



**In the Matter of:**

**ANTHONY NORMAN,**

**ARB CASE NO. 05-124**

**COMPLAINANT,**

**ALJ CASE NO. 2005-STA-18**

**v.**

**DATE: March 29, 2006**

**WILEY SANDERS TRUCK LINES, INC.,**

**RESPONDENT.**

**BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD**

**FINAL DECISION AND ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT  
AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE**

This case arises under the employee protection provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982, as amended.<sup>1</sup> On June 17, 2005, the Complainant, Anthony Norman, submitted a Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement to a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Under the regulations implementing the STAA, the parties may settle a case at any time after the filing of objections to the Assistant Secretary's preliminary findings "if the participating parties agree to a settlement and such settlement is approved by the Administrative Review Board . . . or the ALJ."<sup>2</sup> The regulations direct the parties to file a copy of the settlement "with the ALJ or the Administrative Review Board, United States Department of Labor, as the case may be."<sup>3</sup>

When the parties reached a settlement the case was pending before the ALJ. Therefore, the ALJ appropriately reviewed the settlement agreement. On June 29, 2005, the ALJ issued a Recommended Order Approving Settlement. According to the STAA's

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<sup>1</sup> 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West 1997).

<sup>2</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1978.111(d)(2) (2005).

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

implementing regulations, the Administrative Review Board issues the final decision and order in this case.<sup>4</sup>

The Board issued a Notice of Review and Briefing Schedule apprising the parties of their right to submit briefs supporting or opposing the ALJ's recommended order.<sup>5</sup> Neither party responded to the Board's notice.

The parties certified that the agreement constitutes the entire settlement with respect to the Complainant's claims.<sup>6</sup> Review of the agreement reveals that it may encompass the settlement of matters under laws other than the STAA.<sup>7</sup> The Board's authority over settlement agreements is limited to the statutes that are within the Board's jurisdiction as defined by the applicable statute. Therefore, we approve only the terms of the agreement pertaining to the Complainant's STAA claim.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, while paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement identifies the laws of the State of Tennessee as controlling, we construe this paragraph as not limiting the authority of the Secretary of Labor and any Federal court, which shall be governed in all respects by the laws and regulations of the United States.<sup>9</sup>

As so construed, we **APPROVE** the terms of the agreement pertaining to Norman's STAA claim and **DISMISS** the complaint with prejudice.

**SO ORDERED.**

**M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS**  
**Chief Administrative Appeals Judge**

**WAYNE C. BEYER**  
**Administrative Appeals Judge**

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<sup>4</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(2); *Monroe v. Cumberland Transp. Corp.*, ARB No. 01-101, ALJ No. 00-STA-50 (ARB Sept. 26, 2001); *Cook v. Shaffer Trucking Inc.*, ARB No. 01-051, ALJ No. 00-STA-17 (ARB May 30, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(2).

<sup>6</sup> Settlement Agreement and Release (Settlement Agreement) ¶ 9.

<sup>7</sup> Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 3, 4, 6(a).

<sup>8</sup> *Fish v. H & R Transfer*, ARB No. 01-071, ALJ No. 00-STA-56, slip op. at 2 (ARB Apr. 30, 2003).

<sup>9</sup> *See Phillips v. Citizens' Ass'n for Sound Energy*, 1991-ERA-25, slip op. at 2 (Sec'y Nov. 4, 1991).