlement Agreement, Part II, pare. 5(b). Subsequent
[Page 2]
to execution of the Agreement, Complainant raised concerns, which he also brought to the attention
of the NRC, about whether Respondents would be able to comply with the language of paragraph
5(b).
By document filed April 22, 1997, Respondents have submitted a Motion
for Partial Summary Decision. In support thereof, Respondents argue Complainant's complaint
should be partially dismissed as a matter of law because a claim for anticipatory breach of a
Settlement Agreement is not a cognizable claim under the ERA. Respondents characterize
Complainant's claim as a contingent hypothetical claim which presents an essentially '`if and
when" situation and reason that Complainant cannot possibly establish a claim for violation
of the ERA based on breach of the Settlement Agreement due to the absence of discrimination.
Complainant's opposition, filed July 16, 1997, argues that Respondents have
already breached the warranty provision on at least two occasions or, in the alternative, that there
is a violation of the ERA even if this complaint is interpreted as an anticipatory breach issue.
Complainant proceeds to explain how his complaint establishes the elements of a prima facie
claim under the ERA. See Complainant's Opposition, pp. 5-6. In conclusion,
Complainant argues that Respondents' present Motion must be denied based on outstanding
discovery requests which would, Complainant anticipates, provide further information relevant to
the issue of Respondents' violation of the ERA rooted in breach of the Settlement Agreement.1
1This argument is
unpersuasive because my decision is premised upon the determination that Complainant's theory
of liability fails to state a valid cause of action under the ERA.
2Indeed, there has
been authority issued since my November 27, 1996 Order on Various Motions for Summary
Decision which implicitly supports my ruling that an Administrative Law Judge has no authority
to re-visit a settlement agreement approved by the Secretary. In this regard, see Smith v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 97-ERA-25 (ALJ 3/12/97), dismissed without
comment, (Sec'y 4/23/97).
3It is Complainant's
theory that the provision at issue is unenforceable based on concerns raised by Complainant and
brought to the attention of the NRC, which authority then interposed its own concerns on the
provision. Again, this Judge notes that Complainant would have been within the time frame
established for filing a Petition for Review, see 29 C.F.R. Part 24.7(a), had he acted
upon the NRC's written notification expressing what Complainant describes as its opinion that
paragraph 5(b) is void on the grounds of public policy and federal law. See Order on
Various Motions for Summary Decision, (ALJ 11127196), at p. 5 and nn. 5 & 6.
4The October 13,
1993 decision in Macktal is procedurally distinguishable because the efficacy of
approving that settlement was still under consideration and the questionable provision was
specifically challenged on the grounds that it ran contrary to public policy. In this case, the
Settlement Agreement has been approved by the Secretary's Final Order as a fair, adequate and
reasonable settlement of Complainant Thompson's ERA claims.
5For the record, this
Judge is not prepared to hold that an anticipatory repudiation of a Settlement Agreement can
never be actionable under the ERA because I can clearly envision circumstances where it might
be. I therefore assume that such a claim is actionable and nevertheless find Respondents' Motion
for Partial Summary Decision to be properly allowed.
6For this reason,
Respondents alleged failure to respond in any way to the inquiries made by the NRC is of little to
no value in assessing whether Respondents have anticipatorily breached the Settlement
Agreement.