Section
24.3(b) provides that "[a]ny complaint shall be filed within
30 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation."
It is undisputed that the Respondent issued a
letter on November 6, 1991 notifying the Complainant, Simkeon
Kang, M.D., that he would be terminated from his position as a
Physician with the Department of Veterans Affairs Medicial
Center, Albany, New York, effective November 29, 1991. It is also
undisputed that the Complainant filed his complaint of
discrimination under the Act, through his attorney, on December
23, 1991.
[Page 2]
The Respondent contends that the alleged
violation occurred on November 6, 1991, the date on which the
Complainant received notice of termination, and, since there is
no question that. that date was more than thirty days before the
date of filing, summary decision should be granted as a matter of
course. However, the Complainant argues that the violation
occurred on November 29, 1991, the date of termination, and,
thus, the complaint was timely filed, and summary decision should
be denied.
Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations
§18.40(d) provides that summary decision may be entered for
a party "if the pleadings, affidavits, material obtained by
discovery or otherwise...show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that a party is entitled to summary
decision."
Once a motion for summary decision is properly
made, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must
set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). "[T]he judge's function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there does indeed exist a genuine
issue for trial." Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, under whose Jurisdiction this case
arises, has found that "[s]ummary jugdment is appropriate if
after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
against whom summary Judgement is sought, no reasonable trier of
fact could find in favor of the non-moving party.'"
United States v, All Right, 901 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir.
1990) (quoting Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844
F.2d 988, 992 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 955, 109
S.Ct. 391 (1988).
Generally, in matters involving discrimination
under federal statutes, the Supreme Court has held that the date
of the alleged violation is the time of the discriminatory act,
not the time at which the consequences of the act become painful.
see Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28 (1982);
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct.
498 (1980). While the cited opinions concern claims brought under
42 U.S.C. §1983 and Title VII, respectively, the Ricks-Chardon rule has been extended to cover claims of
discrimination raised under §5851 of the Act. English v.
Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988).
In English, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the filing period for a complaint under
the Act begins, to run on the date the employee was given Final
and unequivocal notice of an employment decision."
Id. at 961. The court explained, "[o]nly upon receipt
of such notice does the filing period begin to run. Until that
time, there is the possibility that the discriminatory decision
[Page 3]
itself will be revoked, and the contemplated action not taken,
thereby preserving the predecision status quo." Id.
The "final and unequivocal" nature of
the notice of termination is what is at issue in this case.
Although the November 6th letter clearly states that "after
a review of the needs of [the] medical center" the
Respondent decided to discontinue the services of the Complainant
as of November 29th, the Complainant alleges, in his verified
Response In Opposition to Motion for Summary Decision, paragraph
2(i), that s "Dr. Kang had many discussions with Mr.
Malphurs, Medical Center Director,...from November 6, 1991
through November 26, 1991, with regard to his possible
termination"; "[o]n November 6, 1991, when Mr. Malphurs
gave Dr. Kang the notice of termination, he stated to him that
his door was always open"; "[Mr. Malphurs] informed
[Dr. Kang] that alternatives to termination were
possible...includ[ing] Dr. Kang resigning at some future date,
not on November 29, 1991."
These statements and actions raise a question
concerning the "final and unequivocal" nature of the
notice of termination, and set forth a genuine issue of material
fact for trial.
Accordingly, entry of summary decision, at this
point, is deemed inappropriate, and the motion is DENIED.
AARON SILVERMAN
Administrative Law Judge
Washington, DC
AS/ls
[ENDNOTES]
1Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233.
229 CFR Part
24, et seq; Procedures for handling discrimination
complaints under Federal Employee Protection Statutes.