Conclusion
Barry bore the burden of proving intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. We find that he has failed to do so. We therefore DENY his complaint.
SO ORDERED.
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
DAVID G. DYE
Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2001).
2 29 C.F.R. Part 24 (2006). The Department of Labor has amended these regulations since Barry filed his complaint. 72 Fed. Reg. 44,956 (Aug. 10, 2007). We have applied the regulations in effect when Barry filed his complaint, and in any event, as explained more fully at note 20, infra, even if the amended regulations were applied to this case, they would not change the outcome.
3 Transcript (Tr.) 25-26, 84.
4 SMI started as a company called AVCO, which was purchased by Textron. Textron went through several structural changes before selling off a division, which became Specialty Materials, Inc. in 2001. Tr. 82-84.
5 Tr. 18.
6 Id. at 89-93.
7 Complainant's Exhibit (CX) 1; Complainant's Brief at 4.
8 Tr. 30, 46.
9 Complainant's Brief at 4.
10 CX 2; Tr. 32-35.
11 CX 2.
12 Id.
13 Tr. 103-104.
14 Respondent's Exhibit (RX) 3; Tr. 91-94, 96.
15 Tr. 108.
16 Id. at 109.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 47.
19 Id. at 118.
20 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b).
21 29 C.F.R. § 24.8. See also Secretary's Order No. 1-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002) (delegating to the ARB the Secretary's authority to review cases arising under, inter alia, the statutes listed at 29 C.F.R. § 24.1(a)).
22 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(b) (West 2000); 29 C.F.R. § 24.8; Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1571- 1572 (11th Cir. 1997); Masek v. The Cadle Co., ARB No. 97-069, ALJ No. 1995-WPC-001, slip op. at 9 (ARB Apr. 28, 2000). The WPCA's amended regulations provide for substantial evidence review of the ALJ's factual findings. 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(b) (2007). Substantial evidence is that which is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). As indicated above, even if the Board applied a substantial evidence review to the ALJ's findings in this case, such review would not change the outcome of our decision, because applying the less restrictive de novo review standard, we agree with the ALJ's ultimate recommendation that Addis's complaint be denied.
23 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a).
24 McKoy v. North Fork Servs. Joint Venture, ARB No. 04-176, ALJ No. 2004-CAA-002, slip op. at 5 (ARB Apr. 30, 2007).
25 Barry may have engaged in protected activity if he stated on his license application that SMI's system was not rated, but there is no evidence that SMI had knowledge of such a statement.
26 Treasure testified that Pilioglos spoke with a representative of the city of Lowell and that the city was behind schedule on rating systems. He also testified that it was his understanding that a licensed operator could work on an unrated system. Tr. 104-06.
27 See Simon v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 49 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d at 148 ("[p]roximity in time is sufficient to raise an inference of causation")).
28 See Jenkins v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-002, slip op. at 18 (ARB Feb. 28, 2003).
29 See, e.g., RX 4.
30 Tr. 108-11.
31 Id. at 118.
32 We note that the ALJ focused her analysis on whether Barry made out the elements of a prima facie case. R. D. & O. at 7-11. But once a case has been tried on the merits, the question whether the complainant has established a prima facie case is irrelevant. Instead, the question is simply whether the complainant has proven that the respondent intentionally discriminated against the complainant because he engaged in protected activity. See Seetharaman v. Stone & Webster, Inc., ARB No. 06-024, ALJ No. 2003-CAA-004, slip op. at 4 (ARB Aug. 31, 2007).