MR. PRESIDENT, I rise to introduce "The Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2006," with Senator Lautenberg which would reaffirm the Comptroller General of the United States and head of the Government Accountability Office (GAO)'s authority to audit the financial transactions and evaluate the programs and activities of the intelligence community (IC). Representative Bennie Thompson, ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee, is introducing similar legislation.
The bill Senator Lautenberg and I offer today is in keeping with legislation introduced in 1987 by Senator John Glenn, the former chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, to ensure more effective oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal.
The need for greater oversight and availability of information to appropriate congressional committees is not new. What is new is that Congress does not have the luxury of failure in this era of terrorism. Failure brings terrible consequence.
Since 9-11, effective oversight is needed now more than ever for two very basic reasons: First, intelligence reforms have spawned new agencies with new intelligence functions demanding even more inter-agency cooperation. The Congress needs to ensure that these agencies have the assets, resources, and capability to do their job in protecting our national security. However, now the Congress cannot do its job properly, in part, because its key investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, is not given adequate access to the intelligence community, led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
Moreover, intelligence oversight is no longer the sole purview of the Senate and House intelligence committees. Other committees have jurisdiction over such departments as Homeland Security, State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and even Treasury and Commerce, which, in this war on terrorism, have intelligence collection and sharing responsibilities. Nor is the information necessary for these committees to exercise their oversight responsibilities restricted to the two intelligence committees as their organizing resolutions make clear. Unfortunately, the intelligence community stonewalls the GAO when committees of jurisdiction request that GAO investigate problems despite the clear responsibility of Congress to ensure that these agencies are operating effectively to protect America.
This is not always the case. Some agencies recognize the valuable contribution that GAO makes in improving the quality of our intelligence. As Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., then Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), observed in testimony before the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, on October 29, 1975: "Another feature of congressional review is that since 1955 resident auditors of the General Accounting Office have been assigned at the Agency to perform on-site audits. Additional GAO auditors were cleared for access in 1973, and GAO, in addition to this audit, is initiating a classified review of our automatic data processing functions." Not surprisingly, this outpost of the GAO still exists at the NSA.
Second, and equally important, is the inability of Congress to ensure that unfettered intelligence collection does not trample civil liberties. New technologies and new personal information data bases threaten our individual right to a secure private life, free from unlawful government invasion. The Congress must ensure that private information being collected by the intelligence community is not misused and is secure.
Over 30 years ago, Senator Charles Percy urged Congress to "act now to gain control over the Government's dangerously proliferating police, investigative, and intelligence activities. " He noted that "we find ourselves threatened by the specter of a ‘watchdog' Government, breeding a nation of snoopers."
The privacy concerns expressed by our former colleague have become vastly more complicated. As I have noted, the institutional landscape has become littered with new intelligence agencies with ever increasing demands and responsibilities on law enforcement at every level of government since the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. They have the legitimate mission to protect the country against potential threats. Congress' role is to ensure that their mission remains legitimate.
The intelligence community today consists of 19 different agencies or components: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Defense; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Departments of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; Department of State; Department of Treasury; Department of Energy; Department of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; National Reconnaissance Office; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Coast Guard; Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at this point a memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service, entitled "Congressional Intelligence Oversight," be included in the Record.
As both House Rule 48 and Senate Resolution 400 establishing the intelligence oversight committees state, "Nothing in this [charter] shall be construed as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of any standing committee of the [House/Senate] to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee."
Despite this clear and unambiguous statement, the ability of non-intelligence committees to obtain information, no matter how vital to improving the security of our nation, has been restricted by the various elements of the intelligence community.
Two recent incidents have made this situation disturbingly clear. At a hearing entitled "Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process, Part II," before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia on which I serve as Ranking Member, on November 9, 2005, GAO was asked about steps it would take to ensure that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Office of Management and Budget, and the intelligence community met the goals and objectives outlined in the OPM security clearance strategic plan. Fixing the security clearance process, which is on GAO's high-risk list, is essential to our national security. But as GAO observed in a written response to a question raised by Senator Voinovich, "while we have the authority to do such work, we lack the cooperation we need to get our job done in that area." The intelligence community is blocking GAO's work in this essential area.
A similar case arose in response to a GAO investigation for the Senate Homeland Security Committee and the House Government Reform Committee on how agencies are sharing terrorism-related and sensitive but unclassified information. The report, entitled "Information Sharing, the Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information" (GAO-06-385), was released in March 2006.
At a time when Congress is criticized by members of the 9-11 Commission for failing to implement its recommendations, we should remember that improving terrorism information sharing among agencies was one of the critical recommendations of the 9-11 Commission. Moreover, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated the sharing of terrorism information through the creation of an Information Sharing Environment. Yet, when asked by GAO for comments on the GAO report, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence refused stating that "the review of intelligence activities is beyond GAO's purview."
However, as a Congressional Research Service memorandum entitled "Overview of ‘Classified' and ‘Sensitive but Unclassified' Information," concludes, "it appears that pseudo-classification markings have, in some instances, had the effect of deterring information sharing for homeland security." I ask unanimous consent that the memo be included following my remarks.
Mr. President, unfortunately I have more examples, that predate the post 9-11 reforms. Indeed, in July 2001, in testimony, entitled "Central Intelligence Agency, Observations on GAO Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities" (GAO-01-975T) before the House Committee on Government Reform, the GAO noted, as a practical manner, "our access is generally limited to obtaining information on threat assessments when the CIA does not perceives [sic] our audits as oversight of its activities." I ask consent that this testimony also be printed following my remarks.
It is inconceivable that the GAO - the audit arm of the U.S. Congress - has been unable to conduct evaluations of the CIA for over 40 years.
If the GAO had been able to conduct basic auditing functions of the CIA, perhaps some of the problems that were so clearly exposed following the terrorist attacks in September 2001 would have been resolved. And yet, it is extraordinary that five years after 9-11 the same problems persist. Once more I refer to Senator Glenn's bill S. 1458, the "General Accounting Office-Central Intelligence Agency Audit Act of 1987." On its introduction he said, "in the long run, I believe carefully controlled GAO audits of CIA will lower the probability of future abuses of power, boost the credibility of CIA management, increase the essential public support the Agency's mission deserves, assist the Congress in conducting meaningful oversight, and in no way compromise the CIA mission." Unfortunately, S.1458 did not become law, and nearly 20 years later, the CIA's apparent management challenges led to the creation of the Director of National Intelligence with the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. If Senator Glenn's proposal made in 1987 had been accepted, perhaps, again, some of the problems that became apparent with our intelligence agencies following 9-11 might never have occurred.
I want to be clear that my legislation does not detract from the authority of the intelligence committees. In fact, the language makes explicit that the Comptroller General may conduct an audit or evaluation of intelligence sources and methods or covert actions only upon the request of the intelligence committees or at the request of the congressional majority or minority leaders. The measure also prescribes for the security of the information collected by the Comptroller General.
However, my bill reaffirms the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct audits and evaluations -- other than those relating to sources and methods, or covert actions - relating to the management and administration of elements of the intelligence community in areas such as strategic planning, financial management, information technology, human capital, knowledge management, information sharing, and change management for other relevant committees of the Congress.
Mr. President, attached is a detailed description of the legislation that I ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record following my statement. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the legislation I am introducing be printed in the Record.
