DATE: February 13, 1989
CASE NO. 86-CAA-007

IN THE MATTER OF

FRANK K. HASSEL,
    COMPLAINANT,

    v.

INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTORS, INC.,
    RESPONDENT.

BEFORE: THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

    I have before me for review a Recommended Decision and order Denying the Complaint (R.D. and O.) issued by Administrative Law judge (ALJ) Ronald T. Osborn. This proceeding was instituted by Frank K. Hassel (Complainant); pursuant to the whistleblower provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982). and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982). complainant charged that he was discriminatorily discharged for having attended a safety meeting at which he raised questions

regarding safety measures at a General Electric plant at which he was working for Industrial Contractors, Inc. (Respondent), a General Electric contractor.

    The ALJ concluded that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment in violation of either the Clean Air Act or the Toxic Substances Control Act. I agree with the ALJ that Respondent failed to establish a prima facie case because there is no tie-in established by the record that Complainant's supervisors knew of his conduct at the meeting or that such questions in any way influenced Respondent's subsequent actions toward him.¹ The record fully supports the ALJ's finding that Complainant had quit his job with Respondent and that there was no evidence, other than Complainant's subjective statements, that conditions were so unpleasant that Complainant was constructively discharged or coerced into quitting. I also agree with the ALJ's finding that the refusal to rehire Complainant after he voluntarily left Respondent's employment did not violate either the Clean Air Act or the Toxic substances Control Act, R.D. and O. 10.

    The record in this case has been thoroughly reviewed and it fully supports the ALJ's recommended decision and order.

    Accordingly, the compliant is DENIED.

    SO ORDERED.

       ELIZABETH DOLE
       Secretary of Labor

Washington, D.C.

¹ The ALJ correctly recognized that the internal nature of complainant's questions did not remove them from the statutory protections. R.D. and O. at 8. I need not consider the ALJ's view that the substance of the questions was too attenuated to the Acts' purposes to be afforded protection. See R.D. and O. at 9.