DATE: December 2, 1992
CASE NO. 92-CAA-8


THE MATTER OF
JIMMY PACE,
          COMPLAINANT,

     v.

KIRSHENBAUM INVESTMENTS,
          RESPONDENTS.

BEFORE:  THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

           FINAL ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
                       AND DISMISSING CASE

    The captioned case, which is before me for review, arises
under the employee protection provision of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7622 (1988) (CAA).  Following a partial hearing,
the parties executed a Settlement Agreement and submitted it to the
Administrative Law Judge who issued a recommended Order of
Dismissal in which he approved the settlement.
    The terms of the parties' agreement have been reviewed.  I
note that the agreement encompasses the settlement of matters
arising under various laws, only one of which is the CAA. 
See, e.g., Settlement Agreement ¶ 2.2.  For the reasons
set forth in Poulos v. Ambassador Fuel Oil Co., Inc., Case No.
86-CAA-l, Sec. Order, Nov. 2, 1987, slip op. at 2, I have limited my review of
the agreement to determining whether its terms are a

fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement of Complainant's
allegations that Respondent violated the CAA.
    I also note that certain language in the agreement could be
construed as a waiver by Complainant of causes of action he may
have which arise in the future.  See, e.g.,
Settlement Agreement ¶ 2.2.  Because a waiver of Complainant's
rights based on future employer actions would be contrary to public
policy, I interpret these provisions as limited to a waiver of the right to
seek damages in the future based on claims or causes of action arising
out of facts or any set of facts occurring before the date of the
agreement.  See Polizzi v. Gibbs and Hill, Case No.
87-ERA-38, Sec. Order Rejecting in Part and Approving in Part Settlement
Submitted by the Parties and Dismissing Case, July 18, 1989 slip
op. at 9, and cases cited therein.
    Additionally, the agreement states that it "is being made

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and entered into in the State of Texas, and the parties agree and
stipulate that Texas law, and applicable federal law, shall
govern its enforceability and construction."  Settlement
Agreement ¶ 3.3.  I interpret this statement as not limiting
the authority of the Secretary or the United States district court
under the statute and the regulations.  42 U.S.C. § 7622(d)
(1988); see also 29 C.F.R. § 24.8(a) (1991);
Phillips v. Citizens Assoc. for Sound Energy, Case No. 91-ERA-25,
Sec. Final Order of Dismissal, Nov. 4, 1991, slip op. at 2.

         As so construed, I find the terms of the agreement to be
fair, adequate, and reasonable, and therefore approve the
Settlement Agreement.  Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.  See, Settlement Agreement ¶ 2.3.

     SO ORDERED.


                                   LYNN MARTIN
                                   Secretary of Labor

Washington, D. C.