UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at KNOXVILLE
[Filed December 6, 1999]
No. 3:98-CV-613
Judge Curtis L. Collier
LOCKHEED MARTIN ENERGY
SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDWARD A. SLAVIN, JR.,
Defendant.
O R D E R
The Court finds Defendant Edward A. Slavin, Jr. has violated the provisions of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum and the Court's previous
oral order of October 25, 1999, the Court hereby ORDERS the following:
(1) Defendant Slavin is ORDERED to make a written apology to Mr. G. Wilson Horde and Plaintiff
Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. In his apology, Mr. Slavin shall acknowledge the inappropriateness
of his personal attacks and express remorse for interjecting such attacks in this case. The apologies must be
sent to Mr. Horde and Plaintiff on or before Monday, December 20, 1999.
(2) The Court ORDERS Mr. SLAVIN to pay the reasonable attorney fees and expenses
incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the Rule 11 violations minus any monies Mr. SLAVIN has
already been ordered to pay. Plaintiff shall submit a bill of costs to the Clerk of Court setting out
the fees and other expenses allegedly incurred.
(3) Mr. Slavin is ORDERED to pay $10,000.00 to the Clerk of this Court. The Court
suspends imposition of this sanction for one year from entry of this order conditioned upon Mr.
Slavin's compliance with all past and present orders from this Court and upon Mr. Slavin not
engaging in any further conduct violative of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
before any court or administrative body. If Mr. Slavin complies with all stated
[Slip op. Page 2]
conditions, the penalty will not be imposed.
(4) Mr. Slavin is ORDERED to provide the Court a list of all bars, whether state,
federal, or local, of which he is a member, and a list of all pending cases in which Mr. Slavin
either represents a party or is a party. These lists shall be submitted to the Court on or
before Monday, December 20, 1999. Mr. Slavin is further
ORDERED to provide an updated list of all pending cases in which he represents
a party or is a party on or before Thursday, May 4, 2000.
(5) Upon receipt of the listing of all bars of which Mr. Slavin is a Member, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to every bar of which Defendant
Edward A. Slavin, Jr. is a member.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at KNOXVILLE
[Filed December 6, 1999]
No. 3:98-CV-613
Judge Curtis L. Collier
LOCKHEED MARTIN ENERGY
SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDWARD A. SLAVIN, JR.,
Defendant.
M E M O R A N D U M
On October 25, 1999, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff Lockheed Martin Energy Systems,
Inc.'s ("Lockheed") Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Court File No. 14). After
hearing arguments of counsel, considering the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the motion, and the
applicable law, the Court orally granted Plaintiffs Motion and summarized its reasons for so doing from the bench.
At that time the Court stated it would issue an expanded written explanation of its decision later. This memorandum
opinion is that fuller decision.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Unfortunately, this litigation has a long history, and an extensive summary of that history is
necessary to explain what lead to the Rule 11 motion and the Court's decision. This case was brought by Plaintiff
Lockheed against Defendant Edward A. Slavin, Jr. to compel Mr. Slavin to
[Slip op. Page 2]
comply with a September 6, 1996 order from the United States Department of Labor ("DOL"). Mr. Slavin
is an attorney licensed to practice law in Tennessee. The DOL order required Mr. Slavin to repay Lockheed over
$27,000 in attorney fees.
The initial DOL litigation involved a charge of discrimination and retaliation filed by Mr. Slavin
and other attorneys on behalf of C.D. Varnadore against Mr. Varnadore's employer,
Lockheed. This charge was filed with the DOL on November 20, 1991. According to the charge, Lockheed
subjected Mr. Varnadore to a hostile work environment as a result of Mr. Varnadore
engaging in federal statutorily protected activity. This litigation became known as Varnadore I.See
Varnadore v. Secretary of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 628 (6th Cir. 1998).
In June 1993, after holding a hearing on the matter, the DOL Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") issued a decision in Mr. Varnadore's favor. Lockheed exercised its right to appeal the decision to
the Secretary of Labor. Two days after the first decision was rendered, on June 9, 1993, Mr. Slavin filed a second
charge of discrimination against Lockheed on behalf of Mr. Varnadore. This second charge, Varnadore II as
it came to be known, was filed pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 ("ERA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851. This second charge prompted the DOL order that Lockheed sought to enforce in this lawsuit in this Court.
A third charge of retaliation, Varnadore III, was filed on August 2, 1994.
The ALJ held a hearing, on the Varnadore II claims in May 1994. Mr. Slavin represented
Mr. Varnadore at the hearing. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a recommended decision and order which found
in favor of Lockheed on all but one of Mr. Varnadore's claims. After receiving a favorable ruling on behalf of Mr.
Varnadore, Mr. Slavin filed a petition for attorney fees, The ALJ granted Mr. Slavin's request in a June 23, 1995
recommended order. Mr. Slavin then moved the
[Slip op. Page 3]
Secretary to issue a "Preliminary Order" requiring Lockheed to pay him the attorney fees and expenses
recommended by the ALJ. Lockheed objected to the payment of attorney fees, however the Secretary ordered
Lockheed to pay Mr. Slavin $27,174.83 in attorney fees and expenses. Lockheed complied with the order and paid
Mr. Slavin the ordered amount.
On January 26, 1996, the Secretary of Labor issued a Decision and Order reversing the ALJ's
decision in Varnadore I, but deferred full consideration of two issues in the case pending the ALJ's ruling in
Varnadore II and Varnadore III. In April 1996, the Secretary established the Administrative Review Board
("ARB") which was responsible for "issuing final agency decisions on question of law and fact arising
in review or on appeal" under a number of laws, including the whistleblower statutes at issue in this lawsuit.
Two months later, on June 14, 1996, the ARB issued a final decision in all three Varnadore
cases. Ultimately, the ARB ruled in favor of Lockheed in all three cases. Subsequent to this ruling, on June 21, 1996,
Lockheed filed a motion with the ARB to order Mr. Slavin to repay the $27,174.83 in attorney fees and expenses
previously paid to him. Lockheed's motion was granted on September 6, 1996. The ARB rescinded the ALJ's
September 11, 1995 preliminary order granting Mr. Slavin $27,174.83 in attorney fees and expenses and ordered Mr.
Slavin to repay that amount to Lockheed.
With a final decision in the Varnadore cases in June 1996 Mr. Slavin petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to review the ARB's June 14, 1996 decision in favor of Lockheed on the
merits. In December 1996, Mr. Slavin petitioned the Sixth Circuit to review the ARB's September 6, 1996 order
rescinding the award of attorney fees and ordering Mr. Slavin to repay the attorney fees and expenses paid to him by
Lockheed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated both petitions for review. Following oral argument the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the ARB's ruling in a
[Slip op. Page 4]
published decision. Varnadore v. Secretary of Labor, 141 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit further held
the Secretary of Labor lawfully created and delegated authority to the ARB to issue final agency decisions. In June
1998, the Sixth Circuit denied Mr. Slavin's request for a rehearing en banc. Mr. Slavin did not file a petition for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
On October 5, 1998, Lockheed initiated this action in this Court seeking an order requiring Mr.
Slavin to comply with the September 6, 1996 order of DOL ordering him to repay the attorney fees and expenses he
had received. In the complaint Lockheed states "[b]y letters dated June 23, 1998 and August 3, 1998, [it]
requested [Mr. Slavin] repay the sum of $27,174.83." The complaint alleges Mr. Slavin failed to respond to the
letters. Four days later, Mr. Slavin filed a motion with a DOL ALJ to reopen the Varnadore cases. This motion
was denied on December 28, 1998.
B. Factual Background for Rule 11 Motion
Based upon the history of the case and the facts, the Court was faced with a relatively straight-
forward, routine collection issue. The factual issues relating to the repayment of the attorney fees and expenses were
uncomplicated and in large measure had been resolved by the ARB. The Sixth Circuit had determined many of the
underlying legal issues and those remaining did not appear to be particularly complex.
In light of the relatively uncomplicated nature of the case, on June 18, 1999, the Court entered
a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering Mr. Slavin to comply with
the DOL order. In addition, the Court ordered Mr. Slavin to pay all costs associated with this action and all prejudgment
interest accruing from the date of the DOL order. Mr. Slavin filed a Motion to Reconsider which the Court denied on
August 17, 1999 (Court File No.
A party shall state in short and plain terms the party's defenses to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If a party is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, the party shall so state and this has the
effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends
in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, the pleader shall specify so much of it as
is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert
all the averments of the preceding pleading, the pleader may make denials as specific denials of designated
averments or paragraphs or may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as the pleader expressly admits; but, when the pleader does so intend to controvert all its
averments, including averments of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, the pleader may
do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
2By serving the sanctions motion on Mr.
Slavin in November and then waiting until February to file the motion with the court, Lockheed fully complied with
Rule 11's "safe harbor" procedural prerequisite. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A); Ridder v.
Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294-95 (6th Cir. 1997).
3Sadly, these excerpts are merely
illustrative and do not fully depict the extent of these improper allegations. Mr. Slavin's response is replete with
additional improper and irrelevant accusations and allegations that have no bearing whatsoever on this collection
case.
4The Court sympathizes with Mr. Stuart
entering the case at the eleventh hour and facing such an unpleasant matter. It is regrettable Mr. Slavin did not
retain Mr. Stuart earlier in the case or at a minimum, consult Mr. Stuart before he took the position he did in this
case. At the hearing on October 25, 1999, the Court expressed its appreciation to Mr. Stuart for his representation
of Mr. Slavin and his service to the Court and commended Mr. Stuart for his efforts on Mr. Slavin's behalf. The Court
takes this opportunity to again thank and credit Mr. Stuart for taking on such a distasteful task.
5When Mr. Stuart made his appearance
in the case an September 28, 1999, he expressed concern regarding conducting discovery and presenting
witnesses on the issue of the time opposing counsel spent in the case and their standards fees, issues possibly
relevant if a monetary sanction in the form of attorney fees and costs was awarded Plaintiff. The Court explained if
that became a relevant issue the Court would likely follow the standard practice in such matters and have the
attorneys submit their costs to the court by way of a motion and affidavit. If there were objections to what had been
submitted, the Court would refer it to the Magistrate Judge for determination. The Court also suggested Mr. Slavin
should be prepared to submit sworn financial statements or other information regarding his financial condition at
the next hearing, The Court offered this suggestion so that if monetary sanctions were determined to be
appropriate, Mr. Slavin would be prepared to present evidence on his ability to comply with a monetary sanction.