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September 25, 2008         DOL Home > OALJ Home > Whistleblower Collection
USDOL/OALJ Reporter
Kahn v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 92-ERA-58 (Sec'y Oct. 3, 1994)


DATE:  October 3, 1994
CASE NO. 92-ERA-58


IN THE MATTER OF

JOHN KAHN,

          COMPLAINANT,

     v.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.,

          RESPONDENT.


BEFORE:   THE SECRETARY OF LABOR


                            DECISION AND ORDER    

     The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissal of
this complaint arising under the employee protection provision of
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), 42 U.S.C. §
5851 (1988).  This case is now before me on review of the ALJ's
Recommended Decision and Order (R.D. and O.).   Although I find
that the complainant established a prima facie case of a
violation of the ERA, I agree with the ALJ that the complaint
should be dismissed because Complainant has not sustained the
ultimate burden of persuasion.
     I. Facts
     Starting in July 1991, Complainant John Kahn worked as a
quality control auditor at Respondent Commonwealth Edison's
(Edison's) Zion nuclear station.  T. 21-22.  On Kahn's first day,
he was so sarcastic, argumentative and condescending to
Industrial Relations employee Susan White that White complained
to her boss about it.  T. 163-164.  On two other occasions that
month when Kahn inquired about a delay in receiving his initial
paycheck, his demeanor was loud and abusive and consequently
Cheryl Orsini complained to her department's assistant manager. 
T. 155-158.  Kahn's supervisor, David Bump, counseled him about 

[PAGE 2] the inappropriateness of his conduct toward Orsini and White. T. 196-197; RX 1. Kahn blamed Orsini for any problem and complained that he did not appreciate the "kangaroo court" that faulted him for his behavior. T. 196-97; RX 1. Shortly thereafter, clerical worker Kathy Wagner complained about Kahn's use of suggestive language and inappropriate touching. T. 172- 174. Kahn admitted touching Wager. T. 38, 204. Human Resources supervisor Norman Breseman warned Kahn that his behavior violated the company's policy against sexual harassment and that further incidents could lead to his discharge. T. 424-425; RX 14. Bump received complaints that Kahn was not getting prior approval for working overtime and that Kahn was abrasive with workers in organizations that he audited. T. 211-214; RX 7. Kahn blamed the "undue resistance" of the audited organizations for the complaints about his attitude. T. 215; RX 4. During the course of his employment, Kahn complained to his managers about several safety issues. T. 53-56, 59-60, 67-70, 72. In April 1992, team leader Robert Whittier spoke with Kahn about certain audit work that had not been completed as required. T. 336-337; RX 9. Kahn got loud, verbally abusive, and twice poked Whittier in the chest. T. 339-340; RX 9. In turn, Whittier also used loud, offensive language. T. 340-341. Other workers attempted to intervene and calm Kahn and Whittier. T. 285, 341; RX 5, 8. A short time after the Kahn-Whittier confrontation, supervisors met with Kahn to get his version of the incident. T. 232-234. Kahn blamed Whittier for the shouting match. T. 234. After speaking with Kahn, the supervisors decided to discharge Kahn because of the number of incidents of his arrogant, unacceptable behavior during ten months of employment. T. 405-406; RX 12. Edison offered Kahn the choice of resigning or being fired, and Kahn chose to resign. T. 235. After Kahn's termination, he reported safety concerns to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). T. 118. He filed this complaint alleging that Edison forced him to resign because he had made safety complaints. II. Analysis Under the ERA's employee protection provision, an employer may not discharge or discriminate against an employee because the employee: (1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence a proceeding under [the ERA] or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . . . or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement
[PAGE 3] imposed under [the ERA] or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . . .; (2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or; (3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of [the ERA] or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1988). [1] There is no dispute that Kahn is an employee and Edison is an employer subject to the ERA. To make a prima facie case, the complainant in a whistleblower case must show that he engaged in protected activity, that the respondent subjected him to adverse action, and that respondent was aware of the protected activity when it took the adverse action. Complainant must also raise the inference that the protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action. Dartey v. Zack Co. of Chicago, Case No. 82-ERA-2, Sec. Ord., Apr. 25, 1983, slip op. at 8. As the ALJ found, R.D. and O. at 6, Kahn's internal safety complaints to managers constituted protected activities under the ERA. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1513 (10th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1011 (1986); Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.) But see, Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984) (ERA protects only complaints to governmental bodies). [2] Edison took adverse action against Kahn when it gave him the option of resigning or being fired, which constituted a constructive discharge. See Earwood v. D.T.X. Corp., Case No. 88-STA-21, Dec. and Ord. of Remand, Mar. 8, 1991, slip op. at 6 (constructive discharge is when employee involuntarily quit or was coerced into quitting). In addition, Edison was aware of Kahn's protected activities when it constructively discharged him, since his safety complaints were made to his Edison supervisors. The final element of a prima facie case is raising the inference that the complainant's engaging in protected activities motivated the adverse action against him. Temporal proximity between the protected activities and the adverse action may be sufficient to establish the inference. Couty, 886 F.2d at 148 (temporal proximity sufficient as a matter of law to establish final element in a prima facie case). Kahn complained to his managers about safety issues during the ten months of his employment with Edison. R.D. and O. at 5. In view of the brief time that elapsed between the safety
[PAGE 4] complaints and the constructive discharge, I find that Kahn introduced evidence sufficient to raise an inference that his protected activities likely motivated the discharge. See Thomas v. Arizona Public Service Co., Final Dec. and Order, Sept. 17, 1993, slip op. at 19 (one year constituted sufficient temporal proximity to raise inference of causation); Goldstein v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., Case No. 86-ERA-36, Case No. 86-ERA-36, Sec. Dec., Apr. 7, 1992, slip op. at 11-12, reversed on other grounds sub nom. Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Martin, No. 92-4567 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 1993) (passage of seven or eight months sufficient). I therefore find that Kahn established a prima facie case of a violation of the ERA. Once Kahn established a prima facie case, Edison had the burden of coming forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. See Dartey, slip op. at 8. It did so by outlining Kahn's abusive and inappropriate behavior toward White, Orsini, Wagner, and Whittier. Once Edison articulated a legitimate reason for taking the adverse action, Kahn had the burden of persuading that the legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination. Dartey, slip op. at 8. At all times, Kahn had the burden of showing that the real reason for the adverse action was discriminatory. Thomas v. Arizona Public Service Co., Case No. 89-ERA-19, Final Dec. and Order, Sept. 17, 1993, slip op. at 20; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed. 2d 407 (1993). The evidence of record overwhelmingly supports the reason Edison gave for discharging Kahn, his inappropriate behavior and language toward co-workers, which culminated in the shouting and poking incident with his team leader, Whittier. I adopt the ALJ's discussion of the voluminous evidence indicating that Edison constructively discharged Kahn because of his behavior and not for reasons proscribed by the ERA. R.D. and O. 8-12. [3] I find that Kahn has not sustained his burden of persuading that the reason Edison articulated for his discharge was not credible or that Edison discharged him for an unlawful reason under the ERA. Accordingly, the complaint is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. ROBERT B. REICH Secretary of Labor Washington, D.C. [ENDNOTES] [1] Section 2902(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Sat. 2776, amended the employee protection provision for claims filed on or after the date of its enactment, October 24, 1992. See Section 2902(i) of Pub. L. 102-486. This complaint was filed in May 1992, so the 1992 amendment does not apply. [2] Since Kahn's complaint to the NRC occurred after he was asked to resign, it does not constitute a protected activity in this case. [3] As the ALJ found, there was an "abundance and unanimity of negative feelings toward" Kahn. R.D. and O. at 9. Workers in departments that Kahn audited complained that they did not like how Kahn treated them. T. 456. Kahn's witness, Darlene Murphy, believed that Kahn could have done his work "without upsetting everybody." T. 456. Another witness called by Kahn, Syed Jaffery, mentioned that Kahn's "very short temper" was a hindrance to his job. T. 464, 467.



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