U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges
Heritage Plaza Bldg, 5th Floor
111 Veteran's Memorial Boulevard
Metairie, LA 70005
Date: August 19, 1996
CASE NO.: 96-CAA-1
In the Matter of
DWAYNE OLSOVSKY,
Complainant
v.
SHELL WESTERN E&P, INC.
Respondent
APPEARANCES:
Michael D. Seale, Esq.
For the Complainant
George P. Parker, Jr., Esq.
Victoria M. Garcia, Esq.
For the Respondent
BEFORE: C. RICHARD AVERY
Administrative Law Judge
RECOMMENDED DECISION & ORDER
Background
These proceedings arise under the employee protection provisions of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 ("CAA"), the Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 ("WPCA"), the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
[Page 2]
U.S.C. § 2622 ("TSCA"), the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 ("CERCLA"), and the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 ("SWDA") (collectively
referred to herein as "the Acts"). Complainant Dwayne Olsovsky
("Olsovsky" or "Complainant") filed a Complaint with the
Department of Labor on or about September 8, 1995, alleging that he was a protected
employee who had engaged in protected activity within the scope of the Acts and was
discharged by Respondent as a result of that activity.
An investigation was conducted by the Dallas, Texas Office of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In a letter dated October 6, 1995, the
Regional Supervisor dismissed Olsovsky's Complaint because the 30-day allowable time
period prescribed by the Acts expired before they could reach a determination on the merits
of Olsovsky's allegations.
On October 11, 1995, Complainant appealed the initial determination
of the Regional Supervisor. The matter was docketed in the Office of Administrative Law
Judges and assigned to me on October 16, 1995, and on that same date, an Order was issued
setting the case for trial on October 30, 1995. Thereafter, however, by agreement of both
counsel, the case was reset for May 15, 1996. Both parties have waived the usual time
restrictions in a case of this nature.1
1 Warren Botard joined
Olsovsky in the original Complaint Letter dated September 7, 1995, and contended that he
had been denied a promotion in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The Regional
Supervisor dismissed Botard's Complaint as untimely because the last incident which he
perceived to be discrimination occurred more than 30 days prior to his filing the Complaint.
I dismissed Botard's Complaint by summary decision entered April 24, 1996. Accordingly,
Botard's Complaint is no longer part of this proceeding.
2 The conclusions that
follow are in part those proposed by the parties in their post-hearing proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law and order, and where I agreed with the summations, I adopted the
statements rather than rephrasing the sentences.
3 Respondent asserted
that Complainant's alleged internal complaints were not protected under the statutes involved
in this proceeding, thus depriving the Department of Labor of jurisdiction. Respondent's
argument is based on the decision in Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029
(5th Cir. 1984). I previously denied Respondent's Motion for Summary Decision on this
point, based on the Secretary of Labor's pronouncements in other decisions issued
subsequent to the Brown & Root decision.
4 In its prehearing
submission, Respondent listed as an issue whether it should recover its attorney's fees. In
its post-hearing submission, Respondent dropped its request for attorney's fees, and instead
only seeks to recover its costs.
5 The S.T.O.P. program
is "a safety oriented program," where employees can write a card when they see
someone doing something that is unsafe or where they are doing something safely. Tr. 213-14.
6 A safe work permit lists
the procedures to be followed in order to ensure that the job is performed properly and
safely. Tr. 173.
7 The Secretary follows
the evidentiary standards prescribed by the United States Supreme Court for federal
discrimination lawsuits. For example, in Dartey, the Secretary followed the burdens
of proof in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and
specifically held that "the initial stages of proof in an intentional discrimination case
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . [are] equally applicable to cases arising
under 29 CFR Part 24." Dartey at 7. Similarly, in the West case, the
Secretary cited the decision in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993), in support of the required evidentiary showing in a whistleblower case.
West at 5.
8 While Complainant also
pointed to a safety award and cash bonus he received in 1994, the evidence was that all
employees received the same award if they worked five accident free years. In otherwords,
he had not been singled out for that award, and I do not find the award to support
Complainant's charges of retaliation.