U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Administrative Law Judges
50 Fremont Street, Suite 2100
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone (415) 744-6577
Fax (415) 744-6569
Date: MARCH 10, 1999
Case No. 1999-CAA-0004
In the Matter of:
TOD ROCKEFELLER,
Complainant
v.
CARLSBAD AREA OFFICE (CAO),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY,
A DIVISION OF CBS, INC., AND
WESTINGHOUSE ISOLATION DIVISION (WID),
Respondents.
Before: Edward C. Burch
Administrative Law Judge
RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
Complainant, through counsel, Edward A. Slavin, Jr., has filed four
complaints alleging acts of discrimination against the Department of Energy and Westinghouse
Electric Company, under the employee protection provisions of the Surface Transportation
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Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. §31101 et seq. and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§7622. The actions filed by Complainant were: (1) 98-CAA-10 and 11; (2) 99-CAA-1; (3)
99-CAA-4; and (4) 99-CAA-6. At issue in the instant Recommended Decision and Order is
Complainant's third complaint, 99-CAA-4.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
On May 9, 1998, Complainant, through counsel, filed his first complaint,
98-CAA-10 and 11, with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) alleging
retaliation under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) and the Clean Air Act
(CAA). Both Respondents, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Westinghouse Electric
Company (WEC), filed Motions to Dismiss and To Stay All Discovery pending the resolution of
their Motions to Dismiss. On August 18, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Henry Lasky issued
multiple orders including Orders to Show Cause to Complainant as to why the Motions to
Dismiss filed by each of the Respondents should not be granted. On September 10, 1998,
Complainant filed his response to the Orders to Show Cause.
On September 28, 1998, Judge Lasky issued a Recommended Decision
and Order in 98-CAA-10 and 11 dismissing all claims against Respondents. That Decision and
Order has been appealed by Complainant to the Administrative Appeals Board. On September
28, 1998, Judge Lasky also issued an order barring Complainant's counsel from appearing before
him in this or any other matter. Consequently, the following three complaints were assigned to
the undersigned.
On August 4, 1998, Complainant's counsel, on behalf of Complainant,
filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the DOE Albuquerque Operations
Office (AL) requesting copies of certain records. Specifically, counsel requested copies of: (1)
the telephone records of several AL employees; (2) any DOE legal bills for Whistleblower
issues; (3) legal audits of AL and DOE's Carlsbad Area Office; (4) a government ethics file for a
former Carlsbad Area Office manager; and (5) any and all documents regarding Complainant that
exist in AL, the Carlsbad Area Office, the Office of Hearings and Appeals, DOE Headquarters,
or WEC. (Decision and Order of DOE, Attachment to Complainant's third complaint). In the
request, Complainant's counsel stated that a full fee waiver was appropriate because the FOIA
request was in the public interest of preventing, detecting, and exposing government fraud.
(Decision and Order of DOE, Attachment to Complainant's third complaint). DOE AL denied
Complainant's request for a fee waiver because it determined that Complainant's action was
personal in nature, that Complainant's counsel made the request in his own commercial interest,
and that Complainant's request was not likely to contribute significantly to public understanding
of the operation and activities of the government. (Decision and Order of DOE, Attachment to
Complainant's third complaint).
On October 2, 1998, Complainant, through counsel, filed a second
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complaint, 99-CAA-1, with OSHA. In the second complaint, Complainant's counsel stated that
the "facts in Mr. Rockefeller's first complaint, dated May 9, 1998, are incorporated by
reference." (Complainant's second complaint). Complainant's counsel also alleged that
Respondents DOE and WEC wrongfully induced Judge Lasky to recommend dismissal of the
first complaint and that the Recommended Decision and Order was contaminated by ex
parte contacts between Respondents, OSHA, and Judge Lasky. The second complaint
further alleged that a DOE lawyer had an improper motive and gave improper legal advice to the
AL personnel about Complainant's FOIA request which allegedly resulted in DOE denying
Complainant's fee waiver request and attempting to charge him $28,000 for 1200 hours of search
time under FOIA. (Complainant's second complaint). Complainant alleged that the $28,000
charge was an act of discrimination, to impede and delay Complainant's ability to obtain
evidence of environmental violations, and in retaliation for engaging in "environmental
protected activity." Complainant alleged that Respondents' actions were an obstruction of
his Whistleblower rights and a continuing violation under the STAA and CAA. (Complainant's
second complaint).
The undersigned issued an Order to Show Cause on November 6, 1998,
which ordered Complainant to show cause, by November 20, 1998, why the second complaint
should not be dismissed. The parties were given the opportunity to present briefs. Both
Respondents submitted Motions to Dismiss arguing that the issues raised by Complainant under
the STAA and CAA in the second complaint were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel
and that the Department of Labor lacked jurisdiction over the FOIA allegation.
On December 4, 1998, the undersigned issued a Recommended Decision
and Order in 99-CAA-1 dismissing Complainant's claims, with prejudice. Although I granted
Respondents' Motions to Dismiss in the decision, my decision was based solely upon the failure
of Complainant to meet the requirements of the Order to Show Cause. Complainant's Order to
Show Cause contained no facts to support his allegations of improper ex parte contacts
and undue influence. Further, I found that the allegations of the first complaint, which were
incorporated into the second complaint, were subject to collateral estoppel and Complainant's
remedy was that of appeal. With respect to the new allegations, I found that they were not
supported by the evidence. The allegations of improper conduct by Judge Lasky were dismissed
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and as unfounded attempts to impugn the integrity of the
trial Judge for the reason that the Judge's rulings were adverse to the Complainant. With regard
to the FOIA allegation, I found that an attempt by DOE AL to charge a copying fee failed to state
a cause of action under the Clean Air Act, collateral estoppel was applicable, and Complainant's
remedy, if any, was appeal. Complainant appealed my Recommended Decision and Order in 99-CAA-1 to the Administrative Appeals Board.
On October 28, 1998, the Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
issued a Decision and Order of the Department of Energy regarding Complainant's FOIA fee
waiver request. (Decision and Order of DOE, Attachment to Complainant's third complaint). In
1 FOIA permits agencies to charge search
and duplication fees to requesters. 5 U.S.C. §522(a)(4)(A); Carney v. United States Dep't of Justice,
19 F.3d 807, 814 (2nd Cir. 1994). Section 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) provides that the fees shall be waived or reduced
"if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public
understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the
requester." 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(A)(iii); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Carlucci,
835 F.2d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987); Carney, 19 F.3d at 814. The requester is assigned the burden of
showing that the fee waiver standard has been met. Carney, 19 F.3d at 814; Larson v. CIA, 843
F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
The DOE has implemented the statutory standard for fee waiver in its FOIA regulations. 10
C.F.R. §1004.9(a)(8). The regulations set forth four factors which must be considered by the agency in order
to determine whether disclosure of the requested information is in the public interest: (A) whether the subject of the
requested records concerns "the operations or activities of the government;" (B) whether the disclosure
is "likely to contribute" to an understanding of government operations or activities; (C) the contribution
to an understanding by the general public of the subject likely to result from disclosure; and (D) whether the
disclosure is likely to contribute "significantly" to public understanding of government operations or
activities. 10 C.F.R. §1004.9(a)(8)(i). If the DOE finds the request satisfies these four factors, it must also
consider the following two factors in order to determine whether the disclosure of the information is primarily in the
commercial interest of the requester: (A) whether the requester has a commercial interest that would be furthered by
the requested disclosure; and, if so (B) whether the magnitude of the identified commercial interest of the requester
is sufficiently large, in comparison with the public interest in disclosure. 10 C.F.R. §1004.9(a)(8)(ii).
2 The undersigned is aware of
Coupar v. Federal Prison Industries/Unicor, 92-TSC-6 and 8 (ALJ June 11, 1992), where an administrative
law judge found that collateral estoppel was not applicable with regard to a prior ALJ recommended decision. I do
not find the Coupar decision persuasive.